

Part III:
*Resilience for Inclusive and Dynamic
Development*

Chapter 11:

Countermeasures against Climate Change in Africa

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1. Introduction

Climate change is already a reality; various phenomena such as rises in global average temperature, floods and drought due to changes in precipitation, an increasing number of large-scale typhoons, hurricanes and cyclones and other extreme weather events have been observed, and, in the long run, rises in sea level caused by the melting of glaciers and ice sheets in the Antarctic, and many other serious phenomena could be realized. IPCC (2007) predicts that greenhouse gases (GHGs) will continue to increase, leading to serious climate change unless appropriate actions are taken promptly. The effects of climate change could threaten human lives, damage the social capital and the fruits of development that both advanced and developing countries have accumulated over the decades and centuries.

Developing countries are particularly vulnerable to climate change, since in addition to being adversely affected by the consequences of climate change such as torrential downpours, drought, the submerging of low-altitude areas due to a rise in sea level and so on, their physical and social capital is not sufficiently developed to adapt to climate change. African continent and other least developed countries (LDCs) and small island developing states (SIDS) are countries of particular concern for their vulnerability to climate change, as many of their inhabitants depend on the natural environment for their livelihoods, and those are already vulnerable even under the current climate conditions. Thus, climate change will introduce new risks to the Continent, in addition to current environmental and socioeconomic stressors.

On the other hand, Africa contributes the least to ongoing global warming, while advanced countries, as well as China, India, and other

emerging countries, have attained economic growth while emitting large amounts of the GHGs that accompany industrialization.

A number of studies on the impact of climate change, mitigation and adaptation and other climate -related activities have been implemented in developing countries. Many developing countries have analyzed the risks caused by climate change and have formulated mitigation and adaptation policies, which have been submitted as National Communications to the Secretariat of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (UNFCCC 2012).

Climate change issues are also a critical development agenda, and development partners have worked to mainstream climate change issues into their development cooperation policies and strategies. The OECD has developed policy guidance to integrate climate change adaptation into development cooperation (OECD 2009). The World Bank featured climate change issues in its *2010 World Development Report* (World Bank 2010), noting that although climate change is one of many issues that developing countries face, “Left unmanaged, climate change will reverse development progress and compromise the well-being of current and future generations.” (World Bank 2010: 37)

Japan has been an active player in the international community in its effort to combat climate change. In 1997, the Japanese government announced a new initiative named the “Kyoto Initiatives,” advocating proactive assistance to developing countries for countermeasures against climate change. Of particular note for Africa, the Yokohama Action Plan, compiled at TICAD IV in 2008, discusses “Addressing Environmental Issues and Climate Change,” along with the need to promote measures for mitigating or adapting to climate change, water resources conservation, hygiene, and education for sustainable development (ESD).

JICA has worked to support countermeasures against climate change in Africa based on the Yokohama Action Plan, at the same time revising the “Direction of Low Carbon and Resilient Development Cooperation by JICA” (JICA 2012). JICA is offering assistance to developing countries in their countermeasures against climate change while advocating three basic policies: (1) climate compatible sustainable development; (2) comprehensive assistance utilizing an array of schemes; and (3)

collaboration with development and climate partners.

Against this backdrop, this chapter discusses the challenges and the ways to address climate change in Africa. Section 2 gives an overview of the general discussion on the importance of such countermeasures; Section 3 summarizes the effects of climate change in Africa and the situation regarding GHG emissions; Sections 4 through 6 will discuss challenges and opportunities regarding climate change, respectively focusing on mitigation measures (Section 4), adaptation measures (Section 5); and on funding, technologies and market mechanisms related to countermeasures against climate change (Section 6). Finally, Section 7 proposes five recommendations for the direction of international cooperation to be pursued at TICAD V and beyond.

2. Dealing with Climate Change

2.1 Impacts of climate change

Developing countries are highly vulnerable to natural disasters; according to a report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) published in 2012, over 95% of the people killed in natural disasters between 1970 and 2008 lived in developing countries. They suffer not only in terms of human casualties; the economic losses in developing countries caused by natural disasters between 2001 and 2006 were smaller than losses in developed countries in absolute terms, but were higher in low-income countries as a percentage of GDP (about 0.3%) than they were in advanced countries (below 0.1%) (IPCC 2012). As shown in Section 1, various phenomena caused by climate change will affect the developing countries severely. Therefore, countermeasures against climate change need to include adaptation alongside with measures to mitigate exposure to the effects of climate change (mitigation). Here, “adaptation” refers to strengthening capacity (adaptive capacity) to reduce the vulnerability of people and natural systems to risks related to climate change.

2.2 Mitigation and adaptation

Mitigation includes introducing renewable energy, promoting energy conservation, reducing the methane gas generated from livestock waste, and increasing CO₂ sequestration by afforestation, reforestation and forest conservation, and so on. However, these measures must be promoted in such a way that they do not impair the benefits of

development. Therefore, governments need to formulate appropriate plans and strategies to balance both development policies and mitigation policies at the national and sectoral level. In addition, governments also need to establish socioeconomic systems where resources are utilized efficiently and effectively, and to promote development and deployment of low-carbon technologies that allow these plans and strategies to be realized.

Measures to deal with the effects of climate change (adaptation) include strengthening adaptive capacity against the increasing number of meteorological disasters, and infrastructure development to deal with the medium- to long-term impact of climate change. However, the impacts of climate change are influenced by such diverse factors and cannot be fully foreseen. Thus, such adaptation measures need to be considered based on the features of the regions, sectors, and communities concerned, along with nationwide measures. In order to steadily pursue adaptive measures in developing countries, the governments need to formulate National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) and other appropriate strategies and plans at the national and sector level. When formulating these plans, it is desirable to take into consideration the results of scientific analyses, such as impact assessments, backed up by scientific data. However, due to the uncertainty of the impacts of climate change, formulating policies based on a precautionary approach and a “no regrets policy” will be required, in a way that suits the development needs of developing countries.

Furthermore, the governments need to take into consideration the risk of “maladaptation” that exacerbates the vulnerability to climate change, when they design plans and projects. That is, without appropriate measures to avoid maladaptation, the adaptation plan and/or project may make the region (or other region) vulnerable further. Therefore, adaptive measures need to be examined with sufficient caution during implementation in order to prevent maladaptation, after discerning the vulnerability of the targeted strata and how they are affected by climate change.

3. Africa and Climate Change


3.1 Greenhouse gas emissions in Africa

As a region, Africa has among the world’s lowest greenhouse gas

(GHGs) emissions and contributes the least to climate change. The percentage of global GHGs emissions emitted in Africa is lower than that of any other region. In 2005, the total GHG emissions from the African region were only 6% of the global total. Moreover, GHG emissions in the African region are 2.56 tons per capita, which is less than half the global average of 5.85 tons per capita (WRI-CAIT 2012).


At individual country level, however, some countries have large emissions. For example, per capita emissions from Equatorial Guinea, the Central African Republic, Libya, Gabon, South Africa, Seychelles, Angola, and Botswana exceed the global average.

Figure 1. Africa's Percentage of Global GHG Emissions



WRI-CAIT (2012)

Figure 2. GHG Emissions per Capita in African Countries



WRI-CAIT (2012)

On the other hand, 585 million people (about three-quarters of the population in Sub-Saharan Africa) cannot access modern energy, and of these people, about 85% live in rural areas and use firewood and other biomass fuels for cooking and so on. Furthermore, about 30 countries suffer from a chronic shortage of electricity.

However, energy demands are expected to rise due to the rapid economic growth and population increase in recent years. It should be noted that if African countries choose to depend on fossil fuels to meet these energy demands, GHG emissions from Africa will increase significantly (World Bank 2012).

In addition, GHG emissions due to land-use and /or land use change are comparatively high in some countries. Those will be increased by further land-use change from forest to farms to address increasing food demand due to population increase.

3.2 Impact of climate change in Africa

Africa is one of the regions most impacted by climate change. Table 1 summarizes climate change trends in Africa and their future impact. In Africa, the temperature has risen by 0.5°C compared to 100 years ago, and impacts of El Niño and La Niña phenomena have been aggravated due to global warming. Also, the impact of climate change on incomes is estimated to reach 1.9–2.7% of GDP. In addition, about 75–250 million people will be threatened due to through increased water stress, and additional 80 million people be at risk of malaria.

Table 1.

<i>Trends</i>	<i>Impacts</i>
<p>-Africa is warming: Africa is 0.5°C warmer than it was 100 years ago. Tendency toward greater extremes: global warming will exacerbate El Niño and La Niña effects.</p> <p>-Vulnerability is rising: the income effects of climate change are approximately 1.9–2.7% of GDP in Africa.</p> <p>-Uncertainty remains: the precise effects of climate change on Africa are not well understood at the country level, due to the fact that very few countries have their own climate change scenarios and risk assessments.</p>	<p>-Increased water stress: 75-250 million more Africans will be at risk of water stress by 2025; arid and semi-arid lands are likely to increase by up to 8%; 25–40% of animal species in national parks in sub-Saharan Africa are likely to be become endangered.</p> <p>-Food insecurity: parts of the Sahara are expected to suffer agricultural losses of up to 7% of GDP.</p> <p>-Threats to health: an additional 80 million people will be at risk of malaria.</p> <p>-Sea level rises: coastal zones, especially in East Africa, will face increased flooding with the adaptation bill reaching 10% of GDP.</p>

Source: Adapted from World Economic Forum (2008).

Climate change seems to have already begun to take its toll in Africa. In the past several decades, the average rainfall in Sub-Saharan Africa has shown a decreasing trend. Compared to the monthly rainfall between 1951 and 1980, the average amount in the 2000s has decreased by as much as 7 mm. The reduction ratio is 2.5 times that of Asia and more than 10 times that of Latin American and the Caribbean countries. The instability and decrease in rainfall poses a food security threat to Africa, where over 90% of agriculture depends on rainfall (UNDP 2012).

Also, Africa is a region where abnormal temperatures, droughts, wildfires, and other climatic disasters take place at the second highest frequency in the world, after East Asian and the Pacific. Even though other natural disasters such as floods and violent storms occur less frequently here than in other areas, their number has increased at the second highest rate in the world and the affected population has tripled in the past decade (UNDP 2012).

Climate change is believed to aggravate the frequency and intensity of extreme weather phenomena. There are concerns that this in turn could have serious impacts not only on agriculture and water resources, but also on ecological systems and gene resources, as exemplified by the expansion of disease vector habitats and the extinction of plant and animal species (IPCC 2011).

4. Mitigation Measures in Africa

4.1 Challenges and opportunities regarding mitigation measures in Africa

As noted above, Africa contributes the least to ongoing global warming, while advanced countries, as well as China, India, and other emerging countries, have attained economic growth while emitting large amounts of the GHGs that accompany industrialization. In many African countries, where economic development and poverty reduction are the most urgent issues, expectations are high that economic development and poverty reduction will be realized by following the same path toward industrialization as these advanced and emerging countries, while effectively utilizing their own resources in the region. Moreover, there is an urgent need for improved access to energy in view of the fact that three-quarters of the population in the region have not had access to energy and have endured chronic electricity shortages, and also because

energy demands are expected to increase as the economy and population grow.

Thus, although the lack of economic infrastructure development is an important challenge for Africa, this situation may be an opportunity for Africa to move toward greener and more sustainable development, in a manner unlike that adopted by the advanced and emerging countries.

Africa has a potential to develop renewable clean energy. For example, Africa holds 15% of the global hydroelectric power generation potential, but only about 10% of this has been developed (World Bank 2012). Besides hydroelectric power generation, there is also high potential for photovoltaic power, solar thermal power, wind power, geothermal power, and biomass energy. By utilizing these resources effectively, the risks accompanying fluctuations in the international price of crude oil and other fossil fuels may be reduced. In addition, there is a potential for Africa to improve efficiency of energy/resource use by leapfrogging to more efficient technologies and infrastructure.

Africa also has great potential for carbon sequestration and storage. The tropical forests in Africa's Congo Basin constitute the second largest such area in the world. However, these forests have been continuing to shrink and deteriorate due to farmland conversion, excessive logging, forest fires, and other factors. According to the FAO, the global forest area shrank by about 13 million hectares a year on average between 2000 and 2010, which is equivalent to one-third of Japan's national land area. Of this, Africa accounts for 3.4 million hectares (FAO 2010). The need to conserve forests, where these natural resources and carbon are stocked, has increased. The Congo Basin is an effective carbon sequestration and storage resource, and is also high in biodiversity. Congo Basin may be benefitted by Introducing Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES), such as Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation plus conservation, the sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks (REDD+), since PES could add new economic value to natural resources which has not yet been appropriately valued.

The sections that follow present a sector-by-sector discussion of the challenges and opportunities related to mitigation measures.

4.2 Energy sector

Improving access to energy is important in view of making progress in industrialization, the poverty reduction accompanied by industrial development, and expanding opportunities to access education and medical services. In order to address increasing in energy demands, the governments need to consider stable energy supply while also attending to preventing pollution and conserving the natural environment.

Africa also has abundant potential for renewable energy, as exemplified by the photovoltaic power and solar thermal power that could be obtained from the ample sunlight in the Sahara Desert and surrounding areas, the geothermal energy found mainly in the Great Rift Valley, the copious source of hydroelectric energy found mainly along large international rivers, and the wind power capacity found mainly along the coastal areas. Crude oil and other fossil fuels have also been found in the region. Those resources could help the government to establish a low carbon society, if the government promotes proactive use of renewable energy and the cleaner use of limited fossil fuel resources appropriate to the economic and technology level of each country.

In addition, GHG emissions could be reduced if a more efficient and stable power supply were made possible by developing of efficient power transmission networks and regional power interchange systems based on power pooling. In remote regions, access to energy could be improved by utilizing small-scale power generation by hydroelectric power, solar power, wind power, and biomass power, as well as independent small-scale grids. However, the use of low-carbon energy requires efforts on the user side such as energy conservation in addition to those on the supplier side. Energy users in rural areas need to convert the traditional types of fuel and methods to modern and more thermally efficient methods.

To support African countries' efforts toward increasing their energy efficiency, JICA has assisted in renewable energy projects including wind power generation in Egypt and geothermal power generation in Kenya, research to utilize solar energy in the Sahara Desert, and the development of efficient power transmission and distribution networks in Tanzania and Cameroon, and so on.

4.3 Transportation and urban sectors

Developing the transportation infrastructure is also important to promote economic growth. On the other hand, economic growth could lead to increasing fuel demands and GHG emissions as road transportation demands increase. If the development of high-traffic arterial roads is insufficient, the increased traveling time caused by traffic jams could hinder economic growth and lead to excessive fuel consumption. Also, if the transportation infrastructure is vulnerable to the foreseeable natural disasters due to climate change, the transport of necessary goods could be impaired in times of disaster, and economic activities could be impeded until recovery is achieved. Therefore, the introduction of low-carbon transportation systems that have sufficient resilience to withstand disasters need to be considered when examining transportation system development.

JICA has assisted African countries in transport infrastructure in various ways: one typical example is the development of arterial roads such as the Nacala Corridor of Mozambique; another is logistics improvement by developing one stop border posts to reduce congestion at borders.

Urbanization has progressed rapidly in major urban areas. Urban plans should be revised by reallocating urban functions more efficiently, according to the development stage of the city, and in the medium- to long-term, disasters-resilient low-carbon urban development should be attempted. As such medium- to long-term projects, the introduction of railroads and Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) systems may be possible options mainly in large- and medium-scale cities.

4.4 Forest management

As discussed above, Africa has an abundance of diverse forest resources, as exemplified by the Congo basin, which is the world's second largest area of tropical forests. Forest conservation is important for increasing the water-retention capacity of the soil and mitigating the scale and frequency of natural disasters, in addition to retaining a resource for absorbing GHGs. In other words, forest conservation is expected to have both mitigating and adaptive effects. On the other hand, Africa has one of the highest percentages of forest reduction in the world. The percentage of forest coverage in the Sub-Saharan region fell from 31.2% in 1990 to 28.1% by 2010. This reduction is attributed to the excessive exploitation of forest resources caused by population growth, the

accompanying fulfillment of basic needs, and economic development, as well as the conversion of forests to other uses (AUC et al. 2012).

Mitigation measures with the aim of reducing GHGs by curbing forest reduction in developing countries were on the agenda for the first time at the 11th meeting of member countries to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (COP11). Subsequently, Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD) was officially adopted as one of the topics for consideration under the Bali Action Plan at COP13, and it was decided in the Copenhagen accord at COP15 to pursue the development of a REDD+ framework.

The introduction of Payments for Ecosystem Services, such as carbon sequestration and storage by forest resources (REDD+), is expected to provide an incentive for forest conservation in the Congo basin and other places where forest destruction is underway.¹

In forest conservation, it is important for the policy makers and project developers to consider residents who depend on forest resources for their livelihoods. It is also important for the government to steadily promote the sustainable use of forest resources in a way that contributes to sustainable forest management, poverty reduction, and regional development. Communities that depend on forests for their subsistence have sometimes used appropriate forest conservation techniques as part of their regional traditions. These indigenous technologies could also be used for effective forest conservation. Also, for reviving deteriorated forests, sustainable forest management needs to be promoted by trading sustainably produced lumber, along with planting and replanting trees in Africa and other areas.

5. Adaptation Plans in Africa

5.1 Challenges and opportunities for adaptation plans in Africa

There is growing concern for Africa about extreme weather, such as the historical drought in the Horn of Africa in 2011, and on food security. Even if a significant reduction in CO₂ is realized globally, it will still take a long time for GHG concentrations in the atmosphere and the climate system to stabilize, and the adverse effects from future climate change

1. JICA has assisted in forest conservation programs in the Congo Basin, Gabon, Ghana, Malawi, and other countries.

could expand. Especially in Africa, where many of the poor live in rural areas and depend on natural resources for their livelihoods, including rain-fed farming, the impact of climate change is a huge threat to achieving inclusive development, since poor people will mainly be affected by the impact of climate change. Water resources are not just used for drinking water and cultivating food for subsistence, but also for many other uses, including for power generation and as industrial water. In addition, in urban areas, due to rapid urbanization and population increases, improvements in urban infrastructure such as water supply, sewerage and drainage systems have been delayed, and measures to combat floods are also urgently required. From this viewpoint, it is necessary for the governments to consider appropriate water resource management including management of forest as source of water, improvements in food productivity, improvements in water supply and sewerage systems, and the appropriate reuse of water resources as cross-sectoral theme.

Another threat to development posed by climate change is loss of developmental dividend due to the increase in natural disasters. The higher frequency of natural disasters and their increased intensity may lead to a loss in the human, social, and natural capital that has been amassed thus far, and could wipe out all the efforts to reduce poverty that have been made to date. This makes efforts to prevent disasters and reduce their impacts essential to securing the benefits of development..

Furthermore, responses to future climate must be considered with regard to existing infrastructure as well as in the creation of new infrastructure. For example, an irrigation facility would require the installation of water-saving equipment so as to withstand the adverse effects of changes in precipitation brought by climate change. For developing countries to create a society and economy capable of withstanding the effects of medium- to long-term climate change, the establishment of climate-proof infrastructure will be required.

In many cases, water resource management and disaster prevention will require a cross-border response. Especially in Africa, with its many international rivers, cooperation among watershed nations is important. Since this is an area where benefits are maximized through cooperation as opposed to through settlement by disputes, a policy dialogue among countries and the formation of cooperative groups involving various

stakeholders, such as private enterprises, citizen organizations, and communities, could maximize benefits, as well as accelerate regional unification, which in turn could lead to expanding markets and new business opportunities (AfDB 2012).

To tackle those challenges and to take an advantage of opportunities, African countries need to improve climate information for informed decision making, tailored solutions including development of early warning system, seasonal forecasts and regional level climate change projections.

The sections that follow will discuss, sector-wise, the challenges and opportunities concerning response measures.

5.2 Agricultural sector

Being dependent on rainwater and lacking adequate distribution systems, Africa has traditionally been very vulnerable to shocks such as droughts and floods. For example, between 2010 and 2011, the Horn of Africa region suffered a severe drought, and more than 10 million people faced a serious food crisis. While the region has periodically suffered severe damage in the past, in recent years the rainwater cycle has become more irregular, and the amount of actual precipitation is falling.

Agriculture is a source of wealth and poverty reduction in Africa, as discussed in Chapter 2. Indeed, the share of employment in agriculture is 65% in the region, and still constitutes a large 32% share of GDP, one-third of the economic development factor (World Bank 2008). In the past, Africa increased production by expanding its cultivated acreage; however, cultivated acreage per capita has been declining due to demographic pressure, and, coupled with stagnant land productivity, this has resulted in a drop in grain production per capita.

Economic growth and strong demographic pressure have caused food consumption needs to expand rapidly, worsening the domestic supply and demand balance and increasing its dependency on food imports. In other words, Africa is highly vulnerable to external conditions such as a sharp increase in international food prices and bad weather accompanied by climate changes.

Although improvements in agricultural productivity are urgently

required in Africa, improving productivity alone will not necessarily make the region less vulnerable or more resilient. Further measures should be considered for the government and farmers; for example, agricultural infrastructure development such as irrigation facilities to help farmers adapt to climate change, development of crop and cultivation methods, and the introduction of agricultural techniques adaptive to climate change. JICA is helping to improve the cultivation system to respond to the droughts and floods caused by climate change.

The private sector will play an important role in assisting local farmers to improve their productivity and enhancing the commercial values of the products through their investment and technology transfer, making their agricultural product competitive in the market. Particularly, foreign agricultural investments are needed in strengthening the production capacity of developing countries, and it is important for the governments to continue promoting this.² On the other hand, if plans are poorly structured and implemented, international agricultural investment could have unintended negative effects on the political stability of the recipient nation, as well as on its social cohesion, human security, sustainable food production, food safety on a household level, and environmental protection. It may also lead to local residents losing access to resources they depend on. Furthermore, land transactions are a very sensitive issue. In Africa, where laws and regulations concerning land use are not well established and where communal land use is a traditional norm, international land transactions can trigger a serious, emotionally charged backlash. At the L'Aquila Summit in 2009, the G8 nations highlighted the Promotion of Responsible Agricultural Investment, a comprehensive approach to promoting global agricultural development through increased investment while mitigating the negative effects of international agricultural investment. In September 2009, the "Principles of Responsible Agricultural Investment that Respects Rights, Livelihoods, and Resources,"³ consisting of seven principles, were announced.⁴ The expectation is that through agricultural investments conducted in line with these principles, agricultural infrastructure will be developed and technology to improve agricultural productivity by sustainable methods will be introduced

2. See Chapter 4 of this volume for more detailed discussion on investments in agriculture.

3. http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/food_security/pdfs/besshi3.pdf

4. Refer to the Knowledge Exchange Platform for Responsible Agricultural Investment (RAI), <https://www.responsibleagroinvestment.org/rai/>.

(refer to Chapter 3).

Since the agricultural sector is the most vulnerable to climate change, another idea would be to establish a structure to cover losses from climate aberrations, such as a climate index insurance policy.

5.3 Disaster prevention and reduction

In recent years, many African countries have been hit by large-scale natural disasters, such as floods, droughts, coastal erosion, and mudslides. With the increasing frequency of natural disasters, the risks they pose and their influence on social and economic development are also rising. However, their effects are varied, and a case-by-case response is required. At the UN World Conference on Disaster Prevention in 2005, the Hyogo Framework for Action was adopted as an international framework for disaster prevention. In accordance with the Hyogo Framework for Action, it is important for the governments to establish disaster prevention plans in line with the priority that each country places on them.

To respond to large-scale disasters accompanying future climate change, meteorological and climate observation capabilities must be improved, and an early warning and evacuation system structure constructed on the bases of an accurate meteorological and climate change forecasting system. In addition, there is a need to improve climate change risk management capabilities in infrastructure development at a sector level, such as agricultural development, water resources management, and traffic, to mainstream disaster prevention and the rapid recovery from disasters.

In addition to conducting disaster prevention training in African countries, JICA is cooperating in programs to enhance response capabilities in countries including Benin, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, and Lesotho, helping to increase their resistance to natural disasters.

Hosono (2012) points out that there are three kinds of gaps between the capabilities required for disaster prevention and the actual levels of such capabilities, which are (1) the level required for addressing expected impact of disaster (a disaster scenario), (2) the level required for a level exceeding a disaster scenario, and (3) the level required to respond to long-term changes. To close these gaps, there are cases in which the

traditional techniques handed down in the community or the technologies used in other developing countries are more favorable than the latest technology. In such cases, cooperation through South-South cooperation or triangular cooperation may be effective.

To respond to a temporary shortage of funds in case a massive disaster occurs, systems such as standby-type loans and insurance could be utilized as safety nets.

5.4 Water resources management

Water resources are an important component in almost all development sectors. Among others, water demand is expected to increase due to the expansion of agricultural and industrial production and the energy sector as well as increasing demand of safe water supply for human lives, while the changes in precipitation accompanying climate change, and the decreased water retention capability due to the reduction of forest resources are all likely to cause an unstable water supplies. Africa has not been able to fully develop the potential of its rich renewable water resources (UNECA et al. 2011). Therefore, developing these potential renewable water resources and appropriately managing water resources are important issues for Africa.

Africa has a number of international rivers like the Nile and the Congo, and approximately three-quarters of its surface water resources, estimated at 4.6 trillion cubic meters annually, are concentrated in eight major international rivers (World Bank 2009). This makes it essential to conduct cross-border water resource management and to establish master plans and enhance governance to conduct optimal Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) for each watershed, which would include the appropriate development of surface and ground water and the purification and recycling of industrial and living discharge water. Africa has established an Africa Water Vision for 2025, which aims to provide an environment in which all people will have equal access to water resources, be able to use these for power generation and agriculture, create an enabling environment for IWRM, and integrate regions based on watersheds (UNECA et al. 2011).

Reservoirs can be an effective response to an unstable water supply (World Bank 2009). However, a safe water supply will have a different meaning for urban and rural areas. In urban areas, improvements in the


water supply system will be required to deal with the increase in population caused by the inflow of people into the areas. On the other hand, since many people lack access to safe water in rural areas, one urgent issue for the governments is to establish in these communities a system and infrastructure for a stable supply of safe water. JICA is currently assisting rural water supply projects in Djibouti and Ethiopia.

6. The Funding, Technology, and Market Mechanisms Associated with Climate Change Measures

The demand for funds to implement these measures is huge. As discussed in Chapter 7, there is a high demand for funds for infrastructure improvement in Africa. AFD-WB 2009 calculated the infrastructure funding needs for 2006–2015 to be US\$93.3 billion, and the financial gap between this amount and that already expended to be US\$48.0 billion. Of this, the funding gap, excluding the efficiency gap (US\$17.0 billion), was calculated at US\$31.0 billion (AFD-WB 2009). According to an estimate by the AfDB 2011, the funding needs accompanying climate change measures will be around US\$9–12 billion annually, if Africa is to take the low-carbon development route, and the incremental cost if appropriate measures are not taken now is estimated to be around US\$13–19 billion (AfDB 2011).

At COP16, the Cancun Agreement was established (UNFCCC 2010), which clearly stated that in the three years between 2010 and 2012, developed countries would provide funding aid of almost US\$30 billion to developing countries in the area of climate change (“fast-start” finance). It also agreed to establish a Green Climate Fund that would make US\$100 billion in funds available annually by 2020 (long-term funds).

Figure 3. Flow of Funds to Africa



Source: UNCTAD, OECD/DAC, and World Bank. IMF's GDP forecast for 2012.
Extracted from Africa Economic Outlook (2012)

As indicated in Figure 3, the flow of funds is on the increase. This fund flow includes not only ODA, but also contains a large amount of foreign direct investment from the private sector. As private fund is also one of major finance sources, government need to consider to mobilise private funds, not just public funds, so as to finance in climate change measures. For further mobilisation of funds for climate change measures, African countries need to strengthen the absorptive capacity for climate funding and improve enabling environment for private sectors.

Particularly, the governments need to engage diverse actors comprehensively in planning and establishing; climate change policies, such as Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) and National Adaptation Plans (NAPs), as part of their development policies; information sharing and dissemination with related parties in transparent manner; and implementation of measures based on an appropriate budget. The climate change program loans now being implemented in Indonesia and Vietnam are donor support schemes for these activities. In these schemes, the donor and the government of the developing country engage in dialogues on the provision of financial support, through which they monitor and evaluate the implementation status of a climate change policy scheme matrix. These schemes provide an efficient way for governments to implement climate change policies such as NAMAs and NAPs as part of their development policies, work toward transparently sharing and disseminating information with

related parties, and implement measures based on an appropriate budget (Sudo et al. 2008, Katsurai and Murakami 2012). On the other hand, Furukawa et al. (2013) have surveyed the effects of general budget support in the health sector and concluded that although there have been certain improvements in budget allocations in this sector, these have had a limited effect on improving health indicators. They comment that general funding support and the complementary effects of the projects and programs require attention. The complementary effects between policy, budget, and project, as pointed out before, should be considered carefully, when policy planner consider to introduce a climate change program loan.

There is also a strong need in Africa for appropriate low-carbon technologies for enhancing development that is resistant to the effects of climate change. The Cancun Agreements also included an agreement to establish a Climate Technology Center and Networks, in order to expand and promote the development and transfer of technology to assist in mitigation and adaptation, and to understand and support technical needs in developing countries. To promote the use of appropriate technology, various activities, such as formulating systematic capabilities and data-gathering capabilities, and establishing systems to share knowledge, will be required in addition to training human resources.

These technical and investment needs could also create an attractive market for private companies. Establishing an attractive market environment for private companies to introduce technology and investments could help promote climate change measures in the private sector.

The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), one of the market mechanisms introduced under the Kyoto Protocol, was expected to promote the active participation of the private sector in the mitigation business, and over 5,500 projects have been registered to date. However, as of the end of December 2012, only 104 projects, a mere 1.9%, were in Africa (UNFCCC 2012). It has been pointed out that the current CDMs have not been able to fulfill the functions intended at the Kyoto Protocol due to the complexity of the applications and fundraising for low-profit projects (Yamada and Fujimori 2012). The use of market mechanisms, such as a simplified CDM or a bilateral offset credit system mechanism,

could act as an incentive for private companies to provide investments and technical transfers, and efforts to improve the system and develop the ability to effectively utilize these mechanisms are important.

7. Toward the Effective Promotion of Climate Change Measures in Africa

As mentioned above, climate change is a cross-cutting issue and a problem that has possible global effects. This means that instead of individual actors such as countries, sectors, or communities responding in an ad-hoc manner, it requires a comprehensive approach spanning various strata from the individual and community level to the governmental and regional level, and there is a need to resolve the “apparent disconnect” generated between a policy-based top-down approach and a community-based bottom-up approach (Bharwani and Taylor 2011). In addition, the activities of each actor must be considered from the viewpoint of externalities that influences the actions of others. For example, an adaptive policy taken by one community might trigger a maladaptation that could exacerbate the disaster damage in another community. Therefore, to effectively implement climate change measures, information sharing among a wide range of actors is important, from the international level down to the community level.

Although Africa has the world’s lowest amount of GHG emissions, it is affected the most by climate change. For Africa to maximize its natural resource potential in a sustainable, low-carbon way, and be resilient to external shocks such as the effects of climate change, it must engage in sustainable development in which everyone can receive the benefits of growth. In other words, Africa is in a position to target sustainable development through inclusive and resilient green growth. Africa’s climate change measures are themselves the start of a new development process.

Regarding its support for climate change measures in developing countries, the Japanese government announced the Kyoto Initiative in 1999, the Environmental Conservation Initiative for Sustainable Development (EcoISD) in 2002, the Cool Earth Partnership in 2008, and the Hatoyama Initiative in 2009. Climate change was incorporated into the Yokohama action plan, at TICAD IV, and as part of the Cool Earth

Partnership, US\$92.1 million in funding was declared in the action plan to support climate change measures in African countries. In the three years from 2010 through 2012, a total of approximately US\$1.3 billion was provided, as support for climate change measures in Africa, covering both mitigation measures and adaptation measures. Japan and JICA have more than fifteen years of experience in the area of climate change measures, and as the largest donor in this field, JICA supports many projects and programs. It has extensive knowledge on the establishment and implementation of promotion methods and the planning and implementation of specific policies related to climate change measures (such as energy, traffic, and agricultural policies), as well as in the measurement, reporting, and verification of GHG reduction effects using Climate-FIT, in vulnerability assessments, and in the methods used to assess project effects through post-project evaluations. This knowledge should be used effectively to support climate change measure policies in Africa. Based on the discussions above, we offer the following recommendations for the effective promotion of future climate change measures in Africa.

Recommendation 1:

It is necessary to establish climate change policies in accordance with the conditions of each country as part of its development policies, share and disseminate this information with stakeholders in a transparent manner, and implement it with appropriate budget allocation.

The climate change policies established by governments, such as Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) and National Adaptation Plans (NAPs), are prepared as part of each country's development policy, and it is desirable for these climate change policies to generate co-benefits that will contribute to sustainable development (Fujikura and Toyota 2012). Many countries in Africa have already created NAMAs. In addition, LDCs have already prepared National Adaptation Programs of Action (NAPAs). These clear, foreseeable, and stable policies lend credibility to the activities of actors, including in private investment. In establishing these policies, the opinions of actors in the private sector and civil society organisations (CSOs), as well as those of women and the poor, should also be actively incorporated along

with those of the government. Furthermore, although the use of data based on scientific analysis is recommended wherever possible, such as the amount of GHG emissions and forecasts of the effects of climate change (Fujikura and Kawanishi, 2010), it is also necessary for the policy makers to respond to the needs of their respective countries based on precautionary principles and the concept of a “no regrets” policy, taking into consideration the capabilities of the subject sector, region, community, and others.

To support these activities, in addition to supporting projects or programmes, schemes such as climate change loans can be effective, but great care should be taken with regard to the mutually complementary nature of policy, budget, and project policy, as well as the leverage effects of general funding support.

Recommendation 2:

For effective Green Growth in Africa, support for access to information as well as innovation through R&D are important to identify opportunities for low-carbon and climate resilient growth and promote effective green growth.

Access to information is the most important factor in today’s society, not only for disseminating climate change policies, but also for providing disaster information or information concerning low-carbon technologies and funding access. It is also important for a country in determining how it can apply climate change measures implemented by other nations or communities, or what effect they could have. Making greater use of information and communication technology (ICT) is one way to improve access to this information. Sharing information and knowledge through policy dialogues is another effective method. In addition, the NAMAs established by each country require monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV), and securing the transparency and accountability of information through MRV will enable the implementation of appropriate climate change policies in a plan-do-check-act (PDCA) cycle. Furthermore, access to technical information will promote a country’s introduction of technology that is internationally available and it can utilize, and could lead to the development of technology enabling leap-frogging. We must not forget that appropriate technical information includes not only cutting-edge technologies, but also information on

traditional technologies, which can be very useful at times. Technology transfers are expected to include not only transfers from developed countries, but also transfers between developing countries through South-South cooperation and triangular cooperation (Hosono 2012).

From the viewpoint of inclusivity using environmental education to enhance people's awareness of climate change is important, particular for the poor, who are vulnerable to the effects of climate change, and also for women, and future generations.

Recommendation 3:

It is necessary to establish an enabling environment where everyone, including the private sector, will participate in various climate change measures.

It is important for the public sector to establish a path toward the creation of a low-carbon economic society resilient to climate change through policies and system improvements. However, the public sector itself neither manufactures nor conducts business transactions on its own. Everyone, not just private companies and CSOs, but also poor and socially vulnerable people, is involved in certain economic and social activities. In view of the public and external nature of global-scale climate change, the participation of all is required for a low-carbon, socio-economic model that is resilient to climate change.

In particular, high expectations are placed on the private sector's participation in climate change measures, in terms of its broad influence, funds, technology, and ability to increase employment. As pointed out by JICA-RI (2012), in addition to support from the policy side, in order to promote the participation of the private sector, actions will be required including organizing an investment environment such as stable macroeconomic operations, establishing fair and transparent legal systems, promoting business models such as public-private partnerships (PPPs), and providing support and seed money for establishing projects.

Recommendation 4:

To promote climate change actions, it is necessary for African countries to use market mechanisms effectively along with the effective use of funds and promotion of capability development

The implementation of specific climate change measures requires funds and implementation capabilities. The Cancun Adaptation Framework requires annual funds of US\$100 billion to be made available by 2020, as well as the structuring of a system to enable effective technology transfers; there is also a strong need for funds for climate change measures and technology in African countries. The effective use of funds is required, as well as the development of ways to maximize the effects of development and climate change measures while minimizing additional costs. Funding for climate change was discussed at the 2011 High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, and the partnership document it adopted calls for the promotion of consistency, transparency, and predictability in effective climate change finance and a broad approach toward development aid (OECD 2011).

In addition to their effective use for supporting climate change measures, public funds are also expected to provide leverage in obtaining private funds,. Establishing a structure and environment to promote private investment can also contribute to an overall increase in private investment, beyond climate change measures. Moreover, by monitoring and evaluating the efforts of the donors involved, even more effective cooperation could be possible. Lamhauge et al. (2012) have conducted studies on monitoring and evaluation methods with regard to several donors' support for adaptation measures. Such monitoring and evaluation methods focusing on the role of donors should be examined in the future.

Market mechanisms like CDM and bilateral offset credit mechanisms, or innovative mechanisms like PES, including REDD+, can be easy for African countries to work with. As pointed out by JICA-RI (2012), in order for these mechanisms to be used effectively to benefit African countries, it is necessary to develop the capabilities of the African countries themselves, and to introduce these mechanisms into international society so they can become even easier to use.

Recommendation 5:

JICA needs to function as a Solution Provider by establishing partnerships with various stakeholders..

From the viewpoint of the public and external nature of climate change on a global scale, an approach to climate change must be taken with the participation of all people. Japan and JICA have more than fifteen years of cooperation experience in the field of climate change, and also constitute the top donor in this field. Particularly, Japan and JICA have comparative advantage in effective use of renewable resources, improvement of efficiency and productivity with optimal management, and so on. There is a need to proceed with cooperation to implement the optimal climate change measures, with Japan and JICA providing all the cooperation knowledge they have amassed to date for everyone to use. In recent years, other donors have also started to provide active support for climate change measures. Further knowledge is also being amassed in the academic and private sectors. In order to establish a low-carbon economic society with the ability to withstand climate change, all this knowledge needs to be utilized in an intercomplementary manner so that all people, including the poor, will be able to receive the benefits of development. Providing an optimal solutions by establishing networks with various actors while keeping in mind international negotiations, technology, and funding trends in the climate change field will be required. To do this, we recommend establishing a broad collaboration among international organizations, other aid organizations, CSOs, universities, autonomous bodies, private companies and others, as well as providing bridges for exchanges among various actors, such as mediating policy dialogues between communities and governments.

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Chapter 12:

State-building and Conflict Prevention in Africa

Ryutaro Murotani

1. Introduction

Violent conflicts have been one of the major obstacles to economic growth and development in Africa.¹ However, in the 2000s, according to the UCDP/PRIO datasets, the African continent witnessed a decrease in the number of armed conflicts and battle-related deaths compared to the 1990s. After the end of the Cold War, the number of armed conflicts in the world hit its peak in the early 1990s, but started to decline from 1993. In Africa, the number continued to increase to 18 in 1998, but started to decrease in the early 2000s (refer to Figure 1). The battle-related deaths per year in Africa, which used to be some 20,000 to 80,000 in the late 1990s, are some 3,000 to 10,000 in recent years. Today, Africa is no longer a continent with many large-scale violent conflicts.

Although the negative impact of violence has declined, we need to remain attentive to potential risks and continue to work on peace-building and conflict prevention. Conflict risks are still major concerns for foreign investors. According to a JETRO survey (2013), political and social instability is the largest concern for Japanese investors in Africa, and more companies are worried about it in 2012 than in 2007.


In the past, some countries suddenly became unstable and fell into violent conflict; there are only 15 countries in Africa that have gone through the past three decades without any armed conflict (based on UCDP/PRIO's criteria). Besides, many countries experienced the

1. Although the statistics provided in the first section cover the entire African continent, the main focus of this chapter is countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Having gone through the Arab Spring in 2011, many of the countries in North Africa are facing the challenge of a transition to more stable democratic rule. Though there are some similarities and inter-connectedness in challenges of state-building in North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa, contexts and characteristics differ so widely that it would be difficult to address both regions in the limited length of this chapter.

recurrence of conflict in a transition period from conflict to sustainable peace. As discussed in World Bank (2011), post-conflict peace-building is a long-term endeavor, which requires more than a decade of institution-building efforts.

Alarmingly, a new type of conflict is on the rise in recent several years, producing an upward trend in the number of armed conflicts. Today, there are many conflicts in which trans-national non-state actors such as Al-Shabaab, AQIM, FDLR, and LRA are involved. The recent tragic incident in Algeria demonstrated the political and security risks posed by these non-state armed groups to foreign investors.

Figure 1. Number of armed conflicts in Africa (top) and in the rest of the world (bottom)



Source: Author's calculation based on UCDP/PRIO datasets²

2. "Internationalized" conflicts are ones that occurred between the government of a state and one or more internal opposition group(s) with intervention from other states (secondary parties) on one or both sides. "Extrasystemic" armed conflict occurs between a state and a non-state group outside its own territory (mostly colonial or imperial wars).

As the characteristics of violent conflicts have shifted from purely internal strife to violence and fragility caused by transnational non-state actors, capable state institutions that provide basic public services, including public safety in remote areas, are a significant element in preventing these problems. The lack of such capable institutions is one of the reasons that allow transnational non-state actors to be active in these fragile areas. The building of an “effective, legitimate, and resilient state” (OECD 2008, 7) is definitely necessary to address such problems.

Coercive measures are frequently needed to counter terrorists, however, it is also essential to look at structural problems that lead to these phenomena. To prevent the spread of the general public’s support for these non-state armed groups, poverty, inequality, and other social problems need to be addressed. It also requires a political/social mechanism that articulates citizens’ expectations and enables the state to respond to society’s demands. In this sense, state-building is a vital endeavor for achieving a stable and peaceful Africa.

The chapter discusses the challenges of state-building in Africa, particularly in relation to conflict prevention. It first highlights important points, which have been raised by existing literature and discussions, concerning state-building (Section 2). It emphasizes the importance of state legitimacy in the eyes of the people, livelihood improvement in addition to public safety, and a long-term perspective for state-building. Section 3 then introduces major research findings by JICA-RI and a JICA survey of its operations. For donors to help improve state legitimacy, the section calls attention to context-sensitivity, horizontal inequalities (HIs), and people’s perceptions. In Section 4, JICA’s current field experience related to state-building will be discussed. On the basis of the analysis in Section 2 and Section 3 and the review in Section 4, the final section will present policy implications for the future.

2. State-building: Building of Capable and Legitimate Institutions

Through their experiences of post-conflict peace-building, the international community, acknowledging the high risk of the recurrence of violent conflict, expanded its focus from short-term emergency response to long-term institution building. Not only in post-conflict

settings but in general, to prevent violent conflicts and establish public safety, state institutions with sufficient capacity to maintain law and order are indispensable. However, to effectively maintain public order, the state needs to be recognized as legitimate by society. In short, effective state-building needs the consolidation of a capable as well as legitimate authority.

Among various discussions on state-building, the importance of state legitimacy, livelihood improvement, and a long-term perspective needs to be underlined. Long-term institution building should not only focus one-sidedly on public safety but also include the task of supporting people's livelihood. Livelihood improvement is necessary for people to understand the dividend of peace and to accept the state as legitimate. These perspectives for long-term institution building have to be introduced in the early stage of any emergency response to humanitarian crises. Development agencies have endeavored to realize "seamless" transitions from short-term emergencies to long-term development, and have implanted long-term visions into their engagement in an early post-conflict period.

Table 1 below summarizes the shift from short-term focus to long-term orientation.

Table 1. Conceptual Framework for State-building

	Short-term (emergency response)	Long-term (state-building)
Public Safety (Law and Order)	Ceasefire monitoring Peace by force	Security Sector Reform (SSR) Rule of Law
Livelihood	Emergency aid	Strengthening of (both central and local) public organizations Human resource development
Objectives	Avoidance of humanitarian disaster	Building of a capable and legitimate state

2.1 Building of capable and legitimate state institutions

In the post-Cold War peace-keeping operations in the 1990s, the international community often failed to avoid the recurrence of conflicts and recognized the lack of effective institutions as one of the reasons for such failures. Failures of international engagement in establishing

sustainable peace forced the international community to pay greater attention to the building of public institutions that guarantee long-lasting sound governance. As incidents such as 9/11 increased global concerns about security vulnerability spilling over from weakly governed countries, scholars, including Fukuyama (2005), Chesterman (2004), Fearon and Laitin (2004), Krasner (2005), Ghani and Lockhart (2008), and Paris and Sisk (2009), debated the importance of and difficulties in state-building in recent years.

This argument also resonated with the international development community that has recognized the importance of good governance since the 1990s. The donor community started to discuss the need to improve its development effectiveness in fragile states, and accepted the idea of state-building in that context. In the OECD/DAC, the INCAF (International Network on Conflict and Fragility) functioned as an active forum to create policy guidance on state-building in fragile states (e.g., OECD 2011). Among the donors, state-building is understood as an effort to strengthen the capacity and legitimacy of state institutions to consolidate effective, legitimate, and resilient states (OECD 2008).³

The lack of capable and legitimate state institutions that protect people from human security crises makes the state vulnerable to violence by non-state actors. Public safety is one of the most fundamental public goods that should be provided by the state. Although such public safety may be temporarily and partially provided by international forces and/or civic groups, the state remains as the primary guarantor of public safety. Therefore, the strengthening of the state security capacity is fundamentally important to protect human security.

However, the mere reliance on coercive forces does not guarantee long-term stability. The state will face new challengers to public safety unless it has peaceful and stable relations with society. To be accepted by a wide range of social forces as the legitimate authority, the state needs to be equipped with inclusive institutions. If the state excludes some parts of its population from public services and the development process, it cannot be regarded as legitimate by the excluded groups. For instance, as we discuss below, horizontal inequalities (HIs) and group-based

3. Leaders of the fragile states themselves formed a group named g7+ and actively participate in the debates, contributing to the international dialogue between fragile states and donors on designing better international engagement to support state-building in fragile states.

grievances have been the major causes of violent conflicts in Africa (Stewart 2010). What inclusive institutions look like, however, differs from one country to another depending on a country-specific context (e.g., OECD 2010).

2.2 Peace-building “from below”: greater emphasis on livelihood

Among various aspects of institution building, the past decade has seen an increasing focus on public-safety issues, as typified by security sector reform (SSR). Critics, however, opposed the imposition of state institutions “from above,” and called for promoting the voices “from below” (e.g., Hilhorst et al. 2010). The efforts for institution building such as the formulation of a constitution, democratic elections, and justice sector reform, may not be the primary concern of the local populations. Advocates of peace-building “from below” emphasize the importance of welfare, livelihoods, and perceptions of the local people and communities (Richmond 2009, Shanmugaratnam 2008). Improvement of welfare and public service delivery is the key for the people to understand the dividends of peace. Richmond (2011) insists on the need to localize, contextualize, and hybridize international state-building policies to adapt to everyday human needs. Roberts (2011) suggests the shift of emphasis from political institution-building to institutions that serve society. Responding to local human needs would help improve the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of local people.

The state’s capacity to deliver services to the people largely depends on effective administrative organizations as well as on the ability of public officials who actually deliver the services to the people. Institutional capacity and human resource development are indispensable to improve the state capacity to support people’s livelihood.

2.3 Bridging the “gap” by institutional and individual capacity development

In the late 1990s, it was pointed out that there is a “gap” between humanitarian assistance and development assistance in a post-conflict situation. Development assistance often came too late in the transition from humanitarian crises to reconstruction phases. Although short-term relief can be provided by external actors, service delivery by local public organizations is indispensable for longer-term livelihood improvement. Besides, the two instruments have different *modus operandi* as humanitarian assistance tries to address emergency needs, while

development assistance aims to support long-term development in more stable environments (Crisp 2001, Ogata 2011).

As a consequence of the increasing awareness of the gap, humanitarian agencies became more concerned about their long-term sustainability, while development agencies started to get involved in post-conflict situations much earlier than before. By infusing a long-term perspective into post-conflict assistance, the seamless supports aim at a smooth transition from short-term emergency to long-term institution building for improving the livelihoods of local people.

3. Research Findings from JICA-RI on State-building Efforts

With regard to state-building and conflict prevention, research projects at JICA Research Institute (JICA-RI) are mainly concerned with state legitimacy. Research findings by JICA-RI indicate that international engagement can support state-building by helping improve state legitimacy. Some of the findings are being reflected in JICA's operational approach, which will be discussed in Section 4.

3.1 Capacity traps and legitimacy traps

In the article "Capacity Traps and Legitimacy Traps: Development Assistance and State Building in Fragile Situations", Takeuchi, Murotani, and Tsunekawa (2011) illustrate how the difference in political environment affects the impact of development assistance, and call for heightened awareness of the different types of fragility when donors decide upon their policies. They categorize post-conflict situations into two types: "capacity trap" and "legitimacy trap." Capacity trap countries are those that have failed to improve state capacity to provide security and basic social services and consequently have failed to establish state legitimacy. Legitimacy trap countries are those that have demonstrated the capacity to provide security and services to the population but suffer from shaky legitimacy due to expanding inequalities and authoritarian management. In this environment, improving state capacity may not necessarily improve state legitimacy. On the contrary, it can further curtail state legitimacy. These two traps create very different contexts in which donors are required to plan their strategies carefully.

3.2 Horizontal Inequalities (HIs)

Inequality has always been an important factor that explains grievances and instability. To address group-based grievances, the perspective of horizontal inequalities (HIs), that is, inequalities between identity groups, has been developed.

Based on case studies and quantitative analysis in ten African countries, Mine et al. (*Preventing Violent Conflict in Africa: Inequalities, Perceptions and Institutions*, 2013) reconfirms the significance of HIs on instability and violent conflict in Africa. Particularly when one group is disadvantaged in multiple dimensions of inequalities (political, social, economic, and cultural), HIs are most likely to cause violent conflicts as demonstrated by the histories of South Africa and Kenya.

In *Ethnic Diversity and Economic Instability in Africa: Interdisciplinary Perspectives*, Hino et al. (2012) suggest that ethnic diversity, though not leading by itself to inter-group conflict, can be a potent force of instability when HIs are high, and particularly when high HIs coalesce with high vertical inequality within each ethnic community.

In short, the alleviation of inequalities is a necessary condition for enhancing state legitimacy, which is fundamental for long-term state-building.

3.3 People's perceptions of inequalities

In assessing the legitimacy of states, people's perceptions are sometimes more important than objective HIs, as people take actions based on their subjective beliefs. As advocates for peace-building "from below" argue, successful state-building efforts should be based on the understanding of the perceptions of local people. According to the analysis of Mine et al. (2013), people's perception of horizontal inequalities (HIs) is not equal to the objective inequality that appears in statistical data. For instance, as observed in Nigeria and Zimbabwe, a group perceiving itself as the poorest is not necessarily the poorest according to social and economic statistics. This implies that external actors should pay attention not only to objective HIs but also to people's perceptions.

Mine and his associates' study demonstrates that this distortion of perceptions is most probably associated with political HIs. The groups that are politically marginalized tend to regard themselves as also being

economically marginalized, even when this contradicts the objective evidence. The Igbo in Nigeria clearly show such tendency. On the other hand, their analysis also indicates that economically advantaged groups tend to behave in a hostile manner through the fear of losing their advantaged positions, when political power relations shift rapidly to their disadvantage. All this evidence points to the importance of political power distribution in post-conflict societies.

Regarding the political HIs, Mine et al. (2013) point to the importance of inclusive mechanisms, either formal or informal, that are open to various identity groups. Their case studies demonstrate the relative political stability of the countries that have power-dispersing mechanisms combining sustainable power-sharing based on informal practices and advanced decentralization. In various Sub-Saharan African countries, informal customs assure every major identity group is represented in decision-making. These power-dispersing mechanisms help fortify legitimacy by means of the inclusive political participation of major groups. If such an arrangement is combined with efficient service delivery and citizen safety (state capacity), the efforts for long-term institution building are on the right track.

JICA's survey report titled *Livelihood and Employment Promotion in Conflict Affected Countries*⁴ (2012) also highlights the importance of people's perception as a lesson learned from its operational experiences. This survey demonstrates that, although it is important to support socially vulnerable populations such as refugees and IDPs, widows, orphans, traumatized people, and handicapped people, exceptionally generous treatment of these people created tensions within communities in past JICA projects. Special consideration to ex-combatants can also create animosity among other people in local communities. External actors need to be careful of these sentiments and try to build confidence between socially vulnerable people and others within local communities.

4. JICA's Approach to Support State-building

JICA has already integrated into its field practice many of the insights obtained from past research and discussion on state-building. JICA has been especially eager to support long-term strengthening of institutional

4. Details of the report will be discussed in the Section 4.1.

and individual capacity, especially for the purpose of improving people's everyday livelihood. Helping the recipient government to effectively connect itself with local residents to strengthen its legitimacy has also been the main goal of JICA activities.

JICA has also promoted "seamless" transition from early humanitarian aid for protection to development assistance for empowerment. This focus requires JICA to get engaged in institution building from the early stages of reconstruction.


Finally, JICA has tried to be more attentive to political contexts in each country, and mainstream conflict-sensitivity ("do no harm") to ensure the positive impact of its activities on state-building.

4.1 Enhancing state capacity and legitimacy

The Government of Japan and JICA have focused their attention more on post-conflict reconstruction and peace-building since the mid-1990s. The revised ODA Charter in 2003 recognizes "human security" as one of its five basic policies, and peace-building as one of its four priority issues. After Sadako Ogata became the President of JICA, JICA integrated the "human security" perspective, especially for conflict-torn countries, as its operational philosophy. As a result, Japan's ODA spending in 43 countries that the OECD categorized in 2010 as "fragile states"⁵ increased its share in total ODA spending (net ODA total, excluding debt relief) from 9.86% in 2000 to 24.24% in 2009 (refer to Figure 2).

5. For statistical purposes, OECD chose 43 countries and areas as "fragile states" in 2010 by using CPIA of the World Bank, ISW (Index of State Weakness) of the Brookings Institution, and CIFI (Country Indicators for Foreign Policy Fragility Index) of Carlton University as their benchmarks.

Figure 2. Share of Fragile States in Japanese ODA (Net ODA total, excluding debt relief)



Source: Author's calculation based on OECD Stat.

In some of these countries (e.g., the Democratic Republic of Congo), JICA engaged in the capacity building of security forces. However, JICA has been more active in the area of livelihood improvement. JICA regarded the capacity of public institutions and public officials directly involved in livelihood improvement efforts as the core function, and provided support to strengthen this function in post-conflict countries such as Sudan, South Sudan, Uganda, and Cote d'Ivoire. This core function centers on health, education, vocational training, and local administration.

JICA's programs for community-based development and vocational training intend to simultaneously strengthen the capacity for public service delivery and improve people's welfare. In doing so, it aims to enhance both state capacity and legitimacy, as improved service delivery by the central or local government organizations would enhance people's welfare and their trust in the state. Emphasis on enhancing people's trust is important particularly in fragile situations. Although their direct impact is limited to project areas, JICA anticipates that these local actions will eventually be scaled up to contribute to the broader and longer-term endeavor of state-building.

JICA's survey report (*Livelihood and Employment Promotion in Conflict*

Affected Countries, 2012) contains evaluations of twelve such projects for community development and vocational training in nine countries and areas, including seven projects in five Sub-Saharan African countries: South Sudan, Rwanda, Uganda, Eritrea, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The following are some of the findings from JICA's activities aiming at enhancing the capacity and legitimacy of state institutions, especially for livelihood improvement. Though the report is based on simple evaluations not as rigorous as academic research, the lessons learned from the field are suggestive.

■ *Capacity development of local public officials*

In these projects, as the lack of individual and organizational capacity is acute in fragile situations, the process of implementation was designed to encourage capacity development of local government organizations. These entities were assigned the responsibility of jointly delivering public services with JICA experts, so that they could learn how to effectively provide services to the local population as on-the-job training.

The Project for Livelihood Improvement in and around Juba for Sustainable Peace and Development (LIPS) in South Sudan and the Study on Community Development in Cataracte District, Bas-Congo Province in the DRC are representative of JICA's approach to community development, which primarily features the capacity development of government (both local and central) institutions, instead of the provision of benefits to farmers directly or via NGOs. When the LIPS project started in 2009, the government of the Southern Sudan had just four years of experience. Basic policy guidelines and strategies had not been well articulated, and local officers had little experience of working in the field. In the project, the community development officers, after receiving training, cultivated the land in cooperation with farmers, built schools, and supported local farmers in starting businesses. This firsthand experience enhanced the officials' capacity and motivation. In the Bas-Congo Study, local government officials were directly engaged with local communities in conducting and monitoring pilot projects.

■ *Feedback of data and knowledge into national policies*

On several occasions, local governments' experience of actual service delivery had a feedback effect of updating and improving the policies at higher levels including national development strategies. As most of the conflict-affected countries do not have sufficient statistical data,

firsthand information from the field can link the voices from below with national policy planning.

One good example is the LIPS project mentioned above. South Sudan's Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry had had little information on agricultural activities in rural villages until the LIPS project provided them with community development manuals and agricultural technology packages. These documents were prepared on the basis of the field surveys, training, and sub-projects implemented in the LIPS project. The documents and information provided are being utilized to formulate a national agricultural development policy.

In Rwanda, the Project for Strengthening the Capacity of Tumba College of Technology (TCT) resulted in the TCT turning into a model for other vocational training centers. More specifically, the TCT conducted in-company training to strengthen the link between trainees and local companies. The Workforce Development Agency (WDA) of the Rwandan government subsequently adopted in-company training in other vocational training centers.

■ *Building confidence in local government institutions*

The nurturing of state legitimacy is important particularly in conflict-affected countries because public service delivery has been suspended for a long period and people may look upon the government as a predatory body rather than a service delivery organization. Under such circumstances, service delivery improvement through participatory planning and implementation can enhance communication between local government officials and citizens and help the local government build confidence among people.

In South Sudan, where public service delivery had barely existed during the war that lasted for more than 20 years, a LIPS sub-project – agricultural extension workers trying to help local farmers – contributed to cultivating local people's confidence in the new government. Local communities established their own rural development committees and directly negotiated with local governments. Communication between the two has been strengthened significantly in the process.

In the case of northern Uganda, local governments did not have even basic facilities such as city halls and offices; so the Project for

Community Development for Promoting Return and Resettlement of IDPs in Northern Uganda provided offices and multi-purpose halls for a variety of public events such as public meetings, training courses, music festivals, and cooking contests. Local governments intended to foster the sense of affinity among local residents, particularly women's groups. They also worked closely with returnees in designing sub-projects, so that local people's trust in government officials would be enhanced.

4.2 Seamless assistance

Under the leadership of President Sadako Ogata, JICA adopted the human security perspective as one of the key pillars for its operation. The human security perspective emphasizes both protection through emergency relief and empowerment for long-term development.

When Ogata became the president of JICA, she stressed the importance of "seamless" support bridging the gap between humanitarian and development assistance. In its mission statement of 2008, JICA endorsed "seamless assistance that spans everything from prevention of armed conflict and natural disasters to emergency aid following a conflict or disaster, assistance for prompt recovery, and mid- to long-term development assistance" as one of its four strategies.

In Sudan and South Sudan, for example, JICA joined the international joint assessment mission while separately conducted its own survey even before the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed in 2005. This rapid engagement resulted in quick impact projects in the early recovery period in South Sudan, such as the Juba River port reconstruction. These projects were soon followed by larger development assistance including human resource development to serve long-term development.

4.3 Mainstreaming of conflict-sensitivity

JICA has also tried to become more sensitive to negative effects on conflicts and state legitimacy that may be inadvertently caused by the donor's activities. To avoid such pitfalls, JICA has introduced the Post-Conflict Needs Assessment (PNA) mechanism by which it analyzes potential conflict risks in each context, and pays due consideration to the impacts of such risks on state legitimacy. It stresses the importance of taking into account the coexistence and reconciliation between different social groups within local communities in designing community

development projects. JICA also plans to introduce the evaluation guideline that incorporate conflict-sensitivity for projects in conflict-affected areas.

One example of such consideration is JICA's efforts in Sudan and South Sudan that aim at mitigating grievances stemming from economic and social disparities among different regions. In South Sudan, in parallel with the assistance to the Juba areas, JICA has intensified its support to less developed regions such as Malakal. In Sudan, JICA has extended its support to less developed areas including Darfur, the eastern provinces, and Three Protocol Areas.

5. Conclusion

State-building and conflict prevention remain as vital challenges in Africa. Bearing in mind the changing nature of conflicts throughout the continent, the international community has increasingly focused on state-building. To prevent violent conflicts and establish long-term stability, building capable and legitimate state institutions, which look after both public safety and livelihood improvement, is essential.

JICA-RI's research findings also demonstrate that successful state-building needs the strengthening of state capacity and legitimacy. Legitimacy building is an especially difficult task because it is deeply affected by changeable perceptions of the people. To nurture state legitimacy, horizontal inequalities (HIs) and other inequalities must be tackled. At the same time, inclusive institutions need to be constructed to foster a sense of fairness among the population.

JICA, as well as other development partners, has already started to integrate some of these insights into its planning and implementation. Coordination and mutual learning between donors will also be essential. However, in order to make their efforts to help state-building and conflict prevention more effective and efficient, greater and more persistent attention should be directed to the following points:

(1) Building of inclusive institutions

Inclusive institutions are key to consolidating state legitimacy based on stable state-society relations. Inclusive institutions can mitigate the

adverse effects of HIs. This, however, does not mean that attending HIs is not important. HIs need to be reduced since they are a root cause of violent conflicts. Meanwhile, inclusive institutions will help foster consensus and compromise among contending forces. However, institutions should not be imposed upon people by external actors since institutions can be securely established only when major stakeholders accept them as legitimate. What donors can do is to provide the recipient country with the opportunity to learn about current and historical experiences of other countries.

(2) Human security perspective: protection and empowerment

In tackling the challenges of state-building, the human security perspective should always be remembered, as it can provide a comprehensive understanding on state-building (Newman 2011). Human security integrates top-down measures to protect people and bottom-up measures to empower them. Capable institutions to protect people and empowered communities to hold the state accountable and legitimate are essential for bringing about a stable state that can maintain public safety and improve people's livelihood. The human security perspective supports the seamless transition from emergency relief to long-term development. While top-down measures are necessary to protect people in emergencies, the empowerment of people and local communities are crucial for long-term development.

(3) Local context sensitivity

External actors need to be sensitive to local contexts so they can avoid doing harm while maximizing the positive impact of their activities. In such assessment of local context, they need to be aware that people's perceptions are not necessarily equal to statistical data. While HIs need to be reduced, at the same time, donors need to pay attention to how their efforts for HI reduction are perceived by various stakeholders and carefully design their projects. This caution is valid not only at the planning stage but also at the operation stage in which local people directly observe donors' behavior. Donor coordination and information sharing must be crucial to avoid harming people's perceptions.

Since the beginning of the millennium, Africa has started to witness a declining number of armed conflicts and battle-related deaths. Though trans-national non-state armed groups may impose new types of challenges on peace-building in Africa, structural problems such as

poverty, inequality, and other social issues remain crucial for peace and security, and state-building remains imperative for a stable and peaceful Africa. African leaders have strived to establish sustainable peace throughout the continent. Donors can help their efforts by supporting the building of capable and legitimate states if they are sensitive enough to local contexts. TICAD will provide a forum for a wide range of stakeholders to discuss how we all can collaborate to address this crucial challenge.

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Part IV:
*South-South Cooperation for Knowledge
Exchange*

Chapter 13:

South-South and Triangular Cooperation for Sub-Saharan Africa's Development

–With special emphasis on knowledge exchange and co-creation

Shunichiro Honda, Hiroshi Kato and Yukimi Shimoda

1. Introduction

This chapter looks at South-South Cooperation (SSC) and Triangular Cooperation (TrC) in the context of the development of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). The reason for our focus on SSC and TrC¹ is twofold. First and most importantly, SSC/TrC has been one of the central principles underpinning and guiding the TICAD process since its beginning in 1993. And second, SSC/TrC has become the key theme both in the UN fora (UN 2012a) and the global process on development effectiveness agenda especially since the 2011 Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF4) in Busan, which strongly highlighted SSC as well as TrC (Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation 2011).²

This paper has two specific objectives. One is to give a broad picture of

1. As to the definition of SSC and TrC, we rely on the definition of the UN, which reads as follows:

“South-South cooperation development is a process whereby two or more developing countries pursue their individual and/or shared national capacity development objectives through exchanges of knowledge, skills, resources and technical know-how, and through regional and interregional collective actions, including partnerships involving governments, regional organizations, civil society, academia and the private sector, for their individual and/or mutual benefit within and across regions. South-South cooperation is not a substitute for, but rather a complement to, North-South cooperation (UN 2012b, p.5).”

“Triangular cooperation involves Southern-driven partnerships between two or more developing countries supported by a developed country (ies)/or multilateral organization(s) to implement development cooperation programs and projects (UN 2012b, p.5).”

2. HLF4 emphasized that “South-South and triangular cooperation have the potential to transform developing countries’ policies and approaches to service delivery by bringing effective, locally owned solutions that are appropriate to country contexts” (Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation 2011: p.9).

the current state of SSC vis-à-vis SSA, given the increasing interest and actual involvement in African development by the Southern partners. And the other is to take a closer look at, among various forms of SSC/TrC, how *knowledge exchange and co-creation* is happening, based on JICA's experiences in facilitating such processes by means of TrC.³

The body of the chapter consists of two parts. Section 2 is an overview of SSC/TrC targeting SSA. Section 3 will try to share some of Japan's experience in supporting knowledge exchange and co-creation through TrC.

2. SSC/TrC: Overview of Trends and Issues

2.1 Africa as the central actor in SSC

SSC itself is an age-old phenomenon, and Africa, together with Asia, has always been at the center of the movement. Cooperation among the South, particularly on the aspect of economic cooperation, dates back to 1955 when the Asia-Africa Conference was held in Bandung, Indonesia, to discuss Afro-Asian economic and cultural cooperation. In the subsequent decades, developing countries pressed further ahead to form a group to push their economic interests (Cheru 2011).⁴ Such a movement first culminated in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) involving more than 100 countries. Then in 1964, G 77, a forum for developing countries to articulate and promote their collective interests relating to the global economy was formed within the United Nations (UN). Throughout, Africa was at the center of the movements.

During the 1970s, several key resolutions and policy documents on technical cooperation among developing countries (TCDC) were adopted, which then culminated in the adoption of "the Buenos Aires Plan of Action (BAPA)" at the UN Conference on TCDC held in 1978. The action plan laid out both the conceptual and operational framework for TCDC promotion, which, to this day, remains as the main reference document (UN 1995). Following the launch of BAPA, there were also moves on the economic cooperation front, such as the Caracas Programme of Action adopted by the High-level Conference on

3. The South-South knowledge exchange in the context of African development seems to have been receiving inadequate attention compared to South-South trade and financing in Africa (UNCTAD 2010; UN 2008; Kragelund 2012).

4. The South-South partnership in the field of economic cooperation has until recently been termed as Economic Cooperation among Developing Countries (ECDC) in UN fora.

Economic Cooperation among Developing Countries (ECDC) in May 1981.

Such high levels of interest in SSC (including ECDC), however, waned in the following decades.⁵ Nonetheless, several notable actions on SSC/TrC started in the 1990s. In 1993, the UN General Assembly endorsed the strategy and framework for the promotion and application of TCDC (UN Resolution 48/172).⁶ And it was around this time that the first TICAD was co-organized in Tokyo by the Government of Japan, the Global Coalition for Africa (GCA)⁷ and the UN. In spite of the rather somber situation surrounding SSC at the time, the Tokyo Declaration for African Development adopted at the 1993 TICAD underscored the importance of SSC, especially the exchange of development knowledge and experience between Asia and Africa. The conference declaration read as follows:

We, the participants of TICAD, recognize that development achievement in East and South-East Asia have^[sic] enhanced opportunities for South-South cooperation with Africa. We welcome the interest shown by some Asian and African countries in promoting this cooperation.⁸

The strong focus on SSC by the first TICAD then led to the holding of the Asia-Africa Forum in Bandung in the following year. The subsequent Tokyo Agenda of Action adopted during the second TICAD in 1998 further went on to highlight intra-African cooperation (TICAD 1998). At TICAD III in 2003, after the launch of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) in 2001 and African Union (AU) in 2002, the participants reviewed the achievements and challenges of the preceding ten years and acknowledged the tangible contributions of the TICAD process in continuously upholding and supporting SSC/TrC practices, especially Asia and Africa cooperation. Building on the review results, its tenth anniversary declaration urged African countries and partners to

5. Manning pointed out that such decline of development cooperation from non-DAC states resulted in the dominance of aid from DAC countries and multi-lateral organizations up until the mid-2000s (Manning 2006).

6. DAC also endorsed the importance of SSC in its document of Principles on the New Orientations in Technical Cooperation (OECD/DAC 1991).

7. GCA was later replaced by the Africa Union (AU) following its establishment in 2002. The World Bank joined the TICAD process as co-organizers from the second TICAD.

8. Tokyo Declaration for African Development 1993 (TICAD 1993 Paragraph 26)

further strengthen their partnership in the spirit of solidarity (TICAD 2003). In furthering the achievement of the past TICAD process, the “Yokohama Declaration towards a vibrant Africa”, the outcome document of the fourth TICAD was presented in 2008 (TICAD2008).

The centrality of SSC/TrC came to be reaffirmed in December 2009 with the Nairobi Outcome Document being adopted at the United Nations High-Level Conference on South-South Cooperation in Nairobi (UN 2010). Organized as the 30th anniversary of the 1978 Conference on TCDC in Buenos Aires, the conference set out the overall UN SSC/TrC framework.⁹ Such heightened energy surrounding this theme has also started to be felt in other global fora, such as the global monitoring process of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. SSC/TrC was registered as one of the major agenda items at the HLF4. The outcome document of the Busan Forum, namely the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, strongly featured the theme as a highly promising approach for effective development cooperation in coming years.

Thus, in the history of the development of SSC/TrC as an effective means for development cooperation, Africa has been playing a dual role – both the central promoter and beneficiary. We also note that the TICAD process has been instrumental in supporting African countries’ efforts in SSC.

2.2 The current state of SSC for Sub-Saharan Africa¹⁰

The limited availability of data makes it nearly impossible to capture exactly the magnitude and breadth of SSC and TrC for SSA including technical cooperation (TC), which is the main aid instruments for knowledge exchange and co-creation. Currently accessible data is from the OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS), which incorporates data from the limited numbers of non-DAC donors, including non-DAC

9. The document was formally endorsed at the 66th General Assembly in February 2010. After the conference actions to translate the Nairobi outcome document into practice got into full swing. A prime example is the annual Global South-South Development Expo (GSSD Expo) with the UN office for South-South Cooperation (UNOSSC) as its main secretariat.

10. The Republic of Korea, which has often been included among the emerging donors, is not fully covered in this paper as it has been a DAC member only since 2009. Nevertheless, as a relatively new donor country, it is worth noting that Korea is among the active donors in knowledge promotion such as through its Knowledge Sharing Program (KSP) implemented by the Korea Development Institute (KDI).

OECD members.¹¹ Other than CRS, the global AidDATA initiative, working closely with the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI), has made an effort to develop an aid database using a variety of sources including CRS, and donor reports. However, the data from most non-DAC donors, including those major actors such as China, India and Brazil, are mostly on a project basis, which made the analysis difficult.


(1) SSC for SSA from partners outside Africa

*Non-DAC partners in the CRS data*¹²

This paper first looks at the trend of Non-DAC partners reported to DAC CRS, which include several major Non-DAC partners such as Saudi Arabia, Thailand and Russia. We will then turn to China, India, Brazil and South Africa, on which an increasing number of articles and reports are now available, as well as to other non-DAC partners such as North African partners, in later sections.

Figure 1 indicates the gross total ODA disbursements by non-DAC partners on CRS data at both levels of global and SSA countries covering the period between 2004 and 2011.

Figure 1. Gross total ODA disbursements by non-DAC partners reported to OECD (in millions of US dollars)




Source: Author based on OECD CRS data (OECD Various Years)

11. Non-DAC donors in the CRS data include the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Poland, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Turkey, Chinese Taipei, Cyprus, Kuwait, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Thailand and the United Arab Emirates.

12. According to the rough definition provided by OECD on the data, ODA denotes the “concessional financing for development (“ODA-like” flows)” (OECD Various Years).

Figure 2 provides a closer look at the disbursement trend regarding SSA from 2004 onwards (indicated by the red columns in Figure 1 above). After the sudden decline in 2009, which may be largely explained by the global financial crisis in late 2008, it returned to an appreciation trend and surpassed the level of 2008 in 2011. The rapid expansion in 2008 and the sudden decline in the following year largely reflect the disbursement trend by oil-producing Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia, which accounts for over 60% of CRS non-DAC donor data. Overall, the ODA trend toward SSA countries seems to be following the same general growth trend of the total ODA by non-DAC partners, at least for the first decade in the 2000s.

Figure 2. Gross total ODA disbursements to SSA countries by non-DAC partners (in millions of US dollars)




Source: By authors, based on OECD CRS data (OECD Various Years)

In addition to the total volume of ODA disbursement, CRS also collects and publishes data specifically on TC. Figure 3 depicts the non-DAC members' ODA disbursement trend for TC to SSA countries. It displays an upward trend similar to that of the total ODA. It should be noted here, however, that the volume of TC is by far a smaller fraction of the total ODA.¹³ Among the non-DAC partners reported to the CRS data, several donors are increasingly active in knowledge exchange through TC in support for the development of SSA countries. One example is

13. The very small volume of TC may also be explained by the composition of CRS data in which oil producing non-DAC donors occupy the large proportion of the total non-DAC donor ODA reported to DAC. The main aid activities of these countries are the financing of infrastructure projects through concessional loan windows such as those of the Saudi Fund for International Development. Also, the fact that other non-DAC donors have not provided disaggregated figures for technical cooperation may also explain the small volume.

Turkey. In addition to its neighboring countries such as those in West Asia, Turkey has been rapidly expanding its assistance to Africa including capacity building assistance through TC in various fields such as agriculture, health and vocational training.¹⁴

Figure 3. ODA disbursements (Technical Cooperation) to SSA countries by non-DAC partners (in millions of US dollars)




Source: By authors, based on OECD CRS data (OECD Various Years)

Looking at the beneficiaries' side, we can see that a limited number of SSA countries tend to have received a large portion of total non-DAC aid disbursements including TC, as shown in Figure 4, which shows that conflict-affected countries tend to receive handsome portions of aid from non-DAC member countries.

14. It is noteworthy that Turkey has been making efforts in systematizing its cooperation by undertaking various actions including the introduction of joint country strategy paper and talent bank mechanism, which pools Turkish technical experts for South-South knowledge sharing (Gülseven 2012).

Figure 4. Share of beneficiaries in reported non-DAC aid to Sub-Sahara Africa, 2011



Source: By authors, based OECD CRS data (OECD Various Years)

Though most individual non-DAC partners in the CRS data do not provide their regional distributions, the most likely major active partners for SSA are oil-producing Arab countries, which mainly provide assistance to Islamic countries in SSA. Other than that, Turkey is an increasingly active donor; it has pledged to provide more aid to least developed countries (LDCs) including SSA countries.¹⁵

China, India and Brazil

As stated above, our analysis so far has not included the very important non-DAC partners of China, India and Brazil, and South Africa due to the unavailability of data. Given this shortcoming, we now turn to the estimated figures of *gross* global ODA disbursements of the three abovementioned countries between 2005 and 2010, using information from the OECD Development Cooperation Report 2012.¹⁶ South Africa will be dealt with later.

15. According to the briefing note of Turkey's development cooperation on the webpage of the Turkish government, aid delivered to Africa increased by 67% from 30.9 million US dollars to 71 million US dollars in 2010.

16. There is also a large discrepancy between the DAC estimation and other estimated figures in several other papers such as by Kragelund 2012, potentially due to definitional issues, the different source of information and other reasons.

Table 1. Trend of Gross Global ODA Disbursements by Brazil, China and India
(in millions of US dollars)

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Brazil	158.07	277.21	291.90	336.83	362.21	N/ A
China	911.90	1,033.27	1,466.86	1,807.57	1,947.65	2,010.61
India	414.50	381.40	392.60	609.50	488.04	639.07
Total Estimate	1,487.47	1,691.88	2,151.36	2,753.90	2,797.90	2,649.68

Source: By the authors, based on OECD (2012) ¹⁷

Table 1 above gives a rough picture of the general trend of these countries in expanding their global ODA. In comparison to the ODA by non-DAC partners (shown in Figure 1), the figures, likely to be significantly underestimated, indicate that considerably larger volumes of ODA are being provided by these three countries, especially by China.

Their specific contribution to SSA is hard to discern, since regionally disaggregated data is unavailable. The following is a glimpse of their profiles by referring to several existing documents.

China's White Paper on Foreign Aid in 2011¹⁸ states that 45.7% of China's foreign aid in 2009 was allocated to Africa including North Africa. It also reports on China's foreign aid distribution by income levels for recipient countries, namely that 39.7% of the total aid is provided to LDCs, a good part of which could be SSA countries. Combining all these, Chinese's sizable foreign aid is likely to be flowing to SSA countries.

Component-wise, the country has also been continuing and expanding TC and knowledge exchanges. The review of the achievements on the Sharm el Sheikh Action Plan (2010-2012) indicated that the country has accepted around 24,000 professionals to the training programs offered by the Chinese Government during the three year period in various fields like agricultural, education and health (The People's Republic of China 2012).

As regards India's aid to Africa, major beneficiaries of her concessional

17. The table is based on the STATLINK data for Figure V33 of the OECD Development Cooperation Report (DCR) 2012.

18. This white paper on China's foreign aid is the first of its kind published by the Chinese Government.

loan aid through the EXIM Bank from 2003 to 2007 (Indian financial years) include Sudan (21%), Ethiopia (7%) and Mali (5%) (Kondoh et al. 2010, pp.33-34). Under the Africa-India Partnership for Enhanced Cooperation adopted in 2011, training opportunities for over 1,200 professionals for Africa have been provided between 2011-12 (AIFS 2011).

Brazil's SSC, according to the 2009 figure, amounted to over 362 million US dollars,¹⁹ out of which 14% is delivered through TC. In spite of the traditional focus on its support to neighboring countries in Latin American, Brazil is expanding its support to SSA. Moreover, it has also started to extend its assistance to non-Lusophone African countries like Ghana and Burkina Faso.²⁰

(2) SSC partners in the African continent

Having looked at the partners outside the continent, we now turn to SSC partnerships on the African continent.

Regional mechanisms for intra-Africa collaboration

First and foremost, the regional organs such as the African Union Commission (AUC), with its development arm of NEPAD and sub-regional organs like SADC and EAC, have played and are increasingly playing larger roles in intra-Africa development cooperation and knowledge facilitation. As part of their mandate, these regional and sub-regional organs have organized various programs and initiatives, which aim to promote the coordinated actions of development cooperation and sharing of knowledge and experience among African countries. Specifically regarding SSC, the AU and NEPAD formulated the African Platform for Development Effectiveness (APDev) in July 2010, with SSC as one of the three thematic thrusts (NEPAD n.d.). In more specific fields, the AUC and NEPAD Agency and the African Development Bank (ADB) have formed an initiative, namely the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA), for the purpose of coordinated region-wide actions on infrastructure development (e.g., energy, transport, water, and ICT) in Africa (PIDA n.d.). In other areas such as agriculture,

19. This figure only covers the grant portion of aid provided by the Federal Government and excludes concessional loans, debt relief and cooperation by state and local governments (OECD 2012 p.260).

20. However, according to the report by the Brazilian Government, African Portuguese-speaking countries still account for 55% of Brazil's resources for TC in Africa (Brazilian International Cooperation Agency 2010).

the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) coordinated by NEPAD has been formulated to create a multilateral framework for agricultural development (CAADP n.d.) involving a broad range of stakeholders including state institutions, NGOs, the private sector and research organs in and outside Africa.²¹

The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) is an innovative NEPAD initiative worth mentioning. APRM is an African-led self-monitoring mechanism for political, economic and corporate governance among African countries that voluntarily acceded to it.²² The APRM process of review and the follow-up actions involve not only the government but also other actors such as civil societies and the private sector. As of the end of 2011, 14 countries had been peer-reviewed (APR Secretariat 2012). Though criticisms remain on its limited abilities to hold African leaders accountable, it has certainly offered rare opportunities for mutual learning among African countries on their governance challenges (Grutz 2010). We now turn to look at individual, prominent SSC partner countries in the African continent: South Africa, and North African countries, notably Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco.

*South Africa*²³

Being a BRICS country, South Africa is by far the major actor in SSC in Sub-Saharan Africa with its GDP roughly 40 times larger than average SSA economies. South Africa's cooperation toward African peer countries covers a wide range of activities like aid, trade, security, and politics, which goes beyond the OECD-DAC's categories.²⁴

Since 2009 when President Zuma took office, the process of institutional development for SSC has been rapidly progressing, including the establishment of the South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA), envisaged to be a unified agency for international cooperation, and of the Partnership Fund for Development, which will replace the African Renaissance and International Cooperation Fund (ARF). The

21. NEPAD has also opened a virtual space for the community of practice involving various themes including infrastructure and agriculture. The access to the community of practice for food security is <http://www.nepad.org/foodsecurity/group>.

22. Thirty three member countries were in APRM as at January 2013 (APR Secretariat 2013).

23. This section draws heavily on Vickers (2012).

24. In 2010, South Africa received about US\$1,000 in net ODA. According to Vickers (2012, footnote 1 in p. 536), about 2.2 % of South Africa's ODA was to Africa over the period 2000-2010.

Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), renamed from the Department of Foreign Affairs, was also established in 2010 for the purpose of “promoting South Africa’s national interests and values” and “the African Renaissance” (DIRCO 2010, p. 6). In April 2012, the concept of SADPA was formally approved by the government. The establishment of SADPA will bring a wide range of changes, including stricter project assessment, mobilization of multiple funding sources, and using various modes of cooperation with emphasis placed on grants and TC.

The notable characteristic of South African cooperation is the country’s active support in the areas of peace building, democratic governance and public sector capacity development including public financial management. This largely reflects the historical pathways along which the country has traveled in the post-Apartheid era.

South Africa has been contributing to sub-regional integration by participating in political and economic regional frameworks, such as the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the SADC free trade area, and the Spatial Development Initiative (SDI).

*Egypt*²⁵

Egypt has been an age-old actor of SSC since the 1970s, particularly in Africa and the Middle East, while learning from development experience gained from other regions including Asia. Egypt prioritizes SSC in its foreign policy, with four principle regions: “free trade areas; foreign direct investment; TC; and exerting efforts for the region’s positive integration into the global economy” (PEMA 2008, p. 8).

There are two funds for Egyptian SSC: one is the Egyptian Fund for Technical Co-operation with Africa (EFTCA) and the other is the Egyptian Fund for Technical Co-operation with the Commonwealth (EFTCC). The EFTCA started its activities in 1991 in order to consolidate and support cooperation between Egypt and other African countries. Its main activities have been organizing training courses, dispatching experts, and offering emergency humanitarian assistance to countries affected by natural disasters. Under the framework of the EFTCA, Egypt has helped more than 30 African countries, managed at least 45 projects,

25. This section chiefly draws on PEMA 2008 and JICA 2007.

dispatched at least 90 short-term and 140 long-term experts in the areas of health, agriculture, water resources, and education, and provided food, medicine, and logistics assistance to many African countries (INSouth n.d.). The other fund, EFTCC, has organized various training courses in the areas of tourism, culture, crime and investigation, the Arabic language, migration, and medical industries for many CIS countries such as Uzbekistan, Moldova, Kazakhstan, Georgia, Albania, Armenia, Tajikistan, Russia, and Mongolia. Egypt also conducts SSC with other partners such as the EU, USAID, Norway, China and Korea, as well as Japan.

*Tunisia*²⁶

Under the supervision of the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, Tunisia has been actively promoting and implementing SSC through the Tunisian Agency of Technical Cooperation (ATCT) established in 1972. The ATCT is obliged to implement the national policy of TC. It has regional offices in Kuwait, Oman, Mauritania, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Its missions include mobilizing appropriate Tunisian human resources to work abroad through TC, providing training for foreign professionals, carrying out technical assistance projects, and promoting SSC/TrC. Tunisia's SSC for Africa covers various areas: poverty reduction, health, vocational training, banking, agriculture, water and the environment, telecommunications, and women's empowerment. The ATCT has dispatched more than 30,000 Tunisian professionals and experts abroad for foreign employers, public and private institutions, and regional and international organizations. It also has provided tailor-made training and standard training programs for 3,000 foreign professionals from more than 39 countries, mainly African countries. These training programs are organized in specialized institutions within the country or by dispatching experts to participants' countries, in cooperation with WB, UNDP, USAID, IDB, GTZ, and JICA.

*Morocco*²⁷

Morocco is a member of the League of Arab States and the Arab Maghreb Union, and maintains friendly ties with the West. Morocco withdrew from the Organization of African Unity (AOU) in 1984 due to its territorial dispute over the Western Sahara. It is currently the only

26. This section draws chiefly on ATCT n.d.

27. This section mainly draws on AMCI n.d. and JICA 2012d.

African country which is not a member of the AU. However, Morocco also places emphasis on measures for Africa. As a foreign policy, Morocco has been promoting cooperation with African and Arab partners.

The Moroccan Agency for International Cooperation (AMCI) established in 1986 has been playing an active role in implementing SSC activities. The AMCI provides 1) training, particularly for foreign students and executives, 2) technical cooperation, and 3) economic and financial cooperation. Morocco receives about 8,000 students (including 6,500 scholarship recipients) from 42 countries, the majority of whom are from African countries. Following South Africa, which is the top investor in Africa, Morocco occupies second place.

The TC provided by the AMCI is to strengthen SSC in various areas through long-, medium-, and short-term training, study visits, dispatching experts, and implementation of joint programs. Partners of Morocco's SSC activities vary: countries of the South for bilateral cooperation, traditional donor countries for triangular cooperation, and international organizations and agencies for multilateral cooperation. The number of beneficiary countries increased from 6 in 2000 to 22 in 2006.

Morocco has also provided economic and financial cooperation since the mid-1990s to support micro-projects in education, health, and small hydro.

2.3 TrC and Sub-Saharan Africa

TrC has been increasingly recognized as a vital modality in support of SSC. Most TrC is delivered through technical cooperation (TCs) including training and dispatch of experts. Its main advantage derives from the opportunities it provides for combining the expertise of diverse development actors²⁸ – expertise likely to fit the needs of partner countries having similar development challenges. Traditional donors including DAC bilateral donors as well as multilateral development institutions can complement such endeavors through the provision of additional financing and knowledge. Hosono argues that “South and North can collaborate on knowledge creation, knowledge exchange,

28. More rigorous analysis regarding the effectiveness of TrC is a remaining challenge (McEwan 2012).

capacity development, and institution building to implement development solutions at scale.”

Below we will have a brief look at TrC's development trends and current status. In fact, a significant part of SSC reviewed above has been conducted as part of the broader triangular partnership.

(1) The trend of TrC by major multilaterals and DAC donors

Globally, the most active bilateral donors in TrC are Japan, Germany and Spain, among which Japan has been widely recognized as the long-standing major actor for years (UN 2008; TT-SSC 2010). Regarding the multilateral institutions, UN specialized agencies including the UN Office of South-South Cooperation (UNOSSC), former Special Unit for South-South Cooperation, UNDP and World Bank are counted as the notable promoters of and contributors to TrC.

Aside from Japan, the details of whose TrC practices for SSA will be touched on in the next section, Germany has been the major TrC contributor mainly through GIZ. Though Latin America has been the main region for German TrC, it has also applied TrC to other regions including SSA (TT-SSC 2010). One example was the collaboration between Germany and Brazil to help strengthen the National Institute of Standardization and Quality (INNOQ) in Mozambique to improve the quality standards of products in Mozambique building on the capacity developed in the National Institute of Metrology, Standardization and Industrial Quality (INMETRO) in Brazil with past GIZ assistance (TT-SSC n.d.a).

As exemplified by the various declarations and guidelines illustrated in the preceding sections, the UN system has been a key promoter and actor in TrC for many years with UNOSSC as the focal point of the entire system. UNOSSC offers diverse modalities for the promotion and support of SSC/TrC to its partners. It manages the UN's major trust fund for SSC/TrC, namely the United Nations Fund for South-South Cooperation. Through a cost-sharing arrangement, it also cooperates with donor governments, including Japan, to support SSC/TrC initiatives. Some major events organized by UNOSSC are supported by this cost-sharing modality, one of which is the annual Global South-South Development EXPO to showcase successful Southern development solutions to the complex challenges facing the South.

UNOSSC also provides management services to various funds including the G-77's Perez-Gurrero Trust Fund for South-South Cooperation and the India, Brazil and South Africa Facility for Poverty and Hunger Alleviation. It has recently established other new mechanisms such as the South-South Global Assets and Technological Exchange (SS-GATE), which supports the South-South public-private partnership through the provision of financial and other knowledge facilitation support.

Other UN specialized agencies such as UNEP, UNIDO and ILO have long engaged in TrC. For instance, in the furtherance of its TrC, UNEP has recently launched the South-South Cooperation Exchange Mechanism for capacity development and technology transfer in the environmental and sustainable development field, which is the online platform to exchange cases of innovative field practices in addition to its more traditional support to SSC through training, workshops and forums (UNEP n.d.).

The World Bank Institute (WBI), the training and knowledge exchange arm of the Bank, is also in the process of further strengthening its function as the support organ for south-south knowledge exchange and capacity development. WBI is using a broad range of SS exchange instruments including the South-South Experience Exchange Trust Fund (SSEETF), a catalytic funding mechanism launched in 2008 for demand-driven SSC initiatives, the Global Development Learning Network (GDLN), a mechanism to promote learning by linking affiliated institutions with ICT such as video-conferencing systems, and also support to regional centers of excellence such as the Zimbabwe-based African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF), a multi-lateral foundation to support capacity development in policy formulation and public management.

(2) JICA's triangular practice for SSA²⁹

Japan has been widely recognized as the long-standing major bilateral actor in triangular cooperation (UN 2008, Fordelone 2009, TT-SSC 2010). The advent of JICA's TrC dates back to 1975, the early days of SSC. Japan has been noted for the advancement of institutionalization regarding its engagement in SSC/TrC, which is still rare among DAC bilateral donors. The SSC/TrC has been clearly stated as one of the central approaches of Japan's ODA in its ODA charter (Government of Japan 2003), mid-term

29. This section draws on JICA's internal documents.

policy (Government of Japan 2005) and JICA's thematic guideline of SSC (JICA 2005).

Over the years, the volume and regional coverage of Japan's TrC has been expanded and diversified for greater impact. The major form of Japan's TrC has been what is called third-country training, or triangular training programs (JICA 2011). Many of these training programs in various fields are offered by the organizations in developing countries, which have built up their expertise and capacity in their respective areas through prior bilateral technical cooperation with JICA and other bilateral and multilateral aid agencies.

Among the regions, participants from SSA have steadily increased, especially since the second half of the 1990s following the launch of the first TICAD in 1993. In 1993, the number of participants from SSA was below 200, which is around 11% of the total beneficiaries in the year. By 2011, the number increased to 1,228 participants; the equivalent of 34% of the total participants (3,780). Also, it is noteworthy that several SSA countries like Ghana, Kenya, Senegal and Tanzania have become active in providing training for other SSA countries, the beneficiaries of which amounted to 381 participants in 2011. This implies that regional centers of excellence, which have knowledge and experiences to share with fellow countries, can be nurtured whatever the level of national income. Other than triangular training programs, JICA also helped dispatch experts from pivotal countries, though its size remains modest, with 23 experts in 2011.

To improve the impact, many of these training and expert dispatch programs have been combined with other aid instruments such as financial assistance within the broader program and project packages including the case of the African Institute of Capacity Development (AICAD), which we will look at shortly. New types of TrC approaches such as the establishment of a regional network as the community of practice, the increased use of ICT including videoconferencing and Internet-based information sharing have also been increasingly adopted, which will also be illustrated later.

To institutionalize TrC, Japan has adopted a system called partnership programs. Over the years, Japan has built up a framework to support SSC by partnering with countries with substantial capabilities for and

willingness to promote SSC (JICA 2009). On the African continent, Japan has partnership programs with three countries: Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco.

In cooperation with the EFTCA in Egypt, JICA started implementing triangular training programs in 1985. In 1998, as an output of TICAD II, Egypt and Japan signed a partnership program, namely the Japan-Egypt Triangular Technical Cooperation Programme for the Promotion of South-South Cooperation in Africa. By 2012, Japan and Egypt cooperated in organizing more than 20 training programs on various themes such as rice cultivation and infectious disease prevention, and accepted about 2,200 participants from 49 SSA countries. The idea of cost-sharing was also introduced. Under the Programme, the two countries have been jointly implementing TC activities to support the socio-economic development of African countries by organizing international training and dispatching experts.

Tunisia entered into partnership with Japan in 1999, when the two governments signed the Japan-Tunisia Triangular Technical Cooperation Programme for the Promotion of South-South Cooperation in Africa. Many activities under the framework focus on areas that contribute to the achievement of the MDGs, such as agriculture, water, and health/medical. By 2012, Japan and Tunisia had cooperated in organizing 17 training programs for about 900 participants and dispatching 20 Tunisian experts.

Morocco and Japan signed the Japan-Morocco Triangular Technical Cooperation Programme for the Promotion of South-South Cooperation in Africa in 2003. Under the program, Morocco has been conducting international training related to such fields as road maintenance, fisheries, and maternal and child health. By 2012, Morocco had implemented nine international training courses for 1,009 participants from 26 SSA countries. One example is a training program for road maintenance engineers of Francophone SSA countries offered by the Institute of Training on Road Maintenance and Construction Machines (IFEER).³⁰ Using inputs from Japan as appropriate, including Japanese

30. IFEER was established in 1993 with the support of the Japanese government including the capital grant aid for its facility construction as well as technical cooperation for capacity development. The institute has become a sub-regional training center for road maintenance engineers of Francophone SSA countries.

road maintenance equipment widely in use in Francophone SSA countries, the course has been providing training fitted to the local needs.

Though not having signed a partnership program, South Africa is a major partner for Japan in supporting SSC for SSA. One of the notable triangular cooperation activities between Japan and South Africa is the support for the NEPAD initiative, in which South Africa has been one of the major players, hosting its secretariat. As an integral part of NEPAD support activities, South Africa's Public Administration Leadership and Management Academy (PALMS) and JICA have been collaborating to organize triangular programs for the training of trainers for public sector development. Since its start, the program has accepted the trainers of management development institutes (MDI) all over SSA countries.

As illustrated by the examples above, Japan's strength in TrC may lie in its accumulated experiences and the wealth of relationships of mutual trust it has developed with a number of Southern partners through its long commitment in TrC. In recent years, it has been trying to diversify its modes of delivery. The remaining task for Japan may be to take stocks of its vast past achievements, review them, and come up with innovative models fitted to the needs of the 21st century.

Though sketchy, our overview presented above of SSC and TrC for SSA shows that over a long period, starting from the 1950s, there has been steady progress in the promotion of SSC and TrC, involving more actors and increasing amounts of resources, accompanied by various institutional developments.

3. Case Studies of Triangular Cooperation for Knowledge Exchanges in SSA

So far, we have looked at the history, current state, and major actors and magnitude of SSC/TrC for SSA. We will now look at specific cases, focusing particularly on knowledge sharing and co-creation. The following five cases have been chosen to illustrate the wide variety of forms and contents of TrC.

3.1 Cases

(1) Transferring localized knowledge to neighboring countries: Vocational and technical Training³¹

Senegal's Vocational Training Center (CFPT) has been playing the role of a center of excellence among French-speaking African countries to increase human resources for industrial development.

The CFPT was established in 1984 with the support of Japan to meet the shortage of entry- and middle-level technical workers, which was an important target in the country's 6th four-year economic development plan (81/82-84/85). The center was designed from the outset with the idea that Senegalese human resources would be nurtured by Senegalese instructors. Since its establishment, the institute has trained about 2,300 technicians and engineers who completed its two- or three-year programs (JICA n.d.).³² These courses have come to be recognized as the country's top level programs, with their completion being treated as a certified qualification for studies in France and Canada. In addition, CFPT has been providing training and retraining to workers in both formal and informal sectors as an implementing organization of the Office National de Formation Professionnelle (ONFP)³³ since the ONFP's establishment in 1984.

Over the years, the CFPT gradually developed its own knowledge and skills best suited to the country's needs. At first, the training content was heavily influenced by what was brought by Japanese experts. With time, however, various innovations were made to produce locally adjusted technical training systems. One small example of such adaptation is that at the CFPT, the students—future leaders in the workplace—are expected to maintain the workshop (work place) in an orderly, safe and clean fashion, according to the key lessons of the 5S doctrines—Sorting, Set in order, Systematic cleaning, Standardizing, and Sustaining. While maintaining its original message, this principle was localized and introduced into the Senegalese context with due modifications to make it suit local labor customs.

31. This section draws on JICA 2012a.

32. Various qualifications obtained through Senegal's education system are valid not only in neighboring countries, but also in France (JICA 2000, p. 324).

33. ONFP is funded by corporate employment insurance, donors, and international organizations that provide financial support for vocational training.

While building up its own capacity, the CFPT started supporting a large number of countries—more than 20 of them—in their human resource development; in 1999, in cooperation with JICA, it started providing 16 French-speaking countries with international training programs (JICA 2012b). Eventually, the Institute came to have about 15% of their BTI and BTS trainees coming from other countries.³⁴ Cultural and socio-economic similarities with the neighboring French-speaking countries certainly facilitated the transfer and sharing of technologies and knowledge. This has resulted in making CFPT one of the core institutions for the development of human resources in West Africa.

One major beneficiary of such cooperation is the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Concurrently with the CFPT project, preparations for a JICA-supported project in DRC were under way. The project aimed to develop the capacity of the DRC's National Institute of Professional Preparation (INPP),³⁵ in which a group of core instructors had to be trained. Since CFPT seemed an ideal resource to support INPP, in 2010, discussions between INPP and CFPT began, facilitated by JICA; the two institutions worked out cooperation plans to meet the needs of the PP with the available resources at CFPT, and cooperation between the two started.

(2) Seeking relevant knowledge from around the world: Civil Service Training Centre in Ghana

The Ghanaian case presented below illustrates an interesting case where a wide range of knowledge was sought and accumulated from a variety of sources, and once internalized, such knowledge was shared more widely with others. Such knowledge exchange happened in a TC project assisted by JICA titled “Capacity Development of Public Administration,” launched in 2007. Its aim was to improve the capacity of the Ghanaian Civil Service Training Center (CSTC). The project focused on two key cross-cutting themes: Ethical Leadership (EL) and Quality and Productivity Improvement (QPI).

From the onset, the project tried to seek knowledge and experience not

34. The number of overseas trainees is limited to 15% of the total due to prioritizing Senegalese citizens (JICA 2000, p.326).

35. The INPP was awarded the International Star Award for Quality (ISAQ) in the Gold Category at the 2012 International Quality Awards in Geneva, Switzerland. The ISAQ is an award for those who are recognized for investing in the improvement of their products and services (ISQA 2010).

only from Japan but also from other Asian and Sub-Sahara African countries including Singapore, Malaysia, Bangladesh, Tanzania and South Africa, which are the members of the Commonwealth and share many common features in their civil service. In particular, the Civil Service College (CSC) in Singapore played a central role. JICA, with its close ties with these partners,³⁶ played the dual role of catalyst and knowledge actor.

During the project, the Ghanaian CSTC acquired relevant knowledge resources from partner countries through diverse modes of triangular cooperation, including face-to-face training sessions as well as video-conferencing. Extensive and intensive exchanges were promoted between Ghanaian officials and their Southern counterparts.

All through these programs, CSTC applied a systematic approach to planning, execution and evaluation of training. Complemented by the improvement of training facilities, the annual number of training programs offered at CSTC has increased from 15 courses to 54 a year, which reflects the improved capacity of CSTC in organizing training provisions.³⁷

With these achievements, CSTC is now moving toward becoming a regional center of excellence in civil service training. Assisted by JICA, the center has started offering training opportunities to Liberia and Sierra Leone. CSTC undertook training needs assessments in the two countries to adjust the training content to suit the needs. The first training was successfully launched in September 2011 and will provide training opportunities to civil servants from the neighboring two countries, with the aim of making them facilitators for future training programs in their respective countries.

(3) Establishing a regional knowledge platform for poverty reduction: AICAD³⁸

The Project of the African Institute for Capacity Development (AICAD) is a cooperation project focusing on regional cooperation in human

36. Japan and Singapore had established close ties, and to facilitate collaboration for TrC, they introduced the Japan-Singapore Partnership Programme for the 21st Century (JSPP21) in 1994.

37. This number includes training programs undertaken outside the project.

38. This section draws on JICA 2012c.

resource development at the higher education level in East Africa. The project is the brainchild of TICAD II, where the idea of establishing a human capacity development base for poverty reduction was discussed. Later, in 2000, in collaboration with Japan, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda reached an agreement to establish AICAD. AICAD was expected to work toward poverty reduction in East Africa through cooperation of the three countries; it highlighted three functions for community-level development activities: 1) research and development, 2) training and extension, and 3) information network and documentation.

Since its establishment, AICAD's functions and organizational structure have been steadily developed. Headquartered at the Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology (JKUAT) in Kenya,³⁹ it had three country offices: at the Egerton University in Kenya, the Makerere University in Uganda, and the Sokoine University of Agriculture in Tanzania. Biannually, Governing Board meetings are held to discuss important issues of AICAD's management among the three countries' ministries related to finance and education, science and technology, and representatives of the member universities.⁴⁰

With poverty reduction as its ultimate goal, AICAD and its members have been promoting a wide variety of activities. They include, for example, in-country training programs and comprehensive multiple-level "Community Empowerment Programmes" for communities, a "Knowledge and Technology Dissemination Programme" for livelihood improvement, East African region-wide training,⁴¹ and the New Rice for Africa (NERICA) dissemination project. These activities resulted in enhancing social cohesion of target communities and women's empowerment. Skills and knowledge obtained through these activities have also been being disseminated by the participants to communities, supporting poverty reduction in member countries.

AICAD's function of networking with other organizations has also been developing. Since 2010, AICAD has been expanding its activities in the area of university outreach activities. It has conducted four regional training sessions in collaboration with the World Bank Institute (WBI)

39. JICA had supported the establishment and development of JKUAT since 1980.

40. As of 2012, the participating universities from the three countries amount to 19 (seven from Kenya, seven from Tanzania, and five from Uganda).

41. Some of the regional training was organized in collaboration with WBI and WIA.

and the Wetlands International Africa (WIA). Also, AICAD's three country offices have been constructing good partnerships with various organizations from national/local governments to NGOs.

Cooperating with Asia played an important role in AICAD's development. Starting in 2002, various professional knowledge exchanges were conducted between educators of the three East African countries and those of Asia, namely Indonesia, Thailand and Japan.

The project had a system of sharing and spreading knowledge and skills. For instance, in 2007, a regional training program for export promotion was held in collaboration with Indonesia's Export Trade Center. Subsequently, in Tanzania, the knowledge and skills shared from Indonesia at the training program spread into society through a cascade system of training: to community leaders and then from them to local community members.

(4) Networking for knowledge exchange: Coalition for African Rice Development (CARD)

The "Coalition for African Rice Development", or CARD,⁴² is an example of a network-based initiative for knowledge exchange and co-creation. Launched on the occasion of the 2008 TICAD IV, it is a multi-stakeholder platform with a well-established management structure "to support the efforts of African countries to increase rice production (CARD 2011)." Providing complementary support for capacity development of SSA governments in effectively managing rice sector development, it has helped interested SSA governments in developing National Rice Development Strategies (NRDS) within the framework of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), agricultural development strategies as well as the country framework for the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP). So far, 21 out of 23 African member countries have successfully formulated NRDS through broad multi-stakeholders consultation process (CARD 2013). It has also provided other kinds of support for creating an environment for rice-related investment.

One of the hallmarks of CARD is its engagement of diverse actors. The steering committee is represented by a broad range of stakeholders

42. For a general description of CARD and a discussion from an agricultural technology's point of view, see, respectively, Chapters 2 and 3 of this volume.

including multi- and bilateral-organs, rice producing partner countries in SSA as well as Africa-based regional organs and initiatives. They include NEPAD, AGRA, FARA, WB, CGIAR, FAO, IRRI and JICA other than for SSA countries (JICA / AGRA 2008; CARD 2011).

With such broad engagement, CARD has tried to act as the forum among international and local knowledge organs like research institutions and donors. In other words, the CARD network is in itself an initiative and mechanism for multi-stakeholder knowledge exchange.

Another notable feature is its demand-driven approach. As the needs and priorities for rice production promotion widely differ from country to country, CARD specialists assist partner countries to identify the bottlenecks in rice production development and then extend the necessary support to address the bottlenecks by inviting specialists from knowledge partners in the CARD network.

CARD has also started to consciously promote intra-regional as well as inter-regional South-South and Triangular learning.⁴³ SSC/TrC has been set as one of four pillars of the CARD programs. Lately, CARD has embarked on a sub-program of linking Asian partners with SSA counterparts. In late 2012, it organized three video conferences for the promotion of the South-South learning process with ASEAN partners including the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, and Japan (CARD 2011, 2012). Also included were government officials and private companies like seed sellers and rice millers, as well as farmers' groups. The participants are now in the process of feeding back what they have learned from the conference into the implementation process of their NRDSs.

As seen from the above, CARD is a dynamic and broad network and platform for promoting intra- and inter-regional knowledge exchange aiming at higher productivity and more profitable rice production.

(5) Creating solutions to shared challenges: cross-border road transport

Triangular cooperation (TrC) can be an effective way of addressing

43. As part of the action for promoting information sharing on rice development, CARD is now developing a dedicated webpage with ample space for storing relevant information with links to all the key African initiatives in rice development (CARD 2011).

regionally-shared issues among countries. One such example is the initiative of promoting One Stop Border Post (OSBP).⁴⁴

OSBP is a trade facilitation approach through the promotion of harmonization and alignment of legal, institutional and procedural aspects of trade at borders with concomitant infrastructure development. With complementary financial and technical support from international donors including JICA, an OSBP for road transport was first introduced at the Chirundu border between Zimbabwe and Zambia in December 2009 with tangible impacts on smoother and more efficient border management. Even though the OSBP's inauguration has been relatively recent, it has already produced significant improvements including the reduction of waiting times for border formalities.⁴⁵ The successful launch of Africa's first OSBP at Chirundu was a case where the concept of integrated border management was put into practice. The OSBP at Chirundu itself was the South-South partnership between Zimbabwe and Zambia assisted by both multilateral and bilateral donors including the World Bank, UK DFID and JICA. Right after the launch, a workshop on the OSBP for road transport was organized with invitees from RECs and representatives of five East African countries, which had planned to introduce OSBPs under the coordination of the East African Community (EAC).

Following the success at Chirundu, the OSBP practice is now being replicated on other borders such as Maraba between Kenya and Uganda and Namanga between Kenya and Tanzania as an integral part of the regional infrastructure initiative. Recognizing an increasing role of regional organizations such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the East Africa Community (EAC) in catalyzing exchanges of knowledge and experience of development practices as well as for the harmonization of cross-border activities, JICA, with other development partners, has helped these regional organs in support of their stronger coordination and regulatory capacity in scaling-up the OSBP approach.

44. For more details, see Chapter 8 of this volume.

45. It is reported that the required time for completing the border control has been reduced from 1–2 hours to 20 minutes for passenger cars, from 2 hours to 1 hour for buses, and from 1–2 days to less than one day for trucks, respectively (See Chapter 8 of this volume).

3.2. Modes of SSC/TrC for knowledge exchange and co-creation

(1) Modes of knowledge exchange

Knowledge sharing and co-creation through SSC/TrC can take a wide variety of forms, depending on the kind of knowledge being dealt with, and the environment in which the exchange takes place. Below is a simple typology of the forms. It should be noted here, however, that the types below are not mutually exclusive and an initiative could evolve from one type to the other with time.

Hub-and-spokes with centers of excellence

In recent years, knowledge exchange through networks has come to draw increasing attention as promising architecture. Among the varied forms of networks, the first is what can be described as the hub-and-spokes-type knowledge exchange. This is a simple form of network relying, at least initially, on an established central institution as a hub of the knowledge sharing activities. And as the network develops, spontaneous exchanges and interactions among the network members often occur, with which the process of a virtuous cycle could kick in. Among the cases presented above, the Senegalese and the Ghanaian ones represent this model, where the CFPT in Senegal and the CSTC in Ghana played central roles. The effectiveness of having these kinds of “centers of excellence” has been proven through a number of cases (Hosono 2013). Examples abound worldwide; to cite a few from Africa: Tanzania as a hub of quality control in hospital management (Honda 2012), Kenya as a hub of strengthening science and mathematics education (Ishihara 2012), and Egypt as a hub of infectious disease prevention and surveillance (TT-SSC n.d.b).

Complex form of network/platform for knowledge exchange and sharing

Increasingly, more complex network forms of knowledge exchange and sharing are being applied in recent initiatives. For this, unlike the case of the above hub-and-spokes, no single institution is assumed to be a central knowledge organ; rather, the alliance comprised a number of interested parties interacting among themselves.

AICAD links up multiple regional research and training organs such as the universities and NGOs. The AICAD headquarters in Kenya plays a facilitating role for knowledge exchanges among the members. CARD, as its name (the “Coalition”) indicates, is essentially “a consultative group of donors, research institutions and other relevant organizations

that aims to promote rice cultivation in Africa via information sharing, harmonization of existing initiatives and projects and advocacy for further investment” (JICA/AGRA 2008; CARD 2011). Within the network, these diverse actors, each having specific expertise, share and learn a broad range of knowledge, including the formulation of national rice development strategies, agricultural extension methods and the knowledge on new high-yielding rice varieties. The CARD secretariat then plays the role of catalyzing and helps promote such multi-actor exchanges. With its expanding stakeholders and increasingly active knowledge exchanges, AICAD and CARD now evolve into more like a “platform” for knowledge sharing and exchange.

Partnership for knowledge sharing and joint problem solving

In contrast to the above two types of knowledge exchange based on networks, the OSBP cases exemplify a tighter partnership among the members seeking solutions to their shared or similar development challenges. This process can, however, develop further, once the knowledge created proves useful. As illustrated in the OSBP’s case, the knowledge and experience created through the tight-knit collaboration between Zimbabwe and Zambia are being shared with countries in eastern and southern Africa. The case of Ghana in civil service training also illustrates the process of a problem-driven partnership for knowledge exchange: starting from the core partnership with a few commonwealth countries including Singapore, Ghana now further disseminates a locally adapted approach for civil service training to Sierra Leone.

(2) Institutional arrangement

Different knowledge exchange requires different institutions. In some cases, as in CARD and AICAD, strong institutional arrangements were introduced from the very beginning; being large-scale projects involving multiple layers of actors, obviously these two projects needed to have a solid institutional base, such as organizational structures and governing bodies; in the case of CARD, the Steering Committee and other structures were put in place, and, for AICAD, networking systems connecting the three countries under the Governing Board as the highest decision making body were set up.

In contrast, the institutional building process took a quite different path in the case of the Senegalese and Ghanaian projects; it was a process of

spontaneous and gradual development: the linkages between the core organizations (i.e., CFPT in Senegal and CSTC in Ghana) and their partner organizations were developed gradually as the knowledge sharing expanded by means of workshops and training courses.

These spontaneously developed institutions, however, can sometimes grow into more formalized organizations. For example, in a project concerning science and mathematics education, a knowledge sharing movement started with an initiative by Kenya, and over the years it gradually developed into a more formalized organization, comprising 27 African countries and regions, with well-articulated mechanisms for the network's governance (Ishihara 2012). A similar experience can be found in a case of hospital management where, with Tanzania as a pivotal country, gradual networking progressed, which eventually grew into an organization of mutual learning involving 15 countries (Honda 2012).

The OSBP's case illustrates another promising pattern. It is a case where the function of regional knowledge sharing on OSBP was strategically incorporated into well-established regional economic organizations such as SADC and EAC. Such approach of using regional organs in knowledge sharing would lead to more harmonized and less fragmented SSC/TrC in the region.

(3) The medium of exchange

As preceding sections have demonstrated, effective knowledge sharing requires the strategic and timely applications of diverse instruments; they could include face-to-face training sessions, dispatch of technical experts, workshops and seminars, and the use of ICT-based information platforms. Especially, more and more opportunities have become available, taking advantage of ICT for knowledge exchange, as exemplified by the WBI's GDLN, APDev's Internet-based communities of practice, as well as the use of video-conferencing in the case of Ghana's Civil Service Training.

On the other hand, it has also been widely recognized that face-to-face learning opportunities continue to be critical in knowledge sharing, particularly with regard to the sharing of tacit knowledge (World Bank and Korea Development Institute 2012; Nonaka 2008). To further improve the impact of SSC/TrC in coming years, strategic and creative

use of these multiple instruments should be explored through the sharing of good practices among stakeholders of SSC/TrC.

(4) Capacity development for more effective SSC/TrC

As an increasing number of countries expand their development cooperation activities, they are also strengthening their capacity as effective SSC performers. As shown above, the ongoing preparation towards the establishment of SADPA in South Africa is an example of such endeavor. Capacity development is also critical on the other side of SSC/TrC, the beneficiaries.

An example of systematic joint efforts for the development of the capacity as SSC partners is the one by the Brazilian Cooperation Agency of the Ministry of External Relations (ABC), UNOSSC and JICA. They have recently embarked on an innovative joint capacity development program in the management aspect of SSC/TrC planning and operations. It is an initiative to provide opportunities for knowledge and experience sharing among the government staff in charge of SSC/TrC technical cooperation. The target countries include both middle-income countries including Brazil mainly as SSC/TrC providers as well as low-income countries, which are mainly beneficiaries. In March 2013, its inaugural “international training course on management of South-South and Triangular Technical Cooperation” was organized in Brasília as part of the program; the program will span the next three years.⁴⁶ The participants of the first training comprised 39 practitioners from 36 countries, including 17 African countries.

Lastly, we maintain that the opportunity for being an SSC cooperation provider is open to any country or organization beyond prominent emerging economies. As illustrated in the Senegalese and Ghanaian cases above, with capacity development, organizations can grow into regional centers of excellence for knowledge sharing, as long as the countries and/or organizations have strong ownership and a persistent will to develop such capacity. Perhaps traditional North-South cooperation by means of TrC can have a role to play in facilitating such capacity development processes, as exemplified in the above cases. In fact, there are countless cases of such capacity development of

46. In addition to the training opportunities, the program also includes other complementary support for SSC/TrC management including online consultation services and advisory missions especially for selected focus countries.

institutions supported by traditional partners. The international community should continue to offer support, by means of appropriate TrC and others, as such countries and organizations that wish to develop their capacities to grow into cooperation providers.

4. Summary and Some Concluding Remarks and Implications

The discussion in Section 2.1 showed that Africa has been a central actor as the promoter and beneficiary of SSC. We also noted that the TICAD process has been playing an important role in promoting the momentum toward more and better SSC for African development. Though sketchy, our discussion in sections 2.2 and 2.3 has revealed that a wide variety of actors have long been and are acting as SSC partners for the development of SSA including regional organs and North African countries, in addition to the oft-cited emerging economies. The lack of data on the activities of emerging and other actors is a serious obstacle in understanding the whole picture, and more effort is called for in data collection and information sharing.

And in Section 3, we argued, based on the experiences we at JICA have accumulated, that knowledge sharing and co-creation through SSC and TrC can take a variety of forms with diverse instruments, depending on the types of knowledge creation and solutions needed. We also argued that knowledge sharing and co-creation should not be monopolized by a small number of actors but is a possibility for all aspiring countries and organizations. In that regards, the North donors with their extensive field office network and long history of close collaboration with counterpart organs in SSA countries are well-positioned to provide support. It is thus expected that the TICAD process will continue to provide space and opportunities for experience sharing and open dialogue among broad stakeholders on the furtherance of SSC/TrC towards inclusive and dynamic development in Africa.

Finally, having attempted to provide an overview of SSC/TrC for Sub-Saharan Africa's development, the authors renewed their recognition of the multi-faceted and complex nature of SSC/TrC; a plethora of issues surrounding SSC/TrC remain uninvestigated, such as their geopolitical nature and the measurement and evaluation of their impact in the

beneficiary countries.⁴⁷ These remaining but critical questions require further research.

47. McEwan and Mawdsley 2012 argues for the need of more critical analysis of triangular or trilateral cooperation beyond the managerial/technical discussions, which most currently available papers including this one are limited to.

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Appendices

Appendix 1:

The TICAD Process and Japan

Kei Yoshizawa

This essay attempts to give a quick review of the history of the TICAD process. Looking back at the different policies and priorities agreed on at TICAD I through IV, and paying particular attention to the roles played by the Japanese government, the essay will try to shed light on the contributions that the TICAD process has had on African development. It will start with a chronological revisit to the process and, toward the end, offer some of the author's views on its 20-year-long evolution.

TICAD I (October 1993, Tokyo)

TICAD I was held in 1993 in the midst of the drastically changing international environment in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War. On the African continent, many countries were struggling toward democracy, while at the same time many were experiencing political turmoil and some, civil wars. Western donors, on their part, were generally experiencing waning interest in supporting Africa after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and policy-wise, they were rather frustrated to see many African countries remaining stuck with slow improvement of macro-economic performance and poor governance. In the meantime, Japan, in 1989, had become the world's top donor in regard to development assistance, overtaking the US, and its bilateral aid to Africa had been increasing rapidly since the late 1980s, including co-financing with the World Bank and IMF through Structural Adjustment Lending and Non-Project Grants supporting balance of payments aligning with structure adjustments.

Thus, TICAD I was held in an international environment where, on the one hand, there was a mounting sense, among African leaders, of the "Marginalization" of Africa in international politics, as well as that of discontentment vis-à-vis the Breton-Woods institutions and the Western donors; on the other hand, there was a mounting expectation toward

Japan as an emerging, though a little unfamiliar, development partner. In 1993, as a multilateral forum, the conference was organized jointly by Japan, the UN, the UNDP and the GCA,¹ and was participated in by 48 African countries (5 of which were represented by their heads of state), 8 international organizations, 12 bilateral donor countries and the EC.

The first TICAD conference came up with a message that, as I see it, mixed the dominant policy orientation in the international aid community at the time and Japan's aid philosophy. The primary interests of the international community in the early 1990s were, on the economic front, economic reform toward a market economy and dealing with the debt crisis still lingering from the 1980s; and on the political/administrative front, the priority was democratization and administrative and financial reforms that the Good Governance principle demanded. These agendas inevitably echoed strongly in the Tokyo Declaration of TICAD I, but the document also incorporated policies and philosophies upheld by the Japanese Government, such as self-help efforts, south-south cooperation and sharing Asian experiences for African development (Horiuchi 2006:28).

In retrospect, it seems that the Japanese aid policy for Africa at the time of TICAD I was rather broad and not as clear as those that would be expressed later at TICAD IV. The commitment of the Japanese Government was also rather limited at TICAD I. It was later in TICAD II and thereafter that Japanese policy orientation took concrete forms and were translated into action programs. Despite these limitations, TICAD I, and Japan's determination for African development that it represented, enhanced the expectations of African leaders for Japan; it was against this backdrop that the holding of TICAD II was announced in April 1996 (Horiuchi 2004: 24).

TICAD II (October 1998, Tokyo)

Following the success of TICAD I, the Japanese government embarked on efforts toward taking the lead in agenda setting in African development and, more generally, in international development. The most notable result was the adoption of the Shaping the 21st Century, The

1. Global Coalition for Africa, a group of experts and intellectuals on political and economic issues regarding Africa

Contribution of Development Cooperation, adopted at the DAC High Level Meeting held in May 1996 (Horiuchi 2004: 25), which was more broadly known as “DAC New Development Strategy”.

The DAC New Development Strategy was different from the then-dominant development paradigms that called primarily for Structural Adjustment and Good Governance. While these policies largely aimed at institutional and regulatory reforms, the DAC New Development Strategy urged that governments and partners focus on the results to be achieved through development, highlighting the importance of self-help efforts and clarifying the complementary role of development aid. It also introduced numerical targets – an expression of the results-focused orientation – on such domains as poverty reduction, social development (education, health), and environmental conservation and sustainable development.

These principles upheld in the DAC New Development Strategy were incorporated in the Tokyo Agenda for Action of TICAD II (Horiuchi 2004: 25); education, health and poverty reduction were identified as the key challenges.² In addition, eight numerical targets and 370 development projects, mostly reflecting the targets, were presented.³

Also, it was at TICAD II that the TICAD framework as we know it today started to be shaped and formalized; the principle of “support for self-help efforts” was adopted as the basic principle of TICAD to be called “Ownership and Partnership” (Horiuchi 2006: 30); and other characteristics of TICAD emerged, such as the emphasis on poverty reduction and social development, a results-oriented approach accompanying numerical targets, and support for South-South Cooperation.

This TICAD framework constituted a pioneering initiative in international efforts toward the adoption of the Poverty Reduction Strategy by the IMF and the World Bank (1999), MDGs by the United Nations (2000) and NEPAD (New Partnership for Africa’s Development,

2. The Japanese government announced the provision of grant aid of about 90 billion yen over the subsequent five years in the fields of education, health and water supply.

3. UNDP reviewed the progress of the implementation of Tokyo Agenda for Action (UNDP 2003).

2001).⁴

TICAD II also served as a platform to strengthen various then-existing international development-related initiatives. For example, the Tokyo Declaration and Tokyo Agenda for Action of TICAD II incorporated the HIPC Initiative (Lyon Summit in 1996) and other decisions made before TICAD II about external debt issues. Subsequently, the expanded HIPC Initiative (Cologne Summit in 1999) was agreed on based on ownership and partnership principles and emphasis on poverty reduction and social development. The World Bank became a co-organizer of TICAD in 2001.

TICAD III (September 2003, Tokyo)

The most important topic of TICAD III was to support NEPAD (New Partnership for Africa's Development), which was presented to the international community at the TICAD ministerial-level meeting (December 2001, Tokyo). NEPAD was consistent with the basic principles of TICAD in that it emphasized ownership by African countries of their development process (Horiuchi 2006: 34). TICAD III agreed to mobilize the support of the international community and expand the partnership in its support. Concrete actions for supporting NEPAD were subsequently developed reflecting TICAD III outcomes; including Cross-Border Transport Infrastructure (CBTI) and One Stop Border Post (OSBP) initiatives highlighted in the TICAD IV Action Plan,⁵ and the African Infrastructure Development Program (PIDA) formulated jointly by the African Development Bank, African Union Commission and the NEPAD Agency, adopted at the African Union Summit in 2012.

The Summary by the Chair of TICAD III confirmed the three pillars of African development, consisting of (1) people-centered development, (2) poverty reduction through economic growth, and (3) consolidation of peace. Highlighting "poverty reduction through economic growth" as the second pillar, this summary could arguably be understood as reflecting the position of the Japanese Government: in order to reduce poverty, economic growth must first of all be promoted – a position not

4. For details, see, for example, the Institute of International Affairs (2003)

5. Please see Chapter 8 of this volume.

necessarily identical with either the market-oriented approach promoted by the IMF and World Bank through structural adjustments, or with the position of the United Nations that was calling for a mobilization of a massive amount of development assistance funds to achieve MDGs by 2015.

Following this, this economic growth agenda became the central issue in the subsequent TICAD process, coinciding with the economic growth of Africa that had started in the early 2000s led by exports of energy and mineral resources. In TICAD IV, “Boosting economic growth” was made the first priority. And toward TICAD V, discussions are underway to move the agenda more in the direction of further acceleration of growth, as summarized by Japanese Foreign Minister Mr. Kishida in the TICAD V Ministerial Preparatory Meeting in March 2013.

TICAD IV (May 2008, Yokohama)

TICAD IV was held in 2008. A total of 51 (out of 53) African countries participated in the conference, with 41 of them represented by heads of state or government. The conference positioned the issue of boosting economic growth as the first pillar, and came up with the outcome documents titled the Yokohama Declaration and Yokohama Action Plan, which clearly stated the commitments of the participants. Japan, for its part, announced that it would double its ODA to Africa and provide up to \$4 billion of new ODA loans over the following five years to support the continent’s economic growth, despite its difficult fiscal position.

Another noteworthy development was the introduction of the follow-up mechanism for monitoring TICAD IV commitments and the Yokohama Action Plan; since 2009, follow-up ministerial meetings have been held every year to monitor the progress of these commitments. TICAD Progress Reports are compiled and reported to the ministerial meetings.

The TICAD IV Yokohama Declaration emphasized the importance of economic growth even more strongly than ever, putting it before other pillars, i.e., those related to MDGs, environmental issues and climate change, and consolidation of peace and good governance. The prioritization of economic growth in TICAD IV represented a remarkable shift from the traditional emphasis on social and human

development since TICAD I and toward the development of infrastructure, trade and investment, and partnership with the private sector.

However, prior to TICAD IV, Japan was constrained in mobilizing its financial resources for supporting economic growth in Africa, due primarily to the debt accumulation problem in Africa. This constraint was relieved by the final settlement of long-standing debt problems agreed on at the Gleneagles G8 Summit in 2005, prompting the Japanese government to announce its ODA Loan support package for Africa through co-financing with the African Development Bank (EPSA).⁶ In TICAD IV, Japan pledged new ODA loans of up to \$4 billion over five years focused on cross-border infrastructure projects in transportation and the power sector to promote regional integration in Africa. This pledge of “Doubling ODA to Africa” under the difficult fiscal situation in Japan was initiated by the strong political leadership of the Fukuda administration at the time, by switching the main destination of the ODA budget, which had been largely directed to other regions.

This also marked a major turning point in Japanese assistance to Africa, which had been virtually limited to assistance in social and human development mainly through grant aid and Technical Cooperation.⁷ The size of the pledged ODA loans (\$4 billion over five years) may not look significant enough when compared with the vast financing gap in infrastructure investment reported to amount to \$48 billion a year (World Bank 2008), but it could play an important role in complementing other financial resources, for example, through co-financing operations with the African Development Bank and the World Bank.

6. EPSA stands for Expanded Private Sector Assistance for Africa. It aims at the provision of ODA loans of \$1 billion over 5 years from 2005 through co-financing with the African Development Bank.

7. This does not mean that social and human development is no longer emphasized in the TICAD IV commitments of Japan; in parallel to infrastructure development, the Japanese contribution to the achievement of MDGs has also been strengthened through grant aid and Technical Cooperation as part of the commitment.

Contributions of TICAD to African Development

So far, we have looked at the development of directions and priorities at respective TICAD meetings, summarized in Table 1 below.

Table 1. Priorities in the outcome documents in TICAD I to IV

	TICAD I (1993)	TICAD II (1998)	TICAD III (2003)	TICAD IV (2008)
Outcome document	Tokyo Declaration on African Development	Tokyo Agenda for Action	Summary by the Chair	Yokohama Declaration, Yokohama Action Plan
Priorities	(1) Political and economic reforms (2) Economic development through activities of the private sector (3) Regional cooperation and regional integration (4) Emergency relief and development (5) Asian experience and African development	(1) Social development and poverty reduction: Promoting human development (2) Economic development: Promoting the private sector (3) Basic foundations for development	(1) People-centered development (2) Poverty reduction through economic growth (3) Consolidation of peace	(1) Boosting economic growth (2) Achieving MDGs (3) Consolidation of peace and good governance (4) Addressing environmental issues and climate change

(Prepared by the author based on information of JICA et al. (2007 and 2013) and the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

We now have a look to see what contributions the whole process has made to African development.

To recapitulate, the following are some of the past major achievements of the TICAD process:

- Respect of the ownership of development through the formulation of the “ownership and partnership” principle at TICAD II.
- Facilitation of development initiatives through African ownership exemplified in such initiatives as NEPAD, agreed on at TICAD III.
- Emphasis on poverty reduction through economic growth as a pillar of the African development agenda at TICAD III, and the

introduction of a growth-oriented development strategy at TICAD IV.

- Development of action plans based on numerical targets and outcome goals as well as the establishment of a follow-up mechanism in TICAD IV.
- Promotion of south-south and especially Asia-Africa cooperation⁸ since TICAD I.

The TICAD process also provided opportunities for the sharing of the development and growth experience between Asia and Africa, an agenda highlighted from TICAD I. The ideas drawn from Asian development experiences, like the role of the governments, growth-oriented development strategies, emphasizing the importance of infrastructure, and strengthening of ownership, added some values to the development strategies in Africa, which had traditionally been led by Washington Consensus-based thinking since the 1990s (Horiuchi 2006: 30, and JICA et al. 2013).

TICAD is different from other fora on African development in its character as a global, open, and multilateral forum. While the EU, China, Korea, India and Turkey, and others have held similar-looking summits or ministerial-level meetings with AU and African governments, these meetings are held with the aim of strengthening bilateral partnerships between the host government or institution and Africa. Unlike these, TICAD is a summit-level meeting on African Development between African governments and TICAD co-organizers, i.e., the Government of Japan, the UN, the UNDP, the World Bank and the African Union Commission. TICAD has a unique character as a forum open to international institutions, civil societies, the private sector, and academics to discuss and reach consensus on the African development agenda and action plan for the next 5 years, not limited to a bilateral partnership and commitment between Japan and Africa.

As an open forum, the TICAD process has attracted the attention and participation of NGOs and the private sector. For example, the Japanese civil society, with the establishment of the Africa Japan Forum (AJF) in 1994, has been playing an important role in the TICAD process; their contributions included participating in the TICAD meetings, organizing side events and consultative meetings with the Ministry of Foreign

8. For more detailed discussion on south-south cooperation, see Chapter 13 of this volume.

Affairs, presenting policy recommendations to TICAD meetings, communication with the public on Africa, networking with African civil societies (TCSF 2008). The private sector was also an important partner: the Keidanren (Japan Business Federation) also holds consultative meetings with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs⁹ and presents proposals to the Government of Japan on the TICAD process and public-private partnership in Africa (Keidanren 2013).

With the changing environment surrounding Africa and the whole world, the challenge for the future TICAD process could be how it can continue to further promote debates and garner resources for African development, both in public and private sectors, while strengthening its unique character as a global and open forum, and building on the rich experience and assets it has created over the last 20 years.

9. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs holds meetings with the civil society and the private sector for TICAD V (<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/ticad/index.html>)

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Appendix 2:

Japan's Official Development Assistance to Africa 2000-2011

		Japan's ODA (Net disbursements, \$ million)				
COUNTRY	SCHEME	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Algeria	Loan Aid	-5.82	-5.00	-2.88	-1.05	-2.70
	Grant Aid	0.00	0.18	0.05	0.11	0.01
	Technical Cooperation	0.94	0.82	0.65	1.08	1.71
	Total	-4.88	-4.00	-2.18	0.14	-0.98
Angola	Loan Aid	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	Grant Aid	17.88	18.20	26.09	32.66	24.03
	Technical Cooperation	3.59	2.51	1.13	0.44	1.43
	Total	21.47	20.71	27.21	33.10	25.47
Benin	Loan Aid	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-34.80
	Grant Aid	3.26	6.86	3.55	4.02	45.21
	Technical Cooperation	2.91	1.40	0.98	2.25	0.74
	Total	6.16	8.26	4.53	6.27	11.15
Botswana	Loan Aid	-0.86	0.69	-4.30	-4.31	-4.17
	Grant Aid	3.56	2.59	1.21	2.78	0.92
	Technical Cooperation	3.35	3.97	2.96	2.79	1.88
	Total	6.06	7.24	-0.13	1.27	-1.38
Burkina Faso	Loan Aid	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	Grant Aid	16.75	16.56	4.71	3.90	3.32
	Technical Cooperation	4.50	3.89	5.31	6.69	5.17
	Total	21.25	20.44	10.02	10.58	8.49
Burundi	Loan Aid	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	Grant Aid	0.16	0.16	0.00	0.00	0.27
	Technical Cooperation	0.08	0.14	0.09	0.09	0.14
	Total	0.24	0.29	0.09	0.09	0.40
Cameroon	Loan Aid	4.49	36.18	0.00	0.00	0.00
	Grant Aid	9.43	2.65	6.11	9.75	13.93
	Technical Cooperation	1.89	2.49	1.40	1.03	2.92
	Total	15.81	41.32	7.51	10.79	16.86
Cape Verde	Loan Aid	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	Grant Aid	9.86	2.63	5.18	10.81	3.65
	Technical Cooperation	0.89	0.80	1.13	0.96	0.29
	Total	10.74	3.43	6.31	11.77	3.94
Central African Republic	Loan Aid	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	Grant Aid	20.94	13.11	12.28	1.40	0.00
	Technical Cooperation	1.81	1.94	0.57	0.32	0.10
	Total	22.75	15.05	12.86	1.73	0.10

2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total
-2.04	-17.25	1.43	0.47	0.47	13.68	0.00	-22.53
0.22	1.24	2.71	1.99	0.00	0.02	0.01	8.71
3.68	4.33	3.12	1.57	1.39	1.77	1.42	63.90
1.86	-11.68	7.26	4.03	1.86	15.48	1.43	50.08
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.32
23.40	8.94	20.17	15.40	3.37	34.30	7.65	282.81
2.89	3.46	2.94	2.35	3.39	3.32	3.77	41.14
26.30	12.41	23.10	17.75	6.76	37.62	11.42	323.61
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-3.14
16.01	6.84	1.67	21.07	19.34	22.43	18.47	327.39
1.85	3.22	5.13	6.14	6.51	6.70	7.70	58.28
17.86	10.06	6.81	27.21	25.84	29.13	26.18	382.50
-7.97	-6.04	-6.72	-24.60	-4.83	-5.14	-5.66	15.99
5.28	4.54	2.47	20.52	0.22	12.87	0.27	70.72
1.84	1.75	2.02	1.95	1.99	2.98	5.29	51.72
-0.86	0.25	-2.22	-2.14	-2.61	10.71	-0.09	138.41
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
12.85	11.62	14.70	11.39	37.84	25.47	24.08	308.30
6.03	6.85	5.73	9.58	11.93	16.11	16.22	112.99
18.88	18.47	20.43	20.98	49.77	41.59	40.30	421.99
-1.42	3.10	-0.62	-0.77	-35.89	0.00	0.00	-11.22
1.66	11.71	6.96	20.83	52.36	34.22	17.63	224.12
0.25	0.62	2.18	3.28	3.95	4.84	3.57	24.23
0.49	15.42	8.52	23.34	20.42	39.06	21.20	237.10
8.56	-79.61	0.00	0.00	0.00	6.06	3.96	6.58
9.04	95.89	16.00	12.50	4.30	31.45	13.03	299.48
1.67	2.49	2.55	3.08	3.81	4.52	6.69	56.44
19.27	18.77	18.55	15.58	8.11	42.03	23.68	362.52
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.49	6.73	20.63	28.86
2.72	1.61	1.44	3.66	14.63	7.35	4.74	126.11
0.11	0.92	0.44	1.64	1.75	3.32	1.17	22.35
2.83	2.53	1.89	5.29	17.87	17.40	26.54	177.36
0.00	0.00	-0.99	-0.57	1.21	-6.12	0.00	-2.01
0.09	0.00	3.15	12.57	4.70	14.15	38.14	342.26
0.01	0.10	0.39	0.17	0.16	0.06	0.11	24.24
0.10	0.10	2.55	12.18	6.08	8.09	38.25	364.52

Appendix 2

		Japan's ODA (Net disbursements, \$ million)				
COUNTRY	SCHEME	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Chad	Loan Aid	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	Grant Aid	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.05
	Technical Cooperation	0.21	0.11	0.13	0.23	0.62
	Total	0.21	0.11	0.13	0.26	0.66
Comoros	Loan Aid	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	Grant Aid	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	Technical Cooperation	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	Total	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Congo	Loan Aid	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	Grant Aid	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.06
	Technical Cooperation	0.07	0.17	0.16	0.10	0.25
	Total	0.07	0.17	0.16	0.10	0.31
Cote d'Ivoire	Loan Aid	4.84	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	Grant Aid	9.78	0.35	0.33	0.40	0.47
	Technical Cooperation	8.78	3.97	4.87	2.05	1.43
	Total	23.40	4.31	5.21	2.44	1.90
Democratic Republic of the Congo	Loan Aid	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	Grant Aid	0.27	0.08	0.66	0.32	48.06
	Technical Cooperation	0.21	0.23	0.19	0.31	0.41
	Total	0.47	0.32	0.85	0.63	48.47
Djibouti	Loan Aid	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	Grant Aid	12.01	1.53	4.03	6.08	6.05
	Technical Cooperation	1.92	1.46	1.41	1.97	1.11
	Total	13.92	2.99	5.44	8.06	7.16
Egypt	Loan Aid	7.06	-11.92	-15.56	-6.92	-17.84
	Grant Aid	45.91	41.49	8.02	9.23	69.07
	Technical Cooperation	32.94	23.10	20.47	19.37	13.63
	Total	85.92	52.68	12.93	21.68	64.85
Equatorial Guinea	Loan Aid	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	Grant Aid	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	Technical Cooperation	0.06	0.03	0.19	0.03	0.01
	Total	0.06	0.03	0.19	0.03	0.01
Eritrea	Loan Aid	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	Grant Aid	0.10	3.30	3.92	11.01	0.32
	Technical Cooperation	0.30	0.17	0.37	0.73	1.30
	Total	0.40	3.47	4.29	11.74	1.61
Ethiopia	Loan Aid	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	Grant Aid	26.18	43.89	37.02	45.21	22.28
	Technical Cooperation	7.85	8.50	13.51	11.32	11.05
	Total	34.03	52.39	50.53	56.53	33.33
Gabon	Loan Aid	-2.49	-1.69	-0.18	-0.31	-0.10
	Grant Aid	0.30	2.65	3.54	0.37	1.82
	Technical Cooperation	0.69	0.62	0.48	1.70	0.97
	Total	-1.50	1.58	3.84	1.77	2.69

2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
0.00	5.97	9.65	14.33	13.85	13.54	20.39	77.82
2.05	2.77	0.25	0.06	0.13	0.22	0.43	9.14
2.05	8.74	9.90	14.39	13.98	13.76	20.82	86.94
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	5.11	0.41	2.11	48.25
0.03	0.06	0.01	0.03	0.20	0.29	1.55	7.26
0.03	0.06	0.01	0.03	5.30	0.70	3.66	55.51
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
0.00	0.00	4.97	10.49	0.00	5.46	6.94	36.13
0.17	0.40	0.01	0.13	0.38	0.52	0.28	5.71
0.17	0.40	4.99	10.62	0.38	5.98	7.21	41.83
0.00	11.71	0.00	0.00	0.00	45.79	1.56	163.06
0.10	0.00	5.48	18.88	9.38	33.94	6.25	404.21
1.27	1.24	1.06	0.62	1.01	1.54	0.36	105.71
1.37	12.95	6.54	19.51	10.39	81.26	8.17	672.95
353.89	-4.95	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.43	-1,029.04	-479.61
2.72	27.50	20.25	45.32	52.62	66.19	1,206.16	1,641.44
19.65	0.62	2.68	5.89	13.08	14.24	9.62	108.25
376.26	23.17	22.93	51.22	65.70	80.00	186.74	1,270.06
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
5.48	3.50	2.58	2.24	26.52	34.42	11.95	247.74
0.90	1.09	1.09	1.50	2.30	3.56	4.62	33.47
6.38	4.59	3.67	3.74	28.82	37.98	16.57	281.22
-98.69	-40.23	-49.96	-38.32	-65.11	-73.07	-126.30	1,496.14
51.55	22.69	10.59	33.22	23.55	20.75	0.14	1,365.22
11.05	12.37	12.33	16.73	22.75	34.59	34.88	613.20
-36.10	-5.18	-27.04	11.64	-18.81	-17.74	-91.29	3,474.55
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.28	8.25
0.09	0.01	0.01	0.09	0.10	0.32	0.04	3.32
0.09	0.01	0.01	0.09	0.10	0.32	0.32	11.57
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
5.48	7.57	6.60	17.24	7.22	8.25	7.25	104.08
1.76	2.34	1.78	0.47	1.56	1.61	2.19	19.86
7.24	9.91	8.37	17.71	8.78	9.86	9.44	123.95
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
20.79	45.15	24.15	32.88	80.79	65.88	86.12	867.91
13.38	12.71	11.89	14.24	16.98	28.01	33.59	270.13
34.17	57.85	36.03	47.12	97.76	93.89	119.70	1,129.25
-0.68	-2.20	-2.10	-2.73	-4.89	-1.95	-2.36	-11.66
5.40	0.12	0.04	0.37	0.13	21.92	8.76	47.55
1.40	1.81	2.31	4.11	4.85	4.80	4.55	33.30
6.13	-0.28	0.26	1.75	0.08	24.77	10.96	69.16

Appendix 2

		Japan's ODA (Net disbursements, \$ million)				
COUNTRY	SCHEME	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Gambia	Loan Aid	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	Grant Aid	2.67	2.04	6.05	5.68	0.32
	Technical Cooperation	0.61	1.07	2.15	3.18	2.34
	Total	3.28	3.10	8.20	8.86	2.66
Ghana	Loan Aid	53.67	3.98	-5.49	0.00	-888.18
	Grant Aid	27.18	10.81	12.21	15.54	989.27
	Technical Cooperation	22.05	19.84	16.83	14.22	14.32
	Total	102.90	34.63	23.55	29.75	115.42
Guinea	Loan Aid	-4.46	-3.96	-2.41	-2.81	-8.67
	Grant Aid	20.59	20.10	18.58	20.27	23.09
	Technical Cooperation	3.01	1.24	2.40	3.37	2.08
	Total	19.13	17.38	18.57	20.83	16.50
Guinea-Bissau	Loan Aid	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	Grant Aid	0.00	0.14	0.00	0.00	0.00
	Technical Cooperation	0.00	0.04	0.12	0.06	0.01
	Total	0.00	0.18	0.12	0.06	0.01
Kenya	Loan Aid	21.89	2.66	-38.86	-49.92	29.90
	Grant Aid	13.11	14.98	28.52	17.19	14.36
	Technical Cooperation	31.85	29.07	27.69	26.14	26.63
	Total	66.86	46.71	17.36	-6.59	70.89
Lesotho	Loan Aid	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	Grant Aid	0.30	4.68	3.50	2.48	0.52
	Technical Cooperation	0.57	0.54	0.43	1.53	0.70
	Total	0.87	5.22	3.93	4.01	1.22
Liberia	Loan Aid	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	Grant Aid	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	Technical Cooperation	0.02	0.05	0.02	0.00	0.00
	Total	0.02	0.05	0.02	0.00	0.00
Libya	Loan Aid	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	Grant Aid	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	Technical Cooperation	0.15	0.17	0.00	0.00	0.00
	Total	0.15	0.17	0.00	0.00	0.00
Madagascar	Loan Aid	-1.32	-1.25	-1.21	-1.31	0.50
	Grant Aid	17.58	20.34	4.80	6.47	21.33
	Technical Cooperation	10.05	6.36	4.00	4.55	6.13
	Total	26.31	25.46	7.60	9.70	27.95
Malawi	Loan Aid	-9.93	-8.38	-8.55	-3.54	-19.53
	Grant Aid	33.02	14.26	16.01	20.94	27.92
	Technical Cooperation	15.44	12.42	11.35	14.01	10.58
	Total	38.53	18.29	18.81	31.41	18.96
Mali	Loan Aid	-2.18	-1.93	-1.87	-0.84	-72.38
	Grant Aid	24.94	16.32	13.36	11.89	84.29
	Technical Cooperation	9.42	8.69	5.54	3.00	1.78
	Total	32.18	23.08	17.02	14.05	13.69

2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
2.61	8.26	5.81	0.61	10.48	16.25	11.17	130.76
1.77	2.73	0.58	0.47	0.91	0.97	0.18	24.81
4.38	10.99	6.39	1.08	11.39	17.22	11.45	155.56
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-103.16
28.03	24.66	27.13	33.86	44.93	47.36	22.04	1,684.79
16.19	19.00	19.35	20.18	19.87	22.65	23.90	413.65
44.22	43.66	46.48	54.03	64.80	70.00	45.94	1,995.29
-0.22	-8.05	-4.08	-0.24	0.00	0.00	0.00	38.58
9.52	21.27	14.54	14.72	16.35	9.96	1.00	430.96
2.65	3.86	1.56	2.37	1.85	0.84	0.98	56.07
11.95	17.07	12.02	16.86	18.20	10.80	1.98	525.60
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
0.00	0.00	0.99	5.07	8.69	15.87	8.71	108.74
0.03	0.04	0.09	0.76	0.74	0.24	1.07	7.48
0.03	0.04	1.08	5.83	9.43	16.11	9.78	116.22
7.56	54.40	2.03	-53.06	-50.68	-68.29	-57.17	637.91
23.39	24.46	28.65	41.59	59.53	68.85	100.53	935.34
29.94	27.29	26.42	20.25	24.81	36.16	36.39	833.84
60.88	106.15	57.11	8.79	33.66	36.72	79.74	2,407.15
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
6.30	4.45	4.41	12.37	2.33	8.14	19.48	98.82
0.38	0.32	0.46	0.80	0.24	0.70	0.75	10.53
6.68	4.76	4.88	13.16	2.56	8.84	20.23	109.37
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	119.03	-198.24	-55.17
0.00	17.19	12.21	12.54	11.06	10.85	240.64	345.80
0.00	0.20	0.25	1.43	3.66	4.42	2.14	36.74
0.00	17.40	12.46	13.98	14.71	134.31	44.55	327.37
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	8.13	8.13
0.33	0.05	0.43	0.19	0.08	0.13	0.05	3.59
0.33	0.05	0.43	0.19	0.08	0.13	8.18	11.72
-147.51	6.34	-0.90	-0.48	-0.26	0.00	0.00	-22.35
178.92	30.05	103.04	11.47	7.39	0.00	0.00	779.22
8.20	7.42	9.05	9.38	11.90	9.62	10.70	162.48
39.61	43.82	111.19	20.37	19.03	9.62	10.70	919.39
-12.94	-4.78	-181.52	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-35.38
18.79	18.00	209.35	16.71	18.98	49.59	11.37	721.98
13.84	10.16	12.47	14.08	16.82	19.86	17.27	306.40
19.70	23.38	40.29	30.79	35.80	69.46	28.64	992.94
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-4.82
20.39	23.51	6.89	32.01	32.80	34.58	36.70	551.18
2.81	3.22	2.76	2.52	2.71	3.71	7.36	87.23
23.20	26.74	9.65	34.52	35.51	38.29	44.06	633.59

Appendix 2

		Japan's ODA (Net disbursements, \$ million)				
COUNTRY	SCHEME	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Mauritania	Loan Aid	-2.04	-1.81	-1.75	-0.02	-73.58
	Grant Aid	29.01	26.25	10.90	19.33	80.20
	Technical Cooperation	2.97	5.16	3.88	4.61	4.48
	Total	29.94	29.60	13.02	23.93	11.10
Mauritius	Loan Aid	-0.64	-0.41	-1.04	-1.18	-1.26
	Grant Aid	0.51	0.08	0.10	3.54	2.50
	Technical Cooperation	2.26	1.63	1.64	0.56	0.29
	Total	2.13	1.30	0.69	2.92	1.53
Morocco	Loan Aid	73.13	71.95	20.49	33.59	45.42
	Grant Aid	15.33	15.00	9.46	15.95	7.81
	Technical Cooperation	14.82	14.68	10.84	15.24	13.08
	Total	103.28	101.62	40.79	64.78	66.31
Mozambique	Loan Aid	-1.03	-0.75	21.73	-0.40	-0.43
	Grant Aid	11.70	26.66	44.81	32.53	16.57
	Technical Cooperation	9.29	7.61	3.12	3.14	3.27
	Total	19.95	33.52	69.66	35.27	19.41
Namibia	Loan Aid	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	Grant Aid	1.64	0.27	2.04	0.14	0.41
	Technical Cooperation	3.78	2.94	1.11	0.68	0.80
	Total	5.43	3.21	3.15	0.82	1.20
Niger	Loan Aid	-6.68	-1.14	-1.10	-0.60	-22.36
	Grant Aid	14.27	7.18	7.96	8.37	30.90
	Technical Cooperation	7.43	7.00	6.43	5.89	5.54
	Total	15.03	13.04	13.29	13.66	14.08
Nigeria	Loan Aid	0.00	-5.03	0.00	-13.84	0.00
	Grant Aid	0.26	11.46	16.85	17.91	5.91
	Technical Cooperation	2.37	2.45	2.26	2.32	2.76
	Total	2.63	8.88	19.10	6.40	8.67
Rwanda	Loan Aid	2.28	0.07	0.00	-0.04	0.00
	Grant Aid	0.75	0.59	0.16	0.45	0.10
	Technical Cooperation	0.33	0.37	0.24	0.24	0.76
	Total	3.35	1.04	0.40	0.66	0.86
Sao Tome and Principe	Loan Aid	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	Grant Aid	1.11	0.99	1.20	1.34	1.39
	Technical Cooperation	0.12	0.07	0.10	0.02	0.07
	Total	1.23	1.05	1.29	1.37	1.46
Senegal	Loan Aid	-3.10	-3.90	-2.72	-6.52	-91.14
	Grant Aid	38.14	12.17	25.41	19.59	125.64
	Technical Cooperation	13.45	14.15	15.14	15.61	15.92
	Total	48.49	22.41	37.82	28.68	50.42
Seychelles	Loan Aid	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	Grant Aid	0.00	4.44	0.29	0.00	0.00
	Technical Cooperation	0.64	0.63	0.23	0.68	0.67
	Total	0.64	5.07	0.51	0.68	0.67

2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-11.69
11.62	9.72	22.13	10.75	6.70	12.53	9.03	484.12
3.10	2.36	1.32	3.73	2.92	2.03	0.96	59.17
14.72	12.08	23.45	14.49	9.63	14.56	9.99	531.64
15.55	3.77	2.10	0.11	-3.34	-3.55	-3.85	22.67
0.85	0.00	0.06	0.08	0.21	0.30	0.27	38.73
0.15	0.24	0.61	0.17	1.06	0.40	1.15	40.92
16.55	4.02	2.77	0.36	-2.07	-2.85	-2.44	102.31
-69.43	43.76	49.71	82.83	85.05	102.78	18.21	898.93
2.22	8.44	6.01	16.85	4.77	8.23	1.74	275.71
13.02	8.93	8.93	6.16	8.12	10.15	10.16	298.32
-54.19	61.13	64.65	105.84	97.93	121.16	30.11	1,473.00
-0.43	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.38	17.21	51.09
9.91	101.71	17.71	17.58	50.19	48.95	14.20	825.61
5.29	5.12	10.07	6.15	10.49	13.52	17.08	124.27
14.77	106.83	27.77	23.72	60.67	62.85	48.49	1,000.98
0.00	0.00	3.04	7.15	36.14	36.39	21.69	104.42
0.00	0.18	1.41	0.61	0.14	0.17	0.15	59.54
0.39	0.83	1.29	1.90	3.54	4.03	3.36	42.06
0.39	1.01	5.74	9.66	39.82	40.59	25.21	205.99
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-28.63
17.20	4.49	19.00	5.56	23.91	15.73	11.58	440.12
6.47	7.60	9.29	11.38	11.15	9.43	4.27	188.86
23.68	12.09	28.28	16.93	35.06	25.16	15.86	600.39
63.29	-488.99	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-182.34
1.78	2,116.31	22.76	25.21	24.56	16.94	25.26	2,430.38
4.09	4.30	4.08	3.75	4.33	6.93	13.30	131.56
69.16	1,631.61	26.84	28.96	28.88	23.87	38.57	2,379.58
-0.88	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	5.53
1.78	8.93	13.96	10.26	12.70	11.01	11.84	227.40
1.94	3.81	5.58	7.49	8.64	11.81	12.44	70.15
2.85	12.74	19.53	17.75	21.34	22.82	24.28	303.03
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
1.31	0.00	2.89	7.15	0.21	2.85	3.44	46.30
0.22	0.03	0.23	0.07	0.21	0.75	0.10	7.22
1.53	0.03	3.11	7.22	0.42	3.54	3.54	53.53
0.00	0.00	0.00	3.19	3.83	2.80	0.00	-16.29
9.62	20.08	18.59	7.89	25.32	30.82	56.34	934.18
18.33	14.42	13.36	14.05	17.58	21.58	26.49	328.15
27.95	34.50	31.95	25.13	46.74	55.21	82.83	1,246.02
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.36	7.79	8.94	1.12	41.25
1.26	1.91	0.76	1.26	1.28	0.63	0.12	18.43
1.26	1.91	0.76	1.62	9.06	9.57	1.24	59.67

Appendix 2

		Japan's ODA (Net disbursements, \$ million)				
COUNTRY	SCHEME	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Sierra Leone	Loan Aid	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	Grant Aid	0.00	0.00	0.06	3.69	0.13
	Technical Cooperation	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.04	0.06
	Total	0.02	0.02	0.09	3.73	0.19
Somalia	Loan Aid	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	Grant Aid	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	Technical Cooperation	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	Total	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
South Africa	Loan Aid	0.00	0.00	-20.05	-1.44	-0.87
	Grant Aid	13.04	3.81	16.38	11.11	14.23
	Technical Cooperation	6.75	9.58	8.36	7.94	5.47
	Total	19.79	13.39	4.69	17.61	18.83
South Sudan	Loan Aid					
	Grant Aid					
	Technical Cooperation					
	Total					
Sudan	Loan Aid	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	Grant Aid	0.08	0.22	0.42	0.60	0.87
	Technical Cooperation	0.59	0.46	0.75	0.87	0.67
	Total	0.67	0.69	1.17	1.47	1.55
Swaziland	Loan Aid	0.00	0.00	1.52	1.02	0.48
	Grant Aid	3.35	3.16	0.47	1.82	3.11
	Technical Cooperation	2.65	3.38	2.53	2.18	1.27
	Total	5.99	6.54	4.52	5.02	4.86
Tanzania	Loan Aid	-12.68	-8.22	-6.54	-1.76	-105.36
	Grant Aid	203.16	241.32	39.31	53.90	139.67
	Technical Cooperation	26.65	27.35	25.43	22.32	18.21
	Total	217.14	260.44	58.20	74.47	52.52
Togo	Loan Aid	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-1.69
	Grant Aid	8.26	2.61	0.05	0.03	2.13
	Technical Cooperation	0.24	0.26	0.29	0.30	0.33
	Total	8.50	2.87	0.34	0.34	0.77
Tunisia	Loan Aid	52.97	70.68	47.92	74.08	50.84
	Grant Aid	3.30	4.04	7.10	1.09	0.31
	Technical Cooperation	15.85	13.74	8.26	10.35	8.59
	Total	72.12	88.45	63.27	85.52	59.73
Uganda	Loan Aid	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-57.79
	Grant Aid	16.00	8.93	3.07	3.14	64.25
	Technical Cooperation	6.37	5.64	5.01	6.39	5.37
	Total	22.37	14.57	8.08	9.54	11.84

2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total
-1.77	50.47	-16.62	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	37.27
2.14	9.01	42.70	10.13	31.95	6.04	18.42	183.56
1.73	3.21	4.02	4.00	5.50	6.18	8.11	38.85
2.09	62.69	30.11	14.13	37.44	12.21	26.53	259.67
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	38.70
0.00	0.24	3.85	23.24	22.60	29.05	51.96	210.51
0.00	0.00	0.01	0.03	0.04	0.02	0.01	5.52
0.00	0.24	3.86	23.27	22.64	29.07	51.97	254.77
-0.85	-0.81	-0.80	-0.91	-1.01	-1.07	-1.18	5.89
11.07	12.24	0.81	0.66	0.43	2.05	2.04	113.34
5.87	4.49	4.65	3.92	5.24	6.13	7.25	107.79
16.10	15.92	4.67	3.67	4.67	7.11	8.11	227.01
						0.00	0.00
						8.71	8.71
						16.85	16.85
						25.56	25.56
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-27.63	0.00	0.00	21.59
0.48	38.20	44.61	100.51	125.09	92.92	73.45	953.40
1.64	4.53	6.97	9.14	13.57	26.16	23.28	125.72
2.11	42.73	51.58	109.64	111.03	119.08	96.72	1,100.72
21.54	9.63	4.75	0.00	0.00	0.00	-2.53	36.41
3.51	1.37	2.01	2.31	0.19	2.81	14.43	83.93
0.86	0.61	0.51	0.87	0.99	1.55	0.66	30.92
25.91	11.62	7.26	3.18	1.19	4.36	12.55	151.29
0.00	0.00	33.96	5.40	48.56	10.50	37.91	101.97
14.44	17.68	667.66	43.36	48.68	65.87	43.73	2,454.59
21.67	21.72	20.04	22.23	23.22	28.23	37.80	626.30
36.11	39.39	721.66	70.99	120.46	104.60	119.44	3,182.85
-1.11	-1.05	-1.04	-0.59	12.89	-0.12	-120.44	-44.04
1.57	1.34	1.16	0.80	20.96	6.65	126.61	257.05
0.29	0.14	0.33	0.13	0.24	1.01	3.10	11.93
0.76	0.44	0.46	0.33	34.09	7.54	9.26	224.96
41.44	9.96	12.28	48.04	8.26	14.37	17.13	618.16
0.57	0.19	0.18	0.03	0.19	12.22	0.16	40.97
9.09	8.41	8.10	5.92	5.97	9.29	7.68	206.91
51.10	18.56	20.56	53.98	14.41	35.87	24.97	866.06
0.00	0.00	0.00	4.62	6.64	6.44	1.15	19.20
4.80	13.56	17.83	39.75	23.16	42.06	28.19	462.66
9.64	8.22	9.68	12.64	24.24	22.74	27.79	195.33
14.44	21.78	27.51	57.01	54.05	71.24	57.12	677.21

Appendix 2

		Japan's ODA (Net disbursements, \$ million)				
COUNTRY	SCHEME	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Zambia	Loan Aid	-6.18	-7.89	21.40	-7.68	-7.54
	Grant Aid	23.75	41.65	32.34	19.55	7.51
	Technical Cooperation	14.36	13.27	14.64	16.45	14.28
	Total	31.93	47.04	68.38	28.32	14.25
Zimbabwe	Loan Aid	21.78	16.34	14.81	0.00	0.00
	Grant Aid	30.08	4.65	3.52	0.08	0.09
	Technical Cooperation	10.51	8.01	5.31	4.93	3.47
	Total	62.37	29.01	23.64	5.01	3.56

Source: Japan's ODA Data by Country, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan

Note:

1. Part of grants through international organizations are included in the category of bilateral *Grant Aid* after 2006 when the grants are earmarked for specific recipients. A wider range of multilateral grants has been categorized as bilateral ODA since 2011, in accordance with the direction of OECD/DAC.
2. The annual figures for *Loan Aid* and *Grant Aid* indicate the sums of funds actually disbursed within the calendar year out of the amount committed with exchanged notes. The figures of *Loan Aid* show the balances after subtracting repayments from recipients.
3. Accumulated totals of *Loan Aid* may be minus figures depending on fluctuations in exchange rates.
4. *Technical Cooperation* includes projects implemented by relevant ministries and local governments in addition to those by JICA.
5. Totals may not always add up due to rounding.
6. The figures in Total show the sum of Japan's ODA disbursements to the country.

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total
	-616.15	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.44	0.59	-309.45
	732.90	16.79	74.14	18.57	16.21	20.90	19.70	1,616.01
	15.19	14.75	20.48	18.57	20.43	23.80	25.79	460.31
	131.94	31.54	94.61	37.14	36.64	46.14	46.08	1,766.91
	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	143.79
	0.15	2.64	7.49	7.69	11.24	17.13	16.09	446.44
	3.94	3.90	4.22	2.27	1.14	1.79	2.01	149.64
	4.09	6.54	11.71	9.97	12.38	18.92	18.10	739.86

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