INTEGRATING CONFLICT PREVENTION IN DEVELOPMENT POLICY AND AID AGENDAS


March 2008
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Policy Messages from the Wilton Park Conference: Conflict Prevention and Development Cooperation in Africa, a Policy Workshop
(November 8-11, 2007)

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PREFACE

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The primary objective of the Wilton Park Conference was to discuss the link between development aid and conflict prevention. Specifically, participants examined the forms of government and structural factors leading to war and the pros and cons of development assistance in trying to avoid such a catastrophe.

Mrs. Sadako Ogata, the President of Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), said that development officials should pay closer attention to the political dimensions of their work and emphasized three main issues: 1) the importance in the conflict prevention of 'human security', meaning both the protection and promotion of the rights of individuals and local communities; 2) the need for development agencies to quickly identify looming threats, respond to socio-political changes in developing countries and 3) a recognition that comprehensive measures be included in any peace-building operation to reduce the risk of new and future turmoil.

The conference allowed participants to explore these issues from various angles, deepen their own knowledge and, most importantly, achieve a shared awareness despite sometimes differing viewpoints.

However, much more needs to be accomplished. Discussion on conflict prevention measures, particularly the role of development assistance, needs further examination and aid agencies must be responsive to changing socio-political patterns in partner countries and provide them with the kind of assistance needed to reduce the potential for conflict.

While pursuing these goals on a practical level, JICA is also committed to promoting further far-reaching academic studies on these issues following the conclusion of the Wilton Park Conference.
Finally, JICA would like to express its deep gratitude to Professor Sakiko Fukuda-Parr from the New School, New York and Professor Robert Picciotto from King’s College, London, for planning and leading the conference. We hope that this accompanying booklet will provide continuing insights and guidance on conflicts, conflict prevention and the role of development assistance in this arena.
PREFACE

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An estimated 40% of the world’s conflicts happen in Africa. The causes of these conflicts, and efforts towards promoting durable peace and sustainable development in Africa, reflect the diversity and complexity of this vast and varied continent. Nonetheless it must be emphasized that the prevention of conflict begins and ends with the promotion of human security and human development. This requires the involvement of all stakeholders over a protracted period and, in most cases, needs to be supported by large flows of finance as well as timely policy actions. While it is not always easy to show tangible results for the high levels of financing required the opportunity cost is very high if conflict is not averted – and consequences are visible and disastrous. As a rule, rebuilding social capital, creating conditions for social cohesion and nation building measures are critical for conflict prevention.

With regard to development cooperation the need for a high degree of policy innovation, simplicity and flexibility is increasingly recognized. In particular, policy conditionalities should be limited and flexible. There is a strong case for Developmental Conflict Prevention (as manifested by interventions in the Great Lakes Region) whereby interventions within peacekeeping and securing peace agreements are broadened to include measures that address the root causes of conflict, along with confidence-building measures and inclusive socio-economic arrangements.

UNDP’s focus in conflict prevention is on capacity building – an area where development partners have not been as flexible as circumstances require at various stages, ranging from preventive measures and relief in humanitarian/emergency situations to recovery, reconstruction and sustainable development. There is a need to develop the capacity to scale up quickly in post-conflict situations so as to be in a position to help build the new state and manage the transition from relief to development. From the very outset international assistance should be provided with a
view to building capacities of national actors for informed, consensual, participatory and socially cohesive, accountable decision making across the full range of issues. Increasingly, the design of international support should focus on strengthening capacities of national actors in areas such as national constituting processes; building an infrastructure for peace at the national and local levels; enhancing capacities for economic management and inclusive development; and the delivery of basic services. As such the alignment of external assistance to national development strategies is critical.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keynote address by Sadako Ogata</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does conflict prevention imply new development policies and development cooperation priorities?</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrating conflict prevention in national development strategies</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrating conflict prevention in development cooperation: reconsidering aid policies and architecture</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New directions: policy and research initiatives</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex A: Summaries of country studies:</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Burundi and Rwanda by Peter Uvin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Democratic Republic of the Congo by Seth Kaplan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Mozambique by John Hanlon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Sierra Leone by Victor Davies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Sudan by Mohammed Ateem</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex B: Wilton Park Conference Programme</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex C: Wilton Park Conference list of participants</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>References</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendices</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 2: Battle Deaths in Armed Conflicts of Sub-Saharan Africa 1980-2005</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 3: Datasets on Armed Conflict</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 4: Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons: Sub-Saharan Africa 1980-2005</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 5: Change in Under 5 Mortality Rates (per 1000 persons) in Years prior to Outbreak of War</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 6: Indicators on Structural Conditions and Conflict Risk</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

Both development and violent conflict involve social transformations that generate winners as well as losers. While the interaction is complex, development requires a modicum of stability while violent conflict is very costly to the economy and the society. Few would disagree that prevention of violent conflict is better than dealing with its consequences but there is little agreement on the most effective preventive methods.

External engagement with societies in conflict is especially problematic and the international community has yet to master the unintended consequences of its interventions. By and large, the international community gives privileged attention to military and political intervention. These are usually mobilized in crisis situations when urgent action is justified by the ‘responsibility to protect’ in countries where governments are unwilling or unable to restrain massive human violations.

This report calls for timely attention to the underlying economic, social and institutional factors that drive political violence, followed by early preventive measures. It highlights the major policy conclusions that emerged from the deliberations of a Wilton Park workshop on conflict prevention and development cooperation in Africa.

The workshop sought to integrate conflict prevention within the priorities of development cooperation directed towards the ‘fragile states’ of Africa. It tapped recent knowledge secured from national and international experience and from policy research on the relationship between poverty and violent conflict. It also drew on background documents, case studies of five countries and 20 oral presentations (see Annexes).

The workshop was jointly sponsored by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). It was attended by policy makers and researchers from national governments, bilateral and multilateral donor agencies, NGOs and academia.

This is not an official record of the workshop. It does not provide a comprehensive account of its deliberations. Nor does it aim at crystallizing a consensus position of the participants and sponsors. The authors take sole responsibility for reporting on what they consider to be the most significant issues among the multitude of topics addressed by the workshop, with special emphasis on those that challenge widely held assumptions and point to new directions for policy and research with a view to making international cooperation work for enhanced human security.1

1 In respecting the ‘Chatham House Rules’ followed at Wilton Park conferences, this report does not attribute ideas to individuals. However, the report indicates written contributions that were made available to the conference and are available on the conference website that were sources, ideas and facts included. These are indicated in parentheses with the name of the author.
It is my great honor to participate in the Wilton Park Conference on “Conflict Prevention and Development” in cooperation with the United Nations Development Programme, and in the presence of a wide range of researchers and policy makers. The ultimate objective of the conference is indeed a daunting one, to explore new approaches to conflict prevention. Since the 1990s, development cooperation has sought ways not only to ameliorate poverty, but also to contribute to economic management and state governance. The development community has definitely become more fully involved in post-conflict recovery and peace building operations. However, as yet it has not successfully identified its role, nor adjusted its policy with regard to conflict prevention.

In fact, there is growing recognition among United Nations and government circles of the vital importance of addressing conflict prevention. The support for preventive action grew in the aftermath of the disastrous consequences of the experiences of the 1990s, particularly the genocide in Rwanda and massacre in Srebrenica. However, looking back on the major conflicts of our times, we note that we have tended to overlook the preceding periods of economic, social and political downturns which led to large-scale and devastating conflicts. Interventions came, generally, too late and too little by military action, political negotiation or humanitarian protection and assistance.

Development cooperation, on the other hand, has rarely dealt with emergency situations. By nature, development assistance addresses long-term problems of poverty, economy and social inequities. Its impact can be proven over a period of time, through rise in per capita growth, or extension of life expectancy or spread of literacy. The development community has tended to look at people as recipients of aid, and turned to the state for planning and management. Security questions have been regarded as matters of state. The ‘fragility’ of state has been identified as the clue to identifying and correcting governance and thereby the insecurity that threatens people’s lives and well-being. Frequently, state fragility has been a pronounced feature in many poorer countries.

On the other hand, in the globalizing world of the new millennium, money, goods, people and information move quickly across borders and within states. The increasing openness in trade and investment contribute to remarkable economic growth across borders and within different segments within states. The globalizing world increases interdependence of states and peoples, but turns them more vulnerable to adverse developments elsewhere. Moreover, terrorist attacks in New York on September 11th, 2001, proved to the world that even the most powerful state could not protect the security of its people even within its own borders. States have been faced with the challenge of ensuring the defense of their territory and people against global networks of non-state actors.
It was against these backdrops of the changing world that the concept of security was broadened from state security to embrace ‘human’ security. Human security entered the stage of international policy debate. At the UN Millennium Summit, Secretary-General Kofi Annan advocated the building of a world embodying the ideals of ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want.’ In the mind of the Secretary-General, the challenges of conflict prevention and development assistance were closely interlinked. Security and development were twin goals requiring comprehensive solutions. The Japanese government also noted the close affiliation of security assurance and development cooperation, and co-sponsored the launching of the Commission on Human Security.

I had the honor and challenge to co-chair the Commission together with Professor Amartya Sen, the Nobel economist from India. The Commission identified ‘people’ at the center in formulating policies and building institutions. People were to be protected in violent conflicts and from the proliferation of arms. People were to be saved from chronic insecurity caused by illness and poverty. The way to save and protect people would be through their empowerment. A host of empowerment agendas was laid out ranging from education of girls and women, universal access to basic health care or empowerment of workers in order to access the market. Social safety measures were essential to save them from serious and sudden downturns in socio-economic and political conditions. At the heart of the Commission’s philosophy was the belief that people should be freed from ‘fear’ and ‘want,’ and should pursue the attainment of all realizable human aspirations. A clear linkage was made between security and development. State plays the complementary role of protecting and advancing human security together with empowering people in the mainstay.

Now reverting to the original purpose of the Wilton Park conference to examine the relevance of development cooperation to conflict prevention, we should first recognize the serious influence that the concept of human security had on programming development assistance. JICA, for example, has incorporated ‘human security’ in its basic principles, and has pursued the policy of focusing on community development across a wide range of sectors. As to the question of addressing the Commission’s warning over serious and sudden downturns that lead to conflicts, the international community as a whole and specifically the development community have remained unprepared. For economic downturns of the kind that traumatized the people of Asia in 1997, the international financial institutions were in possession of some rescue mechanisms, even if not adequate. Financial assistance was extended to troubled countries combined with severe domestic adjustment measures. What became clear was the need to further accelerate the resort to social safety measures in order to help cover the ‘human security’ of affected populations.

When it comes to situations of serious downturns that threaten the security of people within states, there are no ready-made international security mechanisms that can trigger quick action. The existing security system is geared towards stopping aggression between states, and to controlling or limiting the spread of warfare. However, when conflicts turn rampant within states, and when the state authorities possess neither the will nor the capacity to protect their people, there are no international mechanisms or procedures to intervene. People are left to the protection and assistance of humanitarian agencies or hope for success resulting from ad hoc mediations or limited rescue operations, depending on the scale of the catastrophe.
It took the contributions from the Canadian-led International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty and the UN High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change to broaden the ‘human security’ framework to address the need for action related more directly to conflict management and collective security. The issue of humanitarian intervention became hotly debated within the United Nations. Though some ‘emerging norm’ seems to be growing for ‘a collective international responsibility to protect,’ with Security Council authorization, military action with regard to internal conflicts has to be exercised with utmost care. Such intervention would inevitably be exercised ‘amongst people’ who hold diverse political allegiance and are frequently on different sides. The United Nations or coalitions of concerned states are currently facing several internal conflict situations in Africa – Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo – and in other parts of the world such as Afghanistan and Iraq.

I think it is appropriate that the Wilton Park conference devotes its attention to conflict prevention in Africa as it will be on the continent of Africa that development cooperation will play a central role while facing major conflict challenges. For the large majority of the people in Africa, ‘human insecurity’ is a chronic condition that has to be ameliorated by a host of poverty reduction measures. The Millennium Development Goals provide concrete goals to which individual contributing countries can orient their assistance programs. However, if we were to adjust our individual assistance with conflict prevention in view, greater attention would have to be directed to grasping and addressing trends that show serious and sudden downturns.

During my ten-year tenure as UN High Commissioner for Refugees, there were a few cases of international action – peacekeeping operations dispatched to Somalia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone in support of humanitarian operations or as part of international peace-building exercises. However, development cooperation would be suspended when violence turned rampant and conflicts broke out. When violence receded, and governments were restored, development assistance returned to the scene, as post-conflict peace building efforts came to be seen as a legitimate function of development assistance.

In many of the African states that suffered conflicts in recent decades, international efforts were directed mainly to peace building after the conflicts. Let me refer to the case of Rwanda, which stands as the outstanding example of the failures of the international community that eventually led to genocide. To cite a few salient points in Rwandan history, it should be recalled, that since colonial times the country was ruled by powerful chiefs, mostly Tutsis. Deprived of political power, the Hutus challenged the Tutsi-led domination and became increasingly supported by the Belgian administrators. Gaining social consciousness, the Church also turned sympathetic to the Hutus. Tension grew between the Tutsis and Hutus to an explosive point by 1959. Belgium agreed to let go of the League mandate and declared by acclamation the independence of Rwanda. In the legislative election that followed, the Hutu party won by a wide margin and political power moved away from the traditional Tutsis.

Because of growing tension and confrontation, a large number of Tutsis left Rwanda and went to neighboring countries. In order to understand the serious downturns that
took place in Rwanda at the time, I think the refugee factor merits special attention. Between 1959 and 1964 according to UNHCR estimates, 120,000 took refuge in neighboring countries, escaping the violent seizure by Hutu power. By the end of the 1980s, some 480,000, which comprised about half of the Tutsi population in Rwanda, had become refugees, primarily in Burundi (280,000), Uganda (80,000), Democratic Republic of the Congo (80,000) and Tanzania (30,000). Over the next 20 years, the refugees made repeated attempts to return to Rwanda by force, which resulted in provoking renewed violence and further refugee outflows.

The refugees from Rwanda faced difficulties in the neighboring countries of asylum. They were often excluded from the local labor market while they sought opportunities for education and work. Many moved beyond the Great Lakes area and even on to Western Europe and America. In spite of the geographical dispersion, the exiled Tutsis remained in touch with each other. They formed clubs and associations, and circulated publications. In August 1988, a world congress of Rwandan refugees was held in Washington DC, which passed a strong resolution on their ‘right of return’ but the Hutu government of Habyarimana remained intransigent.

In spite of the tensions and conflicts caused by changing power sharing arrangements, the Habyarimana regime succeeded somewhat in obtaining international confidence. Tutsis were politically marginalized and institutionally discriminated against. Though authoritarian, Habyarimana represented a democratically elected majority party government, reasonably stable and bringing in some economic progress. The Catholic Church came to admire the Hutus and to support their rule. Reliance on foreign aid grew rapidly in size. International assistance which had represented less than five percent of GNP in 1973 rose to 11 percent in 1986 and to 22 percent by 1991.

For the donors, until the end of the Cold War period, internal political conditions were mostly outside their realm of concern. The human rights record of the Habyarimana regime went largely unquestioned. Belgium remained the main donor, followed by France and Germany. France, intent on maintaining the French influence throughout the Great Lakes region, courted Rwanda with military assistance as well. Germany, as an early colonizer, maintained its interest in Rwanda. The main areas of assistance from the European donors were education, health and agriculture. For Switzerland, Rwanda ranked first among the recipients.

Japan, at the time under the ‘doubling ODA policy,’ was increasing assistance to a wide range of African countries. Rwanda was favorably assessed as a better managed country, attempting to overcome political confrontation. The close support of the Catholic Church was taken as a positive factor as compared to the situation in Burundi, which continued to face distrust from the Church. The Habyarimana government was considered friendly to Japan as proven by its consistently supportive voting record in various international elections. Much of Japanese assistance to Rwanda centered around Kigali. It covered water supply, communication infrastructure and technical education. The socio-political problems underlying the Rwandan government were not noted by Japanese government officials or aid specialists or by other donors.

In hindsight, it is clear how little those involved in development cooperation had the ability or inclination to read overall social and political trends. To grasp various signals possibly leading to serious downturns would have required some knowledge
that could put together changing political power relations, economic trends, and a host of social mores and population movements. As the Rwandan economy turned critical in the 1980s due to the fall in the coffee price, support from foreign aid sources grew larger in relative importance for the ruling regime. Resources deriving from development cooperation, whether from bilateral donors or multilateral financial lending, became a source of contention within the governing circles.

Throughout this period, one clear signal of the downward trend that the international community ignored was the refugee factor. The presence of close to half a million Rwandan refugees in neighboring countries and beyond was a factor that should have drawn closer attention, and invoked clearer reaction. Instead, the refugee issue in the region remained unaddressed for three decades. Among the Rwandan exiles, in the meantime, those in Uganda had turned increasingly militant. Trained in guerrilla fighting in Uganda, while helping Museveni’s National Resistance Army’s return to power, they formed the Rwanda Patriotic Front, and invaded Rwanda from the north in January 1991. Civil war broke out, and while peace was negotiated, after the shooting down of the presidential plane on April 6, 1994, all-out violence erupted in Rwanda. Genocide was followed by the exodus of more than one and a half million Hutus from Rwanda. Large refugee camps were set up in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Tanzania.

When the repatriation of Rwandan exiles started in 1994, especially in large scale after the attacks on the camps in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in October 1996, the repatriation had to be carried out on an emergency basis. The rehabilitation work had to move as refugees returned and could not wait for careful planning by the development community. The Rwanda government insisted that a quarter of the entire Rwanda population consisted of returning refugees and therefore had to be addressed by UNHCR on emergency terms. UNHCR had to carry out repatriation and reconstruction work simultaneously. Immediate solutions had to be found to meet the shortages of schools, equipment, teachers and funds. Most urgent were the needs of shelters and public service facilities. To make repatriation sustainable, we had to examine the circumstances and causes of the Rwanda conflict and directly address the underlying problems. In short, our contributions had to aim at rebuilding Rwandan society while advancing national reconciliation.

There were three pillars of assistance for UNHCR to address. First, we would provide shelter for the returning refugees. Second, we would assist in restoring justice as a way to promote reconciliation. Third, we would empower women, who were the main group of surviving victims. Over a five year period between 1995 to 1999, UNHCR spent $183 million for reconstructing or rehabilitating almost 100,000 houses to cover the shelter needs of half a million Rwandans. The beneficiaries would make adobe bricks; we would provide two wooden doors, four windows, corrugated iron roofing sheets, poles and plastic sheeting for each house. Labor would come from the people.

Building the judiciary system was an exceptional effort. It ranged from provision of the most basic office supplies and equipment to rehabilitation of courtrooms, tribunal buildings and prosecutors offices in the provinces. We supported the training of judicial personnel, from judges, attorneys and police officers to prison authorities. The rebuilding of the judiciary took place against the backdrop of overcrowded prisons where more than 130,000 genocide suspects were awaiting trial.
The main objective of the Women’s Initiative was to empower women to be proactive in the country’s development. In post-conflict countries, families headed by women and girls look after several younger brothers and sisters. As the reintegration and participation of women in the economic, social and cultural activities were the keys to the country’s recovery, a host of training programs was installed. Provisions were made to strengthen women’s legal rights to land and property and the overall need to strengthen the level of girls’ education was emphasized.

When I went on a return visit to Rwanda last year upon the invitation of the Rwandan government, I was amazed to find so much progress in the interim period. Clearly, I saw housing launched by UNHCR spreading all over the hills. I saw functioning public institutions, and witnessed the traditional gacaca courts supplementing the state judiciary system. The educational facilities had advanced enormously. I visited two schools: one a girls’ boarding school for science teaching, another a mixed technology school for practical training. The women’s center was carrying out mass literary training programs for women at Kigali, but also in the provinces. A good many of the emergency immediate post-conflict rehabilitation programs had been followed up on and further developed.

The one major lesson that I could confirm was the relevance of speedy, immediate post conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction work by those who had been involved in the conflict and knew the most basic reform needs. Development cooperation should take over as rapidly as possible with larger resources and greater expertise. But it was fortunate that the rehabilitation needs of the people, their basic aspirations and patterns of communal life could be transferred over to the incoming developers. Development cooperation stands on developing new and advanced constructs, but also on cooperation with the people and society that will continue to be the permanent masters.

To conclude, the message to be passed on by the Wilton Park meeting is the close linkage of development and security. First, people should be regarded not only as objects or recipients of aid, but active bearers and promoters. ‘Human security’ primarily means people’s security. Second, to prevent conflict, development cooperation must be alert and respond to significant trends of social, economic and political change. Particularly, signs of downturns must be grasped. They are frequently reflected in growing human rights violations, increasing imprisonments and refugee outflows. Third, for post-conflict peace building operations, development cooperation must deal with the root causes of the conflicts and be quick in response and straightforward in ameliorating these fundamental causes.

Thank you very much.
HIGHLIGHTS FROM PRESENTATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS AT THE WILTON PARK CONFERENCE

DOES CONFLICT PREVENTION IMPLY NEW DEVELOPMENT POLICIES AND DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION PRIORITIES?

“For as the nature of foul weather lieth not in a shower or two of rain but in an inclination thereto of many days together; so the nature of war consisteth not in actual fighting, but in the known disposition thereto during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary.”

Hobbes, Leviathan (1651) Part I, chapter 33

It is hard to imagine how poverty can end and sustainable human development – and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) – can be achieved without durable peace. Globally, 40 of the 65 countries farthest away from achieving the Millennium Development Goals by 2015 are those affected by conflict.\(^4\) In sub-Saharan Africa, since 1980, 32 of the region’s 47 countries have experienced 126 armed conflicts involving the state. Furthermore, low intensity conflict is rampant throughout the region, and the share of people living in extreme poverty is rising (Annex D).

In line with global trends, the number of major violent conflicts in Africa during the last four years has declined. Nevertheless, the risk of deadly conflict remains high: peace agreements rarely settle the fundamental claims of warring parties or address the structural conditions that are the root causes of violence (Appendix 1; Mack).\(^5\) Thus, conflict prevention is central to development as well as to security.\(^6\) But the relationship between conflict and development is a complex two-way relationship: while development can help reduce the risks of war; some forms of development aggravate the social tensions that underlie civil strife, criminality and organized violence.

Politics trigger armed conflicts but social and economic conditions, history and location are also drivers

To be sure, conflict is a feature of all societies but the resort to large-scale violence reflects a failure to forge peaceful means of resolving contests over political power and resources. In effect, wars result from political dynamics gone awry. The social and economic context provides an enabling environment within which grievances

\(^2\) Quoted by Valpy FitzGerald in conference presentation.
\(^4\) Fukuda-Parr 2007.
\(^5\) References in this format are to papers or statements presented at the Conference and available on the conference website.
\(^6\) See particularly Collier and others 2002
\(^7\) A large body of literature explores this relationship. It is discussed in later sections of this paper. Collier and Hoeffler 2002 and Fearon and Laitin 2004, “Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War,” American Political Science Review 97(1): 75-90, have argued the strong link between poverty as measured by GDP per capita. See Murshed 2007 for a thorough literature review.
accumulate, entrepreneurs of violence emerge and the incentives and resources that facilitate the recruitment of combatants are shaped.

These structural conditions create a fertile environment for the onset of war. They do not invariably cause wars. Instead, they constitute ‘risk factors’ that raise the probability of violent conflict breaking out. The 1990s research on economic causes of civil war identifies a two-way causal relationship between poverty and violent conflict. While the statistical correlation between low per capita incomes and frequency of war is well established, it does not connotate causality and the literature identifies more specific economic, social and institutional drivers of conflict. The policy implication is that the rate of economic growth as such matters far less than the pattern of development.

Thus integrating conflict prevention in development strategies and aid policies would help reduce conflict risks by addressing privileged social and economic drivers. In particular, cross country statistical analyses and qualitative studies over the last decade show that in poor and fragile states conflict risks can be exacerbated by the weight of history (past conflicts), location (‘bad’ neighbors creating spillover effects), horizontal inequalities, group exclusion, demographic youth bulges and natural resource dependence.

The five country case studies – of Burundi/Rwanda, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Mozambique, Sierra Leone and Sudan (Uvin, Kaplan, Hanlon, Davies and Ateem – Annex A) and the survey of African conflicts (Fukuda-Parr and others – Annex D) prepared for the workshop show the relevance of one or more of these factors in the 126 armed conflicts of the last 26 years. Legacies of ethnic exclusion, inequality and youth unemployment are characteristic features of the 32 conflict affected countries and many of them are located in ‘bad neighborhoods.’ There is considerable controversy over the relative importance of these factors. But they are not mutually exclusive and several of them may co-exist and be mutually reinforcing.

Grievances over group exclusion and inequality have been conflict drivers in Burundi, Rwanda, Sudan, Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia and elsewhere. Struggles over mismanaged natural resources have fueled wars in Liberia, DRC and Sierra Leone. Liberia is a notorious case where all the factors have long been present – including deeply entrenched inequalities between the Americo-Liberian elite and indigenous African groups; weak oversight of natural resources; and neighborhood effects. These

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8 The terms war, civil war, political violence and armed conflict have been used in datasets with precise definitions. For example, the UCDP/PRIO datasets identify as ‘war’ violent conflicts resulting in 1000 battle-related dead, and as ‘armed conflict’ those that result in 25 battle deaths. This report does not follow these strict definitions.
9 See Collier and Hoeffler 2002, among other studies.
10 Collier and Hoeffler 2002.
11 See for example Stewart 2002.
12 See Cincotta and others 2003.
13 Collier and Hoeffler 2002.
14 There has been considerable debate and controversy over these analyses. While there are many disagreements among researchers over data, methodology and findings, there are also many points of agreement and the diverse factors identified are not mutually incompatible but reinforcing. In many contexts, several factors are at play. See Murshed 2007.
factors created the environment within which violence erupted and engulfed the country during two vicious civil wars.

These research findings have important implications for development policy, especially in states where social cohesion is weak and where the allocation of education budgets, the access to jobs in the bureaucracy, the contracts with multinationals, the use of natural resource revenues etc. have distribution consequences that can induce or deepen grievances among disadvantaged groups. Conversely, policies that can ease population pressures such as migration or reduced fertility (e.g. through girls’ education) can have positive conflict prevention impacts.

A whole range of economic policies shaping fiscal management or rural development has an influence on employment. Unfortunately, the design of poverty reduction strategies has rarely addressed such risk factors or addressed the systemic social dysfunctions that underlie conflict proneness. Yet, the policy requirements for conflict prevention are not the same as for growth and poverty reduction. Thus, conflict prevention policies should become an integral part of the policy package promoted in poor countries – just as macroeconomic stability has long been at the top of the agenda promoted by donor countries as an overarching aid priority.

Nothing can substitute for case by case assessments. The relationship between the underlying risk factors listed above and the emergence of armed conflict is neither automatic nor uniform. Their presence should not be considered predictive but probabilistic and worthy of policy attention from a sustainability perspective. But the structural risk factors identified by recent research are present to varying degrees in African countries and particularly in the 32 that have experienced war. While all countries are ‘poor,’ in many cases economic decline did not precede conflict. Horizontal inequality and the youth bulge are present more consistently than other elements. On the other hand, environmental pressure and natural resource dependence have been factors in relatively few of the 32 countries.

Since they relate to development structures, the risk factors identified by policy research are highly relevant to the formulation of development strategies including economic and social policies designed to reduce horizontal inequality, governance reforms to promote social inclusion (especially among youth), capacity building and economic policies to generate investment and employment-creating growth and long-term programs designed to manage the demographic transition (Ohiorhenuan, Couto).

In sum, economic growth alone cannot be expected to address structural risks. Fortunately, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) have broadened the development agenda and there is little doubt that accelerated progress towards their achievement would help enhance human security. But the programs needed to implement the MDGs should be harmonized with other security imperatives. Conflict prevention priorities should be heeded: peace and prosperity go hand in hand.

**Conflict prevention is neglected in development strategies – by both governments and development partners – due to gaps in analytical frameworks and operational tools**
In her keynote address (see above), Mme. Ogata highlighted some inconvenient truths about the international community’s inability or unwillingness to react to obvious signals of economic, social and political deterioration. In Rwanda the world failed to act and prevent genocide despite warning signals, including mounting ethnic strife, rising political tensions and refugee flows. While the failures of international military response by the political community are well known, less well known is the neglect of conflict risks by the development community. In its analysis, based solely on the economic and social performance of the country and its positive steps towards democratic reforms, Rwanda’s development progress was given high marks well after the social and political climate had taken a turn for the worse.

This lack of response reflects gaps in international development strategies of two kinds: analytical and operational. The analytical framework for development does not consider conflict prevention to be a policy objective of national policy nor of development aid. This is currently institutionalized for the development community in the MDGs, which do not include specific security goals or indicators. Until conflict assessments were mandated by donor agencies operating in fragile states, operational assessments of country development prospects did not focus on the political factors that influence domestic transformations. Nor were the structural conditions that make conflict more likely (or more destructive) routinely addressed in the design of development strategies.

An operational gap also needs to be filled: appropriate tools designed to shape the economic, social and institutional policy context for conflict prevention have been neither identified nor utilized. Armed conflict within poor countries is still considered as a predominantly political matter, to be managed through diplomacy, mediation, reconciliation or, in extreme cases, military intervention. These are the major tools of conflict resolution and prevention available to the international community. Thus, international action in Rwanda was late, inadequate and largely reliant on political tools that paid little heed to development issues.

The neglect of conflict prevention is pervasive. The survey of African conflicts prepared for the workshop (Annex D) reviewed the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) for the 32 countries affected by conflict. It found no systematic attention to analyses of economic and social causes or consequences of armed conflict. Some even omitted any reference to war. Other studies of policy instruments document similar findings. Nor do PRSP guidelines, currently under review, mandate a systematic analysis of conflict factors. In brief, both national governments and donor agencies have tended to turn a blind eye to armed violence in the design of their strategies.

Neither national governments nor the international community have developed and applied systematic approaches to integrating conflict consequences and risks into development policy priorities. Major development policy instruments, starting with the PRSPs, need to be consistent in addressing conflict impacts and risks. While development agencies have put in place operational approaches to post-conflict recovery operations such as post-conflict needs assessment, transitional action plans

15 See Scharf and others 2008. This study analyzed 20 PRSPs and similar documents and more than 80 UN Development Assistance Frameworks and found that less than half referred to armed violence.
and rapid delivery mechanisms including multi-donor trust funds and other flexible funding facilities, major frameworks for development such as MDGs and PRSPs have not been adapted to incorporate conflict risks and consequences. (Ohiorhenuan)

These strategic deficits were evident in the pattern of external support accorded Rwanda in the years that preceded the genocide. The country was a priority recipient of aid because of its ‘sound’ economic performance. Another ‘aid darling’ has been Uganda, a country that has sorely neglected its northern region even though it was wracked by conflict. Equally horizontal inequality did not figure prominently in the strategies that donors followed in another major recipient of aid – Côte d’Ivoire. Neglecting to address regional exclusion from the fruits of economic growth and failing to encourage the resolution of group grievance made violent conflict in all of these countries far more likely. Similarly, a ‘halo effect’ of rapid economic growth may conceal the lack of employment creation and social inclusion in such countries as Rwanda or Mozambique where robust economic growth trends have been accompanied by worsening inequality.

Many donors have mandated conflict assessments in fragile states but these assessments have been frequently innocent of policy research findings. Indeed, independent evaluations suggest that conflict insensitivity remains deeply rooted in aid practices.

Yet another reason why conflict prevention in fragile states has been neglected has to do with the fact that it is complex, demanding and hard to justify in terms of visible ‘results.’ That said, in security matters as in the public health field, prevention is demonstrably cheaper than the cure. On average the cost of a civil war is two and a half times the value of the country’s GDP at the time the conflict starts. Preventing a single war saves USD 64 billion a year on average. In the example of Togo, the cost of dealing with war would be much more than the cost of preventing it. (Houngbo) Thus, while conflict prevention involves high risks at the level of individual transactions it generates extraordinarily high rewards in the aggregate.

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16 World Bank 2006.

17 *The Economist* 2004.
INTEGRATING CONFLICT PREVENTION IN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES

To facilitate conflict prevention, human security rather than unbridled and unbalanced economic growth should dominate economic policies and national development strategies in conflict prone states. This requires a deliberate focus on distinctive priorities and operational emphases that have been validated by policy research findings. Specifically, growth and poverty reduction strategies should give particular attention to the factors identified as conflict risks – historical, geographical and structural – and be attentive to political dynamics.

Country specific analyses of social and political trends are essential in identifying risks of war

More research is needed to identify the interaction among structural risk factors in diverse country contexts. Those already identified in the research literature are not predictors. The linkages among them are complex, indirect, numerous and context specific: like Tolstoy’s unhappy families, each violent conflict is unique and endowed with its own history and rationale. Accordingly, there is no standard way to prevent war, but this does not mean that lessons from past experience cannot be drawn to inform country specific analyses of its roots and proximate causes. Hence, rigorous case studies are needed to illuminate the implications of country factors for external engagement policies.

The lessons of Rwanda show the need to incorporate indications of social tensions such as refugee flows in evaluating development performance and identifying priorities (Ogata). In many countries, tensions such as conflicts over land (Putzel) continue to be given little attention in development policy making. Without analysis of these tensions, development policy may unwittingly aggravate them. Development has winners and losers, and is inherently connected to conflicts in society. Political analysis needs to be context specific. ‘Early warning’ economic indicators are too crude and simplistic as political deterioration leading to violent conflict is a highly complex and country specific process.

In general, ‘blueprint thinking’ should be shunned and more qualitative analysis done, particularly regarding the antecedents of economic and social indicators such as refugee flows and structural risk factors such as the situation of youth (Olonisakin) and the allocation of development resources among regions and ethnic groups. In conflict affected countries, analysis of the social and economic impacts and sources of armed violence should provide inputs to setting policy priorities. Systematic approaches to integrating such analysis should be developed and incorporated into instruments such as the PRSPs (Annex A).

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19 Terrorists are largely drawn from the middle classes but the ideologies they serve do not thrive in countries that have benefited from equitable and socially inclusive development.
From a human security perspective, major civil wars are not the only priority; low-intensity and non-state conflicts are a major threat to people’s livelihoods and security in sub-Saharan Africa

The destructive impacts of war do not always show up in national data. Analysis of armed conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa over 19980-2006 shows a precipitous economic decline during war years in Liberia, Sierra Leone, DRC, Eritrea, Burundi, Djibouti, Mozambique and several other countries. Yet the GDPs of only nine of the 22 countries for which data are available were lower at the end of the war than at its onset; in 13 other countries, GDP was higher at the end of the war.

For some, such as Angola and Rwanda, there were dramatic declines at the height of the fighting, followed by recovery. Several countries sustained GDP growth while fighting continued, such as Sudan, Chad, Senegal, Ethiopia and Niger. Evidently, conflict did not affect major drivers of growth (M’cleod). Here again, a barometer of the quality of growth that would display broad-based, equitable and sustainable development characteristics would have been more revealing.

Of course, the destructive consequences of war are made visible from an assessment of disaggregated trends. For example, between 1990 and 2004, Uganda’s Human Development Index (HDI) improved from .411 to .502, childhood immunization rose from 45 percent to 87 percent, and access to clean water improved from 44 percent to 60 percent. Yet these national numbers severely misrepresent the stark and widening regional inequalities.

In 2005-06, Uganda’s national poverty rate was 31.1 percent, while northern Uganda’s poverty level was 60.7 percent. The under-five mortality rate remains three to four times higher in the northern conflict areas than in the non-conflict areas while the adult literacy rate, which stands at 77 percent in central Uganda, is a mere 47 percent in northern Uganda. Neither national economic growth nor changes in Gini coefficients capture these dimensions.

Such situations have not always attracted the attention of senior policy makers in charge of development. Nor have ‘low intensity’ conflicts, often localized, and waged by non-organized groups that do not involve the state been a matter of concern to most donor agencies. Frequently dismissed as ‘banditry,’ such violent conflicts often reflect social grievances that go well beyond ‘law and order’ failures and ought to be indicators of the efficacy of development efforts from a conflict prevention perspective.

Conflict prevention requires building a state and a civil society able to resolve conflicts without resort to violence

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21 Uganda bureau of statistics 2006.
22 UNDP 2007.
Institutions matter. In countries that have been weakened by internal warfare, absent social transformation and institutions built to resolve conflict without violence, the chances that violence will erupt once again (and that the economic recovery will be aborted) are high; in about half of the cases conflict resumes within five years. In sub-Saharan Africa, only two of the 32 countries that had armed conflicts during 1980-2006 achieved peace that lasted over a decade, and of the 154 cessations of fighting, only nine lasted for 10 years, and another 10 ceased less than 10 years ago and have not resumed. In fact, many of the wars have continued for decades, interrupted by cessation of fighting.

Peace agreements often freeze conflict rather than resolve it. Given humanitarian imperatives, they are often imposed as a result of outside pressures well before the conflicting parties reach a ‘saturation point’ or ‘exhaustion level’ in the use of violence. Accordingly, when they sign peace accords, combatants often do so for opportunistic reasons. They suspend violence in the hope that the basic issues that led them to violence will be addressed and that they will be given a major stake in the new economic and political order. The only solution to preventing resurgence of conflict is to build capacity for peace.

A developmental state accountable for human rights obligations

The weakest, least developed states are the least able to protect themselves against insurgency, or to deploy peaceful means to resolve conflict, prevent the onset of conflict and resolve local disputes when they arise or before they escalate into violence. Conversely, in conflict affected and conflict prone countries, a key priority in national development strategies should be the strengthening of core state functions in order to achieve improved governance.

But violent conflicts have occurred where the state was strong, as in Rwanda or Burundi (Uvin). The nature of the state – the compact with the citizen that underpins its legitimacy as well as its resilience in resolving conflicts without recourse to violence – is more central. When a state is unwilling to fulfill its minimal obligations to the population, to maintain security and to prevent gross violations of human rights, and when people see no hope that the state would protect their human rights, the logic of the ‘exit’ option as described by Hirschman becomes compelling (Fukuda-Parr and Fuentes; Picciotto).

Checks and balances under transparent and representative governance regimes help adjudicate conflicting interests in the use of scarce national resources. Weak judicial systems, corrupt police establishments and unregulated private security services solidify the inequities and rigidities of the social order and contribute to ‘structural violence’ against oppressed minorities (Uvin).

Where oppression and elite rule undermine the human rights of citizens, political reform is needed, especially when warfare has undermined local communities, weakened the civil society and eroded the social contract (Davies). Political inclusion is a particularly important part of an agenda for conflict prevention in ethnically

divided countries with high levels of horizontal inequalities (Stewart). Every group should be endowed with an appropriate share of political, economic and social influence.

**Role of civil society**

Beyond the principles of electoral democracy, the creation of a public space for principled policy debate is a critical element of conflict prevention strategy (Kaldor). The civil society plays an essential role in the mediation of conflict. A complex and dense network of voluntary associations, community organizations, academic institutions and professional bodies, the civil society provides public space for principled policy debates that facilitate prevention of violent conflict.

Voluntary organizations can construct platforms for truth and reconciliation activities and become involved in the mediation of conflicts through peaceful means. They can also act as incubators of peaceful change and social innovations. But civil society organizations should not be used to handle responsibilities better handled by the public sector or the private sector (Couto). Finally, vigilance is in order lest legitimacy be allowed to flow towards non-governmental groups that promote exclusive ideologies and divisive identity politics.

**Decentralization as a conflict prevention measure**

Greater state resilience to conflict may result from delegating more authority and responsibility to local authorities for three sets of reasons. First, it may decrease the intensity of grievances felt by remote, isolated regions by improving the quality, responsiveness and equity of social service delivery. Second, it may defuse social tensions by mitigating the urban bias of economic policies and strengthening the political representation of depressed regions and neglected groups. Third, it may help build social capital in local communities through increased participation in local decision making, greater respect for local cultural traditions, etc.

Of course, poorly designed decentralization may have exactly the reverse effects. In particular, grievances may be generated if decentralization is used as a cover for increased central controls. Equally, public displeasure may arise if the benefits expected do not materialize due to lack of organization and skills at local level or if repressive local elites are allowed to use the decentralization initiative to capture fiscal resources and political influence. Decentralization strategies also run the risk of further weakening state institutions (Couto). Thus, decentralization strategies should be aligned with the social political context.

**Violence, gender relations and social capital**

Social breakdown and psychological costs associated with civil war create a fertile ground for violence as personal expressions of frustration and as a means of resolving conflicts. Youth unemployment and shifts in gender roles are central to these social consequences. El Bushra notes, “violence leads to, and is in turn generated by, destructive impacts of armed conflict including poverty, humiliation, frustration, loss of livelihood, failures of governance, political manipulation, breakdown of inter-communal relations.” The resort to violent behavior, especially the rampant sexual
violence, can be explained at least in part by the psychological impact of war on men and women not being able to fulfill their gendered roles.

Repairing the social fabric is an important part of preventing violent conflict in post-conflict societies. Women commonly emerge as the strongest actors in society as they persevere in the struggle for the survival and safety of their families. The strategy needs to be broad, including for example: public debates over gender roles and gender equality, and the promotion of a culture of human rights and citizenship.

**Economic management priorities for post conflict recovery and conflict prevention are not the same as in non-conflict contexts**

The application of standard economic management principles in conflict affected and conflict prone states amounts to a ‘folly of conventional wisdom.’ Raised efficiency, increased output, larger savings, reduced poverty and competitive entry into the global market are appropriate guidelines for peacetime conditions. By contrast, conflict sensitive development calls for reduced uncertainty, increased employment, pump priming of investment, greater horizontal equity and improved governance of natural resources (Ohiorhenuan, FitzGerald). Once again, standard macroeconomic policies geared to long-term economic growth should not trump all other priorities.

**Macroeconomic policies**

Specifically, the special nature of conflict affected and conflict prone economies implies priorities that differ from stable contexts (FitzGerald):

- Reduce uncertainty vs. raise efficiency;
- Increase employment vs. increase output;
- Raise investment vs. raise savings;
- Reduce horizontal inequality vs. reduce poverty;
- Reduce external vulnerability vs. increase world market integration.

The country case studies presented show that the rigid fiscal orthodoxy and the limited role of the state favored by international financial institutions slowed down the economic recovery of Mozambique (Hanlon) and Sierra Leone (Davies). Adoption of ‘big bang’ economic reforms is risky in weak institutional environments. Instead, fiscal policy should focus on production support; transparent and accountable public expenditures; low import duties to reduce smuggling; judicious revenue-sharing with local authorities; and restraint in domestic borrowing to finance the fiscal deficit.

Gradual diversification and deepening of the tax base should also be initiated to address aid dependency over time. Neither zero inflation nor maximum growth should be the exclusive aim of monetary policy. Restoration of development credit (especially rural credit) is essential. A competitive and stable exchange rate should be the aim of central bank intervention in order to minimize Dutch disease effects associated with large scale aid inflows.

**Broad-based growth and reducing horizontal inequalities**

Economic liberalization and privatization may facilitate rapid enrichment of market-savvy minorities that can exacerbate social resentments and ethnic tensions.
Addressing horizontal inequalities requires removal of institutionalized discrimination and exclusion in political, economic and social life. These inequalities can be addressed by strategies of broad-based inclusive development that combine pro-poor growth, universal access to social services, legal reforms to remove discrimination, and progressive taxation. But universal measures are not enough and direct policies to reduce historic inequalities may be necessary.

The experience of Malaysia, Northern Ireland and elsewhere shows that policies to reduce horizontal inequalities can be effective (Stewart). Political reforms such as federalism, decentralization or proportionate representation may improve political inclusion. Affirmative actions in employment and schooling have been effective in South Africa and Malaysia but remain controversial since they may entrench identities.

These policies are still not part of the consensus development agenda (Stewart) of macro-economic policies that involve stabilization and liberalization as well as growth and poverty reduction, nor are they captured by the MDGs. These policies are also neglected in post-conflict reconstruction policies and are not part of the design of majoritarian democratic systems.

**Addressing youth unemployment**

From a human security perspective, population trends are critical. The development process invariably involves a demographic transition when lives lengthen and average family sizes decline. Countries at this stage of the transition are nearly two and a half times more likely than other countries to experience a civil war (Cincotta). In most of them, growth is not sufficient to create enough jobs for the expanding labor force. Their unemployment rates are three to five times higher than the average for developing countries. Among job seekers, young adult males are least likely to find work and most likely to resort to violence in response to their deprivation.

Especially where the state is weak and cannot manage social tensions, the combination of low growth and high fertility is highly combustible, especially where urbanization rates are high. Africa is home to 80 percent of the world’s estimated total of 300,000 young soldiers (aged 10-24). Unemployment rates among African youth average 31 percent: the highest youth unemployment rates in the world. Africa also has the lowest rates of school enrollment and the largest share of the world total of 133 million illiterate young people.

The ease of access to small arms and light weapons makes violence an economic proposition for young unemployed men (Muggah) when economic stagnation prevails and the state security apparatus is weak or illegitimate. In such circumstances, development programs should take account of demographic and employment factors in parallel with security sector reforms that address disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of young combatants in the peace economy.

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25 For example, equitable growth is not part of the policy priority in the Liberia PRSP – see Fukuda-Parr and others 2007.
The policy implications of these findings are straightforward. Population policies should be designed to accelerate the demographic transition, for example by favoring girls’ education, family planning, women’s rights and gender equality. Promotion of employment reduces the risks of conflict. Hence, economic policy should focus on providing enabling environments for rural development, small and medium enterprises and vocational training. Trade policies, foreign direct investment, credit programs and infrastructure development should also be geared to job creation. Emphasis on job training in deprived urban areas and community-based initiatives is especially useful as it combines social capital creation with employment.

**Governance of land rights**

Competing demands over natural resources can fuel discord especially when the structure of ownership is skewed, rights to land are contested and the claimants (for example farmers, pastoralists, ranchers, miners) belong to different ethnic groups (Putzel). Lopsided land ownership in agrarian societies (Kenya, South Africa and Zimbabwe) induces social tensions that fuel resentment and lawlessness. Disputes among different ethnic groups with incompatible requirements for (and/or inequitable access to) arable land, water, forests or fisheries tend to escalate as the natural resource gets depleted. This has been a significant factor behind local conflicts in Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria and Rwanda. In Darfur, such violence has forced at least 1.2 million people from their homes and fields.

Land disputes are being aggravated by infrastructure investments (for example in irrigation and transport) that increase land values in areas where land ownership rights are tenuous, allowing displacement of poor farmers by rich farmers and powerful politicians. Development also induces intensification of land use and deprives nomadic communities of traditional grazing rights. Increased land values resulting from mineral exploration, or forest concessions can lead to land grabs where ownership rights are tenuous and the rule of law fickle.

**Governance of natural resources**

Statistically, civil war is more frequent in countries highly dependent on extractive industries (Hoeffler). In such environments, local elites may capture the bulk of revenues and the control of these resources gives incentives to control the state by violent means. Illicit resource extraction has supplied warlords with resources to purchase arms and recruit combatants. The lure of easy profits has also induced military incursions by neighbors, as in the DRC. Conversely, external intervention may hold the key to their resolution, as in Angola and Sierra Leone.

But, as illustrated by now-developed countries (as well as by Botswana) there is no good reason why oil, gas and mining resources should be a ‘curse.’ They have been a blessing under governance systems able to mediate competing claims and provide a suitable enabling environment for their profitable extraction, processing and use. So in the long run, building institutions to manage resources is essential (Hoeffler). The involvement of foreign companies in natural resource extraction has led to scrutiny by advocacy groups that have promoted public awareness of the links between natural resources, conflict and corruption.
Multinational companies have become more aware of their social responsibilities. In the mining sector, they have been advocating more effective partnerships among the private sector, the civil society and development agencies towards greater and more effective and transparent revenue sharing with local communities affected by extractive industrial activity (McPhail). At the international level, the multi-stakeholder Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative has generated wholesome civil society pressures for public disclosure of budget information in resource rich developing countries.
Development and conflict are essentially national and local processes. But the role of development cooperation is particularly significant in sub-Saharan Africa. Most countries in that region are highly dependent on aid resources for development financing. Hence, the conflict sensitivity of donor countries’ interventions is critical to the stability of the region. While there is ample evidence that aid can do harm, there is also accumulated knowledge about the policy changes needed to lay the foundations for sustainable peace.

**Updating aid policies and architecture: in engaging with ‘fragile states,’ moving from the ‘how’ to the ‘what’**

Over the last decade the donor community has advocated comprehensive reforms of aid delivery arrangements, stressing the need to align aid priorities and processes owned by poor countries lest domestic capacities are undermined. The principles of effective aid (commitment to poverty reduction, national ownership, mutual accountability and results orientation) adopted in the 2003 Monterrey Consensus and the 2004 Paris Declaration are especially well adapted to partnership with capable, accountable and legitimate states.

But donors have come to recognize that not all country partners own the governance preferences and poverty reduction objectives of DAC donors. While the key principles of the Paris Declaration are as relevant in conflict affected and conflict prone countries, they are exceedingly hard to apply and need re-interpretation. This is an urgent task since donor countries have identified violent conflicts and ‘state fragility’ as critical obstacles to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) as well as a threat to the spread of global terrorism and insecurity.

The need to integrate and coordinate actions in pursuit of development, security and human rights had previously been highlighted by “In larger freedom,” the follow-up report to the Millennium Summit issued by the United Nations Secretary-General in 2005.

The same concerns led the donor community to develop the “Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States,” adopted in 2007 as a complement to the Paris Declaration (Manning; Trzeciak). Thus initiatives for reforming aid systems in situations of violent conflict have focused on the challenge of relating to states – rather than the priority needs of countries to prevent conflict and build peace. The Principles are couched in broad, generic terms and address process issues – the ‘how’ rather than the ‘what.’

To address the ‘what’ requires translating the priority attention to state building recommended by the DAC principles into precise guidelines (Manning). More broadly, it requires updating the conflict prevention guidelines to take account of the

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28 This is evident, for example, in the fact that they are not readily ‘evaluable.’ Nonetheless, evaluation guidelines for conflict prevention have been slow to be formulated.
security and development research findings accumulated over the past decade. It also requires addressing coherence with non-aid policies, such as arms trade and other issues highlighted by the reviews of ‘whole of government’ approaches (Tzreciak).

**Recognizing the central role of politics – and the need for political analysis**

Political science, the Cinderella of the development system, should be invited to the ball of policy making, especially in conflict prone states. This imperative reflects the critical role of politics in the implementation of conflict prevention programs. Addressing issues of horizontal inequality, designing conflict sensitive decentralization arrangements, balancing the dictates of economic efficiency with the need to ensure that major interest groups do not derail the implementation of peace agreements, etc. cannot be done without professional and objective assessments of the political force field.

The widely held assumption in the donor community that all ‘fragile states’ are weak in legitimacy, control of the territory, accountability and capacity for administration, and that these are pre-conditions to violent conflicts hides the diversity of conflict-affected countries. Many African states engaged in conflict were weak in all these aspects, such as Liberia and Chad, yet others such as Uganda and Burundi were not. Furthermore, local institutions and non-state actors may be endowed with significant social capital even where the state is weak or non-existent (Somalia).

Understanding the nature of state fragility and its role in vulnerability to conflict also needs country analysis. The apparent inability of political scientists to offer crisp and actionable recommendations to policy makers as well as the willful reluctance of international organizations to address the political consequences of their activities (or their inaction) should be reversed. But care must be taken not to subject political analysis for conflict prevention to the foreign policy priorities of individual donor countries. This is a prerequisite of the ‘doing no harm’ principle.

The objective application of human security principles – focused on the impacts of alternative policy options on society and on human lives – implies that broadly-based poverty reduction – aiming at progress towards a world free from want as well as from fear – should remain the overriding objective of development cooperation. Care must also be taken not to fall into the trap of facile analysis and over-reliance on quantitative ‘early warning signs’ of political and social declines and increasing risks of violence. Without an in-depth knowledge of the country’s history and society, such signs may be misread.

**Investing in early conflict mediation and reconciliation**

Spending for conflict mediation and reconciliation is an investment in peace and prosperity. Neutral facilitation is a better option for nurturing a sustainable peace than backing the friendlier faction. Prudence dictates donor country engagement, not inaction, to help avoid state failure and its likely consequences: growing poverty, violent conflict, large-scale population displacement, and sanctuaries for criminal and terrorist enterprises.
Most violent conflicts result from a combination of underlying and precipitating causes. While the former require treatment of root or structural problems (along the lines sketched above), the latter may be amenable to diplomatic solution. This aims at sparing the international community a choice between respect for national sovereignty and the duty to intervene to protect the innocent. It is a chain with six major links: (i) predictive intelligence and analytical capacity, (ii) an early warning system, (iii) a toolbox of preventive methods, (iv) effective decision making, (v) capacity to respond, and (vi) political will needed for timely action.

The first two links have received extensive scrutiny. The art of intelligence is to cry wolf at the right time and to avoid crying wolf prematurely. The sheer mass of intelligence data hinders interpretation. Human intelligence is often at a premium as multiple dots are identified but remain unconnected. Predictive models predicated on systemic variables tend to predict trouble everywhere. Even the best intelligence gathering apparatus cannot eliminate all the uncertainties. Nothing can substitute for a deep understanding of the society.

Much progress has been made in building early warning capacities, and through the hard-won lessons of history a toolkit has been assembled to facilitate conflict mediation. Equally, a variety of multi-actor models are available to help coordinate the response. With the right skills and the right incentives, preventive diplomacy can help turn spoilers into stakeholders.

Donor country engagement should help to trigger dialogues and initiatives that can assist in remedying social grievances and facilitate the proactive and principled involvement of non-state actors such as non-governmental organizations and private entities. Small arms monitoring, embargoes and targeted sanctions are also part of the arsenal, along with preventive deployment of forces as the last resort. The weakest links in the chain are the political will to act and the strategic capacity to design a response.

Advocacy, political pressure and the promotion of a culture of prevention can nurture political will. This requires shared norms, shared definitions and shared parameters. Conflict prevention strategies should be adapted to the local environment by involving domestic actors, adopting their terminologies and respecting their distinctive cultural traditions. The civil society has a special role to play in changing public attitudes and facilitating reconciliation.

**Heeding the lessons of peace-building experience**

Post-conflict assistance should be designed to promote four distinct objectives: (i) public safety, (ii) reconciliation and justice, (iii) economic and social well-being, and (iv) reform of governance. Integrating military, political, economic, social and humanitarian goals is a delicate endeavor that requires a legitimate authority with good domestic leadership and generous external assistance. Acceptable security is the lynchpin of reconstruction, but healing the wounds of war through justice and reconciliation matters too. Effective coordination between donors and building the capacity of local agencies are more important than speedy implementation. Plans for reconstruction should be based on sound damage assessments and properly sequenced
interventions that display early results and provide for the return of displaced populations and their reintegration into society.

The conversion of military assets for civilian use is an important and complex aspect of the fragile transition from war to peace. Realizing a peace dividend is not straightforward. Many of the resources used for war (military installations, small arms) are of little use in peacetime. The reduction of military establishments may reduce tensions and build public confidence but it may also undercut legitimate national security needs. Conversion of arms production enterprises to civilian purposes raises complex issues of commercial feasibility and public sector restructuring.

Sharp reductions of military expenditures and rapid demobilization may have the unintended effects of privatizing violence and undermining security, as unemployed soldiers turn to criminal activity in order to survive. Collection and disposal of weapons requires careful planning and good community relations. Recruitment of former soldiers into the police and private security forces calls for retraining programs. Reintegration of ex-combatants into the fabric of civilian society requires investments in shelter, health support, counseling, transport, registration, subsistence, training, credit facilities, referral to private sector employers and so forth. The reinsertion of child soldiers into their families and communities requires special support programs.

Reconsidering aid allocation criteria: a venture capital model of aid allocation would be more relevant to the new security and development environment than the prevailing aid allocation protocols

A major gap in the existing conflict prevention policy framework lies in the approach – and the rationale – that the aid community has adopted in allocating aid among countries. The current system rewards well-governed well-performing countries, thus short-changing fragile states. Thus the DAC monitoring reports identify ‘aid orphans’ such as Burundi, DRC and Guinea, which receive less aid than countries with similar levels of poverty and governance indicators (Manning).

More fundamentally, a new approach to analyzing aid effectiveness is needed. The current model is also conceptually flawed as a means to improve aid effectiveness since it is static and does not recognize aid as a risky investment and a contribution to positive change. It rests on three basic operational assumptions: (i) country policies cannot be changed for the better through ex ante conditionality or other forms of donor engagement; (ii) aid cannot be channeled to minimize the distorting effect of poor policies, because of fungibility and the difficulties involved in ‘working around’ governments; (iii) policy and governance as measured by the CPIA determine aid effectiveness.

All three assumptions are questionable (Fukuda-Parr and Picciotto). First, while the history of conditionality is a litany of broken promises, and standard conditions have often proved ill adapted to genuine country needs, constructive changes in policy have been made easier by judicious conditionality combined with trade inducements geared to economic integration (as, for example, in Mexico before the agreement on NAFTA, or in Hungary and Poland before their EU accession). Similarly, businesslike aid
conditions embedded in long-term development partnerships have helped many countries to reduce poverty (for example Ghana, Tanzania and Uganda).

Nor is aid fully fungible. It is simply incorrect to postulate that aid funds channeled through government merely release resources for other uses. This overlooks the fact that in poor, aid-dependent fiscally pressed countries, development spending expands as aid increases and that fiduciary rules associated with project aid are specifically designed to restrain fungibility by attesting that funds are used for the purposes intended by donors. Furthermore, to the extent that development projects incorporate ‘trait-making’ features, aid provides genuinely additional resources.

Third, the correlations between policy quality and aid effectiveness are weak. Indeed, statistical tests show that the positive growth consequences of aid are more pronounced in countries of high economic vulnerability, based on indicators that give pride of place to structural factors and human resource endowments. From an ethical perspective, then, the provision of aid to vulnerable countries has merit in that it helps to compensate them for handicaps over which they have little or no control in the short run. By contrast, linking aid flows to policy prescriptions that may not impact on growth performance or conflict proneness has no redeeming social value.

Further, current aid allocation protocols pay no heed to the channels of aid delivery that critically influence aid effectiveness. While ratings by the World Bank’s independent Operations Evaluation Department confirm that projects have a poorer record in low-income countries under stress (LICUS) than in other countries, they also show that the right kind of aid can achieve good results even in a difficult policy environment. Specifically, 58 percent of the evaluated projects approved by the World Bank in LICUS during 1998-2002 had satisfactory outcomes. And, remarkably, the performance of private sector projects funded by the International Finance Corporation has been as good in LICUS as in other countries.

Conversely, through a signaling and pump priming effect, aid helps to attract private flows and voluntary sector involvement in fragile countries. It helps to create the infrastructure, partnerships, and enabling conditions that allow non-state actors to participate in development operations. These externalities are not captured by current aid allocation principles. Nor do the allocation principles take account of the potential benefits associated with aid flows that are timed to compensate for economic shocks caused by natural emergencies, major adverse movements in terms of trade, or structural vulnerability created by exposure and susceptibility to shocks (counter-cyclical aid).
NEW DIRECTIONS: POLICY AND RESEARCH INITIATIVES

The analysis in this report is intended to stimulate long-term reflection on development strategies and aid priorities. But some immediate actions can be taken to move these ideas forward in forms of both policy initiatives and research projects.

**Agenda for Policy Initiatives: immediate action can be taken to develop operational tools and approaches**

*Developing methodologies for conflict-risk analyses in planning frameworks*

At the country level, unless the development community mandates conflict analysis in planning frameworks, including the underlying causes of social exclusion, conflict prevention will continue to be neglected. PRSPs, despite the institutional constraints they face, especially in weak states, are critical because they influence resource allocations towards domestic priorities. Such analyses should also inform donor instruments such as the UN’s UNDAF and the World Bank’s CAS.

*Adopting new metrics in policy frameworks: Millennium Security Goals (MSGs)*

What does not get measured does not get done. Metrics that incorporate qualitative as well as quantitative measures are needed to promote security, peace and stability (taking full account of the United Nations High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change report). Such goals and indicators would be a desirable complement to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Indeed, they would help achieve them, given that violent conflict is a major obstacle to development progress in the poorest regions of the world. Generated through a participatory and legitimate process and universally adopted, such Millennium Security Goals would put a capstone on the global security and development architecture presaged by the Millennium Declaration that was endorsed by all heads of state at the turn of the century.

Ultimately, the unit of account for measuring security should be the individual or, as an intermediate step, the household. This is where the ultimate burden of armed violence lies – whether it originates at the global, regional, national or local level. Eventually, independent monitoring and evaluation arrangements would need to be set up to measure Quality Adjusted Life Years in order to track progress towards universally agreed Human Security Goals at country, regional and global levels.

**Agenda for policy dialogue: academics and policy makers to consult more to develop a consensus on the economic, social and institutional prerequisites for preventing outbreaks of violence on a case by case basis**

Research over the last decade has shown the inter-relationship between armed conflict and development. The previous section of this report has argued that, so far, the results of these analyses have not influenced development agendas. The knowledge-policy gaps could be filled if the research and policy communities were to draw out the policy implications for identifying the economic, social and institutional prerequisites of preventing violent conflicts. But another obstacle is the lack of consensus among both academics and policy makers.
However, while there are many points of disagreement, there are also some points of agreement. Heated controversies such as ‘greed vs. grievance’ debates have undermined the emergence of consensus positions. The sources of conflict risk identified by different studies and authors are not all mutually exclusive and can be mutually reinforcing (Fukuda-Parr 2007 and Picciotto). The nature of these risks may also change over time (M’cleod). A series of policy dialogues are needed to develop some consensus positions on the macro-economic policies, social policies, sector priorities and institutions that would help reduce risks of conflict.

**Agenda for research: building on the state-centered research of the last decade, a new generation of policy research should focus on causes and consequences of conflict for low-intensity conflicts that challenge prevailing assumptions**

Research of the last decade has helped establish important relationships between poverty and violent conflict. The new generation of research should build on these findings, explore questions that remain unanswered and challenge some of the assumptions that have emerged. To this end, research should give priority to in-depth and rigorous country case studies to illuminate the linkages between the root causes of violent conflict and its precipitating factors and the implications for conflict management and external engagement. Some clear priorities that emerge would be to shift emphasis:

- From causes to prevention policies;
- From major civil wars to low-intensity political violence;
- From economic and social outcomes and drivers to political and institutional designs for resolving conflicts peacefully;
- From ‘fragile states’ to supportive aid instruments;
- From national to individual and group security indicators.

**Policy agendas for conflict prevention**

As already noted, the last decade’s research focused on exploring the relationship between poverty and violence. The new priority should be on the implications of policy options in macroeconomic, sector and institutional areas. The consensus view of the development community defines policy goals of development policy management as economic growth, macroeconomic stability and poverty reduction. Integrating conflict prevention as another policy objective implies a different set of priorities.

**Low intensity conflicts**

State-centric framework has been another feature of the last decade’s research agenda. It has been dominated by analysis focused on the state as the unit of analysis in understanding poverty as a cause of conflict, and on economic and social factors. Cross country regressions use datasets on state-centered civil wars. Qualitative case studies have also focused on the country as a whole. All but one of the over 60 datasets are for wars where the state is a party. Major analyses of global security trends and challenges such as the Human Security Project report on state-centric civil

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29 See also Murshed 2007.
wars. These studies respond to the policy motivation of achieving global security and political stability at the national level.

It is time to give more priority to low intensity conflicts and their causes and impacts, particularly the transmission mechanisms by which their consequences may be limited, and by which policies influence drivers of violence. The state-centric approach neglects non-state and cross-border actors; as Kaldor notes, “although most of these wars are localized, they involve a myriad of transnational connections so that the distinction between internal and external, between aggression (attacks from abroad) and repression (attacks from inside the country), or even between local and global, are difficult to sustain.”

**Institutional and political processes for resolving conflicts peacefully**

The focus on economic and social factors as conflict drivers opened the way for exploring poverty as a cause of violent conflict. It is increasingly recognized that economic and social factors do not relate directly with violence but interact with political factors, and that institutions of governance play an important role. While it is also widely assumed that democratic processes are central, more needs to be explored about the institutions and political processes that make local decision-making processes work to resolve conflicts without recourse to violence. In some cases, elections exacerbated group grievances (M’cleod). More needs to be explored about policy approaches – such as decentralization – that may facilitate such processes.

**Supportive aid policies and instruments**

The consensus view of the donor community on supporting countries affected by violent conflict emphasizes the core elements of the Paris Principles and sound macroeconomic management. Yet pious mantras regarding ownership, partnership and results orientation do not help produce results in fragile states. Research on aid effectiveness is needed to explore policy approaches and instruments that might be more effective. For example, the project vehicle, which lost favor in the era of policy-based lending, is a highly suitable one for assisting weak states.

Sachs describes ‘on the ground’ solutions for ending poverty in poverty-stricken villages and urban neighborhoods, and he unveils a ‘new’ approach to development policy formulation: ‘clinical economics.’ The methods replicate in precise detail the approaches that aid practitioners have long been using to identify development interventions suitable for external funding.

Similarly, research should focus on the impact of rapid liberalization reforms and conditionality. Aid officials have often succumbed to the temptation of ‘big bang’ reform packages in post-conflict situations when governments are weak and still unrepresentative. To be sure, policy-based operations have a role to play in transferring resources, helping to strengthen or re-establish core economic ministries, and locking in basic principles of sound economic management. But these operations may exacerbate conflict and destabilize fragile governments if they involve, as they often do, shifts in resources among competing groups and if, given the law of

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30 Kaldor 2007.
unintended consequences, they favor one faction over the other in a conflict. Subsidy reductions, fiscal reforms and reallocation of public expenditures can have enormous political repercussions and hence should be subjected to critical scrutiny from a conflict-prevention perspective. Where states have collapsed (as in Somalia), the concept of sovereignty should be adjusted: it should allow official interaction with *de facto* entities on the ground. The human cost of awaiting the restoration of territorial integrity may be too high. In general, aid should be conceived of not only as an incentive for good policy performance but also as an instrument for capacity building and conflict management.

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The convergence of security and development objectives requires new policies, new strategies and new forms of external engagement.

Today’s armed conflicts in Africa defy the state-centric analytical frameworks and policy instruments – contemporary armed conflicts in Africa correspond more closely to the concept of ‘new wars’ as they are motivated by both political and private economic objectives, commingle state and non-state actors with local and external allies, and involve violence perpetrated against unarmed civilians by state armies, non-state militias, and organized criminal networks.\(^{31}\)

New engagement requires a human security approach that addresses explicitly the major impacts and causes of war so as to consolidate the peace and prevent the recurrence of conflict. It requires adjustments in conceptual framework for analysis, data gathering and action.

\(^{31}\) See works of authors such as Kaldor 2007 and Reno 2005.
ANNEX A: SUMMARIES OF COUNTRY STUDIES

Country Case Study – Burundi and Rwanda – By Peter Uvin
Structural Causes, Development Cooperation and Conflict Prevention in Burundi and Rwanda

This paper analyzes the relation between development aid and the structural causes of violent conflict. It does so through a case study of two countries, Burundi and Rwanda.

Many of the usually recognized structural causes are present in Burundi and Rwanda. These countries fit comfortably within most structure-based explanations: they are very poor, they had economic crises before the mass violence; they suffered from severe natural resource constraints; they were military dictatorships; and their populations comprised an enormous proportion of youth. But it became equally clear that structural factors alone explain little: what really matters is their interaction, and their specific content and context. Structure is a weak predictor of anything, and an even weaker tool for understanding a particular place. Structural analyses such as those dominant in much popular scholarship – reflected in many peace and conflict impact assessment tools – are at best superficial hints of reality, and at worst beside the point; actions solely based on these insights or tools are bound to be a waste of money. What is needed, then, is far more than an understanding of the mere structural factors – substantive and in-depth local knowledge is required.

In addition, structural causes do not change easily – that is why they are structural! For understanding, and especially for acting on violent conflict, ‘conjunctural’ and ‘intermediary’ political and social factors matter much more than structural ones do. Development aid then, to have an impact on violent conflict, will need to be based on an in-depth analysis of the context within which it works.

We observe that the international community does now deal, much more than before the 1990s, with root causes of violent conflict in Burundi and Rwanda. Many issues that are at the heart of the conflict nexus – ill governance, impunity, social polarization, unaccountable and inefficient security sectors – are now on the development agenda in Burundi and Rwanda, and tens of millions of dollars are spent each year in both countries on affecting these dynamics. In both countries, the post-conflict aims of the donors have been smart and broad; successes, both at the national and the local level have occurred, especially in those rare circumstances where visionary individuals met flexible donors; and lots of good thinking and writing has taken place. There is real progress here, and real learning has taken place in many of these sectors.

Still, there are enormous constraints on the capacity of the development system to achieve its aims. The aid community remains largely unimaginative, inflexible, politically impotent, crushed under bureaucratic and short-term pressures, and largely irrelevant to the crucial dynamics of socio-political change, of violence and peace, in both countries. It does not possess the knowledge and flexibility and political spine to achieve its aims. And, let’s face it, these aims are tough and hard to achieve in any case.
In October 2006, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), which experienced possibly the world’s deadliest humanitarian catastrophe, held the second of two rounds of the first free presidential elections in 46 years. The culmination of a transitional process funded, designed and overseen by the West, the elections were supposed to bring stability, accountability and democracy to a land long devastated by war, poor administration and authoritarianism. Sadly, this brighter future is unlikely to be reached any time soon, for the transitional process is fatally flawed. A bold approach is needed to reform the DRC’s governmental apparatus, the collapse of which not only affects its citizens, but also destabilizes states throughout the continent and provides a haven for terrorists, arms traffickers, and criminal networks.

The country is roughly the same size as Western Europe, but its state has almost entirely withered away, leaving an increasingly despairing population to fend for themselves within a Hobbesian nightmare of chaos and violence. In the last decade alone, violence, disease and malnutrition have killed nearly four million, while armies, warlords and assorted gangs have pilfered hundreds of millions of dollars in gold, diamonds and coltan.

The scale of these problems has been magnified by DRC’s tempting natural resources, vast size, disadvantageous political geography and meager infrastructure. There is a wealth of mineral deposits, including uranium, diamonds, copper, cobalt and coltan. But instead of acting as the country’s economic engine, this natural resource base is fueling today’s conflict. Another factor contributing to conflict is the deep geographical and political divisions that have led to outbreaks of violence between competing factions.

The DRC’s collapse not only affects its citizens; it also destabilizes states throughout the continent, at least half a dozen of which have been drawn into its civil war in recent years, spawning Africa’s first ‘world war.’

The West has pumped billions of dollars into humanitarian programs and a large UN peacekeeping deployment, but it has not fully examined whether its strategy for the country will deal with the root causes of its dysfunction.

The current international effort to fix the DRC prescribes conventional remedies for failed states – elections, economic liberalization and security reforms – that are desirable, but none of which will make a significant difference unless coupled with an ambitious plan to counteract the systemic roots of the country’s profound dysfunctions. If the DRC is to develop homegrown capacities that can eventually overcome the state’s problems, the country’s institutions must be redesigned so that they better reflect its political geography, limited governance capacities, dearth of infrastructure and abundant mineral wealth. Above all, this means giving local leaders a genuine chance to effectively serve the population.
Country Case Study – Mozambique – By Joseph Hanlon
“The war ended 15 years ago, but we are still poor.”

One million people died in Mozambique’s 1981-92 war, and one-third of the population had to flee their homes. After that war, there was an intense feeling of ‘never again – everything must be done to avoid violence.’ But 15 years later, there has been a subtle mood change. Those who fought gained nothing, while their leaders have become comfortable and prosperous. And there is now a new generation of young people who do not remember the war – with a basic primary education they are moving into towns and cities to try to earn a living in the ‘informal sector,’ on the margins of the law. Violent crime is increasingly an issue, in the media and in public meetings with President Armando Guebuza. So far, political violence has been very limited, but where it has occurred has been in areas of economic stress.

Mozambique is a ‘donor darling,’ with relatively high levels of aid. We argue that Mozambique is not the post-conflict success story that has been painted, and that the donors seem willfully blind to growing problems of increasing poverty and jobless youth.

This paper makes four assertions about how divisions impacted war. First, that the 1981-92 war was externally driven and that divisions and conflicts within the country would not have become violent without that outside intervention. Second, that ethnic, language and religious differences have not been and are unlikely to be factors in violence. Third, that the main differences are between rich and poor and between urban and rural, and that differences within groups and provinces are larger than differences between them. Fourth, that there is an important economic division between the south and the rest of the country that is becoming increasingly important.

Using social contract and greed/grievance models of the roots of civil war, it could be argued that the failure of economic modernization strategies of the early 1980s and the deterioration of the rural economy developed into a felt grievance, for which the government was blamed, and thus to a breakdown in the social contract. The breakdown was not serious enough to cause or trigger a war, but it definitely led poor rural people in some areas not to oppose invading forces.

It is difficult to predict organized violence. But we may already be seeing the inchoate violence of a group who are young, poor, only partly educated, and marginalized – illegality, criminality with gratuitous violence, sexual violence, and attacks on outsiders and the more powerful – blamed for the increasing economic problems. This sort of violence is much more common in neighboring South Africa, but it seems to be increasing in Mozambique, particularly with a growing willingness to use weapons and indications of the formation of gangs. The disenchanted young do not seem to identify with language groups nor with parties, and are not voting in elections. Preventing violent conflict requires Mozambique to become an activist, developmental state that intervenes in the economy and gives the young and poor a future and a stake in society.
This paper analyzes the root causes of the 1991-2001 civil war in Sierra Leone, highlighting the role of development cooperation and external factors. The war ended in January 2002 with the signing of a peace accord. The British military intervention was the decisive factor, making military victory for the rebel movement an unlikely proposition. The intervention demonstrated that in a small country like Sierra Leone, a small clinical operation could be effective in helping to end civil conflict in certain circumstances.

Other factors that also contributed to ending the conflict included the decimation of the rebel movement’s military capability in 2000 by Guinean troops repulsing an RUF-assisted rebellion in Guinea on the northern border. Second, UN sanctions forced Liberia to reduce its arms-for-diamonds support for the rebels. An existing arms embargo was extended to a ban on diamond exports and on international travel for members of the government and their families. Third, the intransigent rebel leader, Foday Sankoh, was incarcerated and replaced.

The roots of the Sierra Leone civil war can be traced to Siaka Stevens’ patrimonial system of governance from 1968 to 1985, the emergence of which was aided by ethno-regional rivalries and diamonds. The key subsequent elements of this system of governance that fostered state failure and civil war were political repression, economic mismanagement and corruption, rural isolation, diamonds, youth alienation and ethno-regional rivalries.

Youth alienation and its subsequent radicalization culminated in the formation of the rebel movement in Sierra Leone. Thus, youths played a major role in the onset of the conflict. The available evidence suggests that the country also had a youthful population. The Sierra Leone case is therefore consistent with the youth bulge hypothesis.

Political factors were equally if not more important for conflict than economic ones. Economic and political factors interacted closely, so that any attempt to view them as independent factors, as in the Collier and Hoeffler 2004 categorization, could lead to misleading inferences.

The Sierra Leone case highlights several issues for foreign aid and development cooperation. The first is the absence of a distinct policy for weak states by the international financial institutions. The second issue relates to dealing with external instigation, from Libya and Liberia in Sierra Leone’s case. The implications are that when the international community takes strong positions against external aggressors it can help end violent conflicts in Africa. Third, the Sierra Leone civil war highlights the need to make it difficult for rebels to sell natural resources used to finance violent conflict. Fourth is the domestic management of Sierra Leone’s alluvial diamond resources; donors, and indeed, policy makers, do not appear to have a clear understanding of the complexity of this problem. The fifth issue is the need for donors to reduce the transaction costs of aid, as well as aid unpredictability, by harmonizing procedures and making timely disbursements of committed aid. The Sierra Leone experience shows that delays and shortfalls in aid commitments can be costly.
Country Case Study – Sudan – By Eltigani Seisi M. Ateem
The Root Causes of Conflicts in Sudan and the Making of the Darfur Tragedy

Sudan has been at war with itself since its independence in 1956. The most recent of these conflicts is the current one in Darfur, which instantly brought the region to the forefront of regional and international attention because of the severity of the human rights violations committed. The war that broke out in early 2003 has seen wide-scale mobilization of tribal militias that committed colossal atrocities against the civilian population. Despite the signing of a peace agreement and the strong involvement of the regional and international community, the intensity of the conflict escalated, resulting in a worsening of the humanitarian situation.

Numerous explanations have been given for the causes of the conflict in the Darfur region. It is not principally rebel economic opportunity as argued by the Collier and Hoeffler framework, nor environmental degradation or ethnicity as argued by some other researchers that are the root causes. The seeds of the conflict have been sown by decades of deliberate marginalization and neglect of the region; disproportionate power sharing to the favor of the riverine elites; manipulation of and persistent inequity in resource allocation; and incitement of tribal and ethnic conflicts, all of which are inherently political and economic. This prolonged marginalization has resulted in huge disparities between the center and the Darfur region, where life has become untenable. It contributed to the creation of imbalanced development where socio-economic indicators are much worse compared to those at the center. This was compounded by low levels of public expenditure resulting in poor state capacity for social service delivery at all levels.

While the country’s oil revenues, if properly used, could have partially alleviated poverty across the country, they have instead been dedicated to military spending. The government’s military expenditure is incomparable to its expenditures on social services.

Bad governance in the Sudan in general and in Darfur in particular has been at the heart of the causes of the conflict. Among the characteristics of the country’s bad governance are monopoly of power, rampant corruption, lack of transparency, dishonoring of peace agreements, the disbanding of political parties and the lack of rights to assembly and freedom of expression.

Interventions by some neighboring countries contributed to escalating ethnic tensions in the region, in particular with regard to the Chadian-Libyan war.

The development role of the international community in the Sudan has been weak since 1989 when a military coup toppled a democratically elected government. Development aid was initially scaled down but was subsequently suspended and replaced with humanitarian aid. Development aid was only resumed after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement that ended the war in Southern Sudan.
The statistical association between low incomes, low growth and violent conflict is robust and reflects reciprocal causal links. First, the damage caused by war amounts to development in reverse. Second, poverty exacerbates vulnerability to conflict. Both insecurity and poverty are associated with weak state capacity to protect citizens, manage the economy, deliver services and defuse social tensions. But last decade’s research on development-conflict nexus reveals that not all development contributes to security; some patterns of development can exacerbate risks of conflict. These include development that reduces state capacity and increases state fragility, development that exacerbates group exclusion and horizontal inequalities or that continues dependence on natural resources.

How can external engagement reduce risks of violent conflict and improve the stability of fragile states and contribute to conflict prevention? How can aid and non-aid policies be made more risk sensitive? What should constitute the security content of poverty reduction programs in Africa? What aid allocation criteria would best contribute to peace and stability? Should the mitigation of horizontal inequalities figure on the agenda of poverty reduction strategies? How should aid effectiveness be analyzed if donors wish to prevent conflict? What aid vehicles are best adapted to peace building?

These policy questions are especially relevant to sub-Saharan Africa, the only region of the world where the share of people living in absolute poverty is rising; where nearly 40% of world conflicts are taking place; where the deadliest confrontations of the last decade and a half have been experienced; and where the incidence of violent conflict is rising.

The workshop will tap policy research findings at the intersection of security and development. By connecting knowledge domains and epistemic communities that have remained isolated from one another (development economics, international law, security studies, humanitarian affairs etc.) it will help identify the behaviors of states and non-state agents that encourage the spread of violence, the structural factors that make countries conflict prone and the conflict sensitivity characteristics of development cooperation. This should help to design external engagement strategies best suited to the enhancement of human security in Africa.
THURSDAY, 8 NOVEMBER

1500-1515
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

Donald LAMONT
Chief Executive, Wilton Park

Masafumi KUROKI
Vice President, Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Tokyo

Gilbert HOUNGBO
Assistant United Nations Secretary-General; Assistant Administrator, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and Director of UNDP’s Regional Bureau for Africa, New York

1515-1645
1
KEYNOTE ADDRESS: DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION AND HUMAN SECURITY

Sadako OGATA
President, Japan International Cooperation Agency, Tokyo

1645
Tea, coffee and conference photograph

1730-1900
2
CONFLICT PREVENTION AND DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

Chair: Gilbert HOUNGBO
Assistant United Nations Secretary-General; Assistant Administrator, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and Director of UNDP’s Regional Bureau for Africa, New York

Conflict and development: what do we know?
Sakiko FUKUDA-PARR
Visiting Professor, International Affairs, The New School, New York

Conflict trends and international engagement in Africa: where do we stand?
Andrew MACK
Director, Human Security Report Project, Simon Fraser University, Vancouver

Discussants:
Herbert M’CLEOD
Special Coordinator, Office of the Vice President, Government of Sierra Leone, Freetown

Torgny HOLMGREN
Deputy Director-General, Head of Department for Development Policy, Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Stockholm

1915 Drinks Reception

1945 Dinner with after dinner speaker

IS CONFLICT PREVENTION THE MISSING LINK?

Sir Lawrence FREEDMAN
Vice Principal, King’s College London

FRIDAY, 9 NOVEMBER

0900-1030 THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION

Chair: Ashraf GHANI
Chairman, Institute of State Effectiveness, Washington DC

Aid policy and fragile states: the way forward
Richard MANNING
Chairman, Development Assistance Committee, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Paris

The role of the civil society
Mary KALDOR
Director, Centre for the Study of Global Governance, London School of Economics and Political Science, London

Discussants:

Clare LOCKHART
Director, Institute of State Effectiveness, Washington DC

Stephen BROWNE
Deputy Executive Director, International Trade Centre, Geneva
1030 Tea and Coffee

1100-1230 ADDRESSING DEVOLUTION AND EXCLUSION

Chair: Asbjørn EIDHAMMER
Director of Evaluation, Norwegian Agency for International Development (NORAD), Oslo

Decentralization
Yuichi SASAOKA
Senior Advisor, Development Policy, Institute for International Cooperation (IFIC), Japan International Cooperation Agency, Tokyo

Human rights, state capacity and economic policy
Juan Alberto FUENTES
Director, Central American Institute for Fiscal Studies (ICEF), Guatamala City

International engagement prior to conflict: lessons from Rwanda
Peter UVIN
Director, Institute for Human Security, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Medford

Discussants:

Karin CHRISTIANSEN
Research Fellow, Centre for Aid and Public Expenditure, Poverty and Public Policy Group, Overseas Development Institute, London

Jibrin IBRAHIM
Director, Centre for Democracy and Development, Abuja

1300 Lunch
1500- 5  ADDRESSING EMPLOYMENT, YOUTH AND GENDER DIMENSIONS

Chair: Andrew STEER
Director, Policy and Research Division, Department for International Development, London

Employment
Anthony ADDISON
Executive Director, Brooks World Poverty Institute, University of Manchester

The youth bulge and its implications
Richard CINCOTTA
Consulting Demographer, Long Range Analysis Unit, National Intelligence Council, Washington DC

The gender dimension
Judy EL BUSHRA
Programme Manager, African Great Lakes Region, International Alert, London

Discussant:

Funmi OLONISAKIN
Director, Conflict, Security & Development Group (CSDG), International Policy Institute, King’s College London

1630  Tea and coffee

1700- 6  MANAGING NATURAL RESOURCES

Chair: Jibrin IBRAHIM
Director, Centre for Democracy and Development, Lagos

Natural resources and conflict: curse or blessing?
Anke HOEFFLER
Research Officer, Centre for the Study of African Economies, Oxford University

Managing land and water resources for conflict prevention
James PUTZEL
Director, Crisis States Research Centre, Development Studies Institute, London School of Economics and Political Science

The Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative
Peter EIGEN
Chairman, Transparency International, Berlin
Discussants:

Alan R. ROE  
Former Principal Economist, World Bank; Director, Oxford Policy Management (OPM)

Antonio PEDRO  
Chief, Infrastructure and Natural Resources Development, Economic Commission for Africa, Addis Ababa

1900 Drinks Reception

1930 Dinner  
hosted by Donald LAMONT, Chief Executive, Wilton Park

Dinner Speaker  
The Rt. Hon. the Lord MALLOCH-BROWN  

SATURDAY, 10 NOVEMBER
0900-  7  THE GOVERNANCE AND EQUITY REQUIREMENTS OF PREVENTING VIOLENT CONFLICT

Chair: Ashraf GHANI
Chairman, Institute of State Effectiveness, Washington DC

Horizontal inequality and policy implications
Frances STEWART
Director, Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, Oxford University

Democracy and ethnicity
Yusuf BANGURA
Research Coordinator, United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD), Geneva

Reforming the security sector
Nicole BALL
Visiting Senior Research Fellow, Center for International Development and Conflict Management, (CIDCM), Washington DC

Discussant:

Adedeji A. EBO
Senior Fellow and Head of the Africa Programme, Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Geneva

1030  Tea and Coffee

1100-  8  COUNTRY CASE STUDIES - PARALLEL DISCUSSION GROUPS

Burundi and Rwanda
Peter UVIN
Director, Institute for Human Security, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Medford

Discussant: Sakiko FUKUDA-PARR
Visiting Professor, International Affairs, The New School, New York

Mozambique
Alcinda HONWANA
Director, International Development Centre, The Open University, Milton Keynes

Joseph HANLON
Senior Lecturer, Development & Conflict Resolution, The Open University, Milton Keynes
Discussant: Yoichi MINE  
Associate Professor, Global Collaboration Centre, Osaka University

Sierra Leone  
Victor DAVIES  
Senior Research Economist, African Development Bank, Tunis Belvedere

Discussant: Kamil KAMALUDDEEN  
Economics Advisor and Head of Strategy and Policy Unit, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Monrovia

Democratic Republic of the Congo  
Seth KAPLAN  
Chairman, Alpha International Consulting, New York

Discussant: Tukumbi LUMUMBA-KASONGO  
Professor of Political Science and Chair of the Division of Social Sciences, Wells College; Visiting Scholar, Department of City and Regional Planning, Cornell University, Ithaca

Sudan (Darfur)  
Eltigani S. M. ATEEM  
Senior Regional Advisor, NEPAD and Regional Integration Division, UN Economic Commission for Africa, Addis Ababa

Discussant: Sara PANTULIANO  
Research Fellow, Humanitarian Policy Group, Overseas Development Institute, London

1215-1300  
REPORT BACK FROM DISCUSSION GROUPS TO PLENARY

Chair: Hiroshi KATO  
Director General, Institute for International Cooperation (IFIC), Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Tokyo

1300  
Lunch
1500-1630  ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION

Chair: Tukumbi LUMUMBA-KASONGO
Professor of Political Science and Chair of the Division of Social Sciences, Wells College and Visiting Scholar, Department of City and Regional Planning, Cornell University, New York

Macroeconomic policy
Valpy FITZGERALD
Director, Department of International Development, University of Oxford

Economic recovery
John OHIORHENUAN
Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), New York

Discussant:

Pedro COUTO
Vice Minister, Ministry of Finance, Maputo

1630  Tea and Coffee

1700-1830  POLICY COHERENCE FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION AND PEACEBUILDING

Chair: Robert PICCIOTTO
Visiting Professor, King’s College London

Humanitarian policy dilemmas
James DARCY
Director, Humanitarian Policy Group, Overseas Development Institute, London

Regulating the small arms trade
Robert MUGGAH
Research Director, Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva

The private sector and violent conflict
Kathryn McPHAIL

Discussant:
Alexandra TRZECIAK-DUVAL  
Head, Policy Coordination Division, Development Cooperation  
Directorate, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and  
Development (OECD), Paris

1830-1930  11  PULLING IT ALL TOGETHER

Co-Chairs: Sakiko FUKUDA-PARR  
Visiting Professor, International Affairs, The New School, New York

Robert PICCIOTTO  
Visiting Professor, King’s College London

Panel:

Pedro COUTO  
Vice Minister, Ministry of Finance, Maputo

Ukoha O. UKIWO  
Research Fellow, Centre for Advanced Social Science (CASS), Port  
Harcourt and Visiting Scholar, Institute of International Studies,  
University of California, Berkeley

Dan SMITH  
Secretary General, International Alert, London

2000  Drinks reception

2030  Conference Dinner with after dinner speaker

THE INTERNATIONAL CAPACITY FOR THE GOVERNANCE  
OF PEACE  
Ashraf GHANI  
Chairman, Institute of State Effectiveness, Washington DC

SUNDAY, 11 NOVEMBER

0730-0915  Breakfast and payment of bills

0915  Participants depart
ANNEX C: WILTON PARK CONFERENCE LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

WP889 WILTON PARK CONFERENCE 889 Final List
Conflict Prevention And Development Cooperation In Africa: A Policy Workshop

ADDISON, Anthony
(Visiting Speaker)
UNITED KINGDOM
Executive Director, Brooks World Poverty Institute; Associate Director, Chronic Poverty Research Centre (CPRC); Professor of Development Studies, School of Environment and Development, University of Manchester, Manchester

ASHWILL, Maximillian
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Research Assistant, The New School, New York

ATEEM, Eltigani
(Speaker)
UNITED NATIONS
Senior Regional Advisor, NEPAD and Regional Integration Division, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, Addis Ababa

BALL, Nicole
(Visiting Speaker)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Visiting Senior Research Fellow, CIDCM/University of Maryland; Senior Fellow, Centre for International Policy, Washington DC

BANGURA, Yusuf
(Speaker)
UNITED NATIONS
Research Coordinator, UN Research Institute for Social Development, Geneva

BARNES, Cedric
(Session Participant)
UNITED KINGDOM

BROWNE, Stephen
UNITED KINGDOM
Deputy Executive Director, International Trade Centre, Geneva

CARRILLO, Roxanna
UNITED NATIONS
Chief, Policy Analysis Section, Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), United Nations, New York

CHERINDA, Lúcia
MOZAMBIQUE
Second Secretary, High Commission of Mozambique, London

CHIAPPA, Elizabeth
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Research Assistant, The New School, New York

CHRISTIANSEN, Karin
UNITED KINGDOM
Research Fellow, Centre for Aid and Public Expenditure, Poverty and Public Policy Group, Overseas Development Institute, London

CINCOTTA, Richard
(Speaker)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Consulting Demographer, National Intelligence Council, Washington DC
CISSÉ, Babacar  
UNDP  
Country Director, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Kinshasa

COUTO, Pedro  
MOZAMBIQUE  
Vice-Minister, Ministry of Finance, Maputo

DARCY, James  
(Speaker)  
UNITED KINGDOM  
Director, Humanitarian Policy Group, Overseas Development Institute, London

DAVIES, Victor  
(Speaker)  
SIERRA LEONE  
Senior Research Economist, African Development Bank, Tunis

DEROUIN, Robert  
CANADA  
Director General, Stabilisation and Reconstruction Task Force, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Ottawa

EBO, Adedeji  
NGERIA  
Senior Fellow, Head of Africa Programme, Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Geneva

EIDHAMMER, Asbjørn  
(NORWAY)  
(Co-Chair)  
Director of Evaluation, Norwegian Agency for International Development (NORAD), Oslo

EIGEN, Peter  
GERMANY  
(Speaker)  
Chairman, Extractive Industries Transparency Initiatives, Berlin

EL-BUSHRA, Judy  
(Visiting Speaker)  
UNITED KINGDOM  
Regional Programme Manager, Great Lakes, International Alert, London

FITZGERALD, Edmund  
(Valpy)  
(Speaker)  
UNITED KINGDOM  
Director, Department of International Development, University of Oxford, Oxford

FREEDMAN, Lawrence  
(Visiting Speaker)  
UNITED KINGDOM  
Professor of War Studies; Vice Principal, Research, King's College, London

FUENTES, Juan Alberto  
(Speaker)  
GUATEMALA  
Director, Central American Institute for Fiscal Studies (ICEF), Guatemala City

FUKUDA-PARR, Sakiko  
(Speaker)  
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Visiting Professor, International Affairs, The New School, New York

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(Session Participant)  
UNITED KINGDOM  
Private Secretary to Lord Malloch Brown, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London

FURUKAWA, Mitsuaki  
JAPAN  
Resident Representative, Representative Office London, Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), London
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Position and Institution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gaulme, Francois</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Desk Officer, Fragile States and Societies, Agence Française de Développement, Paris</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghani, Ashraf (Speaker)</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Chairman, Institute for State Effectiveness, Washington DC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groenewald, Hesta</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Conflict Advisor, Saferworld, London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hanlon, Joe (Speaker)</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Senior Lecturer, Development and Conflict Resolution, Open University, Milton Keynes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hashimoto, Kei-ichi</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Senior Advisor, Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hoeflller, Anke (Visiting Speaker)</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Research Officer, Centre for the Study of African Economies, Oxford University, Oxford</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holmgren, Torgny</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Deputy Director-General, Department for Development Policy, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Stockholm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hoshino, Toshiya</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Minister-Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations, New York</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houdeet, Chantal</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Deputy Director (Francophonie), Department of International Affairs, Quebec City</td>
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<td>Hounkbo, Gilbert (Speaker)</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Assistant UN Secretary-General and Director of UNDP Regional Bureau for Africa, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), New York</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibrahim, Jibrin</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Director, Centre for Democracy and Development, Abuja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaques, Isobelle</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Programme Director, Wilton Park, Steyning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaldor, Mary (Visiting Speaker)</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Director, Centre for the Study of Global Governance, London School of Economics and Political Science, London</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kamaluddeen, Kamil</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Economic Advisor, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Monrovia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaplan, Seth (Speaker)</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Chairman, Alpha Consulting International, Riverdale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kato, Hiroshi (Co-Chair)</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Director General, Institute for International Cooperation (IFIC), Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Tokyo</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
KOMUKAI, Eri
JAPAN
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MONCRIEFF, Richard
UNITED KINGDOM
(Session Participant)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Position/Position Details</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MUGGAH, Robert</td>
<td>CANADA</td>
<td>Research Director/Project Coordinator, Small Arms Survey, SSRC Fellow, Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOUWEN, Sarah</td>
<td>NETHERLANDS</td>
<td>Consultant, Human European Consultancy; Ph.D. Candidate, International Law, Cambridge University, Cambridge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OGATA, Sadako</td>
<td>JAPAN</td>
<td>President, Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Tokyo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OHIORHENUAN, John</td>
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<tr>
<td>OLONISAKIN, Funmi</td>
<td>UNITED KINGDOM</td>
<td>Director, Conflict, Security and Development Group (CSDG), International Policy Institute, King's College London, London</td>
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<td>PANTULIANO, Sara</td>
<td>ITALY</td>
<td>Research Fellow, Humanitarian Policy Group, Overseas Development Institute, London</td>
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<tr>
<td>PEDRO, Antonio</td>
<td>UNITED NATIONS</td>
<td>Chief, Infrastructure and Natural Resources Development, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), Addis Ababa</td>
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<tr>
<td>PICCIOTTO, Robert</td>
<td>ITALY</td>
<td>Visiting Professor, King's College London, London</td>
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<td>PILLET, Thibault</td>
<td>FRANCE</td>
<td>Counsellor, Ministry of Defence, Armées</td>
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<td>PUTZEL, James</td>
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<tr>
<td>SASAOKA, Yuichi</td>
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<td>SHIMADA, Go</td>
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<tr>
<td>SMITH, Dan</td>
<td>UNITED KINGDOM</td>
<td>Secretary General, International Alert, London</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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49
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>STEER, Andrew</td>
<td>UNITED KINGDOM</td>
<td>(Co Chair) Director, Policy and Research Division, Department for International Development (DFID), London</td>
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<tr>
<td>STEWART, Frances</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>UVIN, Peter</td>
<td>BELGIUM</td>
<td>(Speaker) Academic, Dean and Professor, International Humanitarian Studies; Director, Institute for Human Security, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Medford</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VOELKNER, Nadine</td>
<td>GERMANY</td>
<td>(Speaker) Associate Tutor; DPhil Research Student, Department of International Relations, University of Sussex, Brighton</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, Maximillian Ashwill, Elizabeth Chiappa and Carol Messineo

Abstract

This paper surveys the nexus between development and armed conflict in sub-Saharan Africa from 1980 to 2005. It focuses on war trends, impact of war on development, socio-economic structures as war risks, and policy responses. Several findings emerge that challenge widely held state-centric assumptions that underpin contemporary analyses, data collection and policy priorities. The wars in question defy conventional analytical frameworks as they commingle state and non-state actors with political, economic and private motives. As the findings illustrate, the state is not a sufficient unit of analysis: more research, data collection and policy attention should be directed to non-state actors and wars and sub-national and cross-border impacts. War is development in reverse, yet in many of these wars, the national economy continued to grow and social indicators improved. At the same time, the destructive impacts were localized, implying that development gaps and horizontal inequalities worsened. Structural risk factors – horizontal inequalities, youth bulge and unemployment, environmental pressure and natural resource dependence – have played a causal or perpetuating role in the wars surveyed. Economic, social and governance reform policies can play a role in conflict prevention by addressing these risk factors, yet at present national and international policy priorities do not systematically address these risks.

Introduction

Sub-Saharan Africa is at the core of today’s global challenge of armed conflict, a challenge that is inextricably related to development. Most of the world’s armed conflicts of recent decades have occurred in the region (Human Security Report Project 2006). Continued violence in several countries, the tenuousness of the peace in others and the legacy of violence pose significant peace, security, and development challenges both within states and for the continent as a whole.

The purpose of this article is to provide an overview of the nexus of poverty/development and armed conflict in Africa. After reviewing trends, the paper explores two sets of links between conflict and poverty: the consequences of war on development and poverty, and socio-economic structures as risk factors for war. The final section considers how these links have been addressed in development policy by examining recent Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs).

Trends

Since 1980, more than half of the countries of sub-Saharan Africa have experienced armed conflict, sometimes multiple conflicts taking place simultaneously in different parts of the country and sometimes lasting for decades. Appendices 1 and 2 chart 126 wars in 32 countries recorded in the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset. Table 1
lists these wars and their key features. It includes only wars in which the state is a party
to conflict, and where at least 25 battle deaths have occurred. These criteria, used in the
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, are common elements of the conventional
definition of war used in many other datasets. While governments do not collect data on
war, over 60 datasets have been created by academics and NGOs to monitor regional and
global trends. The armed conflict dataset maintained by the Uppsala Conflict Data
Program (UCDP) and International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO), is increasingly
used in research and policy work because it is comprehensive, updated annually, and its
methodology is considered rigorous. (See Appendix 3 on datasets.)

There was a general rise in the number of wars in this period, but a decline in the last
four years (2002-2005) from 14 to six (Human Security Report Project 2006) with a
Corresponding decline in the number of battle deaths from 8,200 to 2,400 (Lacina &
Gleditsch 2005; Human Security Report Project 2006). This trend should be treated
with caution because it covers only four years, and many of the political, social,
economic, and structural factors of war are still unresolved.

All but six of these 126 armed conflicts were intrastate or civil wars. Many continued
for decades, interspersed with repeated attempts at settlement, and often involved
multiple parties pursuing different goals. Others, less intense ‘minor wars,’ lasted two
years or less (Gleditsch et al 2002; Harbom et al 2006; Harbom and Wallenstein
2007). The majority have been driven by attempts to control the state and only a few
involved secessionist groups (Gleditsch et al 2002). Many wars have spilled across
national boundaries and developed into sub-regional conflicts, including those in the
Great Lakes, Southern Africa, the Mano River Basin and Central East Africa.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Conflict (&gt;1,000 Battle Deaths)</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Battle Deaths</th>
<th>Date of Peace Accord</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>1975*-2004</td>
<td>126466</td>
<td>2002/04/04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>1965*-2005</td>
<td>43085</td>
<td>2005/08/18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo (Brazzaville)</td>
<td>1993-2002</td>
<td>9791</td>
<td>1999/12/29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Rep. of Congo</td>
<td>1996-2001</td>
<td>149000</td>
<td>2003/04/02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>1998-2000</td>
<td>50391</td>
<td>2000/12/12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>1998-1999</td>
<td>1850</td>
<td>1999/11/01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>1989-2003</td>
<td>12684</td>
<td>2003/08/18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>1990-2002</td>
<td>9759</td>
<td>1993/08/04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>1991-2000</td>
<td>12997</td>
<td>2000/11/10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>1981-2005</td>
<td>67014</td>
<td>1997/12/22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>1983-2005</td>
<td>61528</td>
<td>2005/01/09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>1977*-2005</td>
<td>118275</td>
<td>2002/12/24</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minor Armed Conflict &gt;25 and &lt; 999 Battle Deaths</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comoros</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Today’s armed conflicts in Africa defy the analytical frameworks used in the study of war and security. These conflicts correspond more closely to the concept of ‘new wars’ as they are motivated by both political and private economic objectives, commingle state and non-state actors with local and external allies, and involve violence perpetrated against unarmed civilians by state armies, non-state militias and organized criminal networks (Kaldor 2007; Reno 2005). Kaldor notes that “… although most of these wars are localised, they involve a myriad of transnational connections so that the distinction between internal and external, between aggression (attacks from abroad) and repression (attacks from inside the country), or even between local and global, are difficult to sustain (2007:2).”

**Non-state wars**

Most definitions of war, including the UCDP/PRIO dataset used in this paper, include formally organized contested combat against the state. This excludes armed conflicts between non-state actors such as communal violence, conflict between rival guerrilla groups and warlords, state-sponsored violence against unarmed civilians and acts of terrorism. Data on non-state conflicts have begun to be collected only in recent years. From 2002 to 2005, there were 77 non-state conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa compared with 17 state-based conflicts (Table 2). The number of fatalities was smaller – 12,834 compared with 20,655 (UCDP Non-state Dataset 4.1) These non-state wars differ in character from state wars; they may be ‘low intensity,’ employing unconventional weapons and tactics without regard for traditional political or military codes of conduct (WHO 2002).
### Table 2: Comparison of State-Based and Non-State Conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa 2002-2005
(> 25 battle deaths per year)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries with Non-State Based Armed Conflict</th>
<th>Number of Conflicts Between Non-state Warring Parties</th>
<th>Fatalities: Non-State Conflicts</th>
<th>Number of State-Based Conflicts</th>
<th>Fatalities: State-based Conflicts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>583</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Rep. of Congo</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5298</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>517</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3050</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1944</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>688</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan, Uganda</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>12834</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>20,655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Global Non-State Conflict</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>17832</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UCDP Non-State Conflict Dataset v. 4.1

### Casualties and human costs

Conventional definitions of casualties only count deaths on the battlefield. While the 126 wars described earlier resulted in approximately one million such deaths, the toll would be multiples of this number if all ‘war deaths’ were counted (Lacina & Gelditsch 2005). Battle death estimates do not include victims of state-sponsored violence against unarmed civilians, such as the Rwandan genocide in which 800,000 people perished, and communal violence between non-state groups, such as the 1994-1995 ethnic violence of northern Ghana that saw 15,000 fatalities (Jönsson 2007). They also exclude the depredations of militias on unarmed men, women and children that have characterized much of the violence in Sierra Leone and Angola. Many other non-combatants have died of malnutrition and disease. For example, between 1998 and 2004 in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, an estimated 3.9 million people died from all conflict-related causes of mortality (Coghlan et al 2006). Lacina and Gleditsch (2005) found that battle death estimates as a proportion of total war death estimates – which include civilian battle deaths, fatalities from disease and famine provoked by war, and deaths due to criminal and unorganized violence – range from less than 2% in Ethiopia to 29% in Mozambique (Table 3).
Table 3: Battle deaths are a small part of total war deaths: Deaths in Selected Conflicts in Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Estimates of total war deaths</th>
<th>Battle deaths</th>
<th>Percentage battle dead</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>1975-2002</td>
<td>1.5 million</td>
<td>160,475</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia (not inc. Eritrean</td>
<td>1976-1991</td>
<td>1-2 million</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>&lt; 2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>1976-1992</td>
<td>500,000 to 1 million</td>
<td>145,400</td>
<td>15-29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>1981-1996</td>
<td>250,000-350,000 (to mid-1990s)</td>
<td>66,750</td>
<td>19-27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>1983-2002</td>
<td>2 million</td>
<td>55,500</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>1989-1996</td>
<td>150,000-200,000</td>
<td>23,500</td>
<td>12-16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem. Rep. of Congo</td>
<td>1998-2001</td>
<td>2.5 million</td>
<td>145,000</td>
<td>6%</td>
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Source: This table is reproduced from Lacina and Gelditsch, 2005: 159

Rape, deliberate mutilation, forced conscription of children and the use of landmines – in addition to death and injury – exact long-term costs and inhibit recovery from war. The overall legacy of violence constrains post-conflict reconciliation and political accommodation. Violent armed conflict ignites humanitarian crisis and disrupts human security in all its personal, economic and political dimensions (Collier et al 2003; Stewart et al 2001).

Massive dislocation of people from their homes, livelihoods and communities is another human cost; over the survey period (1980-2005), more than four million Africans fled their countries (UNHCR 2007). In some dramatic cases, as much as 40% of the population of Rwanda fled their homes in 1994, and 14% of Burundi’s people did likewise in 1993. In 2005, there were an estimated 12.1 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in 20 African countries – more than twice the total for the rest of the world (Eschenbächer, 2006). Unlike refugees, IDPs do not cross international borders. Estimates of IDPs have ranged from 300,000 in the 1993-2002 Congo (Brazzaville) conflict to 1.6 million in Uganda in 2005 and to 7.4 million in Sudan in 2005 (IISS 2007). As of 2005 in sub-Saharan Africa, there were 1.9 million people in 17 protracted refugee situations, defined as situations where 25,000 or more people are in exile and reliant upon external assistance for at least five years (UNHCR 2006). (Appendix 4)

Large-scale forced migration increases mortality and morbidity (WHO 2002; Van Damme 1995). Protracted refugee encampments create security problems and conflict between burdened host countries and their neighbors. Refugee populations may include those sympathetic to the irredentist challenges of ethnic minorities in the host
country. Camps often harbor insurgent militias and facilitate small arms trafficking, drug smuggling and other illicit trade (Jacobsen 2002; UNHCR 2006). In host countries, concentrations of refugees may exacerbate environmental problems, including deforestation and pollution and overuse of land and water (Jacobsen 2002, 1997; Black & Sessay 1997; Black 1994).

Consequences of Armed Conflict on Poverty and Development

Civil wars have been called ‘development in reverse’ (Collier et al 2003:13). They divert resources from productive economic activities and from public expenditures for social goods that advance development. They incur direct human costs as described above, and longer-term developmental costs through loss of household assets, destruction of infrastructure essential for both human well-being and for successful agriculture and commerce, as well as loss of confidence in institutions, leading to lawlessness and capital flight (Stewart et al 2001).

However, evidence from the 126 wars in this survey shows that the consequences of armed conflict on development are far from simple; the costs not only vary from one country to another, but are also uneven within countries. Within a given country different segments of the population do not always suffer the cost of war equally, and in the aggregate, the economy does not always falter. Figures 1 - 4 show the evolution of economic output (GDP) and human survival (under-five mortality rate – U5MR) during war years. They show a precipitous economic decline in Liberia, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Eritrea, Burundi, Djibouti and Mozambique among other countries. Only nine of the 22 countries for which data are available show GDP that was lower at the end of the war than at its onset. For some, such as Angola and Rwanda, there were dramatic declines at the height of the fighting, followed by recovery. But several countries sustained GDP growth while fighting continued, such as Sudan, Chad, Senegal, Ethiopia and Niger.

Some examples illustrate why war does not always lead to a decline in national development. Oil in both Sudan and Chad has fuelled economic growth even though armed conflicts have left thousands dead and millions displaced. In Guinea and Uganda, the fighting has been geographically isolated – in the south and southeast in Guinea and in the north in Uganda – without compromising overall growth at the national level. These positive macro-indicators are pernicious in that they mask both widening inequality and human suffering.
Figure 1: GDP decreases* during conflicts 1970-2005 (in constant 2000 US dollars) excluding conflicts of one year
Source: World Development Indicators

0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
16000
18000
Millions
Year
GDP
Cote d'Ivoire (2002-2004)
Mozambique (1977-1992)
Sierra Leone (1991-2000)
Cote d'Ivoire (minor)
Djibouti (minor)
Eritrea (major)
Sierra Leone (major)
Burundi (major)
Mozambique (major)
Congo, Dem. Rep. (major)

*defined by GDP lower last year of conflict compared with first year
^data from Mozambique begins 1980

Figure 2: GDP increases* during conflicts 1970-2005 (in constant 2000 US dollars)^ excluding conflicts of one year**
Source: World Development Indicators

0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
16000
18000
Millions
Year
GDP
Angola (1974-2004)
Chad (1965-2005)
Cote d'Ivoire (1976-1991)
Ethiopia1 (1996-2005)
Ethiopia2 (1996-2005)
Guinea (2000-2001)
Mali (1990-1994)
Rwanda (1990-2002)
Senegal (1990-2003)
Sudan (1983-2005)
Uganda (1981-2005)

*defined by GDP higher last year of conflict compared with first year
**excluding South Africa

- Chad (1965-2005)
- Ethiopia1 (1976-1991)
- Ethiopia2 (1996-2005)
- Guinea (2000-2001)
- Mali (1990-1994)
- Rwanda (1990-2002)
- Senegal (1990-2003)
- Sudan (1983-2005)
- Uganda (1981-2005)
Figure 3: Under-five mortality rate decreases* during conflict 1970-2005 (excluding conflicts with one or less data point recorded during conflict)

Source: World Development Indicators

*Defined by under-five mortality rate being lower at last year of conflict than at closest data point recorded during conflict.

Figure 4: Under-five mortality rate increases* during conflict 1970-2005

Source: World Development Indicators

*Defined by under-five mortality rate being lower at first year of conflict than at closest data point taken at five year increments as compared with end of conflict.
Civil war is development in reverse, but the country is not the best unit of analysis. By disaggregating development indicators along regional or group lines, it is possible to track the deleterious consequences that conflict may have on some segments of a country’s population despite positive aggregated indicators for the country as a whole. From 1990 to 2004, while armed conflict raged in northern Uganda, the country’s human development index (HDI) improved from 0.411 to 0.502, childhood immunization rose from 45% to 87%, and access to clean water improved from 44% to 60% (UNDP 2007). Yet these national numbers severely misrepresent the stark and widening regional inequalities. In 2005-06, Uganda’s national poverty rate was 31.1%, while northern Uganda’s poverty level was 60.7% (Uganda Bureau of Statistics 2006). In addition, the under-five mortality rate remains three to four times higher in the northern conflict areas than in the non-conflict areas (WHO 2005) and the adult literacy rate, which stands at 77% in central Uganda, is a mere 47% in northern Uganda (Nawaguna 2007).

**Structural Conditions and War Risks**

Traditionally, studies of armed conflicts relied on historical and political factors to explain why wars emerge, persist, recur and end. However, in response to the increasing concentration of civil wars in poor countries, new research in the 1990s began to focus on socio-economic conditions that are associated with the frequent occurrence of war. Thus a rich and diverse literature of cross-country statistical and qualitative studies emerged. This research identified a series of social and economic conditions that may exist in a country and that appear to favor the emergence of armed conflict. It identifies several socio-economic factors that raise risks of conflict. It is important to point out that these factors are not mutually exclusive and may coexist and be mutually reinforcing (Fukuda-Parr 2007; Murshed 2007). Moreover, while political and historical factors may be the proximate factors that drive war, structural risks are root causes. Were these factors relevant for the 32 countries surveyed in this paper?

**Chronic poverty**

Studies found strong correlation between per capita income and incidence of conflict, implying that GDP growth would help reduce war risks (Collier et al 2002). All of the 32 countries are among the world’s poorest countries with large proportions of their population surviving in extreme poverty. For these countries, 2005 per capita GDP ranged from $91 to $997 and HDI in 2004 ranged from 0.311 to 0.532. The proportion of people surviving in extreme poverty measured by the international threshold of $1 a day ranges from 15% to 78% for the 21 countries for which estimates are available from 1996-2005. In this respect, these 32 countries are no different from the other 12 countries of the region that remained conflict-free but which are also poor.

A more interesting question is whether economic decline and a general worsening of poverty precede the onset of war. Often, historical accounts of civil war attribute serious economic mismanagement and misrule as among the causes of an insurgency, such as in DRC, Liberia or Sierra Leone. Economic decline prior to the onset of war was registered in 13 of the 32 countries where per capita income was lower at the onset of war than five years previously, and for nine others, GDP growth averaged
less than -1% annually over that period. But this was not a generalized pattern; in 13 countries, per capita GDP was higher at the onset of the war than five years previously (Figure 5), and average annual growth rate was over 1%. Under-five mortality rates were also improving during the years preceding the war for most countries. (Appendix 5)

Figure 6: Per Capita GDP increases during 5th years before onset of armed conflict

*South Africa also had an increase from $2222 to $2749 (off chart)
**Over-dependence on natural resources**

Collier and Hoeffler (2002) argue that over-dependence on natural resources increases war risks, with greatest risk reached when primary commodities comprise a 32% share of GDP. Several of the 32 countries are highly dependent on natural resource exports, including Cameroon, Congo (Brazzaville), Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau and Liberia, where primary commodity exports exceed 15% as a share of GDP. If oil is included, Angola, Nigeria and the Congo are also highly resource dependent. However, the majority of the 32 countries are not so highly dependent on primary commodity exports. In 2000, Côte d’Ivoire’s share of primary commodities to GDP was 31.6% (UNCTAD 2003); two years later war broke out.

Over-dependence on minerals can be a risk factor in two ways. The first is that groups take up arms to seek control of a country’s natural resources. The second is that once war starts, control of mineral resources becomes a lifeline for the warring parties. In Sierra Leone, during the civil war (1991-2000) RUF rebels financed their insurgency through profits from the diamond trade (Keen 2006). In Angola’s civil war (1975-2002), both the government and rebels sustained themselves by exploiting natural resource wealth (Gamba and Cornwell 2000). The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola rebel group did so with diamonds and the ruling Popular Liberation Movement of Angola did so with oil (Le Billon 2001; ICG 2003; Sherman 2000). In the civil war of Côte d’Ivoire, where primary commodity exports reached almost 32% of GDP in 2000, the role of natural resources (i.e. cocoa) in sustaining violence is more ambiguous. In addition to the examples listed above, it is clear that competition for control of the oil wealth has been a factor in the conflicts in Nigeria’s oil-rich Niger Delta.

**Horizontal inequalities**

While the idea that stark inequality would lead to resentment and uprising is intuitively appealing, research has not found empirical evidence of armed war occurring more frequently where vertical inequalities are high. On the other hand, there is more evidence associating horizontal inequality – inequality between groups with ethnic, religious or linguistic ties – with conflict (Stewart 2002). Grievances over historical exclusion from economic, social and political opportunities and power provide incentives for insurgency, and the appeal to group loyalty and identity can be a powerful means to mobilization. These disparities provide explanations for ethnic wars that go beyond historic enmity between groups (Stewart 2002).

Countries in sub-Saharan Africa are characterized by a multiplicity of identity groups with legacies of unequal political and economic power (UNDP 2004). It is widely held that horizontal inequalities are widespread in African countries where ethnicity became politically and economically salient in colonial and post-colonial times. Available data consistently show sharp inequalities when data disaggregated by ethnicity are available for economic and social indicators such as income, educational attainment and access to high-level jobs, as well as in political indicators such as representation in the executive, legislative, military and other institutions of the state. For example, in Namibia the HDI was estimated for six linguistic groups and ranged from a high of 0.960 for German speakers to a low of 0.326 for San speakers (UNDP 2004). Disparities are sharp not only between racial groups but also among Namibia’s
African populations: HDI for Oshiwambo speakers is 0.641, twice the index for the San speakers (UNDP 2004).

However, such data are not consistently available. This survey reviewed two databases that assess the extent of horizontal inequalities that are politically salient in the context of their potential for armed conflict. First, the Minorities at Risk Project’s Aggregate Differential Index (ADI) is a composite of 18 cultural, political and economic indicators that rate differential treatment based on group identity (Minorities at Risk, 2005a: 5). Scores are available for 26 of the 32 countries; Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, Sudan, Liberia, Mali, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Uganda score particularly high – above 10 – on a scale where the maximum possible score is 18 (Minorities at Risk Project 2007).

Second, the Failed State Index uses a composite of 12 sub-indicators. One is a measure of horizontal inequality – ‘Uneven Economic Development along Group Lines.’ Two others indicate the level of political mobilization based on group disparity: ‘Uneven Legacy of Vengeance-seeking Group Grievance, or Group Paranoia;’ and ‘Rise of Factionalized Elites.’ Most of the 32 countries score high on uneven economic development; 22 of them are at the ‘warning’ level while nine others – Comoros, Angola, Djibouti, Eritrea, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Senegal – fall just below the cut-off. Ghana, Mali and Senegal show low scores in political mobilization (rise of factionalized elites), but the political salience of group inequalities is evident in all the countries according to this index (Fund for Peace 2007). Appendix 6 summarizes relevant data from these two databases.

While these databases confirm the presence of group exclusion and political activation, they do not show whether this was a factor that drove past wars. Academic and policy literature that examines the causes of wars in 32 countries identifies horizontal inequality or group exclusion as a factor in several of them.

The war in the southern Casamance region of Senegal is an example of horizontal inequalities as a factor in mobilizing violence. Home to the Diola ethnic group, a distinct cultural entity, the Casamance region also has the highest poverty and infant mortality rates in the country (Senegal PRSP 2002). Other examples include conflicts in Burundi, Central African Republic, among southern Christians in Chad, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, the Afar and Somali liberation movements of Ethiopia, Liberia, Mali, Rwanda, Sudan, Togo, and Uganda. However, it is important to note that group exclusion does not appear to have been a major factor in many other countries such as Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Somalia, Cameroon and Guinea Bissau.

Neighborhood spillovers

Wars have taken on sub-regional dimensions as neighboring countries become embroiled in supporting various warring parties. Neighboring countries serve as safe havens for rebel groups, receive influxes of refugees, incite support among ethnic groups that inhabit more than one state, and provide opportunities for profiteers to engage in smuggling of weapons or natural resources. Warring parties receive direct material and political support from states and other groups. For example, Chad provided refuge for thousands of people displaced by violence in the Central African
Republic and Sudan; the governments of Eritrea and Somalia supported opposing sides in the war in Ethiopia; the governments of Senegal and Guinea sent troops to Guinea-Bissau; Ethiopia, Eritrea, Yemen, Djibouti, Egypt and Sudan have sent arms to various warring groups in Somalia (ICG 2007; Webersik 2004); and finally, the wars in Sudan and Uganda have fed on each other.

**Environmental pressure related to migration**

Although the African continent is sparsely populated when compared with other regions of the world, environmental stress and demographic pressures are present in a number of countries that have experienced violent conflict. Mounting demographic pressure is one of the indicators of the Failed State Index; all the 32 countries score above six, and several above nine (Chad, DRC, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Niger, Somalia, Sudan).

Several conflicts have been triggered by rival claims to scarce land or natural resources. Although the conflict in Sudan has been commonly attributed to historical enmity on religious or racial grounds, in fact resource scarcity lies at the root of the conflict. Drought and desertification have increased pressure on water and land resources, forcing group migration into areas historically settled by others. This encroachment has created stress and led to violence (Youngs 2004:8). The Azawad conflict in Mali (1990-1996) was driven by socio-economic exclusion of the Tuaregs, but environmental stress also played a role (Minorities at Risk 2007). The desertification of the Sahel from the late 1960s to early 1970s, as well as frequent droughts in the 1980s, caused a mass migration of Tuaregs from northern Mali to neighboring countries.

**Demographic youth bulge**

Cincotta (2003) demonstrates strong statistical relationship between demographic patterns and the incidence of armed conflict. His study identifies countries in which young adults comprise more than 40% of the adult population as more than twice as likely as countries with lower proportions to experience an outbreak of civil conflict. In the absence of employment, opportunity or constructive activities, young men especially are known to congregate in gangs that may evolve into politically mobilized insurgencies (Cincotta 2003). This risk factor is present in almost all countries of sub-Saharan Africa, including those that have experienced major wars, minor wars and no wars. Review of data (UNPD 2006) shows that each of the 32 conflict countries surveyed here has a youth bulge with a population aged 15-29 years comprising over 44% of the total.

**History of war**

Statistical analysis has shown high risk that conflict will re-emerge after an end to violence (Collier & Hoeffler 2002). This has indeed been the history of sub-Saharan Africa where formal peace agreements have failed to achieve long-lasting peace. Of the 126 conflicts being surveyed here, there were 154 cessations in fighting, but only nine of these lasted for 10 years. Peace has lasted for an additional 10 conflicts that ended fewer than 10 years ago. Of the 32 conflict-affected countries only eight have experienced peace of at least 10 years duration. In several countries violent state
repression or conflict between identity groups has continued unabated (Gleditsch et al 2002; Harbom et al 2006; Harbom and Wallenstein 2007).

Policy Responses to Address Risk Factors

The preceding sections illustrate ways in which armed conflict has affected the trajectory of development and vice versa. The destructive impact of wars is a source of current poverty and development challenge. Development patterns such as a history of ethnic exclusion and environmental pressure have been among the drivers of past conflicts and continue to raise political tensions. These linkages have important policy implications for development strategy as economic, social and governance reform policies have important bearing on these structural factors. For example, budgetary allocations can deepen horizontal inequalities and group grievance; health and education policies such as measures to increase schooling of girls are central aspects of demographic change; inappropriate agricultural and rural policies can aggravate environmental pressures and competition for land. In these and many other ways, development policy can either alleviate or worsen group grievance, the youth bulge and unemployment, environmental pressure and poor governance of natural resources; it can then help reduce or exacerbate the risks of armed conflict recurring.

To assess how development policies and priorities address these links between armed conflict and development, PRSPs were reviewed where they were available. PRSPs reflect both national priorities and a degree of endorsement by the official donor community. Several of the PRSPs, notably for countries that are emerging from war following a peace settlement – such as Liberia, Guinea Bissau, Congo (Brazzaville), Angola and Djibouti – or following a decisive victory as in Rwanda, identify conflict as a major source of their development and poverty challenges. All of the PRSPs emphasize the importance of governance, but mostly not in relation to preventing recurrence of violent conflict.

Overall, there is scant treatment of armed conflict and its links to development challenges in the 18 PRSPs reviewed; four made no mention of armed conflict that had taken place or was continuing at the time, and while others mentioned the issue, only Liberia’s interim PRSP of 2007 had a section devoted to an analysis of the root causes of conflict. The lack of attention to armed conflict is particularly surprising where wars were being actively fought at the time that the document was prepared and adopted: the Ethiopia PRSP of 2002 refers only to the border war with Eritrea, and in historical context, the pre-1991 wars, not to the ongoing conflicts within the country; the Senegal PRSP of 2002 makes no mention of the persistent fighting in the south at the time; the Chad PRSP of 2003 cites conflict only twice in its 142 pages, referring only to a ‘climate of insecurity and impunity’ in a ‘conflict-ridden environment’ and to ‘decades of armed conflict’ and its impact on armed forces. These findings are consistent with a recent study (Scharf et al 2008) that analyzed 20 PRSP and similar documents and more than 80 UN Development Assistance Frameworks, and found that less than half referred to armed violence.

Structural risk factors – horizontal inequality, youth employment, demographic pressures, migration, neighborhood spillover effects and the governance of natural resources, for instance – were not given priority attention in PRSPs. Issues of unequal development along group lines and ethnic exclusion are rarely addressed. Inclusive development approaches such as equitable growth and greater sharing of power and
opportunities are not explicit goals, even in countries where ethnic grievances and exclusion are politically live issues. The term ‘equity’ most often appears in relation to gender equality. Even the interim PRSP of Liberia, which fully recognizes the pattern of elite rule as a source of the war that lasted over a decade, is weak when it comes to reflecting inclusion as a policy priority. The document says little about setting priorities across regions and activities to ensure distributional balance. While social and physical infrastructure development has been concentrated in Monrovia and along the coast, and the interior has been neglected, this strategy makes no provisions to reverse these historic imbalances; while poverty is concentrated in rural areas, the economic growth strategy does not give priority to agriculture other than the export-oriented plantation sector (Fukuda-Parr and others, 2007).

Thus PRSPs do not systematically include an analysis of the impact of conflict on development or of the root causes of conflict and grievances over issues of political, economic and social exclusion. Ongoing armed conflict in a country is systematically ignored as a source of poverty. Indeed, that both a country’s governments and the donors that endorse them turn a blind eye to recent or ongoing fighting in the country inevitably has repercussions for development and poverty.

**Conclusions**

In surveying the nexus of development and armed conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa since 1980, several findings emerge that challenge widely held assumptions and suggest directions for reconsidering policy priorities, launching new research directions and designing more effective policies for human security.

First, the state as a unit of analysis and focus of policy action does not match the reality of contemporary wars in Africa where the actors are both state and non-state, involve local and external allies and are motivated by political and private economic ends. Yet data collection, analytical frameworks and policy interventions remain state-centric. New research directions are needed that focus on non-state actors and transnational conflict networks, destructive impacts of conflicts at sub-national levels, and on cross-border alliances and impacts. There is a singular lack of data and analysis of non-state conflicts and the distributional consequences of conflicts. Current policy research and policy agendas for conflict prevention, peace building and economic recovery continue to focus on major armed conflicts that involved the state.

Second, the survey found, surprisingly, that economic decline did not uniformly result from war; some economies grew and human outcomes improved even during conflict as impacts were confined to specific locations or as the economy was buoyed by such exogenous factors as commodity exports. More research is needed to understand how the expected consequences of conflict are contained, and the nature of their political implications. More policy attention is needed on the distributional impact of armed conflicts.

Third, the survey shows the prevalence of long-term ‘low-intensity’ conflicts that constitute a human security priority because their violence imposes huge human and developmental costs and has the potential to escalate and spread. They are also a priority for conflict prevention policy. Yet low-intensity conflicts receive little policy attention, especially as a development challenge. As the conflict in northern Uganda illustrates, development disparities are both a cause and a consequence of such conflicts, yet they are considered to be a domestic political/security issue and kept out
of development policy priority setting. In the context of positive development trends for the country overall, the international community can be tempted to ‘turn a blind eye’ to these sources of human insecurity and worsening war risks. New policy approaches need to be developed in the international community to address these cases.

Fourth, structural conditions identified by recent research as risk factors are present to varying extents in most African countries and particularly in the 32 that have experienced war. Horizontal inequality and the youth bulge are relevant more consistently than other factors. While all countries are ‘poor,’ in many cases economic decline did not precede conflict. Environmental pressure and natural resource dependence have been factors in few of the 32 countries. The relationship between underlying risk factors and emergence of armed conflict is neither automatic nor uniform, and their presence should not be considered predictive but rather as relevant risk factors requiring attention. Since they relate to development structures, they are highly relevant to development policy, including governance reforms to promote political inclusion and economic and social policies to reduce horizontal inequality, generate employment-creating growth, promote youth employment and manage the demographic transition. Economic growth alone will not remove these structural risks.

Fifth, neither national governments nor the international community have developed and applied systematic approaches to integrating conflict consequences and risks into development policy priorities. Major development policy instruments, starting with the PRSP, need to be more consistent in addressing conflict impacts and risks.

Finally, this survey documents and confirms the high risks of armed conflict in sub-Saharan African countries as political tensions remain unresolved and structural risk factors prevail. Perhaps most importantly, one of the most striking characteristics of armed conflict in Africa has been the fragility of peace; even where there has been an end to violence almost invariably it has resumed. These patterns point to a need for a more proactive approach to preventing conflict by addressing the structural risk factors.
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**Endnote**

While governments do not collect data on war, over 60 datasets have been created by academics and NGOs to monitor regional and global trends. The armed conflict dataset maintained by the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme (UCDP) and International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO), is increasingly used in research and policy work because it is comprehensive, updated annually, and its methodology is considered rigorous.
### APPENDICES


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**Minor War:** between 25 and 999 battle-related deaths in a given year.  **War:** at least 1000 battle-related deaths in a given year.  **P:** Years during which peace agreements were signed.

**Note:** Somalia was not by definition in armed conflict in 1997-2000 and 2003-2005 since no government could be identified.

### Appendix 2: Battle Deaths in Armed Conflicts of Sub-Saharan Africa 1980-2005

#### Battle Deaths: Major Armed Conflict (>1,000/year)

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#### Battle Deaths: Minor Armed Conflict (25-999/year)

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#### Total per Period

|                | 226758 | 284159 | 161521 | 199797 | 98135 | 2352 | 972752 |


### Definitions

**Battle Deaths:** Both armed combatant and civilian deaths resulting from violence inflicted during the use of armed force by a party to an armed conflict during contested combat. This definition of battle deaths includes deaths during combat and deaths from wounds received in combat. It excludes the sustained destruction of soldiers or
civilians outside the context of any reciprocal threat of lethal force (e.g. execution of prisoners of war). It also excludes non-combat deaths resulting from famine, disease and other results of war.

**Armed Conflict** is a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of the state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths between armed combatants during a contested incompatibility.
Appendix 3: Datasets on Armed Conflict

There are no official datasets on armed conflict from official governmental or intergovernmental bodies. Over 60 datasets created by academic researchers and NGOs track global armed conflict. Their usefulness for research and policy applications varies along key dimensions. What years do they cover and are they updated annually? What criteria define armed conflict? What factors access conflict severity? What data are included and excluded? These datasets with their systematic application of definitions and thresholds allow trends to be identified and cross-country comparisons to be made. This lists the datasets that have been most widely used by researchers and policy analysts internationally.

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<td>J. David Singer and Melvin Small</td>
<td>Includes conflicts in which battle deaths between armed combatants total 1,000 or more. Excludes: - conflicts in which the state is not a party (e.g. conflicts between non-state militias and clans); - low intensity conflicts; - one-sided violence against unarmed civilians (e.g. genocide and massacres of prisoners of war); - civilian fatalities from the cross-fire of war and from factors (e.g. disease, famine) caused by war.</td>
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<td><strong>Datasets on interstate, intrastate, and extra-systemic wars</strong></td>
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<td><strong>UDCP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 4-2006</strong></td>
<td>Gleditsch et al of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) and the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO)</td>
<td>Includes small conflicts in which battle deaths of armed combatants during a contested incompatibility total 25 or more. Excludes: - conflicts in which the state is not a party (e.g. conflicts between non-state militias and clans); - one-sided violence against unarmed civilians (e.g. genocide and massacres of prisoners of war); - civilian fatalities from the cross-fire of war and from factors (e.g. disease, famine) caused by war.</td>
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<td><strong>UCDP Battle Deaths Dataset</strong></td>
<td>Bethany Lacina and Nils Petter Gleditsch of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)</td>
<td>Applies definitions of conflict consistent with the UDCP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset and tracks conflicts recorded in that dataset. Battle death totals include armed combatants plus civilians killed in cross-fire or as “collateral damage” during combat. Excludes: - conflicts in which the state is not a party (e.g. conflicts between non-state militias and clans); - one-sided violence against unarmed civilians (e.g. genocide and massacres of prisoners of war); - civilian fatalities factors (e.g. disease, famine) caused by war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Covers 1946-2005</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethnic Conflict Research project (ECOR)</strong></td>
<td>Christian P. Scherrer 2002 in Structural Prevention of Ethnic Violence, NY: Palgrave</td>
<td>Studies ‘mass violence,’ which encompasses wars of high and low intensity following COW and UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset threshold levels. Uses a seven-part typology that includes non-military acts of mass violence involving non-state actors (e.g. gang wars, genocide).</td>
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<td><strong>Covers 1985-2000</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Conflict Trends in Africa 1946-2004</strong></td>
<td>Center for Systemic Peace, Monty G. Marshall</td>
<td>Does not provide annual data. Tracks armed conflict, political instability in the absence of armed conflict, adverse regime changes, and communal rebellion and inter-communal violence. Armed conflict dataset includes conflicts in which battle deaths reach 500 at a rate of 100/yr. Provides estimates of civilian fatalities from factors (e.g. disease, famine) caused by war.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Covers 1946-2004</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Authors</td>
<td>Coverage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
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</table>
| Fearon and Laitin 2003 | James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin | Covers 1945-1999 | Includes civil wars that meet the 1000-death thresholds with at least 100 annually. Excludes:  
- conflicts in which the state is not a party (e.g. conflicts between non-state militias and clans);  
- state-led massacres when there is no organized opposition. |
| IISS Armed Conflict Database | Hanna Ucko, International Institute for Strategic Studies | Covers 1997 to present | Updated sub-annually, but does not disaggregate data by year. Tracks international armed border and territorial conflicts, internal conflicts, and terrorism. Includes information on political status, fatalities, refugees, economic costs and weapons. |
| UCDP Non-State Conflict Dataset v.1.1, Covers 2002 - 2005 | Joakim Kreutz and Kristine Eck, Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) | A conflict-year dataset with information of communal and organized armed conflict where none of the parties is the government of a state. |

## Appendix 4: Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons: Sub-Saharan Africa 1980-2005

### Cross-Border Refugees in Year of Greatest Displacement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Conflict</th>
<th>Conflict Period</th>
<th>Population 1995 (millions)</th>
<th>Number of Refugees (a) Year</th>
<th>Number of IDPs Year</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
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<tr>
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<td>IISS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>4.1</td>
<td>488,869 1999</td>
<td>&gt; 250,000 2001</td>
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### Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Year of Greatest Displacement**

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<tr>
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<th>Number of Refugees (a) Year</th>
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<th>Source</th>
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<tr>
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<td>2,567,998 1980</td>
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<td>2,257,514 1994</td>
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<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>1991-2000</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>488,869 1999</td>
<td>&gt; 250,000 2001</td>
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<td>South Africa</td>
<td>1966*-1988</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>29,560 1984</td>
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<td>1983-2005</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>730,647 2004</td>
<td>7,355,00 2005</td>
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<td>Uganda</td>
<td>1977*-2005</td>
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<td>306,060 1995</td>
<td>1,600,000 2005</td>
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### Minor Conflict

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<th>Conflict Period</th>
<th>Population 1995 (millions)</th>
<th>Number of Refugees (a) Year</th>
<th>Number of IDPs Year</th>
<th>Source</th>
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<tr>
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<td>1983</td>
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<td>431,000 2002</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>7 2004</td>
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<tr>
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</table>

* Onset of the armed conflict was before 1980. ** Year of 'greatest displacement' for which data is available. Data is not available for all years. n.d.: no data

Sources: (a) UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. UNHCR definition: Refugees represent total refugees originating from the country, both assisted and unassisted by the UNHCR. IDPs: UNHCR's IDP statistics
are not necessarily representative of the entire IDP population in a given country but are exclusively limited to the ones who are protected and/or assisted by the Office.
(b) IISS: International Institute for Strategic Studies Armed Conflict Database
(c) IDMC: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
Appendix 5: Change in Under 5 Mortality Rates (per 1000 persons) in Years prior to Outbreak of War

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2 most recent years prior to war with available data</th>
<th>Conflict Period</th>
<th>Change in Under 5 Mortality Rate before War</th>
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<td>1991-2005</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>1985 and 1990</td>
<td>1990-2002</td>
<td>-14</td>
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<tr>
<td>Congo (Brazzaville)</td>
<td>1980 and 1990</td>
<td>1993-2002</td>
<td>-15</td>
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<tr>
<td>Comoros (b)</td>
<td>1990 and 1995</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>1975 and 1980</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>-24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>1975 and 1980</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>-47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comoros (a)</td>
<td>1970 and 1980</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>-50</td>
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<td>Chad</td>
<td>1960-1964</td>
<td>1965-2005</td>
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<td>1980</td>
<td>1981-2005</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>1961-1965</td>
<td>1966-1988</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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</table>

Average Change in Under-5 Mortality Rate for all of sub-Saharan Africa from 1980-2005 was -7 (per 1000).

Definition: Under-5 mortality rate is the probability that a newborn baby will die before reaching age five, if subject to current age-specific mortality rates. The probability is expressed as a rate per 1,000.

Source: Harmonized estimates of the World Health Organization, UNICEF, and the World Bank, based mainly on household surveys, censuses, and vital registration, supplemented by World Bank estimates based on household surveys and vital registration.
## Appendix 6: Indicators on Structural Conditions and Conflict Risk

### Failed State Index 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Conflict Period</th>
<th>Legacy of Vengeance-Seeking Group Grievance or Group Paranoia</th>
<th>Uneven Economic Development along Group Lines</th>
<th>Rise of Fractionalized Elites</th>
<th>MAR</th>
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<td>8.7</td>
<td>7.5</td>
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<td>8.5</td>
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</table>

**Legacy of Vengeance-Seeking Group Grievance or Group Paranoia:** History of aggrieved communal groups based on recent or past injustices, which could date back centuries; Patterns of atrocities committed with impunity against communal groups; Specific groups singled out by state authorities, or by dominant groups, for persecution or repression; Institutionalized political exclusion; Public scapegoating of groups believed to have acquired wealth, status or power as evidenced in the emergence of ‘hate’ radio, pamphleteering and stereotypical or nationalistic political rhetoric.

**Uneven Economic Development along Group Lines:** Group-based inequality, or perceived inequality, in education, jobs and economic status; Group-based impoverishment as measured by poverty levels, infant mortality rates, education levels; Rise of communal nationalism based on real or perceived group inequalities.

Rise of Factionalized Elites:* Fragmentation of ruling elites and state institutions along group lines; Use of nationalistic political rhetoric by ruling elites, often in terms of communal irredentism, (e.g., a ‘Greater Serbia’) or of communal solidarity (e.g. ‘ethnic cleansing’ or ‘defending the faith’).

Aggregate Intergroup Differentials Index:** ADI is based upon the total differences checked and rated for 18 cultural, economic and political differences including income, land/property, higher education, presence in commerce, access to power, access to civil service, legal protection, etc. Accessed from Minorities At Risk (MAR) website on October 19, 2007 <>.

*Range of Index is 10 (worst rating) to 0 (best).

**Range of ADI: The ADI ranges from -2 (lowest) to 18 (highest).
### Appendix 6.2: Structural Conditions and Conflict Risk

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The Failed State Index: The FSI uses software to index and scan tens of thousands of open-source articles and reports. The data is electronically gathered using a data-collection system that includes international and local media reports and other public documents, including U.S. State Department reports, independent studies and corporate financial filings. The software calculates the number of positive and negative ‘hits’ for the 12 indicators. Internal and external experts then review the scores as well as the articles themselves, when necessary, to confirm the scores and ensure accuracy. For more information regarding the methodology used to calculate the Failed State Index visit <www.fundforpeace.org>.

Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors:* Military or para-military engagement in the internal affairs of the state at risk by outside armies, states, identity groups or entities that affect the internal balance of power or resolution of the conflict; Intervention by donors, especially if there is a tendency towards over-dependence on foreign aid or peacekeeping missions.

Massive Movement of Refugees or Internally Displaced Persons creating Complex Humanitarian Emergencies:* Forced uprooting of large communities as a result of random or targeted violence and/or repression, causing food shortages, disease, lack of clean water, land competition, and turmoil that can spiral into larger humanitarian and security problems, both within and between countries. Range of Index is 10 (worst rating) to 0 (best).

Mounting Demographic Pressures:* Pressures deriving from high population density relative to food supply and other life-sustaining resources; Pressures deriving from group settlement patterns that affect the freedom to participate in common forms of human and physical activity, including economic productivity, travel, social interaction, religious worship; Pressures deriving from group settlement patterns and physical settings, including border disputes, ownership or occupancy of land, access to transportation outlets, control of religious or historical sites, and proximity to environmental hazards; Pressures from skewed population distributions, such as a ‘youth or age bulge,’ or from divergent rates of population growth among competing communal groups.

Youth Bulge, Percentage of 15-24 year olds in total adult population (15-64 yrs old) in 2005 - Sources: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat


**Range of Index is 10 (worst rating) to 0 (best).**