




COUNTRY EVALUATION: HONDURAS

ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPMENT RESULTS



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Foreword

This report presents the findings of the Honduras country evaluation, the Assessment of Development Results (ADR) that was conducted by the Evaluation Office (EO) of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 2004. This evaluation is part of a series of independent country evaluations that the EO undertakes every year in a selected number of countries. ADRs are forward-looking exercises that assess UNDP's contributions to the country's development with a view to generating lessons that can enhance the organization's performance, make it more accountable and promote organizational learning.

Honduras is of strategic interest for UNDP for two main reasons. First, its office is amongst the largest both in terms of staff and non-core resources in the Latin American and Caribbean region. This is largely due to its 'Business Centre' approach, UNDP's strategy to mobilize resources and ensure sustainability of country office operations where core funds are scarce or diminishing. This innovative approach has enabled UNDP to act as an important player in the country's development and have a say in advocacy and policy formulations.

Second, UNDP focused its support on strengthening democracy in a country that suffered from a weak embryonic government, a dearth of solid institutions and widespread corruption. UNDP ventured into almost all areas of governance and used the leverage gained through its business centre to contribute to human development in the country.

The team concludes that UNDP has contributed considerably to the strengthening of democratic institutions and processes, through the promotion of dialogue on sensitive issues such as corruption, political and electoral reforms, and the democratization of the armed forces. UNDP-promoted reforms have made the political system more transparent and representative, enhanced efficiency in public management and advanced the decentralization process.

The business centre has provided UNDP with a platform of operational sustainability enabling it to become an important player in the Honduran development scene. Notwithstanding its success, the report recommends the need to review the business centre concept with a view to aligning its activities with projects linked to the development agenda and to ensure that it does not get too close to business interests, private or public. UNDP also needs to explicitly map out a capacity-building plan to transfer procurement and management skills to local actors, and to lay out a clear exit strategy.

A number of people have contributed to this evaluation, particularly the evaluation team leader Michael Hopkins, Managing Director of MHC International Ltd. and Professor of Corporate and Social Research in the University of Middlesex in London, the principal international consultant, Mr.

Emilio Klein, former Programme Advisor from the Operations Support Group, Mr. Harold Robinson who played an important role during the exploratory phase, and from the Evaluation Office, Ms. Ada Ocampo for her contributions and Ms. Clara Alemann, Task Manager for this exercise.

Victor Mesa, Director of the Documentation Center of Honduras (CEDOH), undertook the in-depth study on democratic governance. Mr. Fuat Andic, peer reviewed the report and provided valuable technical advice to the Evaluation Office. Ms. Fadza Gwaradzimba, Senior Evaluation Advisor, played a vital role throughout the entire ADR process providing overall guidance and advice. Ms. Margarita Bernardo, Ms. Mahahoua Toure and Mr. Anish Pradhan provided invaluable administrative and logistical support. I would also like to thank the numerous government officials, donors and members of civil society organizations and political parties whose insights were invaluable to the team.

We are extremely grateful to the entire team in the Honduras country office for their interest, cooperation and invaluable support throughout, particularly Ms. Glenda Gallardo, principal economist and main focal point for this exercise, Ms. Marcela Flores, Ms. Tania Martinez and Ms. Noelia Nuñez, who provided excellent in-country support during the team's mission, facilitating access to innumerable background documentation which was critical to the evaluation. I would like to thank the former and current Resident Representatives, Mr. Jeffrey Avina and Ms. Kim Bolduc, respectively, and the Regional Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean (RBLAC) for their cooperation throughout the ADR process, in particular to its Director, Ms. Elena Martinez, Deputy Director, Mr. Gilberto Flores, Chief Oversight and Support Mr. Jose Eguren and Programme Advisor for Honduras, Ms. Maria Lucia Lloreda.

By providing an external critical assessment of development results from a strategic perspective, this ADR aims to provide lessons and recommendations that may be used to enhance UNDP's contributions to development effectiveness in Honduras in the near future. We hope that the report will be useful not only to the UNDP but also to its partners and other stakeholders in the country.

Saraswathi Menon



DIRECTOR
UNDP EVALUATION OFFICE

Executive Summary

BACKGROUND

This report presents the findings of the Honduras country evaluation undertaken by the UNDP Evaluation Office (EO) in July 2004. The evaluation is part of a series of independent country evaluations, called Assessment of Development Results (ADRs), that the EO carries out in a select number of programme countries. The purpose of this evaluation is to provide an overall assessment of the key development results and outcomes in Honduras and UNDP's contribution to the country's development through support provided in partnerships with other development actors from 1998 to 2004. It examines and analyzes how UNDP has positioned itself strategically in order to respond to national needs as articulated by the Government. Finally, based on the assessment of development results and strategic positioning forged by UNDP, the report offers strategic recommendations with a view to strengthening the country programme's performance and contribution to development effectiveness in Honduras.

Honduras is of strategic interest to UNDP for two main reasons. First, its office is amongst the largest both in terms of staff and non-core resources in the Latin American and Caribbean region. This is largely due to its 'Business Centre', an approach espoused by UNDP as a strategy to mobilize resources and ensure sustainability of country office operations where core funds are scarce or diminishing. Used extensively in the Latin American and Caribbean region, it facilitates and speeds up a variety of management services, especially those related to procurement processes within government agencies. In Honduras, UNDP has been managing up to 7% of public investment funds with the aim of enhancing efficiency in the management of large bidding and procurement processes. This innovative approach has enabled UNDP to act as an important player in the national development of the country, and to play a major role in advocacy and policy formulation.

Second, UNDP has focused its support on strengthening democratic governance in a country that suffered from an embryonic and weak governance system, dearth of solid governance institutions and from widespread corruption. UNDP ventured into almost all areas of governance and used the leverage gained through its Business Centre to contribute to human development in the country.

The evaluation is, above all, a forward-looking exercise that intends to draw lessons for the strategic positioning of UNDP support in the future and to serve as a basis for dialogue between UNDP and the Government. The report draws upon findings gathered through detailed background studies, field visits and interviews with Honduran decision makers, representatives of civil society and the donor community as well as in-depth studies and reports on poverty and governance, the two thematic areas to which appreciable UNDP resources were allocated during the period of the review.

NATIONAL CONTEXT

Honduras is a country of around seven million people and one of the poorest in Latin America. Its per capita income is US \$970 and about two-thirds of its population lives in poverty. Income is very unequally distributed: its human development index rank in 2004 and 2003 was 115 out of 177 countries and 115 out of 175 countries, respectively, compared to a ranking of 116 in 2002. The country also suffers from high unemployment and underemployment.

Hondurans have lived under authoritarian regimes from 1932 to 1982; thereafter a fragile democracy was installed. The armed forces led a regime of political repression. Since the mid-nineties, progress has been made in subordinating the armed forces to civilian authority and starting a transition to a more democratic society. The military is now firmly confined to its barracks. The democratic regime that was installed in 1982 is focusing on establishing all the necessary institutions for good governance, to reduce abject poverty and stimulate the economy.

The economic structure of the country shows all the characteristics of a developing economy. Agriculture is essentially a two-crop sector producing mainly banana and coffee for export. The fluctuations in the world price of these commodities affect foreign exchange earnings sometimes causing balance of payments deficits. Industry is a low-tech operation in which maquilas are preponderant.

The fragile economy is also affected adversely by frequent natural disasters, the last one of which was hurricane Mitch that raged through the country in 1998 devastating agricultural crops and causing serious floods and soil erosion, depriving many Hondurans of their livelihood. At the time, the country still had weak institutions, the state was inefficient and excessively centralized, and corruption permeated electoral institutions as well as the legislature and the judiciary.¹

Honduras is faced with a set of serious challenges that can be summarized as follows:

Reducing poverty and the income inequality underpinning it are the overarching development problems the country faces. Increasing income while reducing unemployment and underemployment is key to a future in which all Honduras reaps the benefits of growth. Lessening dependency on agricultural exports and maquila products is also indispensable.

On the governance front, Honduras needs to fortify its democratic institutions to effectively deliver policies that address human development, and to eliminate corruption to ensure that public resources are used properly to this end.

Legal, institutional and policy frameworks to further gender equality and to enhance the role of women in society have yet to be enforced in order to make rights and opportunities real for women. Enhancing quality education opportunities and providing health coverage for citizens, as well as reducing high infant mortality and undernourishment of children, and taking effective measures to counter the HIV/AIDS epidemic are all vitally necessary if the government is to make progress in lasting poverty reduction. Improving environmental management, especially with respect to deforestation and soil erosion and establishing effective and efficient disaster management systems are long-standing challenges.

As can be surmised from the summary above, the challenges that face the government are considerable. Given the tasks ahead, the Government of Honduras will have to supplement and complement its own resources with external assistance for some time to fulfill its objectives. The government plan was developed on the basis of the already existing Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper to which the country had committed during the previous government. Its goals are summarized in Box 1.

BOX 1. POVERTY REDUCTION STRATEGY OBJECTIVES

1. Accelerating sustainable and equitable economic growth
2. Reducing rural poverty
3. Reducing urban poverty
4. Strengthening social protection for specific vulnerable groups
5. Enhancing investment in human capital
6. Ensuring the sustainability of the strategy

KEY FINDINGS

Strategic Positioning of UNDP, 1998-2004

Overall, UNDP has been quite successful in Honduras. Its success stems from several factors. Despite the fact that Honduras is a small country, and UNDP's very modest core budget, it is perceived as a neutral but effective partner that can provide independent technical advice to the government and civil society. Its international reputation of impartiality has made it a trusted partner in resolving the country's most pressing issues. It has a critical mass of personnel that delivers a high level of technical advice. Last but not least, it has demonstrated the authority and flexibility to respond rapidly and effectively to the new challenges the country faces. In Honduras this has become an important asset especially after hurricane Mitch.

¹ Honduras is 106th on the list of Transparency International's corruption index.

Resource Mobilization and Strategic Partnership: The Business Centre Model

Core sources are very limited for Honduras. Over the period under evaluation (1998-2003) they amounted to \$13.8 million. The Country Office, on the other hand, had a comprehensive agenda for which it had to mobilize resources to supplement its own scant funds. UNDP's strategy was to set up a Business Centre (BC), to open up competition in sectors where previously only a select number of well-connected firms would participate. It has also been able to secure revenue from the services it provides and this has enabled the country office to sustain BC operations as well as country programme operations. During the period under consideration, the Country Office managed to mobilize about \$20 for every dollar of core funds, which as of 2000 was to a great extent due to BC's activities.

The ADR Team is of the opinion that the BC approach has several advantages within the Honduran context. It not only enhances the visibility and influence of UNDP, it brings full transparency to the public bidding processes and makes them more efficient. Hence, BC in Honduras is a worthwhile endeavour that could be replicated in countries where conditions are similar to those of Honduras. The team did not find hard evidence for the criticism made in some quarters that BC was draining business from the private sector, diverting attention from UNDP priorities, and risking UNDP's unique neutral stand. The mission concluded that the BC has provided UNDP with a platform of operational sustainability enabling it to become an important player in the Honduran development scene. However the mission recommends a review of the Business Centre as it currently stands, with a view to align its activities with projects that are linked to the development agenda of the country; to ensure it does not remain too close to businesses, private or public, in order to ward off any criticism that it is influenced by their interests; to explicitly map a capacity-building plan that ensures that skills in management of procurement processes will be transferred to local actors, and finally, to clarify the BC's exit strategy in order to quell criticisms concerning the risk of tainting UNDP's reputation of neutrality, and of UNDP replacing government functions without an explicit exit strategy nor a capacity-building strategy to transfer skills to government.

PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

Poverty Reduction

The reduction of poverty is one of the declared objectives of the government's development plan, elaborated after hurricane Mitch. Lending banks had an important role in

elaborating the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) upon which the government's development plan is based. UNDP's interventions in efforts to alleviate poverty can be grouped into three major areas: PRSP preparation, National Human Development Reports and rural development

Preparation of PRSP. UNDP played an important role as a facilitator of policy dialogue. Although at its inception the PRSP process was perceived as a donor-led initiative, UNDP worked with the government and other donor agencies towards a better definition of the PRSP. UNDP ensured the participation of political parties and civil society in the consultation process during the preparation of PRSP.

The National Human Development Reports. The second contribution of UNDP was through the publication of the National Human Development Reports. These widely received and respected documents (five reports have been published to date) were highly instrumental in identifying extreme poverty areas. PRSP used the human development index contained in the Human Development Report as a criterion for focusing on the poorest.

From 1998-2003, in cooperation with regional and international institutions, UNDP concentrated most of its efforts in this domain to the execution of several projects aimed at strengthening rural communities' capacity to implement local development initiatives, as well as providing technical assistance to government regarding rural development policy, and building the capacity of municipal governments to manage development projects. The contributions of these interventions to poverty reduction cannot be fully assessed, as their results cannot be isolated from other partner's work. However, some of these projects did contribute to enhance local capacity to manage rural projects at the local level, increased access to rural credit and promoted the participation of citizens in development planning processes at the municipal level. UNDP also contributed to setting up the national institution for sustainable rural development (DINADERS) and provided technical assistance to the Ministry of Agriculture in the formulation of the National Programme for Sustainable Rural Development (PRONADERS). However, besides the execution of numerous projects, UNDP did not use its leverage to facilitate a broad based policy dialogue among relevant stakeholders for the reduction of poverty in rural areas. Finally, UNDP provided financial and technical assistance resulting in the setting up of the Institute of National Statistics (INE), which is widely perceived as a positive and lasting outcome that has greatly facilitated the availability of quantitative data on poverty.

Democratic Governance

Participating in the quest of the government to establish the necessary institutions for good governance, UNDP undertook several interrelated projects and programmes.

Decentralization and municipal development. At the central level UNDP assisted the Ministry of Governance and Justice (Interior) in the elaboration of the programme for decentralization and local development (PRODEL), the outcome of which was the first clear national policy on decentralization. UNDP was instrumental in terms of policy advice in the formulation of the programme and placing decentralization high on the Government's agenda. At the municipal level UNDP embarked upon four different projects that aimed at strengthening the technical capacity of municipal governments in the urban and rural areas in partnership with SIDA in five municipalities chosen as pilot areas. The pilot programme made a significant contribution to strengthening local capacities, improving fiscal and administrative management, and promoting governance and transparency. One achievement that reflects the decentralization process underway is the increase in joint formulation of strategic local development plans between civil society and municipal governments. These two interventions regrettably remained separate efforts, yet interlinkages between the two would have yielded better results. Overall, UNDP's contributions to the elaboration of the national and municipal decentralization programmes have certainly been instrumental in laying the groundwork for decentralization in the country.

Fair and efficient administration of justice. In this sphere UNDP provided training assistance to different institutions within the justice sector – Supreme Court, National Human Rights Commission, Public Prosecutor's Office, and Ministry of Security – to enhance the capacity of their staff. Although these were all standalone interventions focused on the institutions located in the capital of the country, UNDP's support certainly contributed, albeit modestly, to enhance the skills and knowledge of some of the cadres in different justice institutions it supported. It also supported the establishment of a jurisprudence database, highly appreciated by the Supreme Court judges. At the policy level UNDP facilitated policy dialogue, discussion and consensus that led to the National Agreement for Transformation and Sustainable Human Development in the Twenty-First Century, a component of which was the commitment of all political parties to support reform and modernization of the justice system. The programme has enhanced capacity, focusing on the offices located in the capital Tegucigalpa. Although this may be perceived as a weakness of the programme, it has to be kept in mind that the available resources could not permit a coverage wider than designed.

Increased public debate on Sustainable Human Development: the Democracy Trust and National Human Development Reports. UNDP was instrumental in setting up the Democracy Trust (DT) in 2000, which brought together development partners, political parties and civil society to discuss policy issues related to good governance and poverty reduction. UNDP's intervention succeeded in setting up a legitimate, plural and professionally moderated public discussion forum, which responded to the need for open and transparent discussion to pinpoint social, political and economic problems and create consensus around sensitive issues toward implementing long-term policies. The DT became a convener and neutral interlocutor of at least two key national issues: the building of high degree of confidence and communication with civil society actors participating in PRSP consultations; and laying the groundwork for the signing of the Declaration of the political parties to implement political and electoral reforms. In the Honduran setting UNDP's effort was indeed timely.

Subsequently, UNDP disengaged from the Democracy Trust as the main driver of its initiatives with the view that the DT will have to develop its own endogenous strategy by the representatives from every sector of society. The establishment of the DT was an innovative approach with a clear exit strategy. It is now up to the Hondurans to continue the dialogue on key national issues to enable the implementation of long-term policies, and ensure that topics addressed are relevant to civil society and different sectors' urgent concerns.

UNDP stimulated debate on governance. Another substantial contribution of UNDP to articulate the development problems and the need for good governance was to initiate and stimulate public debate. The National Human Development Reports (NHDR) raised public awareness with respect to good governance and its relation with human development, and stimulated meaningful discussion in the country. These reports have received continuous praise among different sectors of Honduran society and helped the articulation of many issues previously ignored mainly due to a weak culture of democratic dialogue and open participation.

Effectiveness of parliament to perform its legislative functions. UNDP provided specific technical assistance to Congress in order to establish a database of legislative information that would allow parliamentarians to perform more efficiently their legislative function. The project installed a computer network and built a database containing all national laws. However, UNDP's assistance to the Congress did not succeed in enhancing the effectiveness of parliament to perform its legislative functions. The ADR mission considers that UNDP has taken note of these limitations and has adjusted the nature of its support to Congress.

Modernization of the Armed Forces. After a long period of supremacy both in the political and economic arena, the democratic governments of Honduras managed to have the armed forces return to their barracks. However, their compliance with the tenets of good governance had to be ensured. At the request of the Ministry of Defense UNDP initiated a project aimed at supporting the reform and modernization of the armed forces. The first initiative consisted of an international audit of the Military Pension Fund Institute. This initiative was unprecedented not only in the country, but also in the region, and it set the groundwork for building a partnership from which several other initiatives ensued.

It has made the armed forces more accountable, thus contributing to the process of their subordination to civil authorities and of becoming a useful instrument to establish democracy in Honduras. The second initiative was the promotion of human rights as part of the armed forces' academic and professional training. The ADR mission is of the opinion that this process is a good example of the synergy that can be created among the different areas of governance toward building a democratic society based on the rule of law.

Anti-Corruption and transparency. From 1998 to 2001 UNDP assisted the government in improving transparency in public administration through promoting accountability in public service. In addition to assisting the audit process of the armed forces' pension system mentioned above, UNDP decisively supported the government, in collaboration with the other partners from international community, in the creation of the Honduran Anti-Corruption Council (NAC) in 2001. UNDP also supported social auditing activities through a number of projects at the local level and these resulted in increasing social demands for transparency within the framework of decentralization and local development Programmes. It also worked closely with Transparency Committees which acted as watchdogs over municipal finance assuring transparent use of public resources. The functioning of these committees is an appreciable advance for Honduras. The first committee was created in Copan in 2001 with UNDP support and there are 30 such committees now. Although UNDP has contributed to the government's efforts to enhance governance through intervention in this area, it cannot be unequivocally stated that it succeeded in achieving all the expected outcomes.

Environment and Natural Resource Management

The prevention of environmental degradation is a key development challenge for Honduras, brought to the forefront of

the agenda after hurricane Mitch. UNDP was instrumental in pinpointing environmental concerns and integrating them into national development planning and policy. Its work has been chiefly based upon its relation with the Global Environment Facility (GEF) since it is an executing body for GEF funds. It spent most of its allocated resources on biodiversity and water resource management programmes through a project known as the Water Platform even though the concerns in the two CCFs covered other priority areas. It is also noteworthy that UNDP distinguished itself by several interventions immediately after hurricane Mitch and at the Stockholm Reconstruction Conference it was given a major role in reconstruction efforts. Although core and non-core funds allocated to environment during the period under consideration constituted only a small fraction of the total, and therefore the intervention areas were limited, the ADR Team finds that UNDP's involvement, though limited, was quite successful in the field of environmental protection as well as disaster management.

Response to Natural Disasters

Not being an emergency agency, UNDP was not equipped to deal with hurricane Mitch. At the start it played only a small role. However, after the hurricane both CCFs were adjusted to be able to undertake the strengthening of the national disaster management system. UNDP worked closely with COPECO (National Emergency Operation Center) in the implementation of mechanisms and methodologies for the strengthening of local capacities in risk management. Subsequently it provided technical and legal support to the law for National Risk Management System and the new construction code promoted by COPECO. The ADR mission finds that UNDP's work on the identification of high-risk areas and the certification of bodies for risk management is a step in the right direction; however, a full system to deal with such catastrophes in Honduras is by no means in place as yet.

HIV/AIDS

Overall, UNDP has played a key role in positioning the HIV/AIDS concern in the national agenda. It has promoted policy dialogue in order to approach HIV/AIDS as a development issue, rather than exclusively as a health problem, and to incorporate a human rights perspective approach. UNDP has also been effective in chairing UNAIDS and in managing the global fund for HIV/AIDS. It has demonstrated an unquestionable capacity for fostering policy dialogue among the UN agencies and for giving a say to civil society, and especially to the people living with AIDS in policy dialogue. It should be highlighted, howev-

er, that in spite of the results obtained, HIV/AIDS is spreading in new areas of the country and that no variations in incidence and prevalence have occurred. Hence, notwithstanding the above-mentioned results, it must be pointed out that UNDP's advocacy role in the future will have to be one of positioning the HIV/AIDS concern better in the Government's agenda. Additionally, present strategies would need to be reviewed in order to guarantee that they will be conducive to a decrease in prevalence and incidence rates; and the implications of HIV/AIDS for social and economic development would need to be incorporated more explicitly into policy dialogue

Gender Equality

UNDP's major milestone in the quest for mainstreaming gender into national policy was its assistance to the creation of the National Institute for Women (INAM) and the formulation of equality laws and national gender policies. Except for these standalone interventions the ADR team found, however, that UNDP has not undertaken efforts conducive to mainstream gender considerations into most of its programmes in the areas of governance, poverty reduction and environment. In almost all cases a gender perspective is lacking in UNDP's activities. UNDP's activities in all programmatic areas should assess the implications of any planned action for women and men, integrating their concerns in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of UNDP's programmes, and in its efforts for advocacy, knowledge management, and policy dialogue with its partners.

CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED

Based on the findings emerging from this evaluation the team concludes that:

As a neutral development partner UNDP has established high visibility. Despite its limited financial resources UNDP has been very effective in promoting ideas, especially with respect to governance, and contributed to tangible results both at the central and local level. In poverty reduction it does not appear to be as successful as it was in the area of governance, for it did not use its comparative advantage as facilitator of policy dialogue as emphatically as it did in governance. A lesson that can be drawn from UNDP's experience in Honduras is that for this organization to be influential in such a sensitive area as governance, it must earn the trust and respect of the decision makers, as well as that of the civil society in any country where it operates.

UNDP has successfully mobilized funds for development. UNDP's success in mobilizing funds is twofold: joint efforts for programme finance with bilaterals and multilat-

erals; and the Business Centre whose revenues supplement its total funds. Success in establishing itself as a reliable partner allowed UNDP to attract funds from other development agencies to execute projects. As core funds shrink there is indeed pressure on Country Offices to supplement their own funds. An additional source for UNDP was the Business Centre that provided additional revenue for the Country Office, but at the same time assisted the government where it lacked capacity. Given its success, similar business centres are worth considering in other countries where socio-economic conditions and government capacities are similar to those of Honduras. But the lesson that one can draw from the Honduras experience is that the role and performance of business centres should be revised so that their activities support initiatives that are linked to the development agenda of the country, ensuring that they do not remain too close to businesses, private or public. Measures should be taken that the BC in fact transfers its knowledge to appropriate government agencies so that they will get well-trained and able staff. In short, business centers anywhere, and Honduras is no exception, cannot be permanent fixtures.

Capacity development is a long-term process, and a key strategy of UNDP interventions. However, in a country like Honduras where there is dearth of capacity and a large staff turnover within the government bureaucracy after each election, capacity development should be a strategy that includes more components than just training and is implemented in a systematic way. The lesson one can draw is that capacity building will be a slow and multifaceted process involving training, advisory and knowledge creation and dissemination. Progress can only be measured if quantitative and qualitative measurements of capacity building are explicitly incorporated into the projects and programmes.

Human Development Reports are extremely valuable tools for contributing to meaningful dialogues in the country. Their preparation and their diagnoses of development issues and their quantitative contents have become an important tool and venue for policy dialogues with the government as well as the civil society. With their statistics they became a standard reference book for donors. The lesson to draw is that if used strategically, National Development Reports can be valuable tools that put the country offices on the map.

The main drivers of poverty reduction programmes in Honduras have been the IFIs. UNDP contributed to these programmes as a facilitator, a role that has been important in the PRSP process. But its role in developing crucial poverty reduction alternative proposals or thinking was not significant. The lesson to draw from the Honduran experience is that to be more effective advocacy and policy

dialogue needs to be linked with projects specifically aimed at poverty reduction.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The findings and the conclusions of the ADR Team lead to a number of recommendations that are given below.

1. The role of the Business Centre should be reviewed.

The ADR mission strongly supports the gradual transformation of the Business Centre from one that only deals with procurement to a greater engagement with the private sector to raise resources particularly for poverty reduction by implementing business partnerships within the overall framework of corporate social responsibility. Refocusing of the Business Centre should not endanger resource mobilization.

2. Concentrate on strategic actions to address poverty reduction and inequality.

Prioritize market oriented and economic development alternatives. Fostering participation at the local level, albeit important, cannot supersede the goal of facilitating opportunities for pro-poor economic growth. Assistance is also needed to align municipalities' plans for local development with the PRSP's priority actions focusing on enhancing market oriented activities.

3. Sharpen the programme focus.

The ADR mission recommends that UNDP should start new areas to complement and fortify its existing programmes in its major areas, governance and poverty reduction. These would be:

I. Continue the interventions in governance. UNDP should continue supporting the process of strengthening democratic governance towards promoting human development. Its approach to decentralization and local development should foster the strengthening of local governance by giving priority to linking governance interventions with poverty reduction strategies at the local level.

II. Improve technical expertise in the area of poverty reduction and rural development. In order to enhance its intervention in this technical area UNDP should devise a strategic approach on PRSP and suggest positive actions for the Government to act upon. It should use its policy advice role in the design of poverty reduction strategy with the human development approach. An appropriate employment generation strategy needs to be developed that integrates rural development with poverty reduction by having a two-pronged approach, namely, carrying out policy dialogue with the Government and providing it with specific technical assistance for the development of a national strategy aimed at poverty reduction in the rural areas. Given the

importance of poverty reduction in Honduras, if such efforts were to be undertaken by UNDP, they should be properly monitored and evaluated.

III. Enhance the linkage between governance, and poverty reduction. The UNDP programme should give greater emphasis to the linkage between governance and poverty reduction, so that both governance and poverty reduction projects are implemented under a common strategy. It is also recommended that UNDP should support governance that emphasizes poverty reduction and local level capacity development

IV. UNDP should mainstream gender considerations into all its work. In the future a gender perspective should be incorporated into all programmes and projects. UNDP should assess the implications of any planned action for men and women, integrating women's and men's concerns in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of its programmes, and in its efforts for advocacy, knowledge management, and policy dialogue with its partners.

V. Reduce standalone projects to the minimum. The ADR Team noticed that UNDP's overall work was organized more around the project logic rather than around development outcomes. It is important that the next CCF should strive to organize the work within the concept of development outcomes.

VI. Enhance skill formation and capacity. Project document design should give greater attention to monitoring and evaluation of capacity building. In particular, quantitative and qualitative indicators for outputs, outcomes and impact should be developed. Institutional needs must be assessed. Consequently training and advisory activities must be clearly identified, as must the audiences. Training courses must also be monitored and their impact measured through tracer studies.

VII. Enhance the monitoring and evaluation capacities. The ADR Team also noticed a need for the country office to improve its monitoring and evaluation capacities. It is recommended that in the future, programmes and projects be monitored diligently and outcome evaluations carried out for all important areas of intervention. UNDP should also explore the relevance of providing support to the government for reinforcing its own monitoring and evaluation capacities.

VIII. UNDP should integrate a broader spectrum of civil society groups and NGOs UNDP should integrate a broader spectrum of civil society groups and NGOs that have demonstrated genuine concern and credibility in order to have them share in the participatory

mechanisms UNDP helped to put in place through different government interventions at the national and local levels. In the same vein UNDP would do well by continuing to support the Democracy Trust until it develops a strong national leadership.

1

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to present the rationale for the Honduras country evaluation, describe the methodology utilized in assessing UNDP's support in the country, as well as to briefly describe UNDP's Country Programme in Honduras.² Chapter 2 elucidates the development issues and trends in the period under study (1998-2004) and key challenges facing Honduras. Chapter 3 examines UNDP's contribution to the country's development results by assessing key outcomes towards which its support was oriented. Chapter 4 highlights UNDP's strategic positioning achieved through its support to national partners in their development efforts. Chapter 5 presents the conclusions, the lessons learned, and recommendations for UNDP's role in the development trajectory of Honduras.

1.1 BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE FOR THE EVALUATION

Honduras is strategically interesting for UNDP mainly for two reasons. First, Honduras is one of the largest country offices both in terms of staff and in terms of non-core resources. The country is also an interesting case study for UNDP since the Business Centre that it set up in the country constitutes a corporate model used by the organization to mobilize resources and ensure sustainability of country office operations where core funds are scarce or diminishing. The Centre has been an important arm, for it contributed to UNDP's success by not only supplementing its own resources, but also by being an entity that has the demonstrative effect in establishing transparency in the public procurement processes, as well as building the capacity of the employees of the government who work together with UNDP personnel and thereby learn by doing.

Second, UNDP focused its support on strengthening democratic governance in a country that suffered from an embryonic and weak governance system, dearth of solid governance institutions and from widespread corruption. UNDP ventured in almost all areas of governance, partnered with a wide array of local actors and used dialogue and policy advice on different dimensions of democratic governance as a strategy to influence key root causes of the country's development problems. This evaluation therefore, attempted to assess the extent to which UNDP had brought to the surface the linkages between good governance and poverty reduction and incorporated these into its country programme.

It is hoped, therefore, that the findings, conclusions and recommendations of this Assessment of Development Report (ADR) will be of some value for UN activities in other countries that are similar to Honduras, i.e. those that are at the lower echelon of middle income countries facing large pockets of poverty unemployment and fledgling democratic institutions.

² The TOR are summarized in Appendix I.

The Honduras ADR aims to capture and demonstrate UNDP's contribution to the development results in the country over 1998-2004 in order to enhance the effectiveness of its interventions in the years to come. In other words, the evaluation covers the cooperation of UNDP with Honduras in the 1998-2000 Country Cooperation Framework (CCF1) period, during its extension in 2001, and in the current CCF covering the period 2002-2006. The ADR also points out where support prior to 1998 may have served as foundation for current achievements. The emphasis of the ADR is on what UNDP actually achieved, its comparative advantage, and its value-added in relation to the key development challenges in Honduras. It also identifies how UNDP could potentially enhance its performance while being consistent with national development priorities as well as UNDP policy.

1.2 UNDP'S OVERALL APPROACH

The strategic areas of support where intended outcomes were planned in Honduras are indicated in the box below. These are: democratic governance, poverty reduction, environment and gender. Honduras also suffers from lack of capacity in its human resources. Hence, UNDP's activities have also been directed to capacity development, in the different areas of support.

Within the overall mandate, as illustrated in the box above, two important concepts have entered into UNDP's

lexicon at the corporate level. One is sustainable human development (SHD) and the other is the Millennium Development Goals (MDG). These two were coupled with a Multi-Year Funding Framework (MYFF) that is an overarching corporate framework which sets the strategic focus to be pursued by UNDP and determines the corresponding budget allocations. Since the UNDP Country Programmes are to adhere to Regional Cooperation Frameworks as well, they are expected to reflect their strategic objectives.

Hence, the programmes of a country office must reflect not only the need areas articulated by the governments, they must also contain the corporate as well as regional objectives. Nonetheless, for UNDP the 'ownership' of its country programme by national partners is paramount, as long as the programme is consistent with the objectives stated above.

1.3 METHODOLOGY

The methodology used in this evaluation is in accordance with UNDP's results-based management (RBM) approach, in that it focuses primarily on the analysis of development outcomes to which UNDP has sought to contribute. The outputs of specific programmes or projects are not the primary focus, given that an outcome is a change in development conditions through the efforts of several development partners of which UNDP is only one. The aim therefore is to explain UNDP's contribution by drawing a credible link between the results and UNDP's activities undertaken in

BOX 1. POVERTY REDUCTION STRATEGY OBJECTIVES


Governance	Poverty	Environment	Gender	Special Development Situations	UN System
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Policy Dialogue * Parliament * Electoral Systems Justice * Decentralization and local governance * Modernization of the armed forces * Management capacity to administer public funds 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Poverty reduction strategies * HIV/AIDS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Global Conventions and funding mechanisms 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * National Action Plans for the advancement of women 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Capacity development in disaster reduction and response system 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * RC system (UNDAF)

Source: RBMS, SRF 2000-2003 3

³ Human Development, MDGs and Donor Coordination were treated crosscutting themes.

BOX 2. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

Figure 1: Evaluation Methodology



partnership with others. The evaluation utilized three major sources of information to collect empirical evidence and inform the judgment of the mission, in line with the ADR guidelines⁴, which propose the ‘triangulation’ of information gathered, i.e. cross-referencing of sources, corroboration and validation of the perceptions and views of relevant stakeholders against documentary evidence and onsite project visits. In other words, the ADR mission assessed progress in a set of strategic outcomes towards which UNDP support was geared, as they relate to the broader development challenges facing the country. This evaluation focuses on the UNDP supported outcomes which either yielded significant results and/or for which considerable outlays were made.

The Honduras ADR Team followed the four inter-related steps listed below for each development outcome considered:

- It stated the intended development outcome as understood by UNDP and its partners
- It assessed the status of development outcomes and progress towards outcomes during the 1998-2004 period.
- It outlined Government’s strategies, policies and priorities in relation to outcomes.
- It evaluated UNDP’s contribution to the outcomes – stating outputs and outcomes where evidence was available – and partnerships used to work towards it.

The mission gathered information on the views of key stakeholders to UNDP’s programme in Honduras, i.e. different government counterparts at the central and

municipal level; civil society representatives including grass root organizations; bilateral and multilateral development agencies; IFIs; political party leaders; and UN agencies. It reviewed the documentary evidence and made onsite project visits in Tegucigalpa, in three municipalities in the Department of Copan in the northwest, and one municipality in the Department of Intibuca⁵.

During an initial preparatory phase, EO undertook a comprehensive desk study to review background information and development trends in Honduras, and made an analysis of the entire country portfolio for the period 1998-2004. The desk studies were made available on a website for the ADR Team. EO undertook an exploratory mission for a week in December 2003 to lay the groundwork for the evaluation and to identify key areas for an in-depth study. A comprehensive study on Democratic Governance was commissioned to a local research institution⁶. The main evaluation mission was held during two weeks in Honduras in July 2004, and the final report was submitted in July 2005.

1.4 OVERVIEW OF UNDP’S PROGRAMME

This Report evaluates the overall support of UNDP mainly articulated in the first two CCFs and the one-year extension between the two that was designed to align the programmes of UNDP with revised national priorities.

Since 1998 UNDP has implemented more than 200 projects in Honduras. 120 were in governance, 50 in poverty,

⁴ <http://www.undp.org/eo/documents/ADR/framework/Methodology-guidance-final-draft.doc>

⁵ The project sites visited by the mission were located in four municipalities in two Departments where the lowest aggregate HDI in the country can be found: three municipalities in the Department of Copan (HDI: 0.556) where UNDP was implementing a local governance and poverty reduction project, and one municipality in the Department of Intibuca (0.483) where UNDP had recently initiated a project to promote rural tourism. The municipalities encompassed by the sample selected for the ADR team’s visit varied in their levels of human development (from a lowest HDI of 0.484 to 0.662, the national HDI is 0.657). Honduras National Human Development Report 2003.

⁶ Conducted by a multidisciplinary team from the Centro de Documentación de Honduras (CEDOH) directed by Victor Meza and liberally drawn upon in the evaluation of the Governance programme

The Table below presents the planned areas of intervention and the expected outcomes as of 1998.

Goals	Sub-goals	Expected Outcomes	No. of Projects
Governance	Dialogue to widen development choices	Increased public debate on SHD	16
	Key Governance Institutions	Increased effectiveness of Parliament	4
	Electoral systems	Institutionalization of fair electoral process	3
	Justice	Fair and efficient administration of justice	12
	Local governance	Reformed planning and budgeting at sub-national levels	12
	Financial management	Efficient and transparent management of the armed forces budget and funds	3
	Improved aid coordination	Increased government capacity to resources administer multilateral	70
Poverty	National poverty frameworks	Anti-poverty strategy developed and implemented	32
	Monitoring poverty	Institutionalization of tools to provide statistics on poverty related issues	15
	HIV/AIDS	Strategies developed to address impact of HIV/AIDS on poverty eradication	3
Environment	Instruments for environmental sustainability	Environmental concerns integrated into national policies	31
Special development situations	Disaster reduction	Capacity development, national disaster reduction and response situations system operational	17

and the rest in the remaining areas. For CCF1 UNDP adopted the following strategies:

- In the area of poverty reduction UNDP undertook to provide technical assistance in policy promotion that included consensus building with government bodies, civil society entities and private enterprises.
- In the governance area UNDP aimed to support measures to strengthen the democratic process and to provide the necessary framework for sustainable human development. Its interventions had three main components: (i). reform and modernization of the state; (ii). transparency of public administration; and (iii). Promotion of democratic ideas.
- The component of promotion of sustainable development comprised four main themes: (i). support for policy formulation and for the legal and institutional framework; (ii). promotion of productive options within the protected areas and consolidation of land/ownership rights; (iii). promotion of alternative sources of energy; and (iv). combating pollution.

CCF1 confirmed a principle of the Administrator's business plan, i.e., the importance of building networks and partnerships to render UNDP-led intervention successful.

Based on the experience of and lessons learned from the previous period CCF2 proposed to concentrate on the following areas:

- In the area of good governance UNDP sought to concentrate on supporting the incoming government in its efforts to reinforce democratic processes, broader local participation, decentralization and structural political reforms evoking greater transparency. Within this overall concept UNDP pursued interventions leading to the promotion of gender equality, respond to the HIV/AIDS pandemic, and to establishing two important funds, one of which is the Democracy Trust and the other is the AIDS Global Fund.
- In the area of reduction of poverty UNDP planned to undertake three interventions. One was the consolidation of the local development capacity; the second was extension of coverage of rural credit to small farmers; and the third was the transfer of agricultural and commercial techniques and better resource management.
- In the area of natural resource management UNDP sought to provide assistance to the Government in sustainable management of forestry resources. To operationalize these interventions UNDP set itself to aggressively mobilizing resources. (See Table 1).

The information contained in the table may give the impression that there is a proliferation of projects, but it should be kept in mind that some of them were of short duration—one year or less—and the numbers are cumulative. However, as projects over the period total 200 it would be worth to analyze the strategic view undertaken vis a vis the number of the apparently standalone projects. Most projects are under the umbrella of the programme within the different thematic areas⁷

Another cautionary note is in order. The UNDP interventions are primarily financed by cost sharing. The preponderance of third party finance is extremely high (see Table 2). Although a relatively great quantity of projects are implemented with donor funds executed by UNDP, their objectives and approach were found to be in most cases relevant to the country needs (i.e.: governance), although as will be pointed out later in Chapter 3, UNDP could do more to contribute to pre-designed projects of large multi-lateral institutions by revisiting its intervention strategy and partnership approach, in particular in the areas of poverty reduction and rural development.

The variations in emphasis in the themes through time is a logical outcome of the country's suffering from hurricane Mitch in 1998, the trauma of which still lingers in Honduras. So the areas, although not different, became in a sense better focussed on those issues that the disaster made more evident, particularly those concerning poverty and the need to reform and strengthen the institutional setting for democratic governance. In relation to poverty, the core strategy of the second CCF was the alignment of the work of UNDP with the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) that was approved by the Government in 2001 and was also considered to be the development plan of the country. In relation to democratic governance, the second CCF emphasized the political reforms that were seen as necessary for the reconstruction of the country.

Annexes II and III provide tables showing the strategic outcomes and corresponding outputs pursued in SRF, as well as the expected development results aligned across UNDAF and CCFs for the period 1998-2006. As mentioned in the methodology section, SRF was implemented in 2000, hence outcomes from the first CCF were 'retrofitted' to suit the corporate policy. It should be noted that this assessment could focus on outcomes, because most of the development results pursued were consistent throughout the period. However, the CO primarily orients its action around programmes and projects, and not around outcomes. Discussions between the mission and UNDP staff

⁷ For the typology of programmes and projects see UNDP/EO, *The Programme Approach*. New York, 1998.

TABLE 2. EXPENDITURE BY THEMATIC AREA, YEAR AND SOURCE OF FUNDING 1998-2003 (\$ MILLION)

AREAS	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	TOTAL
Governance	10.6	31.2	31.0	28.4	38.0	96.7	234.5
Core funds	0.9	1.3	2.7	-0.8	0.4	0.4	4.9
Non-core funds	9.6	29.8	28.2	29.2	37.6	96.2	230.7
Poverty	1.1	4.0	6.8	15.5	12.9	13.5	53.8
Core funds	0.7	1.5	-0.3	0.6	0.6	0.3	3.4
Non-core funds	0.4	2.6	7.1	14.9	12.3	13.2	50.4
Environment	0.8	1.1	4.6	1.9	1.8	1.6	11.8
Core funds	0.02	0.8	2.1	-	0.02	0.02	2.9
Non core funds	0.8	0.3	2.5	1.9	1.8	1.6	9.0
Gender	0.1	0.1	0.5	0.7	0.5	0.3	2.3
Core funds	0.1	0.2	-2.0	0.04	-	-	0.2
Non core funds	0.02	-0.1	0.7	0.7	0.5	0.3	2.1
Disaster relief	0.1	4.3	1.4	1.0	0.2	0.1	7.1
Core funds	0.2	1.5	0.5	0.3	-	-	2.4
Non core funds	-0.03	2.8	0.9	0.7	0.2	0.1	4.7
TOTAL	12.7	40.7	44.2	47.6	53.4	112.2	310.5
Core funds	2.0	5.3	4.8	0.4	1.0	0.8	13.8
Non core funds	10.8	35.55	39.4	47.4	52.4	111.4	296.7

Note: It should be noted that 95% of the amount delivered in the governance area was spent on providing procurement services to the Government and other regional banks, IFIs and international agencies.

Source: Country Office, UNDP, Tegucigalpa. July 2004

on results and future challenges were commonly structured around programmes or projects, and strategies and planning seemed to respond to UNDP's comparative advantage and positioning, but also largely to practical considerations and resource availability from donors more than to 'outcomes' from their stated SRF. SRF planning and reporting was done by the Country Office more to comply with headquarters' requests than for internal programme management purposes.

One key question is the way UNDP support responded to the multiplicity of the government's demand while closely following the overall UNDP mandate, remaining

consistent with its corporate strategy. The thematic areas are indeed expressed at a general level, but there is enough space to define several more specific service lines that may be oriented by the particular requirements of each country. This maintains an adequate balance between UNDP's corporate mandate and specific working areas and satisfies the development needs of countries.

The CCF outlays by thematic areas during the period under consideration are given in the following table.

The table shows that 75% of the expenditures have been allocated to governance interventions. The table also shows that in this area UNDP core funds have diminished

by almost 60% from 1998 to 2003 and non-core sources have increased substantially both in the areas of governance and poverty. In contrast funds dedicated to environment and gender programmes have decreased. This predominance of external sources is mainly due to the activities of the Business Centre that in the second CCF was indeed instrumental in the implementation of support services to national investment projects.

1.5 IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

UNDP's programme implementation strategy has been focused on four modalities of intervention:

- Knowledge generation and advocacy;
- Policy advice;
- Facilitation of consensus-building processes to support political agreements around good governance and poverty reduction;
- Provision of services to facilitate public investment projects.

UNDP's main counterparts have been government agencies at the central and local levels, since out of the total disbursed, 96% of CCF projects have been implemented through the national execution modality. The Technical Secretary of Cooperation (Secretariado Técnico de Cooperación, SETCO) has the responsibility to coordinate overall UNDP assistance and the Secretary of State for Presidency ensures that presidential orders are executed, although in practice, UNDP has a closer link to the Secretary of State with which it agrees on the overall support to be provided.⁸

As can be surmised from the table above, the overall strategy of UNDP has been to mobilize resources through partnerships with other multilateral and bilateral agencies and donors in carrying out its activities in the country.⁹ It has proved itself not only a trustworthy partner in the management of technical cooperation and development, but also in exercising its advocacy and policy advisory role. It has always been viewed as a neutral facilitator and promoter of ideas and activities perceived as important by national and international stakeholders working for Honduras' development. UNDP has also become a strong generator of knowledge, particularly with its National Human Development Reports (NHDR) that have become indispensable for those involved in development issues in the country.

Additionally, UNDP has created a strategy and policy analysis unit in its Unit of Strategy and Prospective (Unidad de Prospectiva y Estrategia) that has produced a number of important research publications. These also include more than forty special studies by Honduran academics on issues associated with human development. These activities reinforce the technical backing that UNDP needs in order to carry out its duties. These have enabled the CO to build consensus around some key issues, particularly those concerning the political and electoral reforms. The concrete result was the Democracy Trust (DT) created and funded by UNDP, a forum enabling multi-stakeholder dialogue on key policy issue and development problems facing the country, in order to build consensus around long-term public policies to address them.

⁸ Secretaría de Estado del Despacho Presidencial

⁹ The major partners of UNDP are the World Bank, IFAD, CABEL, IDB, Canada, GFTAM and Sweden.

2

Honduras

Development Context and Its Key Challenges

2.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND POLITICAL CONTEXT

Honduras gained its independence from Spain in 1821 and joined the Central American Federation that lasted until 1842, when the country became totally independent. During the early 1900s the country became deeply influenced by the United States through the establishment of large fruit production companies coupled with massive foreign capital investments that dominated the banana economy. Fruit companies had powerful stakes in domestic politics and the economy. These dominating US investments undermined the institutional development associated with the liberal reforms occurring in other countries of the region in the early nineteenth century.

Honduras lived under authoritarian and military regimes for fifty years, from 1932 to 1982, when a democratic election took place and the process of a representative and elected government was sworn into office thus inaugurating a democratic regime. Since the mid-nineties a civilian government has succeeded in subordinating the armed forces and confined them to its barracks. Thus, only in the past ten to twenty years has democracy began to enter into the political canvas of the country.

Honduras is greatly affected by geography for three main reasons. First, it is situated between Latin America and the United States; but the market for its products has been traditionally the USA. Therefore, it is highly dependent on fluctuations in US trade. Second, it experiences devastating climatic effects from time to time, hurricane Mitch being the recent and most devastating manifestation of this.¹⁰ Third, its industries are very limited which makes the country mainly a two-crop economy, exporting banana and coffee.

Both economically and socially Honduras shows the characteristics of a developing country with a low level of human development, high unemployment, a high degree of inequality of incomes, a low level of education and weak democratic institutions. Its human development index (HDI) stands at 0.672 (2004), which ranks it 115th in the world.¹¹

¹⁰ An important consequence of hurricane Mitch was that it generated an awareness of the social and environmental weaknesses of the country. At the same time it helped to generate a consensus among the different actors of society that there was an opportunity to rebuild the country on a new basis by transforming its political and institutional structures that would improve equity, transparency, citizens participation and environmental protection. See CEDOH, *Gobernabilidad, Democrática en Honduras*. Background paper prepared for UNDP, 2004.

¹¹ HDI remained basically unchanged between 1998 and 2004.

BOX 3: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 2003

Real GDP growth (%) (average 02/03)	2.9
Real GDP growth per capita	0.8
GDP per capita	US\$ 970
Consumer Price Inflation in 2002	7.7% p.a.
GDP current	US\$ 6.4 billion
Total Debt (% of GDP)	81.8

Source: Economist Intelligence Unit, *Country Profile*, 2002 and 2004; PNUD, *Informe sobre las Metas del Milenio 2003*; Consultative Group, *Attaining the Goals of PRS*, 2004.

BOX 4 1995-97% 1998% 1999% 2000% 2001% 2002 % 2003%

GDP growth	4.3	2.9	-1.9	4.8	2.5	2.6	3.2
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Source: Economist Intelligence Unit, *Country Profile*, 2002 and 2004.

2.2 ECONOMIC CONTEXT

Honduras, together with Haiti and Nicaragua, is one of the poorest countries in the Americas, with a total GDP of \$6.4 billion and a per capita income of \$970. It has a population of 6.9 million (2001) that grows at the annual rate of 2.6%. Two-thirds live in poverty. It is a young population: more than two-fifths (41.2%) were in the 0-14 age group 2004. This has serious implications for employment and job creation. The distribution of income is unequal and unemployment and underemployment are rampant (estimated at 28%). Life expectancy is 66.9 years (2004 estimate).

Agriculture has traditionally been the major component of the country's GDP; the sector's main products consisted of banana and coffee. However, of late, citrus, shrimps, beef and timber began to acquire some importance. In 2003 agriculture constituted 12.8% of GDP. Industrial production is essentially low-tech processing operations, but maquilas have begun to be an important activity within industrial production, pushing its share to 31.9%. It should be noted however that 34% of the labor force is still employed in the agricultural activities as opposed to 21% in industry.

The economy's dependence on agriculture tied its overall economic performance to fluctuations in the world prices of commodities. The steady decline in coffee prices since 1997 has seriously undermined its export earnings and caused erratic variations in the rate of growth of its GDP. The economy, in fact, has shown certain structural changes, thanks to non-traditional exports, and the growth of GDP accelerated in early 1990s. However, between 1995 and

2003 the average rate of growth was only about 3%, i.e., slightly above the rate of population growth (2.4%), which meant that per capita income during the same period increased only 0.6%.

Income inequality is also a major concern. The Gini index stands at the level of 0.563 indicating a great deal of discrepancy between the rich and the poor. Income share received by top ten percent of the families correspond 44.4% of the total income while the lowest ten percent of the families receive only 0.5% of the total income (1998)

The diversification of exports reduced the relative importance of traditional commodities within total exports. While in 1990 traditional exports were 78% of total exports and non-traditional ones were 22%, in 2002 traditional exports fell to 22.7% and non-traditional ones rose to 42.2%. Non-traditional exports today include shrimps, melons, textiles and tourism. The trade is closely tied to the United States. Two-thirds of exports are destined to USA, and little over half of imports originate from USA.

Despite their development and growth, exports still represent only one half of imports. This creates a continuing balance of payments deficit that is largely financed by remittances from Hondurans living abroad and by foreign transfers. In 2003 the balance of payments deficit was 4% of GDP. Abundant foreign aid, particularly from the United States and multilateral lending agencies since mid-1980's has created a debt dependency so that when the changing political context caused the aid flow to wane external debt rose to \$5.5 billion in 2001, nearly 90% of GDP. Domestic financing deteriorated and with surging insecurity and violence in the late nineties foreign investments declined.

BOX 5: STRUCTURE OF EXPORTS, 1990-2002 (\$ MILLION AND PERCENT)

Products	1990	1995	2002
Traditional (\$)	670.9	636.7	523.6
Traditional (%)	78.0	43.3	27.7
Non-trad'l (\$)	183.10	591.3	807.3
Non-trad'l (%)	22.0	40.2	42.7
Maquila (\$)	0.0	241.8	559.7
Maquila (%)	0.0	16.5	29.6
Total	831.0	1,469.8	1,890.6

Note: The above figures do not include tourism.

Source: Banco Central de Honduras.

The weak economy was sorely damaged by the category-five hurricane Mitch in December 1998. Almost all productive sectors were seriously affected with agriculture suffering the most. The biggest export industries collapsed and a large part of the country's infrastructure was destroyed. The value of the assets lost was estimated to be \$5 billion, equivalent to 95% of the GDP of 1998.¹² Most of the banana plantations – about 70% – in the Sula Valley were destroyed. However, non-traditional export activities – *maquila operations*¹³ – were relatively unharmed.

Human factors undoubtedly compounded the devastation caused by the hurricane. In rural areas limited access to productive land¹⁴ led the poor to exploit the natural resources in an unsustainable way. Deforestation and soil erosion contributed to the rapid swelling of rivers. Precarious housing in urban areas caused many deaths. Additionally, weak early warning systems and underestimation of the hurricane's magnitude severely reduced the ability of the Government and of the citizens to react to the disaster. Mitch also laid bare the social, political and environmental vulnerabilities of the country, its institutional fragility and its inability to respond to emergency situations.

Large flows of international aid helped reconstruct bridges and roads, repair homes and local infrastructure, such as water and sanitation, school and health-care facilities. Partly due to mitigate the adverse effects of Mitch but also due to renewed interest in Central America, the World Bank, IMF as well as IDB have extended assistance and made overall macroeconomic adjustments in order to reduce poverty substantially not only by improving the infrastructure, but also the financial sector. For this pur-

pose the World Bank carried out a development policy review in 2004 and extended credit under the umbrella of reduction of poverty. IMF extended a financial sector adjustment credit and IDB also extended appreciable credit for the improvement of secondary education. As a result of all these efforts most infrastructures have been reconstructed and macroeconomic adjustments have been made, but the psychological trauma caused by Mitch still lingers among Hondurans.

Honduras is involved in important regional integration arrangements, such as the Central American Court of Human Rights, the Free Trade Area of the Americas, the Northern Triangle and the free trade agreement between Central America and the United States. Difficulties do arise, however, due to recurrent disputes between these countries over trade and borders, and the relative lack of competitiveness of the Honduran economy compared to larger ones, such as Mexico and the United States.

Honduras' main economic challenges are to increase the stability of the economy through reducing debt, to accelerate growth through increased competitiveness and by developing alternative sources of production that allow the country to earn foreign currency rather than borrow, and to productively absorb a growing low-skilled labor force. Honduras needs to grow in a sustained manner towards its goal of reducing rampant poverty through job creation and human capital development. It must make sure that debt relief is directed toward the creation of employment and the reduction of poverty, an incredibly difficult challenge if, at the same time, it must balance its internal fiscal budget and promote exports.

¹² The Economist Intelligence Unit, *Country Profile*, 2002.

¹³ A *maquiladora* is an assembly plant operating with imported material and equipment on a duty- and tariff-free basis.

¹⁴ Honduras has limited arable land, less than 10% of the country's total area.

2.3 INSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT: CONSOLIDATING DEMOCRACY

Honduras was governed by authoritarian and military regimes between 1932 and 1982. The military dominated the political and economic arena.¹⁵ The main consequence of this regime was political repression; however, its dimension was not at the same magnitude as that in other Latin American countries. In 1982 Honduras finally moved to a democratic regime and since then presidents have been elected by popular vote. Since the mid-nineties progress has been made in subordinating the armed forces to civilian authority and a political transition has started towards building a more democratic society. The military is now firmly confined to its barracks. Although it ceased to hold political power in 1982, it continued to exert some influence in the economic sphere by discretionary management of the military budget and pensions. Their influence has been significantly reduced throughout the past six years. In addition private sector organizations also exert some influence on policy making due to their affiliation with the two major parties. Since 1982 Honduras has made a great leap forward into democratic governance. The process, however, is by no means complete, since the transition takes much more than twenty years.

The nature of Honduran politics presents a major challenge to its future development. Politics are highly partisan with two traditional, dominant parties: the Liberals (PLH) and the Nationals (PNH). There are no substantial differences in their ideology. After two successive liberal governments the nationalist party came into power in 2002 and will remain in power until the elections in 2005. Three minor parties that have never participated in the government in the past have begun to play a larger role, since a new electoral law has started to encourage voting patterns based on affinity between candidates and voters and not traditional political power structures.

Labor and peasant organizations have been active in politics since the 1950s, when they became organized in unions and began negotiating for their rights. Honduras is, today, the most unionized country in Central America. Since the transition to democracy in the early 1980's, sever-

al civil society organizations, particularly religious grassroots organizations, active female groups, indigenous organizations, as well as environmental and human rights groups began to flourish in the country. The advent of democracy has enabled them to address key national issues, debate publicly necessary reforms and forge several national agreements among key stakeholders – government, political parties, civil society organizations, and donors.

Although Honduras has been governed by a formal democracy for the last 22 years, it has yet to address several obstacles to overcome the weakness of key state institutions.¹⁶ The last election in 2001 was the sixth democratic ballot held since 1982; and international observers from the Organization of American States (OAS) declared it free and transparent. It was an important indicator of the democratization process of the country, since it was the first time that voters could vote for the President and Congress representatives separately; which meant that party loyalty took a step back and expression of policy choices took a step forward.

With the 2001 elections policy oriented discussions began to surface and political parties, civil society and donors agreed on the basic tenets for reforming the political and electoral system and enhance good governance. One of the significant achievements was the creation of the Democracy Trust, (DT, or Foro de Fortalecimiento a la Democracia in Spanish) that facilitates dialogue on key national development issues and builds consensus towards long-term policy commitments. Under its umbrella all political parties, together with civil society representatives, committed themselves to pursue political and electoral reforms that seek to make the political process more – transparent, democratic and representative.¹⁷ Although the committed constitutional reforms have yet to be fully internalized, they have nevertheless brought about substantial advances in governance.

Several new institutions were created to improve democratic governance and ensuring the rule of law: these are the National Human Rights Commission, the Public Prosecutor's Office, and the Anti-Corruption Council. In addition a legal framework was approved for the gradual decentralization of the state, a civilian police force was established, and the armed forces were made subordinate to

¹⁵ See Victor Mesa et al., *Democracia y Partidos Políticos en Honduras*. Centro de Documentación de Honduras. Tegucigalpa 2004.

¹⁶ UNDP, *Honduras Common Country Assessment*, 1999.

¹⁷ In 2001, candidates of the five political parties signed a Declaration of the Political Parties to the Honduran People, committing to support electoral and political reforms in Honduras. A Political and a Judicial Commission were created to draft the bills and laws following the commitments. Another agreement was signed in 2002 between 3 of the 5 political parties represented in Congress, which amplified the previous agreement to include other areas such as limiting the immunity for Congress members and other officials of the state. Of the proposed reforms, three were approved during 2002, one in 2003 and almost all of the remaining ones were included in the New Electoral Law and Political Organizations Law passed in May 2004 to replace the outdated 1981 law. The laws passed include: the creation of the Electoral Court, the replacement of the Presidential Designates by a Vice-President, the creation of an independent Population Register (2002), and the removal of the immunity of parliamentarians (2003); Modification of the system through which legislators are elected. Previously citizens voted a closed and blocked list of candidates decided by the president of the party, but could not choose the candidate of their preference. The new system allows citizens to choose the candidate/s of their choice, creating a clear accountability line between the legislator and the constituency that voted for him, not for the caudillo that previously decided his inclusion in the list; authorization to political parties to form alliances without losing their legal status; shortening of the duration of political campaigns; establishment of a more transparent system for financial accountability of parties (2004).

civilian authority. In 2002 Congress enacted the reform of the judiciary system. In 2003 the elimination of parliamentary immunity was in principle approved and, if ratified, will entail a major change towards curbing corruption through increasing transparency in public management. Despite these achievements, there is a long way to go before democratic governance institutions become sustainable and enforce policies and laws according to their mandate.

In 2002 the Government formulated a National Decentralization and Local Development Program (PRODDEL) to strengthen local capacities, improve fiscal and administrative management, promote governance and transparency, and place decentralization high on the Government's agenda. Already in 1991 the Law of Municipalities had been enacted which scaled down the oversized and inefficient public sector by transferring a number of state functions to the municipalities; thereby the municipalities increased their participation in the financing and operation of local social projects. Also 299 municipalities were organized under AHMON (the Honduran Association of Municipalities - Asociación Hondureña de Municipalidades), which aims at strengthening the role of local governments supported by donor programmes. This process of decentralization can easily be observed in "Open Town" meetings that involve communities in the formulation of strategic local development plans.

However, the process has been slow, primarily because the central state has not been able to comply with its constitutional obligation of transferring 5% of the national budget to municipalities. Since around 80% of municipal revenues are allotted to current expenditures, this non-compliance leaves the municipalities short of necessary funds to finance local investment projects. Moreover, many local governments have not as yet developed the technical capacities to assume the responsibilities of the central government.¹⁸ The shortage of local funds combined with the central government's reluctance to let go of the control of certain funds, as well as low technical capacity in some municipalities have deterred deeper reforms in decentralization.

Another serious problem that afflicts Honduras is illegal drug trafficking and its social implications. The Government has made efforts to strengthen the institutions in charge of fighting illegal drug trafficking, but information systems, control and prevention mechanisms, as well as public service capacities to enforce existing regulations, are all very poor. Honduras is a transit country for drugs destined for the USA, particularly cocaine. Anecdotal reports suggest that crime, violence and insecurity are related to the rising drug trafficking. Also, the problem of violent crime and gangs called maras continue to be high on the political agenda.

2.4 POVERTY

Several factors contribute to the widespread poverty in Honduras. Economic growth is slow and volatile; per capita income is low; income is highly unequally distributed; productivity of factors of production is low; there is an imbalance between population growth and natural endowments; public management lacks transparency; and corruption is widespread. Thus poverty is a major concern for the Government of Honduras. ECLAC estimates that 71% of households were poor in 2002; in the rural areas the percentage is higher at 80%. The national agenda since 1999 has been explicitly guided by the overarching goal of reducing poverty as expressed in the two most important government plans: the Master Plan of National Reconstruction and Transformation (MPNRT) and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). While the MPNRT's main objectives were to help the country recover from the impact of hurricane Mitch and improve, in a medium-term frame (1999-2005), the social, economic and environmental conditions caused by this event, the PRSP is a complementary yet much more ambitious long-term programme (2000-2015). It outlines strategies to advance social, political, structural and infrastructure development and plans to reduce the incidence of poverty by focusing on 6 major objectives as shown in Box 6.

BOX 6: POVERTY REDUCTION STRATEGY OBJECTIVES

1. Accelerating sustainable and equitable economic growth
2. Reducing rural poverty
3. Reducing urban poverty
4. Strengthening social protection for specific vulnerable groups
5. Enhancing investment in human capital
6. Ensuring the sustainability of the strategy

¹⁸ Honduras Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, 2001.

The Poverty Reduction Strategy in Honduras is supported by donors. The World Bank and IMF approved the PRSP in late 2000 as a condition for gaining debt relief through the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative. Other lending agencies that participated in the Stockholm Declaration¹⁹ in 1999 also supported the PRSP. The challenge for the country is how to implement the policies that are conducive to poverty reduction. The Government of President Flores had actively participated in the PRSP's elaboration; however, the present Government appears to lack ownership. This is partly due to the fact that PRSP was undertaken by the previous Government and partly to the fact that it was prepared in a relatively short period of time. Hence, civil society could only participate in a consultative mode and was unable to influence the decisions incorporated into the plan.

APRSP was required by funding agencies, and thus became, *de facto*, the National Development Plan of Honduras. For it includes such areas as strengthening civil society participation, decentralization, governance, participatory democracy among others, none of which are directly connected with the reduction of poverty in the strategic sense. These are necessary but insufficient conditions to reduce poverty. The concept of poverty was so widely defined that a higher estimate of the poor is given than is desirable for clear corrective action and for poverty focused programmes. In fact the majority of, if not all, governmental policies have been included under the umbrella of anti-poverty strategy. Accordingly, a significant proportion of people (66% according to the PRSP) were defined as poor in 1999 and Government actions were required to benefit all of them. But it must be stated that the PRSP in fact is not a strategy for the reduction of poverty, but became a programme of action to benefit proportions of the population who were in a disadvantaged position as defined by the per-capita incomes of the households. As a result, a very large majority of Hondurans were defined as poor. Hence, the concept does not appear to be fully conducive to design programmes and policies that were to focus on various segments of the poor.

There was a slight reduction in poverty that may well be due to the development in the country since 1999 and

not totally due to the impact of the PRSP. In fact, ECLAC's figures indicate that poverty in Honduras decreased by 1.4 percentage points from 1990 to 1997, by 0.5 percentage points in 1999, and by additional 3.4 percentage points in 2002, the year that the PRSP was initially implemented. This decrease may also be partly explained by increased remittances from abroad. The World Bank figures put poverty at 75% in 1991 and 63% in 2002, a decline of 12 percentage points. In other words, it appears that poverty had been decreasing in Honduras before the PRSP was implemented, and that nothing significant has occurred since then. It should also be noted that this decline in poverty in Honduras is the lowest observed in Central America. A decline is also observable in the percentage of people who live with \$1 or less a day. In 1997 these persons amounted to 22% of the population, whereas in 2003/2004 their proportion had declined to 20%. However, given the population increase between these two years, their absolute number had risen by about 11,500.

UNDP's Human Development Index (HDI) shows that HDI in Honduras in 1991 was 0.604 and that it rose to 0.650 in 1999 and to 0.657 in 2003. So, as in the case of poverty, recent improvements in this area too have been very slow. Using this approach to assess the gender dimensions of poverty, it is found that the Gender Development Index (GDI) that measures inequalities in human development of men and women, for the same years was 0.585, 0.640 and 0.652, which shows that GDI was lower than HDI. In other words, though inequalities still exist, there is a clear tendency towards a significant improvement in the degree of equality between women and men in terms of human development.

To succeed in reducing poverty Honduras should design, under the umbrella of the PRSP, a more specific strategy that identifies both the geographical areas and the sector of the population that its programmes and policies should reach over and above what the Government would do in any case. Moreover, Honduras should also strive to build institutional capacity so that strategies designed can be implemented effectively and efficiently. If not, the plan to reduce poverty would not go beyond what economic growth would achieve, provided that a strong relationship

¹⁹ The Stockholm Declaration was a response from the international community to the devastation of Hurricane Mitch. The Consultative Group for the Reconstruction and Transformation of Central America, composed of six countries - Canada, Germany, Japan, Spain, Sweden and the USA - met in Stockholm and outlined principles for the reconstruction and democratic transformation of the area. Its main principles related to social and environmental vulnerability, governance, democracy, human rights, external debt and donor coordination. The first meeting took place in December 1998, in Washington, DC. The Presidents of Central America made clear their view of the tragedy as a unique opportunity to rebuild a better Central America. The second meeting of the Consultative Group was held in Stockholm in 1999 when a declaration of principles was agreed. The Governments of Central America and the international community committed themselves to sharing the responsibility for achieving the reconstruction and the transformation of the countries concerned, thus establishing a long term partnership guided by the priorities defined by the Central American countries and based on principles of citizen participation, transparency, good governance, environmental sustainability, and sounder anti-poverty efforts.

²⁰ ECLAC, *op.cit.*

²¹ Chronic malnutrition affects 32% of children under 5 years of age and 22% of all the population. ECLAC, *op.cit.* Pgs. 86, 90.

can be established between growth and reduction of poverty. It would also be relevant for UNDP to undertake, jointly with other partners, research initiatives aimed at seeking for alternative ways (other or complementary to PRS) for reducing poverty that could enrich the policy dialogue by providing wider policy options.

2.5 HEALTH AND EDUCATION

Health coverage is erratic in Honduras and the quality is questionable. It is estimated that the Government provides coverage to 50% of the population and Social Security Institute and private sector 20–25%. The remaining 25–30% of the population has no access to public health care. The population that lives in rural and marginalized urban areas is the segment that is most adversely affected. The rate of undernourished children²¹ and child mortality in the age group of 0–5 is high.

Honduras is one of the countries most severely affected by the HIV/AIDS epidemic (1.8% of the population aged 15–49),²² tuberculosis and malaria²³ in Latin America. Although there is greater access to potable water, its coverage is inefficient and the quality is poor. Although with the increased public spending the health sector has made progress in preventive health programs, particularly in infant and maternal health, and increased coverage of basic sanitation services, many poor households, mostly in rural areas still lack access to potable water.²⁴

Advances have been steadily made over the last 25 years to expand educational facilities and this is reflected in increased primary level enrolment and adult illiteracy.²⁵ Nevertheless, certain deficiencies in quality and efficiency of education compounded by low public spending are still adversely affecting the educational system. The number of years of schooling (4.6 years) for the population ten and over has doubled in the past 25 years; the literacy rate (74.6%) has increased and enrolment in pre-school has doubled (44%).²⁶ Nevertheless, Honduras lags behind most countries in the region concerning enrolment in secondary education and there are pockets of low primary school enrolment in poor rural areas.

The main problems in education lie in primary school enrolment in poor and remote areas. In addition, transi-

tion from primary to secondary school is limited. Only 35% of those who complete primary school continue to the secondary level.²⁷ Although the share of educational expenditures in public spending has increased steadily in the past years,²⁸ the administration continues to be centralized and bureaucratic, with strong disincentives for teachers. Having achieved important gains in access to education, the challenge now is to improve quality and efficiency and improve school attendance. The main causes of low attendance in remote rural areas are the absence of nearby schools and the relatively high opportunity costs for poor parents of sending their children to school. The Honduran Community Education Project (PROHECO), which intends to take schools closer to rural areas, is a valuable initiative to address this problem. Improving the quality of services provided calls for raising teacher qualifications, improving management, curricular innovation and relevancy, and community participation.

2.6 GENDER

The prevailing social and economic conditions seem to affect women more negatively than men. This is true especially with women who are poor and heads of households with children. Poor women in Honduras are also affected by the high birth rate, a main cause for the generational transmission of poverty, and which has a direct effect in decreasing women's opportunities to obtain an education and to enter the labor market, thereby placing them in a position of greater vulnerability than men. Finally, the problem of violence, which is widespread in the country and affecting the entire population is affecting primarily poor women and is still underestimated, underreported and ignored, due to Honduran culture and a tradition of denial concerning gender inequality.²⁹ Although it appears that women fare better than men in life expectancy, combined school enrolment and literacy, they lag far behind men in earning income and in political representation, as revealed by the composition of the National Congress where men occupy approximately sixteen times more seats than women. This is expected to change, however, since the electoral law now stipulates that at least 30% of the candidates have to be women.

²² HDR 2004. Data are from 2001, Belize reported at 2.4%; Country Strategy, IDB, 2002 reports 1.9% of adult population lives with the disease; Geeta Rao Gupta, International Center for Research on Women, 2002.

²³ The Economist Intelligence, Unit Country Report, 2002.

²⁴ See Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, 2000. Public expenditure in health as a proportion of total public expenditure has gone up from 9.7 in 1998 to 12.0 in 2001. ECLAC, Ibid.

²⁵ A. Bedi & J. Marshall. *Primary School attendance in Honduras*. Journal of Development Economics. 2001; Honduras Poverty Diagnostic, World Bank, 2001.

²⁶ Ibid. WB.

²⁷ Honduras Country Strategy Paper, EU. 2002–2006.

²⁸ Public expenditure in education as a proportion of total public expenditure has gone from 17.7 in 1998 to 22.6 in 2001. ECLAC, op.cit. Pg. 347

²⁹ Honduras PRSP, 2000.

It must be noted, however, that Honduras has started to take action towards redressing the gender imbalance. It has created the National Institute for Women in 2000 and the Public Prosecutor's Office for Women to promote gender equity. It has a national policy of promoting gender and has recently enacted laws to provide equal opportunities for women and reduce violence committed against women.

2.7 NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND ENVIRONMENT

Due to its geographical location, Honduras suffers from multiple natural phenomena that, given the country's vulnerability to such events, causes serious damage to its human, natural and physical base and forces deviations in long-term priorities. The high degree of the deterioration in natural resources and environment, misuse of land, misallocation of infrastructure investments, and chronic poverty compound the magnitude of such disasters.

As in any other country, in Honduras poverty and environmental degradation are closely linked. Great degree of environmental degradation is found in areas where the country's HDIs are the lowest. This close link between poverty and environmental degradation and the vulnerability to natural disasters needs to be remedied with measures that provide a better legal framework accompanied with an efficient institutional set-up for natural resource and disaster management, and with active participation of the citizens in the protection of the environment and in the mitigation of the results of natural disasters.

Land use planning is also poor in Honduras, which leads to insecurity of ownership and inability of proper care especially by the poor. The improvements of environmental management require a clear and secure definition of property rights to natural resources. About half of the country is covered with forests that are degrading. Their area was reduced from 53.4% in 1990 to 48.1% in 2001. The Government's forest policy has favored extraction rather than conservation, and economic and social policies have pushed growing numbers of Hondurans to live in forest areas under conditions of subsistence. Public administration is not as yet sufficiently effective to enforce environmental protection laws. Poor farmers and urban developers ignore protective legislation. Deforestation makes rural areas vulnerable to flooding, which occurred when Hurricane Mitch hit the region.

Conscious efforts to improve the sustainability of the environment and to protect it began some twenty years ago; in the last ten years or so they acquired even further importance, thanks to the PRSP and the decisions taken in the Stockholm meetings. Nevertheless, several environmental

problems still persist. There is a high rate of deforestation, soil erosion, and deterioration of biological resources, high level of contamination, as well as destruction and degradation of coastal marine resources. Hence, Honduras needs to reduce ecological vulnerability with well conceptualized and executed actions, high degree of citizen participation and close coordination between the public and private sector in order to achieve sustainable conditions for environmental protection and natural resource management.

2.8 CONCLUDING REMARKS AND KEY CHALLENGES FACING HONDURAS

As can be surmised from the above, Honduras has made serious attempts throughout the decade of the 1990s to improve its economic and social conditions. These attempts have taken even more organized, coherent and logically interrelated form as articulated in the Government's plans.³⁰

Honduras has experienced significant changes for the better. Some are related to the political structure, others are linked to the juridical framework and some are of a sociological nature and embedded in civil society, its organizations and social participation. Nevertheless, a vast majority of Hondurans continue to live in poverty, with meager health-care and low levels of education, with poor access to productive resources and employment as well as problems of rampant crime and insecurity. The heavy external debt burden of the country and a rate of economic growth that does not outpace appreciably the growth of population have diminished the capacity of governments to implement policies that could alleviate the precarious situation of the poor, protect the environment and make development sustainable.

Given the weakness of many state institutions, the question remains whether the new reforms will prove to be sustainable and whether the consensus that was achieved regarding the need to improve equity, transparency, reduce poverty and increase participation can be maintained for the years to come. Additionally the country needs to continue strengthening the rule of law, eliminate impunity and political privileges and promote the respect for human rights. Undoubtedly, in a number of areas Honduras will need support and assistance of the bilateral and multilateral agencies among which UNDP is one.

In order to put into perspective UNDP's efforts in assisting Honduras in its endeavours for development in the ample sense of the word, to assess its success in the past and its possible involvement in the future, a summary of the issues is in order. The key challenges within the overall tenets of the Government Plan can be summarized as follows:

³⁰ See Presidencia de la República, *Plan de Gobierno 2002-2006: Un Compromiso con Honduras*.

- Since a high rate of poverty still permeates Honduras, the PRSP programme will have to be reviewed according to results obtained to date and new alternatives for poverty reduction will have to be sought, or analyzed.
- Economic growth will have to be accelerated to outpace the rate of population growth ensuring that this process is accompanied by employment opportunities for society and particularly the poorest can share in the benefits of growth: in this vein opportunities and challenges for subregional economic integration should have to be analyzed.
- Unemployment and underemployment that plague the economy require job creation that in turn requires investment, especially foreign investment to supplement and complement domestic investment. Policies regarding job creation would have to be developed under a more comprehensive strategy for poverty reduction.
- Honduras has been dependent on traditional agricultural exports, namely banana and coffee. The export structure will have to be diversified, in this context the role of micro enterprises should be analyzed, and the expansion of the industrial sector should also be sought.
- Strategies for effectively reducing or eliminating corruption need to be elaborated.
- The inequalities between men and women in their access to rights and opportunities of development will have to be redressed.
- Public spending will have to be redirected towards education, health and welfare in a more efficient way.
- Strategies and actions for reducing HIV/AIDS should be analyzed and developed.
- Environmental degradation, deforestation and soil erosion will have to be arrested and redressed.

The list above is a tall order that Honduras cannot succeed in undertaking with its own human and financial resources. For some time to come the country will have to supplement and complement its own resources with external assistance. The role of UNDP as a reliable partner of the Government is not likely to diminish; quite the contrary, it will remain as important as it was in the past.

The subsequent two chapters will review UNDP's support and the outcomes towards which it contributed to national development efforts in partnership with local partners, and the last chapter will look into the possible alternatives that are open to UNDP in assisting the Government in the realization of its objectives.

3

UNDP's Contribution to Development Outcomes

This chapter assesses the overall support provided by UNDP to key areas of national development efforts during the period 1998-2004 and seeks to analyze evidence from different sources to account for its contribution to the results achieved in partnership with other national and international actors. As the ADR methodology aims at establishing contribution rather than attribution to development outcomes the report seeks to establish a plausible link between UNDP support and development outcomes.

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3.1 DEMOCRACY, GOVERNANCE AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

As noted previously, Honduras's under-performance in development has been closely related to poor governance. UNDP has, therefore, made this area a top priority and supported good governance since the Country Programme of 1992-1996. However, the devastation caused by hurricane Mitch in 1998 altered the priorities in the country's needs for emergency response and thereby the nature of UNDP's support and that of the international partners. CCF1 (1998-2001) was adjusted to support reconstruction efforts during 1999, but was later extended into 2001 to continue the work on strengthening democratic governance institutions. CCF2 (2002-2006) supported the government's efforts to reinforce democratic processes with broader citizen participation through advocacy and policy advice, alliance building among the major national stakeholders around key development issues, knowledge generation and provision of development services.

Evidence suggests that UNDP was recognized across all segments of the Honduran community as a facilitator of agreements that could lead to crucial political and institutional reforms. During the period under consideration, UNDP responded to many of the government's priorities as expressed in the 2002-2006 Government Plan based upon the PRSP. The Government's stand that equitable and sustainable socioeconomic growth largely depends on the strengthening of democratic governance in the country reflects its commitment to this endeavour and represents the entry point utilized by UNDP, since its profile as the only neutral international partner and its expertise in the area made it the best player to support the Government's efforts in this respect.


Consequently, the government plan includes four specific goals related to governance: 1) Strengthening democratic governance by fighting corruption which permeates central government institutions and process (i.e.: justice sector, electoral institutions, political parties and Congress, and the management of public resources), fostering a reliable and efficient justice system, modernization of the state, participatory and transparent electoral processes, human rights, development of ethnic groups and gender equity; 2) citizen security and defense; 3) decentralization; and efficient and transparent management of public resources to guarantee the sustainability of the strategy.³¹ The commitment of the Government to democratic governance was also found in the important milestone document 'National Agreement for Transformation and Sustainable Human Development in the 21st. Century'³², which included, among 16 other commitments, governance reforms related to the justice system, support to decentralization and

municipal development and an alliance for transparency and efficiency of public management. This platform was supported by UNDP's programme which tackled the issues of modernization of the armed forces, anti-corruption, justice, political reforms, gender equality, HIV/AIDS, citizen empowerment through influence in policy decision-making, and municipal development.

UNDP's support focuses on six areas of governance. The outcomes pursued and the outlays on the main intended governance outcomes are shown in Graph 1. Each is examined subsequently.³³

Decentralization and Municipal Development. The Government's 'Programme of State Modernization' approved in 1990 initiated the decentralization process with the Law of Municipalities (1991).³⁴ Although the post-Mitch consensus promoted by the Stockholm agreement of major donors had seen decentralization as an important mechanism to attain goals towards reducing

GRAPH 1: Governance Outcomes and UNDP delivery 1998-2003



³¹ The PRS that orients the overall government strategy includes the goal of strengthening transparency and participative democracy, as part of its goal of guaranteeing the sustainability of the strategy. PRSP 2001.

³² Acuerdo Nacional para la Transformación y el Desarrollo Humano Sostenible en el Siglo XXI, 2001.

³³ Although the CO includes within the governance area a specific SRF goal that represents the activities of the Business Centre - *Increased government capacity to administer multilateral resources for strategic development initiatives*- the resources mobilized during the period (US\$ 222,665,646) are not included in this graph because it is not strictly comparable either in programmatic terms or in the amount of resources disbursed, to the other SRF governance goals represented in the graph.

³⁴ Autonomy is based on the faculty of municipal governments to raise their own revenues and decide on investments, management of their own budget cycles, and the right to create their own administrative structure. The law also states that municipalities will elaborate and implement local development plans, foster and regulate commercial, industrial and service provision activities and will be in charge of procurement for public services and works. Law of Municipalities, Articles 12 and 13. 1990.

poverty in 1999, the process was not given a high priority in the Government's agenda until the Decentralization and Local Development Programme (PRODDEL) was elaborated with UNDP technical assistance to the Ministry of Governance and Justice in 2002. The PRODDEL aims at consolidating the decentralization process in order to accelerate local, economic and social development. It seeks to strengthen local capacities; attain fiscal and administrative decentralization; foster regional development and territorial regulation; and enhance good governance and transparency.³⁵

Decentralization and municipal development have been the areas in which UNDP has had the most comprehensive strategy of intervention, as well as provided the major value. At the **central level** UNDP technically assisted the Ministry of Governance and Justice (Interior) in the elaboration of the Programme for Decentralization and Local Development the outcome of which was the first clear national policy on decentralization the country has ever had. It also provided the ministry, which was weak and almost nonexistent before 2002, with substantive technical assistance in strategic planning. In addition UNDP extended similar assistance to the Honduran Association of Municipalities (AHMON)³⁶ providing them with technical assistance in elaborating their institutional development plan, thus building the association's capacities to address its priorities of municipal development through a strategic plan.

At the **municipal level** UNDP embarked upon four different projects that aimed at strengthening the technical capacity of municipal governments in urban and rural areas. The findings analyzed in this evaluation refer primarily to the most significant projects as recorded in previous evaluations and interviews carried out by the ADR mission.³⁷ From 1998 to 2003 UNDP worked with five municipalities³⁸ in partnership with SIDA that funded the project (\$3.4 million). The targeted municipalities had the following common problems: a marked deficit in the provision and quality of public services; lack of a clear strategy to enhance citizen participation in local affairs; and institu-

tional weakness that prevented efficient municipal management. UNDP's intervention focused on providing technical assistance to improve efficiency and transparency in municipal management, more specifically, to increase coverage of public services, to enhance citizen participation through joint definition of local development plans, to train civil servants in administration and financial management, and to design and implement development projects. UNDP facilitated local governments to set up Transparency Committees with elected members from civil society to act as a watchdog over municipal finances.

The ADR Team views UNDP's intervention as positive, since at the central level it appears to have significantly contributed to a healthy policy debate and influenced the approach to decentralization that later became national policy. The outcome at the municipal level was strengthening local governance by assisting municipalities to improve their financial and administrative management, providing them with basic equipment (computers, office infrastructure) and training staff in financial skills, cadastral techniques and tax collection. Although results varied considerably from one municipality to another, UNDP has opened avenues for citizen participation, joint development planning between civil society and Government, growing awareness of the right of citizens to demand accountability and of the government to respond to it.

However, a major weakness of the programme was that it did not design a strategy for the pilot projects supported by UNDP to influence the decentralization policy nor did it explain how they would be replicated. While the project document stated that it would implement successful pilot projects of local development that would be replicated, and also inform the decentralization policy, there was no clear strategy as to how this link would be accomplished, and in fact, the successful experiences stayed where they are. Thus, these experiences need to be replicated and their sustainability ensured by using these pilot projects to inform the implementation of the decentralization policy.

Further, the approach to local development should prioritize market-oriented initiatives. Fostering participation

³⁵ Programa de Descentralización y Desarrollo Local (PRODDEL), Unidad Técnica de Descentralización, Honduras. 2002.

³⁶ AHMON is a civil association at the national level, formed by the 298 mayors of municipalities. AHMON was created after a government resolution in 1962 and its mission is to defend municipal autonomy and promote decentralization and national reconstruction efforts. Due to lack of government support, AHMON had little clout until 1992 when it gained strength and visibility.

³⁷ The second municipal development project implemented by UNDP and funded by the Government of Netherlands supported municipal strengthening of 48 rural municipalities and their capacity to identify investment priorities, improved their skills to manage efficiently local development processes and elaborate municipal strategic development plans (\$1.3 million). No evaluations are available of this project. Recently a third has been initiated: Self-managed local development for poverty reduction in the north of Copan financed by Finland (\$3.8 million). A fourth project, which the mission could not assess directly, is the Initiative for the Fight against Poverty (APPI) in the three poorest departments of Honduras.

³⁸ Tegucigalpa, Puerto Cortés, San Pedro Sula, Santa Rosa de Copán and La Paz.

³⁹ The creation of transparency committees is based on the constitutional law that allows citizen access to public information. Reform in 1990 created the figure of the Municipal Commissioner whose function is to mediate conflicts at the local level, denounce cases where the law has been abused, and implement preventive strategies to discourage corruption. It does not however have power to judge. The Commissioner is chosen by the local government out of six candidates proposed by civil society. He/She leads the transparency committee integrated by three other members proposed by civil society and chosen in the same way.

at the local level, albeit important cannot supersede the goal of facilitating opportunities for pro-poor economic growth. UNDP needs to strengthen the links between its efforts to support local governance and its rural development initiatives. If governments are unable to guide and support economic opportunities for its constituents, they will not be able to make use of their enhanced public management skills.

UNDP could also assist municipalities to align their strategic local development plans with the PRSP's priority actions focusing on enhancing market oriented initiatives. Deeper knowledge of how the national plan relates to the municipal one can ensure policy coherence between the central and local levels of government. This would help municipal governments streamline efforts, access available funds, and associate with other municipalities to benefit from economies of scale, etc.

Fair and efficient administration of justice. In terms of resources UNDP's second largest governance intervention was its support to the reform process of the judicial institutions that are considered as highly politicized and corrupt. The 2002-2006 government plan sought to strengthen and modernize the sector, increase its transparency, independence and effectiveness. It aimed to depoliticize the judicial powers, eliminate internal corruption, restrict them to judicial functions and remove the current administrative ones, and modernize the prison system. Social insecurity and drug trafficking are one manifestation of the incompetence of the Ministry of Security, the police, Office of the Prosecutor and the Ministry of Justice. Indeed, private firms, citizens and public officials have identified justice as the most corrupt institution in Honduras.⁴⁰ Another survey reflected that the majority of public opinion (72%) thought that poor people rarely succeeded at having their rights respected.⁴¹ Some improvements have occurred in the justice sector such as the reform of the process to elect Supreme Court Judges in 2001, a New Penal Procedural Code implemented in 2002 and measures to streamline the process of administering justice.

At the policy level UNDP advocated and facilitated policy dialogue, discussion and consensus that led to the National Agreement for Transformation and Sustainable Human Development in the 21st Century that has been committed to by all political parties and included, among others, support to the reform and modernization of the justice system. It also carried out standalone interventions to cooperate with different operators of justice, namely, the Office of the Prosecutor, Ministry of Security, Supreme Court of Justice, the police, and the National Human Rights Commissioner through the provision of technical

expertise in training personnel, efficient management processes and systems, and research and analysis to inform policy decisions.

UNDP's assistance seems to have contributed to the improvement of the prosecutors' capacity to handle cases more efficiently. Although no hard evidence was provided to the ADR Team, several key informants interviewed indicated that such was the case. The training interventions were concentrated at the capital and other big cities. It should be noted that there is a dearth of skilled prosecutors in the interior. In the already described frame, UNDP's support was certainly recognized as a positive contribution but the mission observed that it was not sufficiently widespread. No doubt, UNDP's standalone interventions in building capacity and providing input to the functions of the Supreme Court, the Human Rights Commission, Prosecutor's Office and Ministry of Security have been a constructive contribution towards improving, albeit modestly at this point in time, the administration of justice. However, no evaluations had been undertaken to assess the extent to which the assistance provided resulted in enhanced efficiency of the institutions' processes.

Additionally, UNDP has contributed to the passing of key laws occurred in the period assessed (i.e.: Organic law of the judicial branch, law for the creation of the Judicial career and Office of the judiciary) although establishing the link between UNDP's role in facilitating dialogue and the laws passed is not a feasible task. Moreover, the challenges in increasing efficiency, transparency and access to justice are too daunting for isolated and disperse interventions to have a significant effect.

Given that UNDP is not the largest player in this sector, instead of implementing isolated interventions, it could support other partner's integrated, targeted strategy of intervention to assist the government in the reform and depoliticization of the judicial system. Two key goals should be depoliticizing justice institutions and increasing access to justice for the vulnerable and marginal segments of the population.

Actions to increase access to vulnerable populations should address the different instances for people to be aware of their rights, mechanisms that enable them to claim their rights when violated (i.e.: extending coverage of prosecutor's offices, local ombudsman offices, special courts, community police and alternative conflict-resolution centers in marginal areas of Tegucigalpa and the rest of the country,) and redress and/or protection through justice proceedings.

⁴⁰ World Bank. *Gobernabilidad y Anticorrupción en Honduras: Un Aporte para la Planificación de Acciones*. 2002.

⁴¹ Ibid. *Latinobarometro*, 2002. p.253.

BOX 7: OBJECTIVES OF THE DEMOCRACY TRUST

- To facilitate dialogue on the development of democracy in the country with the participation of all Honduran society.
- To contribute to the strengthening of democracy within political parties and civil society by promoting participation.
- To support the democratic process in the country through strengthening the capacity of civil society and local governments.
- To set up a 'Council of Women' in order to enhance the participation of women into the reconstruction of the country.
- To contribute to the strengthening of the media.
- To enhance international cooperation on the key issues of the country.

Public debate on Sustainable Human Development

was stimulated through two major UNDP initiatives. One was the Democracy Trust (DT) established in October 2000 under the auspices of the President of the Republic and the Archbishop of Tegucigalpa, with the participation of foreign representation and international organizations. Civil society and political parties participated subsequently. The DT operated as a mechanism enabling multi-stakeholder dialogue on key policy issues in the areas of democracy, good governance and poverty reduction. It responded to the need for social and political consensus towards implementing long-term public policies. The institution has been a highly respected set up in Honduras, and it would not have been realized had there not been strong UNDP support. In fact, the close relationship of trust between UNDP and civil society leaders, members of the international community pursuing the Stockholm goals and political parties, enabled the DT to act as a convener and neutral interlocutor of at least two key national issues:

- To build a high degree of confidence and communication with civil society actors participating in PRSP consultations.
- To lay the ground for the signing of the declaration of the political parties to implement key political and electoral reforms.

These were two clear UNDP accomplishments between 1998 and 2003. However, despite its unquestionable success in its first years of existence, UNDP has in recent times disengaged from the DT as the main driver of its initiatives.⁴³ At present, the DT needs to develop an endogenous strategy, led by national champions that can

convene representatives from every sector of society that reflect the growing complexity of Honduran society. The DT should continue facilitating dialogue on key national issues to enable long-term policy implementation, ensuring that topics addressed are relevant to civil society and different sectors' urgent concerns. UNDP needs to continue to support the DT in the transition to its gradual autonomy and may have withdrawn its support too hastily.

The periodic **National Human Development Reports** (NHDR) produced by UNDP are widely referred to and foster a culture of open dialogue about the multidimensional nature of poverty and its effect on different groups in the country. It has been a particularly important tool for the Country Office's advocacy efforts, policy advice and dialogue at the national level. Several government agencies, academic circles and NGOs, use the report to inform their respective actions, policy planning and research. One of the main advantages of NHDRs is the richness of their statistical appendix, which has become a standard reference source for national and international actors involved in the development of the country.

Effectiveness of parliament to perform its legislative functions

Parliament continues to be a fragile institution in Honduras and legislators lack, in general, the capacity and resources to elaborate and analyze draft laws, resulting in new legislation inconsistent with existing laws and the Constitution. This adds to the already patchy legal system in Honduras, abundant in lacunae, legal vacuums and contradictory regulations.⁴⁴ UNDP provided very specific technical assistance to Congress in order to establish a database of legislative

⁴² See, J. Avina; S. Membreno Cedillo. *Foro para el Fortalecimiento de la Democracia (FFD): Aprendizaje para la gobernabilidad democrática en Honduras*. 2004.

⁴³ UNDP has been the central source of technical and financial support to the DT since its creation. This enabled mobilizing resources from other donors (i.e: Switzerland, Netherlands, Denmark, Japan, Finland, Canada, UK). US, Chile and Spain provided cooperation through experts. From 2000 to 2003 the total resources received by the DT including UNDPs were 0,8 million dollars.

⁴⁴ National Human Development Report 2002, p. 80.

information that would allow parliamentarians to perform more efficiently their legislative functions. The project installed a computer network, including the provision of technical equipment and computers; and built a database containing all national laws and relevant information. It also assisted different bodies in Congress, providing advice and analysis on legislative issues, trained legislators to assess and analyze bills. Clearly UNDP's assistance to Congress did not achieve much in enhancing the effectiveness of Parliament to perform its legislative functions. Nonetheless, the ADR Team considers that UNDP has taken note of these limitations and has adjusted the nature of its support to Congress. The current strategy is aimed at strengthening the democratization of the political parties and their representation of Hondurans.

Modernization of Armed Forces. Although democracy was established in 1982, in 1998 the armed forces still had influence in the economy if no longer on politics. The challenge for the current government is to strengthen the civilian Secretary of Defense and clearly demarcate civilian and military functions. At the request of the Ministry of Defense, UNDP initiated a project aimed at supporting the reform and modernization of the Honduran Armed Forces. The first initiative consisted in an international audit of the Military Pension Fund Institute and its group of companies (Instituto de Previsión Militar). This initiative was unprecedented not only in the country but in the region as it opened up to scrutiny an area over which the military had a monopoly for the last 50 years. UNDP's support certainly contributed to enhancing the transparency and accountability in the management of the defense budget. Also at the Government's request UNDP initiated another project, which elaborated the "White Book", a document containing the long-term defense policy for the country from a democratic and civilian stance. UNDP also promoted a human rights component as part of the Armed Forces academic and professional studies and training. Admittedly, these projects could not fully overhaul the military culture in Honduras. However, they had the impact of driving home the idea that civilian authority is over and above the military one. The audit also enabled UNDP to build a partnership with the Ministry of Defense that resulted in a series of joint efforts and ongoing initiatives to enhance the democratization of the armed forces.

Institutionalization of reliable, effective and fair electoral processes. A modest financial investment by UNDP in the area of governance has proved to be signifi-

cant in promoting a democratic and fair electoral process. In 1998, electoral institutions, political parties, Congress, and the justice sector were permeated by partisan politics and lack of impartiality. Politics were strongly influenced by a deeply entrenched patronage system through which 'caudillos' (political chiefs) dominated political clienteles. The government plan 2002-2006 included the goal of consolidating participative democracy through the introduction of reforms in the political-electoral system to ensure its objectivity, impartiality and transparency.

In this context, the entry point of UNDP's main intervention was the Democracy Trust, as noted above, to stimulate discussions on the need to reform the political and electoral system. The DT brought together politicians around a negotiating table that later led to the signing of an important political agreement known as the Declaration of the Political Parties to the Honduran People. UNDP provided substantive policy advice, facilitated the discussion among political parties on necessary reforms, and was the only international agency that became involved in such sensitive issue. UNDP also helped to set a commission of jurists with legal experts accredited by the political parties, who assisted in drafting the specific reforms committed to in the Declaration. The drafts were later submitted to Congress for approval. To date all reforms proposed have been passed into laws and there is a real opportunity to make the electoral process more transparent, reliable, and its outcome more representative of the Honduran population. In 2004 a new Electoral Law and the Political Organizations Law was adopted to replace the outdated 1981 law.

The role of UNDP in contributing to a culture of negotiation, dialogue and consensus-building in the country is widely recognized by actors in government, academics, civil society, the international community, and the political parties themselves. UNDP is recognized as having managed the process that led to political agreements with genuine commitment to national needs, neutrality, expertise and respect for plurality and openness. This ability explains why it succeeded in brokering such sensitive arrangements among actors who had traditionally evaded open dialogue towards national priorities. The Declaration was clearly successful in achieving the aims of creating the enabling environment to reform the political and electoral system.

Anti-corruption and transparency. Honduras features very poorly on Transparency International's Corruption

⁴⁵ Manifiesto de los Partidos Políticos al Pueblo de Honduras, September 2001.

Index.⁴⁶ Corruption pervades all levels of government and the provision of public services. In recent years it has grown to the level that weakens greatly the efforts of good governance and seriously affects human development. To combat it the Government created in 2001 with strong support from UNDP and the international community the Honduran National Anti-Corruption Council (NAC) that is composed of civil society and government representatives, as well as the highest authority of the Catholic Church. NAC's main mandate was to design a transparency and anticorruption strategy. This has proved to be a significant contribution towards efforts for endowing the country with a long-term policy in anti-corruption matters. However, the implementation of the policy suffers from the lack of political will.

The support to anti-corruption initiatives and transparency of public administration has been present in UNDP's Country Programme since 1998. The undertakings during CCF1 assisted the Government to improve transparency in public administration through promoting accountability of public servants; strengthening of treasury inspector's office; and improving the oversight systems. CCF2 echoed the national concern about corruption being a major impediment to progress toward development and stated that among its goals was to promote a political climate based on the basic principles of democracy, including transparency, separation of powers, non-corrupt systems of governance and administration.

At the local level, within the framework of the decentralization and local development programme, UNDP has assisted social auditing activities that stemmed from increased demands for transparency. UNDP's contribution was to provide technical advice and capacity building; it was instrumental in creating the first municipal Transparency Committee as a pilot project in one municipality, Santa Rosa de Copan, an example that was replicated further by the initiative of local governments in 30 different municipalities. The municipal processes of social auditing have acquired a life of their own in many municipalities and have become a moral pressure on public servants who feel watched in an unprecedented way. UNDP contributed to the debate among civil society, the Government and political parties on the gravity of corruption and to the institutionalization of the mechanisms such as NAC and the Transparency Committees to demand accountability and transparency. The fact that UNDP was asked by the armed forces to audit their pension fund, a closed stronghold, reflects the trust in UNDP to address sensitive corruption

issues with impartiality. It stands to reason that UNDP efforts alone cannot stamp out corruption in one blow. However, its contribution in raising consciousness for the elimination of corruption is considered in Honduras no small achievement.

Has UNDP sufficiently addressed the key development challenge of poor governance in Honduras? The ADR Team found sufficient evidence that UNDP contributed to building the capacity of public servants, to strengthening public institutions, promoted broad-based policy dialogue, and advocated transparency, democratic decision-making in the public and private spheres, and human development, all of which are essential elements to deepen democratic governance in Honduras. The Government's efforts at good governance would have progressed much more slowly and been much less effective without UNDP's assistance. One cannot pretend, given the particularities of Honduras, that all the intended results regarding its institutions and organizations, not to mention the mindset, have been achieved. The outcomes described above to which UNDP had clearly contributed, however, cannot be underestimated: the consolidation of democratic governance, and ultimately of human development.

3.2 POVERTY REDUCTION AND SUSTAINABLE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

Honduras is a low per capita income country with high preponderance of poverty in rural and urban areas. Poverty reduction became a more pressing issue after the devastating effects of hurricane Mitch. The World Bank and IDB insisted on the need to develop a poverty reduction strategy connected to the initiative of debt relief for highly indebted poor countries (HIPC). During the period under consideration UNDP implemented different types of interventions representing 14% of the office's total outlays. CCF2 aimed to concentrate UNDP's efforts of poverty reduction in rural areas by focusing on policy reforms in the agricultural sector; providing assistance for alternative income-generating options for communities; strengthening the linkages between agro-industry and small farmers; and extending rural credit to small farmers. In practice, this last aspect represented most of UNDP's efforts in the area of poverty reduction. In addition, consolidation of local development management capacity of the municipalities and communities was of vital importance. UNDP defined two outcomes towards which it would orient its activities in the

⁴⁶ The country ranks 106 out of 133 countries in 2003, and scored 2.3 out of 10, although this represents a slight improvement since 1998, when it scored 1.7 in the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) of Transparency International. The CPI is based on a survey to entrepreneurs, academics and risk analysts in a particular country; it reflects the surveyed population's perception regarding the level of corruption; the index ranges from 10 (highly transparent) and 0 (highly corrupt).

area of poverty reduction: one is the development and implementation of an anti-poverty strategy through a participatory process involving the poor themselves; the other is monitoring poverty, by mechanisms to provide statistics and data on poverty-related issues.

This second outcome was pursued by UNDP by providing assistance in setting up the Institute of National Statistics (INE) in 2001, an initiative which was co-financed by SIDA and where UNDP provided the technical expertise. INE overviews the collection of appropriate data and publishes statistics related to various issues, including poverty. This discreet intervention proved a very positive and lasting contribution. The INE is currently functioning, although with limited human and financial resources, and carries out annual household surveys and compiles statistics to inform public policy.

In line with the two above mentioned outcomes, UNDP's strategy to address poverty reduction in the country concentrated on two main areas. First, it supported rural development at the policy level, by providing technical assistance to the Ministry of Agriculture in the formulation of the National Programme for Sustainable Rural Development (PRONADERS) which is the policy framework for all national initiatives related to rural poverty reduction. The bulk of its support to rural development was provided through the execution of projects aimed at strengthening rural communities' capacities to implement local development and in some cases investment projects (funded by IFAD and the Central American Bank for Economic Integration, CABEL).

Second, it provided policy-oriented research and information to facilitate informed policy dialogue during the elaboration of the PRSP and ensured the participation of diverse sectors of society and politics in the country. The preparation of PRSP was a window of opportunity for UNDP to enhance its cooperation with the multilateral cooperation institutions as well as and its advocacy role within the Honduran setting. UNDP provided technical input to the preparation of the document, but more importantly it established policy dialogue mechanisms that ensured the participation of the different strata of the Honduran society, promoting throughout the process a discussion that not only focused on the economic and fiscal aspects conducive to poverty reduction but on the human development dimensions that a poverty reduction strategy should address. Using the vehicle of the Democracy Trust, UNDP organized meetings to obtain technical and long-term political backing of the strategy.

In the rural areas of Honduras where half of the population of the country lives and 72% are considered to be

poor, UNDP contributed to development initiatives in two directions. One was the design and implementation of rural development projects together with IFAD and CABEL, and the other was of decentralization projects with various bilateral donors. UNDP has not been very active in the area of policy dialogue for the reduction of poverty in rural areas, nor did it use its full potential. In terms of institution building UNDP has played an advisory role during the setting up of PRONADERS, National Direction for Sustainable Rural Development (DINADERS) and FONADERS. Although these initiatives have been noteworthy, the ADR Team cannot ascertain whether they in fact yielded the expected outcomes due to the absence of results-oriented evaluations or monitoring reports of these undertakings.

Poverty reduction through rural development: As mentioned above rural development represented the bulk of UNDP's activities to support poverty reduction. These projects were directed to strengthening the management capacity of rural communities to design and implement projects developed by them to reduce poverty. Additionally, UNDP executed different local governance projects funded by external sources, indirectly linked to the rural development initiatives. In short, UNDP's poverty strategy in the rural area was relevant in terms of coverage and in terms of working in joint ventures with key players in rural development (IFAD and CABEL) as mentioned above. The contribution of UNDP to rural development has been undoubtedly important going by the results of some of the projects i.e. job generation through micro rural enterprises, access to credit, citizen participation in strategic planning at the local level (open town hall meeting), etc. However, to objectively assess how effective UNDP's contribution to rural development has been, codified information would be necessary. Assessments were conducted only in a few isolated cases and mostly with a focus on processes rather than on results. The links between decentralization and local governance with the rural development projects would need to be made more explicit and for that both governance and rural development projects should be implemented under a common strategy conducive to explicit results at the outcome level.

Assessment of UNDP's role in poverty reduction strategy. It is rather difficult to isolate and assess UNDP's contribution to the Government's anti-poverty efforts, since many other international agencies and donors work in the same sphere and the outputs of UNDP's projects cannot be separated from theirs. However, two UNDP contributions stand out. One is policy advice, well received both by the central and local governments. The other was its involvement in capacity building and improving the management capacity of the local governments. UNDP did not design specific capacity building programmes or projects;

but the projects implemented have had a capacity-building content. The ADR Team notes that because of the absence of evaluations assessing of capacity building it is unable to assert that capacity building in fact took place.

In a certain sense the activities of UNDP cannot be divorced from its interventions leading to good governance, for good governance and poverty are inextricably connected. Although the intended results at the municipal level can easily be observed, whether or not there has been an appreciable contribution to the reduction of poverty can only be assessed by studies or evaluations that must be undertaken in the near future.

3.3 ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT:

The degradation of the environment is a key development challenge for Honduras greatly brought into perspective by the hurricane Mitch. Nonetheless, environmental issues do not seem to be a high priority for the government. However, UNDP identified quite correctly an overall SRF outcome that aimed at integrating global environment concerns and commitments into national development planning and policy.

CCF1 had as objectives to support policy formulation and the legal and institutional framework to ensure sustainable environmental management; protect productive options in protected areas and consolidate land ownership rights; promote alternative sources of energy; combat pollution and strengthen risk management and preparedness capacities. CCF2 moved into sustainable income generation alternatives; forestry; energy efficiency; water management; and private sector participation. This latter move illustrated how closely environmental concerns are linked with human development concerns of raising incomes and incorporating the private sector into development. The UNDAF focus area reflected earlier environmental concerns and also added access to telecommunications and information technology. UNDP, being an executing body for GEF funds partnered with this organization through the management of the Small Grants Programme (SGP),

which is aimed at promoting income-generating activities at local level. A financial mechanism for the promotion of sustainable development initiatives implemented by civil society organizations has been instituted in partnership with an NGO, Vida. The use of small grants distributed at decentralized levels is an example of some of the synergies that the environment programme has established with other thematic areas, especially with poverty reduction. Funds destined to environmental programmes were rather limited (3% of total outlays) during the period under consideration. About half was destined to bio-diversity projects in priority areas. It is too early to assess the tangible outcomes of all the projects undertaken, since a number of them are still ongoing. However, one outcome stands out as UNDP's major contribution, and that is its contribution to bring global environmental concerns into the national development planning policy through its advocacy and policy dialogue role.

Although recent, another accomplishment related to policy dialogue is the creation of the water platform. An association facilitated by UNDP where a series of stakeholders from civil society, agriculture and environment related associations and universities involved in water management meet to discuss and work towards an integrated response to the problems of water management in the country. In addition, UNDP's provision of technical and legal support to the Law for National Risk Management System and the Certification Process of the New Construction Code promoted by National Emergency Operations Center (COPECO) is another valuable contribution of its support to policy advice. UNDP's stand on environmental issues is fully consistent with its mandate, namely, to promote sustainable human development.

3.4 HIV/AIDS

HIV/AIDS has the potential to be epidemic in Honduras. In fact, the country is considered the third most affected country in the Latin American region with an HIV/AIDS prevalence of 1-2% of its population. HIV/AIDS is more than just an epidemic; it is a social problem that affects

BOX 8: NATURAL DISASTERS

Because of its geographical location Honduras has high risk of natural disasters, such as the dramatic event of hurricane Mitch. The occurrence of natural disasters cannot be controlled. However, the country regards one of the main elements of MPNRT to be the reconstruction of ecological vulnerability and the establishment of an effective programme of disaster prevention and mitigation, as well as risk management. These elements constitute one of the overall targets of PRS.

human development. AIDS is the second leading cause of hospitalization and death in Honduras⁴⁷ and has been the leading cause of death in women on childbearing age since 1997. More than 600,000 were infected; it is also estimated that as of year 2002, 4,200 persons had died from the disease and approximately 14,000 children under the age of 15 have become orphans as a result of this epidemic. The Honduran Government began working towards decreasing the number of HIV/AIDS infections in the late 1980s, when it created the HIV/AIDS department within the Ministry of Health that formulated the first national strategic plan on HIV/AIDS (PENSIDA I). The PENSIDA I had a strong focus on health issues and failed to visualize HIV/AIDS as a development problem.

UNDP has played a key role in positioning HIV/AIDS in the national agenda. As part of its strategy of intervention it has promoted a policy dialogue in order to approach HIV/AIDS as a development issue within the context of poverty reduction and within the perspective of human rights. UNDP has been instrumental in the creation, in 1999, of the National Commission against HIV/AIDS (Comisión Nacional contra el SIDA, CONASIDA) a mechanism responsible for the formulation of national policies related to HIV/AIDS; and in the formulation of PENSIDA II. The human development approach was reflected in the conception of CONASIDA (1999) and in the formulation of PENSIDA II (2002). In the frame of PENSIDA II, the need of civil society's participation in the formulation and implementation of strategies to combat HIV/AIDS was strongly highlighted

UNDP, in addition to succeeding in bringing the problems connected with HIV/AIDS more forcefully into the national agenda, has also been effective in chairing UNAIDS and in managing the global fund for HIV/AIDS. As a coordinator of UNAIDS it has also demonstrated capacity for fostering policy dialogue among the UN agencies and with a remarkable contribution in the preparation of UNDAF, a work that is recognized by the agencies involved in dealing with the epidemic. UNDP has also been effective as the secretariat of the National Forum for HIV/AIDS whose main achievement was to create an enabling environment to allow representation of social sectors that were not included in discussions up until its creation, especially people living with AIDS as well as of different organizations of civil society with an actual or potential role in informing and formulating policies regarding HIV/AIDS. UNDP has also been instrumental in helping the National Forum to facilitate debate and the initiation of a process of awareness on the need to work in a coordinat-

ed manner through a unified response to the disease.

Notwithstanding these results, it is important to point out that HIV/AIDS still needs to be advocated and positioned in the government's agenda. Strategies should be revised in order to ensure that they will be conducive to a decrease in prevalence and incidence rates. The implications of HIV, not only for social but for economic development, need also to be included more explicitly in policy dialogues.

3.5 GENDER EQUALITY

Gender equality is a long-term goal in Honduras. Gender inequality is deeply embedded in the culture of Honduras. One needs to consider not only the inequality in opportunities, resources and rights in the economic and social arenas, for men and women, but also women's poor representation in the political sphere and their scanty participation in the management of the public sector. Both CCFs mention gender equality as a crosscutting thematic area. SRF specifically defines one outcome concerning gender, seeking as a national plan for the advancement of women, jointly adopted, implemented and monitored by the government, legislature and civil society, with time-bound goals.

UNDP's contribution gained momentum after the Beijing conference on women in 1995. The initial impulse to further gender equality came from UNDP when it supported the creation of the National Machinery for Women (INAM). Subsequently the Government enacted the Law of Equality of Opportunities, the Law on Gender Equality in the Rural Areas, and the Law Against Domestic Violence. A national policy on women was defined that included the First National Plan for Equal Opportunities. Hence, from the institutional and legal point of view UNDP's contribution to the outcome has been very significant.

It must be emphasized that UNDP started a project which no other donor agency was willing to undertake, taking the calculated risk of putting forward the issue of gender equality in the public agenda, and facilitating the necessary conceptual, institutional and legal framework to implement this goal, all in an atmosphere that was not accustomed to it. Second, once the UNDP project was completed, INAM succeeded in mobilizing resources on its own. In other words, UNDP's assistance can be considered successful with a fine exit strategy. Despite this valuable contribution, the mission found that UNDP has not mainstreamed gender considerations into most of its programmes in the areas of governance, poverty reduction and environment, except for stand alone interventions as the one analyzed above and some components of the rural development projects targeted to women.

⁴⁷ Country Profile. HIV/AIDS. USAID. Bureau of Global Health. June 2003

BOX 9: INSUFFICIENT IMPLEMENTATION CAPACITY

There is a pervasive concern within the international community regarding the Honduras' capacity to efficiently and fully implement the entire scope of comprehensive programmes, such as PRSP. This concern is based on the country's historically limited capacity which is due to inherently inadequate human resources in the technical, managerial, and administrative fields.

Source: PRSP 2001.

3.6 CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT

Capacity and reduction of poverty leading to sustainable human development are in fact two sides of the same coin. Enhancement of capacity is a key aspect of UNDP interventions to achieve sustainable development. Neither CCF1 nor CCF2 incorporated any specific projects or programmes directed to capacity development in a defined sector. However, as can be surmised from the totality of the programmes related to good governance at the central as well as at the local level, poverty reduction, management of natural resources, and environment, all UNDP's interventions had a hefty component of building the capacity and enhancing capacity and skills of the respective human resources.

This took several forms; some took the form of on-the-job training, others were in the form of workshops, seminars or intensive training courses. Capacity building efforts however did not immediately yield the expected outcomes. In a country like Honduras, where the base line for capacity is rather low and remuneration of public employees is far from satisfactory, capacity built as a strategy addressing is an inducement for those who seek better remuneration outside the government mechanism. Although the ADR Team had the impression that UNDP projects and programmes contributed to capacity building whenever it was incorporated into them, there is no hard evidence available to ascertain it.

In conclusion, the challenge of tackling the issues of HIV/AIDS, gender equality, environmental management, will continue to be long-term concerns, where the active involvement of UNDP and its current resident representative's foresightedness will be indispensable, as was that of the previous one, and will yield results only in the long term, so long as capacity building remains a crosscutting concern in the programmes, with systematic measurable indicators to gauge capacity built as well as its effects on the performance of the institutions or process to which it is expected to contribute.

3.7 RESPONSE TO NATURAL DISASTERS

This programme was designed in response to devastation

caused by hurricane Mitch. UNDP was not equipped at the time to deal with such an emergency. However, though not being an emergency agency, UNDP revised the CCFs by incorporating in them objectives to strengthen the national disaster management system.

The Government's main agency for disaster preparedness and relief is the National Emergency Operations Center (COPECO) that was created in 1990 to deal with national contingencies. It did not respond well to Mitch. By 2000, UNDP assisted 11 municipalities to enable them to coordinate and decentralize the activities of the Emergency Response Committees, thus facilitating local participation in risk management. By 2002 local capacities for risk management were strengthened in at least 4 municipalities in vulnerable watershed areas. UNDP also worked closely with COPECO in the implementation of mechanisms and methodologies for strengthening local capacities in risk management, such as community organization, early warning, contingency plans, drills, and hydrological scenarios.

Moreover, UNDP extended assistance to COPECO in 2002 in the implementation of a System of Certification of Risk Management Initiatives, as part of COPECO's Strategic Five-Year Action Plan in Risk Management Issues. This certification implied the establishment of a series of thematic, geographical and methodological requirements. This certification system is the culmination of a series of actions undertaken by UNDP through its Environmental Unit to make the certifications an essential tool for the coordination of risk management.

UNDP's work on the identification of high-risk areas and the certification of bodies for risk management is a step in the right direction. Moreover, it is very difficult (and expensive) to prepare for all likely catastrophic events. UNDP acted correctly in response to the plight of the Honduran Government in the case of such a colossal disaster. However, it must be kept in mind that UNDP is not equipped to cope with such emergency situations. The impact of UNDP's intervention was limited only to the preparation of a national institution to face future disasters.

The extent to which the national institution is prepared to tackle them can only be seen in the future, should a disaster occur again.

3.8 RESOURCE MOBILIZATION AND STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP: THE BUSINESS CENTRE MODEL

Following the UNDP Administrator's Business Plan, defined in 2000 under the leadership of the Bureau's Strategic Management Team, UNDP initiated a process to professionalize its service products.⁴⁸ One of these products was the establishment of the Business Centre (BC). The general mandate of a Business Centre is to provide support services for the UNDP programme, national and international partners and for agencies of the UN system in a timely and accountable manner in the areas of recruitment, procurement, contracting, finance and other related matters. Its rationale is based on the need to improve service delivery and not necessarily develop new sources of income for a country office. It aims to align country office operations with the Administrator's Business Plan and to increase country office efficiency. The impetus for such a centre may come from the need to support national execution, cost shared activities and the administration of UN agencies.

Business centres are not new in Latin America, as well as in Net Contributing Countries (NCC). They have been in operation in several countries of the region in order to facilitate and speed up a variety of management services, especially related to procurement. The Latin American governments are faced with a rigid legal framework that impedes programme delivery and inflexible recruitment policies and procedures which prevent the governments from recruiting the most qualified personnel.⁴⁹ In this context, BCs have been used by UNDP across the region to enhance the efficiency in the management of large multilateral loans to governments as well as public investments.

The ADR mission aimed to assess the implications of the BC model for UNDP's support to the development of the country. The evaluation sought to answer the following key questions: 1) As a resource mobilization strategy, is the BC allowing UNDP to strengthen its support to the country's human development challenges? 2) Is the BC building national capacities in the long-term, is it helping the government and private sector set policies and structures in place to enhance transparency? Is there an exit strategy; and finally, 3) Is the model sustainable?

In Honduras, the Business Centre was launched as a

new product line in 2001. It substantially differs from the modality of national execution (NEX). Whereas NEX was reactive to Government's request to provide operational support, the BC provides pro-active management support to the Government's public investment projects. By conducting procurement and recruitment processes in a transparent and efficient manner the BC produces timely implementation of projects.

In line with this initiative, in formulating CCF1 the Country Office in Honduras included as one of its objectives the assistance to the enhancement of transparency and public administration. CCF2 refined this objective by moving into the efficient and transparent management of public investment projects, which included capacity building through provisional financial management and procurement services to government institutions. UNDP entered into a strategic alliance with the Government's Presidential Office for Project Follow-up (OPSP- Oficina Presidencial de Seguimiento a Proyectos) and the Government, with the desire to weed out corruption in the procurement process, instructed all ministries to make all the major procurements through UNDP. The intention was to make thereby the process more transparent and to increase efficiency, for the bidding rules are much clearer and transparent if procurements are made through UNDP and the process is more efficient, since it is freed from the red tape of the Government. Such procurement services also have the demonstrative effect of building the capacity of the staff of OPSP. Total execution by OPSP in 2002 was \$53.4 million, out of which almost \$40 million was disbursed through the Centre.

The Business Centre in Honduras allows UNDP to act as an intermediary between Government and recipients in a transparent and non-corrupt manner by handling around 7-8% of public funds. In doing so it charges a fee, which varies between 3.5 to 11% of the cost of procurement, depending upon the complexity of the transaction. This fee is ploughed back to the budget of UNDP in order to finance other projects, after netting out the expenditures incurred by the Centre, as well as for office support.

The BC should not be a permanent fixture of the Country Office, nor can it be. Its very *raison d'être* is to assist the government in putting in place a procurement system that is capable, transparent and efficient. To the extent that this objective is attained and confidence returns to the Government's bidding processes, the centre's function should fade out. In theory, since the great majority of the projects are nationally executed, as capacity is transferred by working side by side with government units, the

⁴⁸ UNDP, Honduras, 'Business Plan: Staying ahead of the Curve', Tegucigalpa, February, 2002.

⁴⁹ UNDP/RBLAC/BRSP, *On Track and on Time*, Partner Series, No.1, 2001.

government entities in charge of implementing them should gradually be able to carry out directly the procurements required.

However, the ADR team did not find a clear strategy on capacity building, nor an exit plan and timeframe. That said, it should be noted that what will also fade out is the revenue supplement the Country Office receives through the fees it collects via the procurement process. This implies only one thing: either the core funds will have to be increased in proportion to UNDP's mandate in carrying out its functions, or UNDP will have to search even more aggressively for non-core funds. The worst scenario would be to have BC perpetuate its activities, which would defeat its very purpose of creating capacity and making the Government establish the necessary mechanisms and have the trained manpower for carrying out its own procurement. But in the interim the activities of the Business Centre, as explained above, are indispensable not only for Honduras, but also in countries where public administration displays characteristics similar to those of Honduras. In that sense, the BC in Honduras may very well be a model to follow in other countries where the core funds of UNDP are extremely limited provided there is a clear need and a clear exit strategy.

It must be mentioned that a BC, while it is functioning, may have an important spillover effect, namely, to con-

tribute to the culture of corporate social responsibility (CSR). In recent history, CSR has acquired a great deal of importance in the developed countries, where the businesses developed a corporate culture to eliminate discrimination by sex, religion and ethnicity and undertook expenses to provide social amenities for the public good. In many developing countries this type of corporate culture is as yet at a germinal stage. Honduras is no exception. Since UNDP stands for non-discrimination, honesty, and good governance, in its dealings with businesses in Honduras via the Business Centre it can contribute in the long run to the understanding, absorption, and eventually practice of a corporate culture that would have social dimensions. Admittedly, this is a slow process. Nonetheless, UNDP perhaps may be considered the only organization in Honduras that may be able to project corporate social responsibility to private sector entities that deal with the Business Centre.

Evidence from this ADR however suggests that in some quarters, such as the World Bank, IDB, the Tegucigalpa Chamber of Commerce and some bilateral donors, reservations are being raised as to the BC's role. The World Bank and IDB feel that competitive bidding should eventually replace BC, while the Chamber of Commerce is of the opinion that BC is draining business from the private sector, and some bilaterals as well as independent sources believe that UNDP is venturing into areas

TABLE 3.A: UNDP HONDURAS CO EXTRA-BUDGETARY FINANCIAL STATEMENT 1998 – 2004 (IN USD)

	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004*
Reserve Opening	658,700	676,400	876,900	1,548,900	2,720,000	3,209,100	4,438,700
Income Received	300,900	832,500	1,504,100	2,084,000	—	—	—
Programme	—	—	—	—	578,148	696,766	579,351
Service Center	—	—	—	—	1,220,952	3,062,734	2,968,514
DPXB Expenditure	-283,200	-632,000	-832,100	-912,900	-1,310,000	-2,529,900	-3,200,000
Net Reserve	676,400	876,900	1,548,900	2,720,000	3,209,100	4,438,700	4,786,565
	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004*
Delivery (in millions USD)	12.1	41.1	44.1	50.5	—	—	—
Programme	—	—	—	—	12.6	16.2	18.5
Service Center	—	—	—	—	41.0	96.3	101.8
Total	12.1	41.1	44.1	50.5	53.6	112.5	120.4

TABLE 3.B: UNDP HONDURAS CO EXTRA-BUDGETARY FINANCIAL STATEMENT 1998 – 2004 (IN USD)

	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004*
Reserve Opening	658,700	676,400	876,900	1,548,900	2,720,000	3,209,100	4,438,700
Income Received	300,900	832,500	1,504,100	2,084,000	1,799,100	3,759,500	3,547,905
DPXB Expenditure	-283,200	-632,000	-832,100	-912,900	-1,310,000	-2,529,900	-3,200,000
Net Reserve	676,400	876,900	1,548,900	2,720,000	3,209,100	4,438,700	4,786,565
Delivery (\$ million)	12.1	41.1	44.1	50.5	53.6	112.5	120.4

Estimated figures for 2004

that are outside its mandate of promoting human development and thus diverting the organization from its priorities and risking its unique neutral stance. The finding of the ADR mission is that such criticisms are unwarranted, and that given the high level of corruption and inefficiency in the Government's handling of the bidding process, attested by the fact that IDB has started its own project to support the government to improve transparency in its tendering processes, procurement processes handled by UNDP are clearly contributing to more transparent and efficient bidding processes, as well as opening up the competition in sectors where previously only a select number of well-connected firms would participate. Nevertheless, the ADR team noted the absence of a progressive and explicit exit strategy in the medium to the long term.

Some interlocutors in Honduras thought that BC not only diverted attention away from UNDP priorities, but was also a drain on UNDP financial resources. In order to evaluate whether the BC enables the CO to fund development activities, it is important to first establish whether the BC actually yielded revenues beyond its costs, to later assess, assuming there were revenues, whether these are used to strengthen UNDP's development programme in any way. Therefore, the ADR Team paid special attention to this issue. UNDP raises funds in five main ways: 1) core funds (TRAC); 2) special funds from headquarters; 3) cost-sharing with the government on projects and programmes (in-kind); 4) executing donor projects; and 5) direct execution of government projects through the national execution process. In Honduras this latter is by far the largest and has been growing rapidly over the past five years.

Figures of revenues generated by BC were not available before 2002, since the CO did not disaggregate revenues derived from the provision of services. As Table 4.1 shows, on a total of \$137.3 million, BC delivery over 2002 and 2003 (and an estimated \$101.8 million for 2004) that the government placed in UNDP hands to organize and carry

out bids for products and services, earnings from the Business Centre to date total \$4.3 million (\$7.3 million including the 2004 estimate of \$2.968 million).

Now UNDP expenditures from extra-budgetary sources increased from \$912,000 in 2001 to an estimated \$3.2 million by 2004. At the same time, UNDP reserves increased from \$2.7 million in 2001 to an estimated \$4.8 million by 2004. Since programme income is falling away, as seen in Table 3a, from \$696,766 in 2003 to an estimated \$579,351 by 2004, it is clear that the increase in reserves of \$2.1 million over 2001 to 2004 can be entirely attributed to revenue raising actions (less costs) of the Business Centre. The Business Centre has generated revenue on its operations over 2001 to 2004. Before 2001, it appeared that the BC charges were less than today; hence, BC was not generating revenue before 2001. The BC is gradually increasing its fees in line with market rates. Further, as reserves have increased over the period, and this is a matter of some pride in the office in Honduras, BC has contributed to the financial sustainability of the office.

A slightly worrying feature is that income from BC was scheduled to fall in 2004, as were non-core programme funds, when costs are expected to increase sharply by \$0.7 million. The ADR team was not able to find out the reason for this, although, as can be seen from the Table 3a, BC's delivery is estimated to increase from \$96.3 million in 2003 to \$101.8 million by 2004.

It should be noted that once the ADR team had established that the BC generates revenue, it could not obtain figures to confirm how much funds from the BC revenues flowed to what number and type of development projects. Records of this are not available in the CO. However, the figures analyzed above provided by the CO reflect that the BC revenues are enabling the CO to be sustainable and thus, are covering much of programme costs.

In balance, BC has several advantages in its functions

in Honduras. It provides a service that the Government definitely needs at this point of time. It enhances the transparency and efficiency of public bidding processes; it helps spread CSR among businesses; it increases UNDP's revenues to be ploughed back into other projects; and in the final analysis makes UNDP an important player in Honduras, which, in turn, gives greater strength and leverage to carry out its mandate. It should be noted that in the ADR team's view, UNDP can contribute in this way so long as it supports projects that are linked to the development agenda of the country; that it does not remain too close to businesses, private or public, in order to ward off any criticism that it is influenced by their interests; and takes all the precautions that in fact it transfers its knowledge eventually to appropriate government agencies that will be endowed with well-trained and able staff.

On balance, the ADR mission felt that with its current constitution BC has made definite contributions to the development process, keeping the caveats mentioned above. Nevertheless, as core funds for middle-income countries such as Honduras run out, a UNDP presence can only be established through innovative approaches. Consequently, the 'entrepreneurial' approach of UNDP is welcome.

The BC model of Honduras as currently constituted is probably not transferable indiscriminately to every country where UNDP operates. However, it stands to reason that in those countries that have similar developmental characteristics to Honduras, where UNDP has a very high reputation, and where corruption historically has permeated the government and business culture, the BC model could certainly be applicable.

4

UNDP's Strategic Position and Relevance of its Programmes

Honduras is among the main recipients of official development assistance in the Latin American and Caribbean region. Fifteen bilaterals, two regional banks, the World Bank, IMF, EU and several UN agencies work in the country to address Honduras' key development challenges and to enhance human development, stimulate the economy, improve democratic governance and promote environmental sustainability. UNDP, despite its limited financial resources, has been a key player and a government partner in its quest for overall development. This chapter analyzes how UNDP strategically positioned itself to contribute to Honduras's development efforts.

The ADR mission assessed three key factors to determine the organization's strategic positioning in the country: 1) responsiveness of UNDP's programmes and support to national actors to the development needs of the country; 2) relevance of UNDP's support and interventions in relation to the country's development priorities and needs; and 3) partnership strategies forged to address the development priorities facing the country.

4.1 UNDP PROGRAMMES AND NATIONAL PRIORITIES.

UNDP's support has been governed by two CCFs. The first covers the period 1998-2000, and the second the period 2002-2006. The first was extended in 2001 so that the second would coincide with the period of the new government. Both CCFs focus on three thematic areas: 1) poverty reduction, 2) democratic governance, and 3) environment and sustainable development.

Fostering democratic governance has been the priority for the government and has been the mandate of UNDP, an organization that is recognized for its strategic role in three key aspects: as a facilitator of policy dialogue and agreements leading to important political and institutional reforms; for encouraging and supporting the national post-Mitch agenda from one focused solely on reconstruction to one addressing transformation for sustainable development; and for providing substantial policy advice that resulted in institutional strengthening. UNDP in Honduras is perceived as an actor in the national arena, ready to engage in sensitive issues and to open up traditional bastions of power. UNDP's tenet that good governance will ultimately enhance human development is widely shared by Hondurans in the public, private and civil society sectors. From all quarters the ADR mission confirmed that UNDP's stance, namely, that institutional, political and legal reform will eventually have a positive influence on governance, which in turn will lead to improved human development, is relevant and responsive to development priorities as defined by Hondurans.

Poverty is widespread in Honduras and its reduction has been in the government's programmes since the nineties. UNDP's global mandate is to promote human development. In Honduras through its role as advocate and policy advisor, it has succeeded in enhancing the government's awareness on the multifaceted nature of poverty. UNDP's human development reports and publications have contributed to and fostered open dialogues on the multidimensional nature of poverty and have identified how poverty affects different groups in the country. The analysis of the causes of poverty, specifically in Honduras, and alternative ways to reduce poverty at the national level are topics that the HDR should deal with in the future.

Based on the trust it succeeded in earning from all sectors of society in Honduras, UNDP has been able to tackle some key issues that bilateral donors would support but would hesitate to address directly, in particular, the modernization of the armed forces, anti-corruption, justice, electoral and political reforms, gender equality, HIV/AIDS, and citizen empowerment through influence in policy decision-making and decentralization.

4.2 RESPONSIVENESS OF UNDP AND RELEVANCE OF ITS PROGRAMMES

Hurricane Mitch had profound effects on the Honduran society and affected the views held by various social sectors and the relationships among them. After the hurricane, UNDP had a key role in galvanizing consensus among different institutions and social actors in the government, the political parties and religious and civil society, and the international community regarding the unique opportunity that the emergency opened to re-build the country upon a different basis and to improve transparency in the government, the judiciary and the political system, enhancing equity, citizens' participation and environmental protection.⁵⁰

UNDP built upon the agreements forged through the Stockholm declaration that echoed national priorities regarding a new agenda for transformation, and used its leverage through advocacy and policy advice to help define new and profound reforms in the area of governance. It was instrumental in creating the Democracy Trust, a key entry point for UNDP to promote dialogue, ensure the participation of different sectors of society, and build consensus on key reforms. This public discussion forum led to the negotiation among presidential candidates from the five political parties and signature, in 2001, of the "Declaration of the political parties to the Honduran people".

This document is a compendium of the principal political, electoral and institutional reforms the country needed, the main ones of which have been approved, or under process of being approved. UNDP also facilitated the discussion that led the political parties to sign a "National Transformation Agreement for Human Development in the 21st Century" that set out the main paths the country should follow. These agreements constituted important pressure tools that civil society has used to put pressure on political parties to comply with the commitments to reforms they publicly signed.

UNDP's role and its responsiveness in this process cannot be overstated. Given its neutral stance, UNDP was in a unique position as a facilitator as well as a leader, and had the moral strength to call upon the parties to fulfill their roles and reach an agreement that would benefit the development of the country. All the stakeholders, as well as the donor community have recognized UNDP's crucial importance in view of the emerging realities facing Honduras. One particular aspect reflecting the relevance of the UNDP programme was its contribution to the reform of the electoral system, a reform that may eventually make the Parliament a body that will represent more efficiently and effectively the plurality of the views that prevail in society. It is generally agreed that these reforms are crucial for the future and that they could not have been achieved as effectively without UNDP programmes.

Another relevant area in which UNDP made an important contribution and that constituted core activities in the realm of governance was its support to newly created governance institutions, such as the Public Prosecutor's Office and the National Human Rights Commissioner's Office, and directing significant resources to the decentralization process that began with the past governments. UNDP also played an essential role in the creation of the National Institute for Women (INAM) and the National Statistics Institute (INE).

One issue that has been particularly important and politically sensitive in the area of governance has been the question of transparency in the administration of public procurements. Indeed, providing services to the Government in the handling of public tenders and procurement processes for state programmes, particularly in the areas of health and telecommunications have been noteworthy. No doubt, UNDP's relevance and responsiveness in this particular area has been a double-edged sword. While assisting the Government in the handling of procurements through the Business Centre its efficiency and transparency have been occasionally questioned. Although UNDP has

⁵⁰ CEDOH, 2004: *Gobernabilidad en Honduras*. Background paper presented to UNDP.

a system of checks and balances to ensure its integrity and the mission could not find evidence to back the critics' claims, it did ascertain that UNDP's involvement with procurement processes of such large dimensions does present a risk for UNDP's reputation of neutrality and that this has to be carefully handled.

Clearly, governance gives UNDP a highly relevant and visible position in the country, both vis-à-vis the Government as well as other international and donor agencies and civil society. The preponderance of the outlays dedicated to good governance may have pushed the poverty reduction, environment and natural resource management to a second place. These are certainly two areas in which Honduras should concentrate further; they also correspond to the core mandate of UNDP. However, good governance is a *sine qua non* for all other areas to be operative, and the Country Office's insistence on concentrating a major part of its resources on activities leading to good governance is sound and in the long-term conducive to sustainable poverty reduction. However, UNDP should dedicate more efforts to making explicit the links between the governance effects and poverty, in the design, implementation and evaluation of results of its programmes and projects.

4.3 STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS FOR DEVELOPMENT OUTCOMES

UNDP has succeeded in developing a series of activities with the purpose of mobilizing an important group of actors to accelerate the actions taken for the development of the country. For this purpose it has created multifaceted linkages and synergies with international donor agencies, decision makers in the public and private sector and civil society organizations.

First, UNDP has interacted actively and has excellent relationships with other donor agencies in coordination instances, the most important being the G17 (Consultative Group for the Reconstruction and Transformation of Central America), originally formed by five countries in 1998 immediately after hurricane Mitch. It has also joined thematic roundtables formed around the PRSP. Representatives of donor agencies who have worked in Honduras as well as in other countries have pointed out that the general level of coordination among agencies in Honduras is very high, and different international stakeholders see the role of UNDP as very positive and as *primus inter pares*.

Second, the linkages and synergies between UNDP

and the different government agencies have also been very strong. UNDP has supported many diverse activities undertaken by different ministries and, as stated above, has been instrumental in the creation of institutions such as the National Institute for Women (INAM) and the National Statistics Institute (INE). In general UNDP has a significant presence in the public sector of the country. Moreover, by participating in decentralization policies and projects it has developed strong links with many different municipalities that are controlled by different political parties, and strengthened its position as a neutral actor.

Third, UNDP has also established partnerships with NGOs in the process of national transformation.⁵¹ The most important work with NGOs has been the creation and further development of the Democracy Trust Fund that has strived to promote very significant political changes in the country. UNDP has also worked with the National Convergence Forum (FONAC)⁵² and, to a lesser extent, with the labor unions. With political parties UNDP's role was crucial in facilitating the process of dialogue and consensus building that led to the signature of key political agreements based on a common framework in different areas for the development of the country.

With respect to partnerships within the UN system, UNDP is one of the players in the process of preparing UNDAF documents. The first document was elaborated in 2001 with the active participation of FAO, IOM, WHO, WFP, ITU, UNFPA and UNICEF under the coordination of the Resident Coordinator. The framework covers a wider number of issues than the CCFs due to the participation of the specialized agencies, each with a specific area to cover. The document specifies the priority themes that will be covered by the UN system, particularly in relation to PRSP. UNDAF proposes to carry out three important missions. One is to facilitate the coordination among participating UN agencies, the second is to plan the actions to be taken by the respective agencies, and the third is to generate, with the consensus of the agencies, a joint work programme. The first UNDAF document, as well as the successive ones, shows a great deal of parallelism between the strategic areas of PRSP and UNDAF's priority themes. However, the degree of cooperation within the framework of UNDAF cannot be treated any more than a document of joint intentions which holds true in Honduras as well as in many other countries.

One important area where UNDP has established linkages and developed synergies with third parties is in mobilizing resources; this process has taken different forms. As stated earlier, between 1998 and 2003 UNDP's expendi-

⁵¹ Avina, J. and S. Membreño, S., *Aprendizaje para la Gobernabilidad Democrática en Honduras. Foro para el Fortalecimiento de la Democracia*. Tegucigalpa, 2004.

⁵² UNDP/RBLAC/BRSP, *On Track and on Time*, Partner Series, No.1, 2001.

tures totaled US \$310.4 million, of which only US \$13.7 million (less than 5%) were core funds; the rest was mobilized from external resources. Clearly, UNDP has been extremely successful in mobilizing funds. The modality of expenditure varies. One of these modalities refer to the agreements UNDP established with CABI and IFAD, the main players in rural development in Honduras, for the implementation of rural development projects funded by the already mentioned organizations. The role of UNDP in designing, implementing and evaluating these projects is seen to be still marginal (participation in some technical issues at the appraisal level, managing contracts of personnel and providing technical assistance in the field from time to time). The main value of the partnership established with CABI and IFAD is the revenue UNDP obtains for managing part of the funds invested in the projects. Although this is undeniably important and should continue, the question whether UNDP is playing a relevant role and bringing value to its partners and to actual projects remains valid. UNDP should participate in dialogues to decide in which areas of rural development it is worth intervening and under which approaches; as well as promote and participate in sound evaluations that would allow the use of evaluative evidence for policy dialogue as well as for improving actual interventions.

Another modality is executing public tenders and procurements on behalf of other bilateral donors or aid agencies that do not have the infrastructure in the country so as to carry out these activities by themselves. In both modalities UNDP has been working closely with the development agencies of several developed countries, such as Canada, Finland, Italy, Japan, Spain, Sweden among others, USAID, IFIs (World Bank, IDB, CABI) and other UN agencies.⁵³

The importance of UNDP's presence in the country would have been enormously decreased would it not have had access to these additional funds that, by and large, cover most of its programme management activities. UNDP's significant presence in the country allows it to exercise the role of broker, facilitator and generator of ideas, a role that it has exercised successfully in the past. However, the future may be uncertain regarding the aid environment and the possibilities for mobilizing resources from partners. Some donors are beginning to deliver funds as direct budget support, for they believe that particular national institutions are

now in a position to execute the projects themselves directly. For example, the Honduran Social Fund (FHS) has traditionally utilized directly the funds it receives from the World Bank and lately INAM has been doing the same thing with funds it receives from the Swedish Cooperation Agency (SIDA). As Honduras effectively develops higher capacities to identify development problems, articulate and implement timely and effective solutions, UNDP's external sources may decrease. While this in a way is an indicator of its own success, it signals the need for UNDP to develop clear exit strategies and to constantly reassess its role.

4.4 COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE

As indicated previously, despite the limited amount of its core funds, UNDP is a key player in Honduras. This stems from its comparative advantage with respect to some other international development partners in the country. This advantage is at least threefold. First, UNDP is perceived as a neutral development partner that can provide independent technical advice to the Government and civil society as a whole. This is due not only to the successive high quality national human development reports it has prepared. UNDP also has the ability to draw upon a large pool of top-level international experts. Its independent advice is also appreciated since it is not political which seems to be the case with the IFIs and most bilaterals who need to support their government's agendas. The authority it provides to its Resident Representatives allows them to be flexible enough to respond promptly to new developments in the country. Although UNDP was criticized for not responding quickly enough to hurricane Mitch, this criticism was greatly muted when its support to improved governance in the country became highly visible.

Second, UNDP's international reputation as an institution committed to transparency, better governance and against corruption has allowed it to emerge as a trusted partner in combating one of the country's most pressing issues, that of corruption. This has allowed UNDP to become highly visible and successful in conducting around 7% of government purchasing activities, as reflected in Chapter 3 where the Business Centre is assessed.

Third, given that Honduras is a medium level developed country, one could expect that it could draw upon sufficient development expertise from its own population;

⁵³ The question whether non-core resources in fact determine the nature and the number of UNDP projects was posed in the past. An earlier study (UNDP/OE, *Evaluation of UNDP Non-Core Resources*. New York, 2001) has dispelled the misgiving that UNDP, despite the preponderance of non-core funds, did not digress from its mandate. The Honduran case is another example of non-digression where linkages with other donors can be classified into three groups. First are donors who request administrative and managerial services from UNDP in order to carry out their programme, since they do not have capacity in situ. Second are donors who have specific themes that coincide with the priorities of UNDP. The third group consists of funds that UNDP specifically seeks from other donors in order to enhance its own resources for the execution of its programmes. A review of the first CCF found no digression of UNDP from its mandate and the mix very satisfactory. See, Misión de Revisión de Marco de Cooperación, 1998-2001. Tegucigalpa, agosto 2001.

hence, a local development institute at a lower cost might replace some functions of UNDP. Yet, the critical mass of personnel that UNDP provides, coupled with its consistent message that it is an organization that will support countries in their quest to reduce poverty, makes it possible for the organization to be in constant dialogue with the government and advocate human development, so that it can carry out its mandate of reducing human poverty.

5

Lessons Learned and Recommendations

The previous chapters have assessed UNDP's overall performance and its contributions to development results in Honduras. They also assessed UNDP's strategic positioning and the extent to which it has used its comparative advantage to effectively address the challenges and contributed to the country's development effectiveness.

During the period 1998-2004, UNDP programmes covered the areas of democratic governance, poverty reduction, natural resource and environmental management, and issues that ensued after hurricane Mitch. UNDP also distinguished itself in mobilizing resources considerably over and above its core resources to finance its programmes in the priority areas. It has also focused on long-term development goals by assisting institutions and organizations with particular emphasis on good governance. It has earned the respect and the trust not only of the government, but also of many diverse sectors of civil society and the private sector. The bilateral and multilateral agencies perceived it as a neutral and trustworthy partner, a perception also shared by the government. On balance, UNDP's performance, as well as its overall strategic positioning and contribution to development results in Honduras, is significant and positive.

This chapter first pays attention to the lessons learned from UNDP's experience during the period under consideration. It is hoped that they will be of use to UNDP in programming its future activities and be conducive to strengthening its performance, results and effectiveness. By the same token they may be of use for other country offices in countries where the socio-economic conditions are similar to those of Honduras.

5.1 CONCLUSIONS AND EMERGING ISSUES

This section outlines some of the lessons learned in Honduras from UNDP's support to development results and some good practices identified by the development partners. The brief inventory of lessons it contains may not do justice to the richness of UNDP development experiences in Honduras; nevertheless, it attempts to focus on those aspects that could be useful for the future progress of the country, as well as replicable in other countries.

- **As a neutral development partner UNDP established high visibility.** UNDP's influence in Honduras far exceeds what its financial resources would have permitted; moreover, it has been very effective in promoting ideas, especially with respect to democratic governance with some tangible results. Its efforts in the area of poverty reduction do not appear to be as successful as in the governance area. This may very well be due to poor linkages between poverty reduction projects and governance and human

development projects, and because UNDP did not fully exploit its capacity and positioning to facilitate policy dialogue on poverty reduction at the national level. Poverty reduction is a long-term process and the assistance provided by any organization, including UNDP, can only be marginal unless it is combined not only with the assistance from all quarters, but with the government's strong commitment. UNDP cannot tackle alone this complex issue. Another lesson that can be drawn from UNDP's experience in Honduras is that for this organization to be influential in such a sensitive area as governance, it must earn the trust and respect of the decision-makers, as well as that of the civil society in any country where it operates.

- **UNDP successfully mobilized funds for development.** UNDP's success in mobilizing funds is twofold: joint efforts for programme finance with bilaterals and multilaterals; and functioning of the Business Centre whose revenues supplement its total funds. UNDP has been able to attract funds from other development agencies to execute projects. As core funds shrink there is indeed pressure on Country Offices to supplement their own funds; and that is fraught with the danger that UNDP may deviate from its mandate. There are also the potential risks not only to its reputation but also in terms of the opportunity costs to its development programme that might be relegated to a second place. However, UNDP programming during the years under consideration shows that the programmatic focus has been fairly consistent and there are no areas of activity that appear to be clearly outside of UNDP's competence and concern. Some areas into which the BC went into (e.g.: procurement of x-ray equipment for customs in the maritime ports) could be seen as far from the development agenda which UNDP should be prioritizing and supporting; but the development programme and its component projects are for the most part, as mentioned before, relevant and consistent with the country's development priorities and UNDP's mandate. In other words, the Country Office experience shows that it is possible to mobilize funds from other development agencies without largely deviating from corporate mandates, although close attention needs to be paid for BC operations not to overshadow the efforts in the development programme.

Given the success of the Business Centre in Honduras, the model is worth considering for other countries to implement as well where socio-economic conditions are similar to those of Honduras. But the Honduras experience shows that Business Centres cannot be a permanent

fixture of the UNDP offices. They are bound to wane as governments increase their capacity to perform the operations currently undertaken by the Business Centres. While in operation BC should expand and deepen relationships with the private sector, especially for the purpose of financing projects directed to poverty reduction while advancing corporate responsibility practices that can help make operations in the private sector more transparent and a significant contribution to further human development in the country.

Capacity development is a long-term and systematic process. Capacity development is a key aspect of UNDP interventions. However, in a country like Honduras, where there is dearth of capacity and a large staff turnover within the government bureaucracy after each election capacity development is bound to be an activity that will have to be systematically and strategically conducted and that should not be confined solely to training. UNDP programmes in Honduras did contain capacity building provisions, but the absence of evaluations, baseline data and benchmarks to gauge progress make it difficult to assess the effectiveness of the projects and the sustainability of their outcomes. The lesson one can draw is that capacity building will be a slow process and success can only be measured if quantitative and qualitative measurements of capacity building are explicitly incorporated into the projects and programmes.

- **Human Development Reports are extremely valuable tools for contributing to meaningful dialogues in the country.** The preparation of the National Human Development Reports with their diagnoses of development issues and their quantitative contents have become an important tool and venue for policy dialogues with the Government as well as the civil society. With the statistics contained therein they became a standard reference for practically all the donor community. National Development Reports of good quality are very valuable tools that put the country offices on the map.
- **The main drivers of poverty reduction programmes in Honduras have been the IFIs.** UNDP contributed to these programmes as a facilitator of policy dialogue, a role that has been remarkable in the PRSP process. But its role in developing alternative poverty reduction proposals was rather weak. These measures can be more effective if the role of UNDP combines and links its advocacy and policy dialogue role with projects specifically aimed at poverty reduction, incorporating in them gender equality and HIV/AIDS concerns.

5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS

The findings and the conclusions of the ADR Team lead to a number of recommendations that are given below. These recommendations must not be viewed as exhaustive. They are rather directed to enhance the strategic positioning of UNDP in Honduras in order to meet the future development challenges in the years to come.

Strengthening programme effectiveness

UNDP's programme focus should be sharpened. The UNDP programme cannot support every issue in all areas. It has a recognized expertise in governance, while other agencies have expertise in environmental issues. The ADR mission recommends that UNDP should start new areas to complement and fortify its existing programmes in its major areas, governance and poverty reduction. These would be:

- *Enhance skill formation and capacity.* Project document design should incorporate qualitative and quantitative indicators that can be monitored and evaluated. In particular, the expected results and the strategies of capacity building need to be made explicit in UNDP projects. Institutional needs must be assessed. Training courses must be clearly identified, as must the individuals who attend them. The courses must also be monitored and their outcomes measured through tracer studies. Ad-hoc advisory activities and knowledge codification and dissemination together with training should be the main components of a capacity building strategy. Partners for capacity building should also be sought.
- *Continue the interventions in governance.* UNDP should continue supporting the process of strengthening democratic governance towards promoting human development in the three areas it has been working in: rendering the political system more transparent and representative, enhancing efficiency in public management of state institutions; improving citizen security and increasing access to justice. In the area of decentralization, the approach to local development should foster the strengthening of local governance by giving priority to the attainment of productive and economic development outcomes. Fostering participation at the local level, and providing municipal training in public management, albeit important, cannot supersede the goal of facilitating opportunities for pro-poor economic growth. Linking local governance initiatives to rural development efforts could lead to positive results in this direction.
- *Improve technical expertise in the area of poverty reduction and rural development.* The ADR mission noted that UNDP's technical input into the PRSP discussions as

well as into its own programmes did not have a completely consistent approach in better targeting the poor. In order to enhance its intervention in this area it recommends that a strategic approach to poverty reduction should be devised that can draw on PRSP and that UNDP should suggest positive actions for the Government to act upon. The approach should identify differential strategies for the various strata composing the population living in poverty, rural as well as urban, and define the institutional setting under which it will operate. UNDP should link poverty reduction appropriately with the human development approach. An appropriate employment generation strategy needs to be developed. UNDP should use its policy advice role in the design of this strategy, which should integrate rural development together with that of poverty reduction, and link it logically to governance projects, so that they should be implemented under a common strategy. UNDP should exploit its synergies with those organizations that are active in executing specific projects that are well monitored and sustainable.

- *Enhance the linkage between governance and poverty.* The link between governance and poverty was not explicit in the UNDP programme and should not be ignored if improved governance is to be linked to the reduction of poverty. The ADR mission recommends that UNDP should support governance that emphasizes poverty reduction and local governance capacity development. This may be done at three levels: (i) At the design level governance interventions should be substantively rooted in poverty concepts and goals; (ii) At the functional level necessary linkages should be made and synergies ensured between the implementation of governance and poverty projects, programmes and outcomes; (iii) At the results level, UNDP's interventions in governance should be monitored and assessed to ensure that they actually have a positive effect on poverty.
- *Prioritize market oriented development alternatives.* One way to facilitate opportunities for pro-poor economic growth at the local level is by supporting municipalities to align local development with the PRSP's priority actions focusing on enhancing productivity and access to markets.
- *Reduce standalone projects to the minimum and enhance systematic monitoring and evaluation.* The ADR Team noticed that UNDP's overall work was organized more around the projects rather than development outcomes. It is important that the next CCF should strive to organize the work within the concept of development outcomes. Also, the weak culture of systemic assessment of monitoring and evaluation be adhered to and carried out for all important programmes.

- **UNDP should mainstream a gender perspective.** The mission noted that despite some standalone intervention such as the institutional support for the creation of the national women's machinery a gender perspective had not been systematically built into projects and programmes. In the future a gender perspective should be incorporated into all programmes and projects. This implies that UNDP's projects and activities in all programmatic areas should assess the implications of any planned action for women and men, integrating their concerns in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of UNDP's programmes, and in its efforts for advocacy, knowledge management, and policy dialogue with its partners. Incorporating a gender perspective in key issues such as HIV/AIDS becomes paramount.

Strategic Partnerships and Resource Mobilization

The role of the Business Centre should be reviewed. The Business Centre has been a success and could become a potential 'model' that could be replicated in other Latin American countries and, possibly, worldwide. The ADR mission strongly supports the gradual transformation of the Business Centre from one that only deals with procurement to a greater engagement with the private sector through implementing business partnerships, especially for executing the projects directed to poverty reduction, within the overall framework of Corporate Social Responsibility. Re-focusing of the Business Center should not endanger resource mobilization. However, it is important that UNDP makes explicit the links between the BC's activities and the benefits it brings to the country in development terms. This will also allow for better targeting the scope of projects undertaken and focusing on taking on those that support areas of the national development agenda. The BC strategy should also make explicit the timeframe and its exit strategy. This would quell criticisms and risks of tainting UNDP's reputation of neutrality.

UNDP should integrate a broader spectrum of civil society groups and NGOs. This should be carried out in order to have them share in the participatory mechanisms UNDP helped to put in place through the different governance interventions at the national and local levels. This implies increasing citizens' ability to organize themselves collectively towards transforming the present structural relations of power and acquiring sustainable institutional capacity to identify, articulate and act on their own concerns and aspirations. In the same vein UNDP would do well by continuing to support the Democracy Trust in the process of developing national ownership of the initiative

as well as local leadership that can spearhead this valuable dialogue platform.

Partnership with other development agencies should be enhanced and should not lose momentum. UNDP has been successful in establishing partnerships with various donor agencies. However, the degree and relevance of its contribution to different partners is uneven. Since core funds and funds from partners are likely to decline in the future, UNDP should continue to foster its relationships with other development agencies without violating its mandate and tarnishing its neutrality and by seeking to a more substantive and relevant contribution.

5.3 CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

During the period under review, UNDP has risen from a marginal to a key player in Honduras and has often punched above its weight. It has not aligned itself with any particular political party and remained engaged but impartial in the political arena of the country. In Honduras, every change in administration brings new faces to the senior positions of the civil service. This generates new governance challenges, for past achievements in capacity development may be lost and UNDP may have to start again to train the new civil service cadre. These challenges are not UNDP's problem alone but suggest that capacity building in Honduras for now has to be a continuous process and UNDP will need to work closely with government and other key partners on this front.

Operationally, UNDP faces its own budget challenge, which is to continue to leverage its meager resource base with extra-budgetary funds without compromising its integrity and reputation as a development agency. This careful path between taking risks without alienating the wider public is a difficult one to tread. Nevertheless, the general high quality of leadership of UNDP together with systemwide checks and balances means that it is well placed to continue to take measured risks and should be encouraged to do so.

UNDP's comparative advantage lies in being a spokesperson for human rights: political, economic and social. In an environment of distrust, corruption and crime, because of its mandate and impartiality, UNDP is well placed to support openness and transparency. Through careful advocacy and keeping an eye on the human development ball, UNDP will, and should, continue to be an essential player in the future.

ANNEX I: SUMMARISED TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR ADR HONDURAS

The overall objectives of the Assessments of Development Results are to:

1. Support the Administrator's substantive accountability function to the Executive Board and serve as a vehicle for quality assurance of UNDP interventions at the country level.
2. Generate lessons from experience to inform current and future programming at the country and corporate levels.
3. Provide to the stakeholders in the programme country an objective assessment of results (specifically outcomes) that have been achieved, or are likely to be achieved, through UNDP support and partnerships with other key actors for a given multi-year period.

The purpose of the evaluation is to review the experience of UNDP in Honduras; draw lessons learned and recommend improvements. The Assessment of Development Results in Honduras will:

- Provide an overall assessment of the results achieved through UNDP support and in partnership with other key development actors during 1998-2003 with a view to results that are on track to be achieved during the current country programme period (through 2006). The evaluation should also draw links from current achievements to early UNDP interventions before 1998, as appropriate. The analysis should focus on how and why the results were achieved to draw lessons, with particular attention to:
 - Show how UNDP support was used to support Honduran governance reforms and processes, including political and electoral reforms, judicial and legislative reforms, security, modernization of armed forces, decentralization and local development
 - Examine how effective UNDP support was in contributing to poverty reduction (including building capacities in participatory planning by communities, support to policy dialogue mechanisms to include civil society and political parties in the PRSP formulation, as well as the incorporation of the HIV/AIDS strategy into the PRSP), rural development and environmental protection (including the implementation of programs in the field of clean technologies, sustainable alternatives for the generation of income through sustainable use of natural resources)
 - Look at the contribution of UNDP support to donor coordination and brokerage in advancing development results and how UNDP's assistance is contributing to build government capacity to administer multilateral resources for strategic development initiatives and better

manage public investment projects with IFIs.

- Provide an analysis of how UNDP has positioned itself strategically to add value in response to national needs and changes in the national development context, with particular attention to:
 - The entry points and strategy selected by UNDP in support to the critical issues in Honduras, namely democratic governance, poverty, environment and disaster management, gender and UN System coordination, focusing on UNDP's role as neutral broker and facilitator of dialogue around critical governance issues and broker of agreements among key stakeholders to advance necessary reforms.
 - The key strategies of the current country programme;
 - The cooperation with different groups of development partners.
- Based on the analysis of achievements and positioning above, present key findings; draw key lessons and provide clear and forward-looking recommendations in order to suggest effective and realistic strategies by UNDP and partners towards intended results.

The evaluation will undertake a comprehensive review of the UNDP programme portfolio and activities during the period of review. Specifically, the ADR will cover the following:

- Ascertain the relevance of UNDP support on national needs, development goals and priorities, including linkages with the goal of reducing poverty and other Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). This may include an analysis of the perceived comparative strengths of the programme, a review of the major national challenges to development. This aims to ascertain the added value of UNDP support in effectively influencing national development results, through, for example, prioritization; selection of strategies and entry points.
- Assess how UNDP has anticipated and responded to significant changes in the national development context, affecting governance and reform; poverty and social development; as well as sustainable development. The Evaluation may, for example, consider key events at national and political level that influence the development environment; the risk management of UNDP; any missed opportunities for UNDP involvement and contribution; efforts of advocacy and policy advice; UNDP's responsiveness vs. concentration of efforts etc.
- Review the synergies and alignment of UNDP support with other initiatives and partners, including that of the

United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF); the Global Cooperation Framework (GCF) and the Regional Cooperation Framework (RCF). This may include looking at how UNDP has leveraged its resources and that of others towards results, the balance between upstream and downstream initiatives and the work on MDGs.

- The Evaluation should consider the influence of systemic issues, i.e. policy and administrative constraints affecting the programme, on both the donor and country programme sides, as well as how the development results achieved and the partnerships established have contributed to ensure a relevant and strategic position of UNDP.

Development Results

- Provide an examination of the effectiveness and sustainability of the UNDP programme, by: (a) highlighting main achievements (outcomes) at national level in the last five years or so (some results have their origin in efforts prior to 1998) and UNDP's contribution to these in terms of key outputs; (b) ascertaining current progress made in achieving outcomes in the given thematic areas of UNDP and UNDP's support to these. The evaluation should qualify the UNDP contribution to the outcomes with a fair degree of plausibility, and consider anticipated and unanticipated, positive and negative outcomes. It should also gauge the contribution to capacity development at the national level to the extent that it is implicit in the intended results, as well as national ownership as success factor. The assessment will cover the key results and support in all thematic areas (governance, poverty, environment, gender, HIV/AIDS, special development situations, UN system and any other areas as appropriate (See strategic areas of support on Annex II).
- Identify and analyze the main factors influencing results, including the range and quality of development partnerships forged and their contribution to outcomes, the provision of upstream assistance and how the positioning of UNDP influences its results and partnership strategy.
- Assess the anticipated progress in achieving intended outcomes, with regard to the SRF Outcomes (see Annex II); the 2002-2006 Country Programme objectives and proposed future programmes and objectives and the MDGs.

- Based on the in-depth study accomplished by the local research institution on democratic governance,⁵⁴ provide analysis and identify the key challenges and strategies for future interventions in this area. This choice was based on several factors: 1) the relevance of the process of strengthening democratic governance in the Honduran context; 2) the comparative advantage of UNDP and its consistent and significant involvement in this area; 3) the complexity of the governance elements to be analyzed –i.e.: political and electoral reforms, judicial and legislative reforms, security, decentralization and local development and their interconnections and synergies with other areas; 4) the limited availability of comprehensive evaluative, in-depth studies –based on outcome assessment framework– that analyze how the elements of governance relate to each other, and thus, how they should be approached by interventions that intend to influence outcomes, and implications for UNDP's future strategies.

Lessons Learned and Good Practices

- Identify key lessons in the thematic areas of focus and on positioning that can provide a useful basis for strengthening UNDP support to the country and for improving programme performance, results and effectiveness in the future. Through in-depth thematic assessment, present good practices at country level for learning and replication. Draw lessons from unintended results where possible.

Methodology

The assessment will employ a variety of methodologies including desk reviews, stakeholder meetings, client surveys, and focus group interviews and select site visits. The Evaluation Team will review national policy documents and overall programming frameworks (including the UNDAF, CCF I, current Country Programme, SRF/ROARs, PRS, etc.), which give an overall picture of the country context. The Team will also consider any thematic studies/papers, select project documents and Programme Support Documents as well as any reports from monitoring and evaluation at country level, as well as available documentation and studies from other development partners. Statistical data will be assessed where useful. The empirical evidence will be gathered through three major sources of information: perception, validation and documentation according to the concept of 'triangulation'.

⁵⁴ The area proposed for in-depth focus in Honduras is democratic governance. The study will have two main components: the first will analyze the key national development results during the past five years, while the second will focus on achievements accomplished and comparative advantages of UNDP in order to propose strategic recommendations of areas and interventions UNDP could pursue in the future, towards the goals of deepening democratic governance. The analysis will focus on key elements within governance, namely: Political and electoral reforms; Decentralization and local development within the framework of the Poverty Reduction Strategy; Security, Justice and Modernization of the armed forces; and Transparency and Anti-corruption.

A wide stakeholder consultation and involvement is envisaged. The Evaluation Team will meet with Government Ministries/institutions at central and regional level, research institutions, civil society organizations, NGOs and private sector representatives, UN Agencies, Bretton Woods institutions, bilateral donors, and beneficiaries.

The Team will visit field/project sites in a representative sample of states and communities. Possibilities, in addition to Tegucigalpa, include the least developed regions particularly for their importance to many of UNDP's initiatives, including support to the decentralization process and the implementation of poverty reduction strategies and rural development initiatives. These and other field visits will be selected based on, inter alia: (a) strategic importance; (b) the possibility to observe a number of UNDP support in the region; (c) the importance for poverty reduction, and (d) the selected scope areas.

In terms of methodology, the ADR will follow the guidance issued by the Evaluation Office, and consist of preparation (with preliminary desk review, programme mapping, TOR proposal, exploratory mission to the Country Office, theme-specific desk research and local studies and research); conducting the ADR by the country evaluation mission; and use of the ADR and follow-up (dissemination, corporate discussions, country office management response, stakeholder consultations, learning events).

Preparatory work at the local level will be carried out in advance to provide a substantive background for the Evaluation Team. This will include an analysis of achievements and challenges in democratic governance. This study will be conducted by a local research institution, which will include the conduct of select surveys of key partners through questionnaires. This work may entail the review of available reports, collecting additional documentation, conducting select interviews, field visits and analysis and brainstorming. This work will be based on specific TOR in addendum to these generic terms of reference.

Expected Outputs

The main expected output is the comprehensive final report on "Honduras Country Evaluation: Assessment of Development Results", including relevant annexes with detailed data.

Towards the end of their Mission, and prior to leaving the country, the Evaluation Team will discuss its preliminary findings and recommendations with the Resident Representative and the CO staff and present these to the Government and partners at a meeting of key stakeholders. The Team will use this feedback to finalize the report.

ANNEX II: HONDURAS STRATEGIC RESULTS FRAMEWORK – OUTCOMES AND OUTPUTS

OUTCOMES	OUTPUTS
G1-GOVERNANCE	
SGN1 Dialogue that widens development choices SASN2- Increased public debate on sustainable human development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ National Human Development Report disseminated ■ Global Human Development Report disseminated
SGN2 Key Governance Institutions SASN1- Parliament: Increased effectiveness of parliament to perform its legislative functions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Establishment of CIEL (Center for Study of Legislative and Investigative studies) to provide timely information for legislators to make informed decisions and be able to draft/discuss/pass sound laws.⁵⁵
SASN2- Electoral systems: Institutionalization of reliable, effective and fair electoral processes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Creation of an enabling environment for discussion, negotiation and consensus-building between representatives of political parties and civil society on specific electoral reforms; ■ Draft bill on electoral reforms submitted to Congress
SASN3- Justice: Fair and efficient administration of justice	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Need to identify weaknesses of judicial system ■ Personnel of the Human Rights Commission and the Special Prosecutor's Office trained to investigate and resolve complaints from the general public
SGN3 Local governance SASN1– Municipal Development: Planning and budgeting processes at sub-national levels reformed to more effectively incorporate community level perspectives, participation and needs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ 5 urban municipalities and 27 rural municipalities equipped with the necessary tools and mechanisms to achieve efficiency in the management of their own resources, both human and financial, through participatory planning process and enhanced resource base ■ Feasible municipal decentralization scheme systematized, published and discussed at national level
SGN4 Public sector	
SASN2 - Financial management: Auditing and an efficient and transparent management of the budget and funds of the Armed Forces	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Definition and implementation of proposals to improve the administrative management, efficiency and transparency of the Armed Forces ■ Role of the Military Pension Fund redefined to guarantee efficiency and transparency in the management of the pensions of the military
SASN3 - Aid coordination: Increased government capacity to administer multilateral resources for strategic development initiatives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Expanded support services to the government to enhance their capacity to manage public investment projects with IFIs, particularly during the electoral period (2001-2002)

⁵⁵ Although this outcome and corresponding outputs are not stated in the SRF, the outcome is included in the Partnership Strategy Framework and progress towards it is reported as "changes in outcome indicator", though not classified as outputs.

OUTCOMES

G2- POVERTY REDUCTION

SGN1 National Poverty frameworks

SASN1-Poverty Reduction Strategies: National anti-poverty strategy developed and implemented through a participatory process involving, in particular, the poor themselves

SASN3 - HIV/AIDS: National poverty reduction strategies address the impact of HIV/AIDS on development and poverty eradication

- National Programme to reduce rural poverty through participatory planning of communities developed and resources mobilized
- Policy dialogue mechanism implemented to ensure direct participation of major political parties in PRSP formulation
- Policy dialogue mechanism implemented to promote discussion and incorporation of HIV/AIDS strategy in PRSP implemented

G3- ENVIRONMENT

SGN2 Instruments for Environmentally Sustainable Management

SASN2 - Global conventions and funding mechanisms: Global environment concerns and commitments integrated in national development planning and policy

- National and regional programmes in the field of clean technologies formulated and in operation
- Sustainable alternatives for the generation of income through the appropriate use of natural resources designed

Source: Honduras SRF/ROAR Outcomes and Outputs, 2000

ANNEX III: INTENDED DEVELOPMENT RESULTS 1998 – 2006

UNDP THEMES	CCF '98-'00 + CCF EXT. '01 OBJECTIVES	CCF '02-'06 OBJECTIVES	UNDAF '02-'06 FOCUS AREAS	SRF OUTCOMES
GOVERNANCE	<p>Reform and modernization of the state</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Promote rational use of natural resources Create National Statistical system Strengthen and reform judiciary Establish civil police Support government decentralization and promote citizen participation <p>Transparency of public administration</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Accountability of public servants Strengthen institutions Combat tax evasion Improve customs collection and oversight systems <p>Promotion of democratic ideas</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Strengthen capacity of media and CSOs 	<p>Structural political and institutional reforms</p> <p>Judicial, Electoral, Congressional and Military reform.</p> <p>Decentralization</p> <p>Strengthen local government management capacity and increase local participation</p> <p>Promote transparency by supporting National Anti-corruption Committee</p> <p>Efficient and transparent financial management of public investment projects</p> <p>Capacity building through provision of financial management and procurement services to government institutions</p>	<p>Democratic Governance</p> <p>Modernization and decentralization of the state</p>	<p>Policy dialogue</p> <p>Increased public debate on sustainable human development</p> <p>Electoral systems</p> <p>Institutionalization of reliable, effective and fair electoral processes</p> <p>Parliament</p> <p>Increased effectiveness of parliament to perform its legislative functions</p> <p>Justice</p> <p>Fair and efficient administration of justice</p> <p>Participation at sub-national level</p> <p>Planning and budgeting processes at sub-national levels reformed to more effectively incorporate community level participation and needs</p> <p>Financial management</p> <p>Auditing and efficient and transparent management of the budget and funds of the Armed Forces</p> <p>Aid coordination</p> <p>Increased government capacity to administer multilateral resources for strategic development initiatives</p>

UNDP THEMES	CCF '98-'00 + CCF EXT. '01 OBJECTIVES	CCF '02-'06 OBJECTIVES	UNDAF '02-'06 FOCUS AREAS	SRF OUTCOMES
POVERTY REDUCTION	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase coverage and quality of educational and health services • Foster production and job generation in rural and urban small firms • Policy support of HIV/AIDS • Provision of info and services for human development to CSOs 	<p>Policy reform in the agricultural sector</p> <p>Provide alternative income-generating options</p> <p>Strengthen linkage between agro-industry and small farmers</p> <p>Consolidate local development management capacity</p> <p>Extend coverage of credit to small farmers</p> <p>Reduce physical vulnerability and promote equity of rural poor</p> <p>HIV/AIDS* Ensure broad-based, multisectoral response to epidemic nationwide through HIV/AIDS Forum</p>	<p>Economic growth Research macro-economic impacts on poverty reduction</p> <p>Education/ HIV/AIDS Increase coverage, equity and quality of services</p> <p>Infant and Maternal Mortality</p> <p>Population, migration and human settlements Strengthen national statistical system on demographic data Support migrant and displaced populations</p> <p>Food and nutritional security</p>	<p>Poverty reduction strategies National anti-poverty strategy developed and implemented through a participatory process involving the poor themselves</p> <p>HIV/AIDS National poverty reduction strategies address the impact of HIV/AIDS on development and poverty eradication</p>
ENVIRONMENT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support policy formulation and legal and institutional framework • Promote productive options in protected areas and consolidate land-ownership rights; • Promote alternative sources of energy; • Combat pollution • Strengthen risk management and preparedness capacities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Promote sustainable, income-generation alternatives • Assist government in sustainable management of forestry resources • Promote energy efficiency • Introduce adequate watershed management system • Promote private sector participation 	Environment and sustainable rural development	<p>Global conventions and funding mechanisms Global Environment concerns and commitments integrated in national development planning and policy</p>


UNDP THEMES	CCF '98-'00 + CCF EXT. '01 OBJECTIVES	CCF '02-'06 OBJECTIVES	UNDAF '02-'06 FOCUS AREAS	SRF OUTCOMES
GENDER	<p>Strengthening civil rights to promote participation of women. Promote gender mainstreaming in public policy.</p> <p>Target job generating interventions to benefit women</p> <p>Reduce women's workload and improve their living conditions</p>	Strengthen National Institute of Women and UNDP-HIV/AIDS forum	<p>Reproductive Health Improve access to quality and equal education programs and health services</p> <p>Gender equity in the economic, political and social realm.</p>	<p>National action plans National action plan for the advancement of women, jointly adopted, implemented and monitored by government, legislature and civil society, according to time-bound goals</p> <p>Capacity development National disaster reduction and response system operational</p>
SPECIAL DEVELOPMENT SITUATIONS	Strengthen capacities on risk management and preparedness	Strengthen national disaster management system	<p>Disaster prevention, risk reduction and management</p> <p>Strengthen local and national preparedness</p>	
UNDP SUPPORT TO THE UN				<p>Rc system Mobilization of UN partners to adopt common positions on development issues and achieve concrete development outcomes through the UNDAF</p>

Sources: Country Cooperation Frameworks for Honduras (CCF'98-'00, CCF Extension for '01 and CCF '02-'06); United Nations Assistance Framework (UNDAF) '02-'06; Honduras SRF List of Outcomes.

*Note: There is not a specific UNDP theme for HIV/AIDS. In following the ROAR schema of SRF goals, HIV/AIDS was placed under 'Poverty Reduction'.

ANNEX IV: HONDURAS AID RECEIPTS AND UNDP COUNTRY PROGRAMME DELIVERY

FIGURE 1: SUMMARY OF DELIVERY FOR HONDURAS BY SRF GOAL 1998-2003*



* Note: The distribution of UNDP financial allocation by goals is based on delivery.

Source: UNDP Honduras CO.

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FIGURE 2: TOP TEN DONORS OF GROSS ODA FOR HONDURAS (2001-2002 AVERAGE)

	US\$ millions
1. United States	1 f
2. IDA	90
3. Japan	86
4. IDB	79
5. Spain	35
6. Sweden	21
7. EC	19
8. Germany	16
9. Netherlands	13
10. Norway	11

FIGURE 3: NET OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE RECEIPTS

Receipts	1999	2000	2001	2002
Net ODA (US\$ million)	818	450	679	435
Bilateral share (gross ODA)	43%	66%	61%	65%
Net ODA/GNI	15.6%	7.8%	10.9%	6.8%

Source: OECD, World Bank

ANNEX VI

TABLE 5.1 SWOT ANALYSIS OF UNDP, HONDURAS

Strengths	Weaknesses
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ High visibility and positioning as neutral broker of political agreements ensuring inclusiveness. ■ Credibility and trust across the board. ■ Innovativeness and risk-taking. ■ Excellent and influential relationship with the Government. ■ Leadership in Human Development concept, a reference to the development community. ■ Not just a project executor, but involvement as an actor in key national issues and politics. ■ Participation in donor coordination and harmonization of cooperation efforts. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Does not follow Macro/Meso/Micro approach in projects ■ Competing for resources and “business center” activities seen as creating a parallel structure to public administration ■ Weak efforts in developing local capacities. ■ Poverty definition leads to poor targeting. ■ No monitoring of capacity development.
Opportunities	Threats
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Support the implementation of political and electoral reforms passed. ■ Diversification of strategic partnerships by identifying committed stakeholders in Government and civil society. ■ Introduction of employment strategy and linking it to poverty reduction. ■ Better linkage of governance programme to poverty reduction. ■ Redefine role but ensuring sustainability of Democracy Trust. ■ Deepening of justice sector reforms and coordination with other Security/ Prosecution organizations ■ Building trust between civil society/armed forces & police. ■ Transforming BC into a genuine instrument of development. ■ BC continues to generate programme funds through innovative methods such as applying a CSR model. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Possible compromise of its neutrality to advance its interests (BC). ■ Undermining of relationships (social capital) with donors and other actors due to lack of clarity/ information regarding procurement activities. ■ Risk of tilting balance between development programmes and resource mobilization and consequent loss of image as development agency. ■ Hostility of sectors affected by UNDP’s anti-corruption and procurement activities. ■ Becoming less of a key player as programme funds diminish.

ANNEX VI: EVOLUTION OF UNDP PLANNING FRAMEWORKS 1998-2007

Introduction

This note briefly lays out the different corporate planning instruments developed at different times and applicable during the timeframe covered by this evaluation. Different systems mandated the planning of UNDP's interventions at the country level from 1998 to present. These changes are rooted in UNDP's shift towards results based management (RBM), which has been gaining momentum and evolving since 1999.

The ADR process aims to validate UNDP's contribution to results in Honduras and its strategic positioning over a period of six years (1998-2003). It assesses how well UNDP has done in the past, and to what extent there has been progress towards the expected outcomes pursued. The ADR intends to provide clear strategic directions for future UNDP interventions, and anticipate whether the country programme is on track to achieving expected development outcomes. The time frame covered here, both retrospectively (1998 to 2003, CCFI and part of CCFII) and prospectively (2003 to 2006, remaining timeframe of CCFII), straddles different corporate planning systems.

In 1999 UNDP began the effort of mainstreaming RBM as a management strategy or approach through which the organization meant to ensure that its processes, products and services contributed to the achievement of clearly stated results.⁵⁶ This was pursued through a major initiative of reform with the goal of demonstrating how and in which areas the organization was making a measurable contribution to poverty reduction. RBM is intended to provide a coherent framework for strategic planning and management by improving learning and accountability.

Programme Planning and Evaluation instruments

Multi-Year Funding framework (MYFF): An overarching corporate framework that sets the strategic programme focus –strategic goals and service lines– to be pursued by the organization, and the corresponding budget allocated for the period it encompasses. MYFF responds to the organization's effort to sharpen the programmatic focus of UNDP and operationalizes it into a framework integrating programme objectives, resources and outcomes within the corporate priorities and focus. The MYFF provides the context for UNDP Country office operations, as the outcomes they set should be aligned with both the MYFF strategic goals

and service lines, and those set in the Regional Cooperation framework (which sets goals and strategic areas of support particular to a region and the countries it includes). The strategic goals and service lines embodied in the current MYFF have been influenced by the MDGs, which represent the overarching basis for all of UNDP activities during this period, country level demand for UNDP support as reflected in the UNDAFs, the SG's efforts towards UN reform –simplification, harmonization and coordination of all UN activities at the country-level, and the move towards operational effectiveness initiated with the first MYFF in 2000. The first MYFF covered 2000-2003, and the present one is 2004-2007.

UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF):


This lays the foundation for cooperation among the UN system, government and other development partners in a planning and resources framework defines common objectives, indicators and activities for the country programmes and projects of UN agencies. The first UNDAF for Honduras covers 2002-2006.

Country Cooperation Framework (Country Programme or CCF): Based on the results and lessons of past cooperation in the country, it sets the objectives, programme areas and expected results that UNDP plans to achieve over a period of three to five years. Before 1999, CCFs focused less on expected results and stayed at the level of thematic areas of support and proposed strategy. CCFI for Honduras covers 1998 to 2001 and CCFII covers 2002-2006.

Country Office Strategic Results Framework (SRF) and Result Oriented Annual Report (ROAR): Each country selects a series of strategic outcomes⁵⁷ towards which its interventions (i.e.: programme, projects, activities, soft-assistance) will be geared during a country programme period. It identifies corresponding outputs and indicators to measure progress towards the outcomes. It also includes information on strategic partners and baseline information for the indicators selected. This system was implemented in 2000, and the ROAR (self assessment of progress towards outcomes pursued) was elaborated by COs from 2000 to 2003. In 2004 there will be no ROAR in Honduras, the attempt to narrow the focus of what proved to be too loose definitions of outcomes by COs and an impossible aggregation of results at the corporate level, resulted in a new MYFF and different reporting requirements.

⁵⁶ Handbook on Monitoring and Evaluation for results, UNDP Evaluation Office, 2002.

⁵⁷ See definitions below on different levels of outcomes.

PLANNING ARCHITECTURE FRAMING UNDP PROGRAMMES ⁵⁸

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Definitions

National development outcomes ⁵⁹

These are development changes that a programme country has sought to pursue. They are based on the MDGs and other international development targets, and are usually found within national planning frameworks or strategies. National development outcomes can have different target dates for achievement, depending on the baseline situation, level of ambition and operating context.

UNDAF outcomes

These are development changes that the UN country team collectively seeks to achieve as their combined contribution to selected national development outcomes. While national development outcomes may have a seven or 10 or 15-year

time horizon, UNDAF outcomes speak of results to be achieved within the five-year programming cycle. The United Nations system is collectively accountable for these outcomes, working in collaboration with the Government and other development partners, and must be able to demonstrate progress toward their achievement.

Country programme outcomes

These are the core results that UNDP seeks to achieve over a five-year period through its interventions in development conditions that occur between the completion of outputs and the achievement of impact.⁶⁰

Outputs

Outputs are the products and services that result from the completion of activities within a development intervention.

⁵⁸ It should be noted that the pyramid intends to reflect the different levels (i.e.: corporate, regional, country) at which the different planning frameworks are generated. It does not imply that one level is operationally contained by the next one.

⁵⁹ National development outcomes are variously referred to as national MDGs, MDG targets, 'MDG+' targets, impacts, national outcomes, &c.

⁶⁰ Both terms are harmonized with the Executive Committee members of UNDG and consistent with the OECD/DAC 'Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results-based Management, 2002.

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Juan Angel Meza

Municipal Tourism Commission, La Esperanza, Intibuca

Arely Margot Lopez

ANNEX VIII: MDGS AND HONDURAS PROGRESS

HONDURAS COUNTRY PROFILE

		1990	1995	2001	2002
1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger		<i>2015 target = halve 1990 \$1 a day poverty and malnutrition rates</i>			
Population below \$1 a day (%)		—	—	—	—
Poverty gap at \$1 a day (%)		—	—	—	—
Percentage share of income or consumption held by poorest 20%		—	—	—	—
Population below minimum level of dietary energy consumption (%)		18.0	18.3	17.0	—
Population below minimum level of dietary energy consumption (%)		23.0	—	21.0	—
2. Achieve universal primary education		<i>2015 target = net enrollment to 100</i>			
Net primary enrollment ratio (% of relevant age group)	89.1	90.2	87.6	—	—
Percentage of cohort reaching grade 5 (%)		—	59.8	—	—
Youth literacy rate (% ages 15-24)		79.7	82.5	85.5	85.9
3. Promote gender equality		<i>2005 target = education ratio to 100</i>			
Ratio of girls to boys in primary and secondary education (%)		102.5	—	—	—
Ratio of young literate females to males (% ages 15-24)	103.0	103.4	103.8	103.8	—
Share of women employed in the nonagricultural sector (%)		—	—	—	—
Proportion of seats held by women in national parliament (%)		10.0	8.0	9.0	9.0
4. Reduce child mortality		<i>2015 target = reduce 1990 under 5 mortality by two-thirds</i>			
Under 5 mortality rate (per 1,000)		61.0	49.0	38.0	—
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)		47.0	39.0	31.0	30.9
Immunization, measles (% of children under 12 months)		90.0	89.0	95.0	—
5. Improve maternal health		<i>2015 target = reduce 1990 maternal mortality by three-fourths</i>			
Maternal mortality ratio (modeled estimate, per 100,000 live births)		—	220.0	—	—
Births attended by skilled health staff (% of total)		45.4	54.9	—	—
6. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases		<i>2015 target = halt, and begin to reverse, AIDS, etc.</i>			
Prevalence of HIV, female (% ages 15-24)		—	—	1.5	—
Contraceptive prevalence rate (% of women ages 15-49)	46.7	50.0	61.8	—	—
Number of children orphaned by HIV/AIDS		—	—	14,000.0	—
Incidence of tuberculosis (per 100,000 people)		—	—	90.6	—
Tuberculosis cases detected under DOTS (%)		—	—	61.0	—

7. Ensure environmental sustainability*2015 target = various (see notes)*

Forest area (% of total land area)	53.4	—	48.1	—
Nationally protected areas (% of total land area)	—	9.9	6.0	6.4
GDP per unit of energy use (PPP \$ per kg oil equivalent)	4.2	4.6	5.3	—
CO2 emissions (metric tons per capita)	0.5	0.7	0.8	—
Access to an improved water source (% of population)	83.0	—	88.0	—
Access to improved sanitation (% of population)	61.0	—	75.0	—
Access to secure tenure (% of population)	—	—	—	—

8. Develop a Global Partnership for Development*2015 target = various (see notes)*

Youth unemployment rate (% of total labor force ages 15-24)	7.4	5.2	—	—
Fixed line and mobile telephones (per 1,000 people)	—	31.3	83.3	—
Personal computers (per 1,000 people)	—	3.2	12.2	—
General indicators				
Population	4.9 million	5.6 million	6.6 million	6.8 million
Gross national income (\$)	3.5 billion	3.6 billion	6.0 billion	6.2 billion
GNI per capita (\$)	710.0	640.0	910.0	920.0
Adult literacy rate (% of people ages 15 and over)	68.1	71.7	75.6	76.2
Total fertility rate (births per woman)	5.2	4.8	4.1	4.0
Life expectancy at birth (years)	64.9	65.6	66.0	66.1
Aid (% of GNI)	15.8	11.0	10.8	—
External debt (% of GNI)	130.5	129.6	80.8	—
Investment (% of GDP)	22.9	31.6	30.5	—
Trade (% of GDP)	76.1	92.1	93.1	—

Source: World Development Indicators database, April 2002

Note: In some cases the data are for earlier or later years than those stated.

Goal 1 targets: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less than one dollar a day. Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger.

Goal 2 target: Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling.

Goal 3 target: Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education preferably by 2005 and to all levels of education no later than 2015.

Goal 4 target: Reduce by two-thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five mortality rate.

Goal 5 target: Reduce by three-quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal mortality ratio.

Goal 6 targets: Have halted by 2015, and begun to reverse, the spread of HIV/AIDS. Have halted by 2015, and begun to reverse, the incidence of malaria and other major diseases.

Goal 7 targets: Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programs and reverse the loss of environmental resources. Halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water. By 2020, to have achieved a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers.

Goal 8 targets: Develop further an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial system. Address the Special Needs of the Least Developed Countries. Address the Special Needs of landlocked countries and small island developing states. Deal comprehensively with the debt problems of developing countries through national and international measures in order to make debt sustainable in the long term. In cooperation with developing countries, develop and implement strategies for decent and productive work for youth. In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to affordable, essential drugs in developing countries. In cooperation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new technologies, especially information and communications.

Source: World Bank

ANNEX IX: ABBREVIATIONS

ADR	Assessment of Development Results
BC	Business Center
CCA	Common Country Assessment
CCFI	First Country Cooperation Framework (1998-2000)
CCFII	Second Country Cooperation Framework (2002-2006)
CO	Country Office
COPECO	National Emergency Operations Center
CSR	Corporate Social Responsibility
DT	Democracy Trust
GEF	Global Environmental Facility
G17	Consultative Group Consultative Group for the Reconstruction and Transformation of Central America
IDB	Inter American Development Bank
IFI	International Financial Institution
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INAM	National Institute for Women (Instituto Nacional de la Mujer)
INE	Nacional Statistics Institute
NAC	National Anti-corruption Commission
NHDR	National Human Development Report
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
ROAR	Results-Oriented Annual Reports
SIDA	Swedish International Development Agency
SRF	Strategic Results Framework
MYFF	Multi-Year Funding Framework
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UPE	Unidad de Prospectiva y Estrategia

ove Office of
Evaluation
and Oversight



Country Program Evaluation

Honduras

2011-2014



Inter-American Development Bank
November 2014

This Country Program Evaluation (CPE) with Honduras covers the period between January 2011 and April 2014 and is the fourth occasion on which the Office of Evaluation and Oversight (OVE) has evaluated the Bank's program with the country. Previous evaluations covered the periods 1990-2000 (document RE-263), 2001-2006 (document RE-328), and 2007-2010 (document RE-390). Under the Protocol for Country Program Evaluation (document RE-348-3), the main goal of a CPE is to *"provide information on Bank performance at the country level that is credible and useful, and that enables the incorporation of lessons and recommendations that can be used to improve the development effectiveness of the Bank's overall strategy and program of country assistance."*

The current country strategy (document GN-2645) was approved in November 2011 and does not coincide with the country's political cycle. President Porfirio Lobo's administration was in office from January 2010 to January 2014. IDB Management expects to submit a new country strategy to the Board of Executive Directors in December 2014.

The evaluation is structured into four chapters, plus an annex. Chapter I analyzes the general context of the country. Chapter II provides a general analysis of the Bank's program between January 2011 and April 2014, with particular attention devoted to the relevance of the country strategy and an analysis of the program actually implemented. Chapter III provides a sector-based analysis of the implementation, effectiveness, and sustainability of operations and of progress made toward the Bank's proposed strategic objectives. Chapter IV presents conclusions and recommendations.

Country Program Evaluation:

Honduras 2011-2014

Office of Evaluation and Oversight (OVE)



Inter-American Development Bank
October 2014



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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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ELECTRONIC ANNEX: FIGURES AND TABLES

ABBREVIATIONS

BANHPROVI	<i>Banco Hondureño para la Producción y la Vivienda</i>
CABEI	Central American Bank for Economic Integration
COALIANZA	<i>Comisión para la Promoción de la Alianza Público-Privada</i> [Commission for the Promotion of Public-Private Partnerships]
COPECO	Comisión Permanente de Contingencias [Standing Committee on Contingencies]
CNATEL	National Telecommunications Commission of Honduras
CPE	Country Program Evaluation
DEI	<i>Dirección Ejecutiva de Ingresos</i> [Honduras Revenue Agency]
EIRR	Economic Internal Rate of Return
ENEE	<i>Empresa Nacional de Energía Eléctrica</i> [National Electricity Company]
ERSAPS	<i>Ente Regulador de los Servicios de Agua Potable y Saneamiento</i> [Drinking Water and Sanitation Services Regulatory Authority]
FEREMA	<i>Fundación para la Educación Ricardo Ernesto Maduro Andreu</i> [Ricardo Ernesto Maduro Andreu Foundation for Education]
FHIS	<i>Fondo Hondureño de Inversión Social</i> [Honduran Social Investment Fund]
GDP	Gross domestic product
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IHCAFE	<i>Instituto Hondureño del Café</i> [Honduran Coffee Institute]
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INJUPEMP	<i>Instituto de Jubilaciones y Pensiones de los Empleados y Funcionarios del Poder Ejecutivo</i> [National Institute of Retirement and Pensions for Public Officials and Government Employees]
KDF	Korean Development Fund
MER	<i>Mercado Eléctrico Regional</i> [Regional Electricity Market]
NSG	Non-sovereign guaranteed
PBL	Policy-based loan
PRONEGOCIOS	<i>Programa de Fomentos a los Negocios Rurales</i> [Rural Business Development Program]
SANAA	<i>Servicio Autónomo Nacional de Acueductos y Acantarillados</i> [Autonomous National Water and Sanitation Service]
SDC	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
SEFIN	Ministry of Finance
SESAL	Ministry of Health
SG	Sovereign-guaranteed
SIAF	Integrated Financial Management System
SOPTRAVI	<i>Secretaría de Obras Públicas, Transporte y Vivienda</i> [Ministry of Public Works, Transportation, and Housing]
VPC	Vice Presidency for Countries
VPS	Vice Presidency for Sectors and Knowledge

The evaluation was carried out by a team under the direction of Cheryl W. Gray, consisting of Pablo Alonso, José Claudio Pires, Oliver Azuara, Miguel Soldano, Alayna Tetreault-Rooney, Saleema Vellani and Christopher Willoughby, with support from Patricia Sadeghi. This evaluation would not have been possible without the collaboration of many individuals. The team is especially grateful for the time and support provided by Honduran government officials, members of civil society, and Bank personnel from the local office, for their generosity and dedication which far exceeded expectations. Finally, the team would like to thank their OVE colleagues for editing the preliminary drafts of the evaluation and providing valuable feedback.



Honduras is Central America's second poorest country, it has the region's lowest productivity, and poor quality capital formation.

© Nan Palmero, *Blue Skies over Tegucigalpa, Honduras, March, 2014*
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Executive Summary

CONTEXT AND BANK STRATEGY

Honduras has been facing a series of economic, social, and institutional challenges. At the economic level, growth has been slow since the financial crisis, with low productivity and expenditure rigidity, and the economy remains dependent on the U.S. economy and vulnerable to weather events, pests, and natural disasters. A deteriorating fiscal position has led to increases in the debt and the cost thereof, and has made it impossible for the Government of Honduras to reach a new agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) since the last agreement expired in 2012. In the social sphere, the levels of poverty and inequality are notably high as are the levels of violence and crime. At the institutional level, the limited management capacity of public institutions should be noted.

The period under evaluation began just a few months after the end of the “pause” declared by the Bank in its relations with Honduras due to the 2009 political crisis. This meant a significant increase in approvals in 2010 and a high volume of balances to be disbursed, before the start of the period. This increase in resources to be executed, along with the country’s institutional weakness and its traditionally low portfolio performance, promised to make implementation a great challenge.

The deterioration of the fiscal position could jeopardize the country’s borrowing capacity and affects the financial sustainability of many of the Bank’s operations. The Bank has undertaken significant efforts to improve fiscal performance through support for measures to control spending on payroll and social welfare institutes, increase tax revenues and improve public financial management, and support for reaching a new agreement with the IMF. Despite these efforts, the fiscal deficit has grown to higher-than-expected levels.

THE BANK'S PROGRAM FOR 2011-2013

The Bank's country strategy proposed working on five priority sectors, for which it defined strategic objectives while leaving open the possibility that operations would be conducted in other sectors. The Bank also approved four operations that were not associated with any of the priority sectors in the country strategy. The five priority sectors identified in the country strategy were: (i) public management; (ii) financial system; (iii) social protection; (iv) health; and (v) energy. The country strategy also opened up the possibility of Bank support for implementation of the 2011 2012 Comprehensive Policy on Coexistence and Citizen Security and determined that the private sector, through its four windows, could address the following areas: (i) support to financial intermediaries, credit lines for exports; (ii) support for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in agriculture, manufacturing, tourism, finance, and textiles; and (iii) support to the agroindustrial sector, and to health, low-income housing, higher education, and ports through public-private partnerships (PPPs). The four approved operations not associated with the five priority sectors in the Bank's country strategy were in the transportation, urban development, and education sectors, along with one operation to support the census.

The bulk of the lending program targeted primarily the social area, and there was a significant increase in loans to the private sector. Total approved operations amounted to US\$690 million. Of the operations approved during the period, 74% were sovereign guaranteed loans, including ten investment loans and two policy-based or programmatic loans; 4% corresponded to 40 nonreimbursable technical-cooperation operations; and 16.7% to non-sovereign guaranteed (NSG) operations. Of the total of US\$514.3 million in sovereign guaranteed (SG) operations, 80% (US\$409 million) was concentrated in the social sector, whereas approvals in the areas of financial markets and infrastructure accounted for approximately 8% (US\$40 million) each, and modernization of the state accounted for 5% (US\$25 million). During the period, the amount of NSG loans increased approximately six times, from US\$20 million during the previous period to US\$115 million between 2011 and 2013. Of the US\$115 million in NSG operations, 48% corresponded to trade operations and the rest to financial market operations and business development (26% each).

During the country strategy period, the Bank maintained its financial presence in the country, made an effort to target its intervention, and, despite the difficulties faced, managed to significantly improve portfolio execution thanks to the adoption of a project-specific risk management approach. The level of approvals was consistent with the most favorable scenario anticipated in the country strategy. The increased volume of loans and improved disbursements increased the Bank's financial significance in the country as compared to the previous period. Bank disbursements have amounted to more than 30% of the country's total public investments since 2011, reaching as high as 40%. Honduras's debt to the Bank represents approximately two thirds of the country's debt to multilateral development banks. In addition, the Bank's presence

went from 16 to 10 sectors. Lastly, portfolio management has improved substantially, with significant improvements in nearly all management indicators, thanks to actions taken by both the Honduran government and the Bank, primarily related to adopting a contextualized approach for each project and managing the corresponding risks. Average disbursements between 2011 and 2013 were nearly three times higher (i.e. US\$265.6 million) than the previous average. Despite the increase in the level of approvals, this produced a gradual decline in balances to be disbursed to US\$543.7 million at the end of 2013.

Nonetheless, responding in a more strategic and integrated manner to the country's development problems remains a challenge. The improper functioning of certain elements related to the Bank's structure, processes and incentives, diagnosed in the Evaluation of the Results of the Realignment, hindered coordination between sectors and between the Vice Presidency for Countries (VPC) and the Vice Presidency for Sectors (VPS) in the preparation of the country strategy. As a result, the country strategy does not provide criteria for a clear understanding of the rationale for the Bank's intervention with respect to its comparative advantages and those of other donors (i.e. selection of development problems to be addressed, identification of sectors for intervention, and the prioritization of projects). Moreover, despite the fact that the resolution of development problems tends to require a multisector approach, the selection of the objectives in the country strategy, the preparation of the sector technical notes, and the design of projects tend to be addressed from a single sector in the Bank. While there has been a notable increase in the Bank's activity in the private sector, a clear strategy is needed to identify market failures to be resolved and coordinate them with other Bank operations.

IMPLEMENTATION, EFFECTIVENESS, AND SUSTAINABILITY

Most implementation problems are the result of designs that fail to adequately weigh institutional and governance risks or that include unrealistic procurement plans and complex execution mechanisms. In addition, portfolio management was also hindered by the fact that, as a result of the guide for preparing country strategies in effect at the time, the country strategy did not include the sectors from the inherited portfolio. In all cases, execution delays have arisen as the result of technical and administrative weaknesses in executing agencies and in the legal-institutional frameworks of their respective sectors, the politicization and high turnover of officials, or the existence of vested interests that are difficult to overcome. In some instances, there have been projects with unrealistic procurement plans or execution mechanisms inadequate for the proper performance of the operation. The volume of balances to be disbursed at the start of the period was more than US\$670 million, but the country strategy did not include the sectors from the inherited portfolio, making it more difficult to obtain the technical cooperation resources to address the execution problems and maintain the corresponding sector dialogue. The impact of these problems has been mitigated, in part, by the increase in the number of specialists in the Country Office since the pause.



The bulk of the lending program targeted primarily the social area, and there was a significant increase in loans to the private sector.

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Although many of the projects analyzed have achieved some of the desired outcomes, their effectiveness and sustainability are usually threatened by the country's institutional and fiscal weakness. For example, the Bank has done notable work in the area of fiscal consolidation through policy-based loans (PBLs) and technical cooperation operations to support tax collection and reduce the actuarial deficits of social welfare institutions. However, the weak institutional capacity of the Dirección Ejecutiva de Ingresos [Honduras Revenue Agency] (DEI) has hampered achievement of the collection targets and made it impossible to meet both programs' fiscal targets. Along these same lines, the weakness of many of the institutions involved in program execution, such as the Empresa Nacional de Energía Eléctrica [National Electricity Company] (ENEE) and the Secretaría de Obras Públicas Transporte y Vivienda [Ministry of Public Works, Transportation, and Housing] (SOPTRAVI), and others, makes it difficult to achieve the objectives. Low quality information makes it difficult to conduct good diagnostic assessments, develop good policies, and adequately monitor and evaluate interventions. In all cases where sustainability problems have been identified, there are underlying problems of institutional or regulatory capacity or financial viability.

The Bank's collaboration with other donors is active and productive. The Bank is an active participant in the Stockholm Declaration Follow-up Group (G-16)¹ meetings and supports financing the work of some of its forums. The Bank has also coordinated its work closely with other donors and international organizations in specific sectors such as social investment, financial systems, agriculture, citizen security, etc. Lastly, the Bank has provided technical support to the Government of Honduras, in coordination with the IMF and the World Bank, to monitor the Stand-By program and prepare a possible new program with the Fund.

Based on the findings from this evaluation, OVE makes the following recommendations:

1. Give priority to fiscal consolidation. For such purposes, it is recommended that the Bank continue work with the IMF and the World Bank in order to ensure a sustained process of fiscal consolidation that reduces risks related to program sustainability.
2. Design the country strategy based on the most critical development challenges, clearly defining the criteria for participation by the Bank's various sectors (including the Vice Presidency for Private Sector and Non-Sovereign Guaranteed Operations (VPP)), and for the prioritization of projects, while ensuring consistency between the diagnostic assessment and the country strategy. To do this, Management should consider:
 - a. Forming an interdisciplinary team to identify and determine the scope of the development problems faced by the country (e.g., worsening fiscal position, poverty, insecurity, low productivity, etc.) and their causes, based on the growth study, the government's priorities, and other necessary elements.
 - b. Including criteria explaining why the Bank is engaged in the solution to those development problems and the selection of the sector or sectors proposed for resolving them (e.g., in the case of the fiscal consolidation problem, possible actions could be considered in the area of revenues, expenditures, and weaknesses in the respective institutions (ENEE, COALIANZA, ERSAPS, FHIS, etc.), inefficiencies in the energy sector, potential contingent liabilities that may arise from public-private partnerships (PPPs), etc.). This could involve the preparation of multisector Technical Notes.
3. Strengthen the design of operations by: (i) conducting more rigorous institutional assessments; (ii) performing more realistic analyses of governance and financial sustainability; and (iii) engaging fiduciary staff more intensively in the design of execution, disbursement, and procurement mechanisms and plans for investment projects.

4. Devote greater efforts to building management capacity (e.g., human resources, financial and budgetary management, procurement, etc.) in the institutions responsible for projects in execution (e.g. DEI, the Police, SEFIN, SESAL, SOPTRAVI, etc.) and consider making disbursements for future policy-based loan operations contingent on effective changes in the management capacity of key institutions and in the institutional framework of their respective sectors in order to improve their governance.
5. Include in future country strategies the sectors corresponding to each country's existing portfolio in order to facilitate their execution and the continuity of the relevant dialogue, as OVE has recommended in prior CPEs.

OVE RECOMMENDATIONS AND MANAGEMENT'S RESPONSE	
OVE Recommendation	Management's Response
<p>Give priority to fiscal consolidation. For such purposes, it is recommended that the Bank continue work with the IMF and the World Bank in order to ensure a sustained process of fiscal consolidation that reduces risks related to program sustainability.</p>	<p>Agreed. Management is aware that fiscal consolidation is a priority. A technical dialogue is under way on this subject with the government in the context of preparing the Bank's country strategy for 2015-2018. As part of this dialogue, fiscal consolidation is being considered for inclusion as one of the priority sectors of intervention, continuing support for the country in the strengthening of public finances</p>
<p>Design the country strategy based on the most critical development challenges, clearly defining the criteria for participation by the Bank's various sectors (including VPP), and for the prioritization of projects, while sectors (including VPP), and for the prioritization of projects, while ensuring consistency between the diagnostic assessment and the country strategy. To do this, Management should consider:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a- Forming an interdisciplinary team to identify and determine the scope of the development problems faced by the country (e.g., worsening fiscal position, poverty, insecurity, low productivity, etc.) and their causes, based on the growth study, the government's priorities, and other necessary elements. b- Including criteria explaining why the Bank is engaged in the solution to those development problems and the selection of the sector or sectors proposed for resolving them (e.g., in the case of the fiscal consolidation problem, possible actions could be considered in the area of revenues, expenditures, and weaknesses in the respective institutions (ENEE, COALIANZA, ERSAPS, FHIS, etc.), inefficiencies in the energy sector, potential contingent liabilities that may arise from PPPs, etc.). This could involve the preparation of multisector Technical Notes. 	<p>Partially agreed. The design of the Bank's country strategy for the period 2015-2018 will consider the most critical development challenges. In doing so, a process of analysis and consultations is being followed that process of analysis and consultations is being followed that seeks to enhance the Bank's actions in the country. This process includes the following components:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a- Technical analyses regarding constraints on growth and productivity. b- Agreements reached with government authorities during the dialogue (including discussions on national development plans). c- Analysis of the portfolio status and presence of other donors. <p>In addition, the process of preparing the new strategy will follow the suggested guidelines in terms of a multisector approach. Four of the five sector notes to be completed are multisector notes: (1) fiscal consolidation; (2) roadways for regional integration; (3) social inclusion; and (4) sustainable urban development. It should be noted that the urban development note will unequivocally respond to this recommendation as it will be a document prepared by a multidisciplinary team made up of seven Bank divisions attached to the Institutions for Development (IFD) and Infrastructure and Environment (INE) sectors.¹ The note will be based on a multisector diagnostic assessment and will propose territorial interventions that coordinate the actions of the various sectors in specific geographic areas. Lastly, while Management agrees with the recommendation as a whole, it would like to express its difference of opinion with OVE's</p>

OVE Recommendation	Management's Response
	<p>observations regarding the consistency between the diagnostic and the country strategy. Its clarification is presented in paragraph 3.1 of this document.</p>
<p>Strengthen the design of operations by: (i) conducting more rigorous institutional assessments; (ii) performing more realistic analyses of governance and financial sustainability; and (iii) engaging fiduciary staff more intensively in the design of execution, disbursement, and procurement mechanisms and plans for investment projects.</p>	<p>Partially agreed. Management agrees with OVE's recommendation to strengthen the design of operations, but would like to reiterate that it is already giving priority to the issues highlighted in the recommendation: <i>(i) Institutional assessments.</i> The institutional capacity assessment of executing agencies is being conducted systematically in accordance with the Bank's current model for these purposes (the Institutional Capacity Assessment System (ICAS)). This model is based on the analysis of the planning, organizational management, personnel management, goods and services management, financial management, and internal and external control systems. Efforts will continue to improve the quality of institutional assessments under the new country strategy; <i>(ii) Risk analysis.</i> Similarly, resources will continue to be allocated for conducting and improving project risk analyses; and <i>(iii) Engagement of fiduciary staff in the design of execution mechanisms and plans.</i> The participation of fiduciary staff has been maintained in 100% of IDB-financed projects in Honduras, both in the design and during the execution of operations. This will continue during the next strategy period. In addition, as OVE points out in the CPE, strengthening the Country Office in terms of specialists, and the improvement in risk-based portfolio management achieved during the evaluation period will allow the strengthening of the design and execution of operations to continue.</p>
<p>Devote greater efforts to building management capacity (e.g., human resources, financial and budgetary management, procurement, etc.) in the institutions responsible for projects in execution (e.g. DEI, the Police, SEFIN, SESAL, SOPTRAVI, etc.) and consider making disbursements for future policy-based loan operations contingent on effective changes in the management capacity of key institutions and in the institutional framework of their respective sectors in order to improve their governance.</p>	<p>Partially agreed. Management would like to note that the management capacity of the institutions responsible for projects being executed has been strengthened through the training of staff on financial and budget matters, as well as on issues specific to the intervention area. In this regard, the Bank is playing a central role in the dissemination of knowledge (courses, seminars) aimed at strengthening the government's capacities. Management agrees on continuing these efforts, while noting that they have been under way since implementation of the 2011-2014 strategy.</p>

OVE Recommendation	Management's Response
	<p>However, it recognizes that there is room to deepen support in this area. In this regard, the Bank is considering a series of measures to improve execution, which will be set out in detail in the new country strategy. These measures will be aimed at deepening the efforts undertaken to date, such as, for example, in the following areas: (i) tailoring the design of operations to the counterparts' capacities; (ii) coordinating with the borrower in order to anticipate risks; and (iii) deepening training processes in integrated and results-based management in the project executing units.</p> <p>With respect to making disbursements for PBLs contingent upon changes in the management capacity of institutions, this is feasible provided that it is consistent with the Bank's policies and current national legal frameworks. Decisions on the content of operations will be determined in accordance with the programmatic dialogue with the authorities.</p> <p>It is also important to bear in mind that achieving sustainable institutional changes requires a combination of PBLs and technical assistance.</p>
<p>Include in future country strategies the sectors corresponding to each country's existing portfolio in order to facilitate their execution and the continuity of the relevant dialogue, as OVE has recommended in prior CPEs.</p>	<p>Agreed.</p> <p>We agree that the design of the country strategy has to consider the portfolio in execution.</p> <p>Management is currently engaged in a process of revising the methodology for preparing the country strategies and programs, in consultation with the Board. This exercise is being done in the framework of implementation of the recommendations stemming from OVE's IBD-9 evaluation.</p>

¹ Fiscal and Municipal Management Division (FMM), Institutional Capacity of the State Division (ICS); Climate Change and Sustainability Division (CCS); Environment, Rural Development, and Disaster Risk Management Division (RND); Transport Division (TSP); Water and Sanitation Division (WSA); and the Emerging and Sustainable Cities Initiative (ESCI).



The Honduran population is engaged in low productivity occupations and half of the country's economic activity depends on the United States.

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1 Overall Country Context

The economic growth of Honduras has still not recovered to pre-2009 crisis levels. The 2009 economic and political crises led to a 2.4% decline in Honduras's GDP after nine consecutive years of growth.² In recent years, the Honduran economy has shown growth rates that are positive but below those observed in the period immediately prior to 2009. As of the end of 2013, economic activity recorded a year-on-year change of 2.6%, which is less than the 3.9% seen in 2012.³ Several of the factors that have impacted Honduras's economic performance are external, such as the slow recovery of the global economy—particularly in the United States—and weak international prices for Honduran exports. Domestically, the fiscal position has increased the pressure on the performance of the economy as a whole.⁴

A. STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS

The Republic of Honduras suffers from high levels of poverty and inequality. Honduras is Central America's second poorest country with per capita GDP of US\$2,322,⁵ the region's lowest productivity, and poor quality capital formation.⁶ Honduras has the worst child poverty in Latin America with 75% of the population age 17 and younger living in households considered to be poor and 50% living in extreme poverty.⁷ Honduras is the second most unequal country in the region—second only to Haiti—and the eighth most unequal country in the world.⁸ While the top earning 10% of the Honduran population receives 42.4% of total income, the lowest paid 10% receives only 0.4%. This situation is even worse given the characteristics of the Honduran economy, the economic and political crisis of 2009–2010, the country's vulnerability to natural disasters, high levels of insecurity and crime, and institutional weakness.

The Honduran population is engaged in low productivity occupations and half of the country's economic activity depends on the United States. Approximately 47% of the total population lives in rural areas primarily devoted to agricultural activities, involving 39% of the labor force, and as a result of their low productivity, they contribute only 14% of domestic output.⁹ In contrast, 40% of the economically active population is engaged in services and produces nearly 60% of GDP. Exports to the United States—clothing, coffee, shrimp, cables—represent 30% of GDP and remittances sent by Honduran migrants residing in the United States represent 20%.¹⁰ In addition, about 70% of foreign direct investment comes from U.S. companies.

Institutional weakness and corruption limit Honduras's capacity to implement development policies and projects. Various institutional development and corruption indexes show Honduras lagging behind the countries of the region. For example, Honduras scored -0.71 on the World Bank "Government Effectiveness" index and -0.83 on the "Control of Corruption" index, while the region's averages were 0.01 and 0.03, respectively. Honduras also scored 17 on the index of meritocratic practices in the civil service prepared by the IDB, more than 50% lower than the regional average. The World Bank's *Doing Business* index, which evaluates 10 areas of the legal-institutional framework for economic activity, ranks Honduras number 127 out of a total of 189 countries for 2014.¹¹

In addition, the high crime level affects social coexistence and economic activity. Honduras has a high crime rate. Theft and crime in general are the third most important factor limiting business activity.¹² The high rate of homicides warrants special mention. Honduras is the country without armed conflict with the highest homicide rate per inhabitant (79 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in 2013). The causes of this high crime rate are complex and involve the activities of international criminal groups associated with drug trafficking and gangs in poor districts in cities like Tegucigalpa, San Pedro de Sula, and El Progreso.

The Honduran economy is extremely vulnerable to weather events, natural disasters, and pests. The *Germanwatch Global Risk Index* (CRI) ranks Honduras as the world's most vulnerable country in terms of climate effects.¹³ Between 1980 and 2010, Honduras endured more than 60 natural disasters (i.e., hurricanes, earthquakes, tropical storms) involving a loss of 7.6% of GDP over the last 50 years, 15,000 fatalities, and more than four million people affected.¹⁴ A Bank study shows that the effects of natural disasters involved an estimated reduction equivalent to 20% of the capital stock in 1974 and 1998, due to the devastating hurricanes Fifi and Mitch.¹⁵ Estimates indicate that minor events (i.e., floods and landslides) occur with greater frequency and are, over time, more costly than large disasters.¹⁶ Given the lack of adequate phytosanitary measures, coffee leaf rust has caused considerable economic losses.¹⁷ According to figures from the Instituto Hondureño del Café [Honduran Coffee Institute] (IHCAFE) revenues from exports between 2011 and 2013 fell

by more than 40% (from US\$1.3 billion to US\$752.6 million). The Ministry of Finance (SEFIN) estimates that the disease will have a negative impact of about 2% of GDP each year over the next three years.

B. FISCAL IMBALANCE AND RECENT ACCELERATED INDEBTEDNESS

The crises and subsequent low economic growth have accelerated the growth of debt. Between 2007 and 2013, the fiscal deficit of Honduras went from 2.9% to 7.9% of GDP, above the initially projected 5.2%.¹⁸ The causes of this deterioration are varied and include, in addition to low growth, excessive and rigid spending, particularly related to wages and salaries,¹⁹ weakening of fiscal discipline in 2011 and 2012, weak mechanisms for controlling spending, and tax collection problems, among other factors.²⁰ In addition, repayment of the floating debt from earlier years (3.9% of GDP), amortization of foreign and domestic debt (2.3% of GDP), and coverage of the deficit of the ENEE (2% of GDP) put the cash needs of the Government of Honduras at 14.4% of GDP at the end of 2013.²¹ This fiscal deterioration made it impossible to reach a new agreement and standby credit facility with the IMF (the earlier agreement from September 2010 expired in March 2012). The new government that took office on 28 January 2014 is currently in negotiations to reach a new agreement.²²

There is a risk that public debt will continue to increase over the short and medium terms. Honduras's participation in the HIPC debt relief initiative in 2007 enabled it to reduce its public debt by approximately 77%, reaching 17% of GDP. Despite this reduction, at the end of 2013, total public debt as a percentage of GDP reached 42.6% and is expected to reach 46% by year-end 2014 (see Figure 1.2 in the annex).²³ This growth is in response to the need to finance the aforementioned fiscal deficit. The composition of public debt has changed over time. In 2008, domestic debt was just above 20% of total debt while as of the end of 2013, it had increased to 40% of total public spending. As a result, there was an increase in the cost of servicing the debt. Principal and interest payments amounted to 20% of total spending.

At the end of the previous administration, various changes were made in the tax system and public spending was reorganized, with the expectation of reducing the deficit to 5.2% by the end of 2014.²⁴ Despite this, the payments schedule for fiscal years 2014 and 2015 suggests that the fiscal outlook could deteriorate even further if the tax measures approved fail to substantially increase revenues. The Honduran government's budget policy guidelines for 2014 project that total government revenues will cover just 78% of total spending, and the debt could continue to grow (see Figure 1.2 of the annex).

C. REFORM AGENDA

A set of reforms approved by the National Congress during the final months of the previous administration could reduce public spending. In addition to the aforementioned tax reform, the Honduran Congress approved various provisions,



During the period, three operations were approved in the health sector which sought to improve health offerings by decentralizing the system.

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including reforms to the CONATEL Law, BANHPROVI, the INJUPEMP Law, the Biofuels Law, and the Contribution for Social Programs and Conservation of Roadway Assets. In addition, new frameworks have been created such as the Electrical Industry Law, the Hourly Employment Law, and the Law Governing Public Finances. These reforms could reduce the tax liability of various public sector bodies and enterprises and increase the productivity of the Honduran economy. However, experience in the implementation of reforms and institutional weaknesses would lead one to believe that their implementation is going to be challenging.

D. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE IDB AND THE GOVERNMENT OF HONDURAS DURING THE PERIOD

The period under evaluation began a few months after multilateral organizations declared a “pause” in relations with the country due to the political crisis of 2009. The IDB, World Bank, and the European Union froze loans to Honduras in the amount of US\$450 million between 2009 and 2010. This entailed freezing disbursements, suspending new operations, and halting formal relations with the Government of

Honduras. Following the election of President Porfirio Lobo, the various multilateral organizations resumed their operations, although this was a major challenge. As a result of the pause, the balances to be disbursed by the Bank amounted to more than 70% of the portfolio (i.e., US\$670.4 million) at the beginning of the period, which represented an increase of 26% compared to the previous period.²⁵



One objective of the Bank's country strategy was to improve the financial and actuarial sustainability of social welfare systems and the capacity to control and manage spending by personnel.

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2 The Bank's Program for 2011-2014

The Bank has a significant financial presence in Honduras. Bank disbursements represented more than 30% of the country's total public investment in 2013 and 40% in 2011. Honduras's debt with the Bank represents about two thirds of the country's debt with multilateral development banks and represented about 25% of the country's total external public debt during the period under evaluation (see Table 2.1 of the annex).

A. RELEVANCE


The Bank's country strategy (document GN-2645) identified five priority sectors to which it assigned a total of seven strategic objectives that were generally in line with the government's priorities. The five sectors for which the country strategy defined objectives were: (i) public management; (ii) financial system; (iii) social protection; (iv) health; and (v) energy. The main purpose of the sectors selected in the country strategy was to support the achievement of the following three objectives in the "Country Vision":²⁶ (i) a modern, transparent, responsible, efficient, and competitive State; (ii) an educated, healthy Honduras free of extreme poverty, with consolidated social welfare systems; and (iii) a productive Honduras that produces opportunities and decent jobs, and that uses its resources in a sustainable way and reduces environmental vulnerability. Table 2.1 details the relationship between the country strategy's strategic objectives and the Country Vision.

Operations approved during the period associated the five priority sectors of the Bank's country strategy were generally consistent with country strategy objectives and the country's development challenges.²⁷

- a. *Public and financial management and public procurement.* One objective of the Bank's country strategy was to improve the financial and actuarial sustainability of social welfare systems and the capacity to control and manage

spending by personnel. The Bank approved a PBL operation for US\$40 million (HO-L1079) and a technical cooperation operation for US\$300,000 (HO-T1194) to promote the sustainability of the social welfare institutes and control unplanned growth of public employee compensation,²⁸ and six technical cooperation operations for US\$5.1 million that provided continuity for the Bank's work in the area of public financial management (i.e., budget, public credit, public investment, macro fiscal management, etc.).²⁹ These operations are also highly relevant to the development challenges involving fiscal consolidation and institutional fragility. Note that much of the technical assistance provided to the Government of Honduras was used to monitor the stand-by arrangement with the IMF and support negotiations for the new arrangement.

TABLE 2.1. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE BANK'S SECTOR-LEVEL STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES AND THE "COUNTRY VISION" (DOCUMENT GN-2645)



- b. *Social protection.* The Bank's strategic objective in this sector was to "increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the conditional cash transfer program," expected to result in increased program coverage and targeting. One loan was restructured (HO-L1032) and three more loans were approved (HO-L1042, HO-L1071, and HO-L1087). These operations were designed to improve the management and transparency of the Bono 10,000 program, expand its coverage, and ensure access to basic health and education services by beneficiary families. Moreover, although not an explicit objective, these operations are helping ensure its absorption by the national budget, thus contributing to fiscal consolidation and poverty reduction.
- c. *Health.* The objective of the Bank's country strategy for this sector was to improve coordination of and access to basic health and nutrition services. During the period, three operations were approved (loans HO-L1072 and

HO-L1090, and technical cooperation operation HO-G1001), which sought to improve health offerings by decentralizing the system, as well as to improve the quality of medical services, targeting the country's most vulnerable population.

- d. *Energy.* The objectives of the Bank's country strategy for this sector were to increase the rate of coverage for electric power and the use of renewable sources in the production of electricity, to improve the sector's institutional, operational, and financial weakness, and to reduce the sector's impact on the government's deficit. However, the country strategy indicated that the Bank's support for the sector through investment loans would be subject to progress in terms of financial sustainability and strengthening of the electricity sector. Given that no progress was made on these fronts, the Bank only approved one loan operation in the amount of US\$22.9 million (HO-L1039) to support Honduras's integration into the Regional Electricity Market (MER) and five technical cooperation operations to support mitigation of the effects of climate change. Four months prior to approval of the country strategy, the Bank also approved an NSG operation for US\$20 million with financial intermediaries for granting green loans in the energy sector, which was not originally considered in the country strategy (HO-L1077).
- e. *Financial system.* The objectives of the Bank's country strategy for this sector were to strengthen the financial security network and promote greater financial inclusion. During the period, the Bank approved a PBL for US\$40 million aimed at improving banking supervision and regulation and promoting access to the financial system. Although this represents a step in the right direction, deeper reforms are still needed.³⁰

The Bank's country strategy opened up the possibility of carrying out operations in other sectors for which strategic objectives had not been defined. In these cases, the operations were, to a certain extent, aligned with some of the country's development challenges. The Bank's country strategy also considered providing Bank support for implementation of the 2011-2012 Comprehensive Policy on Coexistence and Citizen Security and determined that the private sector, through its four windows, could address the following areas: (i) support to financial intermediaries, credit lines for exports; (ii) support for SMEs in agriculture, manufacturing, tourism, financial, and textiles; and (iii) support to the agroindustrial sector and to the health, low-cost housing, higher education, and ports through PPPs.

- a. *Citizen security.* During the period, the Bank approved one loan (HO-L1063) for US\$59.8 million and two supplementary technical cooperation operations: a grant (HO-X1021) for US\$6.6 million funded by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) and a technical cooperation operation (HO-T1169) for US\$300,000 funded by the Korea Poverty Reduction Fund

(KPRF). These funds were specially targeted on building police capacities, and thus, a priori, these actions are relevant to the challenges related to security and institutional weakness.

- b. *Trade and business development.* The Bank supported these sectors through providing SG loans, guarantees (NSG), and technical cooperation.³¹ Although these projects are formally consistent with the need to improve productivity and promote growth, the Bank's support was provided in the absence of a clear strategy that would make it possible to identify and address the market failures and coordinate with other Bank operations.

The Bank approved four operations not associated with any of the sectors prioritized in the country strategy but that responded to the country's development challenges.

- a. *Modernization of the State.* In 2011 the Bank approved an operation for US\$25 million to support development of the 2012 census and a system of household surveys (HO-L1044). Given the limitations of the information that the Government of Honduras uses in decision-making, this project was relevant with respect to the development challenges since it could help to target social spending and improve the impact of public policies on poverty and inequality. However, the approval was granted without a specific intervention strategy defining the Bank's support to resolve the problems of production and quality of information in Honduras, which are systemic issues, affecting all sectors.
- b. *Transportation.* In 2013 the bank approved an operation (HO-L1089) for US\$17.2 million to cover cost overruns on one of the operations approved in the previous cycle (HO-L1020). This was an important operation in that it links the most important economic hubs (Puerto Cortés to the north, San Pedro de Sula, and Tegucigalpa) with El Salvador to the south.
- c. *Urban development.* The Bank approved a program (HO-L1088) for US\$17.2 million in 2012, to follow up program HO-L1007 approved during the previous period. The program's objectives were to provide access to basic urban services (e.g., water and sanitation) to periurban neighborhoods, increase the job skills of at-risk groups, and increase the social capital of traditionally excluded communities. This program addressed the challenges of inequality and poverty. The program, due to its specific focus on high crime areas, was presented as a citizen security project.
- d. *Education.* The education sector was not included among the country strategy's sectors, since operation HO-L1062 had been approved a few months earlier.³² In addition, the Bank approved three technical cooperation operations (HO-T1149, HO-T1162, HO-T1165) needed for executing the loan and relevant to addressing the reduction of poverty, vulnerability, institutional fragility, and fiscal consolidation.³³

Responding in a more strategic and integrated manner to the country's development problems remains a challenge. The improper functioning of certain elements related to the Bank's structure, processes and incentives, diagnosed in the Evaluation of the Results of the Realignment,³⁴ hindered coordination between sectors and between the VPC and the VPS in the preparation of the country strategy and the definition of clear criteria for a solid understanding of the rationale for the Bank's intervention. The country strategy did not provide an argument justifying the selection of development problems to be addressed, the priority sectors, or the intervention modality. For example, there are problems having a profound impact on the economy on which the Bank took no action, without the country strategy explaining this absence.³⁵ In addition, there are contradictions between the recommendations of the various documents used to prepare the country strategy that are not explained.³⁶ For example, the growth study,³⁷ prepared to identify Honduras's development challenges and the potential best ways to address them, argues that access to financing, although it can and should be improved, is not one of the principal causes of the country's low growth. Despite this, the respective Sector Technical Notes advocated (and the Bank's subsequent action in the sector was directed to) promoting access to financing. It also indicates that the greatest impact on productivity and poverty, in the transportation sector, could be obtained by deconcentrating the investment away from the main corridors. Nonetheless, the Bank's activity focused on the primary network. It also indicates that the low performance of exports is not due to difficulties in accessing international markets, but rather to restrictions affecting the country's growth as a whole (i.e., low human capital, institutional weakness, and excessive bureaucracy, etc.). However, the Bank continued to focus its support on access to international markets. Although these actions may be worthy endeavors, the country strategy does not explain why the Bank has opted for some recommendations and not others. Lastly, despite the fact that the solution of development problems usually requires multisector action, the country sector objectives and the preparation of the Sector Technical Notes were addressed from a single sector in the Bank.³⁸

Because of the guide for preparing country strategies, the Bank's country strategy did not include the sectors from the inherited portfolio, causing difficulties in its execution and in maintaining the corresponding dialogue. In 2010, to compensate for what was not done during the pause, the Bank approved a total of US\$343.3 million, an amount well above the annual average of US\$150 million for the preceding three years. In addition, shortly before the country strategy's approval, the Bank approved a project in education. Partly for that reason, at the start of the period, the amount of the balances to be disbursed amounted to US\$670.4 million (see Table 2.3 of the annex). According to the interviews conducted of Bank staff and representatives of the executing units, the failure to include the corresponding sectors in the country strategy hindered the ability to obtain technical cooperation resources to continue the dialogue and execution of the projects.³⁹

There is no evidence that the country's Fund for Special Operations (FSO) status has affected the Bank's programming in Honduras. As a beneficiary of the FSO, the resources that can be allocated to Honduras are determined every two years based on

its economic and portfolio performance. Thanks to successive cancellations equivalent to 75% of the portfolio, Honduras became one of the FSO countries with the lowest debt risk. Thus, since 2007, these funds have been mixed with Ordinary Capital in a fixed proportion that depends on the sustainability of the debt. During the period, the proportion of Ordinary Capital funds reached 70%. This significantly increased the cost thereof, but increased the availability of funds by 33% (from some US\$160 million per year to more than US\$200 million; see Table 2.4 of the annex). The inability to carry over funds assigned every two years from one two-year period to another seems not to have forced the approval of immature or rapidly disbursing operations to prevent the loss of the funds allocated. The approval patterns and operation preparation times for Honduras are not systematically different from the approval patterns for countries that do not receive FSO funding.

The Bank's collaboration with other donors has been intense and has generated important synergies during the period. In 1999, in response to Hurricane Mitch, the G 16 was created to monitor the reconstruction process and subsequently the country's transformation. This forum has been used to facilitate the coordination of international aid with the Government of Honduras. The Bank is an active participant in the G 16 meetings and supports financing the work of some of its forums (e.g., security, education, and health). Thanks to one of the works financed by the IDB, for example, it was possible to counteract the opposition that existed to applying universal education tests. In addition, the Bank has closely coordinated its work with other international donors and organizations in specific sectors such as social investment (World Bank, CABEL, and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)), financial systems (Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation, KfW, the World Bank, and the IMF), agriculture (IFAD, CABEL, EU, USAID, and the World Bank), and citizen security (SDC, KDF), etc.

The Bank has provided technical support to the Government of Honduras, in coordination with the IMF and the World Bank, to monitor the stand-by arrangement, and for the preparation of a possible new arrangement with the Fund. To do this, funds from the special program for Group C and D countries (HO-T1160 and HO-T1174), as well as other funds, have been used.

B. THE PROGRAM IMPLEMENTED

The bulk of the loan program targeted the social area, and there was a significant increase in loans to the private sector. The total amount of operations approved amounted to US\$690 million. Of the operations approved in the period, 74% were sovereign guaranteed loans and included 10 investment loans and two policy-based or programmatic loans; 4% corresponded to 40 nonreimbursable technical cooperation operations; and 16.7% corresponded to NSG operations.⁴⁰ Of the total of US\$514.3 million in SG operations, 80% (US\$409 million) was concentrated in the social sector, while the financial markets and infrastructure areas approved

approximately 8% (US\$40 million) each, and the area of modernization of the State 5% (US\$25 million). During the period, the amount of NSG loans increased approximately six times, from US\$20 million during the previous period to US\$115 million between 2011 and 2013. Of the US\$115 million in NSG operations, 48% corresponded to trade operations and the rest to financial markets and business development operations (26% each) (see Table 2.2 of the annex).⁴¹ The level of approvals was consistent with the most favorable scenario anticipated in the country strategy. The strategy considered an estimated basic lending framework for approvals of SG loans for a total of US\$648 million over the period 2011-2014 (US\$162 million per year), of which 30% (US\$48.6 million per year) would come from the FSO and 70% (US\$113.4 million per year) from Ordinary Capital. The most optimistic scenario set annual approvals at US\$171 million (US\$684 million), which has been marginally exceeded (US\$171.3 million).

During the period under evaluation, the Bank has reduced the dispersion of its portfolio. The Bank's program in the country has traditionally been highly dispersed.⁴² During the period 2007-2010, a total of 35 approved operations were distributed among nearly 15 sectors. However, during the period under evaluation, the Bank approved a total of 12 SG operations and 10 NSG operations attached to ten sectors (see Table 2.2 of the annex).

C. CHALLENGES AND ACHIEVEMENTS IN PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT

At the start of the period, the conditions for execution of the portfolio were not favorable and foreshadowed additional difficulties for its execution. Honduras was considered one of the countries with the Bank's worst portfolio indices: execution times (68 months) were 58% higher than the Bank's average; costs to prepare operations (US\$5,190 per million approved) were more than twice the average; and execution costs per million disbursed were in fourth from last place among the Bank's countries.⁴³ In addition, the balance to be disbursed was high at the start of the period.

Despite this, the Bank has managed to improve portfolio execution substantially. Between 2007 and 2010, the Bank disbursed an average of US\$96.4 million per year. The average of balances disbursed between 2011 and 2013 was nearly three times higher (i.e. US\$265.6 million). This, despite the increase in the level of approvals, produced a gradual decline in balances to be disbursed, reaching US\$543.7 million at the end of 2013.

The improved pace of disbursements produced an increase in the flow of Bank funds to the country and reduced the age of the portfolio. In 2005, the Bank's balances with the country were negative. The annual average of net flows from the Bank to Honduras for the period 2007-2010 was US\$63.1 million, while the average over the last three years was US\$226.5 million (see Figure 2.1 of the annex). Historically,

the disbursement period was 6.4 years for investment projects and 3.5 years for sector loans in Honduras. During the period, these periods fell to 4.4 and 2.1 years, respectively (see Figure 2.2 of the annex).⁴⁴

Response time by the Country Office to respond to its internal and external counterparts has improved. According to the information obtained from the Bank's official correspondence system (SISCOR), the Country Office's average response time went from 22.6 days in 2010 to 11 days in 2013 (49% reduction) (see Figure 2.3 of the annex). The counterparts interviewed by OVE reported that the Country Office generally responds within five days of the date they send correspondence, a response time four times quicker than that of the World Bank (20-30 days on average).⁴⁵

There has been a gradual reduction in program delivery costs. For the 2010-2013 period, the average cost per dollar disbursed and approved fell by 55% and 53%, respectively, with respect to the prior period. In addition, there was a significant reduction in staff hiring costs. Annual average hours paid declined by 16% between the periods 2005-2008 and 2010-2013. Figure 2.4 of the annex shows the changes in both indicators.

The systemic problem related to financial audits has been eliminated. As of the end of 2010, five of the 31 portfolio operations were problematic, 26 were qualified, and 25 showed delays. As of the end of April 2014, the last deadline for submitting audits, there was no delayed, qualified, or problematic audit.

The solid results obtained in execution have, in part, been the result of actions taken by the Government of Honduras to improve internal coordination, perform strategic monitoring of implementation, and strengthen the executing agencies. As a result of the pause, approximately 50% of public investment, which was financed through international cooperation, was left unfunded. Once the political crisis was resolved, the Government of Honduras reacted by adopting a series of measures to accelerate the execution of projects financed using international cooperation funds. On one hand, it revived the "Control Tower" to coordinate and conduct strategic monitoring of international cooperation in coordination with SEFIN.⁴⁶ The Government of Honduras proceeded to strengthen existing executing units, reducing their number (from 22 during the preceding period to 15 at present) and to leverage the capacity of those with excellent capacity (e.g., the Millennium Account of Honduras in the case of transportation projects—see Box 2.1) so they would assume the execution of programs that were experiencing serious execution problems.

For its part, the Bank has strengthened its presence, and the Country Office has optimized the use of funds and provided appropriate risk management for projects. When the pause ended, the Bank's Country Office in Honduras had four specialists. It currently has nine specialists with high-level technical skills and extensive international experience in project execution. The Country Office also strengthened the project executing units by transferring consultants located in the office.⁴⁷ Thanks to this, the executing units have completely assumed execution of operations, and the confusion

of responsibilities between team leaders and operations analysts/consultants has been considerably reduced.⁴⁸ In addition, the Country Office's management team collaborated to create an early warning and troubleshooting system. Another key factor in improved implementation has been the capacity that the Country Office has shown for managing and assuming the risks of each project on an individualized basis (see Box 2.1).

BOX 2.1 EXAMPLES OF INDIVIDUALIZED MANAGEMENT OF RISKS

Bono 10,000. Three operations were developed since 2004 to finance conditional cash transfers to poor beneficiaries (HO-0222, HO-L1032, and HO-L1042). The design of these projects required concurrent unqualified audits every six months as a condition for disbursements. This resulted in delayed disbursements, since 85% of the audits had qualifications. An analysis of the causes of the observations revealed that nearly all the observations were procedural rather than substantive. Based on this analysis, in the design of the new Bono operations (HO-L1071, HO-L1087, and currently HO-L1093), the choice was made to separate the technical audit from the financial audit. This facilitated gradual progress from transfers every six months to transfers every two months. As a result, the pace of disbursements has accelerated and 100% of the audits are submitted without qualifications and by the established deadlines.

Primary Roadway Network. The execution of the transportation loans approved during the previous period was delayed due to undeveloped designs, weak management capacity of the executing agency (SOPTRAVI), delays in the management of rights of way, additional deterioration of highways, and cost overruns due to inflation and expansion of supervision contracts. In this context, the government asked the Bank to change the executing agency for the roadway portfolio and suggested that those functions be transferred to the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA-Honduras) an entity attached to the Office of the President of the Republic. The Bank justified the change based on the technical, financial, and administrative autonomy of MCA Honduras and the technical quality of its staff. The results of this decision have been very positive considering the completion of work on the CA-5 North, substantial progress in work on the Agricultural Corridor, and annual growth in disbursements for transportation sector operations, increasing from US\$10 million/year in 2010 to US\$65 million/year in 2013.

PRONEGOCIOS. This project, the objective of which is to support the development of rural businesses, necessitated contracting consulting assignments to support the beneficiaries in identifying business opportunities and formulating the respective business plans. Upon completion of each of the 220 business plans programmed, five International Competitive Bidding processes were required, which represented about 600 days per business plan. The Country Office designed a new execution method adapted to the requirements and specific nature of each project. Given that this required the identification and formulation of numerous rural business plans, which by their nature did not fit neatly into consulting methodologies, the choice was made to use a competitive method for selecting consultants based on predetermined standards of quality, obtaining flexibility and agility in the process. To date, 78% of the loan proceeds and all the counterpart funds have been disbursed.



The population's access to electrical power has increased substantially (90%) and the share of renewable sources in the generation of electrical power has increased from 38% to 43%.

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3 Program Implementation, Effectiveness, and Sustainability

This chapter analyzes progress made in implementation and the results of the Bank's program of loans and technical cooperation between 2011 and 2013. It analyzes, in particular, the extent to which the projects under consideration have fulfilled their targets and met their execution deadlines, possible reasons they have not been able to do so, and their sustainability. The projects associated with the priority sectors identified in the country strategy and for which specific objectives were assigned were analyzed first, followed by the projects associated with the priority sectors or areas of dialogue identified in the country strategy but for which no objectives had been assigned. Lastly, projects not associated with any of the priority sectors or areas of dialogue identified in the country strategy were analyzed.

A. OBJECTIVES OF THE BANK'S COUNTRY STRATEGY

Objective 1: Improve the financial and actuarial sustainability of social welfare systems and the capacity to control and manage spending by central administration personnel and increase the use of national systems

By providing technical cooperation and a loan, the Bank supported the achievement of this objective, which contributes to fiscal consolidation and to the reduction of rigidity in public spending. In particular, it approved a PBL for US\$40 million the objective of which was to reduce the actuarial deficits of the National Institute for Teachers' Pensions (INPREMA) and the National Institute for Retirement and Pension for Public Employees and Government Employees (INJUPEMP), to improve the financial viability of the Honduran Social

Security Institute (IHSS), and to increase control over personnel spending.⁴⁹ In addition, the Bank has approved loans and technical cooperation operations in the area of improving revenue collection (HO-L1015, HO-L1030, HO-T1188, and HO-L1055), national financial administration (HO-L1015, HO-T1079, HO-T1134, HO-1143, and HO-1168), municipal financial administration (HO-L1015 and HO-T1182), macrofiscal management (HO-T1143 and HO-1200), and macroeconomic statistics (HO-L1015).⁵⁰

Disbursements have generally been made as scheduled. Cases of substantial delays have been due to problems in the design of the operations. The two PBLs (HO-L1030 and HO-L1079) made disbursements as scheduled 100% of the time. As a result of cessation of the arrangement with the IMF in 2012, the third PBL planned was not prepared. The fiscal and municipal management consolidation program (HO-L1015), despite having to overcome design problems,⁵¹ has disbursed more than 80% and is expected to be completed as scheduled in 2015. Three of the technical cooperation operations (HO-T1134, HO-T1136, and HO-T1143) have disbursed 100% while another three, those targeted at improving budget management (HO-T1079, HO-T1168, and HO-T1182), have been subject to delays due to designs that failed to adequately consider institutional and governance risks. The Puerto Cortés Customs Modernization project has disbursed only 18% of loan proceeds and has less than one year of execution left. This project was designed with multiple objectives and required the participation of various entities independent of each other. The execution mechanism has not resolved the problems of coordination. In addition, there were many changes in the management of one of the participating entities (i.e., the DEI).

In general terms, the sector's programs have delivered their outputs and, to a lesser extent, achieved their outcomes, but there are doubts as to whether the expected impacts can be achieved. The PBLs supporting fiscal consolidation (HO-L1030 and HO-L1079) were disbursed and have achieved seven of the nine outcomes,⁵² but the tax ratio only amounted to 14.5% of GDP in 2013 and not the established goal of 16.8% of GDP. In addition, the fiscal deficit increased.⁵³ The PBL to support the social welfare system did not clearly define concrete indicators and targets for measuring impact: "*maintenance of an appropriate policy framework*," but the macroeconomic context deteriorated during and after the reforms, even leading to suspension of the agreement with the IMF, and so the impact has not been achieved. The technical cooperation operations have been used to support the execution of the earlier projects. Some have helped to improve the dialogue on the design of public policies.⁵⁴ However, in the Puerto Cortés Customs Modernization project,⁵⁵ no progress has been made toward the project outcomes.

The sustainability of the Bank's action in this area shows mixed results. The PBL to support reform of the social welfare institutes seems adequate; the one supporting consolidation of fiscal and municipal management seems adequate

but faces risks of technical obsolescence; the PBL supporting fiscal reform and the Puerto Cortés Customs Modernization project show weaknesses. The technology used to develop the systems supporting the Integrated Financial Management System (SIAF) is subject to rapid technical obsolescence and its updating requires intensive use of costly specialized human resources. Given the fiscal position of the Government of Honduras, it is unlikely that such updating could be done using the government's own funds. The institutional and governance weakness of the DEI jeopardizes the achievement of the PBL's collection goals supporting the consolidation of fiscal management and the Puerto Cortés Customs modernization.

Objective 2: Increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the conditional cash transfer program

To help achieve this objective, the Bank restructured one loan (HO-L1032) and approved three more (HO-L1042, HO-L1071, and HO-L1087). These programs were designed to improve the management and transparency of the *Bono 10,000* program, expand its coverage, and ensure access to basic health and education services by the beneficiary families.

There were substantive improvements in the execution of operations during the period. The Integrated Support for the Social Safety Net Program (HO-L1032) experienced significant delays as a result of the pause and various factors such as: (i) weakness of the management information system; (ii) lack of funds for the Education and Health Secretariats to verify shared responsibility; (iii) delay in transfer payments; and (iv) delay in the allocation of national counterpart funds. Accelerated incorporation and payment of transfers was not accompanied by effective strengthening of the processes required to verify program conditions and operations. This weakened its operations and created some problems such as irregularity in the schedule of payments to beneficiaries and delays in the verification of shared responsibilities. To resolve these problems, the Government of Honduras and the Bank adopted a series of measures, notably the redefinition of the program,⁵⁶ the government's designation of the Secretariat of the Presidency as the coordinating entity for social programs, and the Bank's streamlining of the execution mechanism (see Box 2.1). The verification of conditionalities is now faster, helping to improve educational and health services. The payment systems have also been improved, although it has not been possible to solidify a payments schedule.

The main outcome was national expansion of the program. However, there are still weaknesses in the program's targeting and implementation. Despite errors, the results reported from the *Bono 10,000* program are positive. The impact evaluation indicates that the program is achieving its objectives in education and health:⁵⁷ (i) households in covered villages have increased their consumption of

food and beverages by 30% and have increased spending on school supplies by 25%, compared with households in the control group villages; (ii) the percentage of children whose last visit to the doctor was for a routine check-up rather than an illness has increased from 7% to 12%; (iii) no evidence has been found of negative changes in adult job participation; and (iv) coverage has reached 350,000 families. Despite this, universal coverage of the poorest families has not been achieved, and payments remain irregular.

The sustainability of the program is tied to improvement in the country's fiscal position and the quality of services in education and health. The program's most troubling concern is its fiscal sustainability given that its own resources have been very limited since last year. The long-term success of the program is tied to improvement in the education and health system. In addition, the program should continue improving the verification of shared responsibilities to really increase capacities for improving educational and health and nutrition levels.

Objective 3: Improve coordination of and access to basic health and nutrition services

The three operations approved during the period (loans HO-L1072 and HO-L1090 and technical cooperation operation HO-G1001) sought to improve the supply of health by decentralizing the system, in addition to improving the quality of medical services, targeting the country's most vulnerable populations.

Disbursements to finance the decentralized system occurred as scheduled. However, there have been operational delays in financing for hospital infrastructure. The first operation (HO-1059) has been almost fully disbursed; the second operation (HO-1072), approved in June 2012, has disbursed 26% of the total (US\$7.8 million). To date, the last operation (HO-L1090), approved in 2013, has disbursed 20% this year. Delays were caused due to the lack of a budgetary allocation at the start of the project.

Health sector results are partial and sustainability is a challenge due to fiscal pressures and problems with the managers' capacity. With support from the Bank, the coverage of decentralized services was expanded to include more than 1.13 million people in 74 municipalities in 14 departments as of December 2013. The users' level of satisfaction is above 85% (the project objective was 70%). However, it has not yet been possible to determine what achievements have been made in the area of chronic malnutrition and anemia among children and anemia in pregnant women since the planned survey has not been conducted. In addition, expansion faces serious challenges in the short and medium term (e.g., standardization of quality, institutional weakness of providers, and principally financial sustainability of the program).

Objective 4: Increase the rate of coverage for electric power at the national level and the share of renewable sources in the electric power grid and improve the operational and commercial efficiency of the electricity sector

The Bank has not approved any new operation during the period because the Government of Honduras had not proceeded with implementation of previously agreed reforms.⁵⁸ However, there has been adequate progress made in achieving the expected outcomes from earlier operations. Execution was concluded on the project to construct the Amarateca electrical power station and expand the Zamorano power station that provide power to the country's central and western areas. In line with the objectives of the Bank's country strategy, the population's access to electrical power has increased substantially (90%) and the share of renewable sources in the generation of electrical power has increased from 38% to 43%, although losses in distribution from the ENEE have increased from 26% to 31% (the goal was reduce losses to 20%). In January 2014, Congress approved the Electrical Industry Law, restructuring the ENEE to include different companies (generation, transmission, and distribution), opening those companies to private investment, and establishing an Electrical Energy Regulatory Commission. The Bank's action with the program to support fiscal reform (HO-L1030 and HO-T1192) plus the ongoing dialogue maintained with the authorities helped to improve the rate system, limit subsidies, and introduce the 15% tax for residential consumption above 750 kWh/month, which supports the financial sustainability of the ENEE.

Although the financial and institutional problems affecting the ENEE represent a risk to the fiscal sustainability of the country and the sector, the changes introduced recently are a step in the right direction. The ENEE deficit represents two points of the fiscal deficit. To the financial problems must be added the absence of adequate regulation and policy for the ENEE and inefficient management as reflected in the level of losses in transmission/distribution and commercial losses (e.g., the difference between amounts invoiced and amounts collected). The recent reforms may mean a step in the right direction. Experience with failed reforms in the sector necessitates being cautious and taking every precaution to ensure that the reforms bear fruit.

Objective 5: Strengthen the financial security network and promote greater financial inclusion

The Bank's support to the financial sector helped to improve the financial security network and access to financing. PBLs HO-L1065 and HO-L1069 for US\$40 million each supported the development of legislation intended to stabilize the financial system and facilitate access to financing for SMEs and vulnerable groups. According to the evaluation done by the Bank, financial supervision capacity has improved, so that the country would be better prepared to deal with potential financial crises. NSG loan HO-L1085 for US\$10 million sought to facilitate the granting of lines

of credit, but given the lack of information on the development objectives, it has not been possible to confirm its results.⁵⁹ Nonetheless, the conditions and incentives necessary to promote financial inclusion do not exist.

Objective 6: Use of national systems

The goal established in the Bank's country strategy with respect to national systems for the end of 2014 has already been achieved: One hundred percent of current loan operations are already using the accounting and reports subsystem (SIAFI/UEPEX).⁶⁰

B. APPROVED OPERATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE PRIORITY INTERVENTION AREAS IN THE BANK'S COUNTRY STRATEGY

1. Citizen security

Although the Government of Honduras urgently needs to respond to the challenge of insecurity, disagreements on the direction of the program and political and institutional difficulties faced have affected execution and cast doubts on the achievement of program results and sustainability. In 2012, the Bank approved three operations: a loan (HO-L1063) for US\$59.8 million, a grant (HO-X1021) for US\$6.6 million and a technical cooperation operation (HO-T1169) for US\$3 million.⁶¹ The objective of the loan was to improve crime prevention and prosecution through improvements in the effectiveness of the Department of Security and National Police, criminal investigation capabilities, and municipal management of crime prevention programs. The grants supplemented the loan funds specifically for the training and municipalities components and to strengthen program execution. However, once the operation was approved, the Government of Honduras wanted to place greater emphasis on infrastructure investments even though the effectiveness of actions of this kind in reducing crime is not clearly proven. In particular, the Government of Honduras proposed to direct a large portion of the funds allocated to institutional strengthening in order to construct judicial outposts. The Bank's technical team did not support this proposal, leading to an impasse in project execution. In response to political pressure, the Bank agreed to allocate US\$5 million in addition to the US\$1.5 million originally allocated under this heading, which, a priori, could weaken the effectiveness of the operation. In addition, in a sensitive political context, there have been difficulties finding coordinators who are neutral, properly trained, and have the experience necessary to lead the program under adverse conditions. As a result of this, only 6% of the loan proceeds have been disbursed, 35.6% of the Korean Fund technical cooperation funds have been disbursed (HO-T1169—primarily to support project execution), and none of the Swiss grant (HO-X1021) has been disbursed.⁶² In addition, crime reduction will depend on progress made on other factors such as reducing the porosity of the borders, controlling access to firearms, strengthening the judicial system, inequality, economic opportunities, etc.

2. Trade and business development

The absence of results indicators has made it impossible to determine the effectiveness of the Bank's activity in the trade sector and, with respect to the business development sector, results have yet to be achieved given the lack of progress made in implementation.⁶³

C. APPROVED OPERATIONS NOT ASSOCIATED WITH THE PRIORITY INTERVENTION AREAS IDENTIFIED IN THE BANK'S COUNTRY STRATEGY

1. Modernization of the State

The pace of the execution of the census program is adequate and outputs are being achieved as scheduled. The census program has disbursed nearly 90% of its funds, and there are nearly two years left of program execution. The anticipated outcomes are expected to be achieved at the end of this year. The census program and the previous technical cooperation operation have strengthened the institutional capacity of the National Statistics Institute (INE). It is important for the Government of Honduras to maintain and increase this capacity over time and that the necessary funds be secured to conduct future censuses without depending on foreign assistance.

2. Education

Two of the three components of the education project were delayed due to problems with design development, inadequate planning of the procurement plan, and restrictions in the fiscal space allocated to the project during execution. The first component—Access to Preschool Education—has been adequately executed by the Fundación para la Educación Ricardo Ernesto Maduro Andreu [Ricardo Ernesto Maduro Andreu Foundation for Education] (FEREMA), although there have been delays in the counterpart payments as a result of the fiscal restrictions. In the second component—educational materials and physical adaptations made to schools—there have been delays in delivery of the educational materials for reading, writing, and mathematics primarily due to delays in the review process by the Ministry of Education and fiscal restrictions. In addition, problems with access to schools and their geographic dispersion delayed the determination of their needs for electrical work.⁶⁴ In the third component—introduction of technology to improve the second cycle of basic education (grades 4 to 6)—the purchase of computers was delayed because determination of the technical specifications took longer than expected.

Despite the delays, nearly all the outputs in the education sector have been delivered and we have begun to see some results that can be attributed to the project. Particularly notable are the opening and furnishing of 624 new Community

Preschool Centers (CCEPREB) in 2012, pedagogical support for 1,500 pre-existing CCEPREB in 2011, training of 2,145 CCEPREB teachers, delivery of 2,145 methodology packages and consumables to all participating centers, procurement of approximately 53,000 notebooks (of the anticipated 70,000), and contracting of Internet access services for schools and teachers participating in the program, and services to strengthen the technical and managerial capacities of the Project Management Unit of the SDP (UAP/SDP). Lastly, an initial review performed by FEREMA and the Ministry of Education shows that participating children have made progress in acquiring cognitive skills.

However, fiscal problems cast doubt on the sustainability of project outcomes. All the components generate current expenses that must be covered by the Government of Honduras: payment to volunteer educators and extension of coverage to the country's poorest and most remote areas; continuous updating of texts and ongoing training for educators; and maintenance of Internet access. To date, loan HO-L1062 has been the main source of financing. Although a trust has been formed with Claro and Tigo to support Internet expansion, the fiscal limitations of the Government of Honduras may call into question the future of the program.

3. Urban development

Implementation of the urban development project experienced delays due to weather events, the pause, and the institutional weaknesses of some of the units involved in its execution. The low-income housing program (HO-L1007) for US\$30 million approved in 2006 should help to improve the housing and habitat conditions of low- and middle-income Honduran families by granting individual and collective housing subsidies, improving financial instruments for housing, improving the information available on the sector, and strengthening the Secretaría de Obras Públicas, Transporte y Vivienda [Ministry of Public Works, Transportation and Housing] (SOPTRAVI) and the Fondo Hondureño de Inversión Social [Honduran Social Investment Fund] (FHIS). The investments include drinking water, sewage, drainage, public lighting, social facilities, and mitigation works. Due to administrative and technical difficulties attributable to the area's rugged topography, and the climate of insecurity (e.g., attacks on workers, theft of materials, etc.), progress in construction was delayed.

The project made significant progress in achieving its objectives but its sustainability is at risk. In terms of progress made, the Bank disbursed 3,734 subsidies for housing improvements and 3,695 subsidies for the construction of new homes. The project completion report (PCR) indicates increases in access to water and sanitation and other basic urban services, and reductions in the levels of violence. However, it was not possible to create a market for microloans. There is no mechanism for continuing to monitor and maintain services in the areas of intervention, so there is a risk that the services provided will deteriorate. The second operation (HO-L1088) approved in 2012 has only disbursed 5.8% of its funds, and specific outcomes cannot yet be identified.

4. Transportation

The Bank primarily focused on executing the portfolio pending from earlier periods. At the start of the period, the sector's balances to be disbursed amounted to 94% of the total approved. Nearly all of the US\$45.9 million allocated to the Tourism Corridor (HO-L1013) was intended to finance damages caused by weather events and to cover cost overruns on the Atlantic Corridor (HO-L1020). The Government of Honduras decided to finance that corridor through the private sector using the PPP method. The remaining highway projects experienced delays due to a series of complex factors, including the pause, problems acquiring rights of way, the resettlement of settlers, the absence of final designs, weakness of the executing agency (i.e., SOPTRAVI), deterioration of highways, scarcity of contractors in some areas, and the obligation to have contracts awarded after each legislative election ratified by the Congress. Many of these problems were resolved with the change of executing unit (see Box 2.1). As a result, operations HO-L1013 and HO-L1020 (Tourism Corridor and Atlantic Corridor) have disbursed all their funds; operation HO-L1033 (Agricultural Corridor) has disbursed 47%; and HO-L1018 (Logistics Corridor) has disbursed 7%.⁶⁵ The Tegucigalpa public transportation project (HO-L1061) has disbursed 84% of its funds and construction is moving ahead.⁶⁶ Lastly, the Puerto Cortés project was delayed until the decision was made, with help from the Comisión para la Promoción de la Alianza Público-Privada [Public-Private Partnership Promotion Commission] (CoAlianza) to issue an invitation to bid on the port operation.⁶⁷ The company with the successful bid is expected to deliver twice the square meters planned for the port in 2016.

Despite progress in making disbursements the expected physical goals have not yet been obtained. For example, none of the planned 37.1 kilometers have been constructed in the Tourism Corridor, only 80 of the 112 kilometers planned for the Logistics Corridor have been constructed, and 52 of the expected 56 kilometers have been constructed on the Atlantic Corridor.⁶⁸ In terms of results, the data on the basis of which to establish its progress has not been collected as yet. However, the administrative information available indicates there has been improvement in the quality of the highways and that, despite cost overruns on the Atlantic Corridor, the project continues to generate an economic return (EIRR 15%-17%).

The weakness of some key institutions jeopardizes the sustainability of highway projects. Privatization of the port's management seems to have improved its sustainability. In the first case, SOPTRAVI's performance has been intermittent in the past due to the inadequate technical level of its personnel, excessive turnover, and politicization of its human resources as well as the lack of mechanisms to ensure the transparency of its management. In the second case, the creation of CoAlianza, with support from the Bank, is a step in the right direction for managing PPPs like those being used to complete the Tourism Corridor and manage the Puerto Cortés containers terminal. The sustainability of the Tegucigalpa transportation project depends to a great extent on the conditions of the concessions and the definition of rates, which are complex problems that are difficult to resolve.

5. Environment and natural disasters

The Bank's support for the sector has served to alleviate some of the effects of natural disasters and has advanced the disaster prevention and mitigation agenda. However, the institutional and financial weakness of the institutions in charge of prevention and mitigation jeopardizes the consolidation of the Sistema Nacional de Gestión de Riesgos [National Risk Management System] (SINAGER). Consistent with the Bank's policy on the management of disaster risk,⁶⁹ the Bank's support for Honduras has focused on improving risk analysis capacity, implementing prevention and mitigation measures, improving the management of financial risk, strengthening the ability to respond to emergencies and to implement repair and reconstruction works following disasters. The portfolio executed during the period consisted of the Disaster Risk Management and Prevention Project (MITIGAR) operation (HO-L1031).⁷⁰ To date, 53% of its funds have been executed, primarily those related to the construction of the civil works component, whereas the components relating to the development of institutional capacity have shown moderate progress. In addition, the Bank executed 100% of two technical cooperation operations (HO-T1147 and HO-T1164) from the Ordinary Capital Fund Allocated for Natural Disaster Emergencies to provide food, first aid, and shelter to the victims of tropical storms in Francisco Morazán, Choculeta, and Valle. In addition, funds were used from the Tourism Corridors highway project (HO-L1013) to cover repair work after natural disasters. Despite these effects, the Comisión Permanente de Contingencias [Standing Committee on Contingencies] (COPECO) and municipal entities continue to lack the financial and technical resources they need to carry out their prevention and mitigation functions.

6. Digital agenda and telecommunications

The Bank's support for this sector has been modest in terms of the volume of funds and results, although ongoing dialogue with the Bank has served to guide the reforms. During the period, one operation approved in the previous period was executed and two new operations were approved. The objective of the first (HO-T1145) was to advance the design of a digital agenda through the sharing of experiences. There is no indication of any outcome. The objective of the other two operations (HO-T1152 and HO-T1161) was to prepare studies on reform of the telecommunications system in general and the Empresa Hondureña de Telecomunicaciones [Honduran Telecommunications Company] (HONDUTEL) in particular. The sector's legal-institutional framework has seen positive development but has yet to adopt some of the proposed measures, such as professionalization of personnel, liberalization of the sector, and privatization of HONDUTEL.

7. Water and sanitation

The Bank's program in this sector has obtained some partial results but not all the goals have been achieved nor have the institutional problems affecting the sector's effectiveness and sustainability been resolved. In 2006 the Bank approved an operation (HO0174) for

US\$30 million to execute water and sanitation projects in municipalities, decentralize service, and improve institutional capacity. To date 62.26% of its funds have been disbursed. It also approved an operation (HO-X1017) with the Spanish Cooperation Fund for Water and Sanitation in Latin America and the Caribbean (SFW) for US\$25 million to improve access to water and sanitation services in rural areas with fewer than 2,000 inhabitants. To date, 29% of its funds have been disbursed. As a result of the Bank's intervention, potable water has been provided to 396,515 beneficiaries (6,000 more than planned). However, only 60.10% of the goal with respect to the sewer system has been achieved (30,424 households). Service increased from 0.9 hours per day but did not reach the goal of 11.91 hours of service per day. Lastly, the project has not succeeded in having collections cover consumption expenses. Slow progress in execution and in achieving results is primarily due to the existence of slow bureaucratic processes (e.g. environmental licensing) and the limited technical capacity of the Servicio Autónomo Nacional de Acueductos y Alcantarillados [National Autonomous Aqueducts and Sewers System] (SANAA) and the Ente Regulador de los Servicios de Agua Potable y Saneamiento [Drinking Water and Sanitation Services Regulatory Authority] (ERSAPS). In addition, problems of coordination persist among the Consejo Nacional de Agua Potable y Saneamiento [National Water and Sanitation Council (CONASA), SANAA, ERSAPS, and FHIS and high turnover and politicization in the sector's leading entities.

8. Agriculture

During the period, problems were resolved in execution of the PRONEGOCIOS. At the start of the period, only 1.8% had been disbursed of the US\$27.1 million under the PRONEGOCIOS program, approved by the Bank in 2008. As of July 2014, the Bank has already disbursed approximately 78% of those funds, thanks to actions adopted by the Bank and the Government of Honduras (see Box 2.1).

Preliminary information seems to indicate adequate progress made toward the achievements proposed. The evaluation results are not expected until the end of 2014. However, according to the information collected to date, households living in extreme poverty are being served by the conditional transfer cash program whereas the PRONEGOCIOS service model is better designed to reach poor households in rural areas. The established target of 3,500 households has already been exceeded; there are 78 businesses with an average internal rate of return (IRR) higher than 30% (the goal was an IRR higher than 12%), and 170 businesses are expected to be operating by the end of 2014 (two more than expected). There are still no data on increased incomes in the beneficiary households.

The intervention model ensures the sustainability of investments. To benefit from the program, projects must submit a financial viability plan based on a market study. Beneficiaries must also contribute up to 50% of the counterpart funds. All this helps to make the projects sustainable. One hundred percent of the projects remain in operation and are obtaining the goals set for each project (e.g., income, profitability, employment, sales, etc.). This contrasts with a 40% failure rate for similar companies in the country.



During the period of the Bank's country strategy for 2011-2014, the Bank has maintained significant financial relevance in the country, has made an effort to target its intervention, and, despite facing adverse conditions, has managed to substantially improve portfolio execution.

© MJZ Photography, *The Streets in The Valle, Around the Valle in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, January, 2011*
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4 Conclusions and Recommendations

The deterioration of the fiscal position could jeopardize the country's borrowing capacity and affects the financial sustainability of many of the Bank's operations. The Bank has undertaken significant efforts to improve fiscal performance through support for measures to control spending on payroll and social welfare institutes, increase tax revenues and improve public financial management, and support for the Honduran government for reaching a new agreement with the IMF. Despite these efforts, the fiscal deficit has grown to higher-than-expected levels.

During the period of the Bank's country strategy for 2011-2014, the Bank has maintained significant financial relevance in the country, has made an effort to target its intervention, and, despite facing adverse conditions, has managed to substantially improve portfolio execution, thanks to the adoption of a project-specific risk management approach. The increased volume of loans and improved disbursements increased the Bank's financial presence in the country as compared to the previous period. In addition, its presence in country went from 16 sectors to 10 sectors. Lastly, portfolio management has improved substantially with significant improvements in nearly all management indicators, thanks to actions attributable to both the Government of Honduras and the Bank, primarily related to the adoption of a contextualized approach for each project and proper management of the corresponding risks.

Nonetheless, responding in a more strategic and integrated manner to the country's development problems remains a challenge. The sectors prioritized in the country strategy and the program executed have been, in general terms, relevant to some of the many challenges facing the country. However, the improper functioning of certain elements related to the Bank's structure, processes and incentives, diagnosed in the Evaluation of the Results of the Realignment, hindered coordination between sectors and between

VPC and VPS in the preparation of the country strategy. As a result, the country strategy does not provide criteria for a clear understanding of the rationale for the Bank's intervention with respect to its comparative advantages and those of other donors (i.e. selection of development problems to be addressed, identification of which sectors face these problems, and the prioritization of projects). Moreover, significant inconsistencies have been identified between the various technical documents the Bank developed to prepare the strategy (e.g. sector technical notes and the growth study), which the Bank did not explain or justify. In addition, despite the fact that the resolution of development problems tends to require a multisector approach, the selection of the objectives in the country strategy, the preparation of the sector technical notes, and the design of projects tend to be addressed from a single sector in the Bank. While there has been a notable increase in the Bank's activity in the private sector, a clear strategy is needed to identify market failures to be resolved and coordinate them with other Bank operations.

Most execution problems are the result of operational designs that do not adequately weigh institutional and governance risks, or that include unrealistic procurement plans and complicated execution mechanisms. Delays in execution have occurred due to the technical and administrative weakness of the executing agencies and the legal-institutional frameworks of their respective sectors, politicization and high turnover of officials, or the existence of vested interests that are difficult to overcome. In some instances, there have been projects with unrealistic procurement plans or execution mechanisms inadequate to the proper performance of the operation. The impact of these problems has been partially mitigated by the increase in the number of specialists in the Country Office due to the pause.

Although many of the projects are achieving some of the desired results, their effectiveness and sustainability are threatened by the country's institutional and fiscal weakness. The weaknesses of the institutions intervening in program execution (e.g., DEI, ENEE, SOPTRAVI, etc.) impede the achievement of the objectives. The limited quality of the information available makes it difficult to perform good diagnoses, formulate good policies, and adequately monitor and evaluate interventions. In all cases where sustainability problems have been identified, there are underlying institutional capacity, regulatory, and financial viability problems.

Based on the findings from this evaluation, OVE makes the following recommendations:

1. Give priority to fiscal consolidation. For such purposes, it is recommended that the Bank continue work with the IMF and the World Bank in order to ensure a sustained process of fiscal consolidation that reduces risks related to program sustainability.
2. Design the country strategy based on the most critical development challenges, clearly defining the criteria for participation by the Bank's various sectors (including VPP), and for the prioritization of projects, while ensuring consistency between the diagnostic assessment and the country strategy. To do this, Management should consider:

- a. Forming an interdisciplinary team to identify and determine the scope of the development problems faced by the country (e.g., worsening fiscal position, poverty, insecurity, low productivity, etc.) and their causes, based on the growth study, the government's priorities, and other necessary elements.
 - b. Including criteria explaining why the Bank is engaged in the solution to those development problems and the selection of the sector or sectors proposed for resolving them (e.g., in the case of the fiscal consolidation problem, possible actions could be considered in the area of revenues, expenditures, and weaknesses in the respective institutions (ENEE, COALIANZA, ERSAPS, FHIS, etc.), inefficiencies in the energy sector, potential contingent liabilities that may arise from PPPs, etc.). This could involve the preparation of multisector Technical Notes.
3. Strengthen the design of operations by: (i) conducting more rigorous institutional assessments; (ii) performing more realistic analyses of governance and financial sustainability; and (iii) engaging fiduciary staff more intensively in the design of execution, disbursement, and procurement mechanisms and plans for investment projects.
4. Devote greater efforts to building management capacity (e.g., human resources, financial and budgetary management, procurement, etc.) in the institutions responsible for projects in execution (e.g. DEI, the Police, SEFIN, SESAL, SOPTRAVI, etc.) and consider making disbursements for future policy-based loan operations contingent on effective changes in the management capacity of key institutions and in the institutional framework of their respective sectors in order to improve their governance.
5. Include in future country strategies the sectors corresponding to each country's existing portfolio in order to facilitate their execution and the continuity of the relevant dialogue, as OVE has recommended in prior CPEs.

- ¹ In 1999, following Hurricane Mitch, the Stockholm Declaration Follow-up Group (G-16) was formed to monitor the reconstruction process and subsequently, the country's transformation.
- ² The political crisis began with the departure of Manuel Zelaya in June 2009. See http://www.oas.org/es/centro_noticias/comunicado_prensa.asp?sCodigo=C-219/09
- ³ Central Bank of Honduras, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) (2014).
- ⁴ IDB, Honduras Monthly Newsletter.
- ⁵ World Bank. *World Development Indicators*. Estimated figure for year-end 2012.
- ⁶ Pagés, C. 2010. *The Age of Productivity*. Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, D.C.
- ⁷ ECLAC (2014). *Economic Outlook*, ECLAC, Chile, p. 31.
- ⁸ The GINI coefficient is 57. See *World Bank* <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI>.
- ⁹ World Bank. *World Development Indicators*. Estimated figure for year-end 2012.
- ¹⁰ Ibid.
- ¹¹ See World Bank. *Worldwide Governance Indicators*, <http://www.worldbank.org/wbi>; *Doing Business*, <http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/honduras/>, and *Informe sobre la situación del servicio civil en América Latina* (IDB, 2006).
- ¹² See Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI), *Ficha Estadística de Honduras*, 2014 and Carrión, F. and M. Dammert, comp. 2009. *Economía política de la seguridad ciudadana*. FLASCO, Quito, Ecuador.
- ¹³ *Germanwatch Global Climate Risk Index 2014*. <http://germanwatch.org/en/download/8551.pdf>.
- ¹⁴ IDB-TN-169 Indicators of Disaster Risk and Risk Management: Program for Latin America and the Caribbean (Honduras), IDB 2012.
- ¹⁵ Auguste, S. 2010. *Competitividad y Crecimiento en Honduras*. IDB. Washington, D.C.
- ¹⁶ Comprehensive Natural Disaster Risk Management Program of Honduras, Annex 2, IDB, 2011.
- ¹⁷ Rust is caused by the *Hemileia vastatrix* fungus that causes coffee plant leaves to fall prematurely.
- ¹⁸ See Figure 1.1 of the Annex and Honduras Monthly Newsletter. IDB. February 2014.
- ¹⁹ The total public sector wage bill went from 11.1% of GDP in 2009 to 9.5% in 2013 (SEFIN).
- ²⁰ IMF, 2013. Staff Report for the 2012 Article IV Consultation.
- ²¹ SEFIN, Year-end 2013.
- ²² IMF, 2014. 2014 Article IV Consultation with Honduras.
- ²³ The 2007-2010 CPE indicated that in the worst-case scenario, debt would not reach 30% of GDP in 2015.
- ²⁴ The legislative changes approved include the *Law on the Reorganization of Public Finances, Control of Exemptions, and Anti-evasion Measures*, the purpose of which is to expand the income tax base, regulate exemptions granted, the sales tax, and customs duties on imports. These changes are expected to increase revenues by up to 4%. However, the Honduran Congress relaxed the measures, particularly as regards exemptions, so that the initial objective could not be achieved.
- ²⁵ The key factors contributing to the backlog of balances to be disbursed include the implementation of debt relief and the Bank's concessional financing reform in 2007. For Honduras, the annual average for SG investment loans approvals during the period 2003-2006 was US\$95 million, while in the period 2007-2010 the figure was US\$130 million, an increase of 36%. The global financial crisis also meant supplementary allocations for the period 2009-2010, doubling the amount of FSO resources for Group D2 countries compared to the period 2007-2008 (paragraph 3.3 of document GN-2442-34). Lastly, as a result of the crisis in late 2009, the Bank approved a waiver of the no-carry-over policy for FSO resources for Honduras to allow the entire amount of funds allocated for the 2009-2010 cycle but not approved during 2009 to be used in 2010 (paragraph 3.5 of document GN-2442-34).

- ²⁶ Legislative Decree 286-2009, dated 2 February 2010.
- ²⁷ The Bank's country strategy proposed maintaining dialogue in the following six additional sectors: food security, early childhood development, labor markets, telecommunications, fiscal sustainability, and citizen security.
- ²⁸ The Bank classified this operation under the category of "Social Investment," not "Public Management."
- ²⁹ During the previous period, to support this sector, the Bank approved the Fiscal and Municipal Management Consolidation Program (HO-L1015) for US\$28.6 million and the PBL for the Fiscal Reform Support Program for US\$45.8 million.
- ³⁰ Despite significant advances such as the approval of the new Law on Cooperatives on 28 August 2013, the regulation thereof by the National Bank and Insurance Commission is voluntary and lacks standards. The same holds true for regulation of conditional cash transfers (mobile banking and electronic payments), at both the financial and communications levels, to increase financial inclusion. Challenges also exist in enhancing the transparency of services and the financial culture in Honduras.
- ³¹ The Bank approved four Trade Finance Facilitation Program (TFFP) operations: two to support Banco Atlántida (HO-L1094 and HO-L1098), one to support Banco Lafise (HO-L1095), and another for Banco Ficohsa (HO-L1096). The Bank's TFFP does not prepare specific intervention strategies to identify market failures in each country, as it is understood to respond to needs common among all countries in the region. The Bank also approved a technical cooperation operation (HO-T1097) to strengthen the country's ability to attract foreign investment; a technical cooperation operation to strengthen the authority responsible for public-private partnerships (COALIANZA); a pilot experiment to support the productive and commercial integration of SMEs; and an NSG operation for US\$30 million to internationalize SMEs.
- ³² See the Preface.
- ³³ The operations were designed to strengthen the quality of the educational offering; estimate the fiscal cost of expanding services for education; expand the coverage of pre-school programs; strengthen the quality of programs in primary education; and seek alternatives for the third and fourth cycles.
- ³⁴ Document RE-541-2, pp. 18-21 and 28-30.
- ³⁵ For example, given the country's vulnerability to pests and its rates of rural poverty and the Bank's extensive experience in this sector, a discussion in the country strategy of why the Bank was not taking action to improve agricultural productivity and phytosanitary considerations could be considered missing. See paragraphs 1.1-1.3. The World Development Report (2008) concludes that investment in agriculture is up to three times more effective in reducing poverty than investment in other sectors.
- ³⁶ The six Sector Technical Notes for the following sectors: public management, financial system, energy, social protection programs, health, and fiduciary matters; and the growth study: Auguste, S., 2010. *Competitividad y Crecimiento en Honduras*. Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, D.C.
- ³⁷ See note 36 above.
- ³⁸ OVE was able to validate during visits and interviews that the sectors in the country strategy are highly correlated with the respective sector divisions in the Bank. Moreover, the strategy's indicators are, in many cases, project level indicators.
- ³⁹ Note that, despite these added difficulties, the Bank improved execution of the portfolio during the period (see paragraphs 2.14-2.21).
- ⁴⁰ In addition, three investment grants were approved for US\$33.4 million.
- ⁴¹ A total of seven MIF grant operations were also approved in the amount of US\$5.5 million but are not being evaluated.

- ⁴² Document RE-390.
- ⁴³ See document RE-390, paragraphs 3.7-3.9.
- ⁴⁴ However, the age of the Bank's portfolio with Honduras remains above the average for FSO countries and other Country Department Central America, Mexico, Panama and Dominican Republic (CID) countries.
- ⁴⁵ Executing agency representatives interviewed said that these differences could be explained in part by the fact that the Team Leaders for World Bank projects are located outside the country, making communications difficult.
- ⁴⁶ The Control Tower was created during Ricardo Maduro's administration.
- ⁴⁷ In addition, the Country Office, in collaboration with the Bank's training department (KNL) has trained more than 100 employees of 15 executing units on project execution (75 of whom were specifically trained in PM4R between 2012 and 2013).
- ⁴⁸ The representatives of executing units interviewed reported that prior to this measure, there was confusion in the assignment of responsibilities for project execution between team leaders and operations analysts, which delayed the Bank's response.
- ⁴⁹ In addition, two technical cooperation operations were approved in December 2013: one to strengthen INPREMA (HO-T1194), and another to support strengthening of macrofiscal governance (HO-T1200).
- ⁵⁰ Operations HO-L1015, HO-L1030, HO-L1055, and HO-T1134 were approved before 2011 but continued to be executed during the period under evaluation.
- ⁵¹ Governance, institutional, and execution risks were not adequately evaluated and the execution and procurement plans were not realistic and they had to be amended.
- ⁵² The INPREMA deficit fell to 13%; IHSS revenues for contributions as a percentage of GDP were at 1%; the percentage of government staff hired by the SIAFI rose to 75%; 100% of the Secretariats of State publish their budgets on the SEFIN portal in real time; 100% of the macroeconomic statistics series produced are published; collection per DEI employee has been exceeded; and the 60 positions in the State Modernization Unit have been filled. As for the fifth outcome, already 19 of the planned 25 municipalities are recording their accounts in the Municipal Administration System. The remaining six are expected to do so this year.
- ⁵³ See paragraphs 1.7-1.9.
- ⁵⁴ Particularly thanks to the development of a revenue projection model, a subsidies simulation model, and energy sector reform studies (HO-T1143).
- ⁵⁵ The Bank has classified this project under the category of "Trade." However, it includes a component for improving the efficiency of the DEI's customs collection operations at the port, which is consistent with the objective of improving the fiscal position.
- ⁵⁶ The redefinition of the program included the creation of Community School Committees, in which the participation of the Ministry of Health and Education in the verification of shared responsibilities was promoted. However, the lack of flexibility in the adjustments to the program's rules of operation and limited information provided to local authorities on the beneficiary populations required the establishment of an operations office to do field work to expand the discussions and strengthen institutional credibility. This caused delays in the operation of the program because new design, procurement, and implementation processes had to be coordinated. Moreover, the lack of identity cards and difficulties verifying joint responsibilities for students caused delays.
- ⁵⁷ University of Chicago and ESS Consultores. (2013). *"Primera Evaluación de Impacto del Programa Presidencial de Educación, Salud y Nutrición "Bono 10.000" en Zonas Rurales de la República de Honduras."*
- ⁵⁸ Note that an operation was approved to support Honduras in joining the MER. See paragraph 2.3.d above.

- ⁵⁹ However, in terms of outputs, Banco del País (HO-L1085) increased its SME portfolio from 2,826 in 2010 to 6,753 in 2013, more than doubling the objective for 2015 (3,390). This number reflects the efforts by Banco del País in further downscaling, with the addition of 5,640 new micro clients and 792 new SME clients. Banco del País also increased the volume of outstanding loans from US\$571.2 million in 2011 to US\$714 million in December 2013, again exceeding its target for 2015 of US\$685.4 million.
- ⁶⁰ The UEPEX is a module of the SIAF, used exclusively for the management of Project Execution Units with external financing.
- ⁶¹ As the Urban Development sector was not identified in the country strategy, project HO-L1088 for US\$17.2 million, which provided continuity for HO-L1007 and was approved in 2006, was submitted as a security project. Although it is true that some of the impact indicators are crime reduction indicators and that urban development (i.e., situational prevention) can be an effective crime prevention vehicle, the program clearly involves urban development.
- ⁶² Despite this, it has been possible to make some progress such as conducting studies, designing police training programs, and designing the pilot for the Safer Municipalities program.
- ⁶³ However, there is evidence that these operations are yielding results. For example, between 2011 and 2014, 48 guarantees and five direct loans were granted under the TFFP to support foreign trade from Honduras. These transactions facilitated 116 individual foreign trade operations for a nominal value of US\$175.8 million and an Average term of 162 days. Of these individual operations, 37% were exports from Honduras to the rest of the world. In terms of products, 32% of exports financed under the program were agricultural products, 26% manufactured goods, and 23% processed foods. On the import side, 60% of imported products were gas and oil, and 20% were manufactured goods.
- ⁶⁴ The “Reverse Trade Fair” method was adopted so as to have various providers for the electrical work in the schools.
- ⁶⁵ This project was delayed due to the relocation of the families affected. The executing agency found a solution to the problem and it is expected that it will soon be possible to speed up the pace of execution. There have been no disbursements as yet from the supplementary financing (HO-L1089) to cover cost overruns on the Atlantic Corridor.
- ⁶⁶ Ninety-eight percent of the six kilometers in the first section has been completed while only 65% of the second section has been completed. The third section has been put out for bids but has not been awarded as yet.
- ⁶⁷ CoAlianza was established by a law enacted by Congress in 2010 to promote and manage public-private contracts in the development, execution, and management of public works and services.
- ⁶⁸ The delays in each corridor have different causes. In the case of the Tourism Corridor, they are because funds were used for emergencies. In the case of the Atlantic Corridor, they are due to cost overruns. In the case of the Logistics Corridor, they are due to problems related to relocation of the settlers affected.
- ⁶⁹ Document GN-2354-5.
- ⁷⁰ This operation was prepared using funds from technical cooperation HO-T1102 for US\$1 million.

⑦ 2015 年 2 月 20 日に閣議決定がなされた開発協力大綱（日本語）

開発協力大綱について

平成 27 年 2 月 10 日

閣 議 決 定

平成 4 年に閣議にて決定され、平成 15 年に改定された政府開発援助（ODA）大綱は、これまで我が国の ODA 政策の根幹をなしてきた。

ODA 60 周年を迎えた今、日本及び国際社会は大きな転換期にある。この新たな時代に、我が国は、平和国家としての歩みを引き続き堅持しつつ、国際協調主義に基づく積極的平和主義の立場から、国際社会の平和と安定及び繁栄の確保に一層積極的に貢献する国家として国際社会を力強く主導していかなくてはならない。また、国際社会が直面する課題の解決のために開発途上国と協働する対等なパートナーとしての役割を更に強化すべく、日本の ODA は更なる進化を遂げるべき時を迎えている。

また、現在の国際社会では、多額の民間資金が開発途上国に流れ、企業や地方自治体、非政府組織（NGO）を始めとする様々な主体がグローバルな活動に携わり、開発途上国の開発課題の解決と持続的成長に重要な役割を果たしている。このような状況下にあって、我が国は、ODA のみならず、様々な力を結集して、開発課題に対処していかなくてはならない。

以上の認識に基づき、平成 25 年 12 月 17 日に閣議決定された国家安全保障戦略も踏まえつつ、次のとおり、ODA 大綱を改定し、開発協力大綱を定めることとする。

なお、ここで言う「開発協力」とは、「開発途上地域の開発を主たる目的とする政府及び政府関係機関による国際協力活動」を指すものとする。また、狭義の「開発」のみならず、平和構築やガバナンス、基本的人権の推進、人道支援等も含め、「開発」を広くとらえることとする。

こうした開発協力は、我が国政府及び政府関係機関によるそれ以外の資金・活動（ODA 以外の公的資金（OOF）、国際連合平和維持活動（PKO）等）や開発を目的とする又は開発に資する民間の資金・活動（企業や地方自治体、NGO を始めとする多様な主体による資金・活動）との連携を強化し、開発のための相乗効果を高めることが求められる。

開発協力大綱

—平和、繁栄、そして、一人ひとりのより良き未来のために—

現在の国際社会は、かつてないほどの世界のパワーバランスの変化及びグローバル化と技術革新の急速な進展による国際的な経済活動の拡大と、相互依存の深化並びに様々な非国家主体の影響力の増大といった大きな変化のただ中にある。こうした中、環境・気候変動問題、水問題、災害、食料危機・飢餓、エネルギー、感染症等の国境を越える問題や、国際テロ、国際組織犯罪、海賊等の国際社会の平和と安定に対する脅威はもちろん、脆弱国家における人道的課題や地域紛争、政治的不安定に至るまで、世界各地のあらゆるリスクが、我が国を含む世界全体の平和と安定及び繁栄に直接的な悪影響を及ぼし得る状況になっている。また、新興国・開発途上国の経済的重要性が高まり、これら諸国の経済成長が今後の世界経済の成長の行方を左右する中、新興国・開発途上国において、包摂的で持続可能で強靱な成長を実現することは、世界経済全体の安定的成長にとって不可欠なものとなっている。さらに、我が国自身の経済社会状況を踏まえれば、新興国・開発途上国を始めとする国際社会との協力関係を深化させ、その活力を取り込んでいくことが、我が国自身の持続的な繁栄にとって鍵となっている。こうした変化の中で、平和で安定し、繁栄した国際社会の構築は、我が国の国益とますます分かちがたく結びつくようになってきており、我が国が、国際協調主義に基づく積極的平和主義の立場から、開発途上国を含む国際社会と協力して、世界が抱える課題の解決に取り組んでいくことは我が国の国益の確保にとって不可欠となっている。

また、世界が抱える開発課題も大きく変化している。新興国を筆頭に、多くの国で開発の進展が見られる一方、そうした国々においても、脆弱なガバナンス等に起因する政治経済的不安定や国内格差、持続可能性の問題、「中所得国の罠」等の課題が生じている。また、小島嶼国等においては、特別な脆弱性の問題を抱えている等、単純な所得水準のみでは計ることのできない開発課題が表面化している。また、国内紛争、政治的不安定や地理的、気候的諸条件等に起因する様々な脆弱性ゆえに成長から取り残されている国々では、人道支援に加え、脆弱性からの脱却のため、平和・安定や法の支配・ガバナンス、民主化といった安定的な開発の基盤を確保し、さらに開発の歯車を始動させることが喫緊の課題となっている。加えて、誰ひとり取り残されない、包摂的な開発を実現する観点から、開発のあらゆる段階において、女性を始めとする社会の多様な関係者の参画を確保することが重要な課題となっている。このように、世界が直面する課題は多様化・複雑化し、さらにグローバル化の進展とも相まって、国境を越えて広範化している。これらの困難な挑戦に直面している世界は、これまで以上に各国の知恵と行動を必要としている。

I 理念

上記認識を踏まえ、我が国は、以下の理念にのっとり、「開発途上地域の開発を主たる目的とする政府及び政府関係機関による国際協力活動」である開発協力を推進する。

(1) 開発協力の目的

全世界の国民が、ひとしく恐怖と欠乏から免れ、平和のうちに生存する権利を有することを

確認する我が国は、コロンボ・プランに加盟した1954年以降一貫して、国際社会の平和と繁栄を希求し、政府開発援助（ODA）を中心とする開発協力を通じ、開発途上国の開発努力を後押しするとともに、地球規模課題の解決に取り組んできた。これは、国際社会の責任ある主要な国家として、国際社会の抱える課題の解決に真摯に取り組む、我が国の国としての在り方を体現するものである。我が国の長年にわたる地道で着実な歩みは、国際社会において高い評価と信頼を得るとともに、国際社会もまた、我が国がその国力にふさわしい形で国際社会の平和と安定及び繁栄のため一層積極的な役割を果たすことを期待している。

加えて、我が国は、各種の課題を克服しつつ、世界でも類い希な高い経済成長と格差の小さい平和で安定した社会を実現し、アジアで最初の先進国となった。同時に、アジア諸国等に対し、日本の開発協力の理念及び経験・技術を活かした特色ある協力を行い、その成長を支えてきた。我が国はこうした歩みの中で、様々な成功や失敗を経験し、数多くの経験と知見、そして教訓を得てきた。また、我が国は高度経済成長期の体験だけでなく、人口減少や高齢化への対応、震災復興等、現在直面する課題からも、数多くの教訓を得ている。このような我が国が有する経験と知見、教訓は、世界が現在直面する開発課題の解決に役立つものであり、その活用に対する国際社会の期待も高い。

このような国際社会の期待を踏まえ、世界の責任ある主要国として、国際社会の抱える課題、とりわけ開発課題や人道問題への対処に、これまで以上に積極的に寄与し、国際社会を力強く主導していくことは、我が国に対する国際社会の信頼を確固たるものとする観点から大きな意義を有する。

現在の国際社会では、もはやどの国も一国のみでは自らの平和と繁栄を確保できなくなっている。そのような時代においては、開発途上国を含む国際社会と協力して世界の様々な課題の解決に積極的に取り組み、平和で安定し繁栄する国際社会の構築を実現するとともに、そうした取組を通じて、国際社会の様々な主体と強固かつ建設的な関係を構築していくという真摯な取組の中にこそ、我が国が豊かで平和な社会を引き続き発展させていく道がある。我が国がそうした外交を機動的に展開していく上で、開発協力は最も重要な手段の一つであり、「未来への投資」としての意義がある。

以上の認識に基づき、我が国は、国際社会の平和と安定及び繁栄の確保により一層積極的に貢献することを目的として開発協力を推進する。こうした協力を通じて、我が国の平和と安全の維持、更なる繁栄の実現、安定性及び透明性が高く見通しがつきやすい国際環境の実現、普遍的価値に基づく国際秩序の維持・擁護といった国益の確保に貢献する。

その際、現在の国際社会では、民間企業、地方自治体、非政府組織（NGO）を始めとする多様な主体が、開発課題の解決、そして開発途上国の持続的成長にますます重要な役割を果たしていることを踏まえれば、ODAのみならず、多様な力を結集することが重要である。その意味で、ODAは、開発に資する様々な活動の中核として、多様な資金・主体と連携しつつ、様々な力を動員するための触媒、ひいては国際社会の平和と安定及び繁栄の確保に資する様々な取組を推進するための原動力の一つとしての役割を果たしていく。

（２）基本方針

上記の目的のために行われる我が国の開発協力は、その長い歴史の中で我が国が培ってきた

哲学を踏まえて、更にそれを発展させていくものであるべきである。この観点から、目指すべき方向性を以下の基本方針として定める。

ア 非軍事的協力による平和と繁栄への貢献

非軍事的協力によって、世界の平和と繁栄に貢献してきた我が国の開発協力は、戦後一貫して平和国家としての道を歩んできた我が国に最もふさわしい国際貢献の一つであり、国際社会の平和と繁栄を誠実に希求する我が国の在り方を体現するものとして国際社会の高い評価を得てきた。我が国は今後もこの方針を堅持し、開発協力の軍事的用途及び国際紛争助長への使用を回避するとの原則を遵守しつつ、国際社会の平和と安定及び繁栄の確保に積極的に貢献する。

イ 人間の安全保障の推進

個人の保護と能力強化により、恐怖と欠乏からの自由、そして、一人ひとりが幸福と尊厳を持って生存する権利を追求する人間の安全保障の考え方は、我が国の開発協力の根本にある指導理念である。この観点から、我が国の開発協力においては、人間一人ひとり、特に脆弱な立場に置かれやすい子ども、女性、障害者、高齢者、難民・国内避難民、少数民族・先住民族等に焦点を当て、その保護と能力強化を通じて、人間の安全保障の実現に向けた協力を行うとともに、相手国においてもこうした我が国の理念が理解され、浸透するように努め、国際社会における主流化を一層促進する。また、同じく人間中心のアプローチの観点から、女性の権利を含む基本的人権の促進に積極的に貢献する。

ウ 自助努力支援と日本の経験と知見を踏まえた対話・協働による自立的発展に向けた協力

相手国の自主性、意思及び固有性を尊重しつつ、現場主義にのっとり、対話と協働により相手国に合ったものを共に創り上げていく精神、さらには共に学び合い、開発途上国と日本が相互に成長し発展する双方向の関係を築いていく姿勢は、開発途上国の自助努力を後押しし、将来における自立的発展を目指してきた日本の開発協力の良き伝統である。この観点から、引き続き、開発途上国自身の自発性と自助努力を重視するとともに、日本の経験と知見を活用しつつ、対話と協働を一層深化させ、当該国の自立的発展に向けた協力を行う。その際、人づくりや経済社会インフラ整備、法・制度構築等、自助努力や自立的発展の基礎の構築を重視する。さらに、相手国からの要請を待つだけでなく、相手国の開発政策や開発計画、制度を十分踏まえた上で我が国から積極的に提案を行うことも含め、当該国の政府や地域機関を含む様々な主体との対話・協働を重視する。

Ⅱ 重点政策

(1) 重点課題

我が国は、上記の理念にのっとり、多様化・複雑化・広範化する開発課題に対処し、国際社会の平和と安定及び繁栄を実現するため、課題間の相互関連性にも留意しつつ、以下を重点課題として、開発協力を推進していく。

ア 「質の高い成長」とそれを通じた貧困撲滅

世界には、いまだに多数の貧困層が存在しており、世界における貧困削減、とりわけ絶対的貧困の撲滅は、もっとも基本的な開発課題である。特に様々な理由で発展の端緒をつかめない

脆弱国、脆弱な状況に置かれた人々に対しては、人道的観点からの支援、そして、発展に向けた歯車を始動させ、脆弱性からの脱却を実現するための支援を行うことが重要である。

同時に、貧困問題を持続可能な形で解決するためには開発途上国の自立的発展に向けた、人づくり、インフラ整備、法・制度構築、そしてこれらによる民間部門の成長等を通じた経済成長の実現が不可欠である。ただし、一定の経済成長を遂げた国々の中にも、格差の拡大や持続可能性の問題、社会開発の遅れ、政治経済的不安定等の課題に直面する国々があることに鑑みれば、その成長は単なる量的な経済成長ではなく、成長の果実が社会全体に行き渡り、誰ひとり取り残されないという意味で「包摂的」であり、環境との調和への配慮や経済社会の持続的成長・地球温暖化対策の観点を含め世代を超えて「持続可能」であり、経済危機や自然災害を含む様々なショックへの耐性及び回復力に富んだ「強靱性」を兼ね備えた「質の高い成長」である必要がある。これらは、我が国が戦後の歩みの中で実現に努めてきた課題でもあり、我が国は自らの経験や知見、教訓及び技術を活かし、「質の高い成長」とそれを通じた貧困撲滅を実現すべく支援を行う。

これらの観点から、インフラ、金融、貿易・投資環境整備等の産業基盤整備及び産業育成、持続可能な都市、情報通信技術（ＩＣＴ）や先端技術の導入、科学技術・イノベーション促進、研究開発、経済政策、職業訓練・産業人材育成、雇用創出、フードバリューチェーンの構築を含む農林水産業の育成等、経済成長の基礎及び原動力を確保するために必要な支援を行う。同時に、人間開発、社会開発の重要性に十分に留意し、保健医療、安全な水・衛生、食料・栄養、万人のための質の高い教育、格差是正、女性の能力強化、精神的な豊かさをもたらす文化・スポーツ等、人々の基礎的生活を支える人間中心の開発を推進するために必要な支援を行う。

イ 普遍的価値の共有、平和で安全な社会の実現

「質の高い成長」による安定的発展を実現するためには、一人ひとりの権利が保障され、人々が安心して経済社会活動に従事し、社会が公正かつ安定的に運営されることが不可欠である。我が国はそうした発展の前提となる基盤を強化する観点から、自由、民主主義、基本的人権の尊重、法の支配といった普遍的価値の共有や平和で安定し、安全な社会の実現のための支援を行う。

法の支配の確立、グッドガバナンスの実現、民主化の促進・定着、女性の権利を含む基本的人権の尊重等は、効果的・効率的かつ安定した経済社会活動の基礎をなし、経済社会開発を支えるものであると同時に、格差の是正を始め、公正で包摂的な社会を実現するための鍵である。この観点から、実定法の整備や法曹、矯正・更生保護を含む司法関係者の育成等の法制度整備支援、経済社会制度整備支援、公務員の人材育成、不正腐敗対策を含む行政能力向上支援等のガバナンス支援、選挙制度等の民主的政治体制構築支援、メディア支援や民主化教育等の民主化支援等、必要な支援を行う。

また、平和と安定、安全の確保は、国づくり及び開発の前提条件である。この観点から、貧困を含め紛争や不安定な様々な要因に包括的に対処するとともに、紛争予防や紛争下の緊急人道支援、紛争終結促進、紛争後の緊急人道支援から復旧復興・開発支援までの切れ目のない平和構築支援を行う。その際、難民・避難民支援等の人道支援、女性や社会的弱者の保護と参画、社会・人的資本の復興、政府と市民の信頼関係に基づく統治機能の回復、地雷・不発弾除去や小型武器回収、治安の回復等、必要な支援を行う。また、自然災害等の緊急事態に際しては、中長期的な復旧・復興を視野に入れた迅速な支援を行う。さらに、安定・安全への脅威は、経済社会発展の阻害要因となることに鑑み、海上保安能力を含む法執行機関の能力強化、テロ対策や麻薬取引、人身取引対策等の国際組織犯罪対策を含む治安維持能力強化、海洋・宇宙空間・

サイバー空間といった国際公共財に関わる開発途上国の能力強化等、必要な支援を行う。

ウ 地球規模課題への取組を通じた持続可能で強靱な国際社会の構築

国境を越えて人類が共通して直面する環境・気候変動、水問題、大規模自然災害、感染症、食料問題、エネルギー等の地球規模課題は開発途上国のみならず国際社会全体に大きな影響を与え、多くの人々に被害をもたらすものであり、特に貧困層等、脆弱な立場に置かれた者により深刻な影響をもたらす傾向にある。

こうした地球規模課題は一国のみでは解決し得ない問題であり、地域、さらには国際社会が一致して取り組む必要がある。我が国は、ミレニアム開発目標（MDGs）・ポスト2015年開発アジェンダといった国際開発目標とそれをめぐる議論を十分に踏まえ、国際的な目標や指針作りへの関与及び策定された国際開発目標の達成に向けた積極的な取組を含め、地球規模課題に率先して取り組む。こうした取組を通じ、国際社会全体として持続可能かつ強靱な社会を構築することを目指す。

この観点から、低炭素社会の構築及び気候変動の悪影響に対する適応を含む気候変動対策、感染症対策、ユニバーサル・ヘルス・カバレッジの推進、防災の主流化、防災対策・災害復旧対応、生物多様性の保全並びに森林、農地及び海洋における資源の持続可能な利用、健全な水循環の推進、環境管理等の環境分野での取組、高齢化を含む人口問題への対応、食料安全保障及び栄養、持続可能な形での資源・エネルギーへのアクセスの確保、情報格差の解消等に取り組む。

（２）地域別重点方針

現在の国際社会における開発課題の多様化・複雑化・広範化、グローバル化の進展等に鑑みれば、世界全体を見渡しつつ、世界各地域に対し、その必要性と特性に応じた協力を行っていく必要がある。ついては、以下の各地域に対する重点方針を踏まえ、刻一刻と変化する情勢に柔軟に対応しながら、重点化を図りつつ、戦略的、効果的かつ機動的に協力を行っていく。その際、近年、地域共同体構築を始めとする地域統合の動き、国境を越える問題等への地域レベルでの取組、広域開発の取組、地域横断的な連結性強化の取組、地域間の連結性等が重要な意義を有するようになっていくことを踏まえた協力を行っていく。また、開発の進展が見られても、いわゆる「中所得国の罠」といった持続的経済成長を妨げる課題や防災、感染症、環境・気候変動等の地球規模課題を始めとする様々な開発課題を抱える国々や、一人当たり所得が一定の水準にあっても小島嶼国等の特別な脆弱性を抱える国々等に対しては、各国の開発ニーズの実態や負担能力に応じて必要な協力を行っていく。

アジア地域については、日本と緊密な関係を有し、日本の安全と繁栄にとり重要な地域であることを踏まえた協力を行う。

特に、東南アジア諸国連合（ASEAN）地域については、連結性の強化を含むハード・ソフト両面のインフラ整備支援、域内及び各国内の格差是正を柱として、共同体構築及びASEAN全体としての包括的かつ持続的な発展を支援する。とりわけ、メコン地域への支援を強化するとともに、一定の経済成長を遂げた国々についても、「中所得国の罠」に陥ることのないよう、生産性向上や技術革新を促す人材育成等の支援を継続する。同時に、防災対策や災害対処能力の向上、安定した経済社会活動の基盤となる法の支配促進等のための支援を重視する。また、ASEANが一体となって取り組む課題の解決のため、地域機関としてのASEANと

の連携を推進する。

さらに、南アジアについては、同地域の安定と同地域が有する様々な潜在力の発現に向け、インフラの整備やアジア域内を含めた連結性の強化を始めとする貿易・投資環境の整備等、成長を通じた経済発展の基盤を構築するための協力を行うとともに、保健、衛生、教育等の基礎生活分野の支援、貧富の格差を和らげるための経済社会インフラ整備支援等を行う。

中央アジア・コーカサス地域については、域内の格差にも留意しつつ、隣接地域を含めた長期的な安定と持続可能な発展のための国づくりと地域協力を支援する。

アフリカについては、貿易・投資及び消費の拡大を軸に近年目覚ましい発展を遂げるアフリカの成長を我が国とアフリカ双方の更なる発展に結びつけられるよう、アフリカ開発会議（ＴＩＣＡＤ）プロセス等を通じて、官民一体となった支援を行っていく。また、特にアフリカで進む準地域レベルでの地域開発及び地域統合の取組に留意する。一方、依然として紛争が頻発する国々や深刻な開発課題が山積する国々が存在することを踏まえ、引き続き人間の安全保障の視点に立って、平和構築と脆弱な国家への支援に積極的に取り組み、平和と安定の確立・定着及び深刻な開発課題の解決に向けて、必要な支援を行う。

中東については、日本のみならず国際社会全体にとって、平和と安定及びエネルギーの安定供給の観点から重要な地域であり、平和構築、格差是正、人材育成等の課題に対する協力を行い、同地域の平和と安定化に積極的に貢献し、我が国と中東地域諸国の共生・共栄に向け支援を行っていく。

中・東欧については、自由、民主主義、基本的人権の尊重、法の支配といった普遍的価値を共有する欧州への統合に向けた歩みを支持し、このために必要な支援を行っていく。

中南米については、貿易・投資等を通じた経済発展を一層促進していくための環境整備を支援するとともに、大きな発展を遂げている国においても国内格差が存在すること等を踏まえ、必要な協力を行う。また、日系社会の存在が我が国との強い絆となっていることに留意する。

大洋州、カリブ諸国を始めとする小島嶼国については、多くの国・地域が小島嶼国ならではの脆弱性を抱えており、また、気候変動による海面上昇や自然災害による被害、水不足等、地球規模の環境問題の影響への対応が課題となっていることを踏まえ、小島嶼国の特殊性を勘案し、開発ニーズに即した支援を行う。

Ⅲ 実施

（１）実施上の原則

開発協力の実施に際しては、前述の理念の実現と重点政策推進にとって最大限の効果が得られるよう、開発効果向上等の国際的な議論も踏まえつつ、効果的・効率的な開発協力推進に努めるとともに、当該国・社会に与える影響や協力の適正性確保等に十分な配慮を行うことが必要である。この観点から、以下の諸点を実施上の原則として開発協力を行う。

ア 効果的・効率的な開発協力推進のための原則

（ア）戦略性の強化

我が国の開発協力の効果を最大化するためには、政府・実施機関が一体となり、様々な関係主体とも連携しつつ、我が国の有する様々な資源を結集して、開発協力の政策立案、実施、評価のサイクルに一貫して取り組むという戦略性を確保することが重要である。

政策立案に際しては、開発協力が刻々と変化する国際情勢を踏まえた戦略的かつ機動的対応が要求される外交政策の最も重要な手段の一つであることを十分認識する必要がある。この観

点から、開発途上国を始めとする国際社会の状況、開発途上国自身の開発政策や開発計画及び支援対象となる国や課題の我が国にとっての戦略的重要性を十分踏まえ、必要な重点化を図りつつ、我が国の外交政策に基づいた戦略的かつ効果的な開発協力方針の策定・目標設定を行う。また、開発協力方針の明確化のため、本大綱の下に、課題別政策、地域別政策、国別政策等を位置付ける。

開発協力の実施に際しては、政府及び政府関係機関が有する資源を最大限に活用すべく、ODAとODA以外の資金・協力との連携を図ることで相乗効果を高める。また、外交政策上の観点及び開発協力の効果・効率性の向上のため、技術協力、有償資金協力、無償資金協力を有機的に組み合わせるとともに、迅速性の向上や協力のための諸制度の改善、柔軟な運用に努める。

評価については、協力の効果・効率性の向上に加え、国民への説明責任を果たす観点からも重要であることを踏まえ、政策や事業レベルでの評価を行い、評価結果を政策決定過程や事業実施に適切にフィードバックする。その際、成果を重視しつつも、対象の特殊性やそれぞれの事情を考慮した上で評価を行う。また、外交的視点からの評価の実施にも努める。

(イ) 日本の持つ強みを活かした協力

高度成長や急速な人口動態の変化を経験し、様々な課題を乗り越えつつ、今日まで歩みを進めてきた我が国は、その過程の中で、人材、知見、先端技術を含む優れた技術及び制度を培ってきた。これらを活用することは、開発途上国が今日及び将来直面する同様の課題への対処にとって有用であり、我が国に対する期待も大きい。我が国の開発協力の実施に当たっては、民間部門を始め様々な主体からの提案を積極的に取り入れるとともに、大学・研究機関等と連携することにより教育・学術研究の知見を活用し、それぞれの潜在能力の発掘にも努める。また、インフラ建設等のハード面の支援のみならず、その運営管理等のシステム、人づくりや制度づくり等のソフト面の支援を総合的に行うことにより、日本の経験と知見をより積極的に活用していく。加えて、日本の価値観や職業文化等日本らしさに対する国際社会の高い評価も踏まえ、日本語を含む日本のソフトパワーの活用にも留意する。

(ウ) 国際的な議論への積極的貢献

これまでの我が国の開発協力において得られた経験と知見を中心に整理した上で、我が国の開発協力政策の対外発信に努めるとともに、これが国際的な開発協力の理念・潮流の形成過程において十分に反映されるよう、国際連合、国際金融機関、経済協力開発機構（OECD）（その中の開発援助委員会（DAC））、その他の国際的枠組みにおける議論に積極的に参加・貢献していく。

イ 開発協力の適正性確保のための原則

開発協力政策や個別の事業の適正性確保、また当該国・社会に与える様々な影響への配慮の観点から、以下の原則を常に踏まえた上で、当該国の開発需要及び経済社会状況、二国間関係等を総合的に判断の上、開発協力を実施する。

(ア) 民主化の定着、法の支配及び基本的人権の保障に係る状況

開発途上国の民主化の定着、法の支配及び基本的人権の尊重を促進する観点から、当該国における民主化、法の支配及び基本的人権の保障をめぐる状況に十分注意を払う。

(イ) 軍事的用途及び国際紛争助長への使用の回避

開発協力の実施に当たっては、軍事的用途及び国際紛争助長への使用を回避する。民生目的、災害救助等非軍事目的の開発協力に相手国の軍又は軍籍を有する者が関係する場合には、その実質的意義に着目し、個別具体的に検討する。

(ウ) 軍事支出、大量破壊兵器・ミサイルの開発製造、武器の輸出入等の状況

テロや大量破壊兵器の拡散を防止する等、国際社会の平和と安定を維持・強化するとともに、開発途上国はその国内資源を自国の経済社会開発のために適正かつ優先的に配分すべきであるとの観点から、当該国の軍事支出、大量破壊兵器・ミサイルの開発・製造、武器の輸出入等の動向に十分注意を払う。

(エ) 開発に伴う環境・気候変動への影響

環境と開発を両立させ、持続可能な開発を実現するため、開発に伴う様々な環境への影響や気候変動対策に十分注意を払い、環境に十分配慮した開発協力を行う。

(オ) 公正性の確保・社会的弱者への配慮

格差是正、子ども、障害者、高齢者、少数民族・先住民族等の社会的弱者への配慮等の観点から、社会面への影響に十分注意を払い、あらゆる場面における多様な関係者の参画に努めつつ、公正性の確保に十分配慮した開発協力を行う。

(カ) 女性の参画の促進

男女平等、開発の担い手としての女性の活躍推進等の観点から、女性がさらされやすい脆弱性と女性特有のニーズに配慮しつつ、開発協力のあらゆる段階における女性の参画を促進し、また、女性が公正に開発の恩恵を受けられるよう、一層積極的に取り組む。

(キ) 不正腐敗の防止

開発協力の実施においては、不正腐敗を防止することが必要である。受注企業の法令遵守体制構築に資する措置を講じつつ、相手国と連携し、相手国のガバナンス強化を含め、不正腐敗を防止するための環境を共に醸成していく。この観点からも、案件実施に当たっては、適正手続を確保し、実施プロセスにおける透明性の確保に努める。

(ク) 開発協力関係者の安全配慮

開発協力に携わる人員の安全を確保する観点から、安全管理能力強化、治安情報の収集及び安全対策の実施、工事施工時の関係者の安全確保に十分注意を払う。特に、平和構築に係る支援等、政情・治安が不安定な地域での支援に際しては、十分な安全対策や体制整備を行う。

(2) 実施体制

国際社会において開発課題が多様化・複雑化・広範化し、開発に携わる主体や開発に関係する資金が多様化していることを踏まえ、政府・実施機関の実施体制整備、各種の連携強化及び開発協力の持続的実施のための基盤の強化に努めていく。

ア 政府・実施機関の実施体制整備

我が国の開発協力を進めるに当たっては、開発協力政策の企画・立案の調整を担う外務省を中核とした関係府省庁間の連携を強化する。また、政策の企画・立案を行う政府とその実施を担う独立行政法人国際協力機構（ＪＩＣＡ）との間の緊密な連携を図るとともに、それぞれの役割、責任分担を明確にしつつ、各々の能力・体制整備・制度改善に一層努める。特に、我が国開発協力の競争力を高めるため、機動性、専門性、知の蓄積、調査・研究能力、在外機能等の強化、人材育成、緊急人道支援体制の整備等に取り組む。また、企業、ＮＧＯ、自治体、大学・研究機関、国民等との結節点としてＪＩＣＡの国内拠点が果たす役割にも留意する。

イ 連携の強化

現在の国際社会では、開発途上国の開発にとって、政府以外の多様な主体がますます重要な役割を果たすようになってきていることを踏まえ、政府・政府関係機関による開発協力の実施に当たっては、ＪＩＣＡとその他の公的資金を扱う機関（株式会社国際協力銀行（ＪＢＩＣ）、独立行政法人日本貿易保険（ＮＥＸＩ）、株式会社海外交通・都市開発事業支援機構（ＪＯＩＮ）等）との間の連携を強化するとともに、民間部門を含む多様な力を動員・結集するための触媒としての役割を果たせるよう、様々な主体との互恵的な連携を強化する。

（ア）官民連携、自治体連携

開発途上国の開発推進にとって、ＯＤＡを始めとする公的資金は引き続き重要な役割を担うが、開発途上国への民間資金の流入が公的資金を大きく凌いでいる現状を踏まえれば、民間部門の活動が開発途上国の経済成長を促す大きな原動力となっていることを十分考慮する必要がある。また、アジアにおいては、開発協力によってハード・ソフトの基礎インフラを整備したことで投資環境が改善し、また、開発協力が触媒的役割を果たすことにより、民間企業の投資を促し、それが当該国の成長と貧困削減につながっている。この過程を通じて、アジアが我が国民間企業の重要な市場、投資先として成長し、日本経済にとって極めて重要な存在となったという事実を再認識することも重要である。さらに、我が国の地方自治体が有する独自の経験や知見が、開発途上国の抱える課題の解決にとって重要な役割を果たすようになってきている。

以上を踏まえ、民間部門や地方自治体の資源を取り込むとともに、民間部門主導の成長を促進することで開発途上国の経済発展を一層力強くかつ効果的に推進し、またそのことが日本経済の力強い成長にもつながるよう、官民連携、自治体連携による開発協力を推進する。具体的には、我が国の中小企業を含む企業や地方自治体、大学・研究機関等との連携を強化し、人づくり、法・制度構築、インフラシステム整備等、貿易・投資促進のための環境整備を始めとした取組を計画策定から事業実施まで一貫して進める。

なお、官民連携の推進に当たっては、我が国の開発協力が、民間部門が自らの優れた技術・ノウハウや豊富な資金を開発途上国の課題解決に役立てつつ、経済活動を拡大するための触媒としての機能を果たすよう努める。また、開発協力と共に実施される民間投資が相手国の「質の高い成長」につながるよう、上述の我が国開発協力の重点政策を十分に踏まえ、包摂性、持続可能性、強靱性、能力構築の促進等を確保するよう留意する。

（イ）緊急人道支援、国際平和協力における連携

災害が激甚化・頻発化する中において、防災・減災大国である我が国の貢献の余地は大きい。災害救援等の緊急人道支援の効果的実施のため、国際機関やＮＧＯを含め、この分野の知見を有する様々な主体との連携を強化する。

また、国際平和協力においてもその効果を最大化するため、国際連合平和維持活動（ＰＫＯ）

等の国際平和協力活動との連携推進に引き続き取り組む。

(ウ) 国際機関、地域機関等との連携

独自の専門性、中立性、幅広いネットワークを有する国際機関は、二国間協力ではアクセス困難な分野・地域への協力やその独自性を活かした効果的・効率的な協力を行うことができる。また、二国間協力と組み合わせることで相乗効果が期待できる。これらを踏まえ、人道支援、平和構築やガバナンス、地球規模課題への取組を始めとして引き続き国際機関と積極的に連携する。また、国際機関は、国際的な開発協力の理念と潮流を形成する役割も担うことから、責任ある国際社会の一員として、国際的な規範の形成を主導する上でも、国際機関及び国際社会における我が国の発言力・プレゼンスの強化を図る。さらに、各国際機関との政策協議を定期的実施し、政策調整を行っていくことで、二国間協力との相乗効果を実現するよう努める。また、国際機関を通じた開発協力の効果や評価については、国民への説明責任の確保に特に留意する。

また、地域統合の動きや地域レベルでの広域的取組の重要性を踏まえ、地域機関・準地域機関との連携を強化する。

(エ) 他ドナー・新興国等との連携

我が国と同様、他ドナーには長年の開発協力で培われた経験と知見が蓄積されており、開発効果をより向上させるためには、ドナー間の連携を強化し、協調・協働することが必要である。この観点から、我が国は、外交的観点も踏まえながら、引き続き他ドナーとの開発協力における協調を推進し、開発協力の効果の一層の向上を目指していく。

また、開発協力の実施に当たっては、我が国の長年の協力により相手国に蓄積されたノウハウや人的資源、人材ネットワーク等を有効に活用することが重要である。新興国を始めとする諸国と連携した三角協力は、これらを有効に活用した協力として、国際社会からも高い評価を得ているところ、引き続きこの取組を継続していく。

(オ) 市民社会との連携

開発現場の多様な考え方、ニーズをきめ細かに把握し、状況に応じて迅速に対応できる国内外のNGO／市民社会組織（CSO）、民間財団等との連携は、協力効果の向上及び当該国の公正で安定的な発展にとって重要である。このことを踏まえ、開発協力における参加・協働の強化を含め、NGO／CSOとの連携を戦略的に強化する。そのためにも、我が国のNGO／CSOの優れた開発協力事業や能力向上を支援するとともに、外務省・JICAにおいては、社会開発分野の人材育成、体制整備に取り組む。

また、JICAボランティアの積極的活用も含め、担い手の裾野を拡大する観点からも開発協力への国民各層の広範な参加及び開発協力参加者の知見の社会還元を促進する。その観点から、国民に対する十分な情報提供を行うとともに、開発協力に関する提案を始めとする国民各層からの意見に耳を傾ける。

ウ 実施基盤の強化

開発協力が上記の理念の実現と重点政策推進のために必要な役割を果たすためには、資金的・人的資源等、持続的に開発協力を実施するための基盤を強化する必要がある。対国民総所得（GNI）比でODAの量を0.7%とする国際的目標を念頭に置くとともに、我が国の極めて厳しい財政状況も十分踏まえつつ、開発協力の実施基盤の強化のため必要な努力を行う。

(ア) 情報公開、国民及び国際社会の理解促進

開発協力は、国民の税金を原資としている。したがって、開発協力に必要な資金を確保し、持続的に開発協力を実施していくためには、国民の理解と支持を得ることが不可欠である。この観点から、開発協力に係る効果的な国内広報の積極的な実施に努め、国民に対して、開発協力の実施状況や評価等に関する情報を幅広く、迅速に十分な透明性をもって公開するとともに、政策、意義、成果、国際社会からの評価等を国民に分かりやすい形で丁寧に説明する。また、開発途上国を含めた国際社会において、日本の開発協力とその成果の認知度・理解度を高めることも重要であり、そのための海外広報にも積極的に取り組む。

(イ) 開発教育の推進

学校教育を始めとする様々な場を通じて、世界が直面する様々な開発課題の様相及び我が国との関係を知り、それを自らの問題として捉え、主体的に考える力、また、その根本的解決に向けた取組に参加する力を養うため、開発教育を推進する。

(ウ) 開発協力人材・知的基盤の強化

開発課題が多様化する中、開発協力に関わる人材育成は引き続き重要な課題である。特に、法の支配、ガバナンス、金融、ICT等の分野での開発協力を推進していく上では、それを担う人材の育成・確保等による協力体制の整備が必要である。これを踏まえ、産官学が一体となり、外務省・JICA以外にも、コンサルタント、研究者、大学や学生、民間企業、NGO／CSO等における専門性を持った国際人材の育成を促進するとともに、このような人材が国内外において活躍できる機会の拡大、制度・体制整備に努める。

また、日本が持つ強みを活かして、国際的な開発協力の理念・潮流の形成を積極的に主導していくためにも、日本と開発途上国側の関係者間での政策研究や知的ネットワーク形成を図る等、大学・研究機関等と連携しつつ、開発協力を立案・発信するための研究能力等知的基盤の強化に努める。

(3) 開発協力大綱の実施状況に関する報告

開発協力大綱の実施状況については、毎年閣議報告される「開発協力白書」において明らかにする。

平成27年2月10日
閣 議 決 定

FY 2019 Honduras Country Opinion Survey Report

THE WORLD BANK GROUP

Public Opinion Research Group



WORLD BANK GROUP

December 2019



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Country Opinion Surveys
THE WORLD BANK GROUP



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HONDURAS





I. Objectives

This survey was designed to assist the World Bank Group (WBG) in gaining a better understanding of how stakeholders in Honduras perceive the WBG. The survey explored:

- *General Issues Facing Honduras*
- *Overall Attitudes toward the World Bank Group*
- *World Bank Group's Effectiveness and Results*
- *The World Bank Group's Knowledge Work and Activities*
- *Working with the World Bank Group*
- *The Future Role of the World Bank Group in Honduras*
- *Communication and Information Sharing*
- *Background Information*

II. Methodology

From May to June 2019, 406 stakeholders of the WBG in Honduras were invited to provide their opinions on the WBG's work in the country by participating in a Country Opinion Survey. Participants were drawn from the Office of the President, Prime Minister; office of a minister; office of a parliamentarian; ministries/ministerial departments/implementation agencies; Project Management Units (PMUs) overseeing implementation of WBG projects; consultants/contractors working on WBG-supported projects/programs; local governments; bilateral and multilateral agencies; private sector organizations; the financial sector/private banks; private foundations; NGOs and community-based organizations; the media; independent government institutions; trade unions; faith-based groups; youth groups; academia/research institutes/think tanks; judiciary branch; and other organizations.

A total of 144 stakeholders participated in the survey (35% response rate). Respondents received the questionnaires via courier, email or the online survey platform Qualtrics.

Every country that engages in the Country Opinion Survey (COS) must include specific indicator questions that will be aggregated for the World Bank Group's annual Corporate Scorecard. These questions are identified throughout the survey report.

The results in this year's Country Survey were compared to those in the Country Survey conducted in FY'16 (response rate was 50%, N=180). Data were weighted to reach the same stakeholder composition in two years, which allows for year comparisons. Stakeholder groups which were not present in both fiscal years were not included in the comparison. Respondents who belonged to the "other" stakeholder category were not included either. As a result, mean ratings, percentages of respondents, and the total number of respondents in both years are slightly different from those of the original data reported in the FY'16 COS report and the non-weighted data presented in appendices A, B, C, and E. For the weighted stakeholder breakdown and year comparison results, please refer to Appendix D (page 78).


Note that the body of the report presents data on selected questions of the survey questionnaire. Please refer to Appendix A for data on all survey questions. Appendices B, C, D and E present data on selected questions. Additional data breakdowns are available upon request.



III. Demographics of the Sample

Current Affiliation

- For further analyses, some respondent groups were combined¹.




“Which of the following best describes your current affiliation?”
(Respondents chose from a list.)

¹ Employees of ministries/ministerial departments/implementation agencies and respondents from Project Management Units (PMUs) overseeing implementation of WBG projects, consultants/contractors working on WBG supported projects/programs were combined; respondents from bilateral agencies were combined with respondents from multilateral agencies; respondents from the financial sector/private banks were combined with those from private sector organizations; respondents from NGOs/community-based organizations, private foundations, and trade unions were combined in the “CSO” category; and the small number of respondents from the office of a parliamentarian were included in the “Other” category. There were no respondents from the Office of the President/Prime Minister, faith-based groups, youth groups, and the judiciary branch.



III. Demographics of the Sample (continued)

Area of Primary Specialization




**"Please identify the primary specialization of your work."
(Respondents chose from a list.)**



III. Demographics of the Sample (continued)


Geographic Locations



"Which best represents your geographic location?"
(Respondents chose from a list.)

Note: No respondents selected "Siguatepeque/Comayagua" response option.

Exposure to Agencies within the World Bank Group



"Which of the following agencies of the World Bank Group do you primarily collaborate/work with in Honduras?" (Respondents chose from a list.)


Note: No respondents selected "The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)" or "International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)" response options.



III. Demographics of the Sample (continued)

Familiarity with the World Bank Group

- **Impact of familiarity:** Respondents' ratings of familiarity with the WBG were significantly correlated with their ratings of the WBG's overall effectiveness in Honduras.




"How familiar are you with the work of the World Bank Group in Honduras?"
(1-"Not familiar at all", 10-"Extremely familiar")



III. Demographics of the Sample (continued)

Familiarity with the WBG vs. Other Development Banks²

- **Year comparison:** Respondents in this year's Country Survey and respondents in the FY'16 Country Survey had statistically similar levels of familiarity with the World Bank Group (WBG), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB/BID), the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI/BCIE), and the Latin American Development Bank (CAF).




"How familiar are you with the work of these organizations in Honduras?"
(1 - "Not familiar at all", 10 - "Extremely familiar")

² Means in the chart were calculated based on weighted data. See Appendix D (page 78) for details.




IV. General Issues Facing Honduras

Optimism for the Future of Honduras



"When you think about the future in Honduras, are you ... ?"
(Respondents chose from a list.)

Perceptions of Economic Opportunity




"Do you think that economic opportunity for citizens in Honduras is ... ?"
(Respondents chose from a list.)



IV. General Issues Facing Honduras (continued)

Perceptions of Improvement and Decline in Specific Areas




"Please describe the direction Honduras is moving in, when considering ... ?"
(Respondents chose from a list.)



IV. General Issues Facing Honduras (continued)

Development Priority

- **Year comparison:** Respondents in the previous FY'16 Country Survey indicated that the most important development priorities in Honduras were “*education*” (35%), “*anti-corruption*” (34%), “*poverty reduction*” (32%), “*job creation/employment*” (28%), and “*public sector governance/reform*” (27%).
- **Specialization:** Respondents who identified their primary specialization of work as “*education*” (16% of the sample) were significantly *more* likely to indicate that “*education*” was the most important development priority in Honduras, compared to the rest of respondents in other areas of work (education specialists = 82%; others = 54%).³



"Listed below are a number of development priorities in Honduras. Please identify which of the following you consider the most important development priorities in Honduras.

(Choose no more than THREE)"

(Respondents chose from a list. Responses combined. Top 19 of 28 response options shown.)


³ When more than 10% of the sample are respondents from a particular sector (see the full list of specialized areas in question H2 in Appendix F), analyses are done to see these respondents' views about development priorities in a country.



IV. General Issues Facing Honduras (continued)

What Would Contribute Most to Reducing Poverty

- **Year comparison:** Respondents in the previous FY'16 Country Survey indicated that the biggest contributors to poverty reduction in Honduras were “*education*” (43%), “*anti-corruption*” (36%), and “*job creation/employment*” (35%).



"Poverty reduction is a broad term that encompasses work in many different areas. Which THREE areas of development listed below do you believe would contribute most to reducing poverty in Honduras?


(Choose no more than THREE)"

(Respondents chose from a list. Responses combined. Top 18 of 27 response options shown.)



IV. General Issues Facing Honduras (continued)

The Impact of Global Challenges on Honduras




"Listed below are global challenges. Which do you think have the most serious impact on Honduras?
(Choose no more than TWO)"
(Respondents chose from a list. Responses combined.)



IV. General Issues Facing Honduras (continued)

Trust in Institutions



"To what extent do you trust each of the following groups to do what is right?"


(1-"To no degree at all", 10-"To a very significant degree")

¹Indicator Question




IV. General Issues Facing Honduras (continued)

Trust in the Private Sector



"To what extent do you trust _____ to engage in public service delivery in Honduras?"
(Respondents chose from a list.)

Civil Society Engagement




"When thinking about development efforts in Honduras, do you think that civil society (e.g., NGOs, CBOs) should ... ?"
(Respondents chose from a list.)



IV. General Issues Facing Honduras (continued)

Attributions for Slow/Failed Reform Efforts




"When economic and/or social reform efforts fail or are slow to take place in Honduras, which of the following would you attribute this to? (Choose no more than TWO)"
(Respondents chose from a list. Responses combined.)




V. Overall Attitudes toward the World Bank Group

Overall Effectiveness of the World Bank Group vs. Other Development Banks⁴ (Indicator Question)



**"Overall, please rate your impression of the effectiveness of these organizations in Honduras."
(1-"Not effective at all", 10-"Very effective")
(*Significantly different between FY 2019 and FY 2016)**

Achieving Development Results (Indicator Question)



"To what extent does the World Bank Group's work help to achieve development results in Honduras?" (1-"To no degree at all", 10-"To a very significant degree")

⁴ Means in the charts on this page were calculated based on weighted data.




V. Overall Attitudes toward the World Bank Group (continued)

Influence on Honduras' Development Agenda (*Indicator Question*)



"To what extent does the World Bank Group influence the development agenda in Honduras?" (1-"To no degree at all", 10-"To a very significant degree")

WBG Staff Preparedness⁵



"To what extent do you believe the World Bank Group's staff is well prepared (e.g., skills and knowledge) to help Honduras solve its most complicated development challenges?" (1-"To no degree at all", 10-"To a very significant degree")


⁵ Means in the chart were calculated based on weighted data.



V. Overall Attitudes toward the World Bank Group (continued)

Overall Ratings for Indicator Questions by Stakeholder Groups

- **Stakeholder groups:** Respondents from independent government institutions and employees of ministries/PMUs/consultants working on WBG projects had the highest mean ratings for the aggregated responses to the twenty-eight COS indicator questions, whereas respondents from the private sector/financial sector/private banks and other organizations had significantly lower mean ratings. Responses for individual indicator questions by stakeholder groups can be found in Appendix B (page 59).




Mean Ratings for All Indicator Questions by Stakeholder Groups on a Scale from 1 to 10



V. Overall Attitudes toward the World Bank Group (continued)

Greatest Value

- **Year comparison:** Respondents in the previous FY'16 Country Survey indicated that the WBG's greatest value to Honduras was its "*financial resources*" (61%).




"When thinking about the World Bank Group's role, which activity do you believe is of greatest VALUE and which activity is of second greatest value in Honduras?"
(Respondents chose from a list.)



V. Overall Attitudes toward the World Bank Group (continued)

Greatest Weakness

- **Year comparison:** Respondents in the previous FY'16 Country Survey indicated that the WBG's greatest weaknesses in its work in Honduras were being "*too influenced by developed countries*" (19%) and "*World Bank Group's processes too complex*" (19%).




"Which of the following do you identify as the World Bank Group's greatest WEAKNESSES in its work in Honduras? (Choose no more than TWO)"
(Respondents chose from a list. Responses combined.)



VI. Sectoral Effectiveness

Effectiveness of WBG's Support in Sectoral Areas: Year Comparison⁶




"How EFFECTIVE do you believe the World Bank Group is in terms of the work it does in the following areas of development in Honduras?"
(1-"Not effective at all", 10-"Very effective")
(*Significantly different between FY 2019 and FY 2016)

⁶ Means in the chart were calculated based on weighted data.



VI. Sectoral Effectiveness (continued)

Effectiveness of WBG's Support in Sectoral Areas: Collaboration⁷




"How EFFECTIVE do you believe the World Bank Group is in terms of the work it does in the following areas of development in Honduras?"
(1-"Not effective at all", 10-"Very effective")

⁷ Note in the Appendix on the sectoral effectiveness (Appendix A, page 44) that primarily informed stakeholders responded to this question. Respondents were given the option of "don't know" if they did not have exposure to the WBG's work in certain development areas.




VI. Sectoral Effectiveness (continued)

Helping the Poorest⁸



"To what extent do you believe that the World Bank Group's work and support help the poorest in Honduras?" (Respondents chose from a list.)

The WBG's Human Capital Investment




"From your perspective, which of the following best describes the World Bank Group's current emphasis on investing in human capital (e.g., education, health, social protection)?" (Respondents chose from a list.)

⁸ Percentages in the chart were calculated based on weighted data.




VII. How the World Bank Group Operates

The World Bank Group's Work in Honduras: Year Comparison⁹



The World Bank Group's Work in Honduras: Collaboration




⁹ Means in the chart were calculated based on weighted data.



VII. How the World Bank Group Operates (continued)

Overall Perceptions: Year Comparison¹⁰




"To what extent do you agree/disagree with the following statements?"
(1-"Strongly disagree", 10-"Strongly agree")
'Indicator Question'

¹⁰ Means in the chart were calculated based on weighted data.



VII. How the World Bank Group Operates (continued)

Overall Perceptions: Collaboration




"To what extent do you agree/disagree with the following statements?"
(1-"Strongly disagree", 10-"Strongly agree")
¹Indicator Question



VII. How the World Bank Group Operates (continued)

The WBG as an Effective Development Partner: Year Comparison¹¹



"To what extent is the World Bank Group an effective development partner in Honduras, in terms of each of the following?" (1-"To no degree at all", 10-"To a very significant degree")

*(*Significantly different between FY 2019 and FY 2016)*


¹Indicator Question

¹¹ Means in the chart were calculated based on weighted data.



VII. How the World Bank Group Operates (continued)

The WBG as an Effective Development Partner: Collaboration



"To what extent is the World Bank Group an effective development partner in Honduras, in terms of each of the following?" (1-"To no degree at all", 10-"To a very significant degree")

¹Indicator Question




VII. How the World Bank Group Operates (continued)

Managing Crisis Related Risks



"How effectively does the World Bank Group's SCD and CPF activities support Honduras's efforts to manage crisis related risks?"
(1-"Not effectively at all", 10-"Very effectively")

Effectiveness of WBG's Support




"How effectively does the World Bank Group support Honduras's efforts ... ?"
(1-"Not effectively at all", 10-"Very effectively")



VIII. World Bank Group's Knowledge and Instruments

Frequency of Consulting WBG Knowledge Work and Activities

- **Stakeholder groups:** Respondents from the office of a minister and academia indicated the most frequent usage of the WBG's knowledge work and activities ("*weekly/monthly*") compared to respondents from other stakeholder groups.




"How frequently do you consult World Bank Group's knowledge work and activities in the work you do?" (Respondents chose from a list.)




VIII. World Bank Group's Knowledge and Instruments (continued)


Meeting Honduras's Knowledge Needs¹² (*Indicator Question*)



Contribution of the WBG's Knowledge Work and Activities (*Indicator Question*)



Technical Quality of the WBG's Knowledge Work and Activities (*Indicator Question*)




¹² Means in the charts on this page were calculated based on weighted data.



VIII. World Bank Group's Knowledge and Instruments (continued)

Qualities of the WBG's Knowledge Work and Activities¹³



"In Honduras, to what extent do you believe that the World Bank Group's knowledge work and activities:" (1-"To no degree at all", 10-"To a very significant degree")


¹Indicator Question

¹³ Means in the chart were calculated based on weighted data.




VIII. World Bank Group's Knowledge and Instruments (continued)

Meeting the DRC's Needs for Financial Instruments¹⁴ (*Indicator Question*)



"The World Bank Group's financial instruments (i.e., investment lending, Development Policy Loan, Trust Funds, etc.) meet the needs of Honduras."
(1-"Strongly disagree", 10-"Strongly agree")

Familiarity with WBG's Expanded Financial Instruments



"As part of IDA18, the World Bank Group has expanded (or developed) a number of financial instruments to respond to challenges in IDA countries. These include the Crisis Response Window (CRW), Pandemic Emergency Finance Facility (PEF), Catastrophe Deferred Draw Down Option (CAT-DDO), and the Private Sector Window (PSW). In general, how familiar are you with these new or expanded financial instruments in Honduras?"
(Respondents chose from a list.)


¹⁴ Means in the chart were calculated based on weighted data.



IX. The Future Role of the WBG in Honduras

Making the World Bank Group of Greater Value

- **Year comparison:** Respondents in the previous FY'16 Country Survey indicated that the WBG should “*increase the level of capacity development in the country*” (35%) and “*reach out more to groups outside of Government*” (30%) to make itself of greater value in Honduras.




**"Which of the following SHOULD the World Bank Group do to make itself of greater value in Honduras?
(Choose no more than TWO)"**
(Respondents chose from a list. Responses combined.)



IX. The Future Role of the WBG in Honduras (continued)

The World Bank Group Should Collaborate More with ...




**"In addition to the regular relations with the national government, which TWO of the following groups should the World Bank Group collaborate with more in your country?
(Choose no more than TWO)"**
(Respondents chose from a list. Responses combined.)



IX. The Future Role of the WBG in Honduras (continued)

Where the World Bank Group Should Focus its Resources

- **Year comparison:** Respondents in the previous FY'16 Country Survey indicated that the WBG should focus its resources on “*education*” (32%), “*economic growth*” (26%), and “*public sector governance/reform*” (25%).
- **Specialization:** Respondents who identified their primary specialization of work as “*education*” were significantly *more* likely to indicate that the WBG should focus most of its resources on “*education*”, compared to respondents from other areas (education specialists = 82%; others = 39%).¹⁵




“When thinking about how the World Bank Group can have the most impact on development results in Honduras, in which sectors do you believe the World Bank Group should focus most of its resources (financial and knowledge services) in Honduras? (Choose no more than THREE)”
(Respondents chose from a list. Responses combined. Top 18 of 28 response options shown.)

¹⁵ When more than 10% of the sample are respondents from a particular sector (see the full list of specialized areas in question H2 in Appendix F), analyses are done to see these respondents’ views about which sectors the WBG should focus most of its resources.



IX. The Future Role of the WBG in Honduras (continued)

Future Combination of the WBG Services



"When considering the combination of services that the World Bank Group offers in Honduras, and taking into account its limited level of resources, which ONE of the following do you believe the World Bank Group should offer more of in Honduras?"
(Respondents chose from a list.)




X. Communication and Outreach

Note: When considering the World Bank Group's future outreach with key constituencies, please see Appendix B (page 59) for all responses by stakeholder groups.

General Information Sources

- **Year comparison:** Respondents in the previous FY'16 Country Survey indicated that they got most of their information about economic and social development issues in Honduras from “Internet” (56%) and “periodicals” (45%).




"How do you get most of your information about economic and social development issues in Honduras?
(Choose no more than TWO)"
(Respondents chose from a list. Responses combined.)



X. Communication and Outreach (continued)

Preferred Information Sources

- **Year comparison:** Respondents in the previous FY'16 Country Survey indicated that they would prefer to receive information from the WBG through the “*World Bank Group’s seminars/workshops/conferences*” (44%) and “*direct contact with World Bank Group*” (39%).




**"How would you prefer to receive information from the World Bank Group?
(Choose no more than TWO)"**
(Respondents chose from a list. Responses combined.)



X. Communication and Outreach (continued)

WBG Interaction Frequency




"How frequently do you interact with the World Bank Group now in Honduras?"
(Respondents chose from a list.)



X. Communication and Outreach (continued)

Frequency of Specific WBG Interactions



"Over the past SIX MONTHS, on average how often did you do any of the following related to the World Bank Group (WBG)?" (Respondents chose from a list.)



XII. Appendices

A. Responses to All Questions across All Respondents.....	44
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HONDURAS





Appendix A: Responses to All Questions across All Respondents (N=144)

All rating scale questions are presented with the total number of respondents that provided a rating (N), the number of respondents who indicated that they "Don't know" (DK), the mean rating across all respondents (Mean), and the standard deviation of this mean (SD). Indicator questions are noted with an asterisk (*).

A. General Issues Facing Honduras

1. When you think about the future in Honduras, are you ... ?	Percentage of Respondents (N=140)
Very pessimistic	5.7%
Somewhat pessimistic	33.6%
Somewhat optimistic	40.0%
Very optimistic	18.6%
Not sure	2.1%

2. Do you think that economic opportunity for citizens in Honduras is ... ?	Percentage of Respondents (N=140)
Increasing	17.1%
Decreasing	52.9%
Staying about the same	30.0%

**A. General Issues Facing Honduras (continued)**

3. Listed below are a number of development priorities in Honduras. Please identify which of the following you consider the most important development priorities in Honduras. (Choose no more than THREE)	Percentage of Respondents (Responses Combined; N=140)
Education	59.3%
Job creation/employment	35.7%
Public sector governance/reform (i.e., government effectiveness, public financial management, public expenditure, fiscal system reform)	25.7%
Anti-corruption	25.7%
Health	25.0%
Poverty reduction	21.4%
Crime and violence	16.4%
Economic growth	15.0%
Water and sanitation	14.3%
Agriculture and rural development	7.1%
Food security	7.1%
Social protection (e.g., pensions, targeted social assistance)	6.4%
Energy	6.4%
Equality of opportunity (i.e., social inclusion)	5.7%
Private sector development	5.0%
Judiciary reform	5.0%
Climate change (e.g., mitigation, adaptation)	5.0%
Gender equity (closing the gap between women and men, and boys and girls)	3.6%
Trade and exports	2.1%
Urban development	1.4%
Natural resource management (renewable/non-renewable)	1.4%
Financial markets	1.4%
Transport (e.g., roads, bridges, transportation)	1.4%
Global/regional integration	0.7%
Pollution	0.7%
Disaster risk management	0.7%
Disease	0.0%
Information and communications technology	0.0%

**A. General Issues Facing Honduras (continued)**

4. Poverty reduction is a broad term that encompasses work in many different areas. Which THREE areas of development listed below do you believe would contribute most to reducing poverty in Honduras? (Choose no more than THREE)	Percentage of Respondents (Responses Combined; N=141)
Job creation/employment	45.4%
Education	43.3%
Economic growth	32.6%
Anti-corruption	29.1%
Equality of opportunity (i.e., social inclusion)	21.3%
Agriculture and rural development	19.1%
Private sector development	16.3%
Social protection (e.g., pensions, targeted social assistance)	15.6%
Public sector governance/reform (i.e., government effectiveness, public financial management, public expenditure, fiscal system reform)	14.9%
Health	9.2%
Crime and violence	7.8%
Food security	7.1%
Trade and exports	6.4%
Judiciary reform	5.0%
Water and sanitation	4.3%
Energy	4.3%
Urban development	3.5%
Gender equity (closing the gap between women and men, and boys and girls)	2.8%
Climate change (e.g., mitigation, adaptation)	2.1%
Transport (e.g., roads, bridges, transportation)	2.1%
Information and communications technology	1.4%
Natural resource management (renewable/non-renewable)	1.4%
Financial markets	1.4%
Disaster risk management	0.7%
Global/regional integration	0.7%
Disease	0.7%
Pollution	0.0%

5. When economic and/or social reform efforts fail or are slow to take place in Honduras, which of the following would you attribute this to? (Choose no more than TWO)	Percentage of Respondents (Responses Combined; N=122)
Corruption	60.7%
Political pressures and obstacles	28.7%
Reforms are not well thought out in light of country challenges	27.0%
Poor coordination within the government	25.4%
Inadequate level of government accountability	17.2%
Inadequate level of capacity in the government	11.5%
Inadequate level of citizen/civil society participation	9.8%
Inadequate level of donor coordination	7.4%
Inadequate level of private sector participation	4.1%
Other	3.3%
Private sector involvement and/or influence	2.5%

**A. General Issues Facing Honduras (continued)**

6. To what extent do you trust each of the following groups to do what is right? (1-To no degree at all, 10-To a very significant degree)	Degree			
	N	DK	Mean	SD
1. The national government	133	4	4.64	2.20
2. Bilateral organizations (e.g., DFID, JICA, GIZ, USAID)	136	6	6.85	1.92
3. The World Bank Group*	133	5	6.93	1.92
4. The International Monetary Fund	133	7	6.08	2.18
5. UN	132	7	7.00	1.96
6. Regional development banks (e.g., IDB, CABEL)	140	2	6.95	1.77
7. Honduras's Central Bank	132	8	5.95	2.16
8. International private sector	122	18	6.19	2.03
9. Domestic private sector	134	3	5.64	1.92
10. International civil society (e.g., NGOs, CBOs)	136	4	6.07	1.98
11. Domestic civil society (e.g., NGOs, CBOs)	140	1	5.57	1.97
12. Faith-based institutions	133	6	5.70	2.31
13. Domestic traditional media and their web presence (e.g., newspapers, TV stations, radio)	136	2	4.42	2.13
14. International media and their web presence	132	9	5.62	2.12
15. Web based media (i.e., blogs, social media, other web-based news and information sources)	130	11	5.17	2.13

7. Please describe the direction Honduras is moving in, when considering ... ?	Direction				
	Getting much worse	Getting somewhat worse	Staying the same	Getting somewhat better	Getting much better
Human development (e.g., health, education, and social protection) (N=141)	26.2%	33.3%	22.0%	17.7%	0.7%
Equal opportunity for girls and boys, men and women (N=140)	9.3%	28.6%	37.9%	23.6%	0.7%
Growing Honduras's economy in a way that leads to jobs and employment (N=142)	20.4%	33.1%	31.7%	14.8%	0.0%
The gap between the rich and the poor (N=140)	49.3%	30.7%	17.1%	2.1%	0.7%
Making government more effective (N=142)	28.9%	27.5%	21.8%	20.4%	1.4%
Anti-corruption (N=140)	20.0%	18.6%	26.4%	30.0%	5.0%
Attracting new sources of foreign investment (N=141)	10.6%	26.2%	42.6%	17.0%	3.5%

8. Listed below are global challenges. Which do you think have the most serious impact on Honduras? (Choose no more than TWO)	Percentage of Respondents (Responses Combined; N=134)
Jobs/employment	35.8%
The gap between the rich and the poor	32.1%
Migrants and refugees	30.6%
Climate change	26.9%
Environmental degradation	26.9%
Geo political uncertainty	19.4%
Fragility in Honduras or neighboring countries	12.7%
Technology based disruption	6.0%
Trade constraints	5.2%
Terrorism	2.2%

**A. General Issues Facing Honduras (continued)**

9. When thinking about development efforts in Honduras, do you think that civil society (e.g., NGOs, CBOs) should ... ?	Percentage of Respondents (N=142)
Engage significantly less	10.6%
Engage somewhat less	4.2%
Engage somewhat more	16.2%
Engage significantly more	62.7%
Engage at the same level it does currently	3.5%
Don't know	2.8%

10. To what extent do you trust domestic private sector to engage in public service delivery in Honduras?	Percentage of Respondents (N=142)
To a very low degree	16.9%
To a somewhat low degree	51.4%
To a somewhat high degree	27.5%
To a very high degree	2.8%
Don't know	1.4%

11. To what extent do you trust international private sector to engage in public service delivery in Honduras?	Percentage of Respondents (N=142)
To a very low degree	14.1%
To a somewhat low degree	43.7%
To a somewhat high degree	31.0%
To a very high degree	5.6%
Don't know	5.6%

B. Overall Attitudes toward the World Bank Group

1. How familiar are you with the work of these organizations in Honduras? (1-Not familiar at all, 10-Extremely familiar)	Familiarity		
	N	Mean	SD
1. World Bank Group (WBG)	140	6.71	2.48
2. Inter-American Development Bank (IDB/BID)	139	7.17	2.17
3. Latin American Development Bank (CAF)	135	3.39	2.61
4. Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI/BCIE)	139	6.79	2.59

2. Overall, please rate your impression of the effectiveness of these organizations in Honduras. (1-Not effective at all, 10-Very effective)	Effectiveness			
	N	DK	Mean	SD
1. World Bank Group (WBG)*	126	16	7.13	1.90
2. Inter-American Development Bank (IDB/BID)	129	11	7.29	1.82
3. Latin American Development Bank (CAF)	64	68	4.94	2.40
4. Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI/BCIE)	121	20	7.04	2.13

Staff Preparedness	N	DK	Mean	SD
3. To what extent do you believe the World Bank Group's staff is well prepared (e.g., skills and knowledge) to help Honduras solve its most complicated development challenges? (1-To no degree at all, 10-To a very significant degree)	113	29	7.81	1.71

**B. Overall Attitudes toward the World Bank Group (continued)**

4. When thinking about how the World Bank Group can have the most impact on development results in Honduras, in which sectors do you believe the World Bank Group should focus most of its resources (financial and knowledge services) in Honduras? (Choose no more than THREE)	Percentage of Respondents (Responses Combined; N=139)
Education	46.8%
Job creation/employment	30.9%
Health	26.6%
Public sector governance/reform (i.e., government effectiveness, public financial management, public expenditure, fiscal system reform)	22.3%
Poverty reduction	20.9%
Agriculture and rural development	19.4%
Economic growth	17.3%
Anti-corruption	14.4%
Water and sanitation	11.5%
Private sector development	10.8%
Equality of opportunity (i.e., social inclusion)	10.1%
Social protection (e.g., pensions, targeted social assistance)	9.4%
Energy	7.2%
Climate change (e.g., mitigation, adaptation)	7.2%
Judiciary reform	5.8%
Food security	5.0%
Transport (e.g., roads, bridges, transportation)	5.0%
Financial markets	4.3%
Information and communications technology	3.6%
Trade and exports	3.6%
Crime and violence	3.6%
Gender equity (closing the gap between women and men, and boys and girls)	3.6%
Disaster risk management	2.9%
Natural resource management (renewable/non-renewable)	2.9%
Urban development	2.2%
Pollution	0.7%
Global/regional integration	0.7%
Disease	0.0%

**B. Overall Attitudes toward the World Bank Group (continued)**

5. When thinking about the World Bank Group's role, which activity do you believe is of greatest VALUE and which activity is of second greatest value in Honduras?	Percentage of Respondents (N=126)		
	Greatest Value	Second Greatest Value	Combined
Financial resources	43.7%	12.8%	56.5%
Technical assistance	9.5%	28.0%	37.5%
Capacity development related to World Bank Group supported projects	20.6%	7.2%	27.8%
Implementation support	1.6%	18.4%	20.0%
Policy advice, studies, analyses	10.3%	7.2%	17.5%
Donor coordination	1.6%	8.0%	9.6%
Data and statistics	2.4%	6.4%	8.8%
Mobilizing third party financial resources	3.2%	5.6%	8.8%
Promoting knowledge sharing	2.4%	4.0%	6.4%
Bringing together different groups of stakeholders	4.8%	1.6%	6.4%
Other	0.0%	0.8%	0.8%

6. Which of the following do you identify as the World Bank Group's greatest WEAKNESSES in its work in Honduras? (Choose no more than TWO)	Percentage of Respondents (Responses Combined; N=136)
Not adequately sensitive to political/social realities in Honduras	29.4%
Not enough public disclosure of its work	26.5%
Not willing to honestly criticize policies and reform efforts in the country	22.8%
Not aligned with country priorities	21.3%
Not collaborating enough with partners such as bilaterals, multilaterals, trust funds, UN	11.0%
World Bank Group's processes too slow and complex	11.0%
Inadequate World Bank Group's staffing in Honduras	9.6%
Don't know	8.8%
Too influenced by developed countries	7.4%
Not collaborating enough with private sector	7.4%
Not collaborating enough with civil society (e.g., NGOs, CBOs)	6.6%
Not sufficiently focused on sustainable results	6.6%
Not adequately flexible	5.9%
Staff too inaccessible	3.7%
Other	0.7%
Arrogant in its approach	0.7%

7. To what extent do you believe that the World Bank Group's work and support help the poorest in Honduras? (Select only ONE response)	Percentage of Respondents (N=140)
To a fully sufficient degree	2.9%
To a somewhat sufficient degree	33.6%
To a somewhat insufficient degree	31.4%
To a very insufficient degree	15.7%
Don't know	16.4%

**B. Overall Attitudes toward the World Bank Group (continued)**

8. From your perspective, which of the following best describes the World Bank Group's current emphasis on investing in human capital (e.g., education, health, social protection)?	Percentage of Respondents (N=139)
Increased its emphasis recently	15.8%
Decreased its emphasis recently	12.9%
Emphasis has remained pretty consistent over time	34.5%
Don't know	36.7%

9. In addition to the regular relations with the national government, which TWO of the following groups should the World Bank Group collaborate with more in your country? (Choose no more than TWO)	Percentage of Respondents (Responses Combined; N=138)
Local government	38.4%
Academia/think tanks/research institutes	38.4%
Private sector	29.0%
Beneficiaries	22.5%
NGOs/Community Based Organizations	22.5%
Youth/university groups	16.7%
Donor community	13.8%
Foundations	5.8%
National Congress	3.6%
Other	2.2%
Don't know	1.4%
Media	1.4%

To what extent do you agree with the following statements about the World Bank Group's work in Honduras? (1-Strongly disagree, 10-Strongly agree)	Level of Agreement			
	N	DK	Mean	SD
10. Overall the World Bank Group currently plays a relevant role in development in Honduras*	127	6	6.64	2.14
11. The World Bank Group's work is aligned with what I consider the development priorities for Honduras*	124	9	6.38	2.18

To what extent is the World Bank Group an effective development partner in Honduras, in terms of each of the following? (1-To no degree at all, 10-To a very significant degree)	Degree			
	N	DK	Mean	SD
12. Responsiveness to needs*	122	13	6.14	1.82
13. Flexibility (in terms of the institution's products and services)*	109	26	5.75	1.86
14. Flexibility (in terms of changing country circumstances)*	113	20	5.90	1.90
15. Being inclusive*	115	19	6.29	1.98
16. Openness (sharing data and other information)*	114	19	6.73	1.95
17. Collaboration with the Government*	118	15	7.68	1.65
18. The speed in which it gets things accomplished on the ground*	102	33	5.77	1.79
19. Helping to bring discipline/effective supervision to implementation of investment projects*	109	27	6.76	2.03
20. Collaboration with civil society*	110	26	5.85	2.07
21. Staff accessibility*	117	17	6.27	2.36
22. Collaboration with other donors and development partners*	107	28	6.54	2.01
23. Collaboration with the private sector*	101	35	6.33	1.84
24. Straightforwardness and honesty*	110	26	7.20	2.08
25. Treating clients and stakeholders in Honduras with respect*	107	28	8.02	1.76
26. Being a long-term partner*	109	26	7.99	1.61



C. World Bank Group's Effectiveness and Results

1. How EFFECTIVE do you believe the World Bank Group is in terms of the work it does in the following areas of development in Honduras? (1-Not effective at all, 10-Very effective)	Effectiveness			
	N	DK	Mean	SD
1. Social protection (e.g., pensions, targeted social assistance)	68	64	6.18	2.37
2. Gender equity (closing the gap between women and men, and boys and girls)	74	58	6.81	1.98
3. Private sector development	81	52	6.36	1.96
4. Education	96	36	6.56	1.98
5. Public sector governance/reform (i.e., government effectiveness, public financial management, public expenditure, fiscal system reform)	98	36	6.60	2.09
6. Global/regional integration	66	64	6.76	2.05
7. Food security	83	50	6.71	2.05
8. Urban development	75	57	6.48	2.03
9. Energy	84	48	6.27	2.04
10. Water and sanitation	87	44	6.55	1.92
11. Job creation/employment	79	52	5.58	1.94
12. Financial markets	71	58	6.48	2.02
13. Transport (e.g., roads, bridges, transportation)	86	45	6.55	2.09
14. Agriculture and rural development	90	42	6.71	1.99
15. Trade and exports	73	60	6.63	2.00
16. Crime and violence	65	66	5.74	2.35
17. Natural resource management (renewable/non-renewable)	79	52	6.56	1.99
18. Climate change (e.g., mitigation, adaptation)	86	45	6.70	1.92
19. Poverty reduction	106	29	6.25	2.33
20. Anti-corruption	80	51	5.54	2.41
21. Economic growth	97	36	6.59	1.99
22. Disaster risk management	79	54	6.75	2.04
23. Equality of opportunity (i.e., social inclusion)	77	52	6.61	1.98
24. Disease	58	72	5.95	2.43

Achieving Development Results	N	DK	Mean	SD
2. To what extent does the World Bank Group's work help to achieve development results in Honduras?* (1-To no degree at all, 10-To a very significant degree)	122	15	6.50	1.97

Influencing the Development Agenda	N	DK	Mean	SD
3. To what extent does the World Bank Group influence the development agenda in Honduras?* (1-To no degree at all, 10-To a very significant degree)	123	14	6.72	1.89

To what extent do you agree with the following statements about the World Bank Group in Honduras? (1-Strongly disagree, 10-Strongly agree)	N	DK	Mean	SD
4. The World Bank Group's financial instruments (i.e., investment lending, Development Policy Loan, Trust Funds, etc.) meet the needs of Honduras*	117	20	6.09	2.04
5. The World Bank Group meets Honduras's needs for knowledge services (e.g., research, analysis, data, technical assistance)*	117	20	6.37	2.03

**C. World Bank Group's Effectiveness and Results (continued)**

6. As part of IDA18, the World Bank Group has expanded (or developed) a number of financial instruments to respond to challenges in IDA countries. These include the Crisis Response Window (CRW), Pandemic Emergency Finance Facility (PEF), Catastrophe Deferred Draw Down Option (CAT-DDO), and the Private Sector Window (PSW). In general, how familiar are you with these new or expanded financial instruments in Honduras? (Select only ONE response)	Percentage of Respondents (N=136)
Very familiar	1.5%
Somewhat familiar	9.6%
Somewhat unfamiliar	23.5%
Very unfamiliar	34.6%
Don't know	30.9%

How effectively does the World Bank Group support the DRC's efforts ... ? (1-Not effectively at all, 10-Very effectively)	N	DK	Mean	SD
7. To build stronger domestic resource mobilization systems in the Government (e.g., tax collection)	89	46	6.46	1.87
8. To develop better and stronger data collection/analytics systems within the Government	98	37	6.78	1.74
9. To strengthen the country's crisis preparedness	90	45	6.09	1.82
10. To identify and monitor risks	88	46	6.57	1.73

Systematic Country Diagnostic and Country Partnership Framework Activities	N	DK	Mean	SD
11. How effectively does the World Bank Group's SCD and CPF activities support Honduras's efforts to manage crisis related risks? (1-Not effectively at all, 10-Very effectively)	44	87	6.89	1.73

D. The World Bank Group's Knowledge Work and Activities

1. How frequently do you consult World Bank Group's knowledge work and activities in the work you do?	Percentage of Respondents (N=136)
Weekly	4.4%
Monthly	16.9%
A few times a year	47.1%
Rarely	21.3%
Never	10.3%

In Honduras, to what extent do you believe that the World Bank Group's knowledge work and activities: (1-To no degree at all, 10-To a very significant degree)	Degree			
	N	DK	Mean	SD
2. Are timely	103	28	7.13	1.86
3. Include appropriate level of stakeholder involvement during preparation	93	36	6.78	1.77
4. Lead to practical solutions	99	30	6.66	1.93
5. Are source of relevant information on global good practices	106	25	7.53	1.54
6. Are adequately disseminated	107	23	6.26	2.11
7. Are translated enough into local language	101	29	7.27	2.17
8. Are adaptable to Honduras's specific development challenges and country circumstances*	100	30	6.97	1.71

**D. The World Bank Group's Knowledge Work and Activities (continued)**

Overall Evaluations	N	DK	Mean	SD
9. Overall, how significant a contribution do you believe the World Bank Group's knowledge work and activities make to development results in your country?* (1-Not significant at all, 10-Very significant)	121	16	6.94	1.80
10. Overall, how would you rate the technical quality of the World Bank Group's knowledge work and activities?* (1-Very low technical quality, 10-Very high technical quality)	116	21	7.66	1.64

E. Working with the World Bank Group

To what extent do you agree/disagree with the following statements? (1-Strongly disagree, 10-Strongly agree)	Level of Agreement			
	N	DK	Mean	SD
1. The World Bank Group disburses funds promptly	81	54	7.06	2.24
2. The World Bank Group effectively monitors and evaluates the projects and programs it supports	104	32	6.95	2.26
3. The World Bank Group's approvals and reviews are done in a timely fashion	81	53	7.17	1.95
4. The World Bank Group's Environmental and Social Framework requirements are reasonable	75	58	7.49	1.69
5. The World Bank Group's conditions on its lending are reasonable	86	49	7.06	1.98
6. The World Bank Group takes decisions quickly in Honduras*	85	49	6.36	2.02
7. Working with the World Bank Group increases Honduras's institutional capacity	105	30	7.03	2.17
8. Where country systems (e.g., procurement, financial management, etc.) are adequate, the World Bank Group makes appropriate use of them*	75	60	7.73	2.03

Donor Support to Refugees	N	DK	Mean	SD
9. To what extent do you believe that the donor community is doing enough to support the government's efforts related to the internally displaced persons in Honduras? (1-To no degree at all, 10-To a very significant degree)	112	24	5.56	2.28

10. In which of the following areas do you believe the World Bank Group should provide most of its resources when it comes to providing support to the internally displaced persons in Honduras? (Choose no more than TWO)	Percentage of Respondents (Responses Combined; N=131)
Jobs	49.6%
Education	46.6%
Supporting poor and marginalized local communities	33.6%
Business development	21.4%
Health	18.3%
Public services	9.2%
Social cohesion	7.6%
Infrastructure	3.1%
Other	2.3%
Don't know	2.3%
Macro issues (fiscal accounts, balance of payments, etc.)	1.5%

**F. The Future Role of the World Bank Group in Honduras**

1. Which of the following SHOULD the World Bank Group do to make itself of greater value in Honduras? (Choose no more than TWO)	Percentage of Respondents (Responses Combined; N=133)
Increase the level of capacity development in the country	30.1%
Engage more directly with beneficiaries	24.1%
Reduce the complexity of obtaining World Bank Group financing	22.6%
Help to bring discipline/effective supervision to implementation of World Bank Group projects	18.8%
Engage more effectively with civil society (e.g., NGOs, CBOs)	15.8%
Engage more effectively with partners such as bilaterals, multilaterals, trust funds, UN	12.8%
Engage more effectively with private sector	11.3%
Offer more innovative financial products	11.3%
Offer more innovative knowledge services	10.5%
Collaborate more effectively with Government clients (e.g., national, state, local)	9.8%
Provide more adequate data/knowledge/statistics/figures on Honduras's economy	8.3%
Other	6.8%
Work faster	5.3%
Improve the quality of its experts as related to Honduras's specific challenges	3.8%
Ensure greater selectivity in its work	3.0%
Increase availability of Reimbursable Advisory Services (RAS)	0.8%

2. When considering the combination of services that the World Bank Group offers in Honduras, and taking into account its limited level of resources, which ONE of the following do you believe the World Bank Group should offer more of in Honduras? (Select only ONE response)	Percentage of Respondents (N=132)
Financial services	23.5%
Knowledge products	22.7%
Convening services	5.3%
None of the above	2.3%
The combination is appropriate for Honduras	31.1%
Don't know	15.2%

G. Communication and Information Sharing

1. How frequently do you interact with the World Bank Group now in Honduras?	Percentage of Respondents (N=136)
Never	17.6%
Less than once a year	18.4%
Once a year to a few times a year	37.5%
Less than once a month	5.9%
At least once a month	14.0%
At least once a week	6.6%

**G. Communication and Information Sharing (continued)**

2. How do you get most of your information about economic and social development issues in Honduras? (Choose no more than TWO)	Percentage of Respondents (Responses Combined; N=134)
Internet	62.7%
Periodicals	31.3%
Local newspapers	23.9%
Local television	18.7%
Other	17.9%
Social media (e.g., blogs, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Flickr)	14.9%
International newspapers	7.5%
International television	3.7%
Local radio	2.2%
International radio	0.0%

3. How would you prefer to receive information from the World Bank Group? (Choose no more than TWO)	Percentage of Respondents (Responses Combined; N=135)
World Bank Group's seminars/workshops/conferences	47.4%
World Bank Group's publications and other written materials	33.3%
e-Newsletters	31.1%
Direct contact with World Bank Group (i.e., face to face meetings/discussions)	30.4%
World Bank Group's website	25.2%
Social media (e.g., blogs, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Flickr)	20.7%

4. Which Internet connection do you use primarily when visiting a World Bank Group website?	Percentage of Respondents (N=132)
High speed/WiFi	96.2%
Dial-up	3.8%

5. Over the past SIX MONTHS, on average how often did you do any of the following related to the World Bank Group (WBG)?	Percentage of Respondents			
	Every few days	Every few weeks	Every few months	Not at all
Read, viewed or heard a story about the WBG in local media (newspaper, magazine, TV, radio) (N=128)	10.9%	36.7%	41.4%	10.9%
Read, viewed or heard a story about the WBG in global media (newspaper, magazine, TV, radio) (N=123)	9.8%	35.0%	37.4%	17.9%
Interacted with the WBG on Social Media (e.g., read a post or tweet, liked, commented, shared, retweeted) (N=126)	4.8%	18.3%	21.4%	55.6%
Visited a WBG website (e.g., read a blog, used data) (N=126)	9.5%	23.8%	38.1%	28.6%
Attended an event/conference hosted by the WBG (N=127)	3.1%	9.4%	43.3%	44.1%
Watched a webinar or online event hosted by the WBG (N=122)	0.8%	7.4%	20.5%	71.3%
Read some or all of a WBG research paper or publication (N=128)	7.0%	12.5%	57.8%	22.7%
Met professionally with WBG staff (N=126)	9.5%	10.3%	33.3%	46.8%
Read a WBG e-newsletter (N=127)	3.9%	17.3%	40.9%	37.8%

**H. Background Information**

1. Which of the following best describes your current affiliation? (Select only ONE response)	Percentage of Respondents (N=138)
Employee of a Ministry, Ministerial Department or Implementation Agency	13.8%
Private Sector Organization	12.3%
Media (press, radio, TV, web, etc.)	10.1%
Bilateral Agency	9.4%
Academia/Research Institute/Think Tank	8.0%
NGO/Community Based Organization	7.2%
Multilateral Agency	6.5%
PMU overseeing implementation of project/Consultant/Contractor working on World Bank Group supported project/program	5.1%
Local Government Office or Staff	5.1%
Private Foundation	5.1%
Independent Government Institution (i.e., Regulatory Agency, Central Bank/oversight institution)	4.3%
Other	4.3%
Office of Minister	3.6%
Office of Parliamentarian	2.2%
Financial Sector/Private Bank	2.2%
Trade Union	0.7%
Office of the President, Prime Minister	0.0%
Faith-Based Group	0.0%
Youth Group	0.0%
Judiciary Branch	0.0%

2. Please identify the primary specialization of your work. (Select only ONE response)	Percentage of Respondents (N=140)
Education	15.7%
Generalist (specialized in multiple sectors)	15.7%
Other	14.3%
Finance and markets	7.1%
Macroeconomics and fiscal management	5.7%
Social protection and labor	5.0%
Transport and ICT	4.3%
Poverty	4.3%
Health, nutrition, and population	3.6%
Trade and competitiveness	3.6%
Governance	3.6%
Urban, rural, and social development	2.9%
Agriculture	2.9%
Environment and natural resources	2.1%
Energy and extractives	2.1%
Gender	2.1%
Water	1.4%
Public-private partnerships	1.4%
Fragility, conflict and violence	0.7%
Jobs	0.7%
Climate change	0.7%

**H. Background Information (continued)**

3. Currently, do you professionally collaborate/work with the World Bank Group (IBRD/IDA, IFC, MIGA, ICSID) in your country?	Percentage of Respondents (N=136)
Yes	17.6%
No	82.4%

4. If yes, which of the following agencies of the World Bank Group do you primarily collaborate/work with in Honduras? (Select only ONE response)	Percentage of Respondents (N=21)
The World Bank (IBRD/IDA)	85.7%
The International Finance Corporation (IFC)	14.3%
The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)	0.0%
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)	0.0%

5. Do your projects involve both the World Bank and the IFC?	Percentage of Respondents (N=76)
Yes	17.1%
No	82.9%

6. Which of the following describes most of your exposure to the World Bank Group in Honduras? (Choose no more than TWO)	Percentage of Respondents (Responses Combined; N=120)
Use World Bank Group reports/data	44.2%
Collaborate as part of my professional duties	37.5%
Use World Bank Group website for information, data, research, etc.	33.3%
Engage in World Bank Group related/sponsored events/activities	30.0%
Observer (i.e., follow in media, discuss in informal conversations, etc.)	23.3%

7. What's your gender?	Percentage of Respondents (N=139)
Female	35.3%
Male	64.7%

8. What's your age?	Percentage of Respondents (N=139)
25 and under	0.0%
26-35	7.9%
36-45	33.1%
46-55	33.1%
56 and above	25.9%

9. Which best represents your geographic location?	Percentage of Respondents (N=138)
Tegucigalpa	91.3%
San Pedro Sula	5.8%
North Coast (Litoral Norte)	1.4%
Western Region (Occidente)	0.7%
Olancho/Eastern Region (Oriente)	0.7%
Siguatopeque/Comayagua	0.0%



Appendix B: Responses to Selected Questions by Stakeholder Groups¹⁶

- Office of Minister N=5
- Bilateral/Multilateral Agency N=22
- Media N=14
- Other¹⁷ N=9
- Employee of a Ministry/PMU/Consultant on WBG Project N=26
- Private Sector/Financial Sector/Private Bank N=20
- Independent Government Institution N=6
- Local Government N=7
- CSO N=18
- Academia N=11

A. General Issues facing Honduras

When you think about the future in Honduras, are you ... ?

Office of Minister		Employee of a Ministry/ PMU/Consultant on WBG Project		Bilateral/ Multilateral Agency		Private Sector/ Financial Sector/ Private Bank		Independent Govt. Institution		Academia		Other									
Percentage of Respondents				Local Govt.				CSO													
Very pessimistic		0.0%		3.8%		0.0%		5.0%		5.3%		5.6%		14.3%		0.0%		9.1%		12.5%	
Somewhat pessimistic		0.0%		19.2%		42.9%		30.0%		57.9%		38.9%		28.6%		16.7%		45.5%		50.0%	
Somewhat optimistic		40.0%		57.7%		14.3%		55.0%		21.1%		38.9%		42.9%		50.0%		27.3%		25.0%	
Very optimistic		60.0%		19.2%		42.9%		10.0%		15.8%		11.1%		14.3%		33.3%		9.1%		12.5%	
Not sure		0.0%		0.0%		0.0%		0.0%		0.0%		5.6%		0.0%		0.0%		9.1%		0.0%	

¹⁶ Only 138 respondents provided information about their current affiliation (question H1 in the questionnaire). Therefore, only these respondents were included in the across-stakeholder analysis presented in this appendix.

¹⁷ Includes the following categories: Office of Parliamentarian (N=3) and Other (N=6).

**A. General Issues facing Honduras (continued)**

Listed below are a number of development priorities in Honduras. Please identify which of the following you consider the most important development priorities in Honduras.
(Choose no more than THREE)

Percentage of Respondents (Responses Combined)		Office of Minister	Employee of a Ministry/ PMU/Consultant on WBG Project		Local Govt.	Bilateral/ Multilateral Agency	Private Sector/ Financial Sector/ Private Bank		CSO		Media	Govt. Institution	Academia	Other
Water and sanitation	20.0%	20.0%	20.0%	14.3%	13.6%	5.3%	11.8%	7.1%	16.7%	9.1%	12.5%			
Education*	0.0%	64.0%	85.7%	68.2%	36.8%	52.9%	50.0%	83.3%	90.9%	25.0%				
Public sector governance/reform	60.0%	16.0%	28.6%	27.3%	42.1%	17.6%	21.4%	16.7%	18.2%	37.5%				
Global/regional integration	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%				
Social protection	20.0%	8.0%	0.0%	9.1%	5.3%	11.8%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	12.5%				
Gender equity (closing the gap between women and men, and boys and girls)	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	4.5%	0.0%	11.8%	0.0%	16.7%	0.0%	12.5%				
Private sector development	0.0%	8.0%	0.0%	0.0%	21.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%				
Food security	0.0%	8.0%	14.3%	13.6%	0.0%	5.9%	7.1%	0.0%	9.1%	12.5%				
Urban development	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	9.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%				
Job creation/employment	20.0%	36.0%	57.1%	13.6%	42.1%	41.2%	50.0%	33.3%	36.4%	50.0%				
Health	20.0%	32.0%	28.6%	22.7%	0.0%	29.4%	35.7%	33.3%	36.4%	25.0%				
Financial markets	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	5.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	12.5%				
Energy	20.0%	12.0%	0.0%	4.5%	0.0%	11.8%	7.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%				
Pollution	0.0%	4.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%				
Economic growth	0.0%	8.0%	0.0%	18.2%	26.3%	5.9%	28.6%	0.0%	18.2%	25.0%				
Crime and violence	0.0%	16.0%	14.3%	18.2%	15.8%	11.8%	21.4%	33.3%	9.1%	12.5%				
Natural resource management (renewable/non-renewable)	20.0%	4.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%				
Climate change	0.0%	12.0%	0.0%	0.0%	9.1%	0.0%	5.9%	0.0%	0.0%	12.5%				
Transport	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	4.5%	0.0%	0.0%	16.7%	0.0%	0.0%				
Agriculture and rural development*	60.0%	4.0%	0.0%	0.0%	4.5%	5.3%	11.8%	0.0%	9.1%	12.5%				
Trade and exports	20.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	10.5%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%				
Poverty reduction	0.0%	24.0%	0.0%	0.0%	18.2%	31.6%	23.5%	33.3%	18.2%	0.0%				
Anti-corruption	0.0%	16.0%	42.9%	27.3%	42.1%	29.4%	21.4%	16.7%	36.4%	25.0%				
Equality of opportunity	20.0%	4.0%	0.0%	4.5%	5.3%	5.9%	7.1%	0.0%	9.1%	12.5%				
Disease	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%				
Information and communications technology	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%				
Judiciary reform	20.0%	0.0%	14.3%	9.1%	5.3%	5.9%	7.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%				
Disaster risk management	0.0%	4.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%				

*Significantly different between stakeholder groups

**A. General Issues facing Honduras (continued)**

When economic and/or social reform efforts fail or are slow to take place in Honduras, which of the following would you attribute this to? (Choose no more than TWO)

Percentage of Respondents (Responses Combined)	Office of Minister	Employee of a Ministry/ PMU/Consultant on WBG Project			Local Govt.			Bilateral/ Multilateral Agency			Private Sector/ Financial Sector/ Private Bank			CSO			Media			Independent Govt. Institution			Academia			Other		
		N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD
Poor coordination within the government	33.3%				20.8%			42.9%			15.0%			17.6%			16.7%			46.2%			22.2%			16.7%		
Inadequate level of government accountability	0.0%				20.8%			0.0%			25.0%			5.9%			16.7%			15.4%			22.2%			33.3%		
Inadequate level of donor coordination	33.3%				8.3%			0.0%			5.0%			17.6%			16.7%			0.0%			0.0%			0.0%		
Reforms are not well thought out in light of country challenges	33.3%				33.3%			42.9%			25.0%			35.3%			25.0%			23.1%			11.1%			16.7%		
Political pressures and obstacles	33.3%				50.0%			28.6%			20.0%			17.6%			25.0%			23.1%			11.1%			33.3%		
Inadequate level of private sector participation	33.3%				0.0%			0.0%			0.0%			11.8%			0.0%			7.7%			0.0%			0.0%		
Inadequate level of citizen/civil society participation	0.0%				8.3%			28.6%			5.0%			5.9%			16.7%			0.0%			11.1%			0.0%		
Inadequate level of capacity in the government	0.0%				8.3%			14.3%			20.0%			11.8%			8.3%			15.4%			22.2%			0.0%		
Corruption*	0.0%				50.0%			28.6%			75.0%			70.6%			75.0%			61.5%			88.9%			66.7%		
Private sector involvement and/or influence	0.0%				0.0%			0.0%			5.0%			5.9%			0.0%			0.0%			0.0%			16.7%		
Other*	33.3%				0.0%			14.3%			5.0%			0.0%			0.0%			0.0%			0.0%			16.7%		

*Significantly different between stakeholder groups

	Office of Minister			Employee of a Ministry/ PMU/Consultant on WBG Project			Local Govt.			Bilateral/ Multilateral Agency			Private Sector/ Financial Sector/ Private Bank			CSO			Media			Independent Govt. Institution			Academia			Other		
	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD
To what extent do you trust the World Bank Group to do what is right?	5	7.00	1.41	24	7.17	1.88	6	7.17	2.48	19	6.63	1.67	19	6.42	1.87	17	6.53	1.97	12	6.92	1.98	5	9.00	1.00	11	7.09	1.81	9	6.67	2.65

(1-To no degree at all, 10-To a very significant degree)



B. Overall Attitudes toward the World Bank Group

How familiar are you with the work of these organizations in Honduras?

	Office of Minister			Employee of a Ministry/ PMU/Consultant on WBG Project			Local Govt.			Bilateral/ Multilateral Agency			Private Sector/ Financial Sector/ Private Bank			CSO			Media			Independent Govt. Institution			Academia			Other		
	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD
World Bank Group (WBG)	5	7.60	2.61	26	7.35	2.90	7	7.71	2.06	22	6.77	1.72	19	6.58	1.92	17	5.94	2.68	13	6.77	2.59	5	7.80	2.17	11	6.00	2.72	9	5.33	2.83
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB/BID)	5	7.60	2.30	26	8.12	1.84	7	7.71	1.89	22	7.27	1.70	19	6.79	1.51	17	6.35	2.55	12	6.92	2.81	6	7.33	2.07	11	6.36	2.98	9	7.44	1.74
Latin American Development Bank (CAF)	5	3.40	2.30	25	2.56	2.36	7	3.86	3.93	22	3.86	3.01	19	3.79	2.74	16	3.88	2.47	12	3.17	2.41	4	1.50	1.00	11	3.82	2.23	9	2.56	2.13
Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABE/BCIE)	5	6.80	2.17	26	6.77	2.86	7	7.57	2.07	22	6.95	2.52	19	7.42	1.71	18	5.67	2.87	12	6.92	2.91	5	7.60	2.19	11	7.09	2.43	9	5.89	3.26

(1-Not familiar at all, 10-Extremely familiar)

Overall, please rate your impression of the effectiveness of these organizations in Honduras.

	Office of Minister			Employee of a Ministry/ PMU/Consultant on WBG Project			Local Govt.			Bilateral/ Multilateral Agency			Private Sector/ Financial Sector/ Private Bank			CSO			Media			Independent Govt. Institution			Academia			Other		
	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD
World Bank Group (WBG)	5	6.60	2.19	23	7.96	1.92	7	7.14	2.54	20	6.70	1.98	18	6.67	2.00	15	7.47	1.19	11	7.00	2.37	6	7.67	1.03	9	6.56	1.33	7	6.86	2.04
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB/BID)	5	6.60	2.19	25	8.20	1.89	7	8.43	1.51	19	6.84	2.14	18	6.67	1.71	16	6.75	1.73	11	7.36	1.12	5	7.60	0.89	9	7.00	1.73	9	7.00	1.73
Latin American Development Bank (CAF)	3	5.00	3.61	7	4.57	2.64	3	7.33	3.06	8	4.25	1.16	11	5.36	2.84	9	4.78	2.54	8	4.00	2.56	1	3.00		8	5.25	1.39	4	6.50	1.91
Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABE/BCIE)	5	5.80	2.68	21	7.48	2.46	7	7.14	2.19	18	6.39	2.45	18	7.06	2.04	15	6.40	1.99	11	7.82	1.83	5	7.00	1.58	9	7.22	1.72	7	7.43	1.81

(1-Not effective at all, 10-Very effective)

**B. Overall Attitudes toward the World Bank Group (continued)**

When thinking about how the World Bank Group can have the most impact on development results in Honduras, in which sectors do you believe the World Bank Group should focus most of its resources (financial and knowledge services) in Honduras? (Choose no more than THREE)

Percentage of Respondents (Responses Combined)	Office of Minister		Employee of a Ministry/ PMU/Consultant on WBG Project		Local Govt.		Bilateral/ Multilateral Agency		Private Sector/ Financial Sector/ Private Bank		CSO		Media		Independent Govt. Institution		Academia		Other
Financial markets	0.0%		3.8%		0.0%		4.5%		0.0%		13.3%		0.0%		0.0%		0.0%		22.2%
Social protection	20.0%		7.7%		0.0%		13.6%		5.3%		6.7%		0.0%		16.7%		9.1%		11.1%
Job creation/employment	40.0%		19.2%		28.6%		13.6%		36.8%		33.3%		38.5%		50.0%		36.4%		44.4%
Health	0.0%		38.5%		28.6%		31.8%		10.5%		20.0%		38.5%		50.0%		18.2%		11.1%
Gender equity (closing the gap between women and men, and boys and girls)	0.0%		0.0%		0.0%		4.5%		5.3%		13.3%		0.0%		0.0%		0.0%		11.1%
Private sector development*	0.0%		3.8%		0.0%		4.5%		42.1%		6.7%		15.4%		0.0%		9.1%		11.1%
Pollution	0.0%		0.0%		0.0%		0.0%		0.0%		6.7%		0.0%		0.0%		0.0%		0.0%
Education *	0.0%		57.7%		71.4%		50.0%		31.6%		40.0%		46.2%		83.3%		54.5%		11.1%
Public sector governance/reform	20.0%		19.2%		42.9%		18.2%		31.6%		6.7%		23.1%		16.7%		27.3%		33.3%
Energy	0.0%		11.5%		0.0%		4.5%		5.3%		20.0%		0.0%		0.0%		9.1%		0.0%
Water and sanitation	20.0%		19.2%		0.0%		18.2%		5.3%		6.7%		0.0%		16.7%		9.1%		22.2%
Global/regional integration	0.0%		0.0%		0.0%		0.0%		0.0%		0.0%		0.0%		0.0%		0.0%		11.1%
Food security	0.0%		3.8%		14.3%		9.1%		0.0%		0.0%		7.7%		0.0%		18.2%		0.0%
Urban development	20.0%		0.0%		0.0%		4.5%		0.0%		6.7%		0.0%		0.0%		0.0%		0.0%
Transport	0.0%		3.8%		0.0%		9.1%		0.0%		6.7%		0.0%		16.7%		18.2%		0.0%
Information and communications technology	20.0%		0.0%		0.0%		4.5%		0.0%		6.7%		15.4%		0.0%		0.0%		0.0%
Equality of opportunity	0.0%		3.8%		14.3%		9.1%		21.1%		0.0%		23.1%		16.7%		9.1%		11.1%
Disease	0.0%		0.0%		0.0%		0.0%		0.0%		0.0%		0.0%		0.0%		0.0%		0.0%
Agriculture and rural development*	80.0%		26.9%		0.0%		18.2%		15.8%		26.7%		15.4%		0.0%		9.1%		22.2%
Trade and exports	20.0%		3.8%		0.0%		0.0%		10.5%		6.7%		0.0%		0.0%		0.0%		0.0%
Disaster risk management	0.0%		7.7%		0.0%		0.0%		0.0%		6.7%		0.0%		0.0%		0.0%		11.1%
Crime and violence	0.0%		3.8%		0.0%		4.5%		5.3%		0.0%		0.0%		0.0%		9.1%		0.0%
Natural resource management (renewable/non-renewable)	0.0%		7.7%		14.3%		4.5%		0.0%		0.0%		0.0%		0.0%		0.0%		0.0%
Judiciary reform	0.0%		0.0%		0.0%		9.1%		15.8%		0.0%		15.4%		0.0%		9.1%		0.0%
Economic growth	0.0%		15.4%		14.3%		18.2%		21.1%		6.7%		23.1%		0.0%		18.2%		22.2%
Climate change	20.0%		11.5%		14.3%		13.6%		0.0%		6.7%		0.0%		0.0%		9.1%		0.0%
Poverty reduction	40.0%		23.1%		28.6%		18.2%		15.8%		40.0%		15.4%		16.7%		0.0%		22.2%
Anti-corruption	0.0%		3.8%		28.6%		9.1%		21.1%		13.3%		23.1%		16.7%		27.3%		22.2%

*Significantly different between stakeholder groups

**B. Overall Attitudes toward the World Bank Group (continued)**

From your perspective, which of the following best describes the World Bank Group's current emphasis on investing in human capital (e.g., education, health, social protection)?

Percentage of Respondents	Office of Minister	Employee of a Ministry/ PMU/Consultant on WBG Project			Bilateral/ Multilateral Agency			Private Sector/ Financial Sector/ Private Bank			CSO			Media			Independent Govt. Institution			Academia			Other		
		N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD
Increased its emphasis recently	20.0%																								
Decreased its emphasis recently	0.0%																								
Emphasis has remained pretty consistent over time	60.0%																								
Don't know	20.0%																								

In addition to the regular relations with the national government, which TWO of the following groups should the World Bank Group collaborate with more in your country? (Choose no more than TWO)

Percentage of Respondents (Responses Combined)	Office of Minister	Employee of a Ministry/ PMU/Consultant on WBG Project			Bilateral/ Multilateral Agency			Private Sector/ Financial Sector/ Private Bank			CSO			Media			Independent Govt. Institution			Academia			Other		
		N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD
Donor community*	0.0%																								
NGOs/Community Based Organizations*	0.0%																								
Academia/think tanks/research institutes*	80.0%																								
National Congress	0.0%																								
Foundations	0.0%																								
Media	0.0%																								
Beneficiaries	20.0%																								
Youth/university groups	0.0%																								
Private sector*	20.0%																								
Local government*	80.0%																								
Other	0.0%																								
Don't know	0.0%																								

*Significantly different between stakeholder groups

To what extent do you agree with the following statements about the World Bank Group's work in Honduras? (1-Strongly disagree, 10-Strongly agree)

	To what extent do you agree with the following statements about the World Bank Group's work in Honduras? (1 = Strongly disagree, 10 = Strongly agree)																																						
	Employee of a Ministry/ PMU/Consultant on WBG Project				Local Govt.				Bilateral/ Multilateral Agency				Private Sector/ Financial Sector/ Private Bank				CSO				Media				Independent Govt. Institution				Academia				Other						
	N	Mean	SD		N	Mean	SD		N	Mean	SD		N	Mean	SD		N	Mean	SD		N	Mean	SD		N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD									
Overall the World Bank Group currently plays a relevant role in development in Honduras	4	7.75	1.71		24	7.79	1.91		7	6.43	2.07		21	5.95	2.52		17	5.82	2.13		16	6.25	2.14		11	6.73	1.79		6	7.33	1.37		9	6.44	1.33		8	6.75	1.98
The World Bank Group's work is aligned with what I consider the development priorities for Honduras*	4	8.00	1.63		23	7.61	1.75		7	6.14	2.54		22	5.91	1.95		16	5.44	2.16		16	5.19	2.48		11	5.91	2.55		6	7.17	1.60		9	7.00	1.94		7	6.86	1.46

*Significantly different between stakeholder groups

**B. Overall Attitudes toward the World Bank Group (continued)**

To what extent is the World Bank Group an effective development partner in Honduras, in terms of each of the following? (1-To no degree at all, 10-To a very significant degree)

	Office of Minister			Employee of a Ministry/ PMU/Consultant on WBG Project			Local Govt.			Bilateral/ Multilateral Agency			Private Sector/ Financial Sector/ Private Bank			CSO			Media			Independent Govt. Institution			Academia			Other		
	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD
Responsiveness to needs	5	6.00	1.58	23	7.04	2.03	6	5.17	1.60	19	5.79	1.51	18	5.67	1.91	16	5.94	1.69	11	5.64	1.91	5	7.00	1.22	9	6.00	1.58	7	6.29	1.89
Flexibility (in terms of the institution's products and services)*	5	5.20	1.30	23	6.74	1.91	5	4.40	1.95	18	5.11	1.71	16	4.81	1.56	11	6.27	1.56	9	5.11	1.96	6	7.33	1.21	8	5.75	1.83	6	5.83	1.47
Flexibility (in terms of changing country circumstances)*	5	6.20	1.64	23	6.91	1.68	5	4.60	2.70	19	5.32	1.89	16	4.88	1.89	13	6.15	1.68	10	5.30	2.06	5	7.40	0.55	9	6.22	1.64	6	5.83	1.17
Being inclusive	5	6.80	1.30	22	7.09	1.60	5	5.20	2.59	20	5.55	1.93	14	5.71	2.13	14	6.21	2.36	11	5.91	2.07	5	7.60	1.52	10	7.20	1.62	8	6.00	1.85
Openness (sharing data and other information)*	5	6.80	2.17	22	7.45	1.60	6	5.00	2.28	20	6.45	2.33	14	6.71	1.68	14	6.93	1.82	10	5.40	1.58	4	8.50	1.00	9	7.22	1.48	7	5.86	1.77
Collaboration with the Government*	5	7.80	1.30	24	8.17	1.63	6	6.50	2.07	20	7.65	1.42	16	6.69	1.74	14	8.57	1.22	12	7.58	1.62	4	8.75	0.96	8	7.50	1.41	7	7.00	2.00
The speed in which it gets things accomplished on the ground	5	5.60	2.07	22	6.36	1.84	6	5.00	2.00	17	5.41	1.97	13	4.92	1.80	11	6.00	1.48	9	5.67	1.73	4	6.75	1.71	6	6.33	1.63	7	5.43	1.27
Helping to bring discipline/effective supervision to implementation of investment projects	5	7.00	2.35	25	7.72	1.67	5	5.80	3.03	15	6.73	1.91	15	5.53	1.73	14	6.36	2.34	9	6.00	1.87	6	7.17	1.72	7	7.57	1.72	6	6.67	1.97
Collaboration with civil society*	5	7.00	1.22	16	7.13	2.09	4	5.50	2.08	17	5.82	2.30	16	5.25	1.73	17	4.71	2.28	10	5.90	1.66	4	7.50	0.58	10	6.30	1.25	8	4.75	1.67
Staff accessibility*	5	6.40	1.95	22	7.91	1.95	5	5.80	1.79	19	6.47	2.41	16	6.06	2.26	15	5.27	2.69	11	4.82	2.27	4	7.00	1.41	9	5.78	2.11	8	5.88	2.17
Collaboration with other donors and development partners	5	6.80	1.30	21	7.38	2.06	4	4.25	2.63	20	6.50	1.73	14	6.00	1.57	12	6.25	2.09	7	6.00	2.31	5	8.20	1.10	8	6.50	1.41	7	6.00	2.52
Collaboration with the private sector*	5	6.60	0.89	15	7.33	1.84	4	5.25	1.89	16	6.81	1.52	17	4.65	1.54	14	6.00	2.15	11	6.64	1.86	3	6.33	1.15	8	6.75	1.04	6	6.67	1.37
Straightforwardness and honesty*	5	8.40	2.07	22	8.23	1.63	5	7.80	2.28	15	7.47	1.73	16	5.88	1.54	13	7.08	2.33	11	5.73	2.57	5	8.40	1.52	8	6.50	1.85	7	7.00	2.00
Treating clients and stakeholders in Honduras with respect*	4	7.50	1.73	22	9.00	1.31	6	7.83	2.04	18	7.22	2.56	14	8.00	1.04	12	8.08	1.38	10	7.10	1.52	5	9.20	0.84	8	7.88	1.25	5	7.40	2.30
Being a long-term partner*	4	8.00	1.83	23	8.74	1.01	6	6.50	2.88	18	8.28	1.27	14	7.36	1.74	13	7.85	1.28	11	7.36	1.69	5	9.00	1.22	7	8.29	1.38	6	7.50	2.07

*Significantly different between stakeholder groups

C. World Bank Group's Effectiveness and Results

	Office of Minister			Employee of a Ministry/ PMU/Consultant on WBG Project			Local Govt.			Bilateral/ Multilateral Agency			Private Sector/ Financial Sector/ Private Bank			CSO			Media			Independent Govt. Institution			Academia			Other		
	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD
To what extent does the World Bank Group's work help to achieve development results in Honduras?	5	6.60	1.95	24	7.54	1.93	6	5.67	1.75	19	6.47	1.90	16	5.69	1.89	16	6.00	2.42	12	5.75	1.66	6	7.50	1.64	8	6.38	1.85	7	6.86	1.77

(1-To no degree at all, 10-To a very significant degree)



C. World Bank Group's Effectiveness and Results (continued)

	Office of Minister		Employee of a Ministry/ PMU/Consultant on WBG Project				Local Govt.				Bilateral/ Multilateral Agency				Private Sector/ Financial Sector/ Private Bank				CSO				Media				Independent Govt. Institution				Academia				Other			
	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD					
To what extent does the World Bank Group influence the development agenda in Honduras?	5	7.00	2.35	24	7.42	1.56	6	5.50	1.97	19	6.63	1.54	16	5.81	2.04	15	6.07	2.22	13	6.46	1.94	6	7.67	1.75	9	7.44	1.74	7	7.14	1.57								

(1-To no degree at all, 10-To a very significant degree)

To what extent do you agree with the following statements about the World Bank Group in Honduras? (1- Strongly disagree, 10- Strongly agree)

	Office of Minister		Employee of a Ministry/ PMU/Consultant on WBG Project				Local Govt.		Bilateral/ Multilateral Agency		Private Sector/ Financial Sector/ Private Bank		CSO		Media		Independent Govt. Institution		Academia		Other									
	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD									
The World Bank Group's financial instruments meet the needs of Honduras	5	6.20	1.10	21	6.67	2.33	6	5.17	2.14	20	5.85	1.95	16	5.13	2.00	13	6.15	1.63	12	5.67	2.15	6	7.17	1.72	8	6.00	2.00	7	7.00	2.16
The World Bank Group meets Honduras's needs for knowledge services	5	6.60	1.95	22	6.95	2.19	6	5.00	1.90	19	6.21	2.07	17	5.18	2.40	14	6.64	1.82	11	6.18	1.47	6	7.33	2.07	9	6.56	1.51	6	7.17	1.17

*Significantly different between stakeholder groups

D. The World Bank Group's Knowledge Work and Activities

How frequently do you consult World Bank Group's knowledge work and activities in the work you do?*

Percentage of Respondents	Office of Minister	Employee of a Ministry/ PMU/Consultant on WBG Project										Bilateral/ Multilateral Agency		Private Sector/ Financial Sector/ Private Bank		CSO		Media		Independent Govt. Institution		Academia		Other		
Weekly	40.0%					11.5%			0.0%		4.5%			0.0%		0.0%		0.0%		0.0%		0.0%		0.0%		0.0%
Monthly	20.0%					7.7%			0.0%		13.6%			5.9%		23.5%		30.8%		0.0%		36.4%		33.3%		33.3%
A few times a year	20.0%					53.8%			66.7%		50.0%			52.9%		35.3%		53.8%		66.7%		45.5%		22.2%		22.2%
Rarely	20.0%					23.1%			33.3%		27.3%			11.8%		35.3%		7.7%		33.3%		0.0%		11.1%		11.1%
Never	0.0%					3.8%			0.0%		4.5%			29.4%		5.9%		7.7%		0.0%		18.2%		33.3%		33.3%

*Significantly different between stakeholder groups

In Honduras, to what extent do you believe that the World Bank Group's knowledge work and activities: (1-To no degree at all, 10-To a very significant degree)

	Do you believe that the employee of a Ministry/ PMU/Consultant on WBG Project's knowledge work and activities... (1-7= no to agree at all, 10=100% very significant degree)																													
	Office of Minister			Employee of a Ministry/ PMU/Consultant on WBG Project			Local Govt.			Bilateral/ Multilateral Agency			Private Sector/ Financial Sector/ Private Bank			CSO			Media			Independent Govt. Institution			Academia			Other		
	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD
Are adaptable to Honduras's specific development challenges and country circumstances	5	7.20	1.30	21	7.38	1.69	6	6.33	1.97	16	7.00	1.79	12	6.33	1.78	14	6.64	1.69	8	6.63	1.92	5	7.40	0.89	6	8.00	1.26	5	6.40	2.07

**D. The World Bank Group's Knowledge Work and Activities (continued)**

	Office of Minister			Employee of a Ministry/ PMU/Consultant on WBG Project			Local Govt.			Bilateral/ Multilateral Agency			Private Sector/ Financial Sector/ Private Bank			CSO			Media			Independent Govt. Institution			Academia			Other		
	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD			
Overall, how significant a contribution do you believe the World Bank Group's knowledge work and activities make to development results in your country?	5	7.20	1.79	25	7.32	1.60	6	6.50	2.07	20	6.55	1.82	15	6.00	2.42	13	7.08	1.71	12	6.58	1.88	6	7.83	0.41	9	7.56	1.13	7	6.86	1.77
Overall, how would you rate the technical quality of the World Bank Group's knowledge work and activities?	5	8.60	1.14	25	7.88	1.67	6	7.83	0.75	19	7.84	1.42	15	6.47	1.96	14	7.57	1.83	9	7.11	2.03	6	8.33	1.03	8	8.13	0.99	6	7.50	1.87

-Not significant at all, 10-Very low technical quality, 10-Very high technical quality

(1-Not significant at all, 10-Very low technical quality, 10-Very high technical quality)

E. Working with the World Bank Group**To what extent do you agree/disagree with the following statements? (1- Strongly disagree, 10- Strongly agree)**

	Office of Minister		Employee of a Ministry/ PMU/Consultant on WBG Project				Local Govt.			Bilateral/ Multilateral Agency			Private Sector/ Financial Sector/ Private Bank			CSO			Media			Independent Govt. Institution			Academia			Other		
	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD
The World Bank Group takes decisions quickly in Honduras	4	6.50	1.73	19	7.00	1.76	5	5.80	1.92	12	6.25	1.86	9	6.00	2.55	9	6.56	1.81	8	6.00	2.56	5	7.60	1.67	7	5.86	1.77	5	5.80	3.11
Where country systems are adequate, the World Bank Group makes appropriate use of them	5	7.60	2.07	18	8.22	1.31	6	6.50	3.08	10	8.00	1.41	9	7.44	2.55	7	6.29	3.45	6	8.00	1.41	5	8.80	1.10	3	7.67	1.15	4	8.00	2.16



F. The Future Role of the World Bank Group in Honduras

Which of the following SHOULD the World Bank Group do to make itself of greater value in Honduras? (Choose no more than TWO)

Percentage of Respondents (Responses Combined)	Office of Minister	Employee of a Ministry/ PMU/Consultant on WBG Project	Local Govt.	Bilateral/ Multilateral Agency	Private Sector/ Financial Sector/ Private Bank	CSO	Media	Independent Govt. Institution	Academia	Other
Help to bring discipline/effective supervision to implementation of World Bank Group projects	0.0%	11.5%	16.7%	27.3%	17.6%	12.5%	30.8%	33.3%	33.3%	11.1%
Engage more effectively with partners such as bilaterals, multilaterals, trust funds, UN*	20.0%	3.8%	16.7%	36.4%	17.6%	6.3%	7.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Reduce the complexity of obtaining World Bank Group financing*	80.0%	38.5%	33.3%	13.6%	11.8%	12.5%	0.0%	50.0%	11.1%	11.1%
Offer more innovative knowledge services*	0.0%	11.5%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	18.8%	15.4%	50.0%	22.2%	11.1%
Collaborate more effectively with Government clients	0.0%	23.1%	0.0%	9.1%	0.0%	6.3%	0.0%	33.3%	0.0%	11.1%
Work faster	0.0%	3.8%	16.7%	4.5%	11.8%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	11.1%	0.0%
Increase availability of Reimbursable Advisory Services (RAS)*	20.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Offer more innovative financial products	20.0%	15.4%	33.3%	4.5%	11.8%	6.3%	15.4%	0.0%	11.1%	11.1%
Ensure greater selectivity in its work	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	4.5%	0.0%	0.0%	15.4%	0.0%	11.1%	0.0%
Provide more adequate data/knowledge/statistics/figures on Honduras's economy	20.0%	0.0%	0.0%	13.6%	17.6%	6.3%	0.0%	0.0%	22.2%	11.1%
Increase the level of capacity development in the country	20.0%	42.3%	33.3%	40.9%	17.6%	31.3%	23.1%	16.7%	22.2%	11.1%
Engage more directly with beneficiaries	20.0%	23.1%	0.0%	18.2%	23.5%	25.0%	38.5%	16.7%	33.3%	44.4%
Improve the quality of its experts as related to Honduras's specific challenges	0.0%	3.8%	16.7%	4.5%	0.0%	6.3%	7.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Engage more effectively with civil society*	0.0%	7.7%	0.0%	9.1%	5.9%	43.8%	23.1%	0.0%	11.1%	44.4%
Engage more effectively with private sector*	0.0%	7.7%	0.0%	0.0%	47.1%	18.8%	15.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Other*	0.0%	3.8%	33.3%	4.5%	17.6%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	22.2%

*Significantly different between stakeholder groups



G. Communication and Information Sharing

How frequently do you interact with the World Bank Group now in Honduras?*

Percentage of Respondents	Office of Minister	Employee of a Ministry/ PMU/Consultant on WBG Project	Local Govt.	Bilateral/ Multilateral Agency	Private Sector/ Financial Sector/ Private Bank	CSO	Media	Independent Govt. Institution	Academia	Other
Never	0.0%	11.5%	16.7%	4.5%	17.6%	17.6%	23.1%	50.0%	27.3%	22.2%
Less than once a year	0.0%	7.7%	16.7%	4.5%	23.5%	41.2%	15.4%	0.0%	36.4%	44.4%
Once a year to a few times a year	40.0%	23.1%	66.7%	45.5%	52.9%	29.4%	38.5%	16.7%	36.4%	33.3%
Less than once a month	0.0%	7.7%	0.0%	13.6%	5.9%	5.9%	7.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
At least once a month	40.0%	26.9%	0.0%	27.3%	0.0%	5.9%	15.4%	16.7%	0.0%	0.0%
At least once a week	20.0%	23.1%	0.0%	4.5%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	16.7%	0.0%	0.0%

*Significantly different between stakeholder groups

How do you get most of your information about economic and social development issues in Honduras? (Choose no more than TWO)

Percentage of Respondents (Responses Combined)	Office of Minister	Employee of a Ministry/ PMU/Consultant on WBG Project	Local Govt.	Bilateral/ Multilateral Agency	Private Sector/ Financial Sector/ Private Bank	CSO	Media	Independent Govt. Institution	Academia	Other
Local television	20.0%	40.0%	0.0%	9.5%	23.5%	0.0%	23.1%	16.7%	9.1%	11.1%
Internet	0.0%	80.0%	66.7%	57.1%	58.8%	58.8%	61.5%	83.3%	72.7%	66.7%
Local radio	20.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	7.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
International radio	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Social media	20.0%	12.0%	66.7%	14.3%	11.8%	17.6%	7.7%	16.7%	9.1%	11.1%
International newspapers	20.0%	0.0%	0.0%	9.5%	5.9%	17.6%	0.0%	0.0%	27.3%	0.0%
Periodicals	40.0%	20.0%	50.0%	23.8%	35.3%	41.2%	15.4%	50.0%	36.4%	33.3%
International television	0.0%	4.0%	0.0%	4.8%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	16.7%	0.0%	22.2%
Local newspapers	0.0%	28.0%	0.0%	38.1%	29.4%	23.5%	30.8%	0.0%	9.1%	22.2%
Other	60.0%	12.0%	16.7%	28.6%	17.6%	23.5%	23.1%	0.0%	0.0%	11.1%

How would you prefer to receive information from the World Bank Group? (Choose no more than TWO)

Percentage of Respondents (Responses Combined)	Office of Minister	Employee of a Ministry/ PMU/Consultant on WBG Project	Local Govt.	Bilateral/ Multilateral Agency	Private Sector/ Financial Sector/ Private Bank	CSO	Media	Independent Govt. Institution	Academia	Other
World Bank Group's seminars/workshops/conferences*	60.0%	69.2%	66.7%	31.8%	17.6%	64.7%	50.0%	66.7%	27.3%	33.3%
Direct contact with World Bank Group	40.0%	34.6%	66.7%	27.3%	41.2%	35.3%	25.0%	0.0%	18.2%	22.2%
e-Newsletters	40.0%	30.8%	16.7%	31.8%	29.4%	35.3%	25.0%	16.7%	27.3%	55.6%
World Bank Group's website	40.0%	15.4%	16.7%	45.5%	17.6%	17.6%	16.7%	33.3%	36.4%	11.1%
Social media	0.0%	11.5%	33.3%	13.6%	35.3%	11.8%	33.3%	50.0%	18.2%	11.1%
World Bank Group's publications and other written materials	20.0%	30.8%	0.0%	45.5%	41.2%	11.8%	33.3%	33.3%	45.5%	55.6%

*Significantly different between stakeholder groups

**G. Communication and Information Sharing (continued)**

Which Internet connection do you use primarily when visiting a World Bank Group website?

Percentage of Respondents	Office of Minister	Employee of a Ministry/ PMU/Consultant on WBG Project	Local Govt.	Bilateral/ Multilateral Agency	Private Sector/ Financial Sector/ Private Bank	CSO	Media	Independent Govt. Institution	Academia	Other
High speed/WIFI	100.0%	95.8%	100.0%	95.2%	100.0%	93.8%	92.3%	100.0%	100.0%	88.9%
Dial-up	0.0%	4.2%	0.0%	4.8%	0.0%	6.3%	7.7%	0.0%	0.0%	11.1%

H. Background Information

Currently, do you professionally collaborate/work with the World Bank Group (IBRD/IDA, IFC, MIGA, ICSID) in your country? *

Percentage of Respondents	Office of Minister	Employee of a Ministry/ PMU/Consultant on WBG Project	Local Govt.	Bilateral/ Multilateral Agency	Private Sector/ Financial Sector/ Private Bank	CSO	Media	Independent Govt. Institution	Academia	Other
Yes	40.0%	40.0%	14.3%	19.0%	20.0%	5.9%	0.0%	20.0%	0.0%	11.1%
No	60.0%	60.0%	85.7%	81.0%	80.0%	94.1%	100.0%	80.0%	100.0%	88.9%

*Significantly different between stakeholder groups

If yes, which of the following agencies of the World Bank Group do you primarily collaborate/work with in Honduras? * (Select only ONE response)

Percentage of Respondents	Office of Minister	Employee of a Ministry/ PMU/Consultant on WBG Project	Local Govt.	Bilateral/ Multilateral Agency	Private Sector/ Financial Sector/ Private Bank	CSO	Media	Independent Govt. Institution	Academia	Other
The World Bank (IBRD/IDA)	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	25.0%	100.0%	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%
The International Finance Corporation (IFC)	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	75.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%

*Significantly different between stakeholder groups

Which of the following describes most of your exposure to the World Bank Group in Honduras? (Choose no more than TWO)

Percentage of Respondents (Responses Combined)	Office of Minister	Employee of a Ministry/ PMU/Consultant on WBG Project	Local Govt.	Bilateral/ Multilateral Agency	Private Sector/ Financial Sector/ Private Bank	CSO	Media	Independent Govt. Institution	Academia	Other
Observer	0.0%	8.7%	16.7%	20.0%	36.8%	11.8%	40.0%	33.3%	28.6%	50.0%
Use World Bank Group reports/data	25.0%	17.4%	16.7%	55.0%	57.9%	52.9%	50.0%	50.0%	57.1%	50.0%
Engage in World Bank Group related/ sponsored events/activities*	100.0%	17.4%	50.0%	30.0%	36.8%	47.1%	0.0%	16.7%	28.6%	16.7%
Collaborate as part of my professional duties*	50.0%	73.9%	50.0%	50.0%	21.1%	17.6%	30.0%	16.7%	0.0%	16.7%
Use World Bank Group website for information, data, research, etc.	0.0%	39.1%	50.0%	25.0%	21.1%	52.9%	30.0%	16.7%	42.9%	33.3%
Observer	0.0%	8.7%	16.7%	20.0%	36.8%	11.8%	40.0%	33.3%	28.6%	50.0%

*Significantly different between stakeholder groups



Appendix C: Responses to Selected Questions by Level of Collaboration with the World Bank Group¹⁸

Note that this appendix presents comparative analysis of the data from those respondents who collaborate with the WBG vs. those respondents who do not collaborate with the WBG and covers the following selected questions from the FY19 Honduras COS questionnaire: All 10-point scale questions and questions B4, B6, B7 and F1 from the questionnaire.

- Collaborating with the WBG N=24 ● Not collaborating with the WBG N=112

A. General Issues Facing Honduras

To what extent do you trust each of the following groups to do what is right?

(1-To no degree at all, 10-To a very significant degree)

	Collaborating with the WBG			Not collaborating with the WBG		
	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD
The national government	21	5.33	2.18	104	4.48	2.18
Bilateral organizations	24	6.33	2.24	104	6.97	1.74
The World Bank Group	22	6.59	2.04	103	6.96	1.87
The International Monetary Fund	22	6.14	2.14	103	6.05	2.14
UN	21	6.86	2.10	103	7.07	1.82
Regional development banks	24	6.42	1.95	108	7.01	1.65
Honduras's Central Bank	23	6.35	2.42	101	5.87	2.02
International private sector	19	6.32	2.14	96	6.10	1.95
Domestic private sector	22	5.73	1.75	104	5.54	1.95
International civil society	24	5.67	1.76	104	6.14	2.03
Domestic civil society	24	5.38	1.93	108	5.60	1.96
Faith-based institutions	22	5.68	2.38	103	5.74	2.29
Domestic traditional media and their web presence	24	3.96	1.97	104	4.44	2.13
International media and their web presence	24	4.92	2.41	100	5.73	2.03
Web based media*	22	4.14	2.23	100	5.29	2.02

*Significantly different between collaborators and non-collaborators

B. Overall Attitudes toward the World Bank Group

How familiar are you with the work of these organizations in Honduras? (1-Not familiar at all, 10-Extremely familiar)

	Collaborating with the WBG			Not collaborating with the WBG		
	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD
World Bank Group (WBG)	24	7.58	2.54	108	6.58	2.38
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB/BID)*	24	8.17	1.40	108	6.97	2.21
Latin American Development Bank (CAF)	24	2.79	2.34	105	3.58	2.67
Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABE/BCIE)	24	7.08	2.48	108	6.81	2.56

*Significantly different between collaborators and non-collaborators

¹⁸ Only 136 respondents provided information about their level of collaboration with the World Bank Group (question H3 in the questionnaire). Therefore, only these respondents were included in the analysis presented in this appendix.



B. Overall Attitudes toward the World Bank Group (continued)

Overall, please rate your impression of the effectiveness of these organizations in Honduras.

(1-Not effective at all, 10-Very effective)

	Collaborating with the WBG			Not collaborating with the WBG		
	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD
World Bank Group (WBG)	24	7.08	2.26	95	7.14	1.83
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB/BID)	24	7.29	2.10	98	7.22	1.78
Latin American Development Bank (CAF)	11	4.64	2.91	49	5.14	2.24
Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABE/BCIE)	21	6.43	2.86	93	7.13	1.97

	Collaborating with the WBG			Not collaborating with the WBG		
	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD
To what extent do you believe the World Bank Group's staff is well prepared to help Honduras solve its most complicated development challenges?	21	7.52	2.06	86	7.85	1.51

(1-To no degree at all, 10-To a very significant degree)

When thinking about how the World Bank Group can have the most impact on development results in Honduras, in which sectors do you believe the World Bank Group should focus most of its resources (financial and knowledge services) in Honduras? (Choose no more than THREE)

Percentage of Respondents (Responses Combined)	Collaborating with the WBG	Not collaborating with the WBG
Financial markets	4.2%	4.6%
Social protection	12.5%	7.4%
Job creation/employment	20.8%	33.3%
Health	20.8%	25.9%
Gender equity	0.0%	4.6%
Private sector development	12.5%	11.1%
Pollution	0.0%	0.9%
Education	50.0%	43.5%
Public sector governance/reform	8.3%	24.1%
Energy*	16.7%	4.6%
Water and sanitation	16.7%	11.1%
Global/regional integration	0.0%	0.9%
Food security	0.0%	5.6%
Urban development	4.2%	1.9%
Transport	8.3%	4.6%
Information and communications technology	4.2%	3.7%
Equality of opportunity	8.3%	11.1%
Disease	0.0%	0.0%
Agriculture and rural development	29.2%	18.5%
Trade and exports	0.0%	4.6%
Disaster risk management	8.3%	1.9%
Crime and violence	4.2%	3.7%
Natural resource management*	12.5%	0.9%
Judiciary reform	0.0%	7.4%
Economic growth	20.8%	15.7%
Climate change	12.5%	6.5%
Poverty reduction	16.7%	23.1%
Anti-corruption	8.3%	16.7%

*Significantly different between collaborators and non-collaborators



B. Overall Attitudes toward the World Bank Group (continued)

Which of the following do you identify as the World Bank Group's greatest WEAKNESSES in its work in Honduras?
(Choose no more than TWO)

Percentage of Respondents (Responses Combined)	Collaborating with the WBG	Not collaborating with the WBG
Not aligned with country priorities	8.7%	25.2%
Not enough public disclosure of its work	17.4%	28.0%
Arrogant in its approach	0.0%	0.9%
Inadequate World Bank Group's staffing in Honduras	13.0%	8.4%
Not willing to honestly criticize policies and reform efforts in the country	13.0%	24.3%
Staff too inaccessible	4.3%	3.7%
Not collaborating enough with private sector	8.7%	7.5%
Not collaborating enough with partners such as bilaterals, multilaterals, trust funds, UN	17.4%	9.3%
Not adequately sensitive to political/social realities in Honduras	34.8%	29.0%
Too influenced by developed countries	8.7%	7.5%
World Bank Group's processes too slow and complex*	30.4%	6.5%
Not adequately flexible	13.0%	4.7%
Not sufficiently focused on sustainable results	13.0%	5.6%
Not collaborating enough with civil society	0.0%	7.5%
Other	0.0%	0.9%
Don't know	4.3%	9.3%

*Significantly different between collaborators and non-collaborators

To what extent do you believe that the World Bank Group's work and support help the poorest in Honduras?
(Select only ONE response)

Percentage of Respondents	Collaborating with the WBG	Not collaborating with the WBG
To a fully sufficient degree	4.2%	2.8%
To a somewhat sufficient degree	33.3%	32.4%
To a somewhat insufficient degree	37.5%	31.5%
To a very insufficient degree	20.8%	14.8%
Don't know	4.2%	18.5%

To what extent do you agree with the following statements about the World Bank Group's work in Honduras?
(1-Strongly disagree, 10-Strongly agree)

	Collaborating with the WBG			Not collaborating with the WBG		
	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD
Overall the World Bank Group currently plays a relevant role in development in Honduras	24	6.54	2.25	97	6.68	1.97
The World Bank Group's work is aligned with what I consider the development priorities for Honduras	24	6.79	2.23	95	6.22	2.10

**B. Overall Attitudes toward the World Bank Group (continued)**

To what extent is the World Bank Group an effective development partner in Honduras, in terms of each of the following?
(1-To no degree at all, 10-To a very significant degree)

	Collaborating with the WBG			Not collaborating with the WBG		
	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD
Responsiveness to needs	24	6.38	2.08	93	6.00	1.69
Flexibility (in terms of the institution's products and services)	24	5.75	2.23	80	5.65	1.69
Flexibility (in terms of changing country circumstances)	24	5.75	2.23	84	5.87	1.79
Being inclusive	23	6.35	2.39	89	6.27	1.85
Openness (sharing data and other information)	22	6.91	2.27	88	6.65	1.82
Collaboration with the Government	24	7.58	1.82	90	7.63	1.60
The speed in which it gets things accomplished on the ground	23	5.30	2.24	75	5.83	1.55
Helping to bring discipline/effective supervision to implementation of investment projects	23	7.04	2.23	82	6.66	1.95
Collaboration with civil society	20	6.20	1.79	84	5.69	2.07
Staff accessibility	21	7.00	2.26	90	6.09	2.30
Collaboration with other donors and development partners	21	6.95	2.06	81	6.37	1.95
Collaboration with the private sector	19	6.37	2.09	78	6.23	1.74
Straightforwardness and honesty	22	7.32	2.15	84	7.11	2.06
Treating clients and stakeholders in Honduras with respect	24	7.92	2.15	79	7.96	1.64
Being a long-term partner	23	7.96	1.77	83	7.95	1.58



C. World Bank Group's Effectiveness and Results

How EFFECTIVE do you believe the World Bank Group is in terms of the work it does in the following areas of development in Honduras? (1-Not effective at all, 10-Very effective)

	Collaborating with the WBG			Not collaborating with the WBG		
	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD
Social protection	16	6.56	2.50	50	6.00	2.36
Gender equity	13	7.46	1.81	58	6.62	1.98
Private sector development	16	6.81	2.29	62	6.27	1.87
Education	18	6.67	2.17	75	6.53	1.99
Public sector governance/reform	19	6.37	2.17	76	6.64	2.10
Global/regional integration	13	6.77	2.24	49	6.71	2.00
Food security	17	7.24	2.02	62	6.61	2.06
Urban development	15	6.07	2.31	57	6.56	1.93
Energy	15	5.80	2.24	66	6.42	2.00
Water and sanitation	15	6.33	2.06	70	6.57	1.92
Job creation/employment	14	5.86	2.07	62	5.60	1.86
Financial markets	15	6.67	1.84	55	6.51	2.01
Transport	15	6.07	2.43	68	6.62	2.01
Agriculture and rural development	18	6.89	2.32	68	6.65	1.91
Trade and exports	15	6.87	2.56	56	6.54	1.81
Crime and violence	12	5.25	2.83	52	5.85	2.27
Natural resource management	16	6.31	2.27	59	6.59	1.95
Climate change	17	6.71	1.99	65	6.62	1.92
Poverty reduction	20	6.75	2.77	82	6.06	2.24
Anti-corruption	11	5.55	2.73	68	5.53	2.39
Economic growth	19	6.95	2.39	75	6.48	1.86
Disaster risk management	15	6.47	2.50	61	6.74	1.93
Equality of opportunity	14	7.14	2.18	61	6.44	1.94
Disease	13	5.92	3.04	44	5.95	2.29

	Collaborating with the WBG			Not collaborating with the WBG		
	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD
To what extent does the World Bank Group's work help to achieve development results in Honduras?	23	6.91	2.39	94	6.39	1.83

(1-To no degree at all, 10-To a very significant degree)

	Collaborating with the WBG			Not collaborating with the WBG		
	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD
To what extent does the World Bank Group influence the development agenda in Honduras?	23	6.74	2.07	96	6.72	1.80

(1-To no degree at all, 10-To a very significant degree)

**C. World Bank Group's Effectiveness and Results (continued)****To what extent do you agree with the following statements about the World Bank Group in Honduras?***(1- Strongly disagree, 10- Strongly agree)*

	Collaborating with the WBG			Not collaborating with the WBG		
	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD
The World Bank Group's financial instruments meet the needs of Honduras	22	5.95	2.79	92	6.09	1.84
The World Bank Group meets Honduras's needs for knowledge services	22	6.09	2.67	91	6.44	1.81

How effectively does the World Bank Group support Honduras's efforts ... ? (1- Not effectively at all, 10- Very effectively)

	Collaborating with the WBG			Not collaborating with the WBG		
	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD
To build stronger domestic resource mobilization systems in the Government	15	6.13	1.64	70	6.49	1.89
To develop better and stronger data collection/analytics systems within the Government	20	6.95	1.70	74	6.72	1.75
To strengthen the country's crisis preparedness	21	6.29	1.87	66	6.03	1.79
To identify and monitor risks	16	6.81	1.64	69	6.48	1.79

	Collaborating with the WBG			Not collaborating with the WBG		
	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD
How effectively does the World Bank Group's SCD and CPF activities support Honduras's efforts to manage crisis related risks?	10	7.10	1.85	32	6.88	1.68

*(1- Not effectively at all, 10- Very effectively)***D. The World Bank Group's Knowledge Work and Activities****In Honduras, to what extent do you believe that the World Bank Group's knowledge work and activities:***(1- To no degree at all, 10- To a very significant degree)*

	Collaborating with the WBG			Not collaborating with the WBG		
	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD
Are timely	22	7.18	2.13	76	7.07	1.80
Include appropriate level of stakeholder involvement during preparation	21	6.86	2.15	67	6.75	1.64
Lead to practical solutions	22	6.68	2.10	72	6.63	1.89
Are source of relevant information on global good practices	22	7.64	1.73	79	7.49	1.48
Are adequately disseminated	20	6.60	2.14	82	6.20	2.14
Are translated enough into local language	21	7.19	2.62	75	7.24	2.10
Are adaptable to Honduras's specific development challenges and country circumstances	21	7.48	1.97	75	6.83	1.64

	Collaborating with the WBG			Not collaborating with the WBG		
	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD
Overall, how significant a contribution do you believe the World Bank Group's knowledge work and activities make to development results in your country?	23	7.00	2.28	93	6.85	1.68
Overall, how would you rate the technical quality of the World Bank Group's knowledge work and activities?	23	7.74	2.05	88	7.60	1.51

(1- Not significant at all, 10- Very significant; 1- Very low technical quality, 10- Very high technical quality)



E. Working with the World Bank Group

To what extent do you agree/disagree with the following statements? (1-Strongly disagree, 10-Strongly agree)

	Collaborating with the WBG			Not collaborating with the WBG		
	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD
The World Bank Group disburses funds promptly	21	7.14	2.74	56	7.04	2.11
The World Bank Group effectively monitors and evaluates the projects and programs it supports	22	7.32	2.19	77	6.81	2.26
The World Bank Group's approvals and reviews are done in a timely fashion	20	7.25	2.05	57	7.05	1.97
The World Bank Group's Environmental and Social Framework requirements are reasonable	20	7.30	1.72	54	7.57	1.70
The World Bank Group's conditions on its lending are reasonable	19	7.11	2.11	65	7.00	1.98
The World Bank Group takes decisions quickly in Honduras	20	6.65	2.13	62	6.32	2.01
Working with the World Bank Group increases Honduras's institutional capacity	23	7.26	2.32	78	6.97	2.04
Where country systems are adequate, the World Bank Group makes appropriate use of them	18	7.72	2.19	53	7.62	2.02

	Collaborating with the WBG			Not collaborating with the WBG		
	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD
To what extent do you believe that the donor community is doing enough to support the government's efforts related to refugees in Honduras?	19	6.00	2.58	88	5.38	2.11

(1- To no degree at all, 10- To a very significant degree)

F. The Future Role of the World Bank Group in Honduras

Which of the following SHOULD the World Bank Group do to make itself of greater value in Honduras?

(Choose no more than TWO)

Percentage of Respondents (Responses Combined)	Collaborating with the WBG	Not collaborating with the WBG
Help to bring discipline/effective supervision to implementation of World Bank Group projects	8.3%	22.1%
Engage more effectively with partners such as bilaterals, multilaterals, trust funds, UN	8.3%	12.5%
Reduce the complexity of obtaining World Bank Group financing	33.3%	18.3%
Offer more innovative knowledge services	12.5%	10.6%
Collaborate more effectively with Government clients	8.3%	9.6%
Work faster*	12.5%	2.9%
Increase availability of Reimbursable Advisory Services (RAS)*	4.2%	0.0%
Offer more innovative financial products	12.5%	11.5%
Ensure greater selectivity in its work	0.0%	3.8%
Provide more adequate data/knowledge/statistics/figures on Honduras's economy	8.3%	8.7%
Increase the level of capacity development in the country	37.5%	28.8%
Engage more directly with beneficiaries	20.8%	25.0%
Improve the quality of its experts as related to Honduras's specific challenges	0.0%	4.8%
Engage more effectively with civil society	8.3%	17.3%
Engage more effectively with private sector	16.7%	10.6%
Other	4.2%	7.7%

*Significantly different between collaborators and non-collaborators



Appendix D: Responses to Selected Questions by Year¹⁹

All data presented in this appendix are weighted. As a result, means of the FY 2019 data and the total number of respondents indicated will be slightly different from the aggregated responses in Appendix A. Similarly, responses from FY 2016 respondents and the total number of respondents indicated may differ from those reported in the FY 2016 COS report.

- FY 2016 Number of comparable respondents = 165
- FY 2019 Number of comparable respondents = 132

By weighting, the FY 2016 and FY 2019 samples have the same stakeholder composition and thus are comparable. The weighted percentage of a stakeholder group is determined by the extent to which the World Bank Group interacts with them in the country and the percentage this group usually makes up in the past aggregated annual global data. The weighted stakeholder breakdown is presented below:

Percentage of Respondents	FY 2016	FY 2019
Office of the President/Prime Minister/Minister	8.0%	8.0%
Office of Parliamentarian	3.5%	3.5%
Government Institutions	26.0%	26.0%
Local Government	4.0%	4.0%
Bilateral/Multilateral Agency	13.0%	13.0%
Civil Society	14.5%	14.5%
Private Sector	13.0%	13.0%
Academia	9.0%	9.0%
Media	9.0%	9.0%

B. Overall Attitudes toward the World Bank Group

How familiar are you with the work of these organizations in Honduras? (1-Not familiar at all, 10-Extremely familiar)

	FY 2016			FY 2019		
	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD
World Bank Group (WBG)	162	6.87	2.38	128	6.78	2.51
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB/BID)	161	7.14	2.47	128	7.24	2.17
Latin American Development Bank (CAF)	156	3.39	2.84	124	3.40	2.55
Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI/BCIE)	161	6.65	2.72	128	6.80	2.54

Overall, please rate your impression of the effectiveness of these organizations in Honduras.

(1-Not effective at all, 10-Very effective)

	FY 2016			FY 2019		
	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD
World Bank Group (WBG)	149	6.88	2.21	116	7.21	1.88
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB/BID)*	148	6.76	2.37	119	7.32	1.84
Latin American Development Bank (CAF)*	66	4.02	2.65	61	5.02	2.45
Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI/BCIE)	141	6.74	2.20	111	6.98	2.19

**Significantly different between FY 2016 and FY 2019*

	FY 2016			FY 2019		
	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD
To what extent do you believe the World Bank Group's staff is well prepared to help Honduras solve its most complicated development challenges?	140	7.55	2.15	105	7.80	1.67

(1-To no degree at all, 10-To a very significant degree)

¹⁹ Only those questions that were asked in the FY 2016 and FY 2019 country opinion surveys, with similar response scales/options, are presented in this appendix.



B. Overall Attitudes toward the World Bank Group (continued)

To what extent do you believe that the World Bank Group's work and support help the poorest in Honduras?*

(Select only ONE response)

Percentage of Respondents	FY 2016	FY 2019
To a fully sufficient degree	8.2%	2.3%
To a somewhat sufficient degree	23.9%	34.9%
To a somewhat insufficient degree	49.1%	30.2%
To a very insufficient degree	13.2%	16.3%
Don't know	5.7%	16.3%

*Significantly different between FY 2016 and FY 2019

To what extent do you agree with the following statements about the World Bank Group's work in Honduras?

(1-Strongly disagree, 10-Strongly agree)

	FY 2016			FY 2019		
	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD
Overall the World Bank Group currently plays a relevant role in development in Honduras	153	6.54	2.44	116	6.79	2.07
The World Bank Group's work is aligned with what I consider the development priorities for Honduras	149	6.24	2.30	115	6.49	2.22

To what extent is the World Bank Group an effective development partner in Honduras, in terms of each of the following?

(1-To no degree at all, 10-To a very significant degree)

	FY 2016			FY 2019		
	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD
Responsiveness to needs	147	6.37	2.10	115	6.15	1.78
Flexibility (in terms of the institution's products and services)	134	5.98	1.86	104	5.82	1.84
Flexibility (in terms of changing country circumstances)	140	5.80	1.90	108	6.03	1.87
Being inclusive	139	6.34	2.06	109	6.44	1.93
Openness (sharing data and other information)	135	7.22	2.07	107	6.83	1.89
Collaboration with the Government	143	7.76	1.90	111	7.75	1.61
The speed in which it gets things accomplished on the ground	129	5.86	2.04	96	5.84	1.81
Helping to bring discipline/effective supervision to implementation of investment projects ¹				105	6.85	2.04
Collaboration with civil society	130	6.29	2.16	102	6.00	2.02
Staff accessibility	139	6.22	2.57	109	6.31	2.33
Collaboration with other donors and development partners	126	6.75	2.18	98	6.67	1.91
Collaboration with the private sector*	118	6.92	2.00	94	6.34	1.80
Straightforwardness and honesty	133	7.13	2.35	104	7.34	2.08
Treating clients and stakeholders in Honduras with respect*	133	7.54	2.29	99	8.10	1.69
Being a long-term partner	136	8.15	1.99	103	8.10	1.54

*Significantly different between FY 2016 and FY 2019

¹ Only FY 2019 questionnaire had this response option



C. World Bank Group's Effectiveness and Results

How EFFECTIVE do you believe the World Bank Group is in terms of the work it does in the following areas of development in Honduras? (1-Not effective at all, 10-Very effective)

	FY 2016			FY 2019		
	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD
Social protection	89	6.36	2.50	67	6.34	2.43
Gender equity	65	6.54	2.28	71	6.83	1.97
Private sector development	80	6.85	2.14	76	6.37	1.95
Education	96	6.93	2.16	89	6.64	1.96
Public sector governance/reform	97	6.67	2.46	90	6.72	2.02
Global/regional integration	70	6.97	2.15	64	6.67	2.00
Food security	86	6.76	2.32	79	6.80	1.99
Urban development	69	6.85	1.96	71	6.38	2.05
Energy*	94	7.28	2.24	79	6.24	2.05
Water and sanitation	94	7.03	2.22	82	6.49	1.88
Job creation/employment	79	5.95	2.40	75	5.54	1.93
Financial markets	71	7.08	2.07	69	6.44	1.94
Transport*	76	7.05	2.07	81	6.35	2.07
Agriculture and rural development [†]	100	7.05	2.25	86	6.70	1.96
Trade and exports	68	7.00	2.09	71	6.55	1.99
Crime and violence	74	6.21	2.31	61	5.76	2.36
Natural resource management	72	6.57	2.41	75	6.58	1.95
Climate change	86	7.07	2.41	80	6.66	1.86
Poverty reduction	107	6.95	2.48	101	6.33	2.30
Anti-corruption*	89	6.47	2.58	75	5.63	2.38
Economic growth	93	7.16	2.19	91	6.65	1.96
Disaster risk management ^{''}	78	6.97	2.35	73	6.69	2.04
Equality of opportunity	78	6.40	2.41	73	6.69	1.93
Disease ^{'''}	65	6.53	2.15	58	6.09	2.36

*Significantly different between FY 2016 and FY 2019

[†] In FY 2016, there were two categories related to agriculture and rural development: "Agricultural development" and "Rural development." A mean score of responses to these two categories was calculated and included in a separate variable that then was compared to FY 2019 "Agriculture and rural development" category.

^{''} In FY 2016, the category was "Disaster management."

^{'''} In FY 2016, the category was "Communicable/non-communicable diseases."

	FY 2016			FY 2019		
	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD
To what extent does the World Bank Group's work help to achieve development results in Honduras?	141	6.83	2.02	115	6.58	2.03

(1-To no degree at all, 10-To a very significant degree)

**C. World Bank Group's Effectiveness and Results (continued)**

To what extent do you agree with the following statements about the World Bank Group in Honduras? (1-Strongly disagree, 10-Strongly agree)

	FY 2016			FY 2019		
	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD
The World Bank Group's financial instruments meet the needs of Honduras	134	6.43	2.15	109	6.15	2.03
The World Bank Group meets Honduras's needs for knowledge services	131	6.76	2.07	112	6.39	2.01

D. The World Bank Group's Knowledge Work and Activities

How frequently do you consult World Bank Group's knowledge work and activities in the work you do?

Percentage of Respondents	FY 2016	FY 2019
Weekly	4.7%	6.3%
Monthly	24.2%	16.7%
A few times a year	45.6%	46.0%
Rarely	21.5%	20.6%
Never	4.0%	10.3%

In Honduras, to what extent do you believe that the World Bank Group's knowledge work and activities:

(1-To no degree at all, 10-To a very significant degree)

	FY 2016			FY 2019		
	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD
Are timely	126	7.01	1.93	95	7.09	1.84
Include appropriate level of stakeholder involvement during preparation ¹				87	6.84	1.79
Lead to practical solutions	124	6.60	1.94	93	6.64	1.94
Are source of relevant information on global good practices ¹				98	7.51	1.52
Are adequately disseminated ¹				100	6.26	2.11
Are translated enough into local language	129	7.38	2.36	94	7.42	2.17
Are adaptable to Honduras's specific development challenges and country circumstances	129	6.94	1.97	95	7.06	1.67

¹ Only FY 2019 questionnaire had these response options

	FY 2016			FY 2019		
	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD
Overall, how significant a contribution do you believe the World Bank Group's knowledge work and activities make to development results in your country?	133	7.26	2.02	114	7.02	1.78
Overall, how would you rate the technical quality of the World Bank Group's knowledge work and activities?	132	7.63	1.91	109	7.76	1.64

(1-Not significant at all, 10-Very significant; 1-Very low technical quality, 10-Very high technical quality)

**E. Working with the World Bank Group**

To what extent do you agree/disagree with the following statements? (1-Strongly disagree, 10-Strongly agree)

	FY 2016			FY 2019		
	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD
The World Bank Group disburses funds promptly	108	6.74	2.11	78	7.24	2.19
The World Bank Group effectively monitors and evaluates the projects and programs it supports	129	7.12	2.33	99	7.03	2.22
The World Bank Group's approvals and reviews are done in a timely fashion	121	6.79	2.17	77	7.24	1.87
The World Bank Group's Environmental and Social Framework requirements are reasonable*	96	7.45	1.88	71	7.49	1.72
The World Bank Group's conditions on its lending are reasonable	111	6.95	2.13	83	7.07	1.96
The World Bank Group takes decisions quickly in Honduras	112	6.35	2.10	81	6.52	1.90
Working with the World Bank Group increases Honduras's institutional capacity	133	7.37	2.38	99	7.08	2.14
Where country systems are adequate, the World Bank Group makes appropriate use of them	92	7.27	1.96	73	7.76	2.04

* In FY 2016, the category was "The World Bank Group's "Safeguard Policy" requirements are reasonable."

F. The Future Role of the World Bank Group in Honduras

When considering the combination of services that the World Bank Group offers in Honduras, and taking into account its limited level of resources, which ONE of the following do you believe the World Bank Group should offer more of in Honduras?* (Select only ONE response)

Percentage of Respondents	FY 2016	FY 2019
Financial services	32.9%	22.0%
Knowledge products	24.0%	22.8%
Convening services	4.1%	4.9%
None of the above	2.1%	2.4%
The combination is appropriate for Honduras	33.6%	34.1%
Don't know	3.4%	13.8%

*Significantly different between FY 2016 and FY 2019



Appendix E: Indicator Questions as a Function of Exposure to the World Bank Group

Indicator Question	Currently, do you professionally collaborate/work with the World Bank Group in your country?		Which of the following describes most of your exposure to the World Bank Group in Honduras? (Choose no more than TWO)									
	Not collaborating with the WBG	Collaborating with the WBG	Observer		Use WBG reports/data		Engage in WBG activities		Collaborate		Use WBG website	
			No Mean	Yes Mean	No Mean	Yes Mean	No Mean	Yes Mean	No Mean	Yes Mean	No Mean	Yes Mean
To what extent do you trust the World Bank Group to do what is right?	6.96	6.59	6.69	7.36	7.13	6.51	6.91	6.73	6.83	6.90	6.87	6.83
Overall, please rate your impression of the World Bank Group's effectiveness in Honduras.	7.14	7.08	7.09	7.42	7.62	6.59	7.00	7.53	7.15	7.18	7.08	7.34
Overall the World Bank Group currently plays a relevant role in development in Honduras	6.68	6.54	6.60	6.36	6.81	6.22	6.33	7.03	6.40	6.79	6.72	6.21
The World Bank Group's work is aligned with what I consider the development priorities for Honduras	6.22	6.79	6.28	6.21	6.74	5.68	6.09	6.65	6.03	6.63	6.44	5.92
Responsiveness to needs	6.00	6.38	6.02	6.29	6.21	5.91	6.13	6.00	5.95	6.29	6.07	6.11
Flexibility (in terms of the institution's products and services)	5.65	5.75	5.63	5.81	5.86	5.40	5.68	5.63	5.67	5.67	5.58	5.87
Flexibility (in terms of changing country circumstances)	5.87	5.75	5.72	6.09	6.00	5.55	5.81	5.81	5.82	5.79	5.76	5.90
Being inclusive	6.27	6.35	6.19	6.54	6.49	6.00	6.17	6.52	6.39	6.12	6.14	6.58
Openness (sharing data and other information)	6.65	6.91	6.73	6.83	6.77	6.74	6.69	6.93	6.78	6.73	6.72	6.84
Collaboration with the Government	7.63	7.58	7.77	7.61	7.80	7.65	7.66	7.91	7.83	7.60	7.66	7.89
The speed in which it gets things accomplished on the ground	5.83	5.30	5.62	5.95	5.82	5.51	5.72	5.65	5.85	5.50	5.68	5.73
Helping to bring discipline/effective supervision to implementation of investment projects	6.66	7.04	6.66	7.14	7.16	6.23	6.59	7.17	6.60	7.03	6.84	6.62
Collaboration with civil society	5.69	6.20	5.71	6.04	5.92	5.64	5.85	5.70	5.63	6.13	5.77	5.87
Staff accessibility	6.09	7.00	6.29	6.39	6.65	5.86	6.31	6.31	5.84	7.05	6.18	6.59
Collaboration with other donors and development partners	6.37	6.95	6.49	6.57	6.39	6.67	6.48	6.57	6.43	6.62	6.70	6.10
Collaboration with the private sector	6.23	6.37	6.22	6.26	6.04	6.45	6.26	6.17	6.27	6.16	6.36	5.96
Straightforwardness and honesty	7.11	7.32	7.10	7.46	7.58	6.66	7.21	7.14	7.02	7.45	7.11	7.35
Treating clients and stakeholders in Honduras with respect	7.96	7.92	8.03	8.15	8.20	7.85	8.08	8.00	8.09	8.00	7.92	8.33
Being a long-term partner	7.95	7.96	8.09	7.90	8.16	7.90	7.94	8.31	8.07	8.02	8.05	8.06
To what extent does the World Bank Group's work help to achieve development results in Honduras?	6.39	6.91	6.44	6.42	6.78	6.02	6.31	6.73	6.24	6.76	6.60	6.13
To what extent does the World Bank Group influence the development agenda in Honduras?	6.72	6.74	6.67	6.65	6.74	6.57	6.61	6.78	6.75	6.52	6.63	6.73
The World Bank Group's financial instruments meet the needs of Honduras	6.09	5.95	5.87	6.42	6.16	5.83	6.07	5.88	6.08	5.90	6.13	5.76
The World Bank Group meets Honduras's needs for knowledge services	6.44	6.09	6.23	6.67	6.39	6.26	6.34	6.31	6.39	6.24	6.41	6.15
The World Bank Group's knowledge work and activities are adaptable to Honduras's specific development challenges and country circumstances	6.83	7.48	6.77	7.32	7.31	6.41	6.73	7.20	6.85	6.92	7.00	6.62
Overall, how significant a contribution do you believe the World Bank Group's knowledge work and activities make to development results in your country?	6.85	7.00	6.75	7.29	7.18	6.47	6.75	7.09	6.85	6.86	6.94	6.69
Overall, how would you rate the technical quality of the World Bank Group's knowledge work and activities?	7.60	7.74	7.64	7.65	7.78	7.49	7.46	8.06	7.68	7.60	7.73	7.47
The World Bank Group takes decisions quickly in Honduras	6.32	6.65	6.29	6.53	6.48	6.18	6.28	6.48	6.44	6.21	6.39	6.23
Where country systems are adequate, the World Bank Group makes appropriate use of them	7.62	7.72	7.69	7.67	7.70	7.66	7.67	7.71	7.70	7.66	7.67	7.70

Yellow highlight indicates significant difference between Yes and No means.



Appendix F: Honduras FY 2019 COS Questionnaire



World Bank Group Country Survey FY 2019 – Honduras

The World Bank Group is interested in gauging the views of clients and partners who are either involved in development in Honduras or who observe activities related to social and economic development. The following survey will give the World Bank Group's team that works in Honduras, greater insight into how the Bank's work is perceived. This is one tool the World Bank Group uses to assess the views of its stakeholders, and to develop more effective strategies that support development in Honduras.

A local independent firm has been hired to oversee the logistics of this survey. This ensures anonymity and confidentiality. We hope you'll be candid.

Finally, the survey relates to the World Bank Group's work. The World Bank Group consists of IBRD, IDA, IFC, MIGA, and ICSID. When responding to the survey, please consider the area of the World Bank Group with which you are most familiar.

To complete the survey, please circle/check the response that most accurately reflects your opinion. If you prefer not to answer a question, please leave it blank. If you feel that you do not have an adequate amount of information on a subject, please check "Don't know".

PLEASE NOTE: IN SOME CASES THE SURVEY WILL ASK FOR A SPECIFIC NUMBER OF RESPONSES. PLEASE DO NOT CHOOSE ANY MORE THAN REQUESTED. IF MORE RESPONSES ARE CHOSEN, DATA CANNOT BE INCLUDED IN ANALYSIS.

SECTION A: GENERAL ISSUES FACING HONDURAS

A1. When you think about the future in Honduras, are you ... ?

1	Very pessimistic
2	Somewhat pessimistic
3	Somewhat optimistic
4	Very optimistic
5	Not sure

A2. Do you think that economic opportunity for citizens in Honduras is ... ?

1	Increasing
2	Decreasing
3	Staying about the same

A3. Listed below are a number of development priorities in Honduras.

Please identify which of the following you consider the most important development priorities in Honduras. (Choose no more than THREE)

1	Water and sanitation	15	Economic growth
2	Education	16	Crime and violence
3	Public sector governance/reform (i.e., government effectiveness, public financial management, public expenditure, fiscal system reform)	17	Natural resource management (renewable/non-renewable)
4	Global/regional integration	18	Climate change (e.g., mitigation, adaptation)
5	Social protection (e.g., pensions, targeted social assistance)	19	Transport (e.g., roads, bridges, transportation)
6	Gender equity (closing the gap between women and men, and boys and girls)	20	Agriculture and rural development
7	Private sector development	21	Trade and exports
8	Food security	22	Poverty reduction
9	Urban development	23	Anti-corruption
10	Job creation/employment	24	Equality of opportunity (i.e., social inclusion)
11	Health	25	Disease
12	Financial markets	26	Information and communications technology
13	Energy	27	Judiciary reform
14	Pollution	28	Disaster risk management

SECTION A: GENERAL ISSUES

A4. Poverty reduction is a broad term that encompasses work in many different areas.			
Which THREE areas of development listed below do you believe would contribute most to reducing poverty in Honduras? (Choose no more than THREE)			
1	Trade and exports	15	Private sector development
2	Disease	16	Health
3	Information and communications technology	17	Financial markets
4	Social protection (e.g., pensions, targeted social assistance)	18	Public sector governance/reform (i.e., government effectiveness, public financial management, public expenditure, fiscal system reform)
5	Crime and violence	19	Education
6	Climate change (e.g., mitigation, adaptation)	20	Global/regional integration
7	Transport (e.g., roads, bridges, transportation)	21	Food security
8	Economic growth	22	Water and sanitation
9	Disaster risk management	23	Pollution
10	Equality of opportunity (i.e., social inclusion)	24	Job creation/employment
11	Agriculture and rural development	25	Natural resource management (renewable/non-renewable)
12	Energy	26	Urban development
13	Anti-corruption	27	Gender equity (closing the gap between women and men, and boys and girls)
14	Judiciary reform		

A5. When economic and/or social reform efforts fail or are slow to take place in Honduras, which of the following would you attribute this to? (Choose no more than TWO)	
1	Poor coordination within the government
2	Inadequate level of government accountability
3	Inadequate level of donor coordination
4	Reforms are not well thought out in light of country challenges
5	Political pressures and obstacles
6	Inadequate level of private sector participation
7	Inadequate level of citizen/civil society participation
8	Inadequate level of capacity in the government
9	Corruption
10	Private sector involvement and/or influence
11	Other (please specify): _____

SECTION A: GENERAL ISSUES

A6. To what extent do you trust each of the following groups to do what is right?												
		To no degree at all					To a very significant degree					Don't know
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
1	The national government											<input type="checkbox"/>
2	Bilateral organizations (e.g., DFID, JICA, GIZ, USAID)											<input type="checkbox"/>
3	The World Bank Group											<input type="checkbox"/>
4	The International Monetary Fund											<input type="checkbox"/>
5	UN											<input type="checkbox"/>
6	Regional development banks (e.g., IDB, CABI)											<input type="checkbox"/>
7	Honduras's Central Bank											<input type="checkbox"/>
8	International private sector											<input type="checkbox"/>
9	Domestic private sector											<input type="checkbox"/>
10	International civil society (e.g., NGOs, CBOs)											<input type="checkbox"/>
11	Domestic civil society (e.g., NGOs, CBOs)											<input type="checkbox"/>
12	Faith-based institutions											<input type="checkbox"/>
13	Domestic traditional media and their web presence (e.g., newspapers, TV stations, radio)											<input type="checkbox"/>
14	International media and their web presence											<input type="checkbox"/>
15	Web based media (i.e., blogs, social media, other web-based news and information sources)											<input type="checkbox"/>

A7. Please describe the direction Honduras is moving in, when considering ... ?						
		Getting much worse	Getting somewhat worse	Staying the same	Getting somewhat better	Getting much better
1	Human development (e.g., health, education, and social protection)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2	Equal opportunity for girls and boys, men and women	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3	Growing Honduras's economy in a way that leads to jobs and employment	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4	The gap between the rich and the poor	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5	Making government more effective	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
6	Anti-corruption	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
7	Attracting new sources of foreign investment	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

SECTION A: GENERAL ISSUES

A8. Listed below are global challenges. Which do you think have the most serious impact on Honduras? (Choose no more than TWO)

1	Environmental degradation	6	Jobs/employment
2	Fragility in Honduras or neighboring countries	7	Trade constraints
3	Technology based disruption	8	The gap between the rich and the poor
4	Terrorism	9	Climate change
5	Migrants and refugees	10	Geo political uncertainty

A9. When thinking about development efforts in Honduras, do you think that civil society (e.g., NGOs, CBOs) should ... ?

1	Engage significantly less
2	Engage somewhat less
3	Engage somewhat more
4	Engage significantly more
5	Engage at the same level it does currently
6	Don't know

A10. To what extent do you trust domestic private sector to engage in public service delivery in Honduras?

1	To a very low degree
2	To a somewhat low degree
3	To a somewhat high degree
4	To a very high degree
5	Don't know

A11. To what extent do you trust international private sector to engage in public service delivery in Honduras?

1	To a very low degree
2	To a somewhat low degree
3	To a somewhat high degree
4	To a very high degree
5	Don't know

**SECTION B: OVERALL ATTITUDES TOWARD THE WORLD BANK GROUP****B1. How familiar are you with the work of these organizations in Honduras?**

		Not familiar at all										Extremely familiar
1	World Bank Group (WBG)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
2	Inter-American Development Bank (IDB/BID)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
3	Latin American Development Bank (CAF)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
4	Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI/BCIE)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	

B2. Overall, please rate your impression of the effectiveness of these organizations in Honduras.

		Not effective at all										Very effective	Don't know
1	World Bank Group (WBG)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<input type="checkbox"/>	
2	Inter-American Development Bank (IDB/BID)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<input type="checkbox"/>	
3	Latin American Development Bank (CAF)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<input type="checkbox"/>	
4	Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI/BCIE)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<input type="checkbox"/>	

B3. To what extent do you believe the World Bank Group's staff is well prepared (e.g., skills and knowledge) to help Honduras solve its most complicated development challenges?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<input type="checkbox"/>
To no degree at all									To a very significant degree	Don't know

SECTION B: OVERALL ATTITUDES TOWARD THE WORLD BANK GROUP

B4. When thinking about how the World Bank Group can have the most impact on development results in Honduras, in which sectors do you believe the World Bank Group should focus most of its resources (financial and knowledge services) in Honduras? (Choose no more than THREE)

1	Financial markets	15	Transport (e.g., roads, bridges, transportation)
2	Social protection (e.g., pensions, targeted social assistance)	16	Information and communications technology
3	Job creation/employment	17	Equality of opportunity (i.e., social inclusion)
4	Health	18	Disease
5	Gender equity (closing the gap between women and men, and boys and girls)	19	Agriculture and rural development
6	Private sector development	20	Trade and exports
7	Pollution	21	Disaster risk management
8	Education	22	Crime and violence
9	Public sector governance/reform (i.e., government effectiveness, public financial management, public expenditure, fiscal system reform)	23	Natural resource management (renewable/non-renewable)
10	Energy	24	Judiciary reform
11	Water and sanitation	25	Economic growth
12	Global/regional integration	26	Climate change (e.g., mitigation, adaptation)
13	Food security	27	Poverty reduction
14	Urban development	28	Anti-corruption

SECTION B: OVERALL ATTITUDES TOWARD THE WORLD BANK GROUP

B5. When thinking about the World Bank Group's role, which activity do you believe is of greatest VALUE and which activity is of second greatest value in Honduras?

		Greatest Value (Choose only ONE)	Second Greatest Value (Choose only ONE)
1	Bringing together different groups of stakeholders	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2	Capacity development related to World Bank Group supported projects	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3	Technical assistance	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4	Policy advice, studies, analyses	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5	Financial resources	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
6	Data and statistics	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
7	Promoting knowledge sharing	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
8	Implementation support	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
9	Mobilizing third party financial resources	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
10	Donor coordination	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
11	Other (please specify): _____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

B6. Which of the following do you identify as the World Bank Group's greatest WEAKNESSES in its work in Honduras? (Choose no more than TWO)

1	Not aligned with country priorities
2	Not enough public disclosure of its work
3	Arrogant in its approach
4	Inadequate World Bank Group's staffing in Honduras
5	Not willing to honestly criticize policies and reform efforts in the country
6	Staff too inaccessible
7	Not collaborating enough with private sector
8	Not collaborating enough with partners such as bilaterals, multilaterals, trust funds, UN
9	Not adequately sensitive to political/social realities in Honduras
10	Too influenced by developed countries
11	World Bank Group's processes too slow and complex
12	Not adequately flexible
13	Not sufficiently focused on sustainable results
14	Not collaborating enough with civil society (e.g., NGOs, CBOs)
15	Other (please specify): _____
16	Don't know

SECTION B: OVERALL ATTITUDES TOWARD THE WORLD BANK GROUP

B7. To what extent do you believe that the World Bank Group's work and support help the poorest in Honduras? (Select only ONE response)

1	To a fully sufficient degree
2	To a somewhat sufficient degree
3	To a somewhat insufficient degree
4	To a very insufficient degree
5	Don't know

B8. From your perspective, which of the following best describes the World Bank Group's current emphasis on investing in human capital (e.g., education, health, social protection)?

1	Increased its emphasis recently
2	Decreased its emphasis recently
3	Emphasis has remained pretty consistent over time
4	Don't know

B9. In addition to the regular relations with the national government, which TWO of the following groups should the World Bank Group collaborate with more in your country? (Choose no more than TWO)

1	Donor community	7	Beneficiaries
2	NGOs/Community Based Organizations	8	Youth/university groups
3	Academia/think tanks/research institutes	9	Private sector
4	National Congress	10	Local government
5	Foundations	11	Other (please specify): _____
6	Media	12	Don't know

To what extent do you agree with the following statements about the World Bank Group's work in Honduras?

		Strongly disagree										Strongly agree	Don't know
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
B10	Overall the World Bank Group currently plays a relevant role in development in Honduras												<input type="checkbox"/>
B11	The World Bank Group's work is aligned with what I consider the development priorities for Honduras												<input type="checkbox"/>

SECTION B: OVERALL ATTITUDES TOWARD THE WORLD BANK GROUP

To what extent is the World Bank Group an effective development partner in Honduras, in terms of each of the following?												
		To no degree at all					To a very significant degree					Don't know
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
B12	Responsiveness to needs	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<input type="checkbox"/>
B13	Flexibility (in terms of the institution's products and services)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<input type="checkbox"/>
B14	Flexibility (in terms of changing country circumstances)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<input type="checkbox"/>
B15	Being inclusive	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<input type="checkbox"/>
B16	Openness (sharing data and other information)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<input type="checkbox"/>
B17	Collaboration with the Government	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<input type="checkbox"/>
B18	The speed in which it gets things accomplished on the ground	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<input type="checkbox"/>
B19	Helping to bring discipline/effective supervision to implementation of investment projects	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<input type="checkbox"/>
B20	Collaboration with civil society	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<input type="checkbox"/>
B21	Staff accessibility	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<input type="checkbox"/>
B22	Collaboration with other donors and development partners	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<input type="checkbox"/>
B23	Collaboration with the private sector	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<input type="checkbox"/>
B24	Straightforwardness and honesty	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<input type="checkbox"/>
B25	Treating clients and stakeholders in Honduras with respect	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<input type="checkbox"/>
B26	Being a long-term partner	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<input type="checkbox"/>

SECTION C: WORLD BANK GROUP'S EFFECTIVENESS AND RESULTS

C1. How EFFECTIVE do you believe the World Bank Group is in terms of the work it does in the following areas of development in Honduras? (If you have NO exposure to/experience in working in any of the sectors listed below, please respond "Don't know")													
		Not effective at all										Very effective	Don't know
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
1	Social protection (e.g., pensions, targeted social assistance)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<input type="checkbox"/>	
2	Gender equity (closing the gap between women and men, and boys and girls)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<input type="checkbox"/>	
3	Private sector development	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<input type="checkbox"/>	
4	Education	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<input type="checkbox"/>	
5	Public sector governance/reform (i.e., government effectiveness, public financial management, public expenditure, fiscal system reform)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<input type="checkbox"/>	
6	Global/regional integration	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<input type="checkbox"/>	
7	Food security	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<input type="checkbox"/>	
8	Urban development	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<input type="checkbox"/>	
9	Energy	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<input type="checkbox"/>	
10	Water and sanitation	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<input type="checkbox"/>	
11	Job creation/employment	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<input type="checkbox"/>	
12	Financial markets	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<input type="checkbox"/>	
13	Transport (e.g., roads, bridges, transportation)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<input type="checkbox"/>	
14	Agriculture and rural development	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<input type="checkbox"/>	
15	Trade and exports	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<input type="checkbox"/>	
16	Crime and violence	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<input type="checkbox"/>	
17	Natural resource management (renewable/non-renewable)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<input type="checkbox"/>	
18	Climate change (e.g., mitigation, adaptation)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<input type="checkbox"/>	
19	Poverty reduction	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<input type="checkbox"/>	
20	Anti-corruption	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<input type="checkbox"/>	
21	Economic growth	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<input type="checkbox"/>	
22	Disaster risk management	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<input type="checkbox"/>	
23	Equality of opportunity (i.e., social inclusion)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<input type="checkbox"/>	
24	Disease	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<input type="checkbox"/>	

SECTION C: WORLD BANK GROUP'S EFFECTIVENESS AND RESULTS

C2. To what extent does the World Bank Group's work help to achieve development results in Honduras?											
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<input type="checkbox"/>	
To no degree at all									To a very significant degree		Don't know

C3. To what extent does the World Bank Group influence the development agenda in Honduras?											
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<input type="checkbox"/>	
To no degree at all									To a very significant degree		Don't know

To what extent do you agree with the following statements about the World Bank Group in Honduras?												
		Strongly disagree									Strongly agree	Don't know
C4	The World Bank Group's financial instruments (i.e., investment lending, Development Policy Loan, Trust Funds, etc.) meet the needs of Honduras	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<input type="checkbox"/>
C5	The World Bank Group meets Honduras's needs for knowledge services (e.g., research, analysis, data, technical assistance)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<input type="checkbox"/>

C6. As part of IDA18, the World Bank Group has expanded (or developed) a number of financial instruments to respond to challenges in IDA countries. These include the Crisis Response Window (CRW), Pandemic Emergency Finance Facility (PEF), Catastrophe Deferred Draw Down Option (CAT-DDO), and the Private Sector Window (PSW). In general, how familiar are you with these new or expanded financial instruments in Honduras? (Select only ONE response)	
1	Very familiar
2	Somewhat familiar
3	Somewhat unfamiliar
4	Very unfamiliar
5	Don't know

**SECTION C: WORLD BANK GROUP'S EFFECTIVENESS AND RESULTS**

How effectively does the World Bank Group support Honduras's efforts ... ?												
		Not effectively at all								Very effectively		Don't know
C7	To build stronger domestic resource mobilization systems in the Government (e.g., tax collection)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<input type="checkbox"/>
C8	To develop better and stronger data collection/analytics systems within the Government	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<input type="checkbox"/>
C9	To strengthen the country's crisis preparedness	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<input type="checkbox"/>
C10	To identify and monitor risks	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<input type="checkbox"/>

C11. How effectively does the World Bank Group's SCD and CPF activities support Honduras's efforts to manage crisis related risks? [Please only respond if you are familiar with the WBG's Systematic Country Diagnostic (SCD) and Country Partnership Framework (CPF)]												
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<input type="checkbox"/>		
Not effectively at all									Very effectively		Don't know	

SECTION D: THE WORLD BANK GROUP'S KNOWLEDGE WORK AND ACTIVITIES (i.e., ANALYSIS, STUDIES, RESEARCH, DATA, REPORTS, CONFERENCES)

D1. How frequently do you consult World Bank Group's knowledge work and activities in the work you do?

1	Weekly
2	Monthly
3	A few times a year
4	Rarely
5	Never

In Honduras, to what extent do you believe that the World Bank Group's knowledge work and activities:

		To no degree at all					To a very significant degree					Don't know
D2	Are timely	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<input type="checkbox"/>
D3	Include appropriate level of stakeholder involvement during preparation	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<input type="checkbox"/>
D4	Lead to practical solutions	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<input type="checkbox"/>
D5	Are source of relevant information on global good practices	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<input type="checkbox"/>
D6	Are adequately disseminated	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<input type="checkbox"/>
D7	Are translated enough into local language	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<input type="checkbox"/>
D8	Are adaptable to Honduras's specific development challenges and country circumstances	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<input type="checkbox"/>

D9. Overall, how significant a contribution do you believe the World Bank Group's knowledge work and activities make to development results in your country?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<input type="checkbox"/>
Not significant at all									Very significant	Don't know

D10. Overall, how would you rate the technical quality of the World Bank Group's knowledge work and activities?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<input type="checkbox"/>
Very low technical quality									Very high technical quality	Don't know

SECTION E: WORKING WITH THE WORLD BANK GROUP

To what extent do you agree/disagree with the following statements?													
		Strongly disagree										Strongly agree	Don't know
E1	The World Bank Group disburses funds promptly	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<input type="checkbox"/>	
E2	The World Bank Group effectively monitors and evaluates the projects and programs it supports	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<input type="checkbox"/>	
E3	The World Bank Group's approvals and reviews are done in a timely fashion	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<input type="checkbox"/>	
E4	The World Bank Group's Environmental and Social Framework requirements are reasonable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<input type="checkbox"/>	
E5	The World Bank Group's conditions on its lending are reasonable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<input type="checkbox"/>	
E6	The World Bank Group takes decisions quickly in Honduras	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<input type="checkbox"/>	
E7	Working with the World Bank Group increases Honduras's institutional capacity	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<input type="checkbox"/>	
E8	Where country systems (e.g., procurement, financial management, etc.) are adequate, the World Bank Group makes appropriate use of them	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<input type="checkbox"/>	

SECTION E: WORKING WITH THE WORLD BANK GROUP

E9. To what extent do you believe that the donor community is doing enough to support the government's efforts related to the internally displaced persons in Honduras?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<input type="checkbox"/>
To no degree at all									To a very significant degree	Don't know

E10. In which of the following areas do you believe the World Bank Group should provide most of its resources when it comes to providing support to the internally displaced persons in Honduras? (Choose no more than TWO)

1	Infrastructure
2	Public services
3	Macro issues (fiscal accounts, balance of payments, etc.)
4	Education
5	Health
6	Supporting poor and marginalized local communities
7	Jobs
8	Business development
9	Social cohesion
10	Other (please specify): _____
11	Don't know

SECTION F: THE FUTURE ROLE OF THE WORLD BANK GROUP IN HONDURAS

F1. Which of the following SHOULD the World Bank Group do to make itself of greater value in Honduras? (Choose no more than TWO)

1	Help to bring discipline/effective supervision to implementation of World Bank Group projects
2	Engage more effectively with partners such as bilaterals, multilaterals, trust funds, UN
3	Reduce the complexity of obtaining World Bank Group financing
4	Offer more innovative knowledge services
5	Collaborate more effectively with Government clients (e.g., national, state, local)
6	Work faster
7	Increase availability of Reimbursable Advisory Services (RAS)
8	Offer more innovative financial products
9	Ensure greater selectivity in its work
10	Provide more adequate data/knowledge/statistics/figures on Honduras's economy
11	Increase the level of capacity development in the country
12	Engage more directly with beneficiaries
13	Improve the quality of its experts as related to Honduras's specific challenges
14	Engage more effectively with civil society (e.g., NGOs, CBOs)
15	Engage more effectively with private sector
16	Other (please specify): _____

F2. When considering the combination of services that the World Bank Group offers in Honduras, and taking into account its limited level of resources, which ONE of the following do you believe the World Bank Group should offer more of in Honduras? (Select only ONE response)

1	Financial services
2	Knowledge products
3	Convening services
4	None of the above
5	The combination is appropriate for Honduras
6	Don't know

**SECTION G: COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION SHARING****G1. How frequently do you interact with the World Bank Group now in Honduras?**

1	Never
2	Less than once a year
3	Once a year to a few times a year
4	Less than once a month
5	At least once a month
6	At least once a week

G2. How do you get most of your information about economic and social development issues in Honduras? (Choose no more than TWO)

1	Local television	6	International newspapers
2	Internet	7	Periodicals
3	Local radio	8	International television
4	International radio	9	Local newspapers
5	Social media (e.g., blogs, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Flickr)	10	Other (please specify): _____

G3. How would you prefer to receive information from the World Bank Group? (Choose no more than TWO)

1	World Bank Group's seminars/workshops/conferences	4	World Bank Group's website
2	Direct contact with World Bank Group (i.e., face to face meetings/discussions)	5	Social media (e.g., blogs, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Flickr)
3	e-Newsletters	6	World Bank Group's publications and other written materials

G4. Which Internet connection do you use primarily when visiting a World Bank Group website?

1	High speed/WiFi
2	Dial-up

**SECTION G: COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION SHARING**

G5. Over the past SIX MONTHS, on average how often did you do any of the following related to the World Bank Group (WBG)?					
		Every few days	Every few weeks	Every few months	Not at all
1	Read, viewed or heard a story about the WBG in local media (newspaper, magazine, TV, radio)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2	Read, viewed or heard a story about the WBG in global media (newspaper, magazine, TV, radio)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3	Interacted with the WBG on Social Media (e.g., read a post or tweet, liked, commented, shared, retweeted)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4	Visited a WBG website (e.g., read a blog, used data)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5	Attended an event/conference hosted by the WBG	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
6	Watched a webinar or online event hosted by the WBG	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
7	Read some or all of a WBG research paper or publication	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
8	Met professionally with WBG staff	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
9	Read a WBG e-newsletter	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

SECTION H: BACKGROUND INFORMATION

H1. Which of the following best describes your current affiliation? (Select only ONE response)

1	Office of the President, Prime Minister	11	Private Foundation
2	Office of Minister	12	NGO/Community Based Organization
3	Office of Parliamentarian	13	Media (press, radio, TV, web, etc.)
4	Employee of a Ministry, Ministerial Department or Implementation Agency	14	Independent Government Institution (i.e., Regulatory Agency, Central Bank/oversight institution)
5	Project Management Unit (PMU) overseeing implementation of project/Consultant/Contractor working on World Bank Group supported project/program	15	Trade Union
6	Local Government Office or Staff	16	Faith-Based Group
7	Bilateral Agency	17	Youth Group
8	Multilateral Agency	18	Academia/Research Institute/Think Tank
9	Private Sector Organization	19	Judiciary Branch
10	Financial Sector/Private Bank	20	Other (please specify): _____

H2. Please identify the primary specialization of your work. (Select only ONE response)

1	Water	12	Gender
2	Social protection and labor	13	Transport and ICT
3	Fragility, conflict and violence	14	Urban, rural, and social development
4	Environment and natural resources	15	Governance
5	Public-private partnerships	16	Poverty
6	Education	17	Jobs
7	Health, nutrition, and population	18	Agriculture
8	Energy and extractives	19	Climate change
9	Macroeconomics and fiscal management	20	Generalist (specialized in multiple sectors)
10	Trade and competitiveness	21	Other (please specify): _____
11	Finance and markets		

H3. Currently, do you professionally collaborate/work with the World Bank Group (IBRD/IDA, IFC, MIGA, ICSID) in your country?

1	Yes
2	No

**SECTION H: BACKGROUND INFORMATION**

H4. If yes, which of the following agencies of the World Bank Group do you primarily collaborate/work with in Honduras? (Select only ONE response)

1	The World Bank (IBRD/IDA)
2	The International Finance Corporation (IFC)
3	The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)
4	International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)

H5. Do your projects involve both the World Bank and the IFC?

1	Yes
2	No

H6. Which of the following describes most of your exposure to the World Bank Group in Honduras? (Choose no more than TWO)

1	Observer (i.e., follow in media, discuss in informal conversations, etc.)
2	Use World Bank Group reports/data
3	Engage in World Bank Group related/sponsored events/activities
4	Collaborate as part of my professional duties
5	Use World Bank Group website for information, data, research, etc.

H7. What's your gender?

1	Female
2	Male

H8. What's your age?

1	25 and under
2	26-35
3	36-45
4	46-55
5	56 and above

H9. Which best represents your geographic location?

1	Tegucigalpa
2	San Pedro Sula
3	Siguetepeque/Comayagua
4	North Coast (Litoral Norte)
5	Western Region (Occidente)
6	Olancho/Eastern Region (Oriente)

Thank you for completing the survey!

La Gaceta



DIARIO OFICIAL DE LA REPÚBLICA DE HONDURAS

La primera imprenta llegó a Honduras en 1829, siendo instalada en Tegucigalpa, en el cuartel San Francisco, lo primero que se imprimió fue una proclama del General Morazán, con fecha 4 de diciembre de 1829.



Después se imprimió el primer periódico oficial del Gobierno con fecha 25 de mayo de 1830, conocido hoy, como Diario Oficial "La Gaceta".

AÑO CXL TEGUCIGALPA, M. D. C., HONDURAS, C. A.

JUEVES 9 DE AGOSTO DEL 2018. NUM. 34,714

Sección A

Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Honduras (UNAH)

CERTIFICACIÓN

La infrascrita, Secretaria General de la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Honduras (UNAH), por este acto **CERTIFICA**: El Acuerdo N°. CU-O-157-10-2017 del Acta N°. CU-O-009-10-2017, de la Sesión Ordinaria del Consejo Universitario, celebrada el viernes veintisiete de octubre de dos mil diecisiete, relativo a aprobar el Reglamento General del Sistema de Estudios de Posgrado de la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Honduras, que literalmente dice:

“**Certificación N°. 007-2018.** El Infrascrito Secretario del Consejo Universitario de la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Honduras (UNAH), por este acto, **CERTIFICA**: El Acuerdo No.CU-O-157-10-2017, contenido en el Acta No.CU-O-009-10-2017 del 27 de octubre de 2017, que literalmente dice: “Oficio SCU-No.08-2018 12 de enero del 2018, Doctor **FRANCISCO JOSE HERRERA ALVARADO**, Rector a.i. UNAH. Su Oficina. Señor Rector: La Secretaría del Consejo Universitario de la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Honduras, hace de su conocimiento, que en la Sesión Ordinaria celebrada el viernes veintisiete (27) de octubre de dos mil diecisiete, en Acta No.CU-O-009-10-2017 levantada al efecto, obra el **ACUERDO No. CU-O-157-10-2017**, que en su parte resolutive dice:

ACUERDO No. CU-O-157-10-2017

CONSIDERANDO: Que la Ley Orgánica de la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Honduras, es el cuerpo legal que desarrolla los preceptos constitucionales en materia de educación superior y que definen que la UNAH goza de la exclusividad de organizar, dirigir y desarrollar la educación superior.

CONSIDERANDO: Que la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Honduras tiene como objetivo formar profesionales del más alto nivel académico, cívico y ética, capaces de enfrentar los desafíos que impone la sociedad.

CONSIDERANDO: Que el Consejo Universitario es el órgano máximo de dirección superior, responsable de concertar y generar

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Decretos y Acuerdos

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Sección B

Avisos Legales

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Desprendible para su comodidad

las políticas y estrategias de la gestión universitaria, con visión de largo plazo.

CONSIDERANDO: Que el Consejo General del Sistema de Estudios de Posgrado, remitió a la Secretaría del Consejo Universitario según Oficio No.001-SE-CGP-2017, la propuesta del Reglamento General del Sistema de Estudios de Posgrado de la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Honduras, para su revisión y aprobación por el Consejo Universitario.

CONSIDERANDO: Que el Consejo Universitario cuando se trata de asuntos importantes y específicos ya sean técnicos, académicos o administrativos y en los que se requiera mayor información y dominio para la adecuada toma de decisiones del pleno, integra comisiones especializadas de su seno.

CONSIDERANDO: Que según Acuerdo No. CU-O-025-02-2017, el Consejo Universitario en la Sesión Ordinaria del 24 de febrero de 2017, conoció la propuesta de Reglamento General del Sistema de Estudios de Posgrado y nombró una Comisión integrada por el **DR. NABIL KAWAS KHOURY**, Decano de la Facultad de Ciencias. **DR. MARCO TULIO MEDINA**, Decano de la Facultad de Ciencias Médicas. **MSC. MARTHA LORENA SUAZO**, Decana de la Facultad de Ciencias Sociales. **LIC. JEAN**

DEL RIVERA, Directora del Centro Regional Universitario el Litoral Atlántico (CURLA). **BR. KRISS AILEEN LANZA**, representante Propietaria Estudiantil Facultad de Ciencias Médicas y la **VICERRECTORÍA ACADÉMICA**, quien delegará a representante; para que presenten el dictamen respectivo al pleno del Consejo Universitario.

CONSIDERANDO: Que en la Sesión Ordinaria del 27 de octubre de 2017, se conoció el dictamen presentado por la Comisión obrada para el análisis y presentación al pleno del Consejo Universitario.

CONSIDERANDO: Que es atribución del Consejo Universitario ejercer la potestad reglamentaria en el marco de sus competencias.

POR TANTO:

El Consejo Universitario en aplicación de los Artículos 2, 10, numeral 2 de la Ley Orgánica de la UNAH; y Artículos 2, 23 y 38 del Reglamento del Consejo Universitario.

ACUERDA:

PRIMERO: Aprobar el:

REGLAMENTO GENERAL DEL SISTEMA DE ESTUDIOS DE POSGRADO DE LA UNIVERSIDAD NACIONAL AUTÓNOMA DE HONDURAS

TÍTULO PRIMERO DEL SISTEMA DE LOS ESTUDIOS DE POSGRADO EN LA UNAH

CAPÍTULO I ESTUDIOS DE POSGRADO

Artículo 1.- El Sistema de Estudios de Posgrado de la UNAH regula, organiza, orienta, evalúa, administra e impulsa los estudios de posgrado a fin de que se cumplan los lineamientos académicos, según las disposiciones contenidas en los artículos 3 y 5 de la Ley Orgánica y artículo 2 del Reglamento General de la Ley Orgánica; en el marco de la Ley General del Plan de Reforma y Plan Estratégico Institucional.

Artículo 2.- Son objetivos del Sistema de Estudios de Posgrado:

- a) Formar profesionales altamente competentes e investigadores capaces de proponer alternativas de solución a problemas específicos de su campo de especialización, conforme a los requerimientos del desarrollo científico, político, económico, social y cultural de la nación.
- b) Formar personal docente y de investigación idóneo para laborar en instituciones de educación superior que contribuyan al desarrollo científico y tecnológico.

c) Desarrollar y promover una gestión con calidad y pertinencia integrando las tres funciones universitarias en los diferentes posgrados que desarrollan las diferentes unidades académicas de la UNAH.

Artículo 3.- El presente reglamento tiene su ámbito de aplicación en todas las unidades académicas, administrativas y demás integrantes de la comunidad universitaria, siendo de obligatorio cumplimiento.

TÍTULO SEGUNDO DE LA ORGANIZACIÓN Y PROGRAMAS DE LOS ESTUDIOS DE POSGRADO

CAPÍTULO I ÓRGANOS E INSTANCIAS QUE INTERVIENEN EN EL SISTEMA DE ESTUDIOS DE POSGRADO

Artículo 4.- El Sistema de Estudios de Posgrado estará dirigido por el Consejo General del Sistema de Estudios de Posgrado y la Dirección del Sistema de Estudios de Posgrado será responsable de asegurar el cumplimiento de las disposiciones emanadas por dicho consejo, todo bajo la coordinación, supervisión y evaluación de la Vicerrectoría Académica.

Artículo 5.- Las instancias responsables de la coordinación, gestión y funcionamiento de los Programas de Estudios de Posgrados son:

a. Instancias de conducción y coordinación:

- 1) Consejo General del Sistema de Estudios de Posgrado.
- 2) Consejo del Sistema de Estudios de Posgrado de la Facultad o Centro Regional Universitario.

b. Instancias ejecutivas:

La Gaceta

DIARIO OFICIAL DE LA REPÚBLICA DE HONDURAS
DECANO DE LA PRENSA HONDUREÑA
PARA MEJOR SEGURIDAD DE SUS PUBLICACIONES

ABOG. CÉSAR AUGUSTO CÁCERES CANO
Gerente General

JORGE ALBERTO RICO SALINAS
Coordinador y Supervisor

EMPRESA NACIONAL DE ARTES GRÁFICAS
E.N.A.G.

Colonia Miraflores
Teléfono/Fax: Gerencia 2230-4956
Administración: 2230-3026
Planta: 2230-6767

CENTRO CÍVICO GUBERNAMENTAL

-) Dirección del Sistema de Estudios de Posgrado.
-) Coordinación General de Posgrado de la Facultad o Centro Regional Universitario.
- ∴ Instancias operativas:
 - 1) Coordinación de la Carrera de Posgrado.
 - 2) Coordinación de Investigación y Vinculación UNAH – Sociedad.

SECCIÓN I

INSTANCIAS DE CONDUCCIÓN Y COORDINACIÓN

Artículo 6.- Consejo General del Sistema de Estudios de Posgrado. El Consejo es el órgano de conducción y coordinación del Sistema de Estudios de Posgrado, el cual está encargado de proponer la política y normatividad académica del sistema y velar por el desarrollo, coordinación, control y evaluación de los estudios de posgrado.

Artículo 7.- El Consejo General del Sistema de Estudios de Posgrado estará integrado por:

- a) El Vicerrector Académico, quien actuará como Presidente.
- b) El Director del Sistema de Estudios de Posgrado, quien actuará como Secretario Ejecutivo.
- c) El Director de Investigación Científica.
- d) El Director de Vinculación Universidad – Sociedad.
- e) Los Coordinadores Generales de Posgrado de las Facultades y Centros Regionales Universitarios.

Artículo 8.- El Consejo General del Sistema de Estudios de Posgrado sesionará ordinariamente dos veces al año, a inicio y final del año académico y extraordinariamente cuando lo convoque la Secretaría Ejecutiva a solicitud de la Presidencia del Consejo o a petición de la mitad más uno de sus miembros, cuando el caso lo amerite, con una antelación no menor de 48 horas, según la urgencia.

Artículo 9.- Son funciones del Consejo General del Sistema de Estudios de Posgrado:

- a) Aprobar previo a su presentación al Consejo Universitario por las vías institucionales, el Reglamento General del Sistema de Estudios de Posgrado, las propuestas de reforma, la política, los lineamientos generales y estrategias que fortalezcan la articulación y operación del Sistema de Estudios de Posgrado de la UNAH.
- b) Promover, organizar, coordinar y orientar las acciones del Sistema de Estudios de Posgrado.
- c) Proponer ante las instancias correspondientes el Plan de Desarrollo del Sistema de Estudios de Posgrado de la UNAH.

- d) Solicitar a la Dirección del Sistema de Estudios de Posgrado la evaluación integral de las Carreras de Posgrado, al menos cada cinco años, e informar de los resultados al Consejo Universitario.
- e) Promover acciones de vinculación y cooperación académica con otras instituciones.

f) Recibir y aprobar los informes presentados por la Dirección del Sistema de Estudios de Posgrado.

g) Atención de solicitudes de órganos competentes.

h) Velar por la actualización de las carreras.

Artículo 10.- De los Consejos del Sistema de Estudios de Posgrado de las Facultades y Centros Regionales Universitarios. Los Consejos del Sistema de Estudios de Posgrado de las Facultades y Centros Regionales Universitarios son los órganos de dirección del Sistema en cada Facultad y Centro Regional Universitario, los cuales construirán, aprobarán, darán seguimiento y evaluarán la política y visión estratégica del Sistema en la Facultad y Centro, conforme la política y visión estratégica de la UNAH.

Artículo 11.- El Consejo del Sistema de Estudios de Posgrado de la Facultad y Centro Regional Universitario estará integrado de la siguiente forma:

- a) El Decano o Director, quien actuará como Presidente.
- b) El Coordinador General de Posgrado de las Facultades o de los Centros Universitarios Regionales, quien actuará como Secretario Ejecutivo.
- c) Un representante de la estructura del sistema de investigación de la Facultad (Institutos de Investigación, Unidades de gestión de la investigación, grupos de investigación, Observatorios universitarios) electo entre los directores o coordinadores de dichas unidades. Durará en sus funciones un periodo de 2 años; en el caso de los Centros Regionales, el Coordinador Regional de Investigación.
- d) Los Coordinadores de Carrera de Posgrado de las Facultades o de los Centros Universitarios Regionales.

Artículo 12.- El Consejo del Sistema de Estudios de Posgrado de la facultad o centro regional universitario sesionará ordinariamente dos veces al año, a inicio y final del año académico y extraordinariamente cuando lo convoque la Secretaría Ejecutiva a solicitud de la Presidencia del Consejo o a solicitud de la mitad más uno de sus miembros, cuando el caso lo amerite, con una antelación no menor de 48 horas, según la urgencia.

Artículo 13.- Son funciones del Consejo del Sistema de Estudios de Posgrado de las facultades y centros regionales universitarios:

- a) Definir la política, lineamientos generales y operativos del Sistema de Estudios de Posgrado de la facultad o centro regional universitario, en el marco de la política institucional.

b) Revisar y determinar en primera instancia que los lineamientos generales y operativos del inciso anterior se reflejen en el manual de procedimientos, en donde se plasmará los términos, condiciones y procedimientos que regirán cada programa de posgrado de la facultad o centro regional universitario.

c) Elaborar el Plan de Desarrollo del Sistema de Estudios de Posgrado de la facultad o centro regional universitario para su presentación ante el Consejo General del Sistema de Estudios de Posgrado.

d) Promover, organizar, coordinar y orientar las acciones del Sistema de Estudios de Posgrado de la facultad o centro regional universitario.

e) Apoyar la ejecución académica y administrativa de la Coordinación General de Posgrado de las facultades o centros regionales universitarios.

f) Recibir, conocer y aprobar los informes presentados por la Coordinación General de Posgrado de las facultades o centros regionales universitarios.

g) Comunicar y coordinar con los directores de escuela y jefes de departamentos de las facultades o centros regionales universitarios sobre las acciones de posgrado que requieran el apoyo de estas unidades académicas.

SECCIÓN II INSTANCIAS EJECUTIVAS

Artículo 14.- La Dirección del Sistema de Estudios de Posgrado es la unidad ejecutora de las disposiciones del Consejo General del Sistema de Estudios de Posgrado, quien actuará como Secretaría del mismo. Estará a cargo de un director, nombrado por la Rectoría de la UNAH, a propuesta de la VRA, quien lo seleccionará de la terna de candidatos presentados por el Consejo General del Sistema de Estudios de Posgrado.

Artículo 15.- Son funciones del director del Sistema de Estudios de Posgrado:

a) Cumplir y hacer cumplir el presente Reglamento, demás leyes y normativas de la UNAH.

b) Asegurar el cumplimiento de las disposiciones emitidas por el Consejo General del Sistema de Estudios de Posgrado.

c) Gestionar las acciones pertinentes al desarrollo del Sistema de Estudios de Posgrado contenidas en el Plan Estratégico y en el POA del Sistema.

d) Establecer mecanismos de coordinación con las instancias del sistema de estudios de posgrado y con las autoridades de facultades y centros regionales universitarios.

e) Establecer mecanismos de cooperación con unidades académicas de otras instituciones de educación superior, nacionales y extranjeras, a nivel de posgrado.

f) Velar junto a las Coordinaciones Generales de Posgrado de las Facultades y Centros Regionales Universitarios porque las distintas carreras de posgrado cumplan con las leyes, reglamentos, manuales, instructivos y lineamientos de la UNAH.

g) Acompañar el proceso de elaboración de los proyectos de presupuesto, planes de desarrollo del Sistema y presentarlos al Consejo General del Sistema de Estudios de Posgrado y a los organismos de gobierno de la UNAH, para su aprobación.

h) Presentar al Consejo General del Sistema de Estudios de Posgrado los programas y proyectos propuestos por las coordinaciones generales de posgrado de cada facultad y centros regionales universitarios.

i) Acompañar y asesorar a las Coordinaciones Generales de Posgrados de Facultades y Centro Regional Universitario para que los convenios de cooperación académica de carácter nacional e internacional en el área de estudios de posgrado cumplan con los criterios y lineamientos establecidos por la UNAH.

j) Promover y acompañar la planificación de los procesos de educación continua de los graduados de las carreras de posgrado.

k) Garantizar la evaluación permanente de la calidad y del desempeño de las carreras de posgrado, de conformidad con la normativa vigente y los estándares establecidos a nivel nacional e internacional.

l) Apoyar la búsqueda y gestión de recursos especiales para el desarrollo de las actividades de posgrado.

m) Dar seguimiento, evaluar la política de posgrado y presentar informes al Consejo General del Sistema de Estudios de Posgrado.

n) Autorizar la apertura de nuevas promociones de las carreras de posgrado, conforme a su plan de estudios, después de analizar la programación académica y asegurar las condiciones de calidad para su funcionamiento.

o) Actuar como Secretaría Ejecutiva del Consejo General del Sistema de Estudios de Posgrado.

p) Preparar la memoria anual del Sistema de Estudios de Posgrado.

q) Coordinar e innovar la gestión académica y administrativa del Sistema de Estudios de Posgrado, manejando un sistema de información gerencial de las carreras respectivas.

r) Supervisar las condiciones académicas y administrativas en las que se desarrollan las carreras de posgrado.

s) Solicitar informes de gestión académica y administrativa a los coordinadores generales de posgrado y los coordinadores de carrera de posgrado.

t) Otras funciones que la Rectoría y la Vicerrectoría Académica de la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Honduras le asignen.

Artículo 16.- En caso de ausencia temporal del Director del Sistema de Estudios de Posgrado, por un máximo de tres (3) meses, este último tendrá libertad de elegir a la persona ideal para sustituirlo y si su ausencia fuese definitiva, el Consejo General del Sistema de Estudios de Posgrado presentará nuevamente una terna a la Rectoría de acuerdo al artículo 14.

Artículo 17.- Cada facultad y centro regional universitario contará con una coordinación general de posgrados para asegurar la adecuada conducción, calidad y pertinencia del desarrollo de los posgrados, en esa unidad académica.

Artículo 18.- Para ser Coordinador General de Posgrado de Facultad o Centro Regional Universitario, se requiere:

- a) Ser hondureño o extranjero residente en Honduras.
- b) Ser profesor a tiempo completo de la Facultad, Centro Universitario o Centro Universitario Regional con una antigüedad en el servicio no menor a tres (3) años.
- c) Poseer un grado académico de, Maestría o Doctorado. En el caso de las Facultades de Ciencias Médicas, Farmacia y Odontología el título mínimo será de especialidad.
- d) Competencias demostradas en la gestión académica.

Artículo 19.- El Coordinador General de Posgrado de cada Facultad o Centro Regional Universitario, será nombrado por la Rectoría, a propuesta del Decano o Director de Centro Universitario Regional, en caso de ausencia temporal justificada del Coordinador General que no exceda de treinta (30) días calendario; las funciones del cargo serán desempeñadas por el Coordinador de la Carrera de Postgrado que designe el Decano o Director del Centro Regional. En caso de ausencia más prolongada, se seguirá el procedimiento establecido en el párrafo anterior.

Artículo 20.- Tendrá una dedicación de 2/3 de su jornada laboral y recibirá el pago del plus correspondiente que deberá ser mayor al de un Coordinador de Carrera de Posgrado e incluido en el presupuesto anual de la Facultad o Centro Regional universitario. La duración en el cargo será de cuatro (4) años, pudiendo ser reelecto, siguiendo para ello el mismo procedimiento por el cual fue seleccionado.

Artículo 21.- El Coordinador General de Posgrados de la Facultad o Centro Regional Universitario no será ningún Coordinador de Carrera de Grado y Posgrado, ni jefe de departamento, ni Decano o Director de Centro Regional Universitario, mientras ejerza tales funciones.

Artículo 22.- Son funciones del Coordinador General de Posgrado de Facultades o centros regionales universitarios:

- a) Representar al de posgrado de la facultad o centro regional universitario, ante el Consejo General del Sistema de Estudios de Posgrado y ser el enlace de los Posgrados de su Facultad o Centro

regional universitario con la Dirección del Sistema de Estudios de Posgrado.

- b) Supervisar el funcionamiento de las carreras de posgrado que se ofrezcan en la facultad o centro regional universitario correspondiente y presentar informes periódicos al Decano o Director de Centro Regional Universitario y al Consejo General del Sistema de Estudios de Posgrado.

- c) Asegurar que la facultad o centro regional universitario cuente con los recursos y condiciones necesarias y adecuadas para el desarrollo de las carreras de posgrado.

- d) Elaborar la planificación operativa y el presupuesto anual de la coordinación general de posgrado.

- e) Supervisar periódicamente la aplicación de las políticas de docencia, investigación y vinculación de los posgrados de su facultad o centro regional universitario.

- f) Promover innovaciones académicas de las carreras de posgrado de su facultad o centro regional universitario.

- g) Promover eventos académicos nacionales e internacionales para el fortalecimiento del Sistema de Estudios de Posgrado en la facultad y centros regionales universitarios.

- h) Promover activamente el desarrollo del sistema de autoevaluación con fines de acreditación de la calidad, en las Carreras de Posgrado de su Facultad o Centro Regional Universitario.

- i) Promover la participación de las carreras de posgrado en redes internacionales de investigación científica.

- j) Crear y mantener actualizados junto con las coordinaciones de carrera de posgrado, un directorio de académicos de alto nivel de excelencia para actuar como asesores o examinadores de trabajo de graduación.

- k) Coordinar la elaboración de la memoria anual del subsistema de posgrado en la facultad o centro regional universitario.

- l) Entregar al Decano y Director de Centro Regional con copia a la Dirección del Sistema de Estudios de Posgrado un informe anual integrado de las carreras de posgrado de la facultad o centro regional universitario en los aspectos académicos y administrativos.

- m) Asumir temporalmente, la coordinación de las carreras de posgrado por muerte, jubilación u otra causa justificada relacionada con los coordinadores, por un periodo no mayor de treinta (30) días; en los aspectos académicos se podrá auxiliar de expertos de los departamentos correspondientes. Si fuese definitiva la vacante, se procederá conforme a lo establecido en el artículo 26.

- n) Podrá impartir un máximo de una asignatura por periodo académico en cualquiera de las carreras de grado o posgrado de la facultad o centro regional, como parte de su asignación académica. Los casos excepcionales serán tratados de forma especial.

o) Otras que el Consejo del Sistema de Estudios de Posgrado de la facultad o centro regional universitario designe.

p) Cumplir y hacer cumplir este Reglamento, las disposiciones internas de cada carrera de posgrado y demás leyes de la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Honduras.

SECCIÓN III INSTANCIAS OPERATIVAS

Artículo 23.- De las coordinaciones de Carrera de Posgrado. Cada Carrera de Posgrado será gestionada académicamente por un Coordinador de Carrera.

Artículo 24.- En casos especiales en el que un programa de posgrado tenga inicialmente su sede en la facultad y se oferte en un centro regional universitario, las coordinaciones generales y de carrera de ambos centros deberán trabajar de forma conjunta los mecanismos de conducción, comunicación y monitoreo de dicha carrera. En todo caso, se optimizarán los recursos académicos y el uso de las tecnologías de comunicación e información.

Artículo 25.- El Coordinador de la Carrera de cada Posgrado será nombrado por la Rectoría de una terna propuesta por el Decano de la Facultad o Director de Centro Regional Universitario, gozará de una dedicación de dos tercios de tiempo de jornada laboral, además del pago del plus destinado para dicho cargo e incluido en el presupuesto anual de la Facultad o Centro Regional Universitario. Ningún posgrado podrá ofrecerse sin antes haber sido nombrado el Coordinador de Carrera del Posgrado correspondiente.

Artículo 26.- Para ser Coordinador de la Carrera de Posgrado se requiere:

a) Ser profesor a tiempo completo de la facultad o centro regional universitario, afín a la carrera de posgrado correspondiente, con una antigüedad no menor de tres (3) años.

b) Poseer como mínimo el grado académico que ofrece el posgrado.

c) Tener, preferiblemente, una antigüedad de tres (3) años como académico de un posgrado, exceptuando de este requerimiento a los posgrados recién creados.

d) Competencias demostradas para la gestión académica.

e) Tener experiencia demostrada de haber desarrollado o coordinado proyectos de investigación.

Artículo 27.- Las funciones de los coordinadores de carrera de posgrado serán las siguientes:

a) Representar la carrera de posgrado, ante el Consejo del Sistema de Estudios de Posgrado de la facultad y centro regional universitario y otras instancias y organismos, cuando la coordinación general así lo designe.

b) Presidir las sesiones del comité técnico de la carrera y ejecutar sus disposiciones.

c) Colaborar con la coordinación general de posgrado de la facultad o centro regional universitario en la gestión de los recursos humanos, materiales, financieros y logísticos para las actividades del posgrado.

d) Coordinar, gestionar y supervisar la evaluación periódica y el funcionamiento del plan de estudio de la carrera.

e) Coordinar las actividades de servicios de distintos departamentos que colaboran en la formación de estudiantes de la carrera.

f) Velar por el cumplimiento adecuado de los procesos de ingreso, promoción, permanencia y graduación de los estudiantes de la carrera.

g) Dirigir la elaboración, ejecución y evaluación del plan requerido para la apertura de una promoción de la carrera de posgrado.

h) Dirigir el desarrollo de cursos de actualización a nivel de la carrera de posgrado.

i) Participar en la elaboración de la memoria anual de la carrera de posgrado.

j) Cumplir y hacer cumplir este Reglamento, el Manual de Procedimientos y demás disposiciones generales de la carrera y demás leyes y reglamentos de la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Honduras.

k) Participar en la evaluación periódica de las políticas de docencia, investigación y vinculación con la sociedad de la carrera de posgrado.

l) Elaborar propuestas ante la Coordinación General de Posgrado de la facultad o centro universitario regional tendientes a la renovación constante de las actividades académicas y contenidos curriculares de la carrera de posgrado.

m) Proponer ante la Coordinación General de Posgrado eventos académicos nacionales e internacionales para el fortalecimiento del desarrollo de la carrera de posgrado.

n) Coordinar la planificación de espacios curriculares y demás actividades académicas y de investigación para cada período académico y para cada promoción, para garantizar el proceso de formación del estudiante y contribuir al desarrollo integral y al logro de objetivos de la carrera.

o) Proponer a la Coordinación General programas específicos de evaluación en cada período académico y capacitación sistemática para renovar permanentemente la formación profesional y pedagógica de los docentes de la carrera.

p) Podrá impartir un máximo de una asignatura por período académico en cualquiera de las carreras de grado o posgrado de la

facultad o centro regional, como parte de su asignación académica. Los casos excepcionales serán tratados de forma especial.

q) Gestionar ante la Dirección del Sistema de Estudios de Posgrado la resolución de aquellos asuntos académicos de carácter excepcional, previo conocimiento de la Coordinación General de Posgrado. Por carácter excepcional se entenderán aquellos asuntos académicos que están fuera de las competencias de la coordinación de carrera, en los que no exista regulación normativa expresa o cuando haya duda razonable sobre la aplicación de la norma.

r) Para asuntos de orden disciplinario, deberá aplicar el procedimiento establecido en el Reglamento de Estudiantes de la Universidad.

s) Presentar anualmente informes de su gestión académica y administrativa al Coordinador General de Posgrado, Decano o Director Regional y a la Dirección del Sistema de Estudios de Posgrado, o cuando le sean requeridos por instancia competente.

t) Otras que la Coordinación General les asigne sobre la base de este Reglamento.

Artículo 28.- Cada Carrera de Posgrado contará con un Coordinador de Investigación y Vinculación, será nombrado por la Rectoría de una terna presentada por el Decano de la Facultad o Director de Centro Regional. Gozará de una asignación de 2/3 de tiempo, más el pago de plus destinado para ese cargo e incluido en el presupuesto anual de la Facultad o Centro Regional Universitario.

Artículo 29.- Para ser coordinador de investigación y vinculación de carrera de posgrado se requiere:

a) Ser profesor a tiempo completo de la facultad o centro regional universitario, afín al programa de posgrado correspondiente, con una antigüedad no menor de tres (3) años; de no contar con la categoría de titular, será considerado el grado académico equivalente a la titularidad correspondiente señalada por el Estatuto del Docente Universitario.

b) Poseer como mínimo el grado académico que ofrece el posgrado.

c) Tener, preferiblemente, una antigüedad de tres (3) años como académico del posgrado, exceptuando de este requerimiento a los posgrados recién creados.

d) Tener experiencia en investigación científica y vinculación.

Artículo 30.- Son funciones del Coordinador de investigación y vinculación de las carreras de posgrado:

a) Apoyar a los coordinadores generales y de carrera de posgrado en el campo de la investigación científica y de la vinculación con la sociedad.

b) Definir y asegurar, en conjunto con el coordinador de carrera, la ejecución de las líneas y prioridades de investigación para el

posgrado, derivadas de las líneas y prioridades de investigación de la UNAH y la Facultad o Centro Regional Universitario.

c) Construir la cartera de proyectos de vinculación con la sociedad, describiendo los grupos y organismos con los cuales se vincularán por los temas que desarrolla la carrera de posgrado.

d) Promover la constitución de redes de investigación científica y vinculación que benefician a la carrera.

e) Promover la capacitación en investigación científica y de vinculación con la sociedad destinado para los profesores de la carrera.

f) Garantizar que los trabajos de graduación y artículos publicables cumplan con las exigencias científicas, objetivos y políticas académicas de la Universidad y de la Carrera.

g) Elaborar las normas y procedimientos para realizar las actividades de asesoría, elaboración del proyecto de graduación, desarrollo de las mismas, elaboración del documento de trabajo de graduación y su defensa.

h) Promover mecanismos necesarios de seguimiento a los avances de la investigación por parte de los estudiantes, por medio de la asignación de asesores designados para tal fin, para elevar el índice de graduación de la misma.

i) Garantizar que las horas de servicio social de los estudiantes del programa de posgrado, sean aplicados a la cartera de proyectos de vinculación con la sociedad.

j) Sugerir al coordinador de carrera los miembros de las ternas examinadoras de los trabajos de graduación, procurando que sean integradas por personal especialista en las disciplinas y en la metodología de la investigación.

Artículo 31.- El Comité Técnico de cada Carrera de Posgrado estará integrado por el Coordinador de Carrera, quien lo presidirá, dos (2) representantes estudiantiles del más alto índice académico seleccionados en asamblea de estudiantes del posgrado y dos (2) representantes de los docentes de la Carrera de posgrado, pudiendo invitar en calidad de observadores, cuando se considere oportuno, a instituciones u organismos nacionales o internacionales que apoyan de manera significativa dicha Carrera.

Artículo 32.- Son funciones del comité técnico de carrera de posgrado:

a) Conocer y opinar sobre el proceso académico de la carrera de posgrado.

b) Proponer soluciones a problemas de orden académico y otros que afecten el buen funcionamiento del programa.

c) Otras que someta a consideración la Coordinación General de Estudios de Posgrados de la facultad o centro regional universitario.

CAPÍTULO II DEL PROGRAMA ACADÉMICO DE LOS ESTUDIOS DE POSGRADO

Artículo 33.- Los estudios de posgrado comprenden:

- a) Las carreras de especialización.
- b) Las carreras para optar al grado de maestría.
- c) Las carreras para optar al grado de doctorado.
- d) Programas de posdoctorado.
- e) Cursos de actualización.

Artículo 34.- Las carreras de posgrado mencionadas en el artículo anterior podrán ser permanentes o temporales según las necesidades nacionales o regionales determinadas por los organismos correspondientes de la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Honduras.

SECCIÓN I CARRERAS DE ESPECIALIZACIÓN

Artículo 35.- Las especialidades son estudios que por medio de una intervención de una práctica intensiva desarrollan capacidades específicas dentro de un campo profesional determinado. La especialización puede continuar hasta la subespecialización, que constituye estudios de mayor profundización dentro de un campo más específico. Para optar a la subespecialización deberán completarse previamente los estudios de especialización en la misma área de conocimiento. Los estudios de posgrado referentes a las especialidades tienen carácter profesionalizante, por lo cual contarán con un mínimo del 25% del total de créditos de su plan destinado a la investigación con carácter aplicado y un mínimo de cuatrocientas cincuenta (450) horas académicas de cincuenta (50) minutos, supervisada por el profesor. Las especialidades médicas tendrán un mínimo de mil trescientas cincuenta horas (1,350) de cincuenta (50) minutos, supervisada por el profesor.

Artículo 36.- La duración de las carreras en este nivel va de 3 a 5 años para las especialidades médicas, de uno a cinco años en las subespecialidades médicas y de un año a tres años para las otras áreas del conocimiento. La formación en una especialidad y subespecialidad culminará con la obtención del título de especialista o subespecialista en el grado de especialidad del área respectiva, previo a la presentación de un informe o sistematización de experiencias de aprendizaje, conforme al plan de estudios correspondiente.

SECCIÓN II CARRERAS DE MAESTRÍA

Artículo 37.- La maestría es el estudio mediante el cual se proporciona al profesional la base teórica metodológica para la

profundización del conocimiento científico, con el fin de lograr la interacción entre teoría y realidad. Estas pueden ser académicas o profesionalizantes. Las carreras de maestría requerirán como mínimo seiscientos setenta y cinco (675) horas académicas de cincuenta (50) minutos, supervisadas por el profesor. La condición de académica o profesionalizante deberá constar en el título expedido.

Artículo 38.- Las Maestrías son académicas cuando se refieren a un proceso de formación esencialmente de investigación. El plan de estudios debe incorporar aspectos teóricos, conceptuales y metodológicos, con un mínimo de cincuenta (50) créditos y máximo sesenta (60), al menos un cuarenta y cinco por ciento (45%) en investigación, con una duración promedio de dos (2) años. Como requisito de graduación se finaliza con una tesis, la cual deberá ser un estudio de pensamiento crítico respecto del tema o problema específico y el manejo conceptual y metodológico producto de la actividad de investigación. Se desarrollará de forma original e individual y el resultado de esa investigación deberá ser publicable a través de un (1) artículo científico. La defensa de tesis será de forma pública.

Artículo 39.- Las Maestrías profesionalizantes son aquellas cuyo objetivo central es el fortalecimiento y consolidación de las competencias profesionales en un campo del saber. El plan de estudios deberá contener aspectos teóricos, prácticos y metodológicos, con un mínimo de cuarenta (40) y un máximo de cincuenta (50) créditos y al menos un veinticinco por ciento (25%) en investigación aplicada, con una duración de año y medio a dos años si son de tiempo parcial y no menos de un (1) año si son de tiempo completo. Culmina con un trabajo de investigación aplicada, individual, original y escrito que evidencie la integración de aprendizajes realizados en el proceso formativo, la profundización de conocimientos en un campo profesional y el manejo de destrezas y perspectivas innovadoras en la profesión, como ser: un proyecto institucional, estudio de casos, producción artística o trabajos similares, que ofrezca aportes al desarrollo o aplicación de la ciencia, cuya defensa será de forma pública.

SECCIÓN III CARRERAS DE DOCTORADO

Artículo 40.- Son estudios del más alto nivel académico-profesional, fundamentados en la investigación y caracterizados por la realización de un trabajo, original e individual, bajo la estrecha supervisión de un equipo de expertos calificados que evalúan continuamente el desempeño del candidato. Habilita para el ejercicio profesional, la investigación científica y la docencia universitaria al más alto nivel. Contarán con un mínimo de novecientos (900) horas académicas de cincuenta (50) minutos y contará con una duración de 3 a 5 años si viene de una maestría y de 5 a 8 si viene de una licenciatura. Estas carreras pueden diseñarse curricularmente desde la licenciatura o la maestría académica.

siempre que cumplan con la intensidad y calidad descritas en la normativa del nivel.

Artículo 41.- Los estudios de doctorado culminan con la obtención del grado de doctor, en concordancia con las normas académicas. La modalidad de titulación será la tesis de grado, como resultado de una investigación científica y de la cual el estudiante elaborará tres (3) artículos publicables derivados de la misma investigación. La defensa de tesis será de forma pública.

Artículo 42.- Accederán directamente a estudios de doctorado, los graduados de las Maestrías Académicas y de las Licenciaturas en aquellos programas doctorales que están contruidos curricularmente para aceptar el ingreso desde ese nivel. Los graduados de las maestrías profesionalizantes deberán realizar antes o evidenciar la realización de una pasantía o residencia en un instituto de investigación o instancia académica determinada de un centro de educación superior, en función de los proyectos de investigación institucionales en marcha, el cual tendrá como mínimo cuatrocientos cincuenta (450) horas, con una duración mínima de seis (6) meses y/o tres (3) artículos científicos.

Artículo 43.- Será atribución de las Facultades y Centros Regionales, programar la continuidad de las promociones conforme al Plan de estudios de cada Carrera.

Artículo 44.- Con base en los avances de la tesis, el estudiante elaborará a lo largo de la duración del doctorado tres (3) artículos publicables, conforme al artículo 25 de las Normas Académicas de la UNAH. Al finalizar el componente de formación comprendido en el plan de estudios el estudiante deberá aprobar el examen de candidatura realizado conforme a lo establecido en el plan de estudios. El examen de candidatura será conforme a lo establecido en la normativa de nivel y orientado a la defensa del proyecto de tesis.

SECCIÓN IV

PROGRAMAS DE POSDOCTORADO Y CURSOS DE ACTUALIZACIÓN DEL NIVEL DE POSGRADO

Artículo 45.- Los programas de posdoctorado son estudios de actualización posteriores al doctorado, que constan de una investigación académica o científica con la finalidad de profundizar conocimientos en tema especializado, siguiendo su línea de trabajo doctoral. Los posdoctorados no conducen a un título como los demás posgrados, no es un grado académico.

Artículo 46.- Los programas de posdoctorado tendrán una duración mínima de seis (6) meses y máxima de doce (12) meses. Los criterios para la finalización de los programas deberán establecerse en su manual respectivo, que incluya un plan de trabajo, así como un proyecto de investigación, el cual culmine con una publicación científica que cumpla con los estándares internacionales.

Artículo 47.- Los cursos de actualización ofrecen la oportunidad a los graduados de posgrado de renovar conocimientos en determinadas disciplinas o campos temáticos. Son programas académicos de corta duración, pueden ser teóricos, prácticos o una combinación de ambos. Tendrán una duración de 15 a 60 horas. Dichos cursos no conducen a la obtención de un título, por lo tanto, no son grados académicos y se acreditarán mediante un certificado y se ofrecerán desde las diferentes carreras de posgrado adscritas a las Facultades y Centros Regionales.

TÍTULO TERCERO

DE LA CALIDAD Y DEL INGRESO, PERMANENCIA Y PROMOCIÓN

CAPÍTULO I

LA GESTIÓN DEL CURRÍCULO Y DE LA CALIDAD DE LA CARRERA DE POSGRADO

Artículo 48.- Toda carrera de posgrado de la UNAH contará con el respectivo plan de estudios, aprobado y registrado tal como lo indica la normativa del nivel de educación superior de Honduras y de la UNAH.

Artículo 49.- Después de desarrollar dos (2) promociones las carreras de posgrado deberán iniciar procesos de autoevaluación con fines de mejora continua, para lo cual el Coordinador de la Carrera de Posgrado promoverá la conformación de la Subcomisión de gestión de la calidad.

Artículo 50.- Todas las Carreras de Posgrado que han finalizado la incorporación de mejoras, con base en los resultados de su autoevaluación, incluyendo la revisión y rediseño de su plan de estudios, deberá iniciar el proceso de acreditación de la calidad con la Agencia Centroamericana de Acreditación de Posgrado (ACAP) o con la agencia nacional o internacional que la Carrera de Posgrado considere pertinente.

CAPÍTULO II

DEL INGRESO, PERMANENCIA, PROMOCIÓN Y GRADUACIÓN DE ESTUDIANTES DE POSGRADO

Artículo 51.- Del ingreso de los estudiantes de posgrado. Son requisitos para la admisión de estudiantes de posgrado:

a) Presentar título original del grado requerido según estadio académico extendido o reconocido por la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Honduras y fotocopia cotejada. En el caso de estudiantes extranjeros, se exigirá el título autenticado conforme a las disposiciones de la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Honduras.

b) Presentar la certificación de estudios del grado requerido para su ingreso, original y copia cotejada.

c) Contar con un índice académico mínimo del 70% en el nivel anterior.

d) Aprobar los cursos propedéuticos establecidos en el respectivo plan de estudios.

e) Cumplir con otros requisitos de admisión establecidos en el plan de estudios de la carrera de posgrado en que se matricule.

Artículo 52.- Las fechas de inicio de cada promoción serán establecidas anualmente por la Dirección del Sistema de Estudios de Posgrado conforme planificación académica propuesta por las Facultades y Centros Regionales y para registro de los estudiantes de Posgrado.

Artículo 53.- Las inasistencias a las experiencias educativas se registrarán de acuerdo a lo establecido en el artículo 238 de las normas académicas. Dicha disposición incluirá aquellos planes de estudio ofertados a través de la bimodalidad, asegurando las medidas de control sobre las asistencias, según sea el caso.

Artículo 54.- Cuando el estudiante se vea imposibilitado de asistir a algunas de las actividades de enseñanza aprendizaje que formen parte de las experiencias educativas, por causa justificada, podrá, con base en el principio de flexibilidad en el currículum, acordar con el profesor alternativas académicas para la realización de estas actividades.

Artículo 55.- Las carreras de posgrado no deberán comprometerse en ningún caso a ofrecer a los estudiantes la repetición de clases pendientes o reprobadas en promociones posteriores, ya que la apertura de estas está supeditada a los resultados de la autoevaluación del programa, así como a las necesidades nacionales o regionales conforme al artículo 34 de este Reglamento.

Artículo 56.- Una experiencia educativa que se ha reprobado con menos de 75% sólo podrá repetirla si el Plan de Estudios así lo consigna conforme al artículo 182 de las Normas Académicas de la UNAH. Si el plan de estudios no le contempla, el estudiante podrá con sus propios recursos financieros:

a) Repetir la experiencia educativa en una sección especial o a través de una tutoría en esa misma promoción.

b) Insertarse en la siguiente promoción a partir de la asignatura reprobada y finalizar con su plan de estudios, siempre y cuando el plan de estudios sea el mismo al iniciado por el maestrante.

Artículo 57.- El sistema de evaluación se regirá por las disposiciones establecidas en el plan de estudios, en concordancia con las Normas Académicas y el Modelo Educativo de la UNAH.

Artículo 58.- Cada plan de estudios deberá describir el porcentaje mínimo de ingreso y permanencia, el cual deberá regirse por lo establecido en el artículo 236 de las normas académicas.

Artículo 59.- El estudiante de carrera de posgrado tendrá derecho a la reposición de alguna forma de evaluación estipulada en el

programa de la experiencia educativa que no pudo realizar y a la reposición de la nota más baja, tal como lo establece el artículo 178 de las Normas Académicas. En el plan de estudios de cada carrera de posgrado, se consignará qué asignaturas no son objeto de dicha reposición.

Artículo 60.- El coordinador de carrera de posgrado deberá elaborar al final de cada año, un registro de los estudiantes que se han ausentado del posgrado y aplicar a estos el contenido del artículo 238 de las Normas Académicas.

Artículo 61.- Para obtener el título de una carrera en los posgrados de especialización, maestría y doctorado, se requiere:

a) Aprobar la totalidad de experiencia educativa contenidos en el plan de estudios correspondiente.

b) Cumplir con todos los requisitos académicos administrativos de la UNAH, con los señalados en este Reglamento y en el plan de estudios.

Artículo 62.- Para hacer aplicable el artículo 140, literal b), de las Normas Académicas de la UNAH: a) Las coordinaciones de carrera de posgrado prepararán una agenda de proyectos o bien los estudiantes pueden proponer un proyecto, en ambos casos los proyectos deberán estar enmarcados en al menos 2 de los 4 ámbitos de las iniciativas establecidas en el artículo 140 literal b) de las Normas Académicas de la UNAH (social, cultural, artística, deportiva). b) Las coordinaciones de carrera informarán por oficio sobre el proyecto a la VOA, instancia que esperará el informe final de las coordinaciones, a menos que exista alguna corrección que realizar en cuanto a la forma en que se cumplirá el requisito por los estudiantes. c) Una vez que los estudiantes han realizado el proyecto, las coordinaciones de carrera remiten un informe del cumplimiento, anexando el soporte documental (listados de asistencia, fotografías o cualquier otro medio de verificación). d) La VOA extiende constancia a los estudiantes, con base en informe de la coordinación de carrera de posgrado.

Artículo 63.- El estudiante de posgrado tendrá hasta dos años para concluir, presentar y aprobar su trabajo de tesis o graduación, conforme al artículo 251 de las Normas Académicas de la UNAH. El plan de estudio del posgrado deberá establecer los casos especiales y debidamente justificados en que se podrá autorizar una prórroga, así como el tiempo de duración de esta. Después de este tiempo, el estudiante deberá recibir un curso de actualización temática y de metodología de la investigación, más el pago del diez por ciento 10% del costo total por estudiante según promoción a la que pertenece, acumulable hasta por dos (2) años. Vencida la prórroga sin que el estudiante presente su trabajo de graduación quedará excluido de la carrera de posgrado.

Artículo 64.- El veredicto a ser dado por la tema examinadora en la defensa del trabajo de graduación para optar al grado de maestría o doctorado, se emitirá en los siguientes términos:

a) Reprobado: menos del 75%.

b) Aprobado: 75 a 100%.

c) Cum laude: 80 – 89%.

d) Magna cum laude: 90 – 94%.

e) Summa cum laude: 95% o más.

Artículo 65.- Cuando el estudiante no realice una defensa satisfactoria de su trabajo de graduación, el estudiante tendrá un plazo máximo de seis (6) meses a partir de la fecha de sustentación del examen, para que el trabajo se mejore o se cambie de tema, si ese es el veredicto del jurado examinador. Si por segunda ocasión no tuviese una defensa satisfactoria del trabajo de graduación, deberá atender el dictamen de la terna examinadora.

Artículo 66.- La terna examinadora dará a conocer los resultados del examen inmediatamente después de la práctica del mismo. El fallo de la terna será inapelable. La resolución o calificación será consignada en un libro de actas habilitado en cada carrera de posgrado para tal fin.

Artículo 67.- Los estudiantes en cualquiera de las carreras de posgrado se consideran egresados a partir del momento en el que hayan aprobado todas las experiencias educativas consignadas en el plan de estudios.

Artículo 68.- Los asesores de tesis, lectores y examinadores deberán ser seleccionados y acreditados por el coordinador(a) de la carrera, tomando en cuenta los siguientes criterios:

a) Poseer el grado académico igual o superior al grado que examina.

b) Ser preferiblemente un profesor universitario o un especialista en la temática, con reconocimiento nacional o internacional.

c) Tener reconocimiento profesional, avalado por su hoja de vida.

d) Poseer experiencia investigativa.

e) Los demás que la carrera especifique.

Artículo 69.- Serán funciones de los asesores metodológicos y temáticos:

a) Auxiliar al estudiante durante la planeación y desarrollo del trabajo de tesis o de graduación, en un aspecto o etapa específica.

b) Mantener comunicación continua con el estudiante para evaluar el avance del aspecto o etapa específica en que asesora para el trabajo de tesis o de graduación y hacer las recomendaciones pertinentes.

c) Revisar el trabajo de tesis o de graduación de conformidad con su área de Especialidad.

d) Entregar por escrito las observaciones al Coordinador de Carrera de Posgrado.

e) Rendir informe por escrito al Coordinador de Carrera de Posgrado sobre el desarrollo de sus asesorías.

f) La exclusividad de dictaminar por escrito ante la coordinación de carrera, que el trabajo elaborado una vez evaluado por ellos, reúne los requisitos académicos y formales para que pueda ser defendido. Este dictamen podrá ser integrado o emitido por separado.

Artículo 70.- La petición para la defensa del trabajo de tesis o de graduación será solicitada por el Coordinador de Carrera, quien remitirá el expediente del estudiante al Secretario Académico de la Facultad o Centro Universitario Regional, el cual emitirá el respectivo auto de aprobación señalando la fecha programada para la defensa y con esto el Coordinador de Carrera publicitará la defensa del mismo, ya que tendrá carácter público.

Artículo 71.- Los miembros de la terna examinadora al recibir un ejemplar del trabajo de tesis o de graduación, tendrán treinta (30) días calendario para presentar las observaciones o sugerencias al estudiante, quien junto con su asesor de trabajo de graduación valorarán las mismas a efecto de ser incorporadas.

Artículo 72.- Cuando las autoridades de la carrera de posgrado detecten similitud o indicio racional que haga dudar razonablemente de la originalidad del trabajo final de graduación, con el propósito de fomentar la ética en la investigación y en los posgrados, así como, de garantizar la calidad y la novedad de la producción científica, se realizará la investigación respectiva de acuerdo a los procedimientos establecidos en el manual correspondiente.

Artículo 73.- Del documento del trabajo de tesis o de graduación, una vez aprobado, deberán reproducirse tres (3) copias físicas y digitales, siendo responsable el coordinador de la carrera de custodiar un ejemplar en su archivo, remitir uno a la Biblioteca de la UNAH, y uno al centro de documentación de la facultad o centro universitario regional.

CAPÍTULO III

DEL RÉGIMEN ADMINISTRATIVO FINANCIERO

Artículo 74.- Los programas de posgrado podrán ser financiados por:

a) Asignaciones debidamente autorizadas en el presupuesto anual de la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Honduras.

b) Donaciones y legados que pudieran obtenerse para este fin.

c) Ingresos generados por las carreras de posgrado (matrícula, venta de servicios y otros).

d) Convenios y otros mecanismos de cooperación.

e) Aportes extraordinarios del gobierno u otros organismos nacionales e internacionales.

Artículo 75.- Las carreras de posgrado tendrán acceso al manejo de los fondos provenientes de sus ingresos y la administración de los mismos, estará regida por la normativa de la UNAH. Los posgrados que fueron aprobados en Consejo de Educación Superior entregarán a la UNAH el 25% y en caso de los posgrados por convenios internacionales se transferirá un 10% del monto ingresado. Dichos porcentajes serán para cubrir gastos administrativos y de servicios.

Artículo 76.- La UNAH podrá financiar de forma parcial o total Carreras de Posgrado sensitivas para la academia y la sociedad, siendo establecido en la planificación estratégica de la institución. Estos casos serán únicamente para la formación de docentes y administrativos de la UNAH.

Artículo 77.- La contratación de profesores para las carreras de posgrado, así como lo relativo a la asignación de viajes y viáticos nacionales e internacionales se regirá de acuerdo a la normativa universitaria y a las disposiciones presupuestarias establecidas para tal fin. Los viajes y viáticos internacionales son exclusivos para profesores visitantes.

Artículo 78.- Se permitirá la contratación de profesionales jubilados en casos excepcionales en que no se encuentre en el país un profesional con la cualificación requerida.

Artículo 79.- Cada carrera de posgrado deberá contar con un asistente administrativo, el cual será pagado por la misma, esto con el fin de salvaguardar los bienes, procesos de compra, pagos, y otros, además de la rendición de cuentas y transparencia.

Artículo 80.- El Departamento de Cobranzas y Asesoría legal, serán los responsables de la legalización, control, cobro y demás acciones correspondientes de las obligaciones que se deriven del ingreso, permanencia y promoción de los estudiantes de la carrera de posgrado. Las carreras de posgrado deberán tener en sus archivos copias de los contratos firmados por los estudiantes.

TÍTULO CUARTO

CAPÍTULO I

DISPOSICIONES GENERALES Y TRANSITORIAS

Artículo 81.- Todas las Carreras de Posgrado de la UNAH están adscritas a una Facultad y Centro Regional Universitario. Los Departamentos programaran sus actividades académicas de común acuerdo a los requerimientos de los Coordinadores de sus Carreras de Posgrado.

Artículo 82.- Las carreras de posgrado de naturaleza interdisciplinaria están adscritas una Facultad o Centro Regional Universitario, que desarrolle el o los campos de conocimiento más afines al posgrado, instalando un comité coordinador conformado

por los coordinadores de carrera de posgrado que prestarán servicio a dicha carrera.

Artículo 83.- La Dirección del sistema de Estudios de Posgrado elaborará el Manual de Procedimientos de posgrado considerando las particularidades de cada campo del conocimiento, el cual será aprobado por el Consejo General del Sistema de Estudios de Posgrado.

Artículo 84.- Todo lo no previsto en este Reglamento será resuelto por el Consejo Universitario, previa solicitud del Consejo General del Sistema de Estudios de Posgrado.

Artículo 85.- Se deroga el Reglamento General del Sistema de Estudios de Posgrado de la UNAH, aprobado según Acuerdo No.348-E-2008.

Artículo 86.- Las Carreras de posgrado que al entrar en vigencia el presente Reglamento se encuentren funcionando deben en un plazo no mayor de tres (3) años, incorporar lo preceptuado en este Reglamento.

Artículo 87.- El presente Reglamento entrará en vigencia veinte (20) días después de su publicación en el Diario Oficial "La Gaceta".

SEGUNDO

Ordenar a la Secretaría General la publicación del presente Reglamento en el Diario Oficial La Gaceta.

TERCERO

El presente Acuerdo es de ejecución inmediata. Dado en la Ciudad Universitaria "José Trinidad Reyes", en Tegucigalpa, municipio del Distrito Central, a los veintisiete días del mes de octubre de dos mil diecisiete. **COMUNIQUESE. (F y S) MARIA VICTORIA ZELAYA, SECRETARIA CONSEJO UNIVERSITARIO.** cc: Msc. Belinda Flores de Mendoza, Vicerrectora Académica. cc: Consejo General del Sistema de Estudios de Posgrado. cc: Miembros de la Comisión de Dictamen. cc: Abog. Emma Virginia Rivera Mejía, Secretaria General. cc: Archivo". Y para los fines legales consiguientes, se extiende la presente en la Ciudad Universitaria "José Trinidad Reyes", a los nueve días del mes de abril de dos mil dieciocho. **(F y S) OSCAR ARQUÍMEDES ZELAYA, SECRETARIO.**

Y para su publicación en el Diario Oficial "LA GACETA", se extiende la presente **CERTIFICACIÓN** en Tegucigalpa M.D.C., Ciudad Universitaria "José Trinidad Reyes", dieciocho de julio de dos mil dieciocho.

EMMA VIRGINIA RIVERA MEJÍA
SECRETARIA GENERAL

ホンジュラス共和国公的日刊紙「官報」

（P8 から P12 まで）

第 A 項

ホンジュラス国立自治大学（UNAH）

第二章 大学院研究部門アカデミック・プログラムについて

第三十三条

大学院研究部門には、以下のコースがある。

- 1) 専門課程
- 2) 学位の取得を目指す修士課程
- 3) 学位の取得を目指す博士課程
- 4) 博士研究員プログラム
- 5) 知識更新コース

第三十四条

前条項の大学院課程は、ホンジュラス国立自治大学当該機関が定める国家、地域、県のニーズに即した恒久的、又は一時的なコースである。

第一項 専門課程

第三十五条

専門化とは、集中的な実践介入を通じて、専門的職業分野の特定能力を養うものである。専門課程では、特定分野の学問をより深める専門分化課程まで継続的に学ぶことが可能である。専門分化課程に進むには、同じ知識分野の専門的学問研究を予め履修していなくてはならない。専門化関連の大学院学習プログラムの目的は、プロフェッショナル人材を養成することであり、この課程で学ぶ学生は、応用研究向けプログラムの総単位中、最低でも 25%履修し、且つ、教員が指導する 50 分単位授業を最低でも 450 時間履修することが必要となる。医学専門課程では、教員が指導する 50 分単位授業のうち、最低でも 1350 時間の履修が必要となる。

第三十六条

同課程の学習時間は、医学専門課程で 3 年から 5 年、医学専門分化課程で 1 年

から 5 年、その他の知識領域で 1 年から 5 年である。専門課程、又は専門分化課程のカリキュラムに即した学習経験のシステム化や報告書の提出により、当該課程修了時に、各分野の専門、又は専門分化の資格が授与される。

第二項 修士課程

第三十七章

修士課程では、理論と現実による相互作用の実現を目指し、プロフェッショナル人材の科学知識を深化させることで、方法論的・理論的基礎を築くための指導を行う。修士課程はアカデミック・キャリアとプロフェッショナル・キャリアに区分され、教員が指導する 50 分単位授業を最低でも 675 時間履修することが必要とされる。アカデミック・キャリアでもプロフェッショナル・キャリアでも、修士課程に入学するには学位を取得していることが条件となる。

第三十八章

修士課程において、本質的なリサーチを行う学習過程はアカデミック・プロセスと呼ばれる。平均学習時間は 2 年間であり、リサーチの割合は少なくとも 45% とし、最低 50 単位、最大 60 単位が理論的、概念的、方法論的側面に配分される。リサーチ活動の成果として、特定の問題・テーマ、又は方法論的・概念的処理におけるクリティカル・シンキング関連の論文提出が、卒業の必要要件となる。個々が独自にリサーチを行い、その成果を科学論文として発表できる形でまとめなくてはならない。論文の口頭試問審査は公開で実施される。

第三十九章

修士課程プロフェッショナル・キャリアコースでは、当該知識領域に関するプロフェッショナル・コンピテンシーを強化することを第一に目指す。カリキュラムに基づき、全日制コースの期間は最低でも一年以上、それ以外のコースは 1 年半から 2 年とし、応用リサーチの設定は少なくとも 25%、理論的、実践的、方法論的側面には最低 40 単位、最大 50 単位配分する。個々が独自に応用リサーチに関する論文制作を行い、学習過程で得た学びと専門領域で深めた知識の統合や、専門職種における革新的観点とスキルが運用されたことを証明する。応用リサーチに関する活動とは、開発や科学的応用に寄与する組織的プロジェクト、ケース・スタディー、芸術作品制作等であり、口頭試問審査は公開で実施される。

第三項 博士課程

第四十条

博士課程においてリサーチの基礎となるアカデミック及びプロフェッショナル・レベルは最高水準であり、権威ある専門家チームによるきめ細かな指導のもと、各博士候補者が独自に研究を行う。提供される専門的訓練や科学的リサーチだけでなく、指導する大学教員も皆最高レベルである。修士学位取得者は 3 年から 5 年、学士号取得者は 5 年から 8 年の期間で、50 分単位授業を最低 900 時間履修する必要がある。博士課程規範で定められた質と集中密度に関する要件を満たすのであれば、学士課程からカリキュラムを設計することも、修士課程アカデミック・キャリアコースからカリキュラムを設計することも可能である。

第四十一条

博士課程は学術規範に準拠し、博士号取得により終了する。博士号を取得するには、科学リサーチの実施結果を博士論文にまとめ、そのリサーチをもとに、公開可能な研究論文を 3 本作成する必要がある。論文の口頭試問審査は公開で実施される。

第四十二条

博士課程のカリキュラムは、修士課程アカデミック・キャリアコースからでも、学士課程からでも入学できるように設計されているため、それらの課程終了後、博士課程プログラムを履修することは可能である。修士課程プロフェッショナル・キャリアコースの卒業者は、最低でも 6 か月間 450 時間以上、高等教育センターの指定学術機関か研究機関で実施中のリサーチ・プロジェクトで、予めインターン又はレジデントとして働くか、科学論文を 3 本発表したことを証明しなくてはならない。

第四十三条

学部、又は大学地方センターは、各コースのカリキュラムに応じて、進級後も継続性があるプログラムを設計する権限を持つ。

第四十四条

UNAH 学術規範第 25 条により、学生は博士課程の期間内に、博士論文の進捗に応じて、公開可能な論文を 3 本作成しなくてはならない。学生はカリキュラムの学習コンポーネント終了時に、カリキュラムに合わせて実施される博士課程修了候補者試験に合格しなければならない。候補者試験は、博士課程規範の規定に則り行われ、博士論文プロジェクトの口頭試問審査が実施される。

第四項 博士研究員プログラムと大学院レベルの知識更新コース

第四十五条

博士研究員プログラムは、博士課程終了後に行われる知識更新を目的としたプログラムであり、アカデミックリサーチと科学リサーチに区分される。博士課程の研究活動ラインに即した専門領域の知識を深めることを目指す。博士研究員という学位は存在せず、その他大学院課程のように学位取得を目的としたものではない。

第四十六条

博士研究員プログラムは、最低 6 ヶ月、最高 12 ヶ月間実施される。プログラム終了の基準は、研究プロジェクトや活動計画をまとめた手引書に規定される。研究プロジェクトは、最後に国際基準に準拠した科学出版物としてまとめられる。

第四十七条

知識更新コースでは、大学院卒業者に、特定の学問やテーマ分野において知識を更新する機会が提供される。理論的、又は実践的、或いは双方が組み合わされた複合的な短期間のアカデミック・プログラムである。学習時間は 15 時間から 60 時間。学位取得を目指すコースではないため、学位ではなく認定証明書が発行される。学部や大学地方センターに属する大学院課程として様々なコースの設定がある。

第三篇 入学、学業継続、進級と質について

第一章 大学院課程の質とカリキュラムの管理

第四十八条

UNAH 大学院課程の全コースでは、ホンジュラス高等教育段階に係る規範と UNAH の規範により、承認登録された各カリキュラムが設定される。

第四十九条

大学院課程の 2 期生終了後、継続改善を目的とした自己評価プロセスが開始され、授業の質に関する管理小委員会が大学院課程コーディネーターにより組織される。

第五十条

自己評価の結果を踏まえ、カリキュラムの検証や再構成等、改善策が適用された大学院課程の全コースで、中米大学院認定機関、又は大学院課程により適任と判断された国内外機関と連携し、質の認定プロセスが開始されなくてはならない。

第二章 大学院への入学、学業継続、進級、及び卒業について

第五十一条

大学院入学に関する必要要件は以下の通り。

- 1) ホンジュラス国立自治大学が認定する学術段階に応じて、学位の原本と照合を受けた写しを提出すること。ホンジュラス国立自治大学の規程により、認証を受けた学位の提出が要求される。
- 2) 入学に必要な学業成績証明書の原本と照合を受けた写しを提出すること。
- 3) 大学院入学前の最終学歴段階で、GPA の成績評価が 70% 以上であること。
- 4) 各カリキュラムで設定された準備講座に合格すること。
- 5) 登録予定の大学院課程カリキュラムで定められたその他入学要件を満たしていること。

第五十二条

各期生の開始日は、学部と大学地方センターの学術研究計画書と大学院学生登録手続きに鑑み、大学院研究システム指導部が毎年決定する。

第五十三条

教育実践の欠席に関する取り扱いは、学術規範第 238 条に準拠する。この規範では、必要に応じた出席管理措置が可能な二様式によるカリキュラムの実践方

法が記載されている。

第五十四条

教育実践の一部を構成する何らかの学習指導活動に学生が出席できない場合、カリキュラム適用に係わる柔軟化原則に基づき、正当な理由であれば、その活動実施に代わる学習代替案について教員と合意することが可能である。

第五十五条

大学院課程では、いかなる場合であっても、未履修の講座や不合格とされた講座の翌年次以降の再履修を学生に確約することはできない。講座の開講は、大学院課程規則第 34 条に準拠し、国家及び地域のニーズやプログラムの自己評価結果を基に決定される。

第五十六条

成績評価が 75 % 以下となり不合格とされた教育実践について、UNAH 学術規範第 182 条に従い、再履修がカリキュラムに明記されている場合に限り、再履修することが可能である。カリキュラムにその記載がない場合、学生は自己資金で再履修することができる。

- 1) 特に教育実践の一部分だけを再履修する、又は、同年次にチューターを通じて再履修する。
- 2) 修士課程の学生が履修を開始した当時のカリキュラムから変更がない場合、不合格とされた科目以降、次期学年に編入し、カリキュラムを完遂する。

第五十七条

評価システムについては、UNAH 教育モデルと学術規範に則り、カリキュラムに定められた規程を遵守する。

第五十八条

各カリキュラムでは、最低入学者数・学業継続者数に関する割合が定められていなくてはならない。その割合は、学術規範第 236 条の規定に準ずる。

第五十九条

大学院課程の学生は、学術規範第 178 条に則り、履修することができなかった教育実践プログラムの評価に関して、何らかの形で再評価を受ける権利があり、再評価を受けた場合は、何れか点数の低いほうを差し戻す権利がある。各大学院課程のカリキュラムには、再評価が許可されない科目に関する規定がある。

第六十条

大学院課程コーディネーターは、各年度末に、大学院課程に登録している学生の欠席記録をまとめ、学術規範第 238 条に定められた規定を当該学生に適用する。

第六十一条

大学院専門課程、修士課程、博士課程各コースで資格・学位を取得するには、以下の要件を満たす必要がある。

- 1) 当該カリキュラムの教育実践に全て合格すること。
- 2) UNAH 規則とカリキュラムに規定された事務的学術要件を全て満たすこと。

第六十二条

UNAH 学術規範第 140 条②項を UNAH 規則とカリキュラムに適用するにあたり、以下の活動が必要となる。

- ①大学院課程コーディネーターがプロジェクト・アジェンダを準備するか、若しくは学生がプロジェクトを提案する。いずれの場合も、UNAH 学術規範第 140 条②項で定められたイニシアチブ 4 分野（社会、文化、芸術、スポーツ）のうち、少なくとも 2 分野を網羅するプロジェクトである必要がある。
- ②大学院課程コーディネーターは、プロジェクトについて、公文書にて VOAЕ に報告する。VOAЕ は、学生が必要要件を満たす形で何らかの修正を行うのでない限り、コーディネーターから最終報告書が提出されるのを待つ。
- ③学生によりプロジェクトが実施された後、大学院課程コーディネーターはその裏付け可能な資料（出席リスト、写真、その他あらゆる検証手段等）を添付し、プロジェクト実施報告書を送付する。

④VOAE は、大学院課程コーディネーターの報告書を基に、学生に証明書を発行する。

第六十三条

UNAH 学術規範第 251 条に則り、大学院課程の学生が卒業制作及び論文制作を完成させ、提出し、承認を受ける期間は、最長二年である。大学院課程のカリキュラムには、期間延長が認められる可能性のある特別、且つ正当化されるケースと、その場合の延長期間が定められていなくてはならない。この期間が経過したら、学生は分野別・リサーチ手法に関する知識更新コースを受講し、更に自身が在籍する年次期に応じた生徒一人当たりの総費用の 10%の支払いを受ける。これは最長二年間積み立てが可能である。卒業制作を提出しないまま延長期間が失効した場合、学生は大学院課程から除籍される。

第六十四条

修士課程、又は博士課程の学位取得に際し、卒業制作の口頭試問審査において、審査官 3 名は以下の通り評価する。

- ① 不合格：75%未満
- ② 合格：75%～100%
- ③ クム・ラウデ：80%～89%
- ④ マグナ・クム・ラウデ：90%～94%
- ⑤ スンマ・クム・ラウデ：95%以上

第六十五条

卒業制作の口頭試問審査において、学生にとって満足する審査ではなかった場合、審査官が卒業制作の改善やテーマの変更が必要と判断したときは、最終卒業制作審査日から最大 6 か月間の期間が与えられる。二回目の卒業制作口頭試問審査も満足するものではなかった場合、審査官 3 名の意見に留意する必要がある。

第六十六条

審査官 3 名は審査実施後、直ちに結果を発表しなくてはならない。審査官の決定に不服申し立てはできない。裁定や成績に関しては、大学院各課程で成績会議

用に準備された議事録に記録される。

第六十七条

学生は、カリキュラムに規定された教育実践に全て合格した時点から、大学院の何れかの課程を修了したとみなされる。

第六十八条

卒業論文の指導教官、採点助手、審査官は大学院課程コーディネーターにより選定され、認定される。その際には以下の基準が考慮される。

- ① 試問する学位と同じ、或いはそれより上の学位を保有していること
- ② 大学の教員、或いはその分野の専門家であり、国内外の知識を有することが望ましい。
- ③ 履歴書で証明された専門知識があること。
- ④ リサーチに関する経験があること。
- ⑤ 当該課程で指定されたその他要件を満たすこと。

第六十九条

手法とリサーチに関する指導教官の役割は以下の通り。

- ① 特定の段階、又はある局面において、学生が卒業論文・卒業制作を計画し作成する間、学生をサポートする。
- ② 特定の段階や局面で、学生に卒業論文・卒業制作に関するアドバイスを行う。その段階で評価する際は、学生と継続的にコミュニケーションを維持し、適切な助言を行う。
- ③ 自身の専門分野と合致する卒業論文・卒業制作のチェックを行う。
- ④ 自身の所見を大学院課程コーディネーターに書面で伝える。
- ⑤ 自身のアドバイスに関する報告書をまとめ、大学院課程コーディネーターに提出する。
- ⑥ 学生の卒業制作・論文について、指導教官が一度評価した後、学生が口頭試問審査に進むことができるように、その卒業制作・論文が学術的及び正式な要件を満たしているとの判断を独断で行い、大学院課程コーディネーター一陣に書面で伝える。この判断は集約されることも、個別に表明されることもある。

第七十条

卒業論文・卒業制作の口頭試問審査の申請書は、大学院課程コーディネーターから提出される。大学院課程コーディネーターは学生の学業成績書を学部、又は大学地方センターの学術事務官に送付する。学術事務官は口頭試問審査予定日が記された各決定に関する承認を表明する。これにより、大学院課程コーディネーターは卒業論文・制作の口頭試問実施を公表する。口頭試問は公開で行われる。

第七十一条

審査官 3 人には、卒業論文・制作を一冊受領後、学生に所感や提言を表明するために暦日 30 日間が与えられる。学生は卒業論文・制作の指導教官とともに、所感や提言を取り入れるべく尊重する。

第七十二条

大学院課程当局が、卒業制作最終作品の独自性を合理的に疑わざるをえない理に適った証拠や類似性を見つけた場合、大学院とリサーチに係わる倫理を促進し、科学的所産の質と斬新性を担保するために、当該便覧の手順に則り、各調査を実施する。

第七十三条

卒業論文・制作に関する文書について、審査に合格後、ハード版とデジタル版コピーを三部準備する。大学院課程コーディネーターは自身の文書保管所で一部保管し、UNAH 図書館と、学部、又は大学地方センターの文書センターに夫々一部ずつ送付する責任を負う。

第三章 財務管理体制について

第七十四条

大学院課程プログラムは、以下の通り資金提供を受けることが可能である。

- ① ホンジュラス国立自治大学の年間予算において適宜承認された割り当て配分
- ② この目的で提供された贈与や遺産
- ③ 大学院納付金（登録料、サービス料、その他）

- ④ 協定やその他協力メカニズム
- ⑤ 政府やその他国内外機関による特別な出資金

第七十五条

大学院課程は、その収入から生じる資金の管理にアクセスできる権利を持つ。資金管理には UNAH 規範が適用される。高等教育審議会で承認された大学院は、UNAH に 25%納める。また国際協定が締結された大学院の場合、入金額の 10%が譲渡される。それは管理費とサービス料に充当される。

第七十六条

UNAH は、アカデミーと社会のために、組織の戦略計画を踏まえて設立され、且つ慎重に扱うべき大学院課程に、部分的、或いは全体的に資金を提供することができる。該当ケースは、UNAH の管理者・教員養成コースのみである。

第七十七条

大学院課程で契約される教員の国内外移動旅費と日当については、大学規範と当該手当に関する予算規定が適用される。国外出張旅費と日当の支払いは、海外から訪問する教員に限られる。

第七十八条

国内に資格要件を満たす専門家がいらない場合、定年退職した教員と例外的に契約することができる。

第七十九条

各大学院課程では事務職補助員を雇用する。その報酬は各課程内で支払われる。これは調達プロセスや資産を保護し、その他支払いをサポートするためであり、説明責任や透明性を確保するための措置である。

第八十条

徴収部門と法定顧問は、学生が大学院課程に入学、学業継続、進級する際に生じる責務の公的証明、管理、集金、その他該当する活動について責任を負う。大学院課程では、学生が署名した契約書のコピーを記録保管所に保管しなくてはな

らない。

第四篇

第一章 一般措置、及び経過措置

第八十一条

UNAH の大学院全課程は学部、又は大学地方センターに属する。学科は、その大学院課程コーディネーターの要請により、共通の合意のもと、学術活動を計画する。

第八十二条

学際的な特徴を持つ大学院課程は、学部、又は大学地方センターに属する。学際的大学院課程がサービスを受けられるように、大学院課程コーディネーターがメンバーとなる調整委員会が設置され、その大学院課程に関連する知識領域の発展が推進される。

第八十三条

大学院研究システム指導部は、各知識領域の特殊性を考慮し、大学院に関する手順書を作成する。手順書は大学院研究システム総審議会により承認を受ける。

第八十四条

この規則に規定がない項目は全て、大学院研究システム総審議会の事前要請により、大学審議会で解決される。

第八十五条

合意 No.348-E-2008 に則り、承認を受けた UNAH 大学院研究システム一般規則は撤廃される。

第八十六条

本規則が発効した際、既に運営されている大学院課程は、3 年以内に本規則で規定された項目を付け加えなくてはならない。

第八十七条

本規則は、公的日刊刊行物「官報」に掲載後、20 日経過した後に有効となる。

第二章

本規則を公的日間刊行物「官報」に掲載するよう、事務総局に指示する。

第三章

本合意は直ちに執行すべきものである。2017 年 10 月 27 日、首都圏自治体テグシガルパ市大学都市“ホセ・トリニダー・レジェス”において策定された。**大学審議会事務総局長マリア・ヴィクトリア氏に伝達のこと。CC:学術担当副大学長ベリンダ・フローレス・デ・メンドサ、大学院研究システム総審議会会長、判定委員会委員、事務局長エンマ・ヴィルヒニア・リベラ・メヒア、記録保管室** 法的手続きを目的とし、2018 年 4 月 9 日付で本書状を大学都市“ホセ・トリニダー・レジェス”にて発行する。**オスカル・アルキメデス・セラヤ 事務局長**

2018 年 7 月 18 日、公的日刊刊行物「官報」に掲載する目的で、首都圏自治体テグシガルパ市大学都市“ホセ・トリニダー・レジェス”で本証明書を発行する。

エンマ・ヴィルヒニア・リベラ・メヒア 事務局長

⑪ 2019 年 MCIGPD の収支報告（西語）

LIQUIDACIÓN AÑO FISCAL 2019
MAESTRIA EN COOPERACIÓN INTERNACIONAL Y GESTIÓN DE PROYECTOS
I PROMOCIÓN
ESTRUCTURA 2-04-64-01

INGRESOS	2019	2020
Saldo Disponible del año anterior	337,437.89	634,206.67
Ingresos Netos		
Estudiantes (Autofinanciados)	463,200.00	
Estudiantes (Becas)	99,600.00	
Otros Ingresos		
Gravables		
Exentos		
Ingresos Varios		
Gravables		
Exentos		
TOTAL INGRESOS	900,237.89	
EGRESOS		
Honorarios Profesionales de Personal Docente	162,548.00	
Honorarios Profesionales de Personal Administrativo		
Otros Egresos		
Fondos Especiales y Reintegrables		
Compras Varias		
Viáticos y Reembolso de Viáticos (estipendio)	91,376.22	
Pasajes Aereos	12,107.00	
Gastos Varios y Otros		
Transferencias		
TOTAL EGRESOS	266,031.22	
SALDO DISPONIBLE	634,206.67	

Fecha de Liquidación: 27/02/2020

Observaciones:

- Liquidación al 30 de diciembre de 2019 de la I promoción
- Cálculos con informes de Ingresos al 30 diciembre 2019.


UNAH
Maestría en Cooperación
Internacional de Desarrollo
Proyectos de Desarrollo
Lic. María Aracely Mazier
Coordinador General


Lic. Amilear Lagos
Administrador


Lic. Katerin Sarai Lagos
Especialista en Planificación y
Ejecución del Presupuesto

S.E.A.T.



UNAH
Universidad Nacional
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Maestría en Cooperación Internacional y Gestión de Proyectos de Desarrollo

Planta Docente I Promoción

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Maestría en Cooperación Internacional y Gestión de Proyectos de Desarrollo

Asesores de Trabajos de Graduación I Promoción

NO.	NOMBRE DEL ESTUDIANTE	TITULO	TIPO DE SALIDA DE PROYECTO	ASESOR	EMAIL
1	Karol Janeth Salazar Castillo	La agricultura Urbana, una alternativa de seguridad alimentaria para mujeres sobrevivientes de violencia domestica del 2017-2019	Sistematización de Experiencias	MSc. Mario Contreras	mmm.contreras@yahoo.com
2	Julieta Castellanos	Sistematización del Instituto Universitario en Democracia, Paz y Seguridad (IUDPAS)	Sistematización de Experiencias		
3	Néstor Omar Ulloa Anariba	Propuesta de sistematización de proyectos y elaboración de guía metodológica/pedag ógica de bibliotecas Blue Lupin, del proyecto "Leemos, Aprendemos y creamos para ser felices" de Plan Internacional Honduras en el	Sistematización de Experiencias	PhD. Edwin Medina	emedinaresearch@gmail.com



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Departamento de Lempira					
4	Lourdes Aracely González González	Propuesta de Proyecto de creación de Observatorio de inclusión financiera para MIPyMES de Honduras	Perfil de Proyecto	MSc. Robson Suazo	robson.suazo@unah.edu.hn
5	Densy Fabricio Arias García	Protección del bosque y el fortalecimiento de nuevos medios de vida en la villa de san Antonio-Comayagua	Perfil de proyectos	MSc. Justo Domingo Torres	jdto57@hotmail.com
6	Eduardo Mauricio Bravo Delgado	Impacto del Financiamiento a mujeres en la comunidad de Santa María de la Paz	Investigación	MSc. Ramón Álvarez	ramon.alvarez@unah.edu.hn
7	Hernán Ismael Corrales Guardado	Sistematización de experiencias del proyecto de redes para la prevención de violencias sociales, en la región central del 2018-2020	Sistematización de Experiencias	PhD. Bárbara Mejía	barbaramejiah@gmail.com
8	Lucia Irene Vijil Saybe	Influencia de la Cooperación Internacional en la Instalación de los proyectos	Investigación	MSc. Marta Mazier	marta.mazier@unah.edu.hn



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		extractivos en Honduras: Caso de las ZEDES			
9	Lourdes Suyapa Blandín Alonzo	Análisis del contenido y de lenguaje de noticieros y reportes sobre conflictos socio ambientales	Evaluación de Impacto	MSc. David Carias	davidcariasdavila@gmail.com
10	Fihama Lineth Pineda Flores	Fortalecimiento de las capacidades institucionales para la investigación científica en el sistema de educación superior público de Honduras	Perfil de Proyecto	PhD. Ivin Zelaya	iving.zelaya@unah.edu.hn
11	Ana Karenina Cardona Reyes	Sistematización de Proyecto de Observatorio Demográfico	Sistematización de Experiencias	MSc. Guadalupe Yaneth Carranza	gcarranza@unah.edu.hn
12	Dulce Roció Davis Contreras	Financiamiento de la Cooperación al proyecto educativo	Sistematización de Experiencias	PhD. Bárbara Mejía	barbaramejiah@gmail.com
13	Elisa Díaz Lupian	Financiamiento de la CID en el tratamiento y Manejo de Desechos Sólidos Urbanos Ambientales de Santa Lucía	Perfil de Proyecto		
14	Heidy Yolibeth Fúnez Flores	Mujeres, Sujetas de políticas para la construcción de Paz en las zonas	Investigación		



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15	Julia Elizabeth Ruiz Osorto	Elementos de la Armonización de la CID en Honduras	Investigación	Candidato a PhD. En ciencias del Desarrollo Humano	phd.ccsociales.cu@unah.edu.hn
16	Karen Judith Arteaga Portillo	Desarrollo de parques y su efecto en la población en la construcción de paz	Sistematización de Experiencias	MSc. Mariel Rivera	marielriveram@gmail.com
17	Leycy Pamela Cáceres Canales	Fortalecimiento de Mecanismos de Transparencia y Fiscalización de la Cooperación Internacional	Investigación		
18	Lidia Esperanza Nolasco Lara	Análisis Plan de Nación y Visión de País Desarrollo y avance de la Educación al 2019	Investigación	MSc. Héctor Moncada	hemoncada@unah.edu.hn
19	Luis Adalberto Lemus Ponce				
20	Manuel Antonio Oseguera Rodríguez	Proyecto de Desarrollo de capacidades técnicas productivas a jóvenes y mujeres vulnerables en el sector rural	Perfil de Proyecto	MSc. Patricia Duron	patricia.duron@unah.edu.hn
21	Mariela Lituania Aguilar Rodríguez	Impacto de la Reducción de Fondos de la CID de EEUU como	Evaluación de Impacto	MSc. David Carias	davidcariasdavila@gmail.com



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		mecanismo de cohesión para la disminución de las caravanas de migrantes			
22	Mónica Abigaíl Reyes Flores	La playa como Espacio público en la comunidad Garífuna de Triunfo de la Cruz, Tela, Atlántida	Investigación (IAP)	PhD. Edwin Medina	emedinaresearch@gmail.com




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La Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Honduras (UNAH), es una universidad estatal y autónoma responsable de organizar, dirigir y desarrollar *“La educación superior”*.

La Doctrina Pedagógica de la MCIGPD obedece a los lineamientos del Modelo Educativo de la UNAH, que se basa en una construcción fundamentada en las teorías constructivista, crítica y humanista.



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2

DIAGNÓSTICO: PUNTO DE PARTIDA DE LA MACIGPD

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Conocer las necesidades de la demanda potencial para diseñar un Plan de Estudios de MACIGPD a la medida (2016)



3

Diagnóstico de 2016 concluyo en:



Existe una demanda para el posgrado relacionada con mejorar las competencias metodológicas e instrumentales de los profesionales que trabajan en gestión del desarrollo, en el contexto de programas y proyectos de la cooperación y otros sectores.

4 dimensiones: a) Mecanismos e instrumentos para la Cooperación Internacional y Gestión de Proyectos de Desarrollo, b) principales ámbitos sectoriales de influencia y redes de colaboración, c) demanda de profesionales en el área de Cooperación Internacional y Gestión de Proyectos de Desarrollo, y d) perfil de egreso de los profesionales de la Carrera de Cooperación Internacional y Gestión de Proyectos de Desarrollo en el grado de Maestría.

Los ámbitos de intervención de las organizaciones e instituciones financiadas con fondos de cooperación externa: equidad de género (76 %), derechos humanos (64 %), la productividad y el desarrollo económico (64 %), la inclusión social y la gobernabilidad y ciudadanía (60%).

Los ámbitos menos atendidos: Cultura y el Patrimonio (16 %), la infraestructura (12 %), la seguridad y justicia (24 %) y el fortalecimiento estatal (20 %).

4



- El 84% de las organizaciones e instituciones que trabajan con fondos de cooperación mencionaron la necesidad de contar con profesionales calificados en el área de cooperación externa y gestión de proyectos.
- No existía para ese momento un posgrado de ese perfil en las universidades nacionales.
- Sectores que demandan profesionales:
 - El sector académico, particularmente en la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Honduras, a través de la vinculación entre Facultades, Unidades Académicas, Unidades Técnicas y de Gestión dentro de la misma universidad.
 - Las instituciones del Estado que ejecutan fondos de la cooperación.
 - ONG
 - ONG internacionales que integran el espacio ACI

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MAESTRÍA EN COOPERACIÓN INTERNACIONAL Y GESTIÓN DE PROYECTOS DE DESARROLLO

El propósito es formar profesionales que conozcan a profundidad los principios, funcionamiento y lógicas del sistema internacional de cooperación, sus actores, políticas e instrumentos.



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INFORMACIÓN GENERAL DE LA MCIGPD

- Duración de la maestría: 24 meses
- Unidades Valorativas: 45
- Número de Asignaturas: 14
- Inversión Económica: L.81,000.00
- Curso propedéutico: L. 2000.00
- Matricula: 2,200.00
- Mensualidad: 3,200.00 (24 meses)

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
OBJETIVO GENERAL



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profesionales de diferentes disciplinas interesados en comprender las particularidades del sistema, los instrumentos y mecanismos de cooperación internacional para el desarrollo, capacitados para trabajar, bajo una mirada crítica en el ámbito de la administración pública, las empresas, instituciones académicas y tercer sector; analizando las diferentes etapas del ciclo de programas y proyectos de desarrollo en sus campos de conocimiento más usuales, para proponer soluciones a los problemas de la sociedad en general y la hondureña en particular.

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PERFIL DE INGRESO DE LOS POSTULANTES A PCIGPD



- Egresado de las áreas de la Ciencias Sociales, Ciencias Económicas, Ingeniería y afines.
- Competencias conceptuales en el ámbito de la cooperación internacional, en política económica, sobre las teorías de las desigualdades sociales y conocimiento del contexto actual de país.
- Poseer competencias técnicas y habilidades en el manejo de programas computacionales para la planificación de proyectos de cooperación, tener experiencia en asistencia en proyectos de intervención, experiencia en redacción de documentos de investigación.
- Tener un razonamiento crítico de las problemáticas sociales y proposición clara para la construcción nuevos proyectos de cooperación para el desarrollo del país.

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REQUISITOS DE INGRESO



- Título universitario de licenciatura extendido o reconocido en la UNAH y fotocopia cotejada del mismo en cualquiera de las áreas siguientes: Ciencias Sociales, Ciencias Económicas, Ingeniería y Áreas afines.
- Haber obtenido un índice igual o superior al 70 % en los estudios de pregrado.
- Manejo de Internet y Microsoft Office.
- Remisión de la hoja de vida completa y carta de exposición de interés.
- Manejo del Idioma inglés a nivel de comprensión lectora.
- Asistencia a una entrevista.
- Aprobación de los cursos propedéuticos obligatorios.

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PERFIL DEL EGRESADO DE LA MCIGPD



Logradas competencias teóricas, metodológicas y actitudinales para laborar en:

- La administración pública, organizaciones no gubernamentales y de sociedad civil, organismos de cooperación internacional, empresas consultoras del sector y áreas de cooperación universitaria, entre otros.
- Podrán desempeñarse en las distintas fases del ciclo de planificación de la planificación, negociación programas y políticas de desarrollo.

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- Curso Propedéutico: 34 postulantes a Maestría.
- Matricula: 25 estudiantes.
- Matricula final: 22 (2 traslados laborales, 1 renuncio y 1 se reprobó).
- Una demanda creciente para segunda promoción 2020-2022 de más de 48 solicitudes.
- Documentados: 28
- En espera nuevos postulantes: 5

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RESULTADOS EVALUACION I PROMOCIÓN MCIGPD

- **Método:** Evaluación de estudiantes a docentes y coordinadores, reuniones de reflexión crítica.
- **Participantes en el proceso de evaluación**




Diagram illustrating the continuous evaluation process for permanent improvement:

- Estudiantes a docentes (cuestionario)
- Coordinadores con Coordinación General de Posgrados
- Entre Coordinadores de MCIGPD
- Coordinadores con profesores de MCIGPD
- Evaluación continua para la mejora permanente**

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Detalle del proceso de evaluación:

- Los estudiantes evaluaron a cada docente y coordinación, una vez finalizada la clase.
- Instrumento: cuestionario, reuniones de reflexión crítica y propuesta.

NO. ENCUESTAS EVALUARON	NO DE PROFESORES EVALUADOS	NO DE ESTUDIANTES QUE
240	14	22


Contenidos de evaluación del cuestionario:

- Contenidos de las asignaturas
- La asignatura aporó nuevos aspectos teóricos, metodológicos
- Sobre la Metodología Pedagógica
- Sobre la Bibliografía
- Sobre la interacción de los estudiantes-docentes
- Sobre la Coordinación
- El espacio físico

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
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VALORACION DE CONTENIDOS DE CADA ASIGNATURA




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
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
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LECCIONES APRENDIDAS

- Reorientar el Plan de Estudios en algunas asignaturas; ya que algunas están al final y deberían de considerarse como intermedias.
- Asegurar la cartera de profesores para la Maestría y de ser posible tener dos alternativas, en caso de que no puedan impartir la clase en su momento.
- Establecer una plataforma virtual y tecnológica para la Maestría, que mejore el acceso a fuentes de conocimientos científico.
- Actualización de conocimientos académicos de la planta docente
- El trabajo en equipo de la planta docente ha permitido elevar la calidad académica y administrativa del posgrado.

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LECCIONES APRENDIDAS

- Incrementar el acceso a recursos tecnológicos para mejorar la actividad del proceso enseñanza aprendizaje presencial y virtual.
- Gestionar con la cooperación becas totales o parciales para estudiantes.
- Generar acciones de autosostenibilidad y seguimiento a egresados: diplomados, seminarios con instituciones de cooperación y universidades internacionales.
- Lograr un plan de pasantías que aseguren la practica de los conocimientos adquiridos durante el proceso de estudios de Maestría (prácticas de campo).
- Dar a conocer detalladamente las Normas Académicas y Reglamento de antes del ingreso al PCIGPD

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ALGUNAS CONCLUSIONES GENERALES DE LA EVALUACIÓN



Cada asignatura aporta elementos teóricos y metodológicos para el proceso de aprendizaje y esta relacionada con la experiencia, dominio del tema y metodología utilizada por el docente.

El pensamiento crítico mejora con metodologías participativas atención del profesor al estudiante y pertinencia de los temas abordados.

Los contenidos de las asignaturas se muestran actualizados y pertinentes (80%).

La planta docente mantuvo una buena interacción con los estudiantes y coordinación, en una relación permanente de consulta, atención a recomendaciones e interés de mejora continua.

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- El seguimiento y asesoría oportuna a los trabajos de graduación aseguran la eficiencia terminal de la MCIGPD.
- Continuar con la gestión permanente de proyectos u otras iniciativas con la Cooperación, gobierno y Sociedad Civil, como por ej. con la Dirección de Cooperación Internacional de la Cancillería.
- Dar seguimiento a solicitud de UNAN de replicar la maestría para otros países, en modo semipresencial.
- Se debe mejorar el acceso a plataformas virtuales para mejorar la consulta y complementariedad en el proceso enseñanza aprendizaje.
- El espacio físico se mejorará con el traslado al nuevo edificio.



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
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**Y vamos por más en esta nueva promoción
de MCIGPD.**



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MUCHAS GRACIAS



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⑭ 第 1 期 MCIGPD 学生の卒業制作一覧（日本語）



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Trabajos de Graduación

I Promoción de la Maestría en Cooperación Internacional y Gestión de Proyectos de Desarrollo

No.	Nombre del Estudiante	Profesión	Título	Ubicación Geográfica	Tipo de salida de Proyecto
1	Karol Janeth Salazar Castillo	Licenciada en Trabajo Social	La agricultura Urbana, una alternativa de seguridad alimentaria para mujeres sobrevivientes de violencia domestica del 2017-2019	Col. Nueva Suyapa	Sistematización de Experiencias
2	Julieta Castellanos	Socióloga	Sistematización del Instituto Universitario en Democracia, Paz y Seguridad (IUDPAS)	Honduras - UNAH	Sistematización de Experiencias
3	Néstor Omar Ulloa Anariba	Licenciado en Literatura	Propuesta de sistematización de proyectos y elaboración de guía metodológica/pedagógica de bibliotecas Blue Lupin, del proyecto "Leemos, Aprendemos y creamos para ser felices" de Plan Internacional Honduras en el Departamento de Lempira	Departamento de Lempira - Honduras	Sistematización de Experiencias
4	Lourdes Aracely González González	Licenciada en Administración Pública	Propuesta de Proyecto de creación de Observatorio de inclusión financiera para MIPYMES de Honduras	Honduras	Perfil de Proyecto
5	Densy Fabricio Arias García	Ingeniero de Negocios en el Grado de Licenciatura	Protección del bosque y el fortalecimiento de nuevos medios de vida en la villa de san Antonio-Comayagua	Comayagua, Quebrada Honda	Perfil de proyectos
6	Eduardo Mauricio Bravo Delgado	Licenciado en Administración de Negocios Internacionales	Impacto del Financiamiento a mujeres en la comunidad de Santa María de la Paz	La Paz-Márcala	Investigación
7	Hernán Ismael Corrales Guardado	Licenciado en Trabajo Social	Sistematización de experiencias del proyecto de redes para la prevención de violencias sociales, en la región central del 2018-2020	Distrito Central	Sistematización de Experiencias
8	Lucia Irene Vijil Saybe	Licenciada en Comercio Internacional	Influencia de la Cooperación Internacional en la Instalación de los proyectos extractivos en Honduras: Caso de las ZEDES	Choluteca	Investigación
9	Lourdes Suyapa Blandín Alonzo	Licenciada en Economía	Análisis del contenido y de lenguaje de noticieros y reportes sobre conflictos socio ambientales	Comunidades del Norte y Occidente del País	Evaluación de impacto
10	Fihama Lineth Pineda Flores	Licenciada en Comercio Internacional	Fortalecimiento de las capacidades institucionales para la investigación científica en el sistema de educación superior público de Honduras	Honduras	Perfil de Proyecto



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11	Ana Karenina Cardona Reyes	Licenciada en Comunicación y Publicidad	Sistematización de Proyecto de Observatorio Demográfico	Tegucigalpa	Sistematización de Experiencias
12	Dulce Roció Davis Contreras	Licenciada en Psicología	Financiamiento de la Cooperación al proyecto educativo	Comayagua	Sistematización de Experiencias
13	Elisa Díaz Lupian	Licenciada en Lenguas Extranjeras con orientación en la enseñanza del Francés	Financiamiento de la CID en el tratamiento y Manejo de Desechos Sólidos Urbanos Ambientales de Santa Lucía	Santa Lucía	Perfil de Proyecto
14	Heidy Yolibeth Fúnez Flores	Licenciada en Trabajo Social	Mujeres, Sujetas de políticas para la construcción de Paz en las zonas		Investigación
15	Julia Elizabeth Ruiz Osoto	Licenciada en Relaciones Internacionales	Elementos de la Armonización de la CID en Honduras	Tegucigalpa	Investigación
16	Karen Judith Arteaga Portillo	Arquitecta en el Grado de Licenciatura	Construcción de los parques y su efecto en la población en la construcción de paz	Tegucigalpa	Sistematización de Experiencias
17	Leycy Pamela Cáceres Canales	Licenciada en Contaduría Pública y Finanzas	Fortalecimiento de Mecanismos de Transparencia y Fiscalización de la Cooperación Internacional	Tegucigalpa	Investigación
18	Lidia Esperanza Nolasco Lara	Licenciada en Economía	Análisis Plan de Nación y Visión de País Desarrollo y avance de la Educación al 2019	Tegucigalpa	Investigación
19	Luis Adalberto Lemus Ponce	Ingeniero Civil			
20	Manuel Antonio Oseguera Rodríguez	Licenciado en Sociología	Proyecto de Desarrollo de capacidades técnicas productivas a jóvenes y mujeres vulnerables en el sector rural		Perfil de Proyecto
21	Mariela Lituania Aguilar Rodríguez	Abogada	Impacto de la Reducción de Fondos de la CID de EEUU como mecanismo de coerción para la disminución de las caravanas de migrantes	Tegucigalpa	Evaluación de Impacto
22	Mónica Abigaíl Reyes Flores	Arquitecta	La playa como Espacio público en la comunidad Garífuna de Triunfo de la Cruz, Tela, Atlántida	Tela, Atlántida	Investigación (IAP)

応用 地質

ENGINEERING GEOLOGY

第 58 卷

第 4 号

2017年10月



一般社団法人 日本応用地質学会

ホンジュラス国立自治大学における応用地質学専攻の設立に係る提案

桑野 健*・エリザベス エスピノサ カナレス**

要 旨

中米のホンジュラス共和国では、鉱山資源の探査や研究、斜面災害対策等を目的として高等教育機関における応用地質学関連分野の専攻部門の設立を計画 중이다。著者らは独立行政法人国際協力機構の活動の一環で、ホンジュラス国立自治大学に対して、日本の大学における応用地質学教育の事例を踏まえて、応用地質学関連分野の専攻部門の設立に係る課題を整理したうえで実務的な提案を行ってきた。提案はカリキュラムに関わるもの、体制・組織に関わるもので、前者では地球科学入門、地球科学、応用GIS学、環境地質学、斜面防災学に係る授業科目の追加を提案し、カリキュラムマップを整理した。後者では「地質学教員の補充」と「他学部や他機関との連携・協力」を、それぞれ提案した。

本文は、これら課題と提案内容を取りまとめたものである。

Key words : 斜面防災 slope disaster risk reduction, 国際協力事業 international cooperation project, 教育カリキュラム education curriculum

1. はじめに

ホンジュラス共和国（以下、ホンジュラス）の首都テグシガルパ市は、南北9～13km程度、東西10～15km程度の広がりを持ち、四方を山に囲まれた海拔800～1,000m程度のテグシガルパ谷の中に位置する、人口約119万人の都市である（図-1）¹⁾。近年では山麓部や斜面部での都市開発の影響から地すべりや斜面崩壊が、特に雨季（5～11月）に頻発し、都市生活に多大な被害を及ぼしている^{2)～4)}。テグシガルパ市とその周辺地区を含めた首都圏で地形判読を行った研究では、1,500あまりの地すべり地形があることも指摘されており⁵⁾、将来的な対策が必要とされている。また同国には、潜在的な鉱山や地下資源が多く存在しており、経済発展に向けてこれら資源に係る地質調査・探査が望まれている⁶⁾。

しかしながら、斜面災害対策や鉱山資源の探査・研究等に係る地質調査を実施できる地質学者・技術者は、ホンジュラスにおいて現状では圧倒的に不足している。その要因は、地質学者・技術者育成のための地質学科を有する教育機関が、ホンジュラス国内では単科大学である私立ホンジュラス工科大学（Universidad Politécnica de Ingeniería）しか存在しないことが大きい。

そのため、高等教育機関における応用地質学関連分野の専攻部門の設立が、斜面防災管理や資源開発を実施する上での喫緊の課題であり、その設立がホンジュラス社会の発展並びに同国の地質学の進展に大きく寄与すると期待されている。

またホンジュラス以外の中南米諸国の状況をみると、アルゼンチン共和国、ブラジル連邦共和国、チリ共和国、コロンビア共和国、キューバ共和国、エクアドル共和国、ペルー共和国、ベネズエラ・ボリバル共和国の大学において、資源開発等を目的として地質学科や地球科学科が設立済みであり、地質学教育が導入されている⁷⁾。これら国々を含む中南米域19か国の高等教育機関で、2004～2007年にかけて、大学間の教育課程や学習内容、それらにより養成される能力や到達目標、カリキュラム構成や学位レベル等を議論する「ラテンアメリカTuningプロジェクト⁸⁾」が実施され、その地質部会で、地質学科や地球科学科において必要とされる能力・分野について標準的見解が共有された⁷⁾。また同プロジェクトの地質部会には入っていなかったものの、メキシコ合衆国のメキシコ国立自治大学には応用地質学科⁹⁾並びに地球科学科¹⁰⁾があり、地質学に係る高等教育が行われている。

このような背景のもと、国内最高学府であるホンジュラス国立自治大学（Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Honduras：以下、UNAH）は、これら課題に対応すべく、ラテンアメリカTuningプロジェクト地質部会の議論結果やメキシコ国立自治大学での事例等を参考に、応用地質学

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


図-1 ホンジュラス共和国と首都テグシガルパ市の位置図

関連分野の専攻部門の設立を2012年以降、計画中である。学科の教員に関しては、土木や河川、土壌を研究対象としている複数の大学院生が2017～2019年にかけて国外大学にて学位取得予定であり、これら大学院生は学位取得後UNAで研究を続けることが条件となっているため、帰国後、ホンジュラスにおける応用地質教育の拠点となる当該学科の教員になることが期待されている。また、UNA理学部の中には、地理学、地球物理学、気象学、地盤工学、GISの分野の研究者からなる地球科学研究所（Instituto Hondureño de Ciencias de la Tierra：以下、IHCIT）が存在しており、応用地質学関連分野の専攻部門の設立を技術的に支援することが可能である。

著者らは、日本の独立行政法人国際協力機構（Japan International Cooperation Agency：以下、JICA）が2015年2月～2016年9月に実施した個別専門家派遣「ホンジュラス国 首都圏における地すべり対策能力強化支援（以下、本プロジェクト）」^{11)～12)}の一活動として、日本の大学における応用地質学教育の事例を踏まえて、UNAの応用地質学関連分野の専攻部門の設立に係る課題を整理したうえで実務的な提案を2015年4～8月に行った。本文は、これら課題と提案内容を取りまとめたものであり、日本で長年培われてきた応用地質学に係る経験・教訓が、国際協力事業の観点から中米ホンジュラスの自立発展に大きく貢献した好例として報告する。

なお、ホンジュラスではスペイン語が公用語として広く用いられ、周辺の中南米諸国においてもブラジル連邦共和国を除き、いずれもスペイン語が公用語となっている。

2. 関連組織の概要

2.1 UNA全体

応用地質学関連分野の専攻部門を設立予定のUNAは1847年に設立されたホンジュラス最初の大学で、10学部（社会学部、宇宙学部、人間・芸術学部、理学部、経済学部、法学部、歯学部、化学・薬学部、工学部、医学部）から構成されており、テグシガルパ首都圏の中央校舎と、八つの地方校舎に、約80,000人の学生、3,000人以上の教員が在籍する国内最大の国立大学である⁶⁾。また、UNA全体の2014年の年間予算は約42億レンピラ（約230億円）である⁶⁾。

一年は3学期制（一学期：15週間）であり、毎年1月、5月、9月が学期始まりであり、学生はいずれの学期から入学することが可能で、必要単位を取得し条件を満たした時点で卒業となる。そのため学期ごとに所属学生数が異なる。標準的には卒業までの期間は4年とのことであるが、UNA教員への聞き取りによると、実際に4年間で卒業できるのは全学生の10%未満とのことである。なお、各入学時期の4～5ヶ月程度前に簡単な入学試験が実施される。授業料は多少の変動はあるものの、一学期あたり300レンピラ（約1,600円）前後と非常に安価である。

2.2 UNA理学部

UNAの10学部の一つである理学部は、物理学科、数学科、生物学科、微生物学科の四学科から構成され、各学科から独立した研究組織としてIHCITがある（図-2）¹³⁾。理学部全体の年間予算は約1億1,700万レンピラ（約6億円）（2014年）であり、各学科にはほぼ均等に振り分けられることから学科ごとの年間予算は3,000万レンピラ（約1.6億円）程度となる¹³⁾。




図-2 理学部の組織図

2.2.1 理学部物理学科

応用地質学関連分野の専攻部門は、理学部の一学科である物理学科内に設立する¹⁴⁾。理学部物理学科内に設立する理由について、当初物理学科より設立が提言されたこと、物理学科には応用地質学に関連の深い分野である地球物理学や測地学等の教員が多く在籍していることに加え、IHCIT設立（2007年）に対応した物理学科教員が、今回の応用地質学関連分野の専攻部門の設立に係るフィージビリティ調査やカリキュラム検討に大きく関わったためである。

理学部物理学科は全学年あわせて約3,500人の学生がおり、大学院修士課程、学士課程、冶金学技術者育成コースに分かれている。大学院修士課程はリスクマネジメント学と理論物理学から構成され、学士課程は地球物理学、固体物理学、ニュートン力学の3専攻から構成されている。今回設立を提案した「応用地質学」専攻は、物理学科学士課程の中の4番目の専攻となる（図-3）。

2.2.2 理学部IHCIT

IHCITは理学部に属する研究組織で2007年に設立され、研究分野は水文気象・気候変動、リスクマネジメント、地

球物理の三つに大きく分類され、現在のところ災害リスクマネジメント学修士と水資源・水文学修士の二つの修士課程が存在している。

IHCITには、物理学や地球科学、気象学、土木学、GIS等を専門とする17名の教員（技官4名を含む）がおり、2015年3月よりエクアドル共和国より地質学を専門とする教員が新たに増員された。教員17名の最終学歴は、博士1名、修士5名、学士7名、学士を持たないもの4名（技官）であり、学士以上のもつ教員は授業を行い学生の指導にあたるほか当該分野の研究を主任者として実施しており、技官は基本的には実験や野外活動、研究を支援する立場である。また言語能力として、英語を使用可能な教員は4名程度で、他の教員は単文等のごく簡単な英語に限り理解できる。

なお、IHCIT独自の調査費・プロジェクト費等の予算はなく、教員の人件費は理学部予算から支出されている。

3. 設立される応用地質学専攻の当初計画

UNAHでは地質学科はなかったものの、2004～2007年のラテンアメリカTuningプロジェクト地質部会に、理学部物理学科の教員が参加し、地質学関連分野において必要な能力等に係る議論に参加した。その知見を踏まえて、2012年に理学部物理学科から、カリキュラムを担当する副学長、並びに教員組合に対して、応用地質学専攻の新規設立を進言した。設立にあたり、副学長や学部長等から構成されるUNAH理事会より、進言した物理学科に対して、応用地質学専攻の設立に係るフィージビリティ調査やカリキュラム案の検討が指示された。

2013年、授業カリキュラムの検討に向けて、中南米諸国をはじめとするスペイン語圏・ポルトガル語圏の大学における応用地質学関連分野の学科や専攻ですでに導入されている実際のカリキュラムを入手した（表-1）。入手したカリキュラムに基づいて、物理学科では、応用地質学専攻で必要であろうと考えられる科目を列挙した。これと並行し、ラテンアメリカTuningプロジェクト（2015）⁸⁾を参考に、応用地質学専攻で必要とされる能力・分野について、中南米諸国の地質学関連の大学教授11名、国内の民間企業・研究機関6社、高校生250名、政府機関（関係各省庁）から、2013年の前半と後半の2回に分けて聞き取り調査・アンケート調査を実施した¹⁵⁾。調査の質問項目は「地質図を踏査から作成する能力」、「企業での就業能力」など45項目があり、回答者が応用地質学専攻において必要と思う度合いを5段階評価（5が極めて必要、1が極めて不必要）で記載した。また先に取りまとめた応用地質学専攻で必要であろうと考えられる科目についても、回答者が同様に5段階で評価した。その結果、必要と思われる能力・科目の優先順位が整理された。




図-3 物理学科の組織図

表-1 スペイン語圏・ポルトガル語圏の大学における応用地質学関連分野の学科

No.	国名	大学名	学科 (専攻)
1	メキシコ合衆国	Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico	地球科学
2	メキシコ合衆国	Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico	地質工学
3	メキシコ合衆国	Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico	地球物理
4	メキシコ合衆国	Centro de Estudios Superiores del Estado de Sonora	地球科学
5	メキシコ合衆国	Instituto Politecnico Nacional	地質工学
6	メキシコ合衆国	Instituto Tecnologico Superior de Tacambaro	地球科学工学
7	メキシコ合衆国	Universidad autonoma de nayarit	地球物理
8	メキシコ合衆国	Universidad autonoma de nayarit	地質工学・鉱物学
9	メキシコ合衆国	Universidad Autonoma del Estado de Hidalgo	環境地質工学
10	メキシコ合衆国	Universidad de Sonora	地質
11	グアテマラ共和国	Universidad San Carlos	地質科学
12	グアテマラ共和国	Universidad Tecnologica de Tulancingo	地質工学
13	ニカラグア共和国	Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Nicaragua, Managua	地質工学
14	パナマ共和国	Universidad Tecnologica de Panama	地球物理
15	パナマ共和国	Universidad Tecnologica de Panama	地質工学
16	アルゼンチン共和国	Universidad Nacional de Catamarca	地質
17	アルゼンチン共和国	Universidad Nacional de La Rioja	地質
18	アルゼンチン共和国	Universidad Nacional de La Rioja	水文地質
19	アルゼンチン共和国	Universidad Nacional de Piura	地質工学
20	アルゼンチン共和国	Universidad Nacional de Rio Negro	地質
21	アルゼンチン共和国	Universidad Nacional de San Luis	地質科学
22	アルゼンチン共和国	Universidad Nacional de Tucuman	測地学・地球科学
23	アルゼンチン共和国	Universidad Nacional de Tucuman	地質
24	アルゼンチン共和国	Universidad Nacional del Comahue	地質科学
25	アルゼンチン共和国	Universidad Nacional del Litoral	水資源工学
26	アルゼンチン共和国	Universidad Nacional del Sur	地質
27	エクアドル共和国	Escuela Politecnica del Ejercito	地理・環境工学
28	コロンビア共和国	Universidad de America	石油工学
29	コロンビア共和国	Universidad de Ciencias Aplicadas y Ambientales	地球物理・環境工学
30	チリ共和国	Universidad de Chile	地質
31	チリ共和国	Universidad Andres Bello	地質
32	チリ共和国	Universidad Andres Bello	地質工学
33	チリ共和国	Universidad de Playa Ancha	地質・鉱物学
34	チリ共和国	Universidad Pedro de Valdivia	地質
35	ブラジル連邦共和国	Centro Universitario Augusto Motta	石油工学
36	ブラジル連邦共和国	Centro Universitario de Vila Velha	地質
37	ブラジル連邦共和国	Universidade de Sao Paulo	石油工学
38	ブラジル連邦共和国	Universidade de Sao Paulo	地質
39	ブラジル連邦共和国	Universidade Federal da Bahia	地質
40	ブラジル連邦共和国	Universidade Federal de Ouro Preto	地質工学
41	ブラジル連邦共和国	Universidade Federal do Parana	地質
42	ブラジル連邦共和国	Universidade Federal Fluminense	石油工学
43	ブラジル連邦共和国	Universidade Federal Rural do Rio de Janeiro	地質
44	ブラジル連邦共和国	Universidade Iguacu	石油工学・天然ガス工学
45	ブラジル連邦共和国	Universidade Iguacu	石油工学
46	ベネズエラ・ボリバル共和国	Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Educacion Universitaria	石油工学
47	ベネズエラ・ボリバル共和国	Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Educacion Universitaria	石油化学・精製工学
48	ベネズエラ・ボリバル共和国	Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Educacion Universitaria	石油化学工学
49	ベネズエラ・ボリバル共和国	Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Educacion Universitaria	石油工学
50	ベネズエラ・ボリバル共和国	Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Educacion Universitaria	地球科学工学
51	ベネズエラ・ボリバル共和国	Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Educacion Universitaria	地質
52	ベネズエラ・ボリバル共和国	Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Educacion Universitaria	測地学
53	ベネズエラ・ボリバル共和国	Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Educacion Universitaria	地質工学
54	ベネズエラ・ボリバル共和国	Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Educacion Universitaria	地質・鉱山学
55	ベネズエラ・ボリバル共和国	Universidad Bolivariana de Chile	地質
56	ベネズエラ・ボリバル共和国	Universidad Central de Venezuela	地化学
57	ベネズエラ・ボリバル共和国	Universidad Nacional Experimental de los Llanos Occidentales Ezequiel Zamora	石油工学
58	ペルー共和国	Universidad Nacional de Cajamarca	地質工学
59	ペルー共和国	Universidad Nacional de Ingenieria	地質工学
60	ペルー共和国	Universidad Nacional de Rio Cuarto	地質
61	ペルー共和国	Universidad Privada Antonio Guillermo Urrelo	地質
62	ボリビア共和国	Universidad Autonoma Juan Misael Saracho	石油工学・天然ガス工学
63	ボリビア共和国	Universidad Autonoma Juan Misael Saracho	石油化学工学
64	ボリビア共和国	Universidad pontificia de salamanca	石油工学・天然ガス工学
65	ボリビア共和国	Universidad San Francisco Xavier de Chuquisaca	石油工学・天然ガス工学
66	ボリビア共和国	Universidad Tecnica de Oruro	地質工学
67	スペイン王国	Universidad de Buenos Aires	地質
68	スペイン王国	Universidad de Granada	地質
69	スペイン王国	Universidad de Huelva	地質
70	スペイン王国	Universidad de Huelva	環境地球科学
71	スペイン王国	Universidad de Jaen	測地学・地図製法
72	スペイン王国	Universidad de las Palmas de Gran Canaria	地球物理・地形学
73	スペイン王国	Universidad de las Palmas de Gran Canaria	地球物理・地形学 (応用)
74	スペイン王国	Universidad de las Palmas de Gran Canaria	安全・リスク管理
75	スペイン王国	Universidad de Oviedo	地質
76	スペイン王国	Universidad de Salamanca	地質
77	スペイン王国	Universidad de Salamanca	地質工学
78	スペイン王国	Universidad de Zaragoza	地質
79	スペイン王国	Universidad Politecnica de Madrid	地質工学
80	スペイン王国	Universidad Politecnica de Madrid	地質
81	スペイン王国	Universidad Politecnica de Madrid	測地学・地図製法
82	スペイン王国	Universitat de Barcelona	地質
83	スペイン王国	Universitat de Barcelona	地質工学
84	ポルトガル共和国	Universidade de Aveiro	地質工学
85	ポルトガル共和国	Universidade de Coimbra	地質
86	ポルトガル共和国	Universidade de Evora	地質工学
87	ポルトガル共和国	Universidade de Evora	気象・地球科学
88	ポルトガル共和国	Universidade de Lisboa	地質
89	ポルトガル共和国	Universidade do Minho	地質
90	ポルトガル共和国	Universidade do Porto	地質

なお、カリキュラム案を選定していく過程で、ラテンアメリカ・エネルギー機構（Organización Latinoamericana de Energia）に所属する地質技術者から助言は受けたものの、その他の国際ドナーやNGO等からの支援はなかった。

これら調査に基づいてUNAHは2014年後半に授業カリキュラムの当初案を作成した。JICA支援である本プロジェクトは2015年2月に開始しており、UNAH当初案に対して、課題を整理するとともに提言を行った。以下にUNAH当初案の概要を示す。

3.1 授業カリキュラム

UNAHにおいて当初計画していた応用地質学専攻のカリキュラムは、4年間で56科目：241単位（52科目：221単位が必須、4科目：20単位が選択科目）を取るようになっており、数学・物理・化学等の基礎科目から学び始め、堆積学・構造地質学・鉱物学・岩石学・地形学・物理探査等の専門科目を学んだ後に、最終年（4年次頃）に「石油地質学」、「鉱山地質学」、「土木地質学」、「地熱学」の4分野のうち、1分野を選択する（表-2）。

なお、UNAHは将来的には、最終年に選択する分野を現状の4分野のほか「水文地質学」、「環境地質学」等を加えたいと考えているほか、現在は学士課程だけの計画であるが、修士課程を開設したいと考えている。

募集する学生は60人程度/学期（180人程度/年）で、入学する学生は高校卒業生、ないし物理学科内で他の専攻に変更したい大学生である。

3.2 卒業条件

応用地質学専攻を卒業するためには、規定の授業単位の取得や卒業論文の作成・提出等、以下に示すすべての条件を満たす必要がある¹⁶⁾。

- ・規定された授業単位（基礎科目、専門科目）の70%以上（基礎科目・専門科目221単位中155単位以上）を取得すること
- ・民間企業や官公庁で40時間以上のボランティアを実施すること
- ・関連する企業において、監督指導員のもと800時間以上の仕事に従事すること
- ・卒業論文を作成し、卒論発表会を実施して、審査員から承認をもらうこと
- ・言語（スペイン語や英語等）、コンピュータ技術、教職に係る必要資格を取得すること

ボランティアや企業での就業経験、資格取得等は、授業単位として換算・充当されるわけではなく、上記すべての活動を実施することが卒業条件となる。

卒業論文の作成に際しては、各学生は特定の担当教員に指導を受けるわけではなく、また日本のように研究室という概念もないため、4年次に選択した分野（石油地質学、鉱山地質学、土木地質学、地熱学）に関係する研究を独自

表-2 応用地質学専攻のカリキュラム（当初案）

分野	No.	科目名	単位
基礎科目	1	スペイン語	4
	2	社会学	4
	3	ホンジュラス歴史	4
	4	哲学	4
	5	自然科学	3
	6	人文科学	3
	7	芸術・体育	3
	8	外国語	3
	9	数学Ⅰ	5
	10	一般物理学Ⅰ	5
	11	基礎化学	4
専門科目	12	幾何学・三角法	5
	13	ベクトル・行列	3
	14	微積分Ⅰ	5
	15	微積分Ⅱ	5
	16	微分方程式	3
	17	統計学	3
	18	一般物理学Ⅱ	5
	19	一般物理学Ⅲ	5
	20	分析化学	6
	21	有機化学	6
	22	生物学	4
	23	製図	3
	24	画法幾何学	4
	25	地理情報学	4
	26	職業倫理	3
	27	経済学	3
	28	プロジェクト管理・投資	3
	29	物理地質学	4
	30	鉱物学	5
	31	光学鉱物学	5
	32	内部地球力学	3
	33	火成岩岩石学	5
	34	堆積岩岩石学	5
	35	堆積学	4
	36	層序学	4
	37	古生物学	4
	38	変成岩岩石学	4
	39	構造地質学	4
	40	テクトニクス学	4
	41	地史学	4
	42	地形学	4
	43	一般地化学	5
	44	一般測地学	5
	45	物理探査	6
	46	地質図作成と空中・衛星写真地質学	4
	47	地下開発学	4
	48	水文地質学	5
	49	ホンジュラス・中米の地質	5
	50	ホンジュラスの資源とニーズ	4
	51	野外地質学	6
	52	生活地質学	5
	53	石油地質学	5
	54	石油地化学	5
	55	井戸掘削	5
	56	微古生物学	5
	57	鉱山地質学	5
	58	鉱床学	5
	59	地球統計学	5
	60	探掘技術	5
	61	土木地質学	5
	62	岩石・土質力学	5
	63	応用地質工学Ⅰ	5
	64	応用地質工学Ⅱ	5
	65	地熱力学	5
	66	地熱資源開発技術	5
	67	地熱資源	5
	68	火山学、熱水学、火山ハザード	5

で実施し、原則的には独自で論文を作成することとなる。研究や論文作成にあたり質問や相談がある場合は、適宜、各自が適正と判断する学内教員や学外技術者に指導を仰ぐことになっている。

卒論発表会は、3名の審査員や他の学生の前で行われ、十分な質疑応答ができたと判断されれば合格となる。卒論発表会の審査員は、UNAHの教授だけでなく、民間企業や政府機関の技術者等でもよいことになっている。

3.3 体制・組織

応用地質学専攻の基礎科目は、現在の理学部物理学科の教員が担当し、専門科目は物理学科及びIHCITの教員が主に受け持つ。

地質学自体を教えることができる教員については、1990年～2000年代にアメリカ合衆国及びロシア連邦に留学した2名の教授が理学部にいるほか、IHCITにおいて新規で2015年3月に地質学講師が1名採用された。しかしながら、いまだ十分ではないため新規採用が必要であり、UNAHでは2014年からメディア広報等を引き続いて行っており、教員を広く募集している。カリキュラム検討で主に参考としたメキシコ合衆国メキシコ国立自治大学と、ラテンアメリカTuningプロジェクト地質部会で協議を共に実施したキューバ共和国に対して2015年からはじめから地質学関連の教員を要請しているが、2017年3月時点では未定である。なお、教員はスペイン語が必須であるが、大学4年生程度以上の授業であれば英語でも問題ない。また、教員はホンジュラス国内の他大学でも教鞭をとれるような大学間教員共用プログラムが存在する。

4. 日本の大学の地球科学系学科におけるカリキュラム

日本の大学における地球科学系、特に地質学に係る学士課程のカリキュラムについて、筑波大学生命環境学群地球学類¹⁷⁾や京都大学理学部地球惑星科学系¹⁸⁾、愛媛大学理学部地球科学科¹⁹⁾等の事例を参照して整理した(図-4)。

日本のカリキュラムでは、1年次において外国語や情報処理等の基礎科目と平行して、数学、物理学、化学、生物学等の理学の専門基礎科目を履修するほか、地質学入門や地球科学基礎論等の概論的講義をオムニバス形式で実施することが多い。2年次からは地質学の基本となる鉱物学や岩石学等に加えて、地球史²⁰⁾等の専門科目を履修しはじめる。3年次には固体地球科学²¹⁾や地質構造解析法²²⁾等、より専門的な分野の講義を受講しながら、合わせて地球科学に係る実験や野外実習等を行う。4年次には、1～3年次での学習に基づいて、各学生が卒業研究に従事する。

日本国内の地球科学系学科では、2～3年次における地質学関連の科目と平行して、昨今問題となっている環境保全や自然災害、さらにはこれらの調査ツールとしてのGISやリモートセンシングについての教育を実施している大学




図-4 日本国内の大学におけるカリキュラム例(筑波大学生命環境学群地球学類(上)および京都大学理学部地球惑星科学系(下))

も少なくない。信州大学理学部地球学コース²³⁾では自然環境保全に係る科目を必須とし、高知大学理学部応用理学科²⁴⁾では災害科学コースを設立して斜面災害等の災害現象とその調査方法に係る講義を実施している。千葉大学理学部地球科学科²⁵⁾では必修科目(一部、選択必修科目)としてリモートセンシング概論やGIS実習等を開講している。

これら日本の大学での事例を参考に、次章において応用地質学専攻の設立に係る提案を行った。

5. 応用地質学専攻の設立に係る提案

5.1 課題の整理

前章までに示した応用地質学専攻のUNAHの当初提案内容、並びに日本における地球科学系学科のカリキュラムを勘案した場合、大きく分けて「斜面災害が多いホンジュラスでの大学教育としては不十分なカリキュラム」と「教員不足」という二つの課題があると判断した。

カリキュラムについては、中南米諸国の地球科学系教員

からのアンケート調査等を踏まえて検討しているが、当初の案では基礎科目（数学や物理学）からすぐに専門科目（岩石学等）を学習することになっている。一般的に地質学に係る専門科目をよりよく理解するために、地質学の基礎論や概論を理解したうえで、各種専門科目を学習することが望ましいと考える。また、専門科目として、ホンジュラスで深刻な問題となっている斜面災害に係る科目が存在していない。応用地質学専攻設立の主目的が資源開発であることから、やむを得ない面もあるが、2000年以降、JICAプロジェクトにおいて斜面災害対策を実施している^{26)~27)}ことから、専門科目に、斜面防災に対してGIS・リモートセンシングを使った調査・解析・評価の基礎を学ぶ科目、環境と斜面防災との関連に係る科目等を追加する。さらに4年次の選択科目として「斜面防災学」そのものを加えることが望ましい。

教員については、地球科学系の分野を教えることができる人材が圧倒的に不足している。現在、近隣諸国等から教員を募集しているが、この人材不足は、応用地質学専攻の設立にあたり喫緊の課題である。そのため、理学部だけでなく、斜面防災に関連の深い土質工学や岩盤力学等の講義を行っている工学部等の他学部、さらには実際の災害対策を行っているテグシガルパ市役所等の行政機関との連携・協力が必要である。

5.2 カリキュラムに係る提案

既存のUNAH案における応用地質学専攻のカリキュラムでは、資源開発の基礎に係る科目については概ね網羅さ

れていたことから、斜面防災に係る基本的な知識・技術が習得できるように新たなカリキュラム案を提案した。

5.2.1 基礎科目（1年次）

提案1：地質学の紹介「地球科学入門」の追加

基礎科目では数学や一般物理学、基礎化学等の概論が開講されることになっているが、応用地質学専攻では1年次の早い段階で「地球科学入門」を基礎科目に追加することを提案した。

「地球科学入門」では、第4章に示した日本の大学の事例を参照して、オムニバス形式として各教員が一回ずつ授業・実習を担当し、各専門科目の紹介を行う。これにより、学生はどの科目がどのような内容を実施するのか、どの教員がどのような研究を行っているのかを理解することが可能となり、地質学への理解、さらには応用地質学専攻への期待が高まると思われる。授業スケジュール案は、通常のUNAH物理学科の授業形式¹⁶⁾に則って、一学期間（15週間）で合計120時間の学習を行って5単位を取得するものとした（表-3）。内容は1週間のうち学内において講義と実習を6時間行い、学外での課題レポート作成やグループ討議等の自主学習を2時間とした。

なお、ホンジュラスでは大学入学前の高等学校や中学校においては、地学や地球科学に関連するカリキュラムは存在しない。小学校低学年から理科の授業が開始され、中学校から高等学校にかけて理学系では物理学及び化学の授業があるのみである。そのため、地質学の基本的概念を理解するため、カリキュラムの最初の段階で「地球科学入門」や次節に示す「地球科学」を実施することは非常に有意義である。

5.2.2 専門科目（1年次～3年次）

提案2：地質学の基礎概論「地球科学」の追加

応用地質学に係るこれら専門科目をよりよく理解するために、地質学の基礎論や流れを十分に理解したうえで、各種専門科目を学習することが望ましい。そのため、地質学の基本科目である「地球科学」を専門科目の初期に追加す

表-3 提案授業スケジュール（案）

科目名	週/学期 (週間)	学内学習(時間)		学外学習(時間)		単位
		週あたり	学期あたり	週あたり	学期あたり	
地球科学入門	15	6	90	2	30	5
地球科学	15	6	90	2	30	5
応用GIS学	15	6	90	2	30	5
環境地質学	15	6	90	2	30	5
斜面防災学	15	3	45	6	90	5

表-4 提案授業の講義・実習内容（案）

科目	地球科学	応用GIS学	環境地質学 ²⁸⁾ を一部変更	斜面防災学
講義 実習 内容 (案)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 地球の概観・大きさ 地球の重力とアイソスタシー 地球の地磁気 地球の地震波と内部構造 地殻と鉱物 岩石一般 プレートテクトニクス概論 地球の大気 海洋と気象 水文・湖沼・河川・氷河 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> GIS基礎とソフトウェア リモートセンシング基礎 デジタルデータの入手 空間データの加工・処理 空間解析 マップの作成と活用 斜面防災への適用 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 人間・地質・環境の関係 地球システムと気候変動 地震と人間活動、火山と人間活動 風化、土壌、浸食、土壌汚染 水資源と水環境(水質汚染)、地下水の大量消費と地盤沈下 海岸環境と人間活動 水河と長期気候変動 乾燥と砂漠化 鉱物資源と社会、エネルギーと環境 廃棄物と地質 	<p>【講義・実習】</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 斜面災害(地すべり、落石、岩盤崩壊、土石流)の概要、事例紹介 斜面災害と地質・地形の関係(材料と様式、風化と劣化等を含む) 斜面災害の地形判読(空中・衛星写真判読) 地すべり安定解析(落石シミュレーション・土石流シミュレーションの紹介を含む) 斜面災害に係るハザード評価 ハザードマップの作成と活用 火山災害とその対策・管理 地震災害とその対策・管理 洪水災害とその対策・管理 産業災害(鉱山災害、地盤沈下、汚染問題など)の現状 ハザードマップの作成と活用 <p>【フィールドワーク】</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 斜面災害現場視察・事例紹介 斜面防災対策構造物現場視察

ることを提案した。「地球科学」の授業スケジュール案は表-3のとおりで、講義内容案は表-4のとおりである。

提案3：地理情報のデジタル活用「応用GIS学」の追加

専門科目25「地理情報学」で学んだ地理情報の基礎を実際の応用地質学に活用する目的で、GIS関連分野を応用的・発展的に学習し、地質図や地下資源分布図、地すべりマップ等の作成・編集・解析に繋げられることが望ましい。また、治安が悪く現地調査が困難であるホンジュラスでは、高解像度の衛星写真や地形標高データは、GISを用いた地すべりマップ等の作成に有益であることから、本科目にはリモートセンシングの知識と技術の学習も含めるべきである。そのため「応用GIS学」を専門科目として追加することを提案した。なお、他学部の地理学科等で類似の講義を実施している可能性があるため、これら学部との連携・協力が必要となる。「応用GIS学」の授業スケジュール案は表-3のとおりで、講義内容案は表-4のとおりである。

提案4：地質・人間・生活の関連を理解する「環境地質学」の追加

火山性堆積物が主体のテグシガルパ首都圏では、急峻な地形条件に人口が密集しており、斜面災害が頻発している。周辺の環境と斜面防災、地質学との関連を予め学んでおくことが、環境保全・防災対策に係る理解を助けると考え、自然環境保全に係る科目を必須とする日本の大学の事例²³⁾を参考に、「環境地質学」を専門科目に追加することを提案した。

「環境地質学」は「土地地質学」よりも広い範囲、例えば斜面災害の発生原因となる粘土鉱物、地熱開発にともなうカドミウム汚染等を取り扱うほか、斜面災害の素因に関係する火山性堆積物を学習することができる。授業スケジュール案は表-3のとおりで、講義内容案²⁸⁾は表-4のとおりである。

5.2.3 4年次選択科目

提案5：斜面災害の現象・対策・管理を理解する「斜面防災学」の追加

応用地質学専攻の4年次には石油地質学、鉱山地質学、土地地質学、地熱学の4分野のうち、1分野を選択する。これら4分野についても当初のUNAH案のシラバス¹⁶⁾において、授業内容や授業スケジュール、卒業に必要な単位数等が明文化・体系化されている。

そこで、本プロジェクトによる新規提案では、応用地質学専攻において斜面防災を5番目の新たな分野として追加するのではなく、岩石・土質力学や応用地質工学を学習することになっている¹⁶⁾「土地地質学」分野の中に、「斜面防災学」の科目を追加することとした。この形式が応用地質学専攻の設立が2018年1月に予定されているUNAHには、最も効率的であると考えたためである。

応用地質学専攻において「斜面防災学」科目を受講することにより、斜面防災対策・管理の基礎を理解することができ、ホンジュラス国内で頻発している斜面災害に対して

その対策や管理の方法について検討することが可能となる。また、中南米地域で問題となっている火山や地震等の各種自然災害全般に係る講義も行うことが望ましい。

「斜面防災学」の授業スケジュール案は、通常のUNAH物理学科4年次の研究形式¹⁶⁾に則って、一学期間（15週間）で合計135時間の学習を行って3単位を取得するものとした（表-3）。内容は1週間のうち学内において講義と実習を3時間行い、学外での課題レポート作成やグループ討議、現地調査等の自主学習を6時間とした。講義内容案は表-4のとおりである。

本科目で学んだ内容は、道路斜面やダム湖の斜面、トンネル坑口斜面の安定性評価に利用でき、就職先としては大学や研究所等の研究機関、市役所や省等の行政機関、建設会社等が挙げられる。

5.2.4 カリキュラムマップ（カリキュラムツリー）の提案

カリキュラムマップはカリキュラムツリーとも呼ばれ、履修すべき科目を分類し系統立てて理解しやすいことから、近年、その概念が日本の大学においても導入されており²⁹⁾、図-4に示したとおり地質学科においても利用されている^{17)~20)}。

UNAHをはじめホンジュラスの大学においてはまだカリキュラムマップの概念は導入されていないが、本プロジェクトでは、応用地質学専攻の新規学生が、上記で提案した科目を含めて、基礎科目、専門科目、4年次選択科目を系統立てて、効率的・効果的に学習することができるようカリキュラムマップを提案した（図-5）。カリキュラムマップを活用することによって、授業の必要性や選択の方向性を理解することが可能となる。

5.3 体制・組織に係る提案

本プロジェクトによる新たな提案においては、現在の理学部の教員が応用地質学専攻の基礎科目と専門科目の一部について担当するほか、IHCITも専門科目の一部を受け持つ。

地質学関連の教員については理学部に現在2名いるが、十分ではないため、新規で採用が必要であり、UNAHではメディア広報等を行うほか、近隣諸国に対して地質学関連の教員を要請中である。国内では若干名の応募があったが、地球科学系の出身でない等あり、採用に至っていない。

提案6：地質学教員の補充

地質学、特に本プロジェクトで提案する「斜面防災学」を担当できる教員がいなかったことから、斜面防災の授業を実施できる教員を1名から数名補充することを提案した。

斜面防災学は4年次の科目であるため、応用地質学教員の補充は応用地質学専攻の設立時点でなくともよく、設立以降とする。また地質学教員はUNAH理学部の教員に対して地質学・応用地質学に係る技術移転を行い、将来的にはUNAH側が自立的に応用地質学教育を実施していける体制の構築を目指す。




図-5 カリキュラムマップ (案)

提案7：他学部や他機関との連携・協力

学内で見れば理学部だけでなく工学部等の他学部の連携・協力体制が必要不可欠である。特に土質工学や岩盤力学等は斜面防災に必須であり、主として工学部で学ぶことが多いため、UNAH工学部等から講師を受け入れる。

また、外部機関として、実際の斜面災害対策を行っているテグシガルバ市役所を含む行政機関に講義を依頼するほか、斜面防災に係る調査・対策²⁶⁾、シニアボランティア派遣²⁷⁾、専門家派遣¹¹⁾を2000年以降継続的に実施してきたJICAには蓄積された技術・ノウハウがあることから、教員やコンサルタントを招聘して、集中講義を実施することが望ましい。

6. おわりに

著者らは、ホンジュラス最高学府UNAHにおける応用地質学専攻の設立計画に伴い、特に斜面防災学の観点からカリキュラムと体制・組織について提案を行ってきた。

ホンジュラスの開発や防災対策にとって、応用地質学の研究と人材育成は急務である。本専攻の設立は、地質技術者・研究者の絶対的不足を解消する最初のステップであり、それがUNAHで実現されようとしていることは喜ばしい。

応用地質学専攻の立ち上げには、時間・予算・人員がかかるものの、体制の整備は極めて重要であるため、時間をかけて確立することが必要となる。これら地質学の基礎研究組織の設立により資源開発や災害研究が進展するのは、日本等を見ても明らかである。そのきっかけが資源開発でも斜面防災研究であっても良い。今回が基礎的地質学研究の第一歩となれば幸いである。

また、応用地質学専攻が設立されても早急に成果を期待することは困難であるため、当面は、国内外の協力が不可欠である。そのため、今後、日本を含む国外の大学との大学間協定の締結により学生・教員の相互の交換事業等を実施していくことが望ましい。

謝辞

本提案を検討するにあたり、元愛媛大学教授 山岸宏光博士、元愛媛大学教授 廣田清治博士、山形大学教授 八木浩司博士、帝京平成大学准教授 佐藤剛博士には、活動当初より貴重な助言や指導を多数いただいた。東北大学教授 井龍康文博士には、ホンジュラス関係者が来日した際に応用地質学専攻設立に関わる具体的な助言や日本での問題点について詳細に説明いただき、関係者の理解促進に大きく貢献いただいた。またOYOインターナショナル株式

会社 原崇氏, 国際航業株式会社 塚本哲氏とは, 提案をまとめていく過程で有意義な議論を複数回に渡り実施した。ここに記して上記の皆様にご心より感謝いたします。

本活動はJICAが実施した個別専門家派遣「ホンジュラス国 首都圏における地すべり対策能力強化支援」の一環で実施したものであり, 著者らに貴重な機会をいただいたことに感謝します。

本活動を実施するにあたりホンジュラスで苦楽を共にした, UNAHのIHCIT及び工学部の関係諸君に対して, 深謝いたします。

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(2016年8月1日受付, 2017年8月10日受理)

Recommendation on Foundation of a Department of Engineering Geology in the National Autonomous University of Honduras

Takeshi KUWANO and Elisabeth Espinoza CANALES

Abstract

In the Republic of Honduras in Central America, the establishment of a department of the Engineering Geology has been needed in higher educational organizations, in order to take care of exploration/research on the mine resources and slope disasters in the country. The authors organized the issues on the establishment of the department and have discussed pragmatic proposals on it for the National Autonomous University of Honduras based on lessons and examples on the education of engineering geology in Japan, as an activity of a project on the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA).

The proposal is mainly divided into the curriculum and the organization. On the curriculum, the classes on "introduction of earth science", "earth science", "applied GIS technology", "environmental geology" and "slope disaster management" were proposed to add to the current curriculum, and a curriculum map has been prepared. On the organization, "additional teachers of geology/engineering geology" and "collaboration with other departments in the university and external organizations" were proposed.

The report summarized the issues and the proposals on the establishment of department of the Engineering Geology.

Key words : slope disaster risk reduction, international cooperation project, education curriculum

Names: Renan Rapalo, Education Development Officer, and Julius Schlotthauer, Senior Economist

Renan: 9982 4492; Julius: 9970 6922

rrapalo@usaid.gov; jschlotthauer@usaid.gov

Herewith is USAID's response to the questionnaire sent under cover of your letter JICA NO. 0815 dated 25 February 2020.

1. Necessity and importance of implementing this project for USAID.

For USAID and other cooperating agencies this program will be very important. In particular, USAID seeks to have the countries we assist take on more responsibility for their own development. We need more Hondurans equipped with the knowledge and capacity to design and manage international cooperation and development projects. This master's degree program could be a much-needed complement to the basic training that many social scientists already have in the country. However, it is our experience that the main barrier for professionals in Honduras to access jobs in international cooperation agencies is the lack of competencies in the English language.

2. USAID support to these kinds of projects

USAID has not provided technical/financial support to these kinds of projects. However, four years ago we supported the UNAH in the creation of a master's degree in psychometrics and education evaluation. We do not have plans to support similar projects in the near future.

3. What kind of skills and knowledge does USAID value as locally hiring a program officer.

English proficiency, oral and written communication skills, sector knowledge, experience, team work, managerial, analytical and leadership skills in program management, flexibility, and critical thinking.

4. Course description comments:

This master's degree should focus more on international cooperation for development and reduce the project management part. In addition, there are already other master's degree programs in the country that focus on program management (even the UNAH has one). Furthermore, USAID has a very particular way of managing projects that might be different from other cooperation agencies. What we need is people with very good content-knowledge, knowledge of the country and its development challenges and creative and critical thinking, flexibility, ability to work with others. Creating these should be the focus of this program.

To ensure that the students will have a real chance to work for international cooperation agencies, only students with the required proficiency in English should be admitted. Adding a course on technical English will not solve this problem.

The general context section is too weak and too focused on cooperation. More training on theories on development and economics of development is needed.

Courses on research methodology should ensure that students can design and evaluate quantitative, qualitative and mixed research studies.

Rather than having a closed plan of subjects (Plan de Estudios), there should be seminars where different topics (such as gender, inequality, poverty, education, migration, etc) can be taught as needed.

A practicum for students should be established since the beginning of the program. Students should be inserted in public or international institutions (internships) to get a real experience that goes hand in hand with the theoretical training.

5. Support in terms of lectures and internships.

We may be able to offer this kind of help on a case by case basis as the program develops.

QUESTIONNAIRE

The Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)

Instructions:

1. Please prepare answers in writing, along with supporting data/documents, to the following questionnaire. The answers can be photocopies of the existing documents, if they are suitable.
2. Please adjust description space as it becomes necessary to fit your response.
3. Please share or forward the questionnaires to relevant person to answer some of the questions as necessary.

This **Questionnaire** was prepared by the Survey Team of the Japan International Cooperation Agency for “*Project for Strengthening Master’s Degree Program of National Autonomous University of Honduras on Human Resource Development for Socio-Economic Development*” (hereinafter referred to as “the Project”), with the objective to gather basic information required for the said Project. Please answer all the questions and provide the necessary data and information listed below, including availability and sources of data/information.

Profile of Respondent to Questionnaire

Name	Dr. Gunter Simon
Title and Position	Country Coordinator for Environment, Natural Ressources and Climate
Mobile Phone No.	9460-6772
E-mail address	gunter.simon@giz.de

1. The Project aims at strengthening the Master Program in International Cooperation and Project Management Development (MCIGPD) of UNAH, in order to improve the quality of human resources engaged in the field of International Cooperation and Development in Honduras. What do you think of the necessity and importance of implementing the Project for GIZ? Please explain based on your experiences.

For GIZ this project is very important. Honduras is a country with a lot of international cooperation from several important donors. The different cooperation agencies contract a lot of professionals who are working in projects together with people from national counterparts. It is necessary that the project professionals know about the principles of international cooperation and socio-economic development and specially about their role in this kind of projects as a change agent and not as a better paid national professional.

2. Has GIZ ever provided technical/financial support to improve the quality of human resources engaged in the field of International Cooperation and Development in Honduras? Is there any upcoming project related to this field?

GIZ recently provided technical support to several Universities of Honduras (UNAH/CURLA, UNAG, El Zamorano) in order to improve their curricula on items such as Climate Change and Social Forestry, but not directly on International Cooperation and Development. GIZ also supported applied field investigation with students of the mentioned Universities. Within the logical framework of GIZ-projects there will be further cooperation with UNAG on specific issues.

3. What kind of skills and knowledge does GIZ value as locally hiring a program officer?

GIZ values mostly professional and social competence skills hiring a program officer. But it should put more emphasis on skills concerning the principles and the role of International Cooperation in Honduras and the concepts of sustainable development.

4. Please see the attached course descriptions offered in MCIGPD. Please give us your opinion and suggestion to improve the quality of MCIGPD to meet the current needs of GIZ based on your experiences in working in Honduras, if any.

It is difficult to give an opinion about the very extensive course descriptions. The topics are well chosen, but may be, there is too much theory. Education in general in Honduras is very theoretic and it should be assured that all the students make practical case studies in local communities in order to really understand the contents and the context of this Master Study Program.

5. Do you see any possibility that GIZ provides support (such as offering lecturer, internship, and others) to MCIGPD in the future? Please explain your answer in detail.

GIZ could provide support with internships in its projects and may be offer lecturers for specific items of the study program.

Thank you for your kind cooperation.

QUESTIONNAIRE

Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)

Instructions:

1. Please prepare answers in writing, along with supporting data/documents, to the following questionnaire. The answers can be photocopies of the existing documents, if they are suitable.
2. Please adjust description space as it becomes necessary to fit your response.
3. Please share or forward the questionnaires to relevant person to answer some of the questions as necessary.

This **Questionnaire** was prepared by the Survey Team of the Japan International Cooperation Agency for “*Project for Strengthening Master’s Degree Program of National Autonomous University of Honduras on Human Resource Development for Socio-Economic Development*” (hereinafter referred to as “the Project”), with the objective to gather basic information required for the said Project. Please answer all the questions and provide the necessary data and information listed below, including availability and sources of data/information.

Profile of Respondent to Questionnaire

Name	IDB
Title and Position	Especialista Senior
Mobile Phone No.	504-87321337
E-mail address	Lomas del Guijarro Sur, Tegucigalpa, Honduras

1. The Project aims at strengthening the Master Program in International Cooperation and Project Management Development (MCIGPD) of UNAH, in order to improve the quality of human resources engaged in the field of International Cooperation and Development in Honduras. What do you think of the necessity and importance of implementing the Project for IDB? Please explain based on your experiences.

From the Bank's perspective, this type of program in Honduras is necessary at the postgraduate level that leads to new perspectives on how to do development, therefore, the contents provided we suggest to be reviewed and to bet on introducing innovation in a transversal way in the curriculum.

2. Has IDB ever provided technical/financial support to improve the quality of human resources engaged in the field of International Cooperation and Development in Honduras? Is there any upcoming project related to this field?

Indeed, the Bank, together with the European Union, is supporting the Government of Honduras in the operation of the School of Public Management for senior management, which reports to the Secretary of General Government coordination. In this sense, there is a strategy and action plan for the training of human talent in development management issues. On the other hand, there are specific programs on development issues aimed at Universities, in the form of virtual courses for which they acquire a certificate. At the Postgraduate level, the IDB financially supported the Católica University in the development of the Postgraduate in Project Management, then this postgraduate was disseminated to other universities.

3. What kind of skills and knowledge does IDB value as locally hiring a program officer?

The suggested profile would be: A professional with a PHD level with at least 10 years of specific experience in development at the management level of multidisciplinary projects. Management of the project cycle from the perspective of international organizations and from public and private management (NGOs-foundations under development).

4. Please see the attached course descriptions offered in MCIGPD. Please give us your opinion and suggestion to improve the quality of MCIGPD to meet the current needs of IDB based on your experiences in working in Honduras, if any.

It is suggested to review all content and structure it according to the project cycle, include innovation variables, delve into public policies according to sector frameworks and country plan. Introduce some innovative instruments such as management and payment based on results.

5. Do you see any possibility that IDB provides support (such as offering lecturer, internship, and others) to MCIGPD in the future? Please explain your answer in detail.

The Bank has a multidisciplinary infrastructure at the level of international and local human talent who can be part of conferences, supervise participants during the development of their research.

Thank you for your kind cooperation.

QUESTIONNAIRE

European Union

Instructions:

1. Please prepare answers in writing, along with supporting data/documents, to the following questionnaire. The answers can be photocopies of the existing documents, if they are suitable.
2. Please adjust description space as it becomes necessary to fit your response.
3. Please share or forward the questionnaires to relevant person to answer some of the questions as necessary.

This **Questionnaire** was prepared by the Survey Team of the Japan International Cooperation Agency for “*Project for Strengthening Master’s Degree Program of National Autonomous University of Honduras on Human Resource Development for Socio-Economic Development*” (hereinafter referred to as “the Project”), with the objective to gather basic information required for the said Project. Please answer all the questions and provide the necessary data and information listed below, including availability and sources of data/information.

Profile of Respondent to Questionnaire

Name	Melba HERNANDEZ
Title and Position	Project Manager, Cooperation Section
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1. The Project aims at strengthening the Master Program in International Cooperation and Project Management Development (MCIGPD) of UNAH, in order to improve the quality of human resources engaged in the field of International Cooperation and Development in Honduras. What do you think of the necessity and importance of implementing the Project for EU? Please explain based on your experiences.

Investing in human resources training and capacity development to respond to the changes in the economic and political environment is a priority for the EU. A master program as the one proposed will contribute to the purpose of enhancing the abilities in the Honduran professionals who perform technical assistance, management or project formulation under the international cooperation field to better address the global challenges that humanity faces such as poverty, inequality, climate change and migration among others.

2. Has EU ever provided technical/financial support to improve the quality of human resources engaged in the field of International Cooperation and Development in Honduras? Is there any upcoming project related to this field?

Through its bilateral cooperation projects with the government of Honduras, the EU with the UNAH's expertise has provided during the last five years, technical and financial support for capacity development of government human resources for management of public policies and, development and migration.

3. What kind of skills and knowledge does EU value as locally hiring a program officer?

Since I am not involved in staff recruiting and hiring, I cannot affirm that the following skills will

guarantee a post to an applicant. However, in general terms a person who wills to apply to a local program officer post, must have good knowledge of the EU's history, agencies and bodies; the EU's policies particularly, the development cooperation policy for external actions; a good knowledge of the country's political and socioeconomic situation; and skills such as written and oral proficiency in Spanish, English or any other EU working language; speed in the execution of duties; ability to work within a team and punctuality.

4. Please see the attached course descriptions offered in MCIGPD. Please give us your opinion and suggestion to improve the quality of MCIGPD to meet the current needs of EU based on your experiences in working in Honduras, if any.

I cannot give the requested opinion since the course description was missing.

5. Do you see any possibility that EU provides support (such as offering lecturer, internship, and others) to MCIGPD in the future? Please explain your answer in detail.

The possibility of providing support to the MCIGPD depends on the Head of Delegation's assessment of the request.

Thank you for your kind cooperation.

