

2008



# Effective Technical Cooperation for Capacity Development

Pakistan Country Case Study

Effective Technical Cooperation for Capacity Development Country Case Study



Joint Study on Effective TC for CD



# Effective Technical Cooperation for Capacity Development

Pakistan Country Case Study



**Joint Study on  
Effective TC for CD**



## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This country study was prepared under the guidance, direction and review of a country management team consisting of the following people: Sabina Qureshi, Deputy Secretary, Economic Affairs Division, Government of Pakistan; Anne T. Sweetser, ADB Pakistan Resident Mission and Claudia Buentjen, Regional and Sustainable Development Department, ADB (Manila).

Preparation of the study was assisted and facilitated by: David Watson (International Consultant); Adnan Qadir Khan, Mujtaba Piracha, Mahe Nau Haider, Rehana Shaikh, and Azeema Cheema, (National Consultants); Mr. James Lee International Consultant (Asia Region); and Mr Mike Ratcliffe, International Consultant (Team Leader).

## ABBREVIATIONS

ADB	Asian Development Bank
CB	Capacity Building
CCB	Citizen Community Board
CD	Capacity Development
CDGF	City District Government Faisalabad
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CMIPHC	Chief Minister's Initiative on Primary Health Care
CPLC	Citizen Police Liaison Committee
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DAD	Development Assistance Database
DFID	Department for International Development (DFID)
DMG	District Management Group
DSD	Directorate of Staff Development (of Education Dept. Punjab)
EAD	Economic Affairs Division
EC	European Commission
ECDPM	European Center for Development Policy Management
ESRA	Education Sector Reforms Assistance
GIS	Geographical Information System
GJTMAP	Gender Justice Through <i>Musalihat Anjuman</i> Project (Traditional Courts)
GoPj	Government of Punjab
GoS	Government of Sindh
HDI	Human Development Index
HDR	Human Development Report
JICA	Japanese International Co-operation Agency
LDC	Least Developed Country
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MAJA	Musalihat Anjuman Justice Advocates
MASS	Musalihat Anjuman Support Services
MDB	Multilateral Development Bank
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MoWD	Ministry of Women's Development
NCCR	National Commission for Government Reform
NGO	Non-Government Organization
NHMP	National Highways and Motorway Police

NPIW	National Program for Improvement of Water Courses
NRB	National Reconstruction Bureau
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development
OPP	Orangi Pilot Project
PC1	Planning Commission Proforma 1 for Planning Projects
PCC	Police Complaints Commission
PESRP	Punjab Education Sector Reform Program
P(M)IU	Project/Program (Management) (Monitoring) Implementation Unit
PPHI	President's Primary Health Care Initiative
PPP	Public Private Partnership
PRMP	Punjab Resource Management Program
PRSP	Punjab Rural Support Program
PSC	Public Safety Commission
SAP	Social Action Program
SPU	Strategic Policy Unit (of Faisalabad City District Government)
SWAp	Sector Wide Approach
TBC	To Be Completed
TMA	Tehsil Municipal Administration
TPA	Terms of Partnership Agreement (also ToP)
TPE	Third Party Evaluation
TRTA	Trade Related Technical Assistance
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WB	World Bank
WDR	World Development Report
WPS	Women's Political School
WTO	World Trade Organization
WCA	Watercourse (Users) Association

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### INTRODUCTION

The Minister of State for Economic Affairs requested the Asian Development Bank (ADB) to formulate an activity on capacity development in accordance with the Paris Declaration to improve the quality of aid and its impact on development. It was funded by ADB's Governance and Capacity Development Initiative through a regional technical assistance grant. A range of stakeholders was engaged throughout the process to enhance shared learning and enrich the resulting recommendations.

### KEY STEPS

- Preliminary workshop: development partners and key federal government agencies reviewed of contemporary concepts of Capacity Development and requested an inventory of relevant activities presently underway in the country.
- Scoping Study: identification of capacity issues and experience in Pakistan, and development of a list of successful case studies from which donor and government participants selected twelve for further study at a workshop in early September 2007.
- Case Study Research and Preparation, and Review study of public sector budgets.
- Write-shops: Karachi (5-6 March 2008); Lahore (10-12 March); Islamabad (17-19 March). This participatory method emphasizes review and discussion of drafts, and provides time for revision of the case study texts by project managers and implementers.
- National Workshop on 'Capacity Development for Aid Effectiveness' 13-14 May 2008, Islamabad involving representatives of Federal and Provincial Governments, development partners and civil society. Major issues were presented by representatives of the case studies. Then small groups developed actionable recommendations for government and donor consideration.

### CRITERIA FOR SELECTING CASES

Cases were chosen to illustrate the following:

- A range of service sectors which mean most to poor people: education, health, access to justice, urban water supply and sanitation; political empowerment of women in local government; police performance and accountability.
- Varying regions (time and resources did not permit research in all provinces).
- Contrasting managerial arrangements involving federal, provincial and district governments, and employing PMUs or other modalities.

- A mix of indigenously-initiated, government-resourced, and donor-assisted programs -- one is an NGO program, another features out-sourcing to an NGO, and some involve NGO / government partnerships.
- Prominent gender issues, including those related to women's position and rights in Pakistan society and as service users.

## THE CASES

The report covers the following cases. Their acronyms and funding sources are noted.

### *Karachi Write-Shop*

1. National Water Course Improvement Program Sindh (NPIW) - PMU  
(Federal and Govt of Sindh resources and World Bank)
2. Orangi Pilot Project (OPP) (Karachi squatter settlement upgrading)  
(Own resources / communities / GoSindh / other donors)

### *Lahore Write-Shop*

3. Punjab Education Sector Reform Program (PESRP) PMIU  
(GoPj and World Bank)
4. Punjab's Directorate of Staff Development (DSD) (In-service teacher training)  
(GoPj plus donors)
5. Punjab Resource Management Program (PRMP)  
(ADB loan and GoPj)
6. Chief Minister's Initiative for Primary Health Care (CMIPHC)  
(Punjab Rural Support Program Implemented: GoPj resources)
7. Strategic Policy Unit (SPU) Faisalabad (Support to Devolved Local Government)  
(DFID TA and financial support)

### *Islamabad Write-Shop*

8. Capacity development through Trade Related Technical Assistance (TRTA)  
(EC and GoP)
9. Citizen-Police Liaison Committee and District Public Safety and Police Complaints Commission Faisalabad (CPLC & PSC/PCC)



(Voluntary donations and GoPJ)

10. National Highways and Motorway Police (NHMP)

(GoP budget)

11. Gender Justice Through Musalihat Anjuman Project (GJTMAP)

(UNDP, Norway, SDC, DFID, provincial and district governments)

12. Women's Political School (WPS) - Support for Empowerment of Elected Women

(UNDP / Norway /SDC / DFID)

## THE CONTEXT

The main contextual factors affecting capacity development include:

- Deep-rooted historical factors (which affect political processes at all levels, their interaction with the bureaucracy, and recent decentralization).
- A history of low budget allocation to services, and commensurate status in service delivery performance.
- Socio-cultural factors impede emergence of effective 'voice' mechanisms (and thus for effective pressure for better services).
- Limited impact of prior capacity development efforts (where capacity development was equated with 'training,' and this was generally remote from work realities);
- A poor perception of public services among citizen-users (and a preference for private deliverers if family circumstances permit).
- Frequent (sometimes politically-inspired) transfers within the civil service and generally poor incentives in that environment for leadership or application of new learning.
- Recent devolution to the district level have been at least partly frustrated by hostile attitudes at the provincial level and resultant lack of progress in establishing personnel structures to enhance officials' loyalty to local governments.

## FINDINGS BASED ON CASE STUDIES

Capacity development appears to be a fundamental need in the Pakistan public sector. There is a strong interest in, and many examples of successful CD in Pakistan. There are also indications of large funds being devoted to CD in the public sector, (if often under imprecise category headings including even civil works). However, there is relatively weak demand for CD in the public sector. and lack of sustained political pressure for related

reform. The poorest rely most on basic public services, but their reputation is such that people use privately-delivered services if they can.

Development of accountability institutions such as monitoring and school committees and audit functionality, is often challenging. But close monitoring of results, learning from experience, and constructive remedying of identified bottlenecks contribute to successful outcomes.

Political will is an essential component of successful capacity development. This may include continuous support from high-level ‘champions’, commitment of resources, good working conditions, and ‘space’ for managers to act, take risks, and learn from mistakes. In ‘protected’ environments, managers employ sound human and resource management techniques, and demand adherence to clear and detailed performance standards to achieve positive results. Perhaps political will matters too much and ‘islands of excellence’ may not last when political priorities and personalities change.

Once political will is in place, latent (invisible) capacities of communities and public sector often emerge without external technical assistance. Stakeholder and organizational capacities are, however, not generally assessed in project design and planning. Sometimes CD initiatives are planned, but in most cases, it is a continuously-evolving, ‘accidental’ process.

Quantitative / geographical assessments early in project design are vital: previously-existing ‘information’ was often found to be inaccurate and misleading. Inventorying key resources, developing information systems, and using information in decision-making and in briefing stakeholders (including ‘champions’) were common practices in successful cases.

Partnerships between government, NGOs and the private sector worked well in some cases.

‘Advocacy’ - dissemination of information to stakeholders and champions is important.

Training is most effective when required skills and standards are clear at the start, when delivered ‘on-site’ in a participative practical manner, by competent practitioners; when follow up support is provided in the workplace, and where working conditions were conducive to application of new skills and team-work.

Technical Assistance is positively instrumental appears to work best when it is ‘demand-led’. MDB/donor support is most appreciated if it responds constructively to policies, ideas and initiatives of the host organization; and when it includes firm up-front commitment of funding for a specified period of time. Funding ‘gaps’ while midterm evaluations carried out may disrupt work-plans and undermine retention of carefully-trained trainers and other key staff. Initiatives with implications for capacity development seem not to have led to government action or requests to donors for assistance.

Greater flexibility in planning procedures and formats might be conducive to capacity development. The National Commission on Government Reform (NCGR) has reviewed key

public sector institutions and put forward constructive proposals on many of the issues found to obstruct public sector effectiveness. (See [www.ncgr.gov.pk](http://www.ncgr.gov.pk)).

## RECOMMENDATIONS BASED ON CASE STUDIES

### *For Government Consideration: Macro-issues*

- Consider mechanisms to address political interference in service delivery development.
- Assess the merits and limitations of top-down resource injections and 'control'.
- Remember basic services are delivered locally by local governments.
- Bring together the practitioners to learn from them about what works and why.
- Recognize that communities have considerable capacities to manage resources.
- Acknowledge that, in capacity development as in other fields, donors should be steered by government counterparts, after government determines policy and strategic priorities.
- Actively pursue evidence-based policy making (and request donors how they might help).

### *For Government Consideration: Related to Reform of Management of Public Sector Human Resources:*

- Improve and enhance continuity: of incumbents' service in Key posts, and of policies, strategies and capacities built up.
- Remove disincentives to specialisation, by considering career development for key cadres and capacities, including 'Master Trainers'.
- Re-engineer guidelines related to training in the public service.
- Nurture talent: there is plenty of it (albeit often latent: unrecognized and under-utilized).
- Raise awareness about service standards and about complaint mechanisms.
- Consider partnerships among government, NGOs and other CSOs, and the private sector to fill capacity gaps.
- Re-visit planning procedures to promote enhanced skills and capacities for project and program appraisal.

### *For Donor Consideration*

- Reflect on ‘what works and why’ in these and NCCGR-prepared cases.
- Scrutinize (especially new) policies and legislation to identify potential areas where capacity development will be needed.
- Gauge, and gain, counterpart agency leaders’ commitment in early stages of any collaboration.
- Respond rapidly to brief ‘windows of opportunity’ for CD.
- Avoid ‘overloading’ reform or change agendas.
- Support ‘stock-taking’: validation of information, updating understanding of the current situation; baseline assessments.
- Support advocacy and field-based support components where capacity needs are politically or culturally sensitive or geographically-dispersed.
- Keep expectations modest regarding possibilities for significantly enhancing ‘voice’ and empowerment mechanisms.
- Make significant ‘up-front’ commitments (volume and time) - subject to periodic joint reviews - for programs with large scale and potential scope.
- Ensure TORs and management procedures of TA reflect ‘good practice’ as in these cases and the broader recent literature.<sup>1</sup> Support the development of the domestic consulting industry. Adopt best practice in training.<sup>2</sup>

### NATIONAL WORKSHOP: IMPLICATIONS AND PRIORITY ACTIONS

After presentations on the case studies, the workshop focused on the implications, for both government and development partners, of points that emerged from the case studies and in view of the ‘environment’ prevailing in the public services of Pakistan.

Discussion groups were formed to propose recommendations on the following themes:

- Capacity development issues in Program Planning and design.
- Human Resource Management and Training.
- Organizational Development; Partnerships and Implementation.

---

<sup>1</sup> See ECDPM Policy Management Brief Number 20 – November 2007 – for recommendations emerging from a three-country study of Aid Effectiveness and TA Provision, all oriented to practices more conducive to capacity development. Available via [www.ecdpm.org](http://www.ecdpm.org) and also [www.capacity.org](http://www.capacity.org)

<sup>2</sup> See a recent World Bank study on training for capacity development [www.worldbank.org/ieg/training](http://www.worldbank.org/ieg/training)

- Harmonization of Procedures in CD (especially concerning donors).

### *Capacity development issues in Program Planning and Design:*

In addition to evidence-based planning based using accurate data, key considerations that affect the feasibility of an intervention include a sense of ownership by participants, internal organizational coherence accompanied by effective communication links that promote continuity of activities through time.

Workshop participants supported continued use of PMUs or related forms of sheltered or protected environments for project implementation, given the present structure and working conditions of the civil service. In these, they supported remuneration approximating market scales, simplified procedures, 'flat' organizational structures, and technically qualified staff.

### *Human Resource Management and Training*

This group emphasized the following points:

- Systematic analysis of the host organization's needs, aptitudes and capacity 'gaps' prior to the design of any training or HRM interventions is important.
- Thereafter, training should be synchronized with the host's organizational objectives, and adapted to its human resources' policy framework.
- Training quality should be monitored closely and its impact assessed periodically.
- Follow-up support for trainees is crucial to allow application of new learning in real work settings.
- It is important for donor support to be goal-oriented, but not driven to meet rigidly defined goals - adequate flexibility to realign goals with changing circumstances while keeping intended outcomes in focus is needed.
- The needs of the private sector for more and better-trained skilled workers appears to have been forgotten. Therefore, given the importance of the sector for employment and income generation, donors should more actively support vocational training.

### *Organizational Development and Partnerships*

This form of capacity development is seen as a pillar of aid effectiveness. Group members envisaged clear vision, mission, objectives and targets as the basis for a sound organizational structure with defined departmental functions, appropriately skilled staff, effective procedures and systems of incentives (including career planning and transparent performance evaluation).

It recommended that government insulate key service-delivery organizations from political interference, while giving their top managers a sufficient degree of autonomy to permit them space to act within their mandate and resources.

It recommended that donors – suitably informed about the local context, and acting in harmony with other donors – conduct capacity needs assessments prior to designing organizational development assistance, incorporate flexibility to permit adjustment in the light of subsequent events and progress, and advocate for continuity of leadership in assisted organizations.

Civil society organizations should support dissemination of information on service standards to stakeholders of public services, as a contribution to enhancing demand for services, and transparency and accountability of providers.

### *Procedural/ CD Harmonization (Among Donors)*

The group underscored more harmonization amongst donors and the need for the Government to steer the entire process. It stressed the need for capacity development programs as a dimension of sector plans that support harmonization, and for an overall forum to steer CD for aid effectiveness.

The group raised the question of donor accountability, without agreeing how that might be achieved. They urged donors to avoid ‘box-ticking’ type reviews in favor of a more progressive and constructive form of review of CD programming.

Timeliness and cost-effectiveness of support for CD should be borne in mind, and the use of international TA minimized. When agreed to be necessary, based on appraisal of need and the absorptive capacity of the host agencies concerned, such TA should be chosen in consultation with host agencies.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....</b>	<b>I</b>
<b>ABBREVIATIONS .....</b>	<b>II</b>
<b>EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.....</b>	<b>IV</b>
INTRODUCTION .....	IV
KEY STEPS.....	IV
CRITERIA FOR SELECTING CASES .....	IV
THE CASES.....	V
THE CONTEXT .....	VI
FINDINGS BASED ON CASE STUDIES.....	VI
RECOMMENDATIONS BASED ON CASE STUDIES .....	VIII
NATIONAL WORKSHOP: IMPLICATIONS AND PRIORITY ACTIONS .....	IX
<b>1. INTRODUCTION .....</b>	<b>3</b>
1.1. BACKGROUND .....	3
1.2. SCOPE OF STUDY, AND THE PROCESS ADOPTED .....	5
1.3. CRITERIA FOR SELECTION OF CASES.....	5
1.4. THE CASES.....	6
1.5. ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT .....	7
1.6. LIMITATIONS .....	7
1.7. CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT: EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT IN DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION .....	8
<b>2. THE PAKISTAN PUBLIC SECTOR CONTEXT.....</b>	<b>12</b>
2.1. HISTORY OF PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY IN PAKISTAN: ATTEMPTS TO IMPROVE IT .....	12
2.2. SUMMARY OF FACTORS AFFECTING PUBLIC SERVICE CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT, AND DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS' ABILITIES TO SUPPORT CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT .....	18
2.3. DEMAND FOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT.....	22
2.4. POLICIES FOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT: GOVERNMENT AND DONORS.....	24
<b>3. OVERVIEW OF FINDINGS .....</b>	<b>27</b>
3.1. PLANNING AND DESIGN .....	27
3.2. IMPLEMENTATION.....	33
3.3. FACTORS INFLUENCING SUCCESS.....	43
3.4. MONITORING AND EVALUATION OF CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT .....	59
<b>4. LESSONS AND CONCLUSIONS.....</b>	<b>65</b>
4.1. FOR GOVERNMENT AND DONORS TO CONSIDER.....	65
4.2. SOME CONCLUSIONS – PARTICULARLY FOR DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS TO CONSIDER.....	68
<b>5. RECOMMENDATIONS .....</b>	<b>71</b>
5.1. MACRO ISSUES / IDEAS (MAINLY FOR GOVERNMENT CONSIDERATION) .....	71
5.2. RELATING TO REFORM OR MANAGEMENT OF PUBLIC SECTOR HUMAN RESOURCES: FOR GOVERNMENT CONSIDERATION .....	73
5.3. FOR CONSIDERATION BY MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS AND BILATERAL DONORS .....	75
5.4. IMPLICATIONS FOR COUNTRY PROGRAMMING BY FUNDING AGENCIES .....	76
5.5. SUMMARY OF KEY OBSERVATIONS AND ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE NATIONAL WORKSHOP .....	77
5.6. ACTION PRIORITIES AND IMPLICATIONS.....	79
<b>APPENDIX 1: SCOPING STUDY ON CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT FOR SERVICE DELIVERY IN PAKISTAN .....</b>	<b>82</b>

BACKGROUND AND ISSUES .....	82
SCOPE OF THE ASSIGNMENT .....	85
<b>APPENDIX 2: WRITE-SHOPS: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION.....</b>	<b>93</b>
THE BENEFITS OF THE WRITE-SHOP METHOD.....	93
<b>APPENDIX 3: DOCUMENTS TO WHICH REFERENCE WAS MADE DURING THE SCOPING STUDY.....</b>	<b>95</b>
<b>APPENDIX 4: SUMMARY OF CHARACTERISTICS OF CASES IN THE PAKISTAN CAPACITY STUDY SAMPLE .....</b>	<b>99</b>
<b>APPENDIX 5: SUMMARIES OF CASE STUDIES .....</b>	<b>106</b>
ORANGI PILOT PROJECT (OPP) INSTITUTIONS.....	106
PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION MONITORING UNIT (PIMU): NATIONAL PROGRAM FOR WATER COURSE IMPROVEMENT (NPIW) SINDH .....	106
PUNJAB RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM (PRMP) .....	107
STRATEGIC POLICY UNIT (SPU) – CITY DISTRICT GOVERNMENT FAISALABAD .....	107
CHIEF MINISTER’S INITIATIVE ON PRIMARY HEALTH CARE (CMIPHC) .....	108
PROGRAM MONITORING AND IMPLEMENTATION UNIT (PMIU) PUNJAB EDUCATION SECTOR REFORM PROGRAM (PESRP) 2003-2006 AND 2007-2010 .....	108
DEPARTMENT OF STAFF DEVELOPMENT (DSD): PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF TEACHERS .....	109
NATIONAL HIGHWAY AND MOTORWAY POLICE (NHMP).....	109
GENDER JUSTICE THROUGH MUSALIHAT ANJUMAN PROJECT (GJTMAP) 2005-6 AND 2007-11.....	110
WOMEN’S’ POLITICAL SCHOOL (WPS) 2004 – 07 .....	110
FAISALABAD CITIZEN POLICE LIAISON COMMITTEE (CPLC) AND DISTRICT PUBLIC SAFETY AND POLICE COMPLAINTS COMMISSION (PSC/PCC) .....	111
TRADE RELATED TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE (TRTA) 2003 – 2007.....	111
<b>APPENDIX 6: ISSUES AFFECTING CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT IN THE PAKISTAN PUBLIC SERVICE .....</b>	<b>112</b>
WITHIN THE PUBLIC SERVICE OF PAKISTAN .....	112
WITHIN AND AMONG DONORS IN CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT .....	116
<b>APPENDIX 7: EXCERPTS FROM THE PACIFIC REGIONAL CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT REPORT .....</b>	<b>118</b>
CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMING .....	119
ADB’S BUSINESS PROCESSES AND INTERNAL SUPPORT SYSTEMS .....	125
<b>APPENDIX 8: REPORT ON THE NATIONAL WORKSHOP CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT AND AID EFFECTIVENESS 13 – 14 MAY 2008.....</b>	<b>127</b>
INTRODUCTION .....	127
REFLECTIONS AND FEEDBACK.....	129
COMMENTARY ON TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND AID EFFECTIVENESS .....	130
ACTION PRIORITIES AND IMPLICATIONS.....	130
CLOSING REMARKS .....	132



## 1. INTRODUCTION

### 1.1. BACKGROUND

This report summarizes a study conducted over a period of nine months on capacity development within the public services in Pakistan. It arose out of a request made in September 2006 by the then Minister of Economic Affairs to a group of development partners in Pakistan for action to implement the Paris Declaration of March 2005, especially in terms of greater harmonization of aid program planning and



management processes and procedures among funding agencies, and alignment of the practices of development partners and the Pakistan Government.

The Minister sought to strengthen the basis for an aid policy: one of the recommendations of a report on Aid Effectiveness produced by Dr Tony Killick of the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) a few months earlier.<sup>3</sup> It was agreed that three reviews would be undertaken on aspects of aid practice, by several funding agencies on behalf of the joint Government/Development Partner Working Group on Aid Effectiveness. The United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID) agreed to mount a study of Monitoring and Evaluation practices and approaches; the World Bank was to take forward a review of financial management and procurement practices. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) agreed to launch a joint Economic Affairs Division/ADB study of public sector capacity development with special reference to pro-poor services delivery. The ADB with the support of AusAID had already commissioned a regional study of capacity development in the Pacific region.<sup>4</sup> It was anticipated that this - very productive - exercise, could help shape the Pakistan study.

<sup>3</sup> Killick and Shah (2006) Improving Aid in Pakistan - Issues Paper for the Pakistan Development Forum by Tony Killick and Qaim Shah May 2006

<sup>4</sup> The study can be accessed through the following link: <http://www.adb.org/Documents/Produced-Under-TA/38646/default.asp>. See Appendix 8 for some of its recommendations for country programming by funding agencies

Accordingly, ADB and EAD organized a workshop in February 2007 at which capacity development definitions and concepts were reviewed.<sup>5</sup> One recommendation which emerged was that an inventory of capacity development experience should form part of any future study of the subject. In view of earlier evidence of unsatisfactory capacity development initiatives in Pakistan, the emphasis was proposed to be on more positive, successful cases. Given the major change in governance structure in Pakistan since the Local Government Ordinance of 2001, the frame of reference for the study would also emphasize capacity development implications of, and experience related to, devolution.

Terms of Reference (as in Appendix 1) for the study were agreed between ADB and Government, and consultants duly mobilized.<sup>6</sup> The objectives and scope of the study are summarized in Box 1 below.

***Box 1: Objectives and Scope of the Pakistan Public Services Capacity Development Study***

The objectives of the study are (i) to enhance understanding of CD processes that have been employed to strengthen service delivery in Pakistan; (ii) to provide recommendations to support the effectiveness of interventions in Pakistan, both domestic and external, aimed at improving capacity and service delivery performance. This will input into country development strategies and donor programming and operations. The study will provide a mapping of CD interventions for service delivery conducted since the devolution plan came into effect. Based on the mapping, 8-10 case studies will be identified for a more detailed analysis of capacity and CD support. Emphasis will be placed on a comprehensive range of CD entry points (individual, organization/organizational network, institutions/enabling environment and more innovative support). Given the importance of the devolution context for service delivery, capacity and CD of provincial and local government agencies and other stakeholders will be a key entry point of the study, building on the findings of the Devolution in Pakistan study conducted by World Bank, DFID and ADB<sup>7</sup> and a follow-up study that was recently conducted by ADB. Service delivery will be defined for the purposes of the study as comprising health and education, water and sanitation, and access to justice and dispute resolution. This is consistent with the concepts employed in the Devolution in Pakistan study.

*Source: Terms of Reference*

---

<sup>5</sup> The discussion was based on ADB's Medium-Term Framework and Action Plan for CD (<http://www.adb.org/Capacity-Development/framework.asp>) and the European Commission's aid delivery methods concept paper, which provides useful insights on how to operationalize CD concepts. See European Commission. 2005. *Institutional Assessment and Capacity Development, why, what and how?* Tools and Methods Series. Reference document No. 1. September.

<sup>6</sup> David Watson and Adnan Qadir Khan, both of whom had worked extensively on public sector capacity issues in Pakistan, and had collaborated in two earlier studies of devolution and its capacity dimensions. See Watson/Khan (2005a) for ECDPM and Watson/Khan (2005b) for DFID

<sup>7</sup> ADB/DFID/World Bank. 2004. Devolution in Pakistan. Overview of the ADB/DFID/World Bank study, p. 3, figure 1.

## 1.2. SCOPE OF STUDY, AND THE PROCESS ADOPTED

The study had three phases: the *first phase* was a scoping study conducted between early August and mid-September 2007. During this phase, the consultants met with a wide range of development partners, government agencies at Federal and Provincial level (in Punjab and Sindh), District/Tehsil Municipal Administration (TMA) level (in Karachi), and with several Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) active in service delivery partnerships with government. This culminated in a lively joint workshop held in ADB on 3rd September, at which nearly 20 'candidate' case studies responsive to the aspects of capacity development sought in the ToRs were reviewed and a 'short-list' selected.<sup>8</sup>

The *second phase* of the study involved literature reviews and semi-structured interviewing of informants of candidate case studies, and the compilation by national consultants of the twelve case studies selected for detailed research in the September workshop. These drafts were reviewed in three 'write-shops' in Karachi, Lahore and Islamabad, where case study stakeholders refined and revised their cases. They exchanged experiences on capacity issues, thus deepening their insights into capacity phenomena, and enriching the findings of the study. For reasons of security and political developments, this preparatory process had to be stretched beyond the planned three months to over five months until early March 2008. This phase was handled by two national consultants – Mujtaba Piracha and Mahe Nau Haider (Adnan Qadir Khan no longer being unavailable), with overview of the drafting process provided by David Watson. Azeema Cheema undertook a related study of government budgets for capacity development.

The third phase entailed the distillation of finalized cases and write shop discussions for review and discussion at a National Workshop held in mid May 2008 in Islamabad. This was attended by senior federal and provincial government officials, representatives of funding agencies, and NGOs, as well as by representatives of the case study projects.

## 1.3. CRITERIA FOR SELECTION OF CASES

Cases were chosen to illustrate the following:

- a range of service sectors which mean most to poor people: education, health, access to justice, urban water supply and sanitation, political empowerment of women in local government; police performance and accountability;
- varying regions (time and resources did not permit research in all provinces);
- contrasting managerial arrangements involving federal, provincial and district governments, and employing PMUs or other modalities;

---

<sup>8</sup> A copy of the Scoping Report prepared by D. Watson & Khan can be accessed through: <http://www.adb.org/Documents/Reports/Consultant/40121-PAK/40121-PAK-TACR.pdf>.

- a mix of indigenously-initiated, government-resourced, donor-assisted programs – one is an NGO program, another features out-sourcing to an NGO, and some involve NGO / government partnerships;
- prominent gender issues, including those related to women’s position and rights in Pakistan society and as service users.

#### 1.4. THE CASES

The following were the cases upon which this study and report were based. Their acronyms are presented here, together with funding sources, and if an external agency was involved. See Appendix 4 for a tabular summary of characteristics, and Appendix 5 for text summaries of cases.

---

##### 1.4.1. KARACHI WRITE-SHOP

- (i) National Water Course Improvement Program Sindh (NPIW) - PMU (Federal and Govt of Sindh resources / World Bank funds transferred from an ongoing project)
- (ii) Orangi Pilot Project (OPP) (Squatter Settlement Upgrading) Karachi (Own resources / communities / GoSindh / other support from donors)

---

##### 1.4.2. LAHORE WRITE-SHOP

- (i) Punjab Education Sector Reform Program (PESRP) PMIU (GoPj / WB financially-assisted; no TA)
- (ii) Punjab’s Directorate of Staff Development (DSD) (In-Service Teacher Training) (GoPj / donor funded)
- (iii) Punjab Resource Management Program (PRMP) (ADB loan / GoPj)
- (iv) Chief Minister’s Initiative for Primary Health Care (CMIPHC) (Punjab Rural Support Program implemented: GoPj resources)
- (v) Strategic Policy Unit (SPU) Faisalabad (Support to Devolved Local Government) (DFID TA and financial support)

---

##### 1.4.3. ISLAMABAD WRITE-SHOP

- (i) Capacity development through Trade Related Technical Assistance (TRTA) (EC / GoP resources)
- (ii) Citizen-Police Liaison Committee / District Public Safety and Police Complaints Commission Faisalabad (CPLC & PSC/PCC) (Voluntary donations + GoPj)
- (iii) National Highways and Motorway Police (NHMP) (Federal GoP Budget)

- (iv) Gender Justice Through *Musalihat Anjuman* Project (GJTMAP) (UNDP / Norway / SDC, DFID/ Provincial and District contributions)
- (v) Women's Political School (WPS) Support to Elected Women's Political Empowerment (UNDP / Norway /SDC / DFID)

## 1.5. ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT

The present section summarizes some major 'milestones' in the evolution of 'capacity' as a development concept and subject of research and debate among development practitioners.

One conclusion of a recently-completed research program on capacity change and performance<sup>9</sup> is that the national context in which capacity is to be developed merits careful study. Accordingly, the report proper starts with a condensed review of the context in which capacity is being developed in the Pakistan public sector. It proceeds to an overview of findings, distilled from cases, and of the discussions they generated in the write-shops and the National Workshop. Thereafter a detailed account of the various approaches displayed in the cases, factors apparently contributing to success, and finally monitoring and evaluation issues (especially concerning capacity development) are presented. Conclusions and Recommendations follow which summarize themes worthy of government and donor attention. A separate section notes implications of the study findings for donor country programming and strategy-formulation.

## 1.6. LIMITATIONS

Several weaknesses have become apparent in the process of conducting the study. However, these inevitable limits do not invalidate the conclusions emerging from the exercise, but are stated in order to qualify the insights, and inform similar efforts in future. These include:

- The cases are not typical or representative of the general picture of public service delivery in Pakistan. The sample of cases was deliberately biased towards the positive/successful, in the public sector, and in the field of service delivery.
- Evidence on impact and sustainability of the cases is only sometimes available or indicated. The unambiguously positive features of cases are concerned with their planning, design and implementation-management. Whether they will survive long enough to have a positive impact is unknown in many cases (see also the final point in this list).

---

<sup>9</sup> See European Center for Development Policy Management 2005-2008. Study on Capacity, Change and Performance by Heather Baser and Peter Morgan  
[http://www.ecdpm.org/Web\\_ECDPM/Web/Content/Content.nsf/0/358483CE4E3A5332C1256C770036EBB9](http://www.ecdpm.org/Web_ECDPM/Web/Content/Content.nsf/0/358483CE4E3A5332C1256C770036EBB9).  
The study website has all 20 cases encompassed by the study including one on devolved education services in Punjab

- The sampling which resulted in the long-list of candidate positive case studies was neither comprehensive, rigorous or 'objective'. It was based on suggestions of the consultants, government, donor and civil society interviewees. As such they do not necessarily represent 'best practice' in their sectors.
- The selection of focus-cases at the September 2007 workshop was not systematic. Participants justifiably complained that they had too little information to go on. In retrospect, several very good candidates were rejected. On the other hand, several cases were selected where achievements are yet to be fully realized, or where significant defects in their functioning, or the factors surrounding their development, only became apparent during research. On balance, these problematic cases add to the value of the study: they provide insights into typical obstacles to capacity development in the challenging Pakistan context.
- Interviewees and stakeholder voices recorded in cases were not fully representative of the universe of stakeholder perspectives on cases. Time and resources were inadequate to permit a fuller sample to be interviewed, and more data to be unearthed. Only in one case, was a recent rigorous third party evaluation available to inform the analysis of the case.
- The positive cases forming the 'raw material' for this study are - almost without exception - all vulnerable to impending threats from changes in policy and possibly politically-inspired transfers and postings from which they have largely been 'insulated' over the past few years. There is new political leadership in the federal, provincial and district administrations involved. None except the Orangi Pilot Project (OPP) case can yet claim therefore to be examples of sustainable capacity development.

#### 1.7. CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT: EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT IN DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION<sup>10</sup>

The Scoping Study summarized how capacity issues are reflected in the Paris Declaration itself, a recent set of guidelines from the OECD/DAC, and in one major international study conducted between 2003 and 2008 by ECDPM. It also introduced the notion of systems thinking and its potential in analysis of capacity issues.

Various articles and donor guideline documents - including ADB's *Medium-Term Framework and Action Plan for Integrating Capacity Development into Country Programs and Operations* -

---

<sup>10</sup> There are many definitions of capacity: *Capacity* 'The organizational and technical capabilities relationships and values that enables countries' organizations, groups and individuals at any level of society to carry out functions and achieve their development objectives over time'. (Peter Morgan) *Capacity development* has been defined as 'the process whereby people, organizations and society as a whole unleash, strengthen, create and adapt capacity over time.' OECD-DAC. 2006. The Challenge of Capacity Development. Working Towards a Good Practice. Paris. Available: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/36/36326495.pdf>.

make the point that despite enormous (but imprecisely or variously defined and measured) investment in capacity development as one element of development co-operation, the overall impact has been modest.

Much experience of technical co-operation – the usual umbrella term for the mix of technical assistance, training and organizational development which are the most common elements of capacity development programs – has been unsatisfactory, both for the recipient governments, organizations and individuals concerned, as well as for the agencies financing it, and the consultants delivering it.

A recent overview<sup>11</sup> (IDS 2008) summarizes some of the major dilemmas facing counterpart organizations, practitioners and donors:

- While it is axiomatic to stress the importance of thorough ‘needs analysis’, ‘baseline’ assessments are in fact rare: existing capacities are often ignored or under-valued, and the capacity ‘gaps’ identified may be based on unrealistic, inappropriate or ideal performance standards, and on a poor understanding of factors affecting prospects of change in the prevailing institutional environment.
- Realities on the ground – which may be complex, ill-defined in terms of ‘borders’ and influences affecting them and therefore ‘messy’ – tend to be reduced to ‘manageable’ dimensions with measurable performance indicators and a generous supply of assumptions, through the application of technical or rational planning tools such as the logical framework.
- Inputs are usually most directly targeted at individuals or occasionally, groups, but results are sought in terms of organizational development and performance. Yet the links between individuals’ (changed / improved) behavior and organizational performance is often unclear and unpredictable.
- Financing agencies seek attribution of ‘results’ to capacity-oriented ‘inputs’. However, much experience indicates this is a futile search, and/or a fundamentally misguided notion in view of the multi-faceted nature of, and number of contributory factors affecting, capacity.
- *Fast* results are sought. However, all the indications are that ‘capacity development takes time’, and is often an unpredictable and ill-understood process.
- Aid agencies and lenders – cognizant of their own pressures for accountability to taxpayers, state auditors or governing boards – seek fixed, monitorable plans for delivery. But recent studies point to the need for flexibility - and above all learning

---

<sup>11</sup> Capacity for a Change’: Proceedings of a Capacity Collective Workshop under the auspices of the University of Sussex in 2007, accessed via [http://www.dgroups.org/groups/pelican/docs/Capacity\\_for\\_a\\_change.pdf?ois=no](http://www.dgroups.org/groups/pelican/docs/Capacity_for_a_change.pdf?ois=no)

and reflection - on the part of all concerned, if capacity development is to take root and become a spontaneous, internally-propelled, sustained phenomenon.

In the recent case-study-based international reviews of capacity development mentioned above, there are repeated calls for:

- Better understanding of the country- and historical-contexts.
- Exploration of influences such as socio-cultural factors and political or ethnic/clan/kin-ship power variables.
- More recognition of the importance of trust within the relationships of partner agencies in the development context.
- Understanding 'how change happens' (including analysis of 'drivers' of change).
- Analysis of the potential capacities - which exist everywhere - and how to unleash them.
- Studying the positive/successful cases: trying to understand 'why it worked', and drawing lessons from positive experience.
- Recognition of the importance of the timing and sequencing of reforms and related capacity development initiatives.
- Exploration of examples of sound leadership. This is a thread running through much capacity development literature: we need to understand what it means in practical terms when its' application clearly makes groups work well together<sup>12</sup>. We need to understand how to encourage its emergence, and how to avoid undermining it.
- Innovative approaches to monitoring and evaluation - especially of capacity development processes themselves. These are emerging, and tend to stress learning and reflection by key players, and their empowerment, to make adjustments or 'course-corrections' accordingly. In other words, while 'evidence-based policy' is already a desirable (but surprisingly rarely-practiced) axiom of public policy making, the same notion should be pursued in the current field -- that is, evidence-based capacity development should be promoted.

It is ironic that the aid-harmonization agenda and its concomitant changes in the 'architecture' of aid - away from projects and towards sector wide approaches (SWAs) and budget support - may have some unfortunate implications for capacities for capacity

---

<sup>12</sup> 'If there was a persistent theme in the cases, the process of developing appropriate leadership forms which encourage working together to unleash energy, was it.' Excerpt from the Conclusions section of the *Synthesis Report on the ECDPM Study of Capacity Change and Performance* ECDPM (op.cit.)



development in aid agencies. Aid advisers and officials face progressively fewer opportunities for developing and maintaining familiarity with the conditions their host country counterparts work under, and the practical realities of implementing programs, including capacity development initiatives. Co-ordination meetings with other donors, and host governments, take time. More attention is at last being given in the literature to the capacity 'gaps' which exist in development partner agencies themselves, particularly related to their overall ability, and the incentives for staff, to tackle capacity issues more sensitively and systematically, by learning from experience of 'what works and why, in what circumstances?'.<sup>13</sup>

---

<sup>13</sup> See for example Eyben (2005) *Donors' Learning Difficulties: Results, Relationships and Responsibilities* by Rosalind Eyben *IDS Bulletin* Vol 36 No 3 September 2005 and Ostrom et al (2002) *Aid, Incentives and Sustainability: An Institutional Analysis of Development Co-operation* (Summary Report) by Elinor Ostrom et al SIDA Studies in Evaluation 02/01:1 2002

## 2. THE PAKISTAN PUBLIC SECTOR CONTEXT

*'Ordinary public services that should be provided to the citizens by right in developing societies are procured through sifarish.'*<sup>14,15</sup>

*'Kinship connections are vital in cementing and negotiating bureaucratic hurdles.'*<sup>16</sup>

*'For friends, everything; for enemies nothing; and for the rest, strict application of the rules.'*<sup>17</sup>

*'To be effective, competent people have to act independently. This nobody likes.'*<sup>18</sup>



### 2.1. HISTORY OF PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY IN PAKISTAN: ATTEMPTS TO IMPROVE IT<sup>19</sup>

#### 2.1.1. BUREAUCRATIC/POLITICAL HISTORY

It is widely acknowledged that Pakistan inherited a competent and well-organized bureaucracy at Independence, but that the capacity and influence of the bureaucracy has diminished over the past four decades. Cheema and Sayeed (2004) ascribe this to a tendency to use bureaucratic employment as a patronage mechanism and to growing politicization of the bureaucracy. Internal factors have also promoted bureaucratic decline, reflected in growing levels of malfeasance and incompetence.

*'The declining cohesion and fragmentation of the bureaucracy allowed individual bureaucrats to increase their discretionary powers, while outmoded and ineffective performance management measures left such actions unchecked. Low salaries and a modest benefits package exacerbate rent-seeking tendencies, and contribute to low morale and poor performance. Politicians were unable to enforce accountability on the*

<sup>14</sup> *Sifarish* = an Urdu word meaning 'a recommendation or a connection'. It involves finding a relative or close friend who knows a functionary or has some influence to get things done.

<sup>15</sup> Islam (2004) p 322

<sup>16</sup> Islam (2004) p322

<sup>17</sup> Ex Foreign Minister of Pakistan quoted summarizing bureaucratic attitudes in Nasir Islam (2004) p323.

<sup>18</sup> Tasneem Siddiqui (2005) p 114

<sup>19</sup> This section is based on relevant sections of the Scoping Study, and on Watson & Khan (2005a).

*part of bureaucrats while at the same time failing to provide an over-arching policy framework and appropriate set of incentives to guide bureaucratic behavior. Institutional reforms, political interference and changing incentive structures have had adverse consequences for the developmental performance of the bureaucracy and its capacity to deliver services and public goods effectively' (Cheema and Sayeed, 2004).*

A World Bank report, *A Framework for Civil Service Reforms in Pakistan* (1999) points to weaknesses such as an over-centralized organizational structure; inappropriate skill mix of staff; erosion of accountability within the civil service and to the public at large; and political interference in service matters as underlining the need for reforms in the civil service. Furthermore, it highlights other issues affecting the working of public sector as lack of coordination between different cadres of the civil service; rising public sector wage costs at the expense of development expenditure; and widespread corruption.

---

### 2.1.2. DECENTRALIZATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT: HISTORICAL TRENDS

Devolution has a long history (dating back to the middle of the 19th century in what is now Pakistan, but was then colonial British India), but there is no history of significant resource-based empowerment of local government in Pakistan. Indeed, in colonial times up to partition in 1947 the British granted local governments only very circumscribed functions. They were headed by an all-powerful Deputy Commissioner 'an integral part of the central bureaucracy.' This remained true after Independence.

There is some evidence of their elected members being used intermittently for legitimization of 'essentially unitary' 1962 Constitutional arrangements or building constituencies for the military. Non-party local electoral arrangements resulted in localization and personalization of politics at local level. When Provincial assemblies were revived in 1985 they were dominated by local bodies' politicians. Indirectly elected Provincial Ministers – faced with non-party constituencies – therefore started to use development funds to increase the chances of their re-election. Continued lack of political ownership of local government has led, among other things, to a tendency for discretionary special development programs to be controlled by upper levels of government. Tensions between provincial and local tiers of government led to the suspension of local bodies from 1993 – 1998. Widespread use of political control to transfer bureaucrats, and a tendency to regard Provincial and local governments as employment agencies further undermined local government. In summary, local government reforms prior to 2001 failed to bring about substantive improvement in public service delivery. Table 1 (below) compares Pakistan Human Development Index-related data with other South Asian and Least Developed Countries. It testifies to the unfortunate impact of this continued neglect of investment in local public services.

### 2.1.3. LOCAL GOVERNMENT ORDINANCE LGO 2001

The Local Government Ordinance 2001 and the parallel judicial reforms (assisted by the ADB-supported Access to Justice Program, and illustrated in the Gender Justice Through Musalihat Anjuman Courts Project (GJTMAP) case study) and subsequent police reforms (Police Orders 2002 and 2004) aim at impacting how basic entitlements – for health, education, water and sanitation, public safety, etc – are delivered, and how basic rights – for security of tenure over land and irrigated water, for protection of human rights and personal security – are regulated.

In many ways the most recent local government reform is a break from Pakistan’s historical traditions of local government, in that it is far more wide-ranging than the previous plans and that it has created significantly greater autonomy for the elected local tier. These reforms have a significant potential as a driver for public sector reform. However this potential has been compromised so far due to a number of factors – the limited nature of the reforms; the limited space for political empowerment and electoral accountability; no commensurate programs for capacity development, and the prevalence of entrenched informal control mechanisms at the local level (Cheema and Mohmand 2003, Khan 2007).

There are a general lack of clarity of functions and authority of the local governments, resistance from the provincial government to allowing the local governments to play a dominant role in running/managing their affairs, weak delegation of administrative powers and lack of clarity and consensus on the key primary and secondary responsibilities of each level of government and administration.

Confusion and delays in service delivery are also caused by the issue of parallel jurisdiction between provincial and district departments. Although senior and mid-level employees are made ‘functionally’ responsible at district level, they are still controlled by and accountable to their provincial departments. The limited administrative powers of the district government to hire, fire or transfer employees and other points mentioned above indicate weak or few incentives for capacity development. (See also the results of the only survey yet conducted of local government staff opinions on, and motivation for, their work, at Box 3 below).

### 2.1.4. SOCIAL SERVICES’ HISTORY: EDUCATION AND HEALTH SERVICES

Education and health services have a checkered history as national priorities. Their eventual emergence as national priorities has to be seen against a backdrop of neglect. *Historic budget allocations have been low*, resulting in chronic infrastructure shortages, and in low professional status of teachers and rural health care workers. In the political environment of Pakistan (where patronage is significant), politicians have preferred development schemes with a shorter pay-back time than education and health (e.g. roads, electricity and water supply). They have preferred new schools and Basic Health Units (BHUs) to the demanding agenda of maintaining and enhancing the quality of services in existing facilities. Political influence

has been disruptive: facilities are often sited in politically advantageous but service-inefficient or irrelevant locations; politically-motivated transfer of teachers, or protection of persistently absentee doctors, are engineered as political favors.

#### 2.1.5. HISTORY OF PUBLIC SERVICE- RELATED CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES

As is to be expected in a country context such as that of Pakistan, there is evidence of a long history of externally- and internally- supported projects designed and intended to enhance public sector capacity, *which however resulted in little sustained capacity surviving after their termination*. The main deficiencies and problems, which have recurred in these previous capacity case histories include:<sup>20</sup>

- inadequate and therefore misleading analysis of the precise needs and absorptive capacity of the target institutions and groups, for prospective capacity development efforts.
- limited consideration of the implications of the socio-political, bureaucratic cultural, and institutional environments into which resources were to be devoted. Political interference was a problem in certain cases (e.g. the Social Action Program - SAP);
- lack of ownership by senior officials of some CD programs, resulting in dilatory attendance at, and poor attention given to courses, by the trainees they supervise);
- deficient capacities of the (private-sector-oriented) consulting industry to deal with public sector realities (leading to skepticism on the part of some senior officials as to national consultants' suitability to impart 'capacity building'). Public sector training and manpower development establishments are not able to analyze public sector performance problems and address them effectively;
- existing training programs, often relying on lectures by 'visiting experts' and emphasizing information-type courses rather than on acquisition of practical skills, do not challenge traditional approaches or encourage fresh perspectives;
- large numbers of trainees per training program, make participative training difficult or impossible, especially as time available is usually short. Thereafter little or no 'on-job' follow up or coaching to support application of new learning is provided;
- over-emphasis on observance of formal rules and procedures pertaining to finance, planning, and personnel management, often to the neglect of a more strategic examination of the rationale for public decision making and investment proposals;

---

<sup>20</sup> This list was derived from analysis of 12 education-related service delivery capacity case study programs prior to 2004, and is a summary of the analysis in Watson & Khan (2005a)

- inability to translate the substantial investments in formal capacity development – through training – into improved practices for analyzing public policy issues or for implementing new ways of delivering public services;
- new legal provisions were sometimes necessary to provide a basis for application of a new system or approach government-wide (i.e. the content of the training). These were rarely forthcoming.

#### 2.1.6. THE IMPACT OF SERVICE DELIVERY POLICIES AND RESOURCE AND EXPENDITURE PATTERNS ON HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDICES FOR PAKISTAN

Past neglect of the services on which the poorest members of Pakistan society depend most has taken its toll on the indicators of human welfare annually collated and analyzed in the UNDP Human Development Report (HDR). Pakistan’s aggregated Human Development Indices (HDI) and statistics tend to compare unfavorably to South Asia and in some cases even Least Developed Country (LDC) averages, and illustrated in the Table 1 below.

*Table 1: Summary of Pakistan’s HDI Data compared to South Asia and LDCs*

Variable	Pakistan	South Asia	Least Developed Countries
HDI Value	0.551	0.611	0.488
Adult Literacy	49.9%	59.7%	53.9%
Female literacy	35.4%	47.4%	44.3%
Gross Enrolment Rate (3 levels)	40%	60.3%	48%
<i>Females</i>	34%	-	-
Infant Mortality Rate per 1,000	79	60	97
Education over Military spend <sup>21</sup> ('05)	2.3 / 3.5 (65%)	-	-
Health ('04) over Military expenditure	0.4 / 3.5 (11%)	-	-
Population % under-nourished	24%	21%	35%

*Source: Various tabulations in UNDP, 2008. Human Development Report 2007/2008.*

Pakistan is mid-way between the South Asia HDI and Least Developed Countries (LDCs), but has the lowest average adult literacy among South Asia and the average LDC. Rates of female literacy are also much lower than either of the other parameters; Gross Enrolment Rates are similarly lower. Significantly fewer girls attend school than boys. Pakistan’s level of infant mortality is mid-way between South Asia HDI and LDCs. According to other

<sup>21</sup> As a percentage of GDP: both for education and health (row below).

studies, military expenditure recorded in the HDR is probably under-estimated, if it is (as is probable) based solely on budget data.<sup>22</sup> Even with this reservation, and crudely put, Pakistan spends at least nine times more on its military than on public health. One quarter of the Pakistan population is under-nourished.

#### 2.1.7. THE IMPACT OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE CONTEXT, AND PREVIOUS CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT, ON SERVICE DELIVERY

Several surveys of public opinion on service delivery in Pakistan have been undertaken. One record of public satisfaction levels<sup>23</sup> is contained in the results of a nation-wide, all-District survey of opinion about service delivery conducted in 2002. (GoP, 2003c), and a follow-up survey in 2004 (DTCE/CIET, 2005)<sup>24</sup>. It also cast light on public contacts with politicians, the extent of teacher absenteeism, and popular involvement in voluntary groups at local level. *Just over half the respondents were satisfied with government education services in their area in both years of the survey.* Children from very vulnerable households were less likely to be enrolled in school. The gender gap for enrolment in Punjab (7%: 73:66) was the lowest in the country. Nearly one-third of children in households sampled attended private schools: nearly 90% of the parents of these children were satisfied with the education provided. Only 73% of parents whose children who attended state schools were satisfied.

*Corruption is reportedly a problem in education service delivery.* The CIET/NRB 2002 survey found 7% of head-teachers knew of cases where teachers had to pay for their posting. Transparency International's (TI) 2007 survey gave Pakistan a score of 2.4 and ranked Pakistan 138th in the world for prevalence of corruption: significantly worse than its position in 2003, when it was in the 92nd ranked group of countries in terms of prevalence of corruption, with a score of 2.5/10.00. A TI country survey however, noted that '70% of respondents who interacted with educational institutions cited the existence of irregular methods of gaining admissions. Teachers and the management committees were cited as the most involved. The main causes of corruption identified were a lack of accountability and low salaries.'<sup>25</sup> For health services, the second (2004) survey found a somewhat greater proportion of respondents (27% vs. 23% in 2002) satisfied with health services. But only 24% of respondents actually used state health facilities (down from 29% in 2002). Focus groups

---

<sup>22</sup> See 'Military Inc. Inside Pakistan's Military Economy' by Ayesha Siddiqi Pluto Press, London 2007

<sup>23</sup> Commenting on the dearth hitherto of reliable information on performance of service delivery institutions, the CIET/NRB report (GoP 2003c p1) states 'uneven-ness in the reliability of information makes it all but useless for ..evaluating performance or allocating resources from a central level.'

<sup>24</sup> A total of nearly 60,000 people were interviewed; half household respondents were women; over 700 focus groups added qualitative information to survey results; nearly 1,300 head teachers and health facility heads took part

<sup>25</sup> was among the highest proportion of service-using respondents reporting irregularities of the services compared in the survey. 95% of people admitted to hospitals reported being victims of corruption; 65% of electricity users reported irregularities in acquiring service. But 99% of tax-payers (only 7% of respondents) reported irregularities with Tax Administration authorities. (World Bank. 2004b: 90).

revealed dissatisfaction with doctors' attendance, drug availability, and costs. This caused them to seek private care.

One of the current study's case studies is focused on the role of the Strategic Policy Unit of Faisalabad City District Government (CDGF). The SPU conducted a major citizens' services perceptions survey in 2006: it was the most comprehensive (in terms of coverage of any single District) ever in Pakistan: all 289 Unions in Faisalabad were sampled. The results were for CDGF's top management sobering. By the time of the citizens' perception survey - i.e. after nearly two years of intensive, far-reaching, courageous reforms, fully owned by its political leadership and staff - citizens' views of Council services - as published in June 2007 - were almost uniformly negative (see Box 2).

**Box 2: Results of a Survey of Citizens' Perceptions on Services**

Only 5% of respondents were satisfied with government education services; the majority in urban unions, and half in rural ones, were using private services; the condition of school infrastructure was a particular concern.

Despite this, few complained, because they felt there would probably be no resolution of the issue, 95% reporting no response if they had complained earlier.

In urban areas, health facilities are run by government. They are run by the Punjab Rural Support Program in rural areas. 93% of urban respondents reportedly use private facilities (63% of rural respondents use the private sector).

The levels of satisfaction with services differed enormously according to service zone: 38% satisfied in rural areas, only 3% in urban areas (urban services had reportedly got worse over the past five years).

*Source: Strategic Policy Unit of Faisalabad City District Government. 2007*

Paradoxically, the only area attracting some satisfaction (rural health) was the very sub-sector of service delivery, which had been 'contracted out' since 2004. BHU management has been outsourced to Punjab Rural Support Program (PRSP), and is therefore out of the hands of local government here in common with 11 other Districts in the Punjab under the Chief Minister's Initiative on Primary Health Care (CMIPHC) scheme. This (so far unique) 'outsourcing' is the subject of the CMIPHC case. There are indications that the CDGF is taking this feedback on its services seriously, and they will serve to galvanize future activity, and improve the prospects for further partnerships in service delivery.

## 2.2. SUMMARY OF FACTORS AFFECTING PUBLIC SERVICE CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT, AND DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS' ABILITIES TO SUPPORT CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT

Based on the above historical overview, Appendix 6 summarizes the factors which the Study identified as affecting capacity development potential and prospects in the Pakistan public service (at all levels), and also those factors applying to donors wishing to support capacity development in this context.



These appear to be as follows:

---

### 2.2.1. THE HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN PAKISTAN

- A model of patrimonial politics was unwittingly encouraged by the colonial powers' suppression of local politics, and parallel privileging bureaucratic rule. Thus there were few incentives to organize political parties as mechanisms to consolidate power, or develop and stand by social manifestos to attract constituencies. The political sphere is thus personalized. Entrenched local personal or clan fiefdoms weaken the ability of the state to ensure citizens' basic entitlements.
- Public awareness – and expectations – of the impact of sectoral reforms has been hitherto low. In part, this is one consequence of a significant gap in terms of social development between the well-connected rich, and the dependent poor, with resultant grave inequities of development outcomes. Some observers point to a lack of concerted public or user-group pressure for social service improvements and attribute it to the legacy of the feudal structure of Pakistan society. 'We like to be beseeching supplicants, not 'demanders'.<sup>26</sup>

---

### 2.2.2. WITHIN THE CIVIL SERVICE:

- There is a tendency to transfer senior officials, and even middle-level District officials, frequently.
- Informants complain that there are few incentives to apply learning or innovative approaches derived from training or study tour exposure; work environmental factors are usually not conducive to informal creative communication or team-work; there is a threat of politically-motivated transfers or postings, which affect managers' will and ability to develop, utilize or reward their human resources efficiently; (see Box 3 below for results from Faisalabad: the only survey of public sector employee motivation ever carried out in Pakistan).
- This has resulted in an exit of talent from the public service, and a corresponding influx into NGOs, the consulting industry, and the international diaspora;
- District governments' capacity development has been impeded – some say deliberately – by delays in enactment of provisions for a District cadre. Transfer, postings and allowances of senior and mid-level District personnel are still controlled

---

<sup>26</sup> Tasneem Siddiqui (2005) p 102. See also below the disappointing experience of the respondents to the CDGF's Citizen PESRPpectives opinion survey in 2006/7. In most cases, complaints were not responded to

from Provincial government level. This affects their perceived 'loyalty' to the District in which they serve (see below Box 3).

**Box 3: Comments from an Employee Motivation Survey in one District**<sup>27</sup>

'It is abundantly clear that many employees continue to show their allegiance to the Provincial government.' 'The majority (72%) of employees believe that they do not get any extra reward for the extra efforts and hard work they put into their jobs.' '41% of government employees see no career progression in the district government'.

'The majority of employees (56 - 60%) are positive towards the prevailing management communication style...however communication is often one-way and does not engage a 2-way dialogue'. '49% of employees strongly believe that their management / superior encourages them to work as a team...nearly 80% agree to having higher satisfaction in working as a team.'

The responses to the whole issue of rewards...demonstrate total dissatisfaction by the employees.

Only 40% had seen the CDGF Mission Statement.

Many (65%) remained skeptical about the outcomes of the survey (in terms of whether anything would come out of it).

The sample was over 11,000 employees: approximately one-third of all employees.

*Source: Strategic Policy Unit of Faisalabad City District Government, 2007b*

---

### 2.2.3. CONCEPTIONS ABOUT 'TRAINING'

- Apart from the limited number of well-reputed training institutions providing training from initial recruits to mid-management to senior management in the civil service, the public sector training centers responsible for operational level and technical training are neither providing demand-led training to the trainees nor attracting adequate human resources.
- Courses are not seen as related to practicalities of work and content is often irrelevant to the trainees' jobs, so attendees do not bring high expectations for useful learning.
- Usually individuals are trained, rather than teams of colleagues with inter-related jobs;
- Trainees may return to offices where opportunity to apply new knowledge is limited by lack of an overall conducive environment for application of new skills.

---

<sup>27</sup> It should be remembered that the survey took place after over two years of management reform and training in Faisalabad, spearheaded by the SPU.

- Indeed, most training opportunities, especially if they involve travel overseas, are provided to senior staff. The Faisalabad case experience is pointing to the need for (and benefits of) spreading access to training to middle level staff (who are less likely to be transferred so frequently)..

#### 2.2.4. PLANNING MANAGING AND FINANCING CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS'

- Growing volumes of public and donor 'investment' in programs, institutions, activities and initiatives, are apparently being devoted to the pursuit of capacity development, without commensurate attention to assessment of 'value for money', or systematic learning from experience.' Watson & Khan (2005a).
- Recent efforts to compile data on expenditure on capacity development programs within federal or provincial government budgets face the difficulty that 'capacity development' is nowhere defined in terms of what expenditures should be included under this heading. What figures exist, appear to be impressive. Budgeted expenditure of planned 'capacity building' projects were estimated at over Rs 7 Billion in 2007-8 at Federal government level alone.<sup>28</sup> See Appendix 9 for details of Federal and Provincial government expenditure on 'capacity building' in several financial years, and pertinent qualifications and ambiguities which appear to lay behind the figures.

#### 2.2.5. DONORS' CAPACITY TO SUPPORT CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT IN PAKISTAN

- None of the offices of development partners in Islamabad had an officer or adviser specialized in, devoted to, capacity development.
- Some of the earlier studies (summarized above) of funding agency-supported capacity development, and some of the evidence emerging from the present case sample, points to how development agencies' funding commitment horizons and procedures - and under-developed international institutional networks - often impede support to capacity development in Pakistan.
- Pressures to disburse committed funds (on the one hand), but the need to regularly re-assess progress or impact of phases of support (on the other), produce 'lumpy' unpredictable, and intermittent flows of funds: this has affected the sustainability of capacities (e.g. trainer-trainers) painstakingly built up in earlier phases.

---

<sup>28</sup> Tabulation at Appendix D in Scoping Report produced by Dr Awan (Senior Adviser, JICA).

- Professional career incentives within development agencies are generally not conducive to pragmatic scrutiny of capacity development initiatives or rigorous assessment and understanding of their effects.

### 2.3. DEMAND FOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT

The above passages describing the socio-cultural and political context of Pakistan reveal an unfavorable environment for public pressure for service improvements, and this is one aspect of 'demand' for capacity development.<sup>29</sup> The drive in the past few years for Citizen-Community Boards as popular groupings to launch development and service schemes, and to put pressure on providers (as with School Committees in the Punjab) has met with limited success. However some observers see this pressure as a precondition to capacity development in the public service:

*The expression 'capacity building in the Pakistan public sector' is an oxymoron. In order for public sector capacity to be built, major efforts are needed to increase popular demand pressures on the public service from service users and consumers.<sup>30</sup>*

Box 4 describes how a recent review of an otherwise highly successful local government program's Human Resource Management dimensions was skeptical of its impact on 'accountability' institutions in Faisalabad.

The treatment in Section 3 below also gives grounds for concern that the 'demand' for capacity development is muted in the Pakistan public service. This appears to be the case even when:

- Major future economic development policies and implications are imminent (for example the need to meet World Trade Organization requirements and standards for exports), or
- Existing legislation has important provisions, which could provide a requirement for a major capacity development initiative. For example, the LGO 2001 contained three types of provisions which had direct and major implications for capacity development. First, there was unprecedented delegation of powers to plan and budget for development programs, and manage associated greater funding allocations; second, a much greater proportion, and therefore number, of women's representatives were to be in local assemblies henceforth: most of whom would have had no previous experience, and many at Union level indeed would possess only basic literacy skills. Thirdly, the LGO provided for the establishment of new informal

---

<sup>29</sup> The other dimensions of 'demand' for capacity development may include government policy and strategies, (e.g. active public sector reform programs, devolution) and major government- or donor-funded development initiatives (e.g. Social Action Program in the 1990s).

<sup>30</sup> Former Chairman, National Reconstruction Bureau in 2004 cited in Watson & Khan.2005a

court structures – *Musalihat Anjuman* – for which no preparations (regulations, Standing Orders, Rules of Business, guidance notes in their management and conduct, training programs etc.) had been made.

**Box 4: Capacity Development Challenges within ‘Accountability’ Institutions**

The citizens’ perceptions survey pointed to a major piece of unfinished business: the urgent need for more human resource development and mobilization of all accountability institutions, and of service users, in how to complain and follow-up complaints. Most monitoring committees have still not been set up; elected members appear to need more guidance in the role of councilors, and in how to interpret and analyze information provided by the Strategy and Policy Unit of Faisalabad City District Government (CDGF) (including proposed budgets).

Observations have been made in performance reports about the dearth of human resource capacities in internal audit. Consultations with officials and councilors during the preparation of this case study indicated a general ambiguity in terms of responsibility for initiating training of elected representatives, and apparent doubts about its priority at the level of the Province.

Despite the training and other efforts made by the Strategic Policy Unit, including the opening of a call center (to handle public enquiries and complaints about service delivery), much more needs to be done to improve working relationships between officers and elected members, and them and their constituents.

‘We only saw the budget for the first time on day 2 of the three-day budget meeting; how are we expected to master and comment meaningfully on all that detail?’ ‘The system – with its call letters<sup>31</sup> and so on, is all pretty unfamiliar to us’; CDGF councilors.

‘There is a bureaucratic stranglehold on council business. Elected members are nowhere.’; A CDGF Manager.

‘The way they act now, auditors are part of the problem: not the solution. Their performance is measured by the number of objections/queries they raise. They should be aware of the training we are doing to make compliance with financial regulations better. But they are not.’; Several senior members of one department, during an informal discussion with the authors.

*Source: Watson, D. Alvi, M. and Alam, K. (2008).*

In all three examples above, the relevant EAD/ADB case studies (SPU, WPS and GJTMAP respectively) indicate that the initiative for subsequent capacity development interventions came from development agencies, not relevant government departments. In yet another case: the Chief Minister’s Initiative on Primary Health Care (CMIPHC), the ‘demand’ for better BHU management came not from District assemblies clamoring for improved health services for their constituents, or from recognition by the Provincial Ministry or Minister of Health that policy was not being implemented or services delivered, but from a Provincial

---

<sup>31</sup> An annual circular memorandum from the DCO and/or Head of Finance calling on Department Heads to prepare their budgets, according to prescribed guidelines or ceilings.

Minister (whose portfolio was ‘Special Initiatives’) struck by the problems being faced by people in his own home District from clearly dysfunctional health services. He took the initiative, persuaded District authorities that something radical must be done, and invited the Punjab Rural Support Program (PRSP) to attempt to improve matters.

In the Department of Staff Development (DSD)/In-Service Training of teachers case, the initiative for reform of teacher training came from the then Secretary of Education struck by the waste of resources (and anger of teachers) depicted in the (development partner agency-financed) evaluation, and the expensive and misguided model adopted. Thereafter, the ‘re-vamping’ of the dormant Staff Development department, and the assignment of an appropriately-qualified Director with international experience, who possessed the vision of what was needed and achievable, led to a sounder approach. While this service - in-service training for teachers - is being delivered for District governments, but not directly in response to any demands or complaints from them about the hitherto poor quality of in-service teacher training or their teachers’ performance.

Political pressure for improvements in capacity to deliver public services is not readily apparent. Where it does exist, it may not be carried forward through elected representatives. Or, in other cases, citizens ‘vote with their feet’ and such demand is simply channeled or diverted from the public into the private sector, as illustrated by the surveys mentioned above. In the education and health fields this phenomenon has been observed for decades.

The net result is that capacity development in the public sector lacks a coherent and sustained ‘driver’ in the form of popular pressure for change. Whether the approaches currently being made to develop capacity for ‘voice’, and the explosive growth in independent mass media outlets (including at Provincial and sub-Provincial level) which have commented negatively on many aspects of service provision, will serve to make the new government more sensitive to the needs of the country’s citizenry, remains to be seen.

## 2.4. POLICIES FOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT: GOVERNMENT AND DONORS

### 2.4.1. GOVERNMENT

As a comprehensive aid policy, as also underlined in the Paris Declaration, and an integrated public service capacity development plan are foreseen for Pakistan, the present study is intended to inform debate between government and its development agency partners on what measures should be adopted to harmonize approaches to capacity development within such a policy in future.

The Establishment Division of the (federal government) Cabinet Secretariat has been the principal client and sponsor of a major World Bank-supported Public Sector Capacity Building program of overseas fellowships and professional development courses, which includes provision for the development of the National School of Public Policy. A tracer

study is planned, in order to assess the extent to which returned graduates have in fact been able to work as agents of change within their home Departments, as intended. Graduates under this program are tied to posts relevant to their training for a period after their return.

The National Commission for Government Reforms (NCGR)<sup>32</sup> set up in 2006 has developed concept papers encompassing reform of the public service in general and aspects of training and cadre development in particular. A proposal for re-organization of public service training was discussed in the Commission, and made to government in 2007. So far, there have been no major policy changes actually agreed and enacted from the dialogues stimulated and lead by NCGR. It should be pointed out here that many of the suggestions for future action contained in the recommendations section below confirm the need for reforms along the lines suggested by the NCGR. However, the political will to take on the vested interests who oppose change has been inadequate so far as more immediate challenges are addressed. It remains to be seen if the new government feels sufficiently strongly to take forward a civil service reform agenda. This would directly contribute to capacity development of the public service.

---

#### 2.4.2. DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS

Funding agencies have a wide range of policies and strategies relevant to capacity development. Virtually all espouse the importance of this issue in their organizational and country strategy statements. From statements made during the September workshop, there appears to be a general consensus that more coherent support of capacity development for better social services in Pakistan would be highly desirable. It is hoped that the Study contributes to the debate between government and development partners on this matter.

However, at least one development partner representative had major concerns:

*'Donors spend more time undermining public sector capacity than they do creating it'*<sup>33</sup>

There are also indications in the literature that funding agencies' project design, management and reporting procedures, and the need for staff in project management units, and indeed NGOs, is sapping government capacities. The Paris Declaration, and the present study initiative, is aimed at tackling this and other problems.

*'Donors often tend to sap local capacity by over-designing development projects and by distorting incentives of local agents'*.<sup>34</sup>

---

<sup>32</sup> Its mandate is 'to review the size and structure of government, processes and procedures in use, the rules and regulations, the current level of institutional capacity and the state of public services, with the objective of providing a modern efficient and accountable system of governance on a sustainable basis.'

<sup>33</sup> Senior development agency official, Islamabad

<sup>34</sup> Parveen Rehman, Director Orangi Pilot Project

Several of the present study's cases feature funding agency-related project management units (GJTMAP, WPS), or program implementation monitoring units (PESRP, NPIW). They have evoked criticism from the National Reconstruction Bureau (NRB), despite both the PMIUs being resourced by Provincial government funds. The criticisms revolve around the tendency for Provinces to dictate resource allocation between, and use within, districts, instead of building up 'generic' skills and capacities within district governments (e.g. planning, procurement, monitoring) which would allow them to allocate and use resources as their elected representatives think fit.



### 3. OVERVIEW OF FINDINGS

*'Make an inventory of successful pilot projects in the country and then study them carefully.....We should learn lessons from these success stories' 'Also make an inventory of abandoned schemes...' ....'Let us see some success stories that show that, with courage of conviction and an honest effort, it is possible to achieve the desired results. History is being made all round us in bits and pieces.'*<sup>35</sup>



#### 3.1. PLANNING AND DESIGN

##### 3.1.1. CAPACITY ASSESSMENT PROCESSES

Although there is a wide variety of experience among the cases, thorough assessment of existing capacities among the organizational or stakeholder group (to be) involved in a capacity development intervention was, on the basis of the cases reviewed, relatively rare. 'Capacity' was not used as the focus for such initiatives even when they took place, nor was 'capacity' defined before the start of the initiative, or during its implementation.

The most thorough attempts were made where donors, through consultants, supported the programs or interventions. In the *Faisalabad Strategic Policy Unit (SPU)* case, where the consultants had already been working for several years, sector departmental situation assessments preceded the formulation of plans to tackle the problems they revealed. In the second and third components of the *Trade Related Technical Assistance (TRTA)* case (relating to rigorous establishment of export quality standards testing laboratories, and intellectual property respectively) the results of baseline situation analyses were compared to required institutional performance and procedural standards based on international norms. Work plans of capacity development which were designed to deliver required standards were then produced. In the first component, while baseline assessments revealed limited awareness of trade issues, the eventual design and approach of the subsequent interventions fell short of what was required due to a mix of government institutional 'environmental' and technical assistance design issues.

<sup>35</sup> T. A. Siddiqui. 2005:p 176 and 185

The *Women's Political School (WPS)* case design was based explicitly on previous similar efforts and their 'heritage' in terms of training materials and trainers. Field level support from ex-trainees was understood to be a crucial element in the program, but not included for a variety of reasons, some of which were financial.

The *Punjab Education Sector Reform Program (PESRP)* benefited from a general sector assessment by the World Bank of the (deplorable) state of public education and its infrastructure in the Punjab, and the design recommendation that a strong Program Management Implementation Unit (PMIU) was needed to drive the program forward, essentially on behalf of Districts. It was left to the second, energetic program director, to collect and collate on the first database of its kind, per-school data by district on infrastructure stock and human resource capacities, and make subsequent resource allocations ultimately on the basis of need and local resource generation.

A classic four-Province 'pilot' phase was a feature of the *Gender Justice Through Musalihat Anjuman Project (GJTMAP)*. In effect, this formed an assessment of the capacity implications of the introduction of an innovative approach to dispute resolution and gender-related justice (but one which was alien to judicial, legal, political and local administration players). The subsequent expanded program benefited from the hard lessons learned in phase I, one of which was that advocacy components in such initiatives are crucial (but absent in phase I).

Of the nationally-resourced cases, *National Highways and Motorway Police (NHMP)* and the *National Program for Improvement of Water Courses (NPIW)* illustrated how major initiatives were launched without any adequate or accurate pre-assessment of the prevailing situation, but despite this setback, succeeded admirably in developing new capacity from a low base. In the first case (NHMP), the first Inspector General of Police strove to enforce high standards from the start on officers. He had no formal assessment however, nor did he commission one. He just 'got on with the task' of establishing a new force, negotiating generous resources, leading from the top (and by example, from the front) and inculcating rapid learning about what other countries' traffic police did, and deciding what was feasible on the first 'pilot' motorway in Pakistan, the M2. This became the 'model' for later expansion of the NHMP's work on other new motorways.

In the *National Program for Improvement of Water Courses (NPIW)* case, the PC1 (Planning Commission proforma for a project document) was seriously misleading in terms of data on the presence and location of watercourses, and largely silent on the detailed logistical and organizational capacity implications of improving them. No PMU was mentioned. This provided the flexibility the Sindh Province's new program management team needed, backed as they were by the Chief Minister, providing the authority to push through a PC1 revision, after an inventory was undertaken and realistic management plans put in place.

A similar situation arose in the *Punjab Resource Management Project (PRMP)*. Assessment of capacities was not initially undertaken, but when gaps became apparent, training needs analysis was undertaken by the Civil Service College, Singapore prior to module

development and course design. Training programs were both for participants who would have the opportunity to apply the new skills in their work, and for those who would perpetuate the capacity development work in the future. A seminar series for on-going learning and support, and a several opportunities for advanced study, both domestic and international, for government employees were also established.

The *Chief Minister's Initiative on Primary Health Care* (CMIPHC) was initiated in one district though not designed as a pilot, and its experience was not evaluated before 'scaling up' to 11 more districts was attempted. Tellingly, the World Bank-supported evaluation (World Bank, 2006) took place after, not before, scaling up.

One case, which could have benefited from a frank assessment of existing capacity and feasibility (but in which one was never mounted) was the *Faisalabad Public Safety and Police Complaints Commission* (PSC/PCC). It foundered for a variety of reasons, but importantly because there was no objective prior assessment of the readiness of police and political authorities (at provincial and district level) to hold to account police forces, nor of the other implications – including and especially financial – of building a requisite monitoring and public complaints machinery. Indeed, the case raises the question of how the formulation of legal provisions related to public accountability of key institutions such as the police is handled. Pakistan poses an extremely challenging socio-political environment for such measures, where public awareness of basic rights, and expectations of police probity, are both low, and where there is very limited history of collective public movements to address the authority of state institutions.

---

### 3.1.2. THE ROLE OF VARIOUS STAKEHOLDERS IN DESIGN

The previous section has already implied that 'design' was explicit and formalized *a priori* in only some of the cases, again mainly in the development partner-supported interventions. However, before turning to development partner-supported cases for evidence, it is worthwhile mentioning the *Orangi Pilot Project* (OPP) case, since among all its stakeholders, the clients OPP served formed the most important group. They influenced how, and in what field OPP operated and, therefore, what capacities it had to develop. See Box 5.

In the Strategic Policy Unit of City District Government Faisalabad (SPU) case, while consultants provided suggestions on the importance of taking stock as a basis for action, and put forward ideas on the framework for situation assessments, departmental staff were responsible for carrying them out and writing them up. Meetings of heads of departments subsequently presented and collectively discussed them as a basis for endorsing action plans in the form of strategic operational plans. This collective top-management debate and ownership of analyses and plans is an important feature of this case.

**Box 5: Orangi Pilot Project (OPP) and its Stakeholders**

‘The Orangi Pilot Project (OPP) views itself as a “research institution” which through “prolonged action research and extensive education” helps identify solutions. It promotes community organization and empowerment (through technical guidance) to foster growth on a grassroots level. Overall, the goal of OPP’s various programs are to ‘preferentially support effective existing structure rather than create new ones.’<sup>36</sup> The objective is to develop a “viable” model so that it is replicable by all; the focus is on adapting rather adopting the program in different places.’

‘The OPP started off in an atypical project mode—having no targets, no specific timelines, master plan, policy framework or objectives—and functioning as an independent organization with minimal donor obligations. The component sharing sanitation model was widely accepted, replicated and became one of the major programs of OPP.’ Write-shop discussion confirmed that OPP basically responds to requests from groups of urban *katchi abadi* dwellers (and thereafter builds capacities among partners).

*Source: Case study text.*

In both WPS and GJTMAP, the roles of the donor-consortium lead agency, UNDP (Gender Support Program), was crucial in steering the design processes. Other stakeholders including national project directors, all senior government officials, also participated. Subsequently, project team members played supportive roles, and ideas for approaching consensus on preparation processes for materials, policy and logistical consultations needed during implementation fell essentially to national project managers (NPMs).

The then Chief Minister of the Punjab championed the creation of a strong PIMU to manage the politically crucial PESRP. Subsequently, he endorsed the posting of a diligent and innovative program director (PD) early after its creation. Not only did the PD have the Chief Minister’s backing, he was a self-taught computer expert, with strong ‘political’ credibility at the highest levels of the government. He was able to design the detail of the way in which the PMIU would operate to build its own capacities, and ultimately go on to develop district and sub-district capacities for delivery of the PESRP. This included major new recruitments (of a cadre of District Monitoring Officers, and Monitoring and Evaluation Assistants recruited from outside government, including retired army personnel); incentive structures related to distribution of resources linked to key educational policy goals (e.g. girls’ education; district use of own-resources for education); and a style of management within the PMIU which facilitated internal communication and team-work.

In Punjab Resource Management Program (PRMP), design of the complex, province-wide civil service and financial management reform agenda was initially led by ADB in consultation with the provincial government. The design was sufficiently flexible to

---

<sup>36</sup> Naheed Rehman Social Impacts and Constraints of Microcredit in the Alleviation of Poverty, A Qualitative Study of the Microcredit Program, OPP-Orangi Charitable Trust, Karachi.

accommodate the demands for capacity development and institutional change of an expanding group of stakeholders as they became progressively engaged. A full range of provincial mid level managers took part in a redesign workshop in 2006 where, to ensure sustained reform, they initiated absorption of the PRMP Change Management Unit into the Services and General Administration Department of the province to as the Change Management Wing.

The National Program in Watercourse Improvement (NPWI) project team confirmed in the Karachi write-shop that 'there was no blue-print' for capacity development. The Program Monitoring Unit (PMU) evolved, according to need, and what was feasible. Indeed one of the team members said: *'It is a blessing that capacity development has not developed into a well defined discipline' and...Capacity may be better defined as ability/capability. Capacity development should not be pre-conceived. It should be vision-oriented. In the PMU we carried out capacity development in the shape of mindset development first for all the people, whether working for and/or with PMU, that we would be working as a 'facilitator' in NPIW rather than an 'indifferent monitor'.* In other words, there was no detailed design for capacity development, just several principles which would govern the way the PMU operated, and how it would build capacity elsewhere.

*'The PMU never got overawed by the enormity of the task ahead of it.<sup>37</sup> Imagine the magnitude of challenge: PMU's 12 monitoring teams were required to supervise and monitor every year around 5000 sites of watercourses spread all over the province.'* ...and when it is remembered that over 260 District teams (each with approximately ten members) and Watercourse Associations (WCAs) (one per scheme) had to be enabled to operate and collaborate consistent with prescribed standards and to time, the magnitude of that task was indeed daunting.

---

### 3.1.3. DEFINING CAPACITY OBJECTIVES

Capacity objectives were clearest, most explicit and least ambiguous in the TRTA components 2 and 3. It is no coincidence that both these fields were influenced by internationally-agreed, specific target standards and norms, which all signatories to the WTO are obliged to adopt and achieve.<sup>38</sup> The European Commission is obliged as a matter of development cooperation policy to assist member countries with which it has an aid relationship to attain these standards.

---

<sup>37</sup> The role of PMU as conceived and implemented included information collection, keeping decision makers at all levels informed, identification of issues hampering progress and coordinating decision making.

<sup>38</sup> In a review of the M&E of Capacity and Capacity Development (Watson/ECDPM. 2007), clear governance capacity standards were agreed and set only in the field of public financial management: again, based on internationally-agreed norms under International Monetary Fund tutelage and World Bank assistance.

NHMP similarly used the standards adopted by traffic police in other (industrialized) countries, but adapted to the Pakistan context, as its capacity development objectives. Interestingly, while there were strict 'Standard Operating Procedures' laying down standards for performance of all aspects of the NHMP policing function, an important principle - indeed mission - underlying the role of NHMP is one of *assistance* to the public. Behaviors of officers deemed to be supportive of this overarching objective are rewarded.

The *Directorate of Staff Development* (In-Service Training) also introduced a well-established international approach, but one that was new in Pakistan for defining the capacities of school teachers: Continuous Professional Development. This not only established key competencies for teachers at various levels of professional development, but necessitates an approach to career development which permits professional advancement and promotion *within* teaching, not only outside it (for example, in school management). The establishment and operation of such a framework has daunting implications for the capacities of the (training) staff of teacher-training establishments, and of the Director's own department. There are indications that a participative approach to work programming is yielding benefits in terms of the capacities of donor agencies who support teacher education to work harmoniously with the Department of Staff Development (DSD) and with each other on the same campus.

While *PRMP* follows the job descriptions for devolved governance as outlined in the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 2001, training requirements, initially for staff of key departments (Planning and Development, Finance, Services and General Administration, and Management Planning and Development), have been defined through collaborative training needs assessment with advanced training institutions in Singapore. The then Chief Minister incorporated many of the proposed reforms into the provincial planning process which intended to extend the reforms to all departments.

*PESRP* and *CMIPHC* capacity objectives and performance standards are enshrined in Terms of Partnership Agreements (TPAs) between the PIMU and district governments (in the case of *PESRP*), and between the Punjab Rural Support Program and district governments (in the case of *CMIPHC*). These detail mutual obligations, authorities, tasks, standards and frequencies of performance, and how performance against objectives will be assessed. In a politicized administrative environment, well formulated TPAs in which the interests of multiple stakeholders are clarified, may play a significant role in assisting program managers to deal with efforts to influence their decision making and control.

The *SPU* Faisalabad case illustrated organizational objectives (in terms of a Corporate Plan); departmental objectives (Strategic Operational Plans for each department (sector), in which objectives, and performance 'milestones' were stated, and against which progress was monitored - collectively, among heads of departments - on a quarterly basis); and individual capacity objectives. An elaborate, time-consuming job analysis process was undertaken to define tasks and performance standards consultatively for all principal jobs in the CDGF

administration. These were used as the basis for defining CD objectives for jobs, and for specific, job-related training.

The NPIW was scrupulous in defining capacity objectives and performance standards (i.e. what they should be able to do and how) for the implementing agencies (especially the 260 district teams and Watercourse Associations [WCAs]). These not only became the basis for capacity development workshops and courses, but also acted as yardsticks for subsequent qualitative monitoring of progress. Indeed, it also established strict guidelines for its own (monitoring) staff performance, through establishment clear criteria for assessing progress (or deficiencies).

GJTMAP addressed the needs of an embryonic group of informal dispute resolution structures to be reinforced with pertinent (widely-agreed and understood) regulations. They required practical guidance in handling unfamiliar cases in a sensitive and legally-appropriate manner. Thus this project had the most basic and explicit capacity development objectives of all the case studies.

## 3.2. IMPLEMENTATION

### 3.2.1. DEVELOPING INDIVIDUAL SKILLS AND COMPETENCES

All cases in the sample featured strengthening of individuals' skills and competences as one element in their approach to capacity development. The cases stand in contrast however to the prevalent approach elsewhere in the public service in Pakistan (recounted in Section 2 above, and appendix 6) where 'training' is equated with capacity development, regardless of how it is implemented.

The cases in the sample adopted variants on the following rigorous approaches to individuals' capacity development, which generally led to more satisfactory and productive outcomes:

- *The most successful training programs' content was directly related to the tasks the individuals had to perform.* Training programs under PRMP, directly addressed the skill requirements of district officers responsible for finance and planning and of those responsible for civil service and other reforms at the provincial level. In the SPU Faisalabad a protracted process of job analysis, led to jointly-agreed job descriptions and personnel specifications which were used to design syllabi and brief courses delivered by experienced personnel. Both NPIW and NHMP based their training on detailed descriptions of what had to be done, by whom: i.e. manuals or 'Standard Operating Procedures'.
- *Major efforts went in to curriculum development:* those of the WPS program was based on an inventorying and review of previously-developed materials, in the light of new developments (especially the provisions of the LGO), past experience and feedback from civil society groups with practical field experience. GJTMAP was

scrupulously careful to capture appropriately sensitive themes related to religious texts, the Constitution, and laws in its materials – especially its Rules of Business – which were to become the key documents guiding the work of Musalihat Anjuman courts. Nothing existed before on which to base the work of these courts.

- *Design of materials took account of the needs and basic capacities of the trainees:* WPS was faced with largely illiterate women: they thus put a premium on graphics and diagrams, increased real examples, and reduced the amount of conceptual material. NPIW used established academic or technical training institutions, but was careful to provide core materials based on immediate real needs of the trainees.
- *Trainers 'knew their stuff', and were credible in the eyes of trainees.* They were helped with skills in conducting training sessions. SPU developed an informal cadre or network of Master Trainers (line staff of departments who had not only done well in earlier courses, but had aptitude and interest in playing a training role themselves). WPS mobilized the most able and confident from experienced ex-trainees as trainers. PRMP twinned the provincial government with the Civil Service College, Singapore and negotiated partnerships with National University of Singapore,
- *Practical approaches were used:* trainees had to undertake practical exercises that simulated their tasks in their jobs. They did not just listen to lectures. *'For the first time, training was not a holiday: it was actually related to my job.'* A Faisalabad CDG Departmental official.<sup>39</sup>
- *It was followed up, or reinforced, in the workplace.* *'Actually, the best training we did was on-site, where all trainees could see exactly what had to be done, to what standards, and why'* Project Director, NPIW Sindh (Karachi write-shop comment).
- *Trainees worked in reasonably well-equipped environments* conducive to effort, team-work and innovative suggestions, where their bosses understood why they had undergone training, and were therefore supportive. NHMP institutionalized this approach to training follow up. PRMP ensured that trained individuals were assigned in clusters where they could provide mutual support.

---

### 3.2.2. USING EXISTING (LATENT) CAPACITY

It is apparent that there is considerable talent – capacity – underneath the surface of several unpromising contexts. The most effective approaches to capacity development identified, encouraged, reinforced, and recognized that hitherto undiscovered talent.

- The second *Director of the PESRP PIMU* brought to bear his self-taught IT skills on gathering and analysing data for providing evidence to decision-makers.

---

<sup>39</sup> Cited in D. Watson/ M. Alvi/ K. Alam (2008) *Human Resource Management Case Study* for CDGF and DFID



- The *Director of the NPIW* in Sindh has led the program from its inception, and has presided over a 20-fold increase in scheme completions since he helped establish the PMU. His distinguished previous record in local administration, stood him in good stead in understanding District implementation realities (and how to avoid the many pitfalls), but his recent achievements are an indication of considerable leadership talent.
- The *SPU's* consultants made suggestions for future organizational development and strategic planning approaches: they did not need to do the work themselves. Given the focussed yet permissive atmosphere created by the political and administrative leadership (Nazim and District Co-ordination Officer (DCO) respectively), hidden abilities within existing staff (and national consultants) were unearthed, and mobilized.
- *CMIPHC* empowered District Managers (who were not medics, but from a district administration background). Interestingly enough, it did not train them before taking over their jobs: instead they were expected to learn and 'blossom' where they were. Thus empowered, and faced with clear target performance standards, they did so. They became crucial leaders of, and foci for, debate at District level on health issues in monthly team meetings.

One huge 'reservoir' of latent capacity revealed through several cases is at community level. *OPP* bases its whole philosophy on unleashing community capacity, through its own facilitatory efforts. Initiative always lies with communities: Lane Organizations. *The idea was that OPP would 'aim to improve the quality and expand the scope of the people's own efforts'*<sup>40</sup> No subsidies are necessarily needed to elicit these capacities: indeed, the *CMIPHC* found that once BHUs functioned as they had never done before, under *PRSP* management, communities generated and directed their own financial contributions towards supplementary outreach services. This accords with A H Khan's experience: '*genuine development can not take place through subsidy; people themselves should be prepared to pay for what they want*'<sup>41</sup>. Such community investment leads directly to ownership. A different stratum of 'community' introduced and *resourced* the *Citizen-Police Liaison Committee CPLC* in Faisalabad, along the lines of the already-successful pioneering equivalent in Karachi.

The *NPIW's* achievement of a 20-fold increase in water course schemes' completion was in significant measure, due to the effective mobilization and guidance of Water Course Users Associations (WCAs) and related community-led efforts in upgrading the linings of their water courses. Close monitoring of their financial administration, materials ordering and

---

<sup>40</sup> A. H. Khan What I Learnt in Comilla and Orangi, Reminiscences and Reflections, Orangi Pilot Project.

<sup>41</sup> A. H. Khan The Orangi Pilot Project: Uplifting a Periurban Settlement near Karachi, Pakistan, Reasons for Hope, Instructive Experiences in Rural Development.

deliveries, and on-site works supervision was central to the consistent completion of works, but the WCAs actually did the on-site work.

### 3.2.3. PROGRAM MANAGEMENT MODALITIES: CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT IN SECTOR REFORM

Several cases in the sample feature some sort of Program Management Unit (*GJTMAP*, *WPS*: both donor-funded but implemented under the National Execution formula contained in the Project Cycle Operations Manual - PCOM) or Project/Program Implementation and/or Monitoring Unit (*NPIW*, *PESRP*: both government-financed). They usually 'resided' formally in a parent Ministry or Department, but functioned according to very different procedures, and benefited from more favorable conditions than their 'parent' agency. They proved effective in collating and analyzing available information, harnessing existing, or 'imported' capacities and thereafter generating them internally or among client / stakeholder groups, injecting resources and sponsoring activities in geographically dispersed sites or local authority areas, keeping track of sometimes complex financial flows, and generally acting as the 'flagship' for sector reforms (*PESRP* particularly). Government servants working in the PMUs of various reform initiatives under *PRMP* will later be absorbed into the departments with which they are working, bringing valuable experience and capacities. Yet PMUs are not without their detractors:

*'It's about time donors started backing devolution by building Local Government capacities, instead of building up PMUs at Provincial level'*<sup>42</sup>

Of the PIMUs, that of *PESRP* has latterly proved the most contentious, after a remarkably successful record in its first years: i) injecting resources, management and monitoring systems, incentives, materials, and services (e.g. hiring of teachers) into all districts of the province, according to formulae-based allocations; ii) reforming relations with the private sector, and iii) above all, inculcating pace and direction into a long-neglected key social service sector in Pakistan's largest Province. On the other hand, it has - on its own admission - had until recently limited impact on the organizational capacities of the Departmental Department of Education. It has instead - with the full backing and agreement of the then Chief Minister - focused on *PESRP* implementation. It has received accolades from the World Bank for its efforts (recognized as one of the Bank's 20 best performing programs). It has had some impact on District Education Department capacities (especially in terms of data management and monitoring).

However, its past success has attracted detractors who criticize its generous conditions of service for staff, and limited impact on Departmental entities, and indeed, the problems it has faced in instilling favorable policies towards education at district level, and in working with related initiatives at provincial level (for example the Department of Staff

---

<sup>42</sup> A senior NRB official interviewed during the Scoping Study.

Development) or some of the more enterprising Districts (Faisalabad). Some voice concerns for the sustainability of the information-systems PMUs such as that of PESRP have generated.

PMUs or variants demonstrate however, the significance in the prevailing part-politicized bureaucratic environment in Pakistan public service of institutionally 'ring-fencing' the organizations leading sector reform. Otherwise they are prone to influences and interference which are remarkably disruptive of systematic program management and staff relations and discipline.

The National Workshop on this study debated their merits and demerits: and opted to support PMUs! In the short term, it appears they are likely to be retained as vehicles for influencing sector development rapidly and consistently: particularly in view of the range and complexity of capacity deficiencies affecting local government, and the constraints of managing any urgent major development initiatives in the bureaucratic environment of largely unreformed line Ministries.

---

#### 3.2.4. ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT (OD) -- (EMBEDDED PROJECT MANAGEMENT)

The obverse approach to the PMU-type capacity development model is represented by the NHMP, DSD, TRTA (components 2 and 3), and SPU cases. Here, organizations (and their various departments or units) were the target for capacity development. Of these four, the only local government OD case is that of Faisalabad City District Government – international consultants held key positions in a management unit located within the District Coordination Office. The OD approach is attractive compared to the PMU approach, because it embraces all parts of an organizational system, and notionally enhances inter-relationships among them. However, it is demanding in terms of conditions which facilitate, indeed permit, its adoption:

- A supportive overall policy, governance or legal context.
- Generous allocation of resources (TRTA C2 and C3, and NHMP from government, SPU from DFID and the TA team it financed)
- Time, and/or discrete geographical or functional focus in mandated activities;
- Sustained top-level commitment to the OD effort.
- Consistent, diligent management of components' initiatives.
- Close working relationships or communication with clients of the organizational system (typically, members of the public, or a professional group in the case of the DSD case).

Several of these OD cases displayed the problems which can arise when some parts of the above 'equation' are not present. For example, although the NHMP was able to transform public perceptions of motorway traffic policing, their standards have not been automatically adopted by surrounding jurisdictions. The National Highway Safety Council and National Transport Research Center are both dormant (though NHMP was expected to influence these, too); provincial governments are formally responsible for licensing, safety, driver education and road engineering issues all of which are in disarray, and not deemed to be priorities by respective provincial authorities.

The DSD has labored in a Provincial educational policy vacuum, with inadequate collaboration between component agencies within the education sector, for several years, despite suggestions for better inter-relationship within an over-arching policy framework. This has negatively affected the impact of reforms being made in approaches to in-service teacher training.

The SPU's OD efforts have been diluted and at times disrupted by limits to the authority of the CDGF over key (senior) officials' career development and transfers, or the work of related cadres (e.g. members of the accounting cadre in Government Accounts Office who initially were less than co-operative in transferring or disclosing accounting data to CDGF). The provincial government appears not to be proactive in supporting creation of the long-planned district cadre, which would revolutionize the human resource management environment at district level.

On the admission of its key personnel and consultants, the Faisalabad District reforms need more than the 'project' time horizon to become consolidated: four years is not enough, for such a major organizational reform effort. NHMP officers admit that unless there are significant policy and resource-allocation shifts affecting the functional environment of the police service *as a whole* in Pakistan, this example of an OD 'ripple' will fail to foster wider change.

'Customer relations' or consumer responsiveness are beginning to develop in Pakistan – at least between government organizations and citizens, as the users of services or taxpayers. Thus an important potential 'driver' or engine of reform in more open environments is largely missing (putting in turn more weight on strong leadership at the top of organizations). Only the NHMP and SPU cases have so far demonstrated a 'feel' for this dimension: the NHMP prides itself on public relations and its image and accountability. The SPU has pioneered a major, comprehensive Citizen Perception Survey. The results graphically depicted the lost ground that CDGF must make up if the quality of its services' delivery is to be valued by its citizenry.

Hence, while there are positive examples of OD-type approaches in the case selection, they have their limitations too, in the contentious and multi-level Pakistan public service environment.

### 3.2.5. PARTNERSHIPS

There are several positive examples of where partnerships have contributed to capacity development. *OPP* partners with government in relation to planning specifications and construction of primary and secondary sewerage and drainage infrastructure so that their lines can be easily and satisfactorily connected with the higher level systems. It has influenced design standards, choice of technology and priority-setting. It has assisted by mapping key infrastructure, and trouble-spots. Its reports are openly available to city and provincial authorities.

*CMIPHC* is a classic public-NGO partnership program, where Punjab Rural Support Program (an NGO) is a service-provider/manager. Its managers bring together its own employees and those of government regularly to discuss health issues and to enhance co-ordination. This did not happen before the *CMIPHC* was established.

*PESRP* has forged better public/private partnership in provision of education through the rejuvenated, and now private sector-led Punjab Education Foundation.

*DSD* has acknowledged that the private sector, educational NGOs, provincial and district training institutions, and funding agencies all have a role to play if in-service support to teachers is to be coherent: and has employed a deliberately participative consultative approach to this end.

*GJTMAP* is probably the case where successful partnership-making mattered most – not just to smoothness of implementation, but to the feasibility of the entire project’s introduction of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) to conservative stakeholders in Pakistan (see Box 6 below).

#### *Box 6: GJTMAP’s Partnership Strategy*

*GJTMAP* faced a potentially major problem of rejection in its attempts to introduce an alien (informal) approach to dispute resolution in the *Musalihat Anjuman* courts: hostility from a professionally formal and conservative judiciary, and from the legal profession that could have interpreted their introduction as a potential loss of clients and business; a potentially apathetic police force, reluctant to recognize the value of such courts; District governments who are already strapped for funds, and saw *Musalihat Anjuman* as yet another drain on their facilities and scarce resources; from religious authorities who misinterpreted the courts’ potential role in relation to family law, and the rights of women.

Remarkably, the Project has largely overcome such ‘stakeholder threats’ by a highly successful approach in building partnerships through sound research, informal advocacy, careful and patient explanation, consultative non-threatening approaches, sharing and jointly developing training materials and gradual introduction of *Musalihat Anjumans* in only four Districts as pilots.

*Source: Case and Write-shop discussion*

WPS partnered with Local Government Academies to deliver training. Early partnership with the Aurat Foundation helped build understanding of the significance of Union-level Documentation and Resource Centers and/ or access to local government offices for back up support and 'space' for ex-trainee female representatives.

As an example of a project attempting to introduce awareness and operational infrastructure associated with a notoriously complex aspect of national economic policy (international trade) TRTA forged partnerships between new government testing and regulatory institutions, and the private sector (especially industry and sector associations). Its Component 1 faced more difficulties in building partnerships between participating government ministries. This appears to have been related to limited engagement between TA personnel and the Ministry of Commerce, and subsequent weaknesses in its ownership of the component.

'Twinning' of local training institutions with foreign specialized colleges or institutes has been demonstrated as an effective way to sustain quality and stay current with state of the art practices in capacity development under PRMP.

---

### 3.2.6. POLICY AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORM

An aspect of policy and institutional reform, which is sorely needed, but still in abeyance in terms of formal agreement and implementation, is (national) civil service reform: see comments above on the National Commission for Government Reform (NCGR). Absence of firm leadership and practical steps to reform the way Pakistan's bureaucracy is structured and operates significantly hampers (organizational) capacity development in the public sector, notwithstanding the positive cases explored in this study. Clearly, political will - and supporting conditions and resources - to take on the vested interests which prefer (and benefit from) the status quo - is inadequate.

Several of the cases have themselves made some impact or contribution in terms of reform at least in terms of the way services are delivered:

- The *CMIPHC* has had a remarkable effect on national policy governing the management of BHUs. The President's Primary Health Care Initiative (PPHI) has emerged directly from it. Rural Support Programs are to be tasked with managing this level of facility in the first 50 Districts outside Punjab (PRSP is to play a mentoring role).
- *PESRP* was based on a solid sector analysis by the World Bank. This paved the way for reforms in the way education services were resourced, planned and above all delivered at District level. PESRP has provided coherent information to policy makers (including the Chief Minister's monthly meeting on policy and programs' progress), and has influenced allocation of resources between Districts. It has influenced policy on employment of District Executive Officers (Education),

succeeding at one point in having them all dismissed and replaced with candidates chosen through more rigorous than usual approaches.

- *NPIW* has influenced the manner in which Province-wide programs are managed monitored and thus implemented. The then Chief Minister of Sindh has requested its help in addressing the management of Land Revenue and Records: the much complained-about government service.

**Box 7: Punjab Resource Management Program's Civil Service Reform Initiatives**

PRMP is unique among the cases in this study because it addresses a broad range of civil service reforms at the provincial level. Its purpose is to assist the provincial government through reforms to governance structures, systems and processes to strengthen provincial finance, to realign provincial institutions for pro-poor service delivery, and to create opportunities for growth and income generation in the private sector. Included are civil service reform initiatives for:

*a) Human resource management to improve services:* Covering a civil service census; development of a dynamic human resource data base; institutionalized merit based, transparent, procedures for recruitment, promotions, and transfers; rationalized staff and enhanced skill levels; specially designed training programs to meet promotion requirements and creation of a new Provincial Management Service, a new Prosecution Service

*b) Better financial management of these services:* Linking payroll and pensions with personnel records, broadening membership in the provincial public service commission and increasing its autonomy for managing recruitment, promotions and transfers; delineating contractual and regular posts in Health and Irrigation and Power Departments; creating a district cadre at least in education reorganizing the finance department along functional lines; and creating incentivized pay packages in education and health departments.

*c) Systems for reviewing and deepening the reform process itself:* Change management positions have been specified in 40 different agencies; a new working group is developing HR policies, and two departments will implement performance based HR management; establishment of a working group on rules of business; functional review and business process reengineering of pilot departments has been carried out; and a capacity development framework for civil service training (as described in this case) has been approved by the Chief Minister.

Provincial ownership of the overall initiative is reflected especially in institutionalization of efforts to broaden and ensure the sustainability of the reform process through creation of a task force on civil service modernization and reforms, and upgradation and empowerment of the Civil Service Change Management Wing.

*Source: Case study and Write-shop discussion*

- *NHMP* has however worked under an unhelpful and incompletely formulated and implemented broader policy framework relating to vehicle condition regulation and licensing, road engineering and street furniture, road safety and education of teachers and young people in that regard. It has so far pushed unsuccessfully for the National Highway Safety Council to be activated (it is moribund due to lack of

interest mainly on the part of Provincial governments, in whose mandate road communication and traffic regulation falls according to the National Highway Safety Ordinance of 2000).

- Similarly, the *Directorate of Staff Development* of Punjab's Department of Education has promoted (as unsuccessfully as NHMP) for discussion and introduction of a broad policy framework for education, which encompasses and explicitly interlinks the role and outputs of all institutions and initiatives impinging on the education of children in the Punjab.
- *PRMP* is unique in focusing on civil service freeform at the provincial level. (see Box 7).

In general, examples of successful capacity development are easier to identify in more localized or focused projects. The complexity of wide scale reform initiatives necessitates strong leadership, sustained support, and committed effort at many levels. Sequencing reforms, and synchronizing initiatives among the institutions involved – and development of the capacity to manage these – become much more important with increasing scope of institutional and organizational change.

---

### 3.2.7. VOICE, EMPOWERMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY

In any analysis of holistic capacity development, the notions of voice, empowerment and accountability have great significance as drivers of suppliers of services to improve delivery. They act as incentives to development of capacities to deliver. However, as Section 2 on the Pakistan context for public sector capacity development indicates, the socio-cultural history and nature of Pakistan society, and its manifestation in political institutions, delimits the scope and nature of such notions. See Box 2 above for a summary of insights into the (limited) development of capacity in 'accountability' institutions, even where an effective organizational development effort has been pursued.

Several of the cases however, have made important strides to attempt to empower their clients through providing them with vehicles or mechanisms for 'voice', and thus make a gesture towards enhancing their own accountability. The huge Citizens Survey in the SPU/CDGF case is an example, as is the embryonic 'One Stop Shop' / Complaints Center now staffed 24 hours a day, as the only example in the sample of organizational capacity development for 'voice'.

The NHMP directly responded in the media and internet to public complaints about abusive behavior of one of its officers in a well-publicized incident. It succeeded in attracting praise after not only apologizing publicly, but also detailing what had been done to prevent such occurrences in future.

The case 'twins' of Citizens Police Liaison Committee and the Public Safety and Police Complaints Commission in Faisalabad stand in stark contrast and testimony to the



dynamics of accountability in this key state service. They illustrate the contrast in commitment towards, performance of, and utility of two types of bodies oriented towards better accountability of the police. See Box 8 below:

***Box 8: Citizens Police Liaison Committee and the Public Safety and Police Complaints Commission in Faisalabad: Contrasts in Capacities and Police Accountability***

The Citizen Policy Liaison Committee is apolitical, voluntarily financed and run, and is highly valued and successful. The Public Safety Commission / Police Complaints Commission (PSC/PCC) has been dogged by (apparently) politicized membership; poor and unreliable funding commitments (and therefore staffing), and apparent unwillingness of Provincial authorities to implement LGO 2001 provisions in regard to police accountability to the public. Only the remarkable efforts of the current Chairman - including his making financial contributions from his own pocket - have kept the PSC/Police Complaints Commission 'in business'.

The PSC case also raises questions about the capacity (i.e. readiness) of the police to be held accountable. The fundamental constraint on the extent to which police accountability can become a reality - pointed out by a NHMP senior officer in the Islamabad write-shop - is the chronic pressure the police works under: there is no slack period; they cannot take leave or work conventional reasonable shifts. Constables, the backbone of the service, are treated inhumanely: pay and conditions are very poor; morale is reportedly rock-bottom.

Write-shop discussion revolved around the apparently negative effects of the Police Ordinance 2002 and 2004: accountability of the police to a bureaucracy compared to a District Magistrate was seen as a backward step.

There also appeared to be fundamental policy-design flaws in the institutional arrangements of the PSC/PCC bodies involved, which are rendering them inoperable. Overseas models for PSCs seem to have been adopted without adequate consideration of the differences (in, for example education levels, literacy rates and popular expectations of the accountability of the police) between Pakistan and the 'source' countries (e.g. Japan).

In particular, the lack of resources for, (apparently symbolic of lack of political will and commitment to) the Faisalabad and 22 other notified District Public Security Commissions in the Punjab is a basic problem: which remains unsolved in the case, despite the lobbying of the Faisalabad PSC Chairman to the Ministry of Home Affairs. Political interference, nepotism and lack of professionalism are real risks in these circumstances, despite the existence of laws, which appear reasonable. By contrast, the 'model' for Citizens-Police Liaison Committee (CPLC) Faisalabad - CPLC Karachi - has had no political interference whatsoever in its relatively long history.

*Source: Case study text and write-shop deliberations*

### 3.3. FACTORS INFLUENCING SUCCESS

The discussions in the write-shops were very helpful in identifying, and indeed reinforcing with more evidence, the factors which have influenced favorably the performance, reputation, and abilities of many (but not all) the cases in the 'sample' in the study. These are as follows:

### 3.3.1. CLEAR PRIORITIES

The cases show that determination - borne out of new policy, an urgent need, intolerance of past failures, or of the status quo, or ambition to improve the state of development in a sector, province or district - led to clarity of priorities. In turn, these guided resource mobilization, the development of requisite capacities, and decisive action.

The person who founded OPP - Dr Akhtar Hameed Khan - seeing the clear priority in the teeming *katchi abadis* of Karachi - backed up by depressing data on the health status of their populations - enabled residents to help themselves through construction of basic sanitation and drainage infrastructure. That is what OPP was set up to do.

The SPU in Faisalabad took months to build consensus on what the CDGF's Mission should be.<sup>43</sup> This laid the base for the Corporate Plan (laying out development objectives, and how they would be attained), and ultimately Strategic Operational Plans (SOPs) for each department. The priorities have basically remained the same for the past four years.

In the case of PRMP, the serious state of public finances in the Punjab led policy-makers to conclude that 'something must be done'. Accordingly public finance reform was a core pillar of the PRMP (and still is).

The realities of the international trading system posed both an economic opportunity for Pakistan, but also a threat. If it did not bring its own export quality testing and intellectual property regulatory institutions into line, it risked exclusion and economic decline. Accordingly, core priorities became clear; generous volumes of government resources were allocated to build up the necessary infrastructure, and well-qualified, well-remunerated counterparts were assigned to work with advisers under the TRTA project.

The convergence of growing demand for irrigation water in Sindh, and threatened supplies of irrigation water, led the then Chief Minister to set ambitious goals for water course improvement, and provide the authority and resources to meet these priorities.

To avert traffic accidents of disastrous dimensions on the newly-opened M2, the Government felt the need and clear priority for establishing a new type of force - NHMP.

---

<sup>43</sup> The Mission Statement of CDGF - forged through painstaking discussion between SPU and the departments over a period of months - is 'We will provide high quality services which compare with the best in the country. We will work with everyone who wants a better future for our District. We will establish an efficient, effective and accountable District Local Government, which is committed to respecting and upholding women, men, and children's basic human rights, responsive towards people's needs, committed to poverty reduction, and capable of meeting the challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Our actions will be driven by the concerns of local people.'

### 3.3.2. BLANK SLATES (STARTING FROM 'SCRATCH' CAN BE AN ADVANTAGE)

Several cases essentially 'started from scratch': there was no organizational structure (or capacity) initially. OPP was created in 1980 from nothing to support katchi abadi dwellers' own efforts to improve their lives by building basic sanitation and drainage infrastructure. It is still one of the 'leanest' (and most famous) development organizations in the world.

The PMU of NPIW was not proposed in the PC1 launching the Sindh provincial program. The newly-designated Director was able to assess realities, negotiate resources, and plan accordingly.

Similarly, the PESRP agreed between the Punjab government and the World Bank with contained provision for a PIMU, but there was no clear blueprint for its structure. Its imaginative and energetic director was able to build the PIMU in accordance with needs and available resources.

There had never been a project such as GJTMAP before. It was to introduce an alien form of dispute resolution to local authorities, guided only by the provisions of the Local Government Ordinance of 2001. Its National Project Director and National Project Manager took pains to set up the PMU in such a way that it could perform well, faced with an arduous and sensitive program to implement. The NPM took charge of staffing: and insisted on recruitment by merit. He did not 'inherit' staff brought in by patrons.

The newly-designated IGP was given 'carte blanche' (and a promise of the resources he needed) to create NHMP from nothing; and quickly.

### 3.3.3. NO BLUEPRINTS FOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT

Reading the cases, one sees phrases such as 'capacity development happened by accident' (PESRP); 'we had no plan for building capacity' (NPIW). One conclusion is that in such a complex, multi-factor, multi-influence, difficult-to-control, uncertain environment such as that in the Pakistan public service, any detailed plan is doomed to failure, or needs massive revisions 'as soon as the ink is dry'. Another conclusion from many of the cases is that there was no well-thought-out approach to capacity development. It appears that strong pragmatic, trusted managers surveyed the scene, and saw what had to be done, and began to assemble the resources and skills to achieve the priorities. Indeed, given the state of capacity development as a discipline, this pragmatic step-by-step approach is wise.<sup>44</sup>

---

<sup>44</sup> The World Bank admits in its own review of its own performance in building institutional capacity that: 'Capacity building has not developed as a well-defined area of development practice with an established body of knowledge about what works in meeting needs under different country and sector conditions'

One case stands out for its careful planning of how it built up formidable institutional capacities in a short time: the Faisalabad SPU led debate on priorities, situation assessments, and corresponding SOPs. These discussions were influenced by technical advisers who had experience of municipal development elsewhere. Complementary steps and ‘building blocks’ were agreed as essential: there was not much point in pursuing a typical capacity development approach: ‘training’ for financial and human resource managers, if CDGF was financially insolvent, unable to keep track of financial commitments against its budget, and did not know how many people it employed (as was the situation in 2004). Therefore enormous effort went into establishing information systems (financial, human resources, revenue, ultimately geographical) to provide the basic information with which newly-trained and empowered managers could manage resources. Plans were also made (and carried out) for job analysis: finding out what people did (as opposed to what they were supposed to do), and subsequent preparation of job descriptions: in turn it was correctly anticipated that these could become the basis of better training programs.

Similar province-wide initiatives are included in the reform agenda of PRMP. Initially a set of ambitious reforms negotiated on the basis of recommendations by external specialists, the change process has been increasingly owned and revised by mid level as well as leading provincial government officials who desire to see it succeed and spread among all departments and agencies in order to promote enhanced service delivery and accountability.

Thus in the familiar field of local government organizational development: with generic challenges, and well-tried and tested management systems implied as necessary, planning of capacity development was proved to be feasible, and ultimately effective. This accords with recent experience in the major ECDPM study of capacity issues.<sup>45</sup>

Another pair of cases: both following internationally-accepted standards of required performance, made detailed planning feasible and indeed essential: TRTA components 2 and 3 followed tried and tested approaches to developing the requisite capacities of specialized organizations, and were based on detailed capacity development workplans, that had formed the basis for similar exercises, guided by technical advisers, in other countries.

---

#### 3.3.4. PROTECTED ‘SPACE’ FOR CAPACITY TO DEVELOP: THE PAKISTAN ‘SPACE’ PROGRAM?

This success factor is linked to the previous characteristics of successful cases. As outlined in Section 2, it is unfortunately a characteristic of development administration in Pakistan that

---

<sup>45</sup> The most systematic planned approach to capacity development represented in any of the 20 case studies in the ECDPM sample was the Philippines Local Government Support Program (see text at [www.ecdpm.org](http://www.ecdpm.org) and follow links on right hand side of screen to Capacity Study).

politicians and sometimes development partners feel they can influence decision taking – including over recruitment, transfer and promotion of staff – within the civil service.

It follows therefore – and this accords with observed experience in virtually all the cases – that in order for any initiative to achieve established priorities, and to deliver rapid measurable results, some form of protected ‘space’ must be provided to appointed program managers to manage, innovate, take risks, learn-by-experience, and take decisions without constant recourse to ‘authorities above’, or the need to plead for resources, or the need to prove results immediately.

The person behind *OPP* (AH Khan) was backed financially (and strongly in terms of encouragement) by an endowment provided by the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) Foundation, although *OPP* has remained strongly independent in spirit ever since and is not beholden to BCCI or any of its other numerous donors.

The Directors of *NPIW* and *PESRP* were given full authority (and adequate resources) by their respective Provincial Chief Ministers. The director of *DSD*, was similarly well-connected, and could refer attempted interference to her Chief Minister. The new IGP was given full authority by the then Prime Minister to set the *NHMP* up. One of the characteristics of his leadership was that he tolerated no interference in his management chain. His ‘protected space’ enabled him to operate like that.

*‘Basically, the ‘capacity’ is there in the police, and many other organizations in Pakistan. All that is needed to liberate or mobilize it, is ‘political will’ (=political protection), so that it can get on with the job. (Presenter of the NHMP Case in Write-shop)*

These managers were also empowered – within their ‘space’ – to by-pass existing rules, conventional, bureaucratic, forms of working, procedures, and standard staffing ratios. They could create their own ‘rules of the game’ and did so.

---

**3.3.5. PATRONAGE - OTHERWISE KNOWN AS ‘POLITICAL WILL’ – IS THE KEY TO ALL THE ABOVE.. (BUT IT MAY BE A TWO-EDGED SWORD, AND MAY WORK IN TWO WAYS...)**

For every protected space there is ‘the protector’: the patron, the champion, of the initiative in question. He (or she) declares the priority; may well give the managers ‘carte blanche’, does not spell out any blueprints (indeed usually does not have one), and provides the ‘space’ in which to ‘get on with the job’. The then Prime Minister, in the case of *NHMP*; the then Chief Minister of Punjab in the *PESRP* and *DSD* cases; the then Chief Minister of Sindh in the *NPIW* case; the then Minister for Special Initiatives (and the then Punjab Chief Minister, and ultimately the President) in the case of *CMIPHC*; the two successive Nazims and DCOs in Faisalabad who housed the *SPU* in the DCO’s office (highly symbolic in itself), and helped form, and then backed the plans and ideas it came up with. They fought the battles with the Provincial government ‘behind the scenes’ if potentially disruptive transfers of key senior officers were mooted.

But this all works in two ways: the reverse is illustrated by some cases which demonstrate what can happen if patrons are absent, move on, or new political groupings take over. *GJTMAP* and to an extent *WPS* had a 'chequered history' in this regard. Changes of National Project Director and directors in the provinces led to occasional successful external interference over project team appointments, and financial 'gaps'. The Faisalabad *PSC/PCC* case is the ultimate evidence of absence of political will: dysfunction, near-total paralysis, under-funding, and many unfilled vacancies on its staff. *CMIPHC* has been through very difficult times due to changes in top political governance in the province, and ebbing of support within the Department of Health for this radical approach to health services' management. The same fate - with similar antecedents - is beginning to affect the PIMU of the *PESRP*. Lahore write-shop participants were moved to make a series of recommendations to the new Provincial Government...in the form of a spontaneous 'Lahore Declaration'. The most deeply-felt concerned the possible implications of new political directions.

***Box 9: The Lahore Declaration (in part): babies, bathwater, and beyond...***

Given the inception of a new Provincial government in the Punjab, participants at the Lahore write-shop opined that it is vital that 'the baby is not thrown out with the bathwater' (i.e. that a degree of continuity will be vital) in terms of the capacity development programs which have become established - and some very successful - under the previous regime.

One (perverse) dimension of the 'championship' factor is that change of champions means changes in priorities and 'pet schemes'.

Participants encouraged the new Provincial government to resist the temptation to overturn or reject programs, and substitute new staff for experienced hands, simply for the sake of change, and 'putting its stamp' on a new administration.

Instead, participants acknowledged that several programs - including cases featured in the write-shop - could indeed benefit from an objective, balanced, inclusive, re-assessment of their merits and demerits.

*Source: Lahore write-shop proceedings.*

A significant 'cloud' also hangs over the horizon for *NPIW*, which could affect the sustainability of capacities it has developed: in the form of political changes after the recent election. It is too early to predict its resilience in the face of pressures for transfer and recruitment of key field team staff. However, concerns were raised in the write-shop that district team management would come under pressure from newly-elected District Nazims for the employment of 'their' people: whether they met job requirements or not. Unless the new government continues 'protection' for the program, they fear qualified staff may be transferred or replaced.

### 3.3.6. LEADERSHIP

Good leaders get the most from their people: they define what has to be done, to what standards; they define individual and team roles; they build the team as a team: so that all individuals understand their role in relation to others. They delegate, and thereby encourage and praise creativity and originality in team members. They communicate, listen and learn.

The Punjab Provincial government is beginning to encourage the development of distinctive team-leadership/management arrangements: it can reward and praise good examples of team-leadership. Leadership can be taught (i.e. good leaders are made, not born). PRMP is trying to build and spread these skills through its Capacity Development Framework.

#### *Box 10 What Leaders do: NHMP's early days*

What did the then newly-designated DIG Abdul Hafeez Bangash DO as leader of NHMP in the early years?

He led by example to juniors: personally changing tires of members of the public stranded on the new M-2 (and ensuring that the 'message was passed around' to junior officers that the IG 'gets his hands dirty' and 'knows the job').

He therefore practiced what he preached in helping the public: never asking subordinates to do things he would not do himself.

He developed a Mission (public safety) for the service and ensured all knew of it, understood it, and therefore felt under moral pressure to abide by it.

He selected, retained and promoted team leaders on merit based on seniority, and the qualities they demonstrated.

He negotiated or generated extra financial resources to deliver the Mission, and to complement the human resources available...including meeting basic household and family needs through an enhanced officers' salary package.

He monitored reporting systems: checking back with members of the public that they had benefited from officers' help (and punishing any false reporting) (i.e. building in a check process, ensuring that routine management and reporting is in fact working).

He ensured the NHMP 'lived up' to the protection from interference it enjoyed (i.e. he made sure it delivered results, and did not abuse the trust the Prime Minister had put in it).

He accepted no excuses or exceptions to the standards he laid down. There was no impunity enjoyed by anyone. Laws and regulations were rigidly enforced: (including on politicians and fellow police-officers if they were caught speeding for example).

He acted as an 'umbrella' for his officers: sheltering them from the pressures and threats from political figures seeking favor, and if necessary standing up to, and facing down, these threats.

*Source: Write-shop proceedings*

There are some conspicuous examples in the sample of case studies. The original leader of *OPP*, A H Khan impressed his philosophy on the members of his embryonic organization, and its values still prevail. The Nazim and DCO of Faisalabad have overseen the transformation of their city's administration. District Support Managers in CMIPHC bring all health providers together monthly to discuss common problems and solutions. The director of *NPIW* has built up a formidable small but efficient monitoring team, and has taken risks and defied consensus among participating departments in order to deliver weekly (but paper-less) monitoring reports, with field teams using satellite-linked hand-sets to send data to PIMU computers immediately. The NPM of the *GJTMAP* project has needed all his networking and advocacy skills in persuading a diverse group of professionals, police officers and administrators of the benefits of Alternative Dispute Resolution, and to support its emergence in Musalihat Anjuman courts.

The Islamabad write-shop was privileged to hear from the first IGP *NHMP*: he presented what he did as a leader to bring the *NHMP* into being (see Box 10).

One implication is that the temptation to transfer frequently top managers/leaders should be resisted. Instead, their leadership has to be allowed to take root. It cannot do so if the duration of postings is a matter of months, or if the authority of leaders is undermined by condoned cases of politically-motivated 'placement' or removal of staff.

---

### 3.3.7. GETTING THE NUMBERS RIGHT: 'BACK TO THE DRAWING BOARD'

Gathering of up-to-date, reliable, intelligible, consistent data which can be analyzed to produce information useful (indeed essential) for management is a consistent feature of the cases in the sample of this study. All successful cases have put great store in having solid information, but have also gone further, and have used information - appropriately, attractively and graphically presented - for briefing decision-makers and encouraging them to use evidence as a basis for policy decisions.

*NPIW* was faced with the immediate and urgent task of inventorying afresh all the water-courses in Sindh, after it became immediately clear that the information on which the Provincial PC1 for the program was based, was wholly erroneous and not only reflected only a small proportion of water courses, but gave a misleading impression of their distribution between Districts. Given that all subsequent budgeting planning and monitoring would be based on such distributions, it was crucial to 'get the numbers right' at the start. Another challenge was the huge geographical distribution of schemes: clearly each had to be uniquely and consistently identified, and somehow 'plotted' on maps. The Director introduced satellite imagery - based Geographical Positioning Systems and related hand-held communications technology systems. This became the first example of its usage in a development program in Pakistan.

*PESRP's* first task was also inventorying of all schools' situation and resources (if any). Data on teachers' distribution (gathered for the first time) was helpful in supporting EDOs



(Education) in the previously time-consuming task of negotiating and handling requests for transfers: the 'stock' of teachers of certain grades and subject specialities in the school of 'origin' and 'destination' could be readily seen, as could the consequences of the proposed transfer.

SPU Faisalabad has proceeded further than any other local authority - of any size - in Pakistan in the collation, analysis and use of information for decision-taking (see Box 11 below). Its Nazim and officers are well aware of the benefits this information affords. PRMP also includes development of human resource and financial management data bases at the provincial level.

**Box 11: Faisalabad SPU Case: Information Systems, and Evidence-Based Decision Making**

'We are talking about "confidence building measures" here. All Districts need a SPU. We are trying to empower our staff with better information, to give them more confidence in their own judgments.'  
The DCO Faisalabad'

'The combination of data from HRMIS and the GIS (and its depiction on maps) reveals under-staffed education and health facilities and gaps in service provision. These can be correlated with other indicators (e.g. literacy rates). Future infrastructure and other investment patterns are being adjusted to target these areas for immediate attention. Organizational re-structuring is being proposed in some key Departments to improve efficiency (already improved through the application of time-saving and accuracy-enhancing information systems). Better-trained officers - backed up with Geographical and Municipal Service information systems - have been able to formulate a Sustainable Long-Term Development Plan for the City District. For the first time this offers the prospect of attracting additional investment resources for strategic economic infrastructure in a coherent, inter-related, logical, time-phased fashion. The (then) Chief Minister of Punjab, and the President of Pakistan were impressed by the SLTDP on their visits to Faisalabad that they committed provincial and federal government funding to finance its early stages. As a direct result, Rs 11 billion of infrastructure investment has been approved by Provincial authorities, and another Rs 5 billion is 'in the pipeline' from Federal sources.'

'For the first time, we are seeing where the gaps in services really are.' A CDGF Departmental official.

(Above quotes from D. Watson/ M. Alvi / K Alam 2008)

'The City District Nazim reflected that the concept and more importantly the tools of 'evidence-based' planning and budgeting introduced in the district helped his office and the District Assembly target allocation of funds to sectors and areas where these are most needed. This contrasts sharply with the usual practice in most Districts of a system of 'equal and blanket' distribution amongst members of the district assembly, or alternatively, allocated totally on basis of 'political demand' rather than 'need', as practiced in most other districts.

The district has developed information systems for Finance, Human Resources, Community Development, Roads and Revenue Departments, which are directly assisting the service delivery areas in these departments. These systems have introduced efficiency in the operations of these departments. For example, a Financial Management Information System (FMIS) has helped the CDGF in identifying under-investment in poor areas and to target investments in these areas. With the help

of a Human Resource Management Information System (HRMIS), the department is better able to utilize its human capital and to plan in advance its HR needs. Similarly the Citizen Community Boards (CCBs) MIS has made the registration process of CCBs very easy and this now involves less effort and human resources.

The district has also developed an in-house Geographical Information System (GIS) for the whole District which has provided a platform to link all the information systems. The GIS is being used as a planning tool, which is in line with the actions being taken by the Urban Unit of the Planning and Development Department, Punjab. Comprehensive primary data collection together with on-site photographs is being built for development project planning as well as monitoring purposes. This database is helpful in identifying encroachments on government land, identifying properties being used for commercial purposes, and management of billboard hoardings etc. It is an excellent tool for minimizing revenue leakages but also has the potential for levying and raising new taxes. However, up to now the district government has not been very eager about imposing any new taxes. Thus creation of 'fiscal space' has been limited to better expenditure management and plugging of collection leakages.'

*Source: Quotation from the Faisalabad SPU Case*

---

### 3.3.8. CONTRACTING IN SCARCE CAPACITIES: INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY

Information systems demand Information Technology (IT) skills. These are rare in often over-staffed, under-resourced government offices. In almost all the cases – whether donor-assisted or not – IT skills were sorely needed, and at least initially, had to be brought in from the private and/or consulting sector in Pakistan. The resources which had been made available for the cases permitted this (in all but the PSC/PCC case in Faisalabad). The great advantage of locally-resourced IT skills is that the firms who help install and design IT and information systems, are readily available for subsequent trouble-shooting, maintenance, adjustment or extensions.

Once skills were 'imported', steps were commonly taken to transfer technological knowledge (at least for basic system maintenance and design-adjustment) to existing staff of the case organization. Retention of such staff has posed some problems, even in challenging environments such as CDGF.

CDGF has gone further than any other case in training managers in the use of IT and information systems for management purposes, and the comparison of data in different systems (e.g. the HRM system, and Financial Management Information System, to illustrate inconsistencies and or 'ghost' employees).

NPIW has employed GIS based data systems to provide updated information on virtually every water course in Sindh. Monitors in the field enter reports from a hand held device directly into the provincial computer system which automatically updates the data. The watercourses can be viewed on-line from wide to very close range to identify problems and monitor progress.

### 3.3.9. THE ART OF PERSUASION: GRAPHICS, BRIEFINGS, COMMUNICATION, CREDIBILITY

As mentioned earlier, *WPS* employed graphics in the training materials for largely illiterate women union councillors for effectively training them about the responsibilities of their positions. Also illustrated above, especially where information systems were central to the capacities developed in cases such as that of *SPU*, their products are useful, and used, as evidence to form the basis of policy recommendations. This use – in the form of clear computer graphics and presentations – was particularly important in the early days of *PESRP*, when information from the schools database became the basis for allocation of resources, approved after graphical presentation by the Program Director to provincial decision makers, Members of the Provincial Assembly (MPAs), and councilors.

*PRMP* has included a sound communications strategy, an excellent website, and continuous holding of stakeholder forums has ensured that the reforms are seen as transparent and inclusive.

In cases such as those in the sample where ‘patrons’ have often been instrumental in providing ‘space’ and protection for high priority schemes, program managers have clearly always been conscious of the need to provide regular, comprehensive ‘ammunition’ to them, to demonstrate progress, challenges, unmet needs, implications for changes in policy or resource allocation. Most of the cases featured attractively, intelligibly presented information in various formats, clearly intended for a variety of audiences.

Credibility was built up in a variety of ways including sensitivity to cultural norms, values, use of cheap and affordable technologies, involvement of community and other stakeholders, transparency in operations, innovations and partnerships. Patrons also lend authority and thereby credibility!

### 3.3.10. DEMAND-LED TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE: ‘IN-HOUSE / ON-SITE’ BUT ‘BEHIND THE SCENES’

We turn now to the significance of the influence of technical assistance in capacity development – at least how it is evidenced by the cases in the study sample. Some comments on funding agency practices – both supportive, and destructive, of capacity development, then follow.

TA featured as a significant influence in the following cases:

- *SPU* (long term international and national TA, on-site);
- *PRMP* (long and short term mainly national TA and a relationship with the Singapore Civil Service College for support to capacity development);

- TRTA (all three components: In C1: nationals (as managers) and short term internationals; C2 long- and short-term internationals; C3 long- and short-term internationals.)
- GJTMAP (UNDP-contracted NPM (long-term) and some other national consultants)
- WPS (UNDP-contracted NPM (long-term) and some other national consultants)
- DSD (some specialized TA on-site mainly short-term)
- NHMP (only through overseas study visits to other police forces)

The SPU case provides some important insights into technical assistance provision – especially where the HRM capacity dimensions of reform are a key priority. The core team was made up of international consultants and locally-hired nationals, all based in Faisalabad. The latter were provided with technical back-up and professional development training by the headquarters office of the parent consulting firm. Departments of the Council had counterpart specialists working alongside TA personnel in the SPU. The SPU team has regular team meetings to exchange information and jointly plan initiatives. The DCO (in whose office building the SPU is housed) was Project Director; Executive District Officer (EDO) Finance and Planning the Deputy Director. All key documents and correspondence of the Unit went out from SPU under the signature of the DCO or respective EDOs. All the outputs of the Unit were issued in the name of EDOs. The SPU’s technical assistance team were almost ‘invisible’: at presentations (including to funding agencies), the consultants were mainly observers: the SPU/CDGF staff did most of the talking.

The case indicates that a pre-requisite of varied capacity development across an organization the size and diversity of CDGF (with 35,000 employees) would appear to be a dedicated on-site technical assistance team, ‘embedded’ with counterparts, facilitating the introduction of reforms and innovative practices. A flexible scheduling of volume and type of TA inputs is important (rather than being driven by precise time-bound targets or outputs: see below comments regarding funding agency approaches). A combination of international consultants (bringing credibility and comparative experience to bear, helping shape the overall direction of reforms initially) and national consultants is required. The TA model where consultants were part of the SPU team (as opposed to being in a separate PMU) proved highly successful in this case. The SPU is positioned within the DCO’s office: sending appropriate ‘signals’ as to its strategic role and importance.

PRMP’s use of Singapore Civil Service College has generally proved positive, from comments made in the case and during the write-shop. The key is that foreign visiting staff are well-briefed before and during their visits, so that their utility can be maximized. Due to their active involvement in the training needs analysis, they were able to optimize the relevance of training materials that were produced for the civil service training programs. PMUs for a number of reform initiatives are staffed with government servants located in

offices near the provincial departments with which they are working closely They will (re-) join the same departments later.

TRTA's use of TA varied: the Component 1 formula proved more problematic than in the other two components. The write-shop concluded that the Ministry of Commerce appeared to have been inadequately engaged at the start of the TRTA project, and faced lack of information and weak co-ordination of the players. The Ministry felt that there was too little frequency of interaction with the contractor over the selection of consultants and the five (trade-related) studies; the budget was set by the funding agency with the consultants, but not transparent to the client agency. Mapping of institutions should encompass those currently/immediately involved, and those which could potentially play a capacity development role in future. In Components 2 and 3 however, where the task was to 'bring up to speed' several Pakistani institutions, the task, although as important and technically challenging as Component 1, proved somewhat more straightforward (as discussed in several sections above) in that objectives were clear and unambiguous; well-experienced TA personnel were able to conduct a comprehensive baseline assessment, and develop a detailed yet feasible workplan of what had to be achieved to meet stringent international standards. The magnitude of counterpart resources, and caliber of staff assigned, guaranteed positive TA outcomes.

---

### 3.3.11. DEVELOPMENT OF PAKISTAN'S CAPACITIES FOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT

Despite a bleak historical record in developing its own capacities for capacity development in the public service (see Appendix 6), the cases illustrate how it can be done. In five of the cases (OPP, SPU/CDGF, NHMP, DSD and PRMP) dedicated training facilities have been developed and supported. In other cases, PESRP, NPIW, GJTMAP, WPS, TRTA, internal capacities were developed to deliver large volumes of training, without a dedicated training center or facility.

Technical assistance was brought to bear in the SPU case in establishing an Institute of Learning for in-service teacher-trainer upgrading. OPP has a dedicated Research and Training Institute. The NHMP has established a well-resourced dedicated training center. DSD seeks to guide the work of the Provincial Institute for Teacher Education (PITE) and most of the Government Colleges for Elementary Education (GCET) in districts - now brought under its administrative control to create its province wide outreach. PRMP has forged an international partnership with the Singapore Civil Service College to analyze training and organizational development needs in key Provincial Departments, and to support the future capacities and work of the Provincial Management Planning and Development Department.

SPU's courses were delivered by personnel experienced in the field in question. Generally, the cases ensured that trainers were familiar with the technical subject matter through having direct operational experience of applying it. Credibility of trainers in the eyes of

trainees was thus reinforced. Master Trainers (various terms were adopted for them) were helped with skills in conducting training sessions. SPU developed an informal cadre or network of line staff of departments who had not only done well in earlier courses, but had aptitude and interest in playing a training role themselves. WPS mobilized the most able and confident from experienced ex-trainees as trainers.

Given the considerable influence (positive and potentially negative) trainers have over future capacity development of individuals, the cases devoted considerable attention to the choice of who becomes a trainer, and how they are prepared and utilized in this function. DSD persuaded the Provincial Department of Education to change the criteria and process for selection of District Teacher Educators (DTEs) towards a more competitive process, with salary incentives to attract positive candidates.

**Box 12: The DSD Approach to Trainer- and teacher-development**

DSD has recognized the limitations of off-site course-based training, when trainees really need help apply learning in their own workplace. To that end, and 'to further decentralize and to bring the venues of professional development closer to the beneficiaries, the concept of 'clusters' has been introduced which bring together a group of schools around a central location which has been designated as Cluster Training and Support Center (CTSC). The typical cluster center consists of a group of 20 to 25 primary schools within a radius of 15 kms. It basically constitutes the support network from where cluster- and school-based activities are facilitated, supported and coordinated. The CTSC will provide a venue for organizing professional events for primary school teachers and other categories of teachers. Through arrangement, apart from the regular in-service training teachers will have a chance to develop their competencies through follow-up, mentoring, peer coaching, class room visits, professional meetings, distance based learning and professional degree courses.'

Source: Quotation from Case text

**3.3.12. FUNDING AGENCIES: SUPPORTIVE, PREFERABLY NOT MICRO-MANAGING; BUT WITH WHAT TIME HORIZONS... WHEN DOES THEIR GOOD-WILL EXPIRE...AND RETURN?**

The funding agency to the SPU CDGF case (DFID), made the following contributions during its engagement with Faisalabad District government:

- DFID sought, and obtained, the approval of the Faisalabad District government to the appointment of the consultant team for the devolution reform project before appointing them.
- It demonstrated flexibility in the interpretation of the Memorandum of Understanding with Faisalabad, when well-justified requests for additional objectives or elements of the program were made by CDGF.
- It did not insist on detailed time-bound work-plans from the consultants. Instead they were left to plan their inputs and work flexibly with the CDGF client.

- The donor's regular monitoring and review processes were led by the Islamabad office of DFID, and by the same national officials: hence there was a degree of familiarity on their part with the antecedents and nature of the Faisalabad intervention.
- Donor review mission reports were compiled in a transparent, consultative, evidence-based manner, and concluded on the basis of consensus between Faisalabad (CDGF and consultants) and DFID stakeholders.

**Box 13: The 'Islamabad Declaration' – Suggestions Regarding Support for Elected Women's Representatives - for Funding Agencies' Attention**

The Islamabad write-shop made several practical suggestions for development partner consideration – an Islamabad declaration? – Particularly on future funding agency support to the development of capacities of female elected representatives:

- Acknowledge that a single training program, or even a series of programs, is unlikely in themselves to develop sustainable capacities (and practical abilities) in women councilors.
- Try to make a long-term funding commitment – subject to periodic reviews – in a manner not interrupted by time-lags between one phase and the next. These have proved very disruptive of the capacities of trainers and trainer-trainers painstakingly developed in the early stages.
- Support advocacy components in all future programs.
- Forge a long-term strategy to give women back-up which they require: even the knowledge that some help was available would be very encouraging.
- Facilitate the use of Literacy Centers (available in every Union) to serve as Documentation and Resource Centers (DRCs).
- Use DRCs for sensitization of prospective women candidates BEFORE they stand for election.
- Support the translation of a series of several hundred case studies of individual women elected representatives developed over the last 2 years by the Aurat Foundation.
- Help conduct 'tracer' studies tracking the activities of ex-trainees (one was conducted some time ago by UNDP): thus – together with the case studies – revealing important insights into what women representatives were able to DO after training.
- Support provision of those services, which make most impact on women's lives (such as watsan).

Source: Islamabad Write-shop proceedings

*'Donors should realize that support to local government cannot be just financial assistance; technical assistance is needed too. The key to the effective management of our relationship with the donor in this case was our knowing what we wanted to do, and presenting a coherent case. We were proposing to go beyond the Memorandum of*

*Understanding. The GIS and Call Center were not planned within the project. The donor people knew this. However, they backed us.* A Senior CDGF Manager (quoted in D. Watson/ M. Alvi / K Alam 2008)

Unfortunately, the GJTMAP and WPS cases proved that large, ambitious long-term in nature, sensitive, and training-resource-intensive initiatives such as these face major difficulties if funding agencies have modest time horizons for their commitments: especially if they do not commit all the resources needed (even in the medium term) at the start of the capacity development endeavor. Even the TRTA case<sup>46</sup> in its latter stages is suffering from a similar 'development partner - funding - phasing - gap' problem. The cases show that there is a real risk of momentum (and capacities developed in the earlier phase) being lost while the funding agency decides on its commitment to subsequent phases, or when political or security events and factors intervene, and bilateral agencies reconsider their position and overall levels of co-operation with Pakistan.

---

### 3.3.13. PLANNING IN SPITE OF PC1S, NOT BECAUSE OF THEM

The write-shops reviews of cases produced occasional comments about PC1s (the Planning Commission project planning proforma), and the government's planning process in general. There was too little time to pursue this issue to a satisfactory or exhaustive extent, but - for what they are worth - some of the points made are reproduced here. The indications are that the present process and to some extent the proformas involved, are not conducive to effective consideration of capacity issues. *This may be an opportunity for productive government/funding agency interaction and collaboration in future.* Representatives of both OPP and NPIW programs were critical of standard Government planning machinery, in the Karachi write-shop. The PC1 format, and the planning steps which it represents, appeared to the participants to be in need of urgent review: it currently appears to be an impediment to sound project planning and implementation, and to capacity development. From both programs' perspectives, too little emphasis is put on understanding the (development) problem - and the various options for solving it, and to gathering reliable information to assess its magnitude and dimensions (and its geographical dispersion).

In the OPP case, participants opined that much more attention needs to be placed on interaction at the planning stage between government and potential beneficiary communities, so that their inputs, mobilization, and participation throughout can be ensured, and designs (and implementation modalities) can reflect local perspectives and capacities. In this way, sustained maintenance of infrastructure created, is more likely. Urgent attention is needed to government design and construction standards (and costs) for urban infrastructure - based on OPP experience.

---

<sup>46</sup> Only 'bridging' by ITC and UNIDO have kept up some activities in the TRTA program currently



In the *NPIW* case, the PC1 was based on out-of-date or simply incorrect information on the number and geographical distribution of water-courses. This problem should have been picked up in the planning stage, and data gathering should have been proposed as an essential first step. In both cases, arguments were made in the write-shop for more flexibility in the planning (and indeed budgeting) system: to provide the opportunity to re-plan frequently (even on an annual basis) to reflect operational realities not anticipated at the planning stage. Another plea was for the PC1 to be treated (as formally intended) as a public document, and disclosed in draft to stakeholders, who should be empowered to comment on it. In this way, the often major difficulties which arise in government project implementation – managers of implementation have usually having had no role in planning the project – could be avoided. An assessment of the capacity of participating organizations should also be an integral part of PC1 preparation.

### 3.4. MONITORING AND EVALUATION OF CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT

In his preparatory remarks for the National Workshop, the need for monitoring capacity development progress and constraints or obstacles in the public services was articulated.

Partly because of this, and because of the methodology used when researching the cases, it was difficult for the consultants to comment on, assess or understand how M&E is being used effectively and systematically for the ‘undefined’ capacity in almost all cases, or for identifying capacity constraints, making course corrections and for building capacities during implementation. However, the following analysis is offered as a contribution to this little-researched issue in public service in Pakistan.

---

#### 3.4.1. WHAT IS MONITORED? IS IT ‘CAPACITY’?

Most of the cases featured well-established monitoring functions. Sometimes, they were part of funding agency-required accountability systems, but were not solely in place to satisfy funding agencies. For example, the *SPU*’s systems included quarterly reviews via reports to, and presentation of, progress to meetings of all Heads of Departments (EDOs) under the chairmanship of the DCO and the Nazim, and six-monthly written report of progress against workplans for all Departments and functions (including Human Resource Development). They were not part of the DFID Support to Decentralized Local Government in Faisalabad Project monitoring system: which included annual (eventually six-monthly) joint reviews, and joint bi-annual ‘output to purpose’ Reviews.

Both these systems included the monitoring of systems and activities, which related to the capacity of the CDGF (information systems, financial systems, and human resource management advances including training, seminars, dialogues with provincial government on the development of a District Cadre), and relations with citizen clients (e.g. the Citizen’s Perspectives Survey).

Both *GJTMAP* and *WPS* were/are also required to report to development partners and government through UNDP. The former monitored progress at all levels in all four Provinces and ultimately 20 Districts; it also had sampled 'tracking' analyses to assess what newly established Musalihat Anjuman courts were doing and how they were performing. The *WPS* has undertaken more limited ex-post training surveys. However, the Aurat Foundation (a partner in the early days of the project) has interviewed over 300 women elected representatives, on their life as a councilor before and after training has transcribed, edited and collated the outcomes in Urdu, and is considering translation into English.<sup>47</sup> This represents a potentially major and innovative insight into the capacities possessed by the women before training, the capacities they were provided with through training, how they fared in the often hostile environment of their home constituencies thereafter, what they had been able to initiate, and what support they received, and needed, then.

*OPP's* approach to monitoring is integral to the way it operates. It routinely and regularly (weekly and quarterly) brings staff from its main operational units together to review not just progress, but what is being learned about the extent to which it has been able to provide solutions to the problems faced by the communities which approached it for help. There is much self-criticism, reflection, and 'self-monitoring' as well as routine reporting to its development partners (documentation - particularly recording momentous initiatives or advances in design, innovation or problem-solving) is a strong feature of the *OPP modus operandi*.

---

#### 3.4.2. WHY MONITOR? LEARNING, AND INCENTIVES, FOR IMPROVEMENT? OR A 'BEATING-STICK'?

The *NPIW* team made a distinction in the Karachi write-shop between their reason for monitoring (to identify not just 'how we are doing'? but 'what is proving a bottleneck, and how can we remove it - or what is working well and how can we replicate it?'), and the 'indifferent' monitoring they had observed elsewhere in other Provinces (in the same national program). In the latter approach, progress is tracked, and reported upon to higher authorities, virtually without comment. There may or may not be requests from them for follow-up or further exploration of underlying reasons for performance variations from plan. There is little or no feedback to those implementing the program: i.e. those reporting the data on progress.

*NPIW* also takes a pride in 'monitoring the monitors': checking for inconsistencies or deliberate (or accidental) mis-reporting from field teams. This is facilitated by the GSM/GPS technology combination permitting paperless monitoring. For a full list of M&E achievements in *NPIW* see Box 14 below.

---

<sup>47</sup> Given the financial status of the Aurat Foundation currently, this precious data-bank could only be translated if a donor was willing to finance it.

**Box 14: Achievements in Monitoring by NPIW Sindh**

1. Key Monitoring and Evaluation accomplishments include: i) compilation of District- wise inventory of watercourses; ii) computerized database of all Sindh watercourses; iii) a Geographical Information System (GIS)-based monitoring system that includes a precise digital map of whole irrigation system of Sindh; iv) identifying their exact location using satellite imagery; maps and data collection of entire irrigation system and digitization of all maps;<sup>48</sup> v) a program for generating, and compiling reports; vi) detailed monitoring forms and system updating forms and reports; viii) the Project Monitoring Unit conducted special training sessions with all field teams and district offices and insisted on weekly reporting<sup>49</sup>, an uncommon occurrence in itself; ix) the PMU monitoring teams visit each site and check the pace and quality of work<sup>50</sup>. This ensures effective monitoring that provides solid basis for necessary corrections and smooth implementation and x) the outcome is a paperless updating system and a monitoring system that allows instant and easy access to information on a digital map.
2. The combination of Geo-stationary Satellite Monitoring (GSM) and Global Positioning System (GPS) technology enabled PMU to gather reports from its monitoring teams from the site in real time.<sup>51</sup> Geographical Information System (GIS) - based monitoring system is more effective, reliable than traditional monitoring systems<sup>52</sup>. The unique identification of watercourses<sup>52</sup> and the monitoring system also enables the field teams to report on various fields of observations.
3. Capacity development spin-offs from the PMU have also included orientation provided to 500 officers of the Irrigation Department in the GIS.
4. One indication of the achievements of PMU, and the demonstration of its capacity, is that the President of Pakistan, who was given a presentation of GIS in February 2007 directed that all other Provinces should develop similar system, and Sindh should expand its utilization of GIS for monitoring Health and Education departments as well as for Land Administration and Management. Consequently the Chief Minister of Sindh asked the PMU to tackle the crucial issue of Land Records Management<sup>53</sup> and that the Punjab NPIW is now reportedly emulating its model<sup>54</sup>.

*Source: Case study text*

<sup>48</sup> This required PMU coordination with some 500 irrigation officials from 150 sub-divisions.

<sup>49</sup> PMU has developed different forms for capturing and accessing information at every stage of watercourse improvement. Weekly reporting by every field team on four key fields relating to (i) application (ii) registration (iii) technical sanction and (iv) physical work

<sup>50</sup> It compiles and sends its reports using hand held devices from the site of watercourse, which updates the data in real time at servers installed in PMU HQ Karachi. Thus the PMU HQ receives all field reports even before they are compiled at the regional level.

<sup>51</sup> Sending monitoring reports direct from the watercourses through hand-held devices using SMS/GPS references to servers at PMU HQs means that reports are received and entered into databases within seconds.

<sup>52</sup> It ensures a precise and clear digital map of the entire irrigation network, fool-proof identity of watercourses and a verifiable way of monitoring the monitors. End-product is a user friendly, effective single screen operation to access all information and reports and simplification of a multi-step data transmission and processing system into a one-click procedure and unique geographical identity of each watercourse.

<sup>53</sup> In the two Social Audits in 2002 and 2004, there were more critical comments about local government handling of land revenue matters than any other sector or service apart from the police.

<sup>54</sup> On the directive of the President of Pakistan, issued after a presentation by the PD PMU in February 2007.

Several cases feature Terms of Partnership Agreements (TPAs) between the PIMU and District governments (in the case of the *PESRP*) and the Punjab Rural Support Program and Districts (in the case of *CMIPHC*). They form a part of M&E systems which are based on agreed indicators of service performance and progress, and provide incentives for performance especially in the *PESRP* case. Indicators are conflated into District Performance Monitoring Indices for all Districts. These are in turn used as factors in allocation of program resources in the succeeding year's Provincial development budget awards for education, as well as being triggers for financial rewards to EDOs (Education) in the best performing Districts. Given the importance of the results of monitoring in resource allocation, *PESRP* has made corresponding heavy investments into development of monitoring capacities at local level (see Box 15).

**Box 15: Capacity Development for Monitoring in *PESRP***

Capacity development for monitoring in *PESRP* has been extensive: 'PMIU has put in place an extensive field-team including 35 District Monitoring Officers (DMOs) a new post created especially in all districts of Punjab. At the field level, there is an IT branch and field team consisting of 929 Monitoring & Evaluation Assistants (MEAs) who have been provided with motorbikes for monitoring schools. The District Education Administrators (AEOs) will gradually take over the monitoring role. But no phasing out is possible in the foreseeable future, as their orientation is still primarily as teachers and not as education managers.

There are concerns about duplication of efforts with the existing M & E system of the department. The existing institutionalized Departmental administrative monitoring arrangements have essentially been by-passed.

PMIU-*PESRP* however argues that the arrangements made under *PESRP* are not only of urgent nature but also relate to capacity and skills that were non-existent within the department. Major capacity building initiatives have been planned for Education Department at provincial as well as those at District level and at a later stage the external PIMU support can be merged in to the main stream.'

*Source: quotation from Case Text*

### 3.4.3. THIRD PARTY (OBJECTIVE) EVALUATIONS: THEIR USE AND MISUSE

Third Party Evaluations have been undertaken extensively in *PESRP* and *DSD* cases and one for *CMIPHC* by the World Bank. The World Bank evaluation<sup>55</sup> of *CMIPHC* presents comprehensive data on the impact of the changed management arrangements on utilization, condition, staffing, patients' opinion, their 'out of pocket' expenditures on health, technical quality of care (including damning remarks on both 'with *PRSP*' and 'without' cases); availability of drugs; efficiency gains especially in costs of delivery (enabling savings in

<sup>55</sup> World Bank (2006) *Partnering with NGOs to Strengthen Management: An External Evaluation of the Chief Minister's Initiative on Primary Health Care in Rahim Yar Khan District*, Punjab South Asia Human Development Sector Report No 13 March 2006

District budgets to be generated) and recommendations for how agreements between Districts and PRSP should be improved with better specification of objectives, indicators of success, roles (especially of District Health Officers), and more particularly the encompassing of preventative as well as curative services in this contracting out of management. It also recommends further close M&E of future expanded application of the contracting out model. This has not happened yet. PRSP however did request the Planning and Development Department to evaluate other Districts delivery under PRSP management.

The evaluations in PESRP have included assessments of elements of the program (for example books, database and stipends). These evaluations showed satisfactory results, hence there was no change in Program strategy. However, the Teacher Training evaluation (of 2003/4) showed wastage of effort, which suggested that there was a need to change training design, and a fresh start under DSD tutelage. Stipend Evaluation and School Committee Capacity Building evaluation reports were awaited at the time the case was prepared. These could lead to changes as required.

Discussion in the Lahore write-shop included perceived impartiality in the World Bank evaluation of CMIPHC and the role of the Provincial Health Secretariat in this. The implication was that some parties sought to denigrate PRSP's work, and to bolster support among districts for a return to the status quo ante (where districts manage health services). PRSP reports continued obstacles being put in its path by some elements of the Provincial Health Department, despite the up-scaling of outsourcing to a national policy scale.

---

#### 3.4.4. WHO SHOULD MONITOR SERVICE DELIVERY CAPACITIES AND PERFORMANCE? ELECTED COUNCILORS OR OTHERS? THEORY AND PRACTICE

Box 4 in Section 2 describes the difficulties which the Pakistan socio-cultural context poses for democratic accountability of the executive branches of government at various levels in respect of social services' delivery. In theory, elected representatives, or user groups (such as School Committees) should demand, and use, information generated by monitoring and evaluation activities (and the comments of their own constituents) to assess and scrutinize service delivery, and Councils' policies, plans and budgets.

When a district planner was asked at one of the write-shops for his comments on whether Councilors could and should be more engaged in service monitoring, he cautioned of dangerous, purely-political machinations - of scoring of constituency political points, and/or pressure to employ or dismiss certain individuals. Councils are not so far organized into specialized Sector Committees (which would allow some focused capacity development in terms of policy and budget scrutiny). Therefore they do not have much potential as forums for constructive, informed debate on specialized service issues.

### 3.4.5. MONITORING VIA STEERING COMMITTEES? SOME DO STEER (PRMP) AND SOME DO NOT (TRTA): WHY?

Some – but not many – of the cases have Steering Committees (SCs). Some of these appear to convene regularly and to work well (reportedly the case with *PRMP*'s, and with the National and Provincial SCs of *GJTMAP*). Others appear to have proved disappointing (*TRTA*'s). Why the difference?

- *Commitment of senior politicians and officials* appears to be crucial: itself an indication of 'ownership' on their, and their agencies' part. *PRMP*'s is chaired by the Chief Secretary made up of the Ministers and Secretaries of the key Departments which are supported by the Program.
- The *composition* of such Committees (i.e. whether they are truly representative of stakeholder constituencies) appears to be important: those in *GJTMAP* were crucial in bringing coherently to bear a range of institutional and professional perspectives and 'voices', whose engagement was important to project outcomes and effectiveness.
- The *location* of meetings in the *TRTA* case appears to have been part of the explanation (or indeed the symptom of an underlying 'ownership' problem). The donor ended up chairing the Steering Committee meetings on its own premises, in part because the Ministry of Commerce appeared not to accord much priority to the *TRTA* program.

## 4. LESSONS AND CONCLUSIONS

### 4.1. FOR GOVERNMENT AND DONORS TO CONSIDER

#### 4.1.1. CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT: A FUNDAMENTAL NEED IN PAKISTAN

The public service capacity issue is a vital one for Pakistan to address. The welfare of its people, its integration into the world economy and labor market, and its national reputation, pride and prestige, all depend on improving it. The PRMP case illustrates – for donors and government – that no reform program can be successful unless sustained capacity is developed to bring about reform and stay its course. Reform is not just about legislation – passing laws and making rules – it is about people – those who run government offices and implement policies.



The poorest people in Pakistan are the ones who depend most on public services. The experience of education sector reform PESRP and the health services management case CMPIHC (and the Citizen Perspectives Survey in Faisalabad) vividly illustrate that if families have any financial ability at all, they tend to use private sector facilities...or the outsourced BHUs in the CMIPHC case. The government-run services are viewed as generally inadequate.

#### 4.1.2. ISLANDS OF EXCELLENCE: FOR HOW LONG?

We are dealing with successful capacity ‘islands’. They have been chosen as cases because (at least after rapid pre-appraisal in 2007 during the Scoping Study) they appeared to represent public sector service delivery examples that ‘worked’ and represented significant success in capacity development, despite the challenging environment posed by the Pakistan public service. Some observers fear for ‘islands’ (as well they might in the age of Global Warming!)

*‘The sea of mediocrity will always overwhelm the island of excellence’<sup>56</sup>*

<sup>56</sup> NCGR Website: paper on the District Cadre

Indeed, as became clear, particularly from discussions in write-shops, the apparent success of most cases does not make them any less vulnerable to future interference, and subsequent performance decline. They may well prove to be unsustainable in what is now a new political era in Pakistan. Despite its strong reputation, and the resources it has expended to bolster the capacities of District teams, NPIW has begun to detect local pressures to replace skilled able District team staff with local politicians' preferred people.

---

#### 4.1.3. RECOGNITION: AN ALL-TOO-RARE INGREDIENT OF MANAGERS' EXPERIENCE IN THE PAKISTAN PUBLIC SERVICE

It is hoped that the present capacity case study exercise: codifying positive, brave examples of extraordinary achievement - will lead to recognition and praise for those concerned, and to a justified celebration of what can be achieved: thus setting an example for others to follow.

---

#### 4.1.4. A SIMPLE STORY IN MANAGEMENT TERMS: FEW NEW TECHNICAL OR REFORM INSIGHTS

It must be acknowledged, that the successful approaches illustrated in the cases do not represent revolutionary new approaches to resource management. They illustrate what can be achieved when competent public service managers are allowed to 'get on with it' with adequate resources. As such they are simply a mix of both 'blinding glimpses of the obvious' and 'application of 'tried-and-tested' management and technological approaches to improving human and other resource management'. In short, they do not represent 'rocket science'. They nonetheless include examples of cost-saving, efficiency and extraordinary performance.

---

#### 4.1.5. BUT GREAT TESTIMONIES TO ORIGINATORS AND MANAGERS

What is noteworthy however, is that they took place despite the obstacles encountered in an administrative and bureaucratic-cultural system which may fail to support consistent application of sound management techniques. The cases arose because some influential person or other refused to tolerate 'more of the same'. Instead, someone - the initiator, or the key players involved - demonstrated determined leadership; courage; persistence; pride; application of existing or new skills; ingenuity; creativity and integrity.

---

#### 4.1.6. NCGR 'HAS BEEN HERE BEFORE': WITHER POLICY REFORM IN GOVERNMENT?

The slow progress of the NCGR's deliberations and the difficulties it has faced in translating its well-argued comprehensive concept papers into application of the liberal reform principles NCGR espouses, may deter others who wish to innovate in the public service.



NCGR's experience points to difficulties that may be encountered in implementing recommendations developed under the initiative. Many of the issues which this study has identified as obstructing human resource capacity development in the public service have already been identified by NCGR as needing reform, and the alternative forms such reforms may take have been effectively aired.

It appears that political will to take decisive action on long-proposed reforms has been missing to date. Little momentum for reform or related advocacy appears to have been built up among civil servants after their return from expensive overseas training supported by scholarships under the Public Sector Capacity Building program (which NCGR helps administer).

In general, the examples of successful capacity development in this report involve fewer policy and institutional reforms than operational and organizational level initiatives. Combined with this study's observations and analysis of deficient demand for capacity development within government and the impression that many strategic departments have not, or have not been able to develop feasible action strategies to address priority future policy issues, support for enhanced policy analysis and policy formulations may be a suitable focus for future capacity development efforts.

---

#### 4.1.7. REMEMBER THAT THESE POSITIVE CASES ARE NOT THE FULL SAMPLE

One of the many paradoxes of Pakistan is that the number of positive cases of outstanding achievement ('against the odds') in what to many observers appears to be a hostile unresponsive public service environment, exceeded the capacity of the study team to do them justice. The Study Team simply did not have enough time and resources to capture all the favorable positive cases currently operating in the Pakistan public service.

Indeed, what was remarkable was not the shortage of 'capacity' in the public service, but the large volumes of LATENT capacity, available to be tapped (within the public service, and particularly at community level). However, such capacity is often stifled by a range of socio-cultural, political economy and 'vested interest' bureaucratic factors. It is worth repeating here a pair of telling quotations from one of the write-shops:

Basically, the 'capacity' is there in ... many other organizations in Pakistan. All that is needed to liberate or mobilize it, is 'political will' (=political protection), so that it can get on with the job. (a Senior Police Officer presenting the NHMP Case).

...and 'we do not need the foreign loans: we just need the management HERE...permitted through political will (synonymous with protection from political interference)' (quote from proceedings of the same write-shop).

#### 4.1.8. PERSONALITIES MATTER: MAYBE TOO MUCH

Basically, the officer above was alluding to the power of key personalities to create ‘space’ in which managers can manage without undue interference. As noted in the findings above: this was a recurring theme in the cases. The GJTMAP case – despite having an undeniably very competent National Program Manager at its helm, was dogged by attempted interference at its inception at federal level, and indeed during its life at Provincial level. It lacked a constant, resolute ‘patron’ or champion who could dissuade or prevent interfering political or bureaucratic influences.

It is clear that if the public service is to reform (itself), individuals should cease to matter quite so much. Development of sustained capacity does not, and cannot, rely on individuals’ permanent presence or vigilance. Development administration and management will have to be made routinely straightforward: and tolerance to political or other interference, reduced or eliminated altogether.

#### 4.2. SOME CONCLUSIONS – PARTICULARLY FOR DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS TO CONSIDER

##### 4.2.1. KEY LESSONS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL LITERATURE APPLY IN PAKISTAN

In Section 1 above we reviewed some of the more often-observed or repeated lessons and messages about capacity and capacity development in the international literature, in what are usually development partner-supported research initiatives. It appears that many hold true in the Pakistan public sector capacity context.

These include:

- The Importance of ‘Context’ (especially its socio-cultural and bureaucratic history dimensions) and understanding their implications, in supporting development of capacity systems; (hence the protracted treatment of this in Section 2 and Appendix 6);
- ...and of trying to gain insights into ‘how change happens’ and ‘why something worked...well!’ (hence the putting forward, and discussion of, these case studies);
- The importance of sound leadership (many examples here);
- The emergence of innovative approaches to monitoring and evaluation (several cases: from NPIW’s GIS to OPP’s regular reflections on what has been learned);

4.2.2. BUT THE PAKISTAN CONTEXT POSES PECULIAR AND PARTICULAR PROBLEMS, WHICH PUT A REAL PREMIUM ON DONORS GETTING SOME THINGS 'RIGHT':

- Gaining commitment or guarantees from government, in the early stages of a prospective intervention is particularly crucial in Pakistan. For example, guarantees of counterpart funding, not just during, but at the end of interventions so that they can be sustained. This appears to have worked quite well in the case of the Faisalabad SPU after DFID support ended. Lobbying from the funding agency's side for continued government funding has been a feature of this case.
- Such commitments need to extend to the 'protection' of program management from political or other interference, and unduly rapid transfers.
- There is importance in funding agencies resisting the temptation to overload the reform agenda initially: reform is complex and difficult enough in this context. The PRMP case was saved from paralysis (due to an over-ambitious initial reform agenda) by a flexible modular structure, and later joint agreement on immediate foci, (i.e. phased reforms) which in turn helped 'ownership' develop.
- The difficulties - yet the importance - of rigorously selecting, and nurturing, good 'master trainers' or other proponents of change in any initiative, make continuity particularly crucial.
- Yet one of the other characteristics of Pakistan is the fluid and fragile geo-political and security situation. Both impinge on funding agencies' willingness and abilities to sustain support (particularly bilaterals who often use UNDP as implementing agency for joint programs). Several of the cases illustrated graphically the negative and indeed capacity-threatening consequences of interruptions of funding supply (due to both country-stability factors and phasing of different tranches of support being subject to interim evaluations).
- ...and the sheer size of the country, and its cultural context means that capacity development in sensitive issues (gender, political empowerment, innovation in the realm of local dispute resolution for example) implies, in terms of program design:
  - advocacy and
  - field-based back-up support components for such programs are particularly important aspects of design, which need to be 'built-in' and adequately resourced
  - realistic time-horizons are needed
  - 'up-front' commitment by donors of significant resources really is helpful.

- Offering to support inventorying of the existing facilities, infrastructure, situation, or simply up-to-date data collection and analysis as a starting point, is very useful in circumstances where the Planning Commission or even Provincial Planning and Development departments may be remote from field realities, and may have only out-of-date information available at the time of program planning.
- This includes ‘mapping’ of actual or potential stakeholders, and joint reviews or assessments of baseline capacities in counterpart institutions.
- Development partners need to note the limitations of experience in Pakistan in strengthening accountability and ‘voice’ institutions. Expectations of what can be achieved in this context need to be kept modest. There is a list of suggestions for funding agencies wishing to support female elected representatives in Box 13.
- Funding agencies’ processes for managing TA injections need to reflect some of the realities thrown up by the current set of cases:
  - Consultants’ need to be unambiguously accountable to their host agency
  - ToRs need to permit flexibility in attaining goals and not contain specific rigidly phased levels of effort or time-bound tasks or target outputs
  - Consultants should be jointly selected: with participation of client agencies
  - TA management processes should be as devolved as possible in country offices
  - Consultants should be expected to serve in Pakistan, alongside counterparts.
  - Specific steps should be provided for, in briefing and preparing short-term consultants.<sup>57</sup>

---

<sup>57</sup> See ECDPM Policy Management Brief Number 20 – November 2007 – for recommendations emerging from a three-country study of Aid Effectiveness and TA Provision, all oriented to practices more conducive to capacity development. Available via [www.ecdpm.org](http://www.ecdpm.org) and also [www.capacity.org](http://www.capacity.org)

## 5. RECOMMENDATIONS

### 5.1. MACRO ISSUES / IDEAS (MAINLY FOR GOVERNMENT CONSIDERATION)

#### 5.1.1. ACKNOWLEDGE THE DIFFICULTIES OF 'DEFYING CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT GRAVITY': STOP INDULGING POLITICIANS' PRIORITIES AND INTERFERENCE

This is all about government deciding what is important, and what government really must deliver. A common characteristic of the cases is that they were deemed to be a priority: and special arrangements made to protect them from the worst of the effects of a difficult environment. Failure to take account of common patterns of interference by actors with vested interest when designing activities is tantamount to 'defying gravity' in capacity terms and often leads to poor results.

#### 5.1.2. ASSESS THE MERITS AND LIMITATIONS OF TOP-DOWN RESOURCE INJECTIONS AND 'CONTROL'

There will be circumstances when top-down control are crucial, and those where bottom-up influence is more important. For major new sector initiatives where consistency and fairness between Districts are important, case studies of Provincial Units pose opportunities for learning of the advantages (and short-falls) of this arrangement.

#### 5.1.3. BRING TOGETHER THE PRACTITIONERS TO LEARN ABOUT WHAT WORKS AND WHY?

There appears to be enormous stores of experience, ideas and energy within the public service, if the information held in these case studies is anything to go by. However, rigid hierarchical structures within and between organizational units pose few opportunities for learning from experience in government. There should be opportunities here for operational staff (and indeed affected communities!) - for example to comment on draft PC1s, to identify possible missed alternative approaches, and possible pitfalls. Gatherings would need neutral (professional) facilitation. Senior staff could then be invited in to hear feedback in a 'neutral'/anonymous manner, based on group discussion.



#### 5.1.4. RECOGNIZE THAT COMMUNITIES HAVE CONSIDERABLE CAPACITIES TO MANAGE RESOURCES

OPP and NPIW (and to an extent CMIPHC) illustrated considerable community capacity to generate and manage resources (including artisans) in relatively simple construction projects. It accords with other recent or current cases in Pakistan (Education Sector Reform Assistance supported by USAID, and Northern Areas Education Project supported by DFID) where communities were given guidance and some resources, and successfully managed their own infrastructure schemes, at a fraction of costs (and to higher resultant quality and endurance) accruing if government contractors are involved. The presenter of the OPP case at the National Workshop suggested cost ratios as follows: if the cost is Rs 1 with community self-help implementation, the cost is Rs 3 if local government handles it; Rs 7 if Provincial government handles it, and Rs 28 if it is donor funded. However, there are inevitably very strong vested interests who would prefer to continue use of contractors, for a variety of reasons, only some of which are legitimate. It is timely that these vested interests are firmly confronted within government. In many ways it cannot afford to continue along current (contracting) paths.

#### 5.1.5. ACKNOWLEDGE THAT IN CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT FUNDING AGENCIES SHOULD BE STEERED BY GOVERNMENT COUNTERPARTS

The DSD case vividly illustrated how development partners were relatively easily coordinated, after the Director decided what the policy and strategy was, and asked for funding agencies to 'subscribe' to the policy through their support, dove-tailed with others. The same analogy applies to management and co-ordination of foreign assistance at higher levels of government. The same DSD case however, pointed out that overall policy was in that particular case less than clear.

#### 5.1.6. ACTIVELY PURSUE EVIDENCE-BASED POLICY MAKING (AND REQUEST DONORS HOW THEY MIGHT HELP)

One telling point made in the same case study was that policy initiatives oriented to improving the quality of services are inevitably complex and depend on multiple actors or players (at several layers of government), and their capacity enhancement. They also demand good evidence on which to judge optimal strategies among alternatives, and to judge the effects or merits of measures already taken. Third party evaluations are one form of evidence-gathering. There are many others. As indicated in this report, there are some cases of use and misuse of third party evaluations and evidence. Moving ahead with more evidence-based policy would appear to be important for both government and donors working together.

## 5.2. RELATING TO REFORM OR MANAGEMENT OF PUBLIC SECTOR HUMAN RESOURCES: FOR GOVERNMENT CONSIDERATION

### 5.2.1. IMPROVE AND ENHANCE CONTINUITY: OF INCUMBENTS' SERVICE IN KEY POSTS, AND OF POLICIES, STRATEGIES AND CAPACITIES BUILT UP

The Lahore write-shop unanimously generated the following recommendation (to the new Punjab government): 'it is vital that 'the baby is not thrown out with the bathwater' (i.e. a degree of continuity will be vital) in terms of the capacity development programs which have become established - and some very successful - under the previous regime. The temptation should be resisted to overturn or reject programs, and substitute new staff for experienced hands, for the sake of change. Instead, several programs - including of course the cases featured in the write-shop - could indeed benefit from an objective balanced inclusive re-assessment of their merits and demerits.'

### 5.2.2. REMOVE DISINCENTIVES TO SPECIALIZATION BY CONSIDERING CAREER DEVELOPMENT FOR KEY CADRES AND CAPACITIES

### 5.2.3. RE-ENGINEER GUIDELINES RELATING TO TRAINING IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE

The NCGR has already made proposals in these regards. All the present study can do is marshal additional evidence on the importance of both issues, if capacities are to be sustainably developed by being aligned with incentives within professional groupings. The NHMP case illustrated the problems arising from the absence of Rules governing promotions. The drafting of such documents is a practical way forward on this, even without major reforms of HRM in the public service.

### 5.2.4. NURTURE TALENT: THERE IS PLENTY OF IT (ALBEIT OFTEN LATENT, UN-RECOGNIZED AND UNDER-UTILIZED)

The key to this is objective, regular performance appraisal and assessment of individuals' training and career progression needs. Again the NCGR has already drawn attention to this. We do so too.

### 5.2.5. RAISE PUBLIC AWARENESS ABOUT THE STANDARDS THE PUBLIC SHOULD EXPECT AND ABOUT HOW TO COMPLAIN EFFECTIVELY

The Faisalabad depicted grim situations in both public awareness of standards, their experience of low standards, and the futility of complaining. A program of raising public awareness has been recommended before, but the present study adds its weight to those suggestions. Public pressure in the words of the ex Chair of the NRB, is a key driver of capacity development in the public sector:

*'Capacity Building in the Pakistan Public Sector' is an oxymoron. Public pressure from outside it, for improvements in service delivery, are an essential complement.'*

There appears to be a need to explore international practices on setting 'minimum' standards for service delivery and the need for regulating service providers. The Punjab Government is working with ADB on preparing standards for the social sectors. Another initiative could include 'benchmarking' (GJTMAP is already conducting such an exercise). This would include identifying and documenting best practices found at local and provincial levels (as this Study has attempted to do for some cases) and replicating demonstrable improvements in observed practices for training and service delivery, including the best practices.

---

#### 5.2.6. REMEMBER BASIC SERVICES ARE DELIVERED LOCALLY: BY LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

Capacity development for devolved local government appears crucial: whatever the nature of policy on devolution in future. It is suggested that the approaches used in Faisalabad – already recognized by the Government of Punjab and many other interested Districts – become a model for future work in this regard. DFID has commissioned a series of detailed case studies codifying the experience which will be available on the SPU website.

---

#### 5.2.7. CONSIDER PARTNERSHIPS: GOVERNMENT/NGO-CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATION/PRIVATE SECTOR TO FILL CAPACITY GAPS

The CMIPHC, OPP, PRMP, and TRTA cases illustrate the benefits, and practical approaches:

- Achievement of clearly-articulated, mutually-consistent goals among partners, which individually would have been more difficult or less cost-effective;
- 'Playing to respective strengths' (i.e. taking advantage of comparative advantages possessed by partners);
- Progressive emergence of realization of mutual benefits from the joint arrangement.

Adequate resources, and past familiarity, credibility and current mutual respect of partners one with the other are conditions of such partnerships.

---

#### 5.2.8. RE-VISIT PLANNING PROCEDURES AND PROFORMAS SUCH AS THE PC1 ETC.: ENHANCE SKILLS AND CAPACITIES FOR PROJECT AND PROGRAM APPRAISAL

Current processes appear to impede capacity development. It would be worthwhile to explore this issue in the way recommended at Recommendation 1c above.



### 5.3. FOR CONSIDERATION BY MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS AND BILATERAL DONORS

#### 5.3.1. GAUGE - AND ENCOURAGE - 'COMMITMENT' TO CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT ON THE PART OF GOVERNMENT COUNTERPARTS

Remember that 'windows of opportunity' for capacity development may open briefly in the public sector and it is up to funding agencies to react fast. See also suggestions above in the Conclusions section for requesting counterpart contributions and guarantees.

#### 5.3.2. SUPPORT CAPACITY ASSESSMENTS AND INSTITUTIONAL 'MAPPING'

This is an important preliminary to major sectoral interventions and Sector/Program Data and Information assessments. There appears to be considerable scope for funding agencies to support these early stages of major initiatives. See also above in Conclusions section.

#### 5.3.3. ACKNOWLEDGE THE CRUCIAL ROLE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN SECTOR PROGRAM DELIVERY: AND THE IMPORTANCE OF TRAINING MIDDLE-LEVEL STAFF

This is the parallel to the recommendation to government above on devolution capacity development. The often rather negative experience of several other donor-supported initiatives in this field over the past few years should be reflected upon in designing jointly future interventions.

#### 5.3.4. MAKE TRAINING AND FELLOWSHIPS MORE EFFECTIVE (PART OF THE TRAINING OVERHAUL MENTIONED ABOVE)

This was the subject of a specific panel discussion during the National Workshop in mid-May. The suggestions are listed below.

#### 5.3.5. OPEN UP OPPORTUNITIES FOR GOVERNMENT INSIGHTS INTO 'GOOD PRACTICE' PUBLIC SERVICE POLICY AND PEOPLE-MANAGEMENT PRACTICES

This is the corollary of the above recommendation to government on evidence-based policy. There is much MDBs and bilateral donors could do to provide insights into positive practices internationally, and indeed nationally, by promoting the generation and appropriate dissemination of positive case studies such as the 'batch' generated by the present exercise. We suggest that these cases (after being prepared for printing and packaged accordingly) be sent to those public and private management and academic institutes in Pakistan and the region, which are concerned with public service management and administration.

#### 5.3.6. ENSURE NATIONAL CAPACITY PROVIDERS ARE NURTURED AND INCENTIVES PROVIDED FOR THEIR ACTIVE ENGAGEMENT IN PUBLIC SECTOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT

Given the importance of national consultants in successful capacity development (and the problems reported by NPIW in accessing adequate numbers of satisfactory consultants), funding agencies could well explore how studies of the local consulting market could help frame policies for supporting the development of national consultants in future, especially in the field of organizational development and change management. The same applies to institutes and university departments which are involved in designing and delivering training for the public service.

#### 5.4. IMPLICATIONS FOR COUNTRY PROGRAMMING BY FUNDING AGENCIES

The Study team have been requested to make some suggestions on the implications for funding agencies, emerging from the capacity development study. In this, they face a dilemma. Only half the cases featured significant financial or technical support from funding agencies. This is too small a sample on which to frame robust conclusions. While two out of the three write-shops discussed donor issues, the conclusions were not detailed enough (nor pitched at specifically MDBs or other multi-lateral or bilateral agencies) to derive firm recommendations.

It will be important for Pakistan-based funding agencies to frame their own conclusions, based on this draft report and the discussions of the National Workshop.

However, having studied the findings and recommendations of the study of capacity development in the Pacific region conducted under ADB auspices in 2007, several of its conclusions pose interesting parallels, and resonate with the experience of capacity cases reviewed in the Pakistan context. These are paraphrased and summarized below. For ease of reference, the relevant sections of the Pacific report are attached as Appendix 7. Given that the Pacific study was sponsored by the Pacific regional department of ADB (and co-funded by AusAID), its ToRs were deliberately pitched towards recommendations for ADB consideration.<sup>58</sup>

- Strengthen mechanisms to enhance understanding of the context (including capacity issues) in which funding agencies are working: utilising local partners and previous analyses;
- Build consensus with government on what the key CD issues are, on this basis;

---

<sup>58</sup> Bolger (2008) *ADB Pacific Capacity Development Scoping Study –Final Report* by Joe Bolger March 2008 (also available on the ADB website).

- Encourage country-led continuous participative programming;
- Assist government and other partners in analysis of political economy issues (using frameworks such as the 'Drivers of Change' approach)
- Debate the implications of 'mainstreaming' CD in programming (currently in the Pacific cases it appeared more of an 'add-on').
- Consider longer commitment periods – especially in cases where new unfamiliar or culturally challenging capacities are needed.

Some points specifically on CD programming included (from the Pacific report box 8):

- Select "demand-driven" pilots in key ADB sectors/thematic areas in the countries to provide a basis for initiating new CD approaches.
- Provide inputs to encourage new approaches, such as stakeholder analysis, capacity assessments.
- Strengthen participatory approaches to enhance ownership and effectiveness of CD programming.
- Ensure programming decisions are based on strategic analysis of capacity options (e.g., best entry points, modalities, sustainability/exit strategy).
- Increase emphasis on capacity for demand and local accountability.
- Explore possibilities for increasing reliance on local capacity-building options, such as facilities, exchanges, and use of local consultants.

Other points concerned ADB's own business processes, and are less relevant here.

## 5.5. SUMMARY OF KEY OBSERVATIONS AND ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE NATIONAL WORKSHOP

The National Workshop on 13 -14 May 2008 made the following observations:

- There were great advantages in studying a variety of cases of capacity development in action; several participants noted their appreciation of the workshop;
- It appeared that some had had clearly tangible results, but some illustrated the barriers (cultural and other) impeding the impact of – for example - short courses for teachers and female elected representatives;
- It also appeared that some cases illustrated more 'independence' of movement in organizational 'spaces' permitted by political patrons, than others.
- Some cases illustrated not only the importance of political will, but also of the vital need for conscientization of politicians to the benefits of improved service delivery to

their constituents. It seemed that it was by no means self-evident to politicians that improved services would bring benefits of greater political popularity. There were real dangers that capacity development for service delivery, without the political will to endorse and support it, would be unsustainable. The Chief Operating Officer of Punjab Rural Support Program noted how there was political and bureaucratic opposition in at least one District to its presence and role in health service management – despite the improvements it had brought;

- The important issues in training seemed to be: thorough needs analysis beforehand (including identification of potential capacities to be unleashed); the need for continuous training (not brief one-off courses); and an ex-post supportive environment back at work – including due recognition for achievements in training, and some opportunities for independent action, responsibility or leadership to boost trainees’ pride in their work.
- The need for a supportive institutional environment was endorsed by several participants as an essential aspect of sustained capacity development. It was up to leaders to facilitate that. The tendency to transfer trainees out of posts for which they had been prepared, or indeed for them to leave the public service (as illustrated by Component 2 of the TRTA case) were seen as major endemic issues which had to be tackled if expensive training inputs into the public service were not to be wasted.

Participants also debated key features of optimal design of technical assistance interventions. These included:

- The importance of explicit requests for assistance – i.e. demand for it - as a basis for any invitation for the presence of TA;
- Involvement of client / host organizations in the selection and monitoring of the performance of TA teams; (contrasting examples were cited in this regard);
- The importance of TA personnel being able to adjust their inputs to the contextual realities of their host organization. The SPU’s consultants had several years experience in Faisalabad prior to embarking on the organizational development of the City District Government;
- The absorptive capacities of the host, and its ability and confidence to manage TA inputs, need to be considered as factors affecting TA programs’ success.
- Some distinctions were drawn between the position of TA personnel in Faisalabad (integrated within the SPU itself and Departments) and the source of TA in PRMP (based in a Program Management Unit).
- There were also distinctions between these two cases in the apparent motivation of trainees to attend training courses. In the SPU case, this was encouraged and facilitated by the work done on preparing job descriptions for all employees, as a

basis for tailor-making of course content to meet job requirements within a single organization (CDGF). In the PRMP case, TA consultants had faced difficulties in attracting participants from diverse organizations and departments within the Provincial government for courses in generic skills.

## 5.6. ACTION PRIORITIES AND IMPLICATIONS

The workshop finally focussed on the implications – for government and for development partners – of learning points, which had emerged from perusal of the cases and in view of the ‘environment’ prevailing in the public services of Pakistan. The main categories were as follows:

- Capacity development issues in Program Planning and design;
- Human Resource Management and Training
- Organizational Development; Partnerships and Implementation
- Harmonization of Procedures in CD (especially concerning donors)

Groups’ discussion under each category produced the following recommendations to government and development partners in taking forward capacity development initiatives in the framework of the Paris Declaration to promote aid effectiveness.

---

### 5.6.1. CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT ISSUES IN PROGRAM PLANNING AND DESIGN:

The key considerations under-pinning feasibility of any intervention included ownership and the backward and forward inter-linkages of the intervention;

In present civil service conditions, some form of sheltered protected environment appeared inevitable (in some form of Management Unit): with remuneration approximating market scales, simplified procedures, ‘flat’ organizational structures, and technically qualified staff.

---

### 5.6.2. HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND TRAINING

This group emphasized:

- The importance of systematic analysis of the host organization’s needs, aptitudes and capacity ‘gaps’ prior to the design of any training or HRM interventions;
- Thereafter, programming of training should be synchronized with the host’s organizational objectives, in the context of its human resources’ policy framework, and its delivery monitored closely and periodically its impact assessed.
- Back-up support to ex-trainees was crucial (as discussed above in earlier discussion), to allow continued application of new learning in real work settings.

- For the donor of any such support, it was important for them to be goal-oriented, but not to reduce this to 'goal-chasing'. I.e. the donor should be conscious of the need to maintain direction in their support, but be flexible if it appeared that goals needed to be adjusted in the light of changing circumstances.
- The needs of the private sector for more and better-trained skilled workers appeared to have been forgotten. Therefore, given the importance of the sector for employment and income generation, there appeared to be scope for much more engagement of donors in vocational training.

---

### 5.6.3. ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND PARTNERSHIPS

This form of capacity development was seen as a pillar of aid effectiveness. They envisaged organizational vision, mission, objectives and targets providing the basis for a structure with corresponding departmental functions undertaken by appropriately skilled human resources, procedures and systems of incentives and motivation (including career planning and performance evaluation).

It recommended that government insulate key service-delivery organizations from political interference, while giving their top managers a sufficient degree of autonomy to permit them space to act within their mandate and resources.

It recommended that donors – suitably informed about the local context, and acting in harmony with other donors - conduct capacity needs assessments prior to designing organizational development assistance with flexibility to permit adjustment in the light of subsequent events and progress, and advocate for continuity of leadership in assisted organizations.

Civil society organizations should support dissemination of information on service standards and official prices to stakeholders of public services, as a contribution to enhancing demand for services, and transparency and accountability of providers.

---

### 5.6.4. PROCEDURAL / CD HARMONIZATION (AMONG DONORS)

This group foresaw the need for an aid policy statement (to be formulated by EAD); sectoral plans for capacity development programs (drawn up by ministries, supported by donors), and an overall steering forum.<sup>59</sup>

The group raised the question of donor accountability, without agreeing how that might be achieved. They urged donors to avoid 'box-ticking' type reviews in favor of a more progressive constructive form of review of CD program experience.

---

<sup>59</sup> There is already a Steering Committee on Aid Effectiveness, established by the Minister of Economic Affairs in September 2006.

Timeliness and cost-effectiveness of support for CD should be borne in mind, and the use of international TA minimized. When agreed to be necessary, based on appraisal of need and the absorptive capacity of the host agency(ies) concerned, such TA should be chosen in consultation with host agencies.

## APPENDIX 1: SCOPING STUDY ON CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT FOR SERVICE DELIVERY IN PAKISTAN<sup>60</sup>

Draft 15 March 2007

### BACKGROUND AND ISSUES

#### A. Overview of Capacity Development in the Context of the International Development Effectiveness Discussion

1. Despite huge external investments over many decades, progress in enhancing capacities in developing countries has been disappointingly slow. Since 2000, when the United Nations (UN) Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were adopted, the challenge of accelerating capacity development (CD) has taken on a new urgency. Monitoring reports on MDG progress have consistently revealed that public sector capacity lagged behind all other MDG benchmarks.

2. In the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness<sup>61</sup> partner countries, including Pakistan, committed to capacity strengthening objectives and country-led implementation strategies. In turn, donors committed to align support with partners' CD objectives, to make greater use of country systems and to harmonize support. To help implement these commitments ADB has adopted a CD Framework and Action Plan in January 2007 aiming at strengthening ADB's assistance for CD in DMCs so that it becomes more demand-driven, effective and efficient.<sup>62</sup>

3. Since the adoption of the Paris Declaration, a number of follow-up initiatives have been taken to strengthen the effectiveness of CD programs. A recent publication by Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)'s Development Assistance Committee (DAC)'s Network on Governance <sup>63</sup> reviewed 40 years of development experience and concluded that donors and partner countries alike have tended to look at CD as mainly a technical process, or as a transfer of knowledge from North to South. The publication explains how donors have failed to recognize the critical importance of country ownership and leadership, and how they underestimated the importance of the broader political context within which CD efforts take place. The European Center for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) has analyzed the linkages between capacity,

---

<sup>60</sup> The title of the Study has changed slightly, to reflect a range of public sector services in the eventual sample.

<sup>61</sup> Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (2005). Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness: Ownership, Harmonization, Alignment and Results. Paris, March.

<sup>62</sup> ADB. 2007. IN.9-07. Integrating Capacity Development into Country Programs and Operations. Medium-Term Framework and Action Plan. Manila.

<sup>63</sup> Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development. Network on Governance (2006). The Challenge of Capacity Development. Working Towards Good Practice.



change and performance through a study that began in 2003.<sup>64</sup> The study includes 18 field studies, two of them on Pakistan.<sup>65</sup>

4. Increasingly, partner countries and donors are reviewing their CD experience to improve country-wide, sector-wide or local-government-wide strategic CD planning and the effectiveness of future CD interventions.<sup>66</sup> Future challenges and open question include (i) modes of delivery in the future aid architecture (role of long-term experts, can financial aid be CD?; (ii) does mutual accountability imply mutual ownership, can ownership be a process?; (iii) monitoring and evaluation of CD and of non-tangible issues, such as ownership, leadership, legitimacy, credibility, trust, confidence; and (iv) methodologies and scaling up of capacity needs assessments.

## **B. Overview of Capacity Development for Service Delivery in Pakistan**

5. A recent workshop on CD conducted by the working group on Sector Wide Approaches and Capacity Development confirmed an earlier finding<sup>67</sup> that there is no agreed official definition of CD in Pakistan. CD is usually seen in a narrow way limited to individual skills development to perform jobs better. A CD strategy that prioritizes future CD interventions is lacking, but the Economic Affairs Division (EAD) has recently recognized that in the context of implementing the Paris Declaration there is a need to improve strategic oversight and guidance on CD for service delivery.

6. However, if service delivery data are taken as a proxy for capacities it does not appear that this support has been successfully targeted at CD. Pakistan is classified by the World Bank as low income country with a GNI per capita of \$690 in 2005 and a Human Development Index ranking of 134 out of 177 countries.<sup>68</sup> In 2004, primary school enrolment stood at 82.1%, secondary school enrolment at 27.2% and the adult total literacy rate at 49.9. Every 10th child did not reach his or her fifth year. The ECDPM study on capacity building in the education sector<sup>69</sup> concluded that:

*“The government faces a real capacity building dilemma. There is an urgent need for effective and rapid development of capacities in civil society (citizen community boards*

---

<sup>64</sup> ECDPM Interim Report.

<sup>65</sup> David Watson, Adnan Qadir Khan (2005), Capacity building for decentralized education service delivery in Pakistan, July and David Watson (2005), Capacity building for decentralized education service delivery in Ethiopia and Pakistan, June.

<sup>66</sup> For instance Pacific countries are in the process of conducting a Scoping Study on Capacity Development supported by ADB and Aus-AID. Numerous studies have been conducted by donors to evaluate the role of project administration units, the provision of technical assistance, and the provision of technical assistance personnel. See for instance ADB. 2005. *Special Evaluation Study on the Role of Project Implementation Units*. Manila: and ADB. 2007. *Special Evaluation Study on the Performance of Technical Assistance*. Manila.

<sup>67</sup> Watson/Khan p. vi.

<sup>68</sup> UNDP. 2004. Human Development Index database.

<sup>69</sup> Watson, Khan. 2005, p. viii.

*and elected councilors) and the public sector (...). However, there are severe constraints on enhancing capacities to design and deliver programs that will induce sustained behavior change and more effective organizational performance.”*

7. Such constraints comprise:<sup>70</sup>

- Implementation of recent, comprehensive devolution program is incomplete. The roles of district governments in relation to provinces and federal authorities have yet to be fully clarified, districts so far have gained little fiscal discretion, and differences of opinion among members of national and provincial assemblies and district councilors persist.<sup>71</sup>
- Systems for accountability to citizens at the district and other local levels mean that incentives for service delivery are lacking.
- Movement away from such features of the colonial legacy as political pressure, patrimonialism, and interference is not complete.
  - The socio-economic context with relatively low literacy rates, with huge gender disparities and no tradition for popular pressure on politicians or service providers, especially in rural areas.
  - There is little experience and clarity on capacity development among key players.

8. There are indications that faced with unsatisfactory results from earlier CD initiatives; donors are increasingly adopting more innovative approaches to CD. Such approaches include:

- Stimulating accountability for service delivery
- Analysis and policy dialogue on operational aspects of devolution
- Experimenting with organizational development approaches to enhance local government capacities
- Experimenting with organizational development approaches to enhance sector agency capacities.

---

<sup>70</sup> Based on Watson, Khan. 2005, p. vii and viii

<sup>71</sup> In August 2001, the President introduced a devolution plan, to be implemented through the National reconstruction Bureau (NRB). The aim of the plan was – through community empowerment – to enhance bottom-up accountability, and thereby improve service delivery. See for details: ADB, World Bank, DfID, Devolution in Pakistan, 2004.

9. The more recent and innovative initiatives have not been systematically analyzed<sup>72</sup> and “success” will have to be defined and often qualified. This achievement may have been due to certain strong leaders and other individuals. It may have arisen through an independent status that freed operations from social or political constraints. After decades of external assistance to build domestic capacities in the public sectors in Pakistan, decades of quite extensive effort and expenditure it is time that the main stakeholders better understand how capacity can be successfully built and sustained.

### **C. Defining Capacity Development in Operational Terms**

10. Given that there is no agreed concept of capacity and CD in Pakistan it is suggested that the concepts which have been discussed in the Capacity Development Seminar of the Pakistan Working Group on Sector Wide Approaches and Capacity Development will be used. The discussion was based on ADB’s CD Framework and Action Plan and the European Commission’s Aid delivery methods concept paper which provides useful insights on how to operationalize CD concepts.<sup>73</sup> The main concepts are defined in box 1.

#### *Box 1: Main Concepts*

Capacity: ‘the ability of people and organizations to perform tasks and produce outputs’

CD is defined as a process by which people and organizations create and strengthen capacity over time.

Support to CD is defined as inputs and processes that external actors use to support capacity development.

*Source: EC Institutional Assessment and Capacity Development. Why, what and how?*

11. The CD concept employed here presupposes that public sector agencies will remain the key entry points for CD operations, but that other key organizations and groups in the private sector, nongovernment sector and civil society will be given larger roles. Organizations are seen as open systems and entry points for CD interventions exist at individual, organizations/networks of organizations, institutional/enabling environment levels.

## **SCOPE OF THE ASSIGNMENT**

### **A. Objective and Scope of the Study**

---

<sup>72</sup> However, there are indications in an ADB special evaluation study on the social sectors in Pakistan that they have been more successful than previous approaches.

<sup>73</sup> European Commission (2005). Institutional Assessment and Capacity Development, why, what and how? September

12. The objective of the study is (i) to enhance understanding of CD processes that have been employed to strengthen service delivery in Pakistan; (ii) to provide recommendations to support the effectiveness of interventions in Pakistan, both country and external, aimed at improving capacity and service delivery performance. This will input into country development strategies and donor programming and operations.

13. The study will provide a mapping of CD interventions for service delivery conducted since the devolution plan came into effect. Based on the mapping, 8-10 case studies will be identified in up to two provinces for a more detailed analysis of capacity and CD support. Emphasis will be placed on a comprehensive range of CD entry points (individual, organization/organizational network, institutions/enabling environment and more innovative support, such as the four areas described in Section 2).

14. Given the importance of the devolution context for service delivery, capacity and CD of provincial and local government agencies and other stakeholders will be a key entry point of the study, building on the findings of the Devolution in Pakistan study conducted by World Bank, DFID and ADB<sup>74</sup> and a follow-up study that was recently conducted by ADB.

15. Service delivery will be defined for the purposes of the study as comprising health and education, water and sanitation, and access to justice and dispute resolution. This is consistent with the concepts employed in the Devolution in Pakistan study.

## **B. Methodology and Key Activities**

### *Phase 1 (August - September 2007)*

16. This phase would aim to a) establish key issues from literature and working group experience; b) prepare a comprehensive mapping of CD interventions implemented from August 2001 to 2006; c) produce a long list of possible “successful” case studies covering a range of approaches used by different donors; d) validate the proposed focus and methodology of the study; e) propose an initial framework for further case studies; and f) present the proposed framework and discuss with the working group.

### *Phase 2 (October 2007 - January 2007)*

17. The second phase will consist of field visits to two pre-selected provinces and would result in the preparation of 8-10 case studies. It is anticipated that the case studies would be prepared by the international and local CD specialists with strong inputs by those directly involved in the respective CD interventions. One write-shop in each of the two provinces is envisaged to help finalize the first drafts of the case studies. For a short overview of the write-shop methodology see Attachment 1. The donor working group would be briefed on the initial findings of the write-shops and evolving themes and provide a rough framework

---

<sup>74</sup> Devolution in Pakistan. 2004. Overview of the ADB/DFID/World Bank study, p. 3, figure 1.

or agenda for the proposed conference including likely invitees, venue, and costing. The aim of the meeting would also be to further validate the focus of the study, establish some provisional, general, common themes.

### *Phase 3 (January – April 2008)*

18. Phase 3 will consist of the further elaboration of issues, themes, possible best practices and principles and the preparation and conduct of a conference on “Capacity Development for Service Delivery – Building on Experiences” to be held in Islamabad in April 2008 under the auspices of the Working Group on Sector Wide Approaches and Capacity Development. The 2–3-day conference will serve to discuss the findings of the study. The objectives of the conference will be (i) to enhance understanding of past experience of CD for service delivery in Pakistan in order to generate recommendations for improved CD support from development partners; (ii) identified ToRs for a joint process of diagnosis and design of joint CD support. The workshop and study will be documented in a publication.

19. The case studies will include an assessment of the following aspects of CD:

- (i) Capacity Assessment – what was assessed at the design stage? The part focuses on external as well as internal factors which shape capacity and begins with a focus on the outputs of the organization(s).
- (ii) Capacity Assessment – How was the capacity assessment conducted? The part focuses on the capacity assessment process, including ownership and participation issues.
- (iii) CD and Change-Enabling Environment and Commitment. In how far was the feasibility and likely success of CD and change determined by the domestic drive for and commitment to change, as well as by resistance and constraining factors in the context.
- (iv) CD and Change-Goals and Design Issues. In how far did the CD process benefit from clear results identification. Did the design consider promotion of change by working both on internal and external factors, and on both functional/technical and political dimensions of capacity.
- (v) External Support to CD – the demand and supply side. In how far did the demand for external support, as well as the quality of design and delivery of the external support analyzed. Were development partners aligning to domestic processes, and harmonizing initiatives and approaches?

20. The analysis will be broadly based on the checklist for Assessment for Capacity and Capacity Development Support which is based on the European Commission’s Aid Delivery Methods Concept Paper. It is intended to further analyze lessons learned with a view to

isolating key issues and themes, and best practices, if not principles, that might guide future CD operations in Pakistan and to summarize and promote the same as a guide to future CD.

### **C. Implementation Arrangements**

21. The study will be supervised by the Working Group on Sector Wide Approaches and Capacity Development which is jointly chaired by the Economic Affairs Division and ADB's Pakistan Resident Mission.

22. The study will be conducted on an intermittent and phased basis over the period September 2007 to April 2008. The consultants will work closely with all relevant ADB and other funding donor staff, Resident Missions and Offices and will support ADB and the other donor's staff to engage in the study as and when available during the course of other work.

23. It is intended that both the consultancy and the workshop(s) seek the involvement of all relevant development partners in Pakistan, including the provincial and local levels.

24. It is proposed that ADB hire a CD systems specialist/Team Leader who has strong CD experience and at least some experience of working in Pakistan and a local consultant with extensive experience in social sectors in a devolved context on an intermittent basis.

### **D. Cost and Financing**

25. The initial cost of the study, estimated at US-\$172,000, will be financed by a grant from ADB's TA funding program. The Regional Technical Assistance Project on a Governance and Capacity Development Initiative was approved in January 2007 and aims at strengthening the capacity orientation of country partnership strategies to be prepared in 2007 and 2008<sup>75</sup>.

### **E. Detailed Tasks of the Consultant(s)**

*Consultant A (international): Capacity Development Specialist (international, 2 person-months)*

26. The CD specialists will have a degree in social science, political science, or public administration and at least 15 years' experience in designing and implementing CD programs in the region. Experience with local government service delivery is required. The consultant will have contributed to the recent CD debate and should have experience in developing and applying capacity assessment tools at the local or sector level. The position requires strong facilitation and communication skills and long-term experience in the Asia and Pacific Region. The consultant will be responsible for the following tasks:

---

<sup>75</sup> ADB. REG-Governance and Capacity Development Initiative. Technical Assistance Paper. January 2007.

- (i) Review all relevant documentation and other literature pertaining to CD in service delivery in Pakistan. This will include: a) the ECDPM and DFID studies on Capacity Building for decentralized education service delivery in Pakistan and Punjab;<sup>76</sup> b) The Devolution in Pakistan study conducted by ADB/DfID/World Bank and the follow up study conducted by ADB; c) ADB and other donors evaluations of CD and service delivery in Pakistan, ADB and other donors evaluations of CD and modalities; d) CD policy papers of various donors.
- (ii) Review and report on new and emerging approaches to CD, including any which have not been tested in Pakistan.
- (iii) Review ADB's and other development partner CD documentation pertaining to service delivery in Pakistan. This will include documentation to be requested from EAD, provincial governments, World Bank, DfID, UNDP, CIDA, GTZ, and JICA through the working group on Swaps and CD.
- (iv) Discuss successful CD in Pakistan with EAD, ADB and other major donors with a view to preparing a long list of potential case studies.
- (v) Analyze lessons learned based on review of the literature and personal communications with a view to isolating possible key issues (in particular those issues that are likely to influence the demand for CD and incentives in a devolved context), themes, good practices and principles that might guide future CD in Pakistan and summarize them in a way which could be used as a guide to further conduct of the study, including possible case studies, possible workshop(s) agenda, and future CD in Pakistan.
- (vi) Review the CD checklist and propose a common set of questions and otherwise prepare an initial methodology for the preparation of proposed case studies of more successful CD.
- (vii) Visit two provinces and solicit the views of provincial and local governments and civil society stakeholders as to which CD interventions in service delivery were considered successful, what makes CD successful and sustainable, how development partners might better assist CD, and identify examples of more successful interventions.
- (viii) Draft a summary of possibly 8–10 initial example case studies of more successful CD. Selected case studies should reflect stakeholder interest to contribute to the study, coverage of a variety of CD circumstances, and ability to represent more innovative

---

<sup>76</sup> David Watson and Adnan Khan. 2005. Capacity and Capacity Building in the Punjab for Devolved Education Service Delivery: Comparing current approaches with international experience.

CD processes. Identify local case study writers, subcontract and support them during the initial drafting process.

- (ix) Conduct two write shops (one in each of the Provinces involved). Prepare a detailed outline, agenda, suggested invitees, facilitators, program of support and management, and costing for two write-shops on CD in service delivery in two Provinces that are likely to be held in the provincial capitals in December 2007 to January 2008.
- (x) Prepare a detailed outline, agenda, suggested invitees, facilitators, resource persons, program of support and management, and costing for a workshop(s) on CD in the Pakistan that is likely to be held in Islamabad in April 2008.
- (xi) Consult widely throughout Pakistan with government agencies, civil society and donor agencies to incorporate views and to build support for the proposed workshop(s).
- (xii) Serve as presenter and supervise the conduct of the workshop(s) and report on same.
- (xiii) Based on all works undertaken (literature review, interviews, case studies and workshops), analyze lessons learned with a view to isolating key issues, themes, good practices and principles that might guide future CD in Pakistan and summarize them in a way which could be used as a guide to future CD in the region.
- (xiv) Briefly analyze and comment on the demand for CD, including for specific forms of CD, in the Pakistan and any patterns of demand apparent at the Provincial and local level.
- (xv) Rationalize and provide tentative suggestions as to what characterizes more successful CD in Pakistan with a clear focus on the necessary supporting actions of development partners, governments and other stakeholders.
- (xvi) Ultimately identify by the end of the consultancy any changes needed in the roles and responsibilities of governments and development partners to build more successful partnerships to guide more effective CD interventions in the future.
- (xvii) At the completion of the study, review CD definitions and develop a proposed taxonomy of the different forms of CD, their objectives, different approaches, and other characteristics that meet the demands of successful CD in Pakistan and in the light of the findings of the study.
- (xviii) Produce a report on the entire exercise with executive summary detailing major lessons and directions to improve CD in Pakistan.

27. The CD specialist will prepare an initial report to be presented to the funding donors at the end of the second phase, possibly end January, 2008. Report(s) on each workshop(s) will also be prepared. A draft final report will be prepared toward the end of the third phase,



possibly by mid April 2008. This will be submitted to funding donors for review and comment prior to finalization of the report.

***Consultant B (national) Service Delivery/Devolution Specialist (6 months, intermittent)***

28. The service delivery/devolution specialists will have a degree in social science, political science, or public administration and at least 15 years experience in designing and implementing service delivery/devolution programs in Pakistan. Experience with local government service delivery is required. The consultant will have contributed to the recent service delivery/devolution debate and should have a good understanding of CD and CD concepts. The position requires strong facilitation and communication and writing skills. The consultant will be responsible for the following tasks:

- (i) Review all relevant documentation and other literature pertaining to CD in service delivery in Pakistan. This will include: a) the ECDPM and DFID studies on Capacity Building for decentralized education service delivery in Pakistan and Punjab;<sup>77</sup> b) The Devolution in Pakistan study conducted by ADB/DfID/World Bank and the follow up study conducted by ADB; c) ADB and other donors evaluations of CD and service delivery in Pakistan, ADB and other donors evaluations of CD and modalities; d) CD policy papers of various donors.
- (ii) Collect and review of ADB's and other development partner CD documentation pertaining to service delivery in Pakistan. This will include documentation to be requested from EAD, Provincial governments, World Bank, DfID, UNDP, CIDA, GTZ, and JICA through the working group on Swaps and CD.
- (iii) Participate in discussions on successful CD in Pakistan with EAD, ADB and other major donors with a view to preparing a long list of potential case studies.
- (iv) Support analysis of lessons learned based on review of the literature and personal communications with a view to isolating possible key issues (in particular those issues that are likely to influence the demand for CD and incentives in a devolved context), themes, good practices and principles that might guide future CD in Pakistan and summarize them in a way which could be used as a guide to further conduct of the study, including possible case studies, possible workshop(s) agenda, and future CD in Pakistan.
- (v) Liaise with the international consultant, PRM, ADB headquarters, and stakeholders at the national, provincial and local government levels.
- (vi) Conduct mapping exercise of CD in service delivery from August 2001 and end of December 2006.

---

<sup>77</sup> David Watson and Adnan Khan. 2005. Capacity and Capacity Building in the Punjab for Devolved Education Service Delivery: Comparing current approaches with international experience.

- (vii) Support review of the CD checklist and propose a common set of questions and otherwise prepare an initial methodology for the preparation of proposed case studies of more successful CD.
- (viii) Support identification of long lists of good practices in the two Provinces, including carrying out field work at the provincial and district levels.
- (ix) Make advance preparations and conducting follow-up activities for write shops, Working Group on Sector Wide Approaches and CD briefings, and conference follow-up activities, including preparing materials in Urdu.
- (x) Contribute to knowledge management activities in the respective countries, including updating provincial government web sites and information brochures and feeding material into ADB and other donor dissemination activities.
- (xi) Contribute to reports as required.

## APPENDIX 2: WRITE-SHOPS: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION<sup>78</sup>

A “write-shop” is a participatory workshop where people share their experiences in a particular area of interest through written cases; analyze their experiences, and relate them to larger concepts (literature and models). The write-shop allows participants to refine and deepen their understanding of an issue through reflection on practice. The lessons learned then help strengthen practice at the level of action (organization or community) and government and donor policy and support to a particular area. A write-shop normally leads to written products including policy briefs, case summaries, and sourcebooks for practice, case studies, training manuals, or brochures. Pioneered by the International Institute of Rural Reconstruction, other groups have adapted the basic write-shop process to suit their own needs. Development organizations have used write-shops for nearly twenty years.

The write-shop assembles people from various backgrounds with a common interest in the topic. No single person has a monopoly on knowledge—most is embedded in the collective memory and experiences of the group. Participants will also gather some knowledge from available data, such as reports and articles. Beyond those with direct experience, the organizers invite resource people to participate providing a complementary lens or perspective to the group. The write-shop provides the setting for validating information and exchanging ideas, resulting in improved cases and emerging conclusions for policy, practice, and better frameworks.

The write-shop process is characteristically iterative, normally subject to three rounds of discussions among all participants depending on the particular needs and objectives. The write-shop is rigorous, demanding significant amounts of time and effort from its participants—not only during the day, but often during some evening hours as writers struggle to revise and strengthen their cases. Before and after the write-shop, the participants will need to spend time editing, circulating, and revising their cases. Organizers normally engage a support team to take the final drafts and edit, illustrate, and publish them into desired products.

### THE BENEFITS OF THE WRITE-SHOP METHOD

The distinguishing feature of the write-shop is its emphasis on participation. Although getting everyone actively involved is challenging, the rewards are great. The write-shop method typically accomplishes much more than standard workshop models, for various reasons. First, it recognizes the participants themselves are the most important resource having much to contribute. By constantly engaging the participants in the discussions, they find opportunity to learn from one another. Second, it builds consensus among the participants. Finally, its design helps build up momentum creating synergies among

---

<sup>78</sup> Pete Malvicini, excerpt from a background document prepared for a workshop on the Pacific Scoping Study

participants – there is a general feeling of collective ownership of the publication, and thus a stronger desire to deliver results. Successful CD (and projects) includes participation. The write-shop becomes in itself a capacity enhancing experience by empowering a group of people.

### APPENDIX 3: DOCUMENTS TO WHICH REFERENCE WAS MADE DURING THE SCOPING STUDY

- ADB (2001a) *Report and Recommendations to the President: Access to Justice Program Loan Document Pakistan 32033* November 2001
- ADB (2001b) *Project Performance Audit Report: The Social Action Program (Sector) Project Loan 1301-PAK* November 2001
- ADB (2004) *Devolution in Pakistan (3 Volumes)* ADB, World Bank, DFID
- ADB (2006) *Integrating Capacity Development into Country Programs and Operations: Proposed Medium Term Framework and Action Plan* RSDD May 2006
- ADB () *Social Sector Evaluation* Evaluation Department ADB 2005
- ADB (2007) *Performance of Technical Assistance: ADB Special Evaluation Study*
- AKU-IED (2004) and SAHE *Effectiveness of In-Service Teacher Training Programs offered by University of Education, Lahore* Evaluation Report
- Alam, Khatib and Naveed *Aalia Community Led Approach to the Delivery of Quality Basic Education Faisalabad Area Upgrading Project* November 2001
- Ashraf, *A Northern Areas Education Project Management Development: Final Evaluation* November 2003
- Ashraf N et al *Report of the President's Task Force on Human Development* Islamabad, January 2002
- Banuri, T., Ali Dehlavi, and Abdul Hafeez *Policy Matters: A Vision for the National School of Public Policy* February 2003
- Boesen and Therkildsen (2005) *Results Oriented Approach to Capacity and Change* by Nils Boesen and Ole Therkildsen for DANIDA February 2005
- Bolger (2008) *ADB Pacific Capacity Development Scoping Study –Final Report* by Joe Bolger March 2008
- Brinkerhoff (2005) *Organizational Legitimacy, Capacity and Capacity Development* by Derick Brinkerhoff ECDPM Discussion Paper 58A June 2005
- Brinkerhoff (2007) *Capacity Development in Fragile States* by Derick Brinkerhoff / RTI with ECDPM May 2007
- CDGF (2007a) *Citizen's Perceptions Survey Report* June 2007 SPU, CDGF
- CDGF (2007b) *Employee Motivation Survey : Human Resource Management* July 2007 (both CDGF references available on SPU website [www.spu.com.pk](http://www.spu.com.pk) )
- Chapman, J. 2002. *System Failure: Why Governments Must Learn to Think Differently*, 2nd ed. London: Demos. [www.demos.co.uk/catalogue/systemfailure2/](http://www.demos.co.uk/catalogue/systemfailure2/)

- Cheema and Mohmand (2003) *Local Government Reforms in Pakistan: Legitimising Centralisation or a Driver for Pro-Poor Change?* Thematic Paper for DFID's Drivers of Change Study (Mimeo)
- Cheema A., Khwaja A.I., Qadir A. *Decentralization in Pakistan: Context, Content and Causes* (1st Draft) January 2004 prepared for Decentralization in Developing Countries: a Comparative Perspective by D. Mookherjee and P Bardhan
- DFID (2006) *Technical Assistance: How To Note* DFID
- DTCE (2005) *Social Audit 2004/05* by CIET International for DTCE 2005
- Easterly (2003) *The Political Economy of Growth without Development: A Case Study of Pakistan* in Dani Rodrik (ed) *In Search of Prosperity* Princeton University Press
- European Commission *Aid Delivery Methods Program: Checklist for Capacity Development Support*
- European Commission (2005). *Institutional Assessment and Capacity Development, why, what and how?*
- ECDPM (2005) *Study on Capacity Change and Performance Interim Report* – Peter Morgan, Tony Land and Heather Baser ECDPM Discussion Paper 59A April 2005
- ECDPM (forthcoming) *Synthesis Report on the ECDPM Study of Capacity Change and Performance* by Peter Morgan, Heather Baser and Tony Land ECDPM (forthcoming)
- Eyben (2005) *Donors' Learning Difficulties: Results, Relationships and Responsibilities* by Rosalind Eyben IDS Bulletin Vol 36 No 3 September 2005
- GoPj (2006) *Capacity Building Framework for Punjab* Punjab Resource Management Program P+D Dept Lahore 2006
- Gray D (2003a) *Report for DFIDP on Performance Budgeting Training for Government of Punjab* April 2003
- Gray D (2003b) *Fiscal Devolution Technical Assistance Project Completion Report* for ADB October 2003
- IDS (2008) 'Capacity for a Change': Proceedings of a Capacity Collective Workshop under the auspices of the University of Sussex in 2007, accessed via [http://www.dgroups.org/groups/pelican/docs/Capacity\\_for\\_a\\_change.pdf?ois=no](http://www.dgroups.org/groups/pelican/docs/Capacity_for_a_change.pdf?ois=no)
- Islam (2004) *Sifarish, Sycophants, Power and Collectivism: Administrative Culture in Pakistan* by Nasir Islam in *International Review of Administrative Sciences* Vol 70 (2) 2004
- Khan (2005) *Straddling State and Society: Devolution and Pakistan's Ambiguous Associations* Decentralization Support Program ADB Islamabad
- Khan (2007) *Devolution and the Politics of Pro-Poor Change* by Adnan Qadir Khan Queens University, Canada 2007
- Killick and Shah (2006) *Improving Aid in Pakistan – Issues Paper for the Pakistan Development Forum* (supported by Donor Poverty Reduction Working Group) by Tony Killick and Qaim Shah May 2006

- Mohmand (2005) *Local Government Reforms in Pakistan: Strengthening Social Capital or Rolling Back the State?* Working Paper Lahore University of Management Sciences
- Morgan and Quaiman *Institutional and Capacity development: Results Based Management and Organizational Performance* by Peter Morgan and Ann Quaiman for CIDA June 1996
- Morgan (1997) *The Design and Use of Capacity Development Indicators* by Peter Morgan for CIDA December 1997
- Morgan (1998) *Capacity and Capacity Development: Some Strategies* Peter Morgan (for CIDA) October 1998
- Morgan (1999) *Update on Performance Monitoring of Capacity Development: What are we Learning?* By Peter Morgan (for CIDA) October 1999
- NRB (2007) *Donors, Devolution and Development: Aligning Support to MDGs and Devolution* (International Conference on MDGs) April 2007 NRB
- OECD/DAC (2006) *The Challenge of Capacity Development: Working Towards Good Practice* DAC Governance Network February 2006
- OECD (2007) *2006 Synthesis Report on the Monitoring of the Paris Declaration: Overview of Results* OECD 2007
- Ostrom et al (2002) *Aid, Incentives and Sustainability: An Institutional Analysis of Development Co-operation* (Summary Report) by Elinor Ostrom et al SIDA Studies in Evaluation 02/01:1 2002
- Piracha M (2007) *Governance Assessment - Devolution* M Piracha et al for ADB
- Siddiqua (2007) *'Military Inc. Inside Pakistan's Military Economy'* by Ayesha Siddiqua Pluto Press, London 2007
- Siddiqui (2005) *Dynamics of Social Change* by Tasneem Ahmad Siddiqui Sama Publishing 2005
- Siddiqui (1998) *Katchi Abadis: The Problem, and Ways to a Solution* Tasneem Ahmad Siddiqui November 1998
- UNDP (2006) *Mid-Term Evaluation : Gender Support Program* UNDP 2006
- UNDP (2008) *Human Development Report 2007/2008* (UNDP 2008)
- Watson Alvi and Alam (2008) *Final Draft Human Resource Management Case Study* for CDGF and DFID February 2008 by D Watson, M Alvi and K Alam
- Watson and Khan (2005a) *Capacity Building for Decentralized Education Service Delivery in Pakistan* by David Watson and Adnan Khan (Discussion Paper 57G) Maastricht: European Center for Development Policy Management June 2005
- Watson and Khan (2005b) *Capacity and Capacity Building in the Punjab for Devolved Education Service Delivery: Comparing Current Approaches with International Experience* by David Watson and Adnan Khan – Discussion Paper commissioned by DFIDP February 2005

Watson (2006) *Monitoring and Evaluation of Capacity and Capacity Development* (ECDPM Discussion Paper, No. 58B). Maastricht: European Center for Development Policy Management June 2006

Wheatley, M. and Kellner-Rogers, M. 1999. *What do we measure and why? Questions about the uses of measurement*. Journal for Strategic Resource Measurement 1999

Williamson (2005) *Improving Social Services Delivery in the Punjab* by Tim Williamson et al (for ADB / DFID)

World Bank (1999) *A Framework for Civil Service Reforms in Pakistan* (1999)

World Bank (2002) *Completion Report Social Action Program (II)* April 2002

World Bank (2006) *Partnering with NGOs to Strengthen Management: An External Evaluation of the Chief Minister's Initiative on Primary Health Care in Rahim Yar Khan District, Punjab South Asia* Human development Sector Report No 13 March 2006

Zaidi (2001) *Can the Public Sector Deliver? An Examination of the Work of the Sindh Katchi Abadi Authority* by S Akbar Zaidi UNDP / LIFE 2001

Zaidi (2005) *Task Force on Municipal Services: Setting Directions for Good Governance* Government of Sindh compiled by S Akbar Zaidi 2005



APPENDIX 4: SUMMARY OF CHARACTERISTICS OF CASES IN THE PAKISTAN CAPACITY STUDY SAMPLE

Title / Nature Of Case	Location / Level	Funding / Duration	Donor / Ta Involvement	Capacity Issues / Themes Illustrated
<b>Orangi Pilot Project OPP</b> <b>Provision of basic sanitation and water infrastructure.</b>	Karachi urban 'katchi abadi' settlements	1980 - BCCI Endowment + Communities	Various donors No donor TA	Voluntary influential benefactor initiative; some donor funding; needs-based community capacity mobilization; values-driven; no master-plans for CD; all parties learning from experience; progressively more engagement and influencing of government via highly credible advocacy based on firm coalition of community interests. Little or no donor influence.
<b>National Water Course Improvements Project NWCIP PMIU Sindh</b> <b>Upgrading of water-courses for irrigation in numerous sites.</b>	Rural irrigation-fed areas of Sindh Province A component of Federal Program	2004 - Province - PMIU Federal for Program WCA in-kind contribution: labor	World Bank (financing transferred from an ongoing project) No donor TA funding or foreign TA	Political 'protection'; freedom to establish 'lean' corporate-style PMIU (and District Teams) according to needs and merit based recruitment; no CD master-plan; inventorisation of and innovative intro of GIS for recording and mapping infrastructure; problem-solving, learning-oriented, paper-less monitoring and evidence-based planning; intensive systematic training and job-specification; 'unleashing' of community (WCA) capacities; issues in national consultants' selection and in federal planning processes and PC1.

Title / Nature Of Case	Location / Level	Funding / Duration	Donor / Ta Involvement	Capacity Issues / Themes Illustrated
<b>Punjab Resource Management Program PRMP Urgently-required public finance and civil service reforms</b>	Punjab Provincial Government	2003 -2010	ADB program loan(s)  TA long- and short-term	Sequencing of reforms and modular flexibility within very comprehensive program oriented to influencing high-level policy; progressive development of ownership; major emphasis on training, through use of international (civil service college) contractor; questions arising concerning limited actual change in 'culture' of public appointments and transfers, and in perpetuation of Provincial government resistance to devolution to Districts.
<b>Strategic Policy Unit SPU Only 'pure' District government capacity development case.</b>	City District Govt. Faisalabad	2004 - 2008	DFID  Long-term TA + capital contributions	Four-year donor financial commitment. Sustained top-level political and official commitment to establishment of SPU, with Departmental representatives. Assessments of sector departmental 'baseline' and needs; flexible capacity development planning; emphasis on HRD and establishing and using information systems (Financial, Human Resources, Geographical, Revenue) + job-definition + systematic training. Performance incentives and quarterly (collective) reviews for HoDs; major surveys of staff and citizens' opinions; results fed back to management. New Provincial funding for continuation.

Title / Nature Of Case	Location / Level	Funding / Duration	Donor / Ta Involvement	Capacity Issues / Themes Illustrated
<b>Chief Minister's Initiative in Primary Health Care CMIPHC 'Out-sourcing' of health services management to NGO.</b>	RYK District Punjab then 11 others in Punjab, then national	2003 - District health budgets	No TA	Provincial + District governments partnerships defined in specific performance-level contracts with NGO, giving protection from political and administrative interference in management of key staff. Impacts positive on cost-effectiveness; doctors' + staff attendance and attitude; patient use, service delivered, community mobilization and co-ordination (via monthly meetings) with other health services. Issues include under-mining of CMIPHC by Provincial bureaucracy due to loss of patronage over medical staff; tendency of Districts to 'abdicate' responsibilities; limited District health management capacity development so far; no improvement in preventative services; concerns about doctors' limited skills and sustainability of the model (despite its now being applied on national scale).
<b>Punjab Education Sector Reform Program PESRP Major Province/MDB-supported program to enhance access to education, and now its quality.</b>	Punjab province-wide PMIU in Lahore	2003 - 2010	Punjab government World Bank District governments No TA component	Top-level political commitment and protection to management of new PMIU; innovative leadership by initial Director; intensive capacity development in monitoring of needs-based resource-injection, resource-use and introduction of incentives for District engagement and girls education; facilitation and regulation of private capacities. Issues arising about cost-effectiveness and sustainability given small impact on Provincial Education Department, difficulties of translating Provincial policy into Districts, of improving and monitoring quality of education at District level, and the recent loss of the former key political patron.

Title / Nature Of Case	Location / Level	Funding / Duration	Donor / Ta Involvement	Capacity Issues / Themes Illustrated
<p><b>Directorate of Staff Development Education Department DSD</b></p> <p><b>Introduction of internationally-recognized approaches to teachers' in-service training.</b></p>	<p>Punjab province – wide</p> <p>DSD in Lahore</p>	<p>2005 –</p> <p>Punjab government</p>	<p>Various donors</p> <p>Some long- and short-term TA</p>	<p>Evaluation of earlier attempts aided recognition of the ineffectiveness of past approaches to in-service training of teachers; illustration of institutional complexity of any efforts raising professional quality of service delivery; and need for participative approaches in building ownership and consensus (including among donors). Case illustrates application of rigorous 'cascade' training complemented by incentivisation and professionalisation of teachers (including career development). Issues include weight of mandate on limited professional resources located in DSD; absence of over-arching education policy to facilitate DSD role and link it to other agencies activities; past 'protection' of Director.</p>
<p><b>National Highways and Motorways Police NHMP</b></p> <p><b>Creation and operation of a distinct traffic police force, using internationally-recognized approaches and standards.</b></p>	<p>Federal police force</p> <p>National coverage</p>	<p>Federal government</p>	<p>No donors or TA</p>	<p>Top level political commitment to operation of prestige infrastructure project, and police role in that; uncompromising early (and continued) leadership and 'undiluted' management command exercised through Standard Operating Procedures; need for negotiation of adequate resources to permit a 'living wage' and conducive working conditions; equal application of laws, and destruction of culture of elite 'impunity'; strictly meritocratic recruitment and performance assessment; public praise and appreciation. Issues include limitations of model due to absence of overall policy and/or implementation on regulation of transport, vehicles and driver testing and licensing, road engineering, driver and pedestrian education: all contributing to a hostile overall traffic environment outside motorways.</p>

Title / Nature Of Case	Location / Level	Funding / Duration	Donor / Ta Involvement	Capacity Issues / Themes Illustrated
<p><b>Gender Justice through Musalihat Anjuman Project GJTMAP</b></p> <p><b>Introduction of Alternative Dispute Resolution in new local courts impacting on gender issues and family welfare.</b></p>	<p>All Provinces: now in 20 Districts; PMU in Islamabad</p>	<p>2005 - 2011</p> <p>Federal, Provincial, District budgets</p>	<p>NORAD, DFID, SDC, UNDP (NEX)</p> <p>Short-term TA</p>	<p>Illustration of need for partnerships between, many types of stakeholders (judicial and legal professional, police, provincial and local government); and therefore need for advocacy if an unfamiliar concept is to be accepted. Significance of accurate and sensitive representation of religious principles in materials and training governing justice and individual rights. Innovations included orientation of males to the need for better gender-oriented justice. Major issues in establishing geographically-dispersed project teams, where local patrons' 'protection' has been variable (and therefore politically-motivated transfers intrude); serious issues of mobility and vocal representation of women on MAs, and need for stronger MAJA role: illustrates the importance of high calibre leadership skills in project managers. Donor commitment periods, fund-phasing and reliability have proved very difficult to manage in view of the complexity of the project's financial structure, and fragility of its delivery capacity established.</p>

Title / Nature Of Case	Location / Level	Funding / Duration	Donor / Ta Involvement	Capacity Issues / Themes Illustrated
<p><b>Women's Political School WPS</b></p> <p><b>Training of large numbers of new-elected women members of local assemblies.</b></p>	All Provinces	2004 – 2007 \$4.5 million	UNDP (NEX), NORAD, SDC  Short-term TA	Case where assistance of umbrella Gender Support Program crucial; prior inventorisation of training, ex-trainers and materials already undertaken / in existence. Illustrated need for careful preparation of materials (using simple concepts) for largely illiterate trainees; development and co-option of Local Government Academies as decentralised training providers; use of master-trainers; and the need for post-course periodic 'refresher' training and follow-up support through some form of local resource or documentation centers. Male representatives were a crucial complementary target group of the women's training. Also illustrated the vital need for advocacy components in such projects, and longer and more reliable donor funding commitments.
<p><b>Citizens' Police Liaison Committee CPLC + Public Safety Commission PSC</b></p> <p><b>Accountability of the police: addressed thru two distinct bodies.</b></p>	Faisalabad City	CPLC 2001 – Voluntary (business community)  PSC 2003 - Punjab and local government	No TA delivered (but is committed from ADB AJP)	Illustrates the contrast in commitment towards, performance of, and utility of two types of bodies oriented towards better accountability of the police. The CPLC is apolitical, voluntarily financed and run, and is highly valued and generally successful. The PSC has been dogged by (apparently) politicised membership; poor and unreliable funding commitments (and therefore staffing), requiring Chairman to subsidize operations personally; apparent unwillingness of Provincial authorities to implement LGO 2001 provisions in regard to police accountability to the public.

Title / Nature Of Case	Location / Level	Funding / Duration	Donor / Ta Involvement	Capacity Issues / Themes Illustrated
<p><b>Trade Related Technical Assistance TRTA</b></p> <p><b>C1 = Awareness raising on trade and negotiating</b></p> <p><b>C2 = CD for Export product testing laboratories</b></p> <p><b>C3 = CD in institutions for Intellectual Property protection</b></p>	Islamabad and Karachi institutions	<p>2004 - 2007</p> <p>Over € 12 million government funding contributions</p>	<p>EC</p> <p>TA in all three components</p> <p>C1 = ITC</p> <p>C2 = UNIDO</p> <p>C3 = WIPO</p>	<p>Issues in C1 included Ministry of Commerce ownership and sustainability of future (re-) training capacities after problems with retention and turnover of trained staff. Cs2&amp;3 illustrate advantages of good baseline assessments, and of having clear 'target' standards to aim at in 'conformity assessment' infrastructure, of a clear and practical work-plan drawn up by well-experienced contractors, who commanded respect and thus leveraged major government financial commitments to existing/new institutions' development. Steering Committee established, but could have done more to spread 'learning' between what transpired to be diverse component capacity development experiences.</p>

## APPENDIX 5: SUMMARIES OF CASE STUDIES

### ORANGI PILOT PROJECT (OPP) INSTITUTIONS

OPP was established in 1980 by Dr Akhtar Hameed Khan to serve the needs of poor *katchi abadi* dwellers in Karachi for basic sanitation and drainage infrastructure. They housed over 60% of its population at that time. OPP's philosophy was to grow gradually, in response to community demands, to support (not to subsidise) community efforts through action-research into needs and how they might be met, to guide communities, to apply low-cost technologies in design, to liaise with (not compete with) government agencies on the design and construction of main sewerage and drainage systems, and to avoid confrontation with local politicians. The emphasis is always on replicability through further community-propelled efforts. The most experienced community members of Lane Organizations in earlier schemes become the trainers of fellow *katchi abadi* dwellers in future. OPP trained local masons and artisans in the new simple technologies it had pioneered, in order that Lane Organizations would not have to rely on contractors. It recruited local architects from universities. OPP influenced the nature and content of the National Sanitation Policy approved by the Government of Sindh in 2006, which embodies the OPP 'model'. The Karachi Water and Sewage Board has prepared a master plan for sewage disposal which relied on OPP maps and inputs. OPP has a wide network of partners - NGOs and government agencies - which have benefited from OPP training programs. OPP's approach to monitoring is to convene meetings of staff from its various institutions regularly to reflect on experience, to be self-critical, and to learn from each other. It has also ensured that its experience and insights are well-documented. The case illustrates that much more attention needs to be placed on interaction at the planning stage between government and potential beneficiary communities, so that their inputs, mobilization, and participation throughout can be ensured, and designs (and implementation modalities) can reflect local perspectives and capacities, and expensive contractors can be avoided. In this way, sustained maintenance of the infrastructure created, is more likely. Urgent attention is needed to government design and construction standards (and costs) for urban infrastructure - based on OPP experience. Government should never underestimate the 'latent' capacities of communities, and their abilities and willingness to share costs if partners in schemes or projects fulfil their side of the bargain.

### PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION MONITORING UNIT (PIMU): NATIONAL PROGRAM FOR WATER COURSE IMPROVEMENT (NPIW) SINDH

The Sindh Province's program for water-course improvement is one part of this strategic federal government-financed nation-wide program intended to make radical improvements in the efficiency of the utilization of progressively scarcer irrigation water at a time of mounting demand for such water. Registered Water Course User Associations undertake the practical work, under the guidance of Department of Agriculture Field Teams. The role of the Program Monitoring Unit was to ensure design and construction standards were



established and maintained, and to track progress constructively: i.e. to spot problems or bottlenecks in implementation and to help correct them. The challenge was to keep track of developments in thousands of sites all over Sindh Province. The Director of the PMU was able to establish the Unit with a free hand (the PMU had not been anticipated in the PC1), and it quickly became apparent that the data on which the PC1 had been based was wrong. The first task of the PMU was to conduct an inventory of watercourses in the Province: it then successfully persuaded the Steering Committees to change the PC1 in this light. This inventory became the basis for an Information System, which incorporated IT systems including Geographical Positioning Systems (using satellite technology) and Geographical Information Systems, which enabled paperless weekly reporting from sites. The net result was a twenty-fold increase in schemes completed per year, within 18 months of the PMU being set up. District Teams (260 in number, comprising thousands of staff) were trained intensively, to supervise schemes – including by using consultants – according to detailed manuals prepared by the PMU. Water Course Associations were helped to become registered and organized to meet ambitious annual programs. The ‘protection’ afforded by the PMU’s position in the Chief Minister’s Office helped prevent political interference in program implementation. Instead, merit-based recruitment and consistently high performance became primary characteristics of enlightened team management, and the subsequent reward and progression of individuals. In retrospect however, the PMU team reflects that capacity was developed ‘by accident’: there was no detailed plan!

#### PUNJAB RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM (PRMP)

PRMP was born as a GoPj/ADB joint approach to tackling grave public financial resource crises with a view to achieving the Vision 2020 of the Chief Minister. While its primary focus has been strengthening Provincial finances, it is also concerned with realignment of provincial institutions to promote pro-poor service delivery in the Districts, and to promote growth and income generation in the private sector. Formulation in 2006 was marked by close GoPj/ADB collaboration; a flexible modular-based design; high-level Steering and Executive Committees (which actually function?); regular stakeholder forums; jointly assessed progress in implementation (which is leading to enhanced and broadened ‘ownership’ within the Provincial government); a major and broad-based Capacity Building Initiative of training programs here and overseas, involving strengthened training capacities here; the establishment of a Change Management Wing in S&GAD, and work towards public service reform through a Civil Service Reform Task Force under the Chief Secretary. Issues include sequencing of reforms (tax revenue reform is coming after ‘softer’ reforms).

#### STRATEGIC POLICY UNIT (SPU) – CITY DISTRICT GOVERNMENT FAISALABAD

This case represents the only major effort to build District government capacities to manage resources under devolved governance since the reforms of 2001. The SPU was established in the DCO’s office in 2002 as one element in CDGF’s response to the Punjab Local

Government Ordinance 2001. CDGF has been assisted by a group of consultants (GHK) who were already familiar with the city, having supported the Faisalabad Area Upgrading Project in the 1990s. The SPU is the 'Think Tank' of the CDGF: the interface between CDGF management and the consultants; the facilitator of the Corporate Plan and Strategic Operational Plans for all Departments; the developer of the human resource, financial management and revenue management information systems (HRMIS, FMIS and RMIS) and latterly of a Geographical Information System (for planning, building control and revenue generation purposes); the generator of the process of preparing job descriptions for all employees and of content for the numerous training programs mounted since 2004, and is the supporter of the major budget and expenditure management efforts of the Finance Department. Extensive Citizens' Perceptions and Employee Motivation Surveys designed and processed in the SPU have provided important (and salutary) information on which to base future services and staff development strategies. Yet there is still no District control over APT for senior staff, and no District Cadre. There are prospects however of Provincial government funding for continued reforms, and for 'showcasing' CDGF for other Districts contemplating major reforms and associated capacity development.

#### CHIEF MINISTER'S INITIATIVE ON PRIMARY HEALTH CARE (CMIPHC)

Born out of an experiment by an imaginative Minister in one District, sorely under-served by its health facilities, this program has been replicated first at the behest of the Chief Minister in eleven other Districts of the Punjab, and then nationally. It involves the 'outsourcing' of the management of District Basic Health Units and other facilities by Districts to the Punjab Rural Support Program (PRSP). This organization receives District health budgets; took over District staff in post; recruits non-medical professionals as District Support Managers (at Provincial government expense), and any other staff needed but not in post when they took over (including and especially doctors: paid higher salaries by PRSP). A third-party evaluation by the World Bank (NB this was not a donor) indicated major improvements in staff attendance, drug availability and efficiency (22% savings) in budget use. Public satisfaction with performance enhancements have led to community contributions, which permit more work with communities and schools in health extension campaigns. Issues still surround the future of District government health management capacities (which is leading to near-abdication of their responsibilities); the relative neglect of 'outreach' preventative medical services (sanitary inspection; vaccination staff; Lady Health Workers are not under PRSP control), and erosion of bureaucracy support and consequent need for more 'fire-fighting' on PRSP's part.

#### PROGRAM MONITORING AND IMPLEMENTATION UNIT (PMIU) PUNJAB EDUCATION SECTOR REFORM PROGRAM (PESRP) 2003-2006 AND 2007-2010

Represents the largest single initiative to enhance access to, and ultimately quality of, public education services in the Punjab. The World Bank is supporting GoPj in financing this program, which is managed and monitored by the Project Monitoring and Implementation

Unit (PMIU). The evolution and role of the PMIU is of particular interest in this case. With almost no technical assistance, it has introduced innovative people- and resource-management practices (including 'terms of Partnership' agreements with Districts); developed and used databases of education facilities, resource injections, teachers and their postings; managed the recruitment of over 80,000 teachers; introduced incentives for girls' education; re-vamped the Punjab Education Foundation (the private/public sector interface), and begun capacity development for Districts' Education staff, especially in management. Issues arise however in the limited 'spin-off' of capacities from PMIU into the Education Department as a whole; the future role of Districts in managing and monitoring education; continued difficulties in establishment and (particularly) sustainability of School Councils; and whether the PMIU will continue to be insulated from interference in its staffing and role.

#### DEPARTMENT OF STAFF DEVELOPMENT (DSD): PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF TEACHERS

The current initiative – based on the philosophy of Continuous Professional Development of teachers, who represent the foundation of quality-enhancement in education – emerged from a massive (but abortive) attempt to upgrade teachers in in-service training in 2002/3. The DSD approach represents a break from the traditional thinking which characterized earlier efforts; a participative approach to the progressive introduction of international best practice in teacher development, including decentralized in-service training through carefully selected and trained teacher-trainers working in established centers, serving clusters of schools; strict co-ordination of inputs from a variety of donors; close attention to the career development incentives facing teachers; and pressure for better integration of all stakeholders involved in enhancing the quality of education (public and private), in a clearer policy context, but in a 'web of political and organizational interests'.

#### NATIONAL HIGHWAY AND MOTORWAY POLICE (NHMP)

The then Prime Minister mandated the establishment of the NHMP in 1997. From modest beginnings, hurriedly staffed by 500 deputed officers from regular police forces, to enforce road rules and safety on the first stretch of 336km of motorway in Pakistan, it has grown to an exemplary specialized police service of over 5,000 officers covering 3,400km of motorways. This has occurred despite the prevailing national traffic and driving culture, with non-adherence to rules, and weak administration of, and adherence to, various vehicle and driver standards licensing regimes. NHMP stands and functions in sharp contrast to the regular police service, and has won much public confidence. Key features of this case include: top level political 'will' (backing and 'protection' from interference); capacity and performance goals clear from the outset; demand-led NHMP-financed intensive training (including overseas) of new inductees to specified and uncompromising performance standards; close supervision and performance appraisal; good working conditions and up-to-date vehicles and equipment; zero tolerance of corrupt transactions with motorists; equal application of the law (including to 'VIPs') and promotion of a road safety culture. However,

the case raises questions about the reasons for the lack of progress in the 'wider system' (incl. licensing, public and driver education on road safety, routine traffic policing, road infrastructure design and engineering). These and other concerns are raised about the wisdom of 'keeping NHMP prominent'. Its 'ripples' risk remaining mere ripples!

#### GENDER JUSTICE THROUGH MUSALIHAT ANJUMAN PROJECT (GJTMAP) 2005-6 AND 2007-11

This pioneering project has attempted to apply the provisions of LGO 2001 concerning access to justice for women through new informal courts to be established following the principles of alternative dispute resolution (ADR). The project started initially for two years (2005-6) in 8 pilot Districts (two in each Province). Thereafter, based on positive evaluation, it has been extended until 2011 spread over 12 more Districts. So far, the rate of settlement of cases in the MA courts is over 60%. The project team put in place has proved highly effective in forging consensus among a wide variety of stakeholders at various levels of government (from judges, lawyers, the police - particularly important for the referral of cases - to officials within MLGRD, to District and Union officials) and among NGOs. MA Support Services (MASS) and MA Justice Advocate (MAJA) have also been set up; Rules of Business of the MAs have been drafted consultatively; development of practical but legally accurate materials has taken place, and subsequently intensive training has been given to members of the MAs. Key insights include the importance of including awareness raising and advocacy as an element of such programs; the need for strict control of quality of trainer-training, and the importance of clarity and specificity in the legal content of materials. Challenges included budget reductions (due to donor program phasing and other constraints), and politically-motivated local government staff transfers.

#### WOMEN'S' POLITICAL SCHOOL (WPS) 2004 - 07

WPS represented a follow-up effort to an earlier initiative (Women's Political Participation Project - WP3) and was concerned with the preparation of over 23,000 newly-elected women political representatives for office in District and Union Councils. Implemented through the Ministry of Women's Development, WPS took a decentralized approach integrating and building capacities in existing local government institutions (including Local Government Academies). It used the resource-pool of trainers remaining from WP3, to reach all Districts using local women as trainers, who needed orientation in political issues, having modest educational backgrounds. Training needs analysis, and mapping of earlier training efforts and materials thus available, preceded curriculum development. Training of male representatives was an innovative (and successful) element of the program. Implementation challenges included: turnover of project staff; the need for familiarity with GoP Project Cycle Management Manual (PCOM); and the omission of comprehensive provision of Resource and Documentation Centers to provide field back-up to ex-trainees, and of a sorely-needed advocacy component. Although training was monitored in terms of conduct and inputs, and a database of trainees was constructed, there was little follow-up in the field to assess the

extent to which newly-elected women political representatives were able to apply their training. Questions remain as to the commitment of donors to such ventures, in view of the limited time available to reach such a large and dispersed target group, and the inevitable need to repeat such programs in future.

#### FAISALABAD CITIZEN POLICE LIAISON COMMITTEE (CPLC) AND DISTRICT PUBLIC SAFETY AND POLICE COMPLAINTS COMMISSION (PSC/PCC)

The legal provisions affecting the role and accountability of the Police were revised – after 141 years (!) – in 2002 in the Punjab Police Ordinance, which was itself revised (some argue to its detriment, because of its growing politicization) in 2004. Public accountability of the police underpins this case. The Faisalabad CPLC was established in 2001 along the voluntary lines of the Karachi ‘model’, by similarly motivated private industrialists. It is active and effective, and liaises regularly between public and the police, using information technology. The DPSC although foreseen in the PO as having an oversight role, has been marked by changing chairmanship and membership, vacancies in most key posts, persistent shortage of budget, and periods of non-existence. Its capacity development is the responsibility of the CPLC. None has taken place yet (despite provision for it in the ADB Access to Justice Program), because of the shortages of key DPSC staff. Indeed there appears to be minimal interaction between the two bodies. Questions are raised in the case regarding the apparent willingness of Provincial and District police authorities to be subject to public scrutiny, and therefore their commitment to the DPS/PCC.

#### TRADE RELATED TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE (TRTA) 2003 – 2007

This project seeks to assist Pakistan in building the necessary capacity to address trade-related issues, thereby fostering its integration into the world economy and ultimately contributing to poverty alleviation. Its three components include (1) creating awareness and capacity building on trade and WTO negotiations, notably for Government officials and private sector representatives; (2) improving Pakistan’s institutional structure for checking standards and quality control, focusing on key export sectors (e.g., fisheries, textiles and agro-food processing) and (3) Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) in Pakistan through the establishment of Intellectual Property Organization-Pakistan and by upgrading relevant IPR institutes in Pakistan. (1) is implemented by International Trade Center (ITC) with the Ministry of Commerce as focal point; (2) is implemented by United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) with the Ministry of Science & Technology as focal point, (3) is implemented by ITC through a sub-contract with World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). IPO-Pakistan acting as a focal point. Capacity issues raised include: need for better ‘mapping’ of potential counterpart institutions (affecting future replication) in (1); highly effective baseline assessment and conduct of TA to well-defined institutional performance standards in (2); and major GoP financial and other commitment in both (2) and (3) leading to effective institution building. Steering Committee performance was questionable in this case.

## APPENDIX 6: ISSUES AFFECTING CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT IN THE PAKISTAN PUBLIC SERVICE

Given the public service context summarized in the main text, and the evidence from recent attempts at capacity enhancement, we note the broad issues here in two categories: those affecting the public service; and a second of those arising within funding agencies (i.e. Multilateral Development Banks) affecting their readiness flexibility and ability to address capacity development effectively.

### WITHIN THE PUBLIC SERVICE OF PAKISTAN

A range of indigenous factors and practices appear to affect capacity development within the public service. They include:

#### *The historical, political and cultural context*

- (i) Pakistan's democratic tradition has remained questionable, at best. Having inherited a highly centralized colonial state, dominated by a strong bureaucracy and military, democracy in Pakistan has had a flawed history with the state largely retaining the capacity to operate autonomously of popular pressures. Prior social structure (biraderi, tribes etc) considerations reigned supreme in the colonial government's calculus of co-opting native elites that helped establish territorial nexus of administration with patrimonial politics (Waseem 1994)<sup>79</sup>. The colonial practice of curtailing local politics and privileging executive/bureaucratic systems of rule established a model of patrimonial politics. Craig and Porter (2005) argue that this engineered political system provided little incentives to organize parties as a mechanism to consolidate power or stand on a social manifesto through which to create ties with constituents and enabled those already dominant to use legislative, fiscal and administrative instruments to protect the status quo.<sup>80</sup> Politics in Pakistan is characterized by the personalization of the political sphere. Within this model of patrimonialism, political ties are largely based on leadership-centred, informal groupings. The presence of such entrenched local power weakens the ability of state to ensure or enforce basic citizens' entitlements (Mohmand 2005)<sup>81</sup>. This is borne out by Pakistan's development experience which is marked by significant social development gap and by grave inequities of development outcomes

---

<sup>79</sup> Waseem, M. (1994). *Politics and the State in Pakistan*. Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research

<sup>80</sup> Pete Malvicini, excerpt from a background document prepared for a workshop on the Pacific Scoping Study

<sup>81</sup> Mohmand, S. (2005) "Local Government Reforms in Pakistan: Strengthening Social Capital or Rolling Back the State", Working Paper, Lahore University of Management Sciences

and by an emphasis on providing targeted goods rather than universal goods (Easterly 2003)<sup>82</sup>.

- (ii) A factor which may be significant in terms of the context in which reforms are being attempted, and in which relevant capacities developed, is the fact that public awareness (and expectations?) of various sectoral reforms is low. This is reportedly the case among professionals such as lawyers in the case of the major Access to Justice Reforms Program. This factor may be a cause of limited public, pressure-group, media, and parliamentary pressures on the executive to deliver, or at least account for the huge volume of resources devoted to pursuit of these reforms.
- (iii) Other commentators are more pessimistic, and implicitly cast doubt on the efficacy of greater public awareness. They opine that lack of concerted public or user-group pressure for social service improvements is at least in part due to the legacy of the feudal structure of Pakistan society.<sup>83</sup> Historical and cultural factors impede the abilities of civil servants to serve the public without favor (as outlined above in the 'context' section).

#### *Issues within the civil service*

- (i) A generic issue affecting all levels of state bureaucracy is the propensity to transfer senior officials (and even middle-ranking officials at District level) frequently. This may relate to established norms of service duration; fears of abuse of office from over-long familiarity with associated organizational or personal networks, or other factors (including political / electoral factors, and perceived 'loyalty'). This has been cited by most informants as a factor not only negatively affecting the impact of any specialized training provided by donors as part of capacity-developmental initiatives. Continuous 'churn' of incumbents of key posts means that there is often too little time for productive and sustained application of new learning. Rapid turnover of key managerial staff also precludes team-building and development of organizational units as better-functioning entities. Frequent change of top management bodes ill for the establishment and sustained operation of improved processes or coaching and nurturing of the careers of the immediate subordinates of key managers.
- (ii) One of the other generic factor at play within the public service as a whole, is the perceived lack of incentives - for individuals undertaking or participating in some form of capacity-development program - to apply consistently and over a period of time, any learning or innovative approaches derived from training, workshops or international study tour exposure. Job descriptions - even if they are available and

---

<sup>82</sup> Easterly, W. (2003). "The Political Economy of Growth Without Development: A Case Study of Pakistan," in D. Rodrik (eds.) *In Search of Prosperity: Analytical Narratives on Economic Growth*. Princeton University Press, New Jersey

<sup>83</sup> Siddiqui (2005) for example 'We like to be beseeching supplicants, not demanders' (p102);

up to date - are rarely stated in terms of performance standards or key (measurable) competences; there is usually no obligation to undertake specialized training (or to demonstrate associated competences) before career progression through promotion or upgrading. 'Environmental' factors –public sector pay, working conditions (including availability of essential equipment for example transport ...and fuel to operate it...), and the ever-present threat of 'political' interference with managerial decisions related to staff recruitment, postings, transfers, and promotions - impede or completely frustrate any efforts to manage, develop, reward and utilize human resources objectively and efficiently over a sustained period in the public sector.

- (iii) The resulting frustrations often lead to the exit from the public service of talent, a growing concern with many top public servants, as well as to the perpetuation of systemic under performance.
- (iv) A specific factor affecting both incentives, and apparent accountability and 'loyalty' of officers working for District governments, is that they are members of their respective Provincial government's establishment (or, for the most senior, are indeed members of the District Management Group, a Federal cadre), and therefore seconded from another service. Hence their promotion, transfers and postings, leave etc. are essentially decided by levels of government other than their District 'home' working base. The establishment of a specific District Government Cadre for local government officers has been made part of the current civil service reform program, but is yet to be enacted and introduced.<sup>84</sup>

### *Issues related to Conceptions about and Approaches to Training*

- (i) Public service training providers are located in a few centers. Their staff deliver training courses in them (not in the workplace of trainees). On-site problem-diagnosis and needs-analysis rarely happen. Low status (in terms of postings) and low priority for resource allocation negatively affect the capacity of such staff development centers. There are very few centers or staff oriented, or physically equipped, to apply contemporary learner-centred training methodologies: they appear to be unfamiliar with good training practices in the private sector (Khan 2006). They generally have a supply driven orientation and are not subjected to competitive pressures from within and outside the public sector.
- (ii) The content of the training in public sector training institutions is often irrelevant to the current needs of the public sector and the trainees. Reading lists are of highly variable quality and the normal practice does not include proper background

---

<sup>84</sup> A census of local government staff will precede final decision-making in the Punjab. Clearly such a far-reaching policy must await the outcomes of the imminent elections.



research or survey of policy makers' specific needs before selecting a theme or its treatment (Banuri et. al. 2003).

- (iii) A related factor is the general tendency to consider individual officers as subjects of training rather than teams of officials from the same organization, or functionally inter-related units. This militates against the possibility of a 'critical mass' of officials being similarly equipped - in terms of new abilities or attitudes - to collaborate productively to forge some improvement or change in working practices related to prior training. The 'bosses' of trainees are rarely oriented to the nature and subsequent possible implications for application, of training to be attended by their subordinates. If so exposed, they might well be more supportive of innovation by trainees on their return. Some informants cite the related tendency of opportunities for training to be allocated first to relatively senior staff, and only thereafter, from what possibilities remain, to middle level officials. However, in certain sectors, key functions are performed by relatively lowly-graded staff.<sup>85</sup>
- (iv) There are examples where capacity development programs managed and resourced from different levels of government are being conducted in the same Districts and unions: methodologies differ, as do the conditions of employment of respective key field staff of the programs.<sup>86</sup>

#### *Issues related to Planning Management and Financing of 'Capacity Development'*

- (i) Growing volumes of public and donor 'investment' in programs, institutions, activities and initiatives, are apparently being devoted to pursuit of Capacity Development, without commensurate attention to assessment of 'value for money', or systematic learning from experience.<sup>87</sup> This was observed in the 2004 Capacity for Devolved Education Study in the Punjab (Watson / Khan 2005a), and appears to be representative of the scene at Federal level. The constraints go beyond the typical problems (apparent in the international literature) of difficulties in defining what CD is, and how to assess its impact (see Watson 2006), and relate to a generic tendency to avoid close monitoring of progress and results, in favor of pushing ahead with

---

<sup>85</sup> The courts depend for their smooth operation on the work of Court Administrators and Clerks. Opportunities for their job and career development have been almost non-existent before the advent of the ADB-supported Access to Justice Program. The 'Community Mobilizers' in the Punjab Pilot Literacy Project (JICA-supported) are a crucial element of the project, and play a vital role, but their posts are graded modestly, and they do not receive pay commensurate with the responsibilities which their jobs carry.

<sup>86</sup> The courts depend for their smooth operation on the work of Court Administrators and Clerks. Opportunities for their job and career development have been almost non-existent before the advent of the ADB-supported Access to Justice Program. The 'Community Mobilizers' in the Punjab Pilot Literacy Project (JICA-supported) are a crucial element of the project, and play a vital role, but their posts are graded modestly, and they do not receive pay commensurate with the responsibilities which their jobs carry.

<sup>87</sup> See Appendix 9 of the Scoping Study on illustrative orders of magnitude of expenditure on capacity development at Federal level and in Punjab Province, and from the DAD database on some donor programs.

implementation of plans, and expenditure of allocated resources. It remains to be seen whether the current concerns over introduction of 'Managing for Development Results' will overcome what appear to be both systemic and attitudinal problems. On a related note, it appears that the Service Delivery Surveys (2002 and 2004) undertaken by CIET Pakistan<sup>88</sup> have not been used as fully as intended as 'mirrors' to key public service delivery agencies: providing feedback on the opinion of users on the standards of service provided.

- (ii) The definition of capacity development covering institutional and organizational as well as individual training levels (and what contributes to, or detracts from them) is not commonly reflected in government documents, or in its budgeting for CD related activities. Instead, the usual association – when capacity development is mentioned – is with various types of training programs. Vital complementary factors (essentially conditions that affect the governance environment) and measures are usually not regarded as influences on the potential value of training. Training is usually not seen as only one of a range of complementary capacity development measures.<sup>89</sup>

#### WITHIN AND AMONG DONORS IN CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT

A variety of factors have emerged, from discussions with donor representatives during the mapping exercise, which impinge (often negatively) on their own capacity to embrace capacity development issues, and support to the public sector in Pakistan.

- (i) While all of those agencies consulted regard capacity development (either explicitly or implicitly) as a cornerstone of their public sector aid policies and strategies, no single adviser, in any of the Pakistan offices of development partners consulted, was specifically responsible for their agencies' work towards this over-arching goal. The most common arrangement is for sector and or program specialists and managers to regard it as an issue with which they are very concerned, but are not specifically responsible for, nor prepared to handle. Development agencies' headquarters' policy units usually have specialists 'on call' to support country offices when required in institutional or capacity development analyses. One implication is that donor co-

---

<sup>88</sup> See DTCE (2005)

<sup>89</sup> These may include framing supportive regulations or laws; organizational restructuring or role-re-definition (and definition of inter-relationships with other related organizations); personnel management improvements including rationalization of staffing levels and/or definition, assessment and perhaps certification of core competencies for key posts; rationalization of remuneration, recruitment, selection, distribution, postings and transfers, and criteria for promotion of staff; revision of organizational and individual performance assessment and disciplinary procedures; career development and succession planning; provision of career guidance, in-service training or coaching (especially in leadership, for managers); production of operational job guidelines and codes of conduct; improved communication and co-ordination procedures; public relations and user awareness policies and campaigns (including complaints management). Technical assistance may have a role to play in some or all of the above.

operation towards the goals of the Paris Declaration in-country is impeded. Not only is the notion of 'capacity development' vague but the government and donor players lack clear accountability structures for handling capacity development as an element of their programs.

- (ii) Speed and flexibility of response by a multilateral or bilateral agency to a government request or invitation to collaborate in capacity development is crucial. The presence of a political or official 'champion' of a reform, or capacity development initiative, is illustrated by many of the 'success stories'. However, it appears that donors' procedures - and inadequately developed networks of information or specialized institutions, often impede rapid, technically optimal, locally appropriate technical support to capacity development in Pakistan. Factors and obstacles relate to: formal competitive bidding obligations; tying of sources of TA, twinning partners or training providers; agencies' lack of familiarity with, and inability to mobilize, appropriate professional, academic groups or 'peer practitioners' (including service providers) especially those in similar countries of 'the South' for capacity development initiatives. For example, the need is often for innovative non-conventional types of inter-institutional partnerships (e.g. intermittent 'twinning' and coaching relationships with peer agencies' staff in Pakistan). Thus external partners and institutions other than just consulting firms are needed to support Pakistan's capacity development. It appears that this poses a challenge for some development agencies.<sup>90</sup>
- (iii) All agencies acknowledged that - to varying degrees - pressures to disburse committed volumes of financial and technical assistance were a factor inhibiting gradual, pragmatic, small-scale, pilot-project initiatives which might cast light on the effectiveness - and especially the sustainability - of capacity development initiatives. Such pressures are also a factor in making it difficult for an aid agency to 'say no'. If they did refuse funding, it sends a negative political signal, and anyway another aid agency would probably agree to pick up the bill....
- (iv) As discussed in a review of the literature on M&E of capacity and capacity development (Watson 2006), professional and career incentives within development agencies are generally not conducive to cautious and careful assessment of the effectiveness and sustainability of capacity development support or investments. Hence the factor mentioned in the previous sub-section (apparent indifference on GoP's part to the results of its capacity development expenditures) is partly attributable to donor corporate indifference too.

---

<sup>90</sup> statement is inevitably a generalization: the extent to which these factors pose impediments to effective collaboration in capacity development vary considerably between development agencies.

## APPENDIX 7: EXCERPTS FROM THE PACIFIC REGIONAL CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT REPORT<sup>91</sup>

### *Box 7: Summary of Implications for ADB on Institutionalizing a CD Approach*

The findings from this study, Asian Development Bank (ADB) Capacity Development Working Group (CDWG) report, and 2007 CD retreat suggest that ADB needs to

- Strengthen mechanisms to enhance understanding of the programming context, including capacity issues, as a basis for country partnership strategies (CPSs), including political economy issues, leadership, ownership, commitment, and capacities associated with key cross-cutting and sector issues. Political economy analyses should be done with local stakeholders and analyses carried out by other donors should be used where possible;
- Draw on this enhanced understanding to secure agreement with Pacific developing member countries on CD priorities and strategies to be reflected in the CPS as well as sector strategies and plans;
- See the country CD strategy process as an ongoing, country-led process guided by participatory methods; and
- Through consultations on the CPS, ensure a better fit between ADB programming strategies (including CD strategies), Pacific country programming and CD priorities, and the broader reform agenda in the country.

*ADB = Asian Development Bank, CD = capacity development, CPS = country partnership strategy.*

Other suggestions raised by retreat participants relating to CD and country programs included the following:

- Mainstream CD in country partnership strategy formulation.
- ADB should assist countries in analysis of political economy issues (drivers of change).
- At the CPS stage, more players, beyond government, should be involved.
- Use country processes and the right local people to assess capacity.
- Consultation and participation is “absolutely necessary.”
- Hire people who know and understand the area.

---

<sup>91</sup> Bolger (2008) *ADB Pacific Capacity Development Scoping Study –Final Report* by Joe Bolger March 2008 (available on the ADB website).

- Avoid multiple donor-led CD plans.
- Do not just focus on “technical fixes.”
- Focus on the country strategy but approve allocations annually.
- Do not focus solely on money; look into other solutions.
- Improve incentives for staff.

Retreat participants recognized the challenge of understanding the drivers of change as well as capacities of communities—a process that is made more difficult by the limited time allocated for community engagement and strategy development. A possible solution identified for ADB was to partner with an organization that has comparative advantage, has been doing political economy, and is “living” in partner countries, such as UNDP—which also has a set of Default Principles for Capacity Development.

Other issues for ADB consideration include:

- The nature of the consultation and participation processes required to ensure CD issues are addressed adequately in the CPS;
- How to frame capacity issues in the CPS, including how to address them from a systems perspective;
- Role of ADB’s Resident Missions in the CPS process;
- Roles for CD specialist/advisor in supporting development of the CPS, including integration of CD principles and strategies;
- Special needs/requirements of small PDMCs—do they require different assessment processes?;
- How to monitor capacity results linked to the CPS; and
- The particular challenges of fragile or post-conflict states—how does this affect the CPS process?

ADB’s April 2007 report on weakly performing countries addresses the last point, indicating that ADB’s response has been to modify its own processes to reflect conditions on the ground. Recommendations from the report could provide a reference point for determining how to deal with such countries in the CPS process.

## CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMING

In considering how to move forward with new programming approaches, PARD will have to determine whether it views CD as an “add-on” or as something to be mainstreamed into its operations. The case studies offered a mix of experiences in this respect, but with the

majority treating CD as an add-on to support other project objectives. The CDWG has suggested piloting activities leading over time to a more mainstreamed approach.

Specifically, the CDWG report recommends “using the new conceptual framework and principles on a pilot basis (selecting one or two key executing agencies per DMC) and in sectors in which ADB has a substantial presence, such as transport, energy, or education.”<sup>92</sup> The report also recommends a demand-driven approach in the selection of key executing agencies (to ensure ownership), sharing lessons from the pilots, and supporting a gradual shift in approaches (such as by facilitating stakeholder analyses, organizational and institutional analyses, and establishment of performance benchmarks and databases). In addition, the report calls for “disciplined analysis” of executing agency capacity and the roles of other stakeholders, including consideration of soft capacities and enabling factors. See Appendix 6 for outputs and activities specified in the CDWG report.

At ADB’s CD retreat, participants were asked what needs to be done differently to integrate CD more effectively in Pacific operations. They offered the following recommendations:

- Fund participatory processes and make them the norm for strategy, design, and implementation in order to establish “real demand” for development.
- Listen to and assess the needs of government, civil society, and NGOs in all interventions for sustainable capacity.
- Invest in understanding what is appropriate and will last and let that inform decisions on approach/modalities.
- Promote a systems/program approach to CD, such as funding clusters of TAs for weakly performing countries.
- Support longer-term interventions.

Other issues relating to CD programming for consideration by PARD include:

- How to strengthen participatory processes in support of CD programming (what works in what context);
- How to assess capacity issues in advance of CD programming decisions;
- How to determine the right programming fit; the varied and changing contexts, including shifts in local capacity, suggest that interveners need to draw upon a range of approaches and modalities when addressing capacity issues;
- Roles for trust funds or CD funds;

---

<sup>92</sup> ADB 2006g. p.25.

- How to determine the appropriate entry point and approach, for example,
  - contributing to a more enabling environment (e.g., policy advice);
  - strengthening interorganizational capacity (e.g., through advice, incentives);
  - building local capacity to build capacity (e.g., facilities);
  - individual skill enhancement, such as in country training, mentoring, secondments, placements, overseas scholarships, exchanges, placements;
  - duration of CD interventions and exit strategies;
- How to enhance capacity for demand and local accountability;
- Roles and responsibilities of various partners, for example, assignment of counterpart staff by executing agencies;
- Monitoring capacity results; and
- Role of ADB Resident Missions.

The CD retreat included a session specifically on TA management given the importance of TA to many CD processes. Table 3 highlights suggestions that emerged from that discussion.

In the retreat discussion, it was suggested that ADB may not be ready to delegate recruitment to executing agencies. However, participants highlighted different options that could increase PDMC's role in recruitment without placing new administrative burdens on them.

The discussion on TA also noted the ongoing need for capacity substitution in the region, given gaps in Pacific labor markets. It was suggested that capacity substitution is required when no local person with technical/professional competency or specialization is available, or when there is such a person but who has no experience (for example, a new law graduate who may be considered as director for public prosecutions). Some participants underlined the importance of thinking in terms of "strategic gap filling" within a long-term capacity strategy. Specific strategies such as "two-in-a-box," were also considered – two people filling one position but dividing responsibilities with emphasis on technology or skills transfer and an exit strategy. Finally, as one participant noted, it is important to be clear on the reasons for existing gaps, particularly in countries with a long history of externally funded training programs.

*Table 3: Suggestions for Technical Assistance Management in Capacity Development*

Processes for Managing TA	
<b>Identification</b>	<p>Redefine process of TA identification (e.g., be more government-driven).</p> <p>Use fewer, longer-term, larger TAs in cluster/phased modes.</p> <p>Provide budget for Pacific-based selection, identification, and conceptualization of TA.</p>
<b>Recruitment and Contracting</b>	<p>Governments should be given more of a free hand in selection of TA personnel; nationally-driven.</p> <p>Introduce new recruitment/contracting modalities (e.g., framework contracts).</p> <p>Delegate contracting/recruitment of individual consultants to PARD/Resident Missions with Central Operations Services Office (COSO) having an oversight function.</p> <p>Advertise through E-Consult.</p>
<b>Orientation/Preparation</b>	<p>There should be a formal induction process for each TA, incorporating cultural and country elements.</p>
<b>Management</b>	<p>Implementation should be supported as part of the TA.</p> <p>The TA should report to the executing agency.</p> <p>There should be mutual accountability between donor and executing agency.</p>
<b>Monitoring and Evaluation</b>	<p>Monitoring and evaluation should be based on CD indicators.</p>

*PARD = Pacific Department; TA = technical assistance.*

Retreat participants offered the following "rules of thumb" with respect to capacity substitution or gap filling for weakly performing states, post-conflict states, or micro states:

- Determine whether the need is real or perceived (PDMC perspective).
- Consider gap filling strategically (including whether the contribution can be sustained).
- Understand the reasons for the gap (e.g., political economy issues) rather than filling it without question.



- Focus on gap filling within an appropriate institutional framework (avoid tactical responses).
- Fill gaps within a long-term CD strategy and long-term political and socioeconomic growth strategy.
- Avoid approaches that are potentially capacity negative or foster dependency.
- Recognize capacity substitution as a valid public policy option
- Support longer-term interventions.
- Consider volunteers as an option, especially in small communities.
- Agree on an exit strategy for long-term TA.
- Encourage pooled regional capacity, where appropriate, for national needs.
- Be selective about which sector to support.
- Favor “essential” sectors (e.g., education and health).
- Require full beneficiary “buy-in,” including dedicated counterpart support.

Other issues relating to the role of advisors touched on at the retreat or in the case studies include

- how to ensure clear, locally owned terms of reference, including who drafts them, and who approves them;
- how to link work plans of advisors not only to key performance indicators but also mutually agreed key capacity indicators;
- naming the role – advising, training/mentoring, systems development, or gap filling. As indicated in AusAID’s recent Discussion Paper on Technical Assistance and Capacity Building in Timor-Leste, “naming the role matters.” Many advisors end up performing in-line functions, either because a counterpart is not available, or simply to fill an existing gap that may have been the unspoken intent. The AusAID paper concludes: “Being clear about the purpose enables more accurate terms of reference, better matching of potential candidates to the role, and helps establish transparent performance expectations;”<sup>93</sup>
- how to recruit and select effective advisors, with the right combination of technical skills, experience, local knowledge, ability to facilitate, transfer skills, etc.;

---

<sup>93</sup> AusAID 2007b. p.5

- value of long-term versus short-term TA. Long-term TA is frequently seen as a preferred option, given the importance of understanding the context, developing relationships with local stakeholders, and the greater potential for focusing on long-term capacity needs. Some cases demonstrated a preference for short-term and/or intermittent TA because it allowed local partners to benefit from specialized expertise while ensuring local ownership of the process;
- how use of local consultants can be enhanced to increase ownership, strengthen local consultancy capacity, and ensure better understanding of the local context (e.g., culture, traditions, power dynamics, informal systems, reasons for capacity problems); and
- monitoring advisors inputs, results, or performance. This requires enhanced attention to M&E, including developing domestic capacity; it can also provide a boost to local accountability.

Box 8 summarizes the study's implications on CD planning.

**Box 8: Summary of Implications for ADB on CD Programming**

- Select "demand-driven" pilots in key ADB sectors/thematic areas in the countries to provide a basis for initiating new CD approaches.
- Provide inputs to encourage new approaches, such as stakeholder analysis, capacity assessments.
- Strengthen participatory approaches to enhance ownership and effectiveness of CD programming.
- Ensure programming decisions are based on strategic analysis of capacity options (e.g., best entry points, modalities, sustainability/exit strategy).
- Ensure programming in conflict-affected communities is informed by proper analyses.
- Increase emphasis on capacity for demand and local accountability.
- Explore possibilities for increasing reliance on local capacity-building options, such as facilities, exchanges, and use of local consultants.

*ADB = Asian Development Bank, CD = capacity development,*

As noted, special consideration is needed for CD interventions in conflict or post-conflict situations. The following factors have been highlighted by the DAC Network on Governance, among other sources, and are relevant to such situations in the Pacific region:

- Carefully analyze the country context, including the current (and prospective) capacity situation before committing to reforms (e.g., capacity deficits resulting from the conflict, financial limitations, role of traditional institutions).
- Ensure a clear understanding of the conflict (e.g., history of the conflict, reasons for it, potential for relapse).
- Ensure an understanding of stakeholders' commitment to reforms.
- Jointly develop an approach that is likely to work in the given circumstances, being realistic about what can be achieved in light of contextual factors.
- Promote multi-stakeholder involvement to bring communities together, build a critical mass in favor of change, and increase prospects for sustainability.
- Give priority to CD efforts that reduce fragility or prevent a return to conflict or state collapse.
- Identify partners carefully and support them over the long term.
- Where state capacity is weak but political will is present, CD efforts should focus selectively on restoring core state functions (to create conditions for restoration of a broader range of state services).
- Think about the confluence of security, development, and diplomatic efforts, and how development efforts can best fit.
- Respect local ownership and leadership (e.g., by setting realistic goals and thinking long term).
- Where state capacity is severely challenged, consider channeling support through nonstate actors.
- Coordinate with other development partners in order to minimize demands on existing administrative capacity.

## ADB'S BUSINESS PROCESSES AND INTERNAL SUPPORT SYSTEMS

Various reports on CD have highlighted the need for funding and supporting agencies to enhance their capability for addressing capacity issues in developing countries. Many of these agencies have high technical capacity (such as in engineering, health, or economic management) but often less capacity in facilitation, skills transfer, or design of consultative and participatory processes.

The CDWG's final report and other ADB documents have highlighted areas for improving ADB's business processes and internal support systems. The recent report on improving ADB's TA program, for example, notes various procedural areas requiring attention

including “apparent lack of focus for parts of the TA program; internal procedures, which can be time consuming while adding limited value to project design; an emphasis on processing until approval rather than implementation; the risk of a supply-driven approach with insufficient ownership by DMCs and executing agencies; and constraints in ADB internal TA management.”<sup>94</sup> Priorities from the CDWG report are outlined in Appendix 7.

The CD retreat identified areas where ADB and other donor agencies could improve business processes and support systems for CD. For example, participants indicated a need for donor organizations to help staff become specialists on the Pacific, as well as on participatory methods. Others spoke of the need for ADB to give greater emphasis to its role as a development institution, beyond the banking side of its mandate.

Specific suggestions from the CD retreat on this topic included the following:

- Commit more resources to TA design and TA implementation.
- Use a more selective approach in application of resources.
- Design CD TA in Pacific countries, not in ADB headquarters, Manila.
- Encourage joint donor approaches.
- Recognize and give importance to CD in ADB Departments’ work plans.
- Rely on staff with Pacific and CD experience.
- Encourage application of innovative tools for mobilization of consultants (e.g., framework/indefinite delivery contracts).
- Streamline access to funds.
- Use flexible/adaptive designs that allow changes through the implementation phase.
- Do not lose sight of the value of small, flexible, rapid TA to respond to urgent capacity needs.
- Strengthen national consulting capacity in the Pacific.
- Re-examine internal incentives; accountability/rewards should be for outcomes, not loans designs/programming.
- Seek board and management approval (exception) to fund Pacific country strategies rather than TA for weakly performing Pacific countries.

---

<sup>94</sup> ADB 2007b. p.i.

## APPENDIX 8: REPORT ON THE NATIONAL WORKSHOP CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT AND AID EFFECTIVENESS 13 - 14 MAY 2008

### INTRODUCTION

The National Workshop on Capacity Development and Aid Effectiveness was held in the Marriott Hotel, Islamabad on 13th and 14th May 2008. It was attended by a total of x participants from federal government departments, all Provincial governments, civil society and private sector organizations, development co-operation partner organizations, teams from the case studies selected for review and presentation, and the ADB staff and consultants involved in the EAD/ADB capacity study.<sup>95</sup>

The purpose of the Workshop was to contribute to the preparation of the Government of Pakistan's inputs to, and representation at, the High Level Meeting on progress in implementing the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness to be held in Accra in September 2008. It reviewed the experience of twelve case studies of successful capacity development in Pakistan, in the light of international experience, and the observations of a wide variety of government, civil society, private sector and development partner stakeholders. On this basis, the Workshop identified actionable proposals for furthering capacity development in the public service in Pakistan and promoting aid effectiveness.<sup>96</sup>

The Workshop was opened with welcoming remarks by Dr Anne Sweetser, Social Development Specialist in PRM, and Task Manager for the EAD/ADB capacity study. Tariq Mahmood the officer responsible for Aid Effectiveness in EAD, summarized the history of discussions of technical co-operation and capacity development between government and development partners, and the creation of a Steering Committee on Aid Effectiveness in September 2006 at the request of the then Minister of State for Economic Affairs. The outcomes of the EAD/ADB Pakistan capacity study would feed into the ongoing JICA Regional Study of Technical Co-operation for Capacity Development, which would be submitted in Accra.

Peter Fedon, Pakistan Country Director of the ADB affirmed ADB's commitment to the Paris Declaration's goals, and to the Millennium Development Goals in relation to poverty reduction. Capacity development was an integral element of both initiatives. He acknowledged that the historical, political and cultural context in Pakistan posed considerable challenges, but acknowledged that the case studies in the sample represented important examples of what could be done despite these challenges. As such they provided

---

<sup>95</sup> See attachment for a list of participants, the agenda for the National Workshop, and list of cases

<sup>96</sup> It was preceded on May 12 y briefing discussions between the ADB Task Manager, consultants and the EAD Acting Secretary and officials. Later on May 12, case presenters rehearsed their presentations for feedback by the ADB Task Manager and consultants.

a sound basis for identification in the workshop of practical actions to be taken forward by government and development partners to promote capacity development in future.

The Acting Secretary, EAD Mr Junaid Iqbal Chaudhuri thanked the ADB, workshop participants and the consultants for their contributions to the debate on capacity development pursuant to the Paris Declaration principles, and to Pakistan's contribution to the forthcoming High Level Meeting. He also noted the Development Assistance Database, the work of the three Working Groups on Aid Effectiveness (of which the present CD initiative was one), and the Aid Effectiveness Unit in EAD as practical examples of how Pakistan was pursuing its obligations under the Paris Declaration. He was particularly impressed by the intense consultations which had led to the finalization of the case studies, and anticipated their utility when published not only as encouraging examples of worthy achievements of improved service delivery within the Pakistan public sector, but also as symbols of close co-operation between government and development partners. As such they would contribute to the framing of joint policies on development co-operation in future.

In the first session of the Workshop, David Watson, ADB Lead Consultant for the EAD/ADB Capacity Study presented a distillation of capacity issues from the recent international development literature and experience, and from the earlier Scoping Study in Pakistan. He also synthesized some of the main recurring themes emerging from scrutiny of the twelve positive case studies.<sup>97</sup>

- The remainder of the first day, and the first session of the following day, were devoted to a series of presentations from representatives of the case study teams, followed by discussion among participants. The presentations were clustered according to the key issues which had emerged during the March write-shops on the cases:
- The emergence of 'latent' (previously unrecognized) capacities, particularly among communities and stakeholders of development initiatives;
- Best practices in making training effective, and their implications;
- Capacity Development in culturally challenging fields;
- The role of information, and information systems, for Capacity development and evidence-based policy and decision-taking;
- The importance of Human Resource Management as a complement to training inputs.

---

<sup>97</sup> This presentation, along with all other presentations made at the National Workshop will be made available to all participants on CD-ROM by ADB.

## REFLECTIONS AND FEEDBACK

At the end of the first day, participants were invited to reflect on some of the more important themes emerging from the presentations and discussions so far.

Feedback included:

- There were great advantages in studying a variety of cases of capacity development in action; several participants noted their appreciation of the workshop so far;
- It appeared that some had had clearly tangible results, but some illustrated the barriers (cultural and other) impeding the impact of – for example - short courses for teachers and female elected representatives;
- It also appeared that some cases illustrated more ‘independence’ of movement in organizational ‘spaces’ permitted by political patrons, than others.
- The Public Safety and Police Complaints Commissions’ saga from Faisalabad symbolized how shaky their legal and institutional basis had been: it appeared that the capacity of the police for being held accountable was deficient, and there was little or no high-level backing for these new structures in practice.
- Other cases illustrated not only the importance of political will, but also of the vital need for conscientization of politicians to the benefits of improved service delivery to their constituents. It seemed that it was by no means self-evident to politicians that improved services would bring benefits of greater political popularity. There were real dangers that capacity development for service delivery, without the political will to endorse and support it, would be unsustainable. The Chief Operating Officer of Punjab Rural Support Program noted how there was political and bureaucratic hostility in at least one District to its presence and role in health service management – despite the improvements it had brought;
- The important issues in training seemed to be: thorough needs analysis beforehand (including identification of potential capacities to be unleashed); the need for continuous training (not brief one-off courses); and an ex-post supportive environment back at work – including due recognition for achievements in training, and some opportunities for independent action, responsibility or leadership to boost trainees’ pride in their work.
- The need for a supportive institutional environment was endorsed by several participants as an essential aspect of sustained capacity development. It was up to leaders to facilitate that. The tendency to transfer trainees out of posts for which they had been prepared, or indeed for them to leave the public service (as illustrated by Component 2 of the TRTA case) were seen as major endemic issues which had to be tackled if expensive training inputs into the public service were not to be wasted.

## COMMENTARY ON TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND AID EFFECTIVENESS

On Day 2, after the final two cases were presented (one – SPU Faisalabad - illustrating effective technical assistance, one – NPIW Sindh - illustrating what can be achieved without it), participants discussed optimal arrangements for provision of Technical Assistance in the framework of the Paris Declaration and to promote aid effectiveness.

One donor representative noted the complementary nature of training and technical assistance inputs in developing organizational capacities. Participants debated key features of optimal design of technical assistance interventions. These included:

- The importance of explicit requests for assistance – i.e. demand for it - as a basis for any invitation for the presence of TA;
- Involvement of client / host organizations in the selection and monitoring of the performance of TA teams; (contrasting examples were cited in this regard);
- The importance of TA personnel being able to adjust their inputs to the contextual realities of their host organization. The SPU's consultants had several years experience in Faisalabad prior to embarking on the organizational development of the City District Government;
- The absorptive capacities of the host, and its ability and confidence to manage TA inputs, need to be considered as factors affecting TA programs' success.
- Some distinctions were drawn between the position of TA personnel in Faisalabad (integrated within the SPU itself and Departments) and the source of TA in PRMP (based in a Program Management Unit).
- There were also distinctions between these two cases in the apparent motivation of trainees to attend training courses. In the SPU case, this was encouraged and facilitated by the work done on preparing job descriptions for all employees, as a basis for tailor-making of course content to meet job requirements within a single organization (CDGF). In the PRMP case, TA consultants had faced difficulties in attracting participants from diverse organizations and departments within the Provincial government for courses in generic skills.

## ACTION PRIORITIES AND IMPLICATIONS

The workshop then focused on the implications – for government and for development partners – of learning points, which had emerged from perusal of the cases and in view of the 'environment' prevailing in the public services of Pakistan. After a presentation of a summary of possible implications from the Lead Consultant, participants in groups identified key issues for debate. Workshop facilitators then grouped these into major



categories of implications under which concrete actionable steps were to be subsequently identified.

The main categories were as follows:

- Capacity development issues in Program Planning and design;
- Human Resource Management and Training
- Organizational Development; Partnerships and Implementation
- Harmonization of Procedures in CD (especially concerning donors)

Groups' discussion under each category produced the following recommendations to government and development partners in taking forward capacity development initiatives in the framework of the Paris Declaration to promote aid effectiveness.

#### *Capacity development issues in Program Planning and design:*

The key considerations under-pinning feasibility of any intervention included ownership and the backward and forward inter-linkages of the intervention;

In present civil service conditions, some form of sheltered protected environment appeared inevitable (in some form of Management Unit): with remuneration approximating market scales, simplified procedures, 'flat' organizational structures, and technically qualified staff.

#### *Human Resource Management and Training*

This group emphasized:

- The importance of systematic analysis of the host organization's needs, aptitudes and capacity 'gaps' prior to the design of any training or HRM interventions;
- Thereafter, programming of training should be synchronized with the host's organizational objectives, in the context of its human resources' policy framework, and its delivery monitored closely and periodically its impact assessed.
- Back-up support to ex-trainees was crucial (as discussed above in earlier discussion), to allow continued application of new learning in real work settings.
- For the donor of any such support, it was important for them to be goal-oriented, but not to reduce this to 'goal-chasing'. I.e. the donor should be conscious of the need to maintain direction in their support, but be flexible if it appeared that goals needed to be adjusted in the light of changing circumstances.
- The needs of the private sector for more and better-trained skilled workers appeared to have been forgotten. Therefore, given the importance of the sector for employment and income generation, there appeared to be scope for much more engagement of donors in vocational training.

### *Organizational Development and Partnerships*

This form of capacity development was seen as a pillar of aid effectiveness. They envisaged organizational vision, mission, objectives and targets providing the basis for a structure with corresponding departmental functions undertaken by appropriately skilled human resources, procedures and systems of incentives and motivation (including career planning and performance evaluation).

It recommended that government insulate key service-delivery organizations from political interference, while giving their top managers a sufficient degree of autonomy to permit them space to act within their mandate and resources.

It recommended that donors – suitably informed about the local context, and acting in harmony with other donors – conduct capacity needs assessments prior to designing organizational development assistance with flexibility to permit adjustment in the light of subsequent events and progress, and advocate for continuity of leadership in assisted organizations.

Civil society organizations should support dissemination of information on service standards and official prices to stakeholders of public services, as a contribution to enhancing demand for services, and transparency and accountability of providers.

### *Procedural/ CD Harmonization (among donors)*

This group foresaw the need for an aid policy statement (to be formulated by EAD); sectoral plans for capacity development programs (drawn up by ministries, supported by donors), and an overall steering forum.<sup>98</sup>

The group raised the question of donor accountability, without agreeing how that might be achieved. They urged donors to avoid ‘box-ticking’ type reviews in favor of a more progressive constructive form of review of CD program experience.

Timeliness and cost-effectiveness of support for CD should be borne in mind, and the use of international TA minimized. When agreed to be necessary, based on appraisal of need and the absorptive capacity of the host agency(ies) concerned, such TA should be chosen in consultation with host agencies.

## CLOSING REMARKS

The Workshop ended with remarks from the ADB Country Director, the Lead Consultant, the Task Manager for the Capacity Development study, and the Acting Secretary EAD. Peter Fedon noted that the Chief Minister of AJK had already requested co-operation from

---

<sup>98</sup> There is already a Steering Committee on Aid Effectiveness, established after an appeal to donors by the Minister of Economic Affairs in September 2006.

ADB in mounting a co-ordination meeting on capacity development in AJK, and that this was symbolic of the political will and ownership needed to push ahead the capacity development agenda in government. He hoped that the subsequent publication of the case studies, the synthesis report and workshop proceedings would further promote the well-justified pride of case teams in their achievements, and help discussions of possible rationalization of regulations and procedures within the public service, to promote better service delivery. Follow-up meetings could keep track of progress in this regard.

David Watson noted that the synthesis of issues discussed in the workshop derived from the case studies represented only the 'tip of the iceberg' of what was a remarkably rich stock of insights from the case examples. He hoped the forthcoming publication of the full synthesis study (including Workshop results) would do justice to what were rich capacity development case materials, and would act as timely and positive inputs into debate within the new government on how to re-shape policies on service delivery in future.

Mr Junaid Iqbal Chaudhury stressed that the 'latent' (hitherto unrecognized) capacities within the public service should be mobilized, and the Standards of Performance adopted by for example the National Highways and Motorway Police served as an excellent example of one means of such mobilization. He hoped that the learning process on capacity development issues started through this workshop would continue, but not at the expense of program implementation. He acknowledged that the onus for harmonization of aid processes and procedures in fact rested with government, but that the commitment demonstrated by development partners, other participants and case teams in the workshop, posed an auspicious 'critical mass' for further such efforts.

Anne Sweetser confirmed that ADB would be distributing full sets of case study and workshop products to all participants in the next few weeks. She closed the workshop proceedings by thanking all workshop participants for their contributions, and the CD study consultant team for their work over the last nine months.