

# The Promotion of Reconciliation and Peacebuilding Process through Development Aid Programmes in Timor-Leste

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Institute for International Cooperation  
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# **The Promotion of Reconciliation and Peacebuilding Process through Development Aid Programmes in Timor-Leste**

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**December 2005**

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# Contents

<b>List of Tables</b> .....	<b>iii</b>
<b>List of Figures</b> .....	<b>iii</b>
<b>List of Pictures</b> .....	<b>iii</b>
<b>List of Abbreviations</b> .....	<b>iv</b>
<b>Basic Information of Timor-Leste</b> .....	<b>vi</b>
<b>Executive Summary</b> .....	<b>1</b>
1. English .....	1
2. Japanese .....	5
<b>Introduction</b> .....	<b>8</b>
Research Purpose .....	8
Structure of the Paper .....	9
Limitation of the Paper .....	9
<b>1. Description of Ainaro District and Field Research Methodology</b> .....	<b>10</b>
1-1 Description of Ainaro District .....	10
1-1-1 General .....	10
1-1-2 History .....	11
1-1-3 Economy .....	13
1-1-4 Security .....	13
1-1-5 Politics .....	15
1-1-6 People/ Communities .....	16
1-2 Research Methodologies .....	18
1-2-1 Observation through Community Empowerment Work .....	19
1-2-2 Selected Field Research .....	19
1-2-3 Interviewing to the Stakeholders .....	20
1-2-4 Questions Asked .....	20
1-2-5 Difficulties .....	20
<b>2. National Reconciliation in Timor-Leste</b>	
– Distance between National Level and Community Level – .....	<b>22</b>

2-1	Reconciliation at National Level: The Aims of the Government of Timor-Leste	23
2-2	Reconciliation at Community Level	25
2-2-1	Case Study 1: Reconciliation Process and Challenges in Cassa	25
2-2-2	Case Study 2: Reconciliation Process and Challenges in Manutasi	27
2-2-3	Lessons Learned from Case Studies	28
<b>3.</b>	<b>Promotion of Community Reconciliation and Peacebuilding Process through Development Projects</b>	<b>31</b>
3-1	Development Aid Projects in Ainaro: Actors, Activities and Challenges	31
3-2	Comparative Study of Three Development Aid Projects in Ainaro	32
3-2-1	Relevance	33
3-2-2	Performance	33
3-2-3	Implementation Process: implementation structure, relationship with local communities etc.	34
3-2-4	Efficiency/Impact	35
3-2-5	Effectiveness	36
3-2-6	Sustainability	36
3-2-7	Challenges	37
3-2-8	Relation with Promoting the Reconciliation and Peace building Process	37
3-3	Development Aid Project and the Process of National Reconciliation and Peacebuilding	43
	<b>Conclusion</b>	<b>45</b>
	<b>Bibliography</b>	<b>48</b>
	<b>Appendixes</b>	<b>50</b>
	Appendix 1: List of Suco and Aldeia in Ainaro District	50
	Appendix 2: List of People Interviewed in Selected Field Research	51
	Appendix 3: List of Organisations or Projects Visited	52
	Appendix 4: The List of Questions Asked	53
	Appendix 5: Major Projects Implemented in Ainaro District	55
	Appendix 6: SWOT(Strength, Weakness, Opportunity and Threat) Analysis of Current Circumstances in Timor-Leste	57
	Appendix 7: Political Parties in Timor-Leste	62
	Appendix 8: The UN Missions in Timor-Leste	63

## List of Tables

Table 1-1	Population in Ainaro District .....	11
Table 1-2	Reported Violence on Women and Children .....	14
Table 1-3	Martial Art Groups in Ainaro District .....	15
Table 1-4	Result of the August 2001 Constituent Assembly Elections in Ainaro .....	16
Table 1-5	Features of Each Sub-district in Ainaro .....	18
Table 2-1	Comparative Study of Reconciliation Process in Cassa and Manutasi .....	29
Table 3-1	Ainaro District Project for RESPECT .....	34
Table 3-2	Comparative Study of Three Development Aid Projects in Ainaro .....	39

## List of Figures


Figure 1-1	Crimes in Ainaro .....	14
Figure 1-2	Crime Statistics in Ainaro (2002-2004) .....	14
Figure 2-1	Cassa Village Overview .....	26
Figure 2-2	Manutasi Village Overview .....	27

## List of Pictures

Picture 1-1	Map of Ainaro .....	10
Picture 1-2	Tais Making in Cassa .....	13

## List of Abbreviations

ACTC	Ainaro Community Training Centre
AMCAP	Ainaro and Manatuto Community Activation Project
CAVR	Comissao de Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliacao de Timor Leste (The Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation)
DA	District Administrator
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DRC	District RESPECT Committee
DV	Domestic Violence
FASID	Foundation for Advanced Studies on International Development
MAFF	Ministry of Agriculture, Fishery and Forestry
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
ODA	Official Development Assistance
PCM	Project Cycle Management
PCU	Project Coordination Unit
PNTL	Police National de Timor-Leste
PRA	Participatory Rural Appraisal
PSC	Programme Steering Committee
PWC	Programme Working Committee
QIP	Quick Impact Project
RESPECT	Recovery, Employment and Stability Programme for Ex-combatants and Communities in Timor-Leste
TOT	Training of Trainers
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Service
UNV	United Nations Volunteer



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## Basic Information of Timor-Leste

Area	14,600 sq km	Source	JICA Timor-Leste
Population	924,642 (2004)		UNFPA/ Census Timor-Leste
Climate	tropical, hot and humid with distinct rainy season (Nov. - Apr.) and dry season (Jun.- Sep.)		CIA The World Factbook
Languages	Official Languages: Tetum, Portuguese Working Languages: Indonesian, English Indigenous Languages: Fataluku, Bekais, Bunuk, Dawan, Galoli, Habun, Idalaka, Kawaimina, Kemak, Lovaia, Makalero, Makasai, Mambai, tokodete and Wetarese		Hull (2004)
Religion	Roman Catholic 90%, Muslim 5%, Protestant 3%, Hindu 0.5% and smaller number of Buddhist and Aminist		CIA The World Factbook
Natural Resources	gold, petroleum, natural gas, manganese, marble		CIA The World Factbook
Currency	US dollar		
Administrative Divisions	13 administrative districts: Aileu, Ainaro, Baucau, Bobonaro, Cova-Lima, Dili, Ermera, Lautem, Liquiza, Manatuto, Manufahi, Oecussi, Viqueque		
Chief of State	President Kay Rala Xanana Gusmao (Presidential election is expected in 2006)		
Head of Government	Prime Minister Mari Bin Amude Alkatiri		

### UNDP Human Development Report 2004

Human Development Index (HDI) Rank	158 <sup>th</sup> out of 177 countries
Life expectancy at birth	49.3 years (147 <sup>th</sup> )
Adult literacy rate	58.6%
GDP per capita (2002)	497 US\$
ODA received total (2002)	219.8 million US\$
ODA received per capita (2002)	297.6 US\$
ODA as % of GDP (2002)	56.6%

# Executive Summary

## 1. English

Timor-Leste has enjoyed the full support from the international community. The massive international presence in the country contributes to the maintenance of security. The country also achieved substantial economic growth in 2000-2001, with a growth rate of over 15% per year (The Economist Intelligent Unit, 2004). On the other hand, Timor-Leste depends heavily upon foreign aid for every aspect of the country. The massive international presence has caused higher consumer prices and unsustainable economy in the country. The growing gap between the capital Dili and rural areas, and between employed and unemployed people creates feelings of frustration with the government, especially in rural areas. The international community now categorises Timor-Leste in the stage of sustainable development. Nevertheless, considering the fragility, sensitivity of the societies, potential threats and uncertainties for the future, it must be useful to study the relationship between development projects and the promotion of the peacebuilding and national reconciliation process in order to achieve sustainable development of the country. Thus, in this paper, the author discusses how the development aid projects could or should promote the process of reconciliation and peacebuilding in post-conflict societies through the experiences of Timor-Leste. The following objectives are developed to achieve this aim:

- (1) To describe Ainaro district and explain the field research methodologies conducted in Ainaro
- (2) To analyse the activities and challenges of reconciliation process in Ainaro
- (3) To assess development aid projects implemented in Ainaro and examine their relation to the promotion of reconciliation and peacebuilding
- (4) To suggest how the development aid projects should be designed, implemented and evaluated in post-conflict societies

Ainaro is one of the 13 governmental and administrative divisions of Timor-Leste. It is located to the south west of the country and about 116km away from the capital. According to the census conducted in 2004 (UNFPA), Ainaro district has a population of 53,629. One of the oldest kingdoms was in Ainaro. It seems that the traditions and customs succeeded from the past have been maintained relatively well among the people. During the Indonesian occupation, there were many people who had a “double standard life”, generally people worked for the Indonesian army, however, at the same time, they secretly supported guerrillas, who worked for the independence in the mountains. Therefore, the division of the ex pro-independence side and the ex pro-autonomy side is quite confusing. This makes the reconciliation process quite complicated as well. The author applied three different approaches during the research period: observation through community empowerment work for a duration of six months, selected field research through home staying in two communities in Ainaro and interviews with the stakeholders in various organisations. In the

research, the author applied qualitative research methods, including one-to-one in-depth interviews, the life history method and semi-grouped discussion.

The government stance toward reconciliation could be described as “unity and forgiveness”. The government worked hard on seeking justice and promoting reconciliation. The work can be evaluated positively. In community-based reconciliation, the government stressed the reintegration of militias into society by returning to their villages, asking forgiveness and making amends by supporting victims and their families. This concept was widely accepted by the international community. Even at the community level, it was getting accepted and achieved the certain level of success, although there was much confusion and anger towards the idea at the first stage. On the other hand, the government soon faced the reality that real justice cannot be met because of the internal politics of Indonesia. It can be said that this fact has weighted heavily on the government of Timor-Leste and led it to establish the principles of amnesty and reconciliation toward Indonesia externally. This politically motivated idea of reconciliation thus emphasises forgiveness internally even if this situation only limited justice could be met. The government motivation on reconciliation seems to be toned down now in front of so many challenges for the nation-building. However, this does not mean that reconciliation is not a big issue in the society of Timor-Leste.

How do the people at community level observe the process? Do they agree with the government stance? How do they perceive the development of reconciliation in their community? In the cases of Cassa and Manutasi, the people continue their every day life even under the situation of high sensitivities between the ex pro-autonomy side and ex pro-independence side. In both communities, substantial growing frustration is recognised among the people, although people evaluated positive on the government challenges on reconciliation. People, especially living in rural areas feel that they are ignored because most of the developmental profits are now only shared by a small number of people who have jobs in cities, especially in the capital Dili. It seems that this causes distance between the central government and people in rural areas. The concern for the future is that the growing frustration at the community level intensifies anti-government movements and it deepens the division inside the community at the same time. This could set back the gains that the reconciliation process achieved. In this sense, development projects have the high potentials to reduce the frustration among the people in communities and promote the process of reconciliation and peacebuilding. Therefore, in chapter 3 the author assessed particular three development aid projects implemented in Ainaro: AMCAP (Ainaro and Manatuto Community Activation Project), RESPECT (Recovery, Employment and Stability Programme for Ex-combatants and Communities in Timor-Leste) and Road Construction Project in order to examine the relation between development aid projects and the promotion of the peacebuilding and national reconciliation process.

Promoting reconciliation is one of the objectives of AMCAP. Although there is not particular consideration for this issue in implementation of each activity, most of the local staff are from the local communities of Ainaro. It seems they have their own measures in choosing the activity sites. They tend to choose the place with less problems of reconciliation and communication among

residents. RESPECT itself planned to take a part in the peacebuilding process of the country, especially in DDR (Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration) of ex-combatants at the beginning. However, at the project planning stage the dissatisfaction and sensitivity towards the idea of DDR was recognised in society, furthermore the definition of ex-combatants was not set by the government of Timor-Leste and it was difficult for UNDP alone to establish the definition, therefore ex-combatants were counted as a part of vulnerable groups, which were identified by each community itself in RESPECT projects. As a result, projects focused on community development as QIP (Quick Impact Project), especially at the district level. Compared with these two projects, the road construction project does not have any relation with promoting reconciliation and the peacebuilding process. It is simply designed as a development project. What we saw in all development projects is the reality that project implementers do not have the time to consider the reconciliation and peacebuilding process of communities, because each project itself possesses the challenges and difficulties in its implementation at the ground. How can we fill the gap between the reality of each development project and the high potential of each project to promote the reconciliation and peacebuilding process on the ground? Although the difficulties of implementing daily activities in each project should be carefully addressed, the promotion of the reconciliation and peacebuilding process should be considered as a basic stance of projects implemented in war-affected communities. Considering the fragility of society and high sensitivity among people, the soft manner which aims co-existence of inhabitants should be applied in projects implementation rather than directly aiming to promote reconciliation in order not to cause negative impact through the activities. At each stage of a project several recommendations could be made. At the stage of project planning, detailed field research about society, people and culture should be conducted. This is because written data often does not show the reality on the ground and/or does not reflect the frequent changes of war-affected communities. Each project in a conflict affected communities should consider the peacebuilding process including the reconciliation process, for example taking into consideration the gender point of view. There is also a need in the planning a comprehensive project that involves or at least anticipates the future of a wider area to consider the national policy of the country. At the implementation stage, each project should consider the fragility of post-conflict communities and pay careful attention to small changes or divisions in each community. Sensitivity, openness and neutrality should be always kept in minds among development aid workers as the basic working stances in communities. It is also important to make good use of the opportunities of regular monitoring or ongoing evaluation, to identify each projects relation with the peacebuilding and reconciliation process. And especially in the communities of Timor-Leste, which consist of a small number of people in a small area, development aid projects should take the role of bridging communities through giving them opportunities to interact with each other. This could be the first step of mutual understanding. At the evaluation stage, each project should include the indicators to assess how the project has contributed to the process of reconciliation and peacebuilding process. Sustainability of each project should be carefully considered as well. There are several things we could learn from the reconciliation challenges in Timor-Leste; First of all reconciliation is such a difficult task at every level. At the national level it

is affected heavily by international relations, while at the community level, the reconciliation process is closely connected with the process of nation building. Therefore it is difficult to assess or evaluate the reconciliation process by itself. On the other hand, the reconciliation process can be evaluated through the relationship with the nation building process. Secondly, the situation of reconciliation is quite different between war-affected countries and even between communities within a country, because each country, each community and each person has different experiences from each conflict and has different culture, and traditions. Thus at the national level each war-affected country should establish its own purpose, strategy and process on reconciliation as well as for nation building. At the community level, a flexible system needs to be designed and established to promote reconciliation under different circumstances and to meet the needs of each community based on its own situation. Thirdly, reconciliation requires long term processes and it can only be established by the people in communities by their own desire.

Japan is one of the biggest donor in Timor-Leste. However, its assistance lacks comprehensive strategy as “Japan” among a huge number of projects. This leads the lack of consistency on Japanese assistance on the ground. For instance, the three projects described in chapter 3 are all funded by Japan. Although the degree of Japanese involvement differs one by one, local people as well as other international partners of assistance recognise that all the projects represent the government of Japan; its desire, aim and objectives. Under this circumstance, however, we cannot see any comprehensive strategy of Japan towards the reconstruction and peacebuilding of Timor-Leste among these three projects. This not only reduces the efficiency of assistance compared with the huge amount of money spent, but also confuses the recipient country, people on the ground and international partners of assistance what the government of Japan wants to do through these assistance. There is a high level of need for the government of Japan to organise various channels of assistance under the comprehensive assistant strategy.

## 2. Japanese

東ティモールは 400 年以上に及ぶポルトガルの統治ののち 24 年に渡ってインドネシア軍による占領を経験した。そして 1999 年のインドネシアからの独立の是非を問う住民投票直後の騒乱ののち、国家建設のために国際社会からの援助を一身に受けることとなった。その結果、2000 年から 2001 年にかけての経済成長率は 15% に達した(The Economist Intelligent Unit, 2004)。一方で、東ティモールは国のありとあらゆる分野において国際社会に過度に依存している。現在の高い経済成長率も主に国際社会の支援によるところが大きく、また国際社会の過度な存在は東ティモールに周辺諸国と比べて異常に高い物価をもたらした。国内政治の不安定さ、都市と地方の経済格差の拡大などが国連の治安維持部隊の撤退後の国の安定に大きな不安を残している。

国際社会にとって東ティモールはすでに開発期の段階にあり、戦後復興というカテゴリから外れつつある。しかし国内の不安定要素を熟考すると、今後の国の安定した発展を図るために開発プロジェクトと平和構築・国民和解促進との関連性を研究することは有効であると考えられる。そこで本リサーチペーパーでは、紛争国における開発援助プロジェクトがどのように平和構築、特に国民和解の促進に関わっていくべきかを論じる。この上位目的を達成するために以下の目的を設定する。

1. アイナロ県の概要を描き、アイナロにおけるフィールドリサーチの方法論を論じる
2. アイナロ県における和解促進に関する活動と課題を分析する
3. アイナロ県における開発援助プロジェクトの概要を描き、開発援助プロジェクトと和解、平和構築促進との関係を論じる
4. 紛争国における開発援助プロジェクトがどのように計画、実施、評価されるべきかについてアイナロ県の事例をもとに論じる

アイナロ県は首都ディリの南西約 116km のところに位置しており、人口は約 54,000 人(2004 年)である。古くから栄えた王国の 1 つで、昔からの伝統、習慣を色濃く残している地域といえる。インドネシア統治時代には、表面的にはインドネシア軍の下で働き、密かに独立運動を支持してきた人々が数多くおり、そのため独立派と併合派の区別が困難な地域である。アイナロにおけるフィールドリサーチでは、著者の国連ボランティアとしての活動を通じた観察、特定の 2 つの村でのフィールドリサーチと各関係機関へのインタビューの 3 つのアプローチを用いた。調査は主に *Qualitative* の調査手法を活用した。

東ティモール政府が進めてきた和解は、端的に言えば“団結と赦し”重視の和解と行うことができるだろう。国民和解の第一歩としてのこの和解の姿勢、旧独立派民兵の帰還促進などの活動は内外から高く評価されている。一方で、インドネシアの内政と同国との国家関係改善との兼ね合いから、インドネシア軍統治下、及び 1999 年の騒乱時における犯罪を法に基づいて裁くという“正義”を追求することが困難な状況下において、東ティモール政府は正義があいまいなまま和解を進めるというディレンマに直面した。現在、東ティモールにおける和解は矛盾を抱えたまま、多くの国づくりの困難の前でどこにも解決を見

出せない状態にあるように思われる。コミュニティーに住む人々はこの国家としての和解政策をどのように受け止めているのだろうか？また実際のコミュニティーレベルの和解はこれまでどのように進められ、現在どのような状況にあるのだろうか？カッサ、マヌタシの2つの村のケースでは、状況は異なるもののどちらも旧独立派と旧併合派住民の間に高いセンシティブティを抱えながら人々の日常生活が続けられていた。人々は国家の和解政策に一定の理解を示しつつも、独立以後、日々厳しくなっていく生活状況の中で行き所の無い不満を増大させていた。今後懸念されるのは、この不満が地方における反政府活動を活発化させ、また同時にコミュニティーにおける住民間の溝を増大させてゆき、ひいてはこれまで築き上げてきた和解プロセスを後退させる危険性があることである。このような現状を考察すると、“不満の縮小”という点において開発援助プロジェクトが和解と平和構築の促進に貢献できる可能性はあるといえるのではないだろうか。そこで本リサーチの第3章では、アイナロ県で現在進行中の3つの開発援助プロジェクト - AMCAP(Ainaro and Manatuto Community Activation Project), RESPECT(Recovery, Employment and Stability Programme for Ex-combatants and Communities in Timor-Leste) と道路建設プロジェクト - の分析を通じて、開発援助プロジェクトを通じたコミュニティー和解と平和構築の促進への可能性について論じた。

1999年からの緊急援助期には東ティモールのほかの地域と同様アイナロ県においても沢山の緊急支援プロジェクトが組まれた。そのほとんどがインフラ整備などの短期間のプロジェクトであった。緊急援助期から開発援助期への過渡期である現在、プロジェクト数は急激に減少した。2005年3月現在、2つの国連プロジェクト、3つの国際NGO、3つのローカルNGOと1つのODAプロジェクトが進行中である。上に挙げたAMCAPとRESPECTは国連機関(UNDP)を通じた日本政府の支援によるプロジェクトで、道路建設は日本政府の無償資金協力によるものである。AMCAPでは和解促進はプロジェクトの目的の1つとされているものの、実際の活動自体に和解に対する考察は行われていないようである。スタッフは和解など住民間のトラブルの少ない地域を選んで活動しているようにも見受けられる。RESPECTは当初平和構築の一環、特にDDR(武装解除、動員解除及び元兵士の社会復帰)を目的として企画されたようである。しかしながら、計画の段階で元兵士の社会復帰に対する社会的認知の低さや、若者の雇用率の低さ、「元兵士」という定義が東ティモール政府内で確立されておらず、UNDP単独でその定義を確立することも困難だったことなど様々な問題から、元兵士は各コミュニティーの判断による「社会的弱者」という枠組みの1つとしてプロジェクトに組み込まれることとなった。その結果元兵士の社会復帰という側面は県レベルのプロジェクトではあまり見られず、地域の開発を促すQIP(Quick Impact Project)としての側面を強く持つこととなった。道路建設プロジェクトに関しては始めから一般の開発援助プロジェクトとして計画・実施されており、和解、平和構築促進への考慮というものは見受けられない。しかしながら、紛争後の復興支援に関わるプロジェクトの基本的スタンスとして、特に地域での問題解決などの場面で和解・平和構築への配慮や考察が必要であると考えられる。どのプロジェクトでも共通して言えることは、プロジェクトの実施現場では日々の業務が多忙であり、またプロジェクト自体が多く困難を抱えている中で、和解・平和構築促進のためのイニシアティブをとることは現場で働く開発援助従事者に更なる負荷を課すことになり、実際問題として非常に困難であるとい

うことだ。では開発援助プロジェクトがもつ和解・平和構築促進への可能性と実際のプロジェクト現場の現実との狭間を一体どのように縮めることができるだろうか。現場の日常の困難さは充分理解されたうえで、それでも各開発援助プロジェクトが和解・平和構築促進へ貢献できるその高い可能性は重視されなければならないと考える。紛争社会の抱えるセンシティブィーや脆弱性を考慮すると、和解・平和構築促進をそのまま中心目標として掲げるよりも、開発援助プロジェクトによって負のインパクトを起こさないよう人々の共存・共栄をめざす柔軟な目標の設定が必要であると思われる。

上記の3つのプロジェクトの考察を踏まえて紛争国における開発援助プロジェクトのあり方について以下のように提言する。プロジェクト計画時には、まずプロジェクトサイトの詳細な現地調査（地域、社会、人など）を行う。これは、往々にして書かれたデータは信頼性に欠け、紛争地域の突如としてかわる現状をつかみきれていないからである。ジェンダー視点と同様全てのプロジェクトが和解、平和構築促進への視点を基本スタンスとして持つ。そしてプロジェクトが仮にある特定の地域のものであっても、広く地域全体、その特定活動分野の政策までを見通した包括的なプロジェクトを計画する。プロジェクト実施時には、紛争地域の脆弱性を理解し、地域の小さな変化や住民間の溝に配慮する。プロジェクトの基本理念として、センシティブィー、開放性、中立性を常に念頭において活動を行う。日常業務の中でプロジェクトの個々の活動と和解、平和構築促進との関連性を問うことは困難なので、定期的な活動のモニタリングなどの機会を利用してその関連性を研究する。プロジェクト実施の過程でコミュニティー間/内の住民の交流を促し、住民間の相互理解を図ることも重要である。プロジェクトの評価時には、評価の視点のひとつとして和解・平和構築促進の項目を設ける。プロジェクト終了時には各活動の持続性への考察も重要であろう。東ティモールの和解・平和構築の過程からもいくつかのことを学ぶことができる。まず、和解のプロセスは国際関係との絡み等のためにそれ単独で評価することは困難である。しかしながら、国際関係や国家建設との関わりという視点から総合的に評価することは可能であろう。次に、それぞれの国、地域、家族、個人は紛争によってそれぞれ異なった経験をへているため、各紛争国は独自の和解の目的、方法論、プロセスを確立する必要がある。また、各コミュニティー間/内でも異なる状況を把握し、それぞれの状況に応じた柔軟性のある和解・平和構築を計画・実施する必要がある。

日本は東ティモールの最大ドナーのひとつである。これまでに様々な団体やプロジェクトを通じて多額の援助が行われてきている。しかしながら、援助しているプロジェクトの間に日本としての包括的な援助への姿勢、戦略が見受けられない。例えば、第3章で挙げた3つの開発援助プロジェクトは日本政府としての援助の方法、関与度がまちまちであるけれども、どれも日本からの援助を受けて行われており、実際現場ではどれも日本の援助として住民に受け取られている一方で、この3つのプロジェクトの間に日本政府としての東ティモールにおける包括的な和解・平和構築へのビジョンは見られない。これは各プロジェクトの効率を下げるばかりではなく、日本が東ティモールへの多額の援助を通じて目指しているものをあいまいにしてしまい、現地政府、住民及びパートナーである国際援助機関の間に困惑を生み出している。日本はドナーとして様々にある援助のチャンネルを日本としての援助の包括的な概念の下に再構築する必要性にせまられているように思われる。



## **Introduction**

Timor-Leste has enjoyed the full support from the international community. The total ODA (Official Development Assistance) received reached 219.8 million US dollars in 2002, which provided each person with 297.60 US dollars of assistance (UNDP, 2004). The massive international presence in the country contributes to the maintenance of security. The country also achieved substantial economic growth in 2000-2001, with a growth rate of over 15% per year (The Economist Intelligent Unit, 2004). In time, oil and gas revenues will start to underwrite state expenditures, although there are some sensitivities and difficulties about the relationship with the government of Australia. Politically the government has been trying to establish good relationships with foreign countries. The government specifically puts considerable diplomatic effort into the improvement of its relationship with Indonesia. The international diplomacy of Timor-Leste is welcomed and supported by the international community.

On the other hand, Timor-Leste depends heavily upon foreign aid for most aspects of the country. The substantial economic growth in 2000-2001 was created mainly by the international presence within the country. The massive international presence has also caused higher consumer prices in Timor-Leste. In addition, the country faces several potential threats and uncertainties about its security after the UN Military Component (UNSF – United Nations Security Force and MLG-Military Liaison Group) mission leaves in May 2005. Externally, pro-Indonesian militia still present an irritant to the border security of Timor-Leste. Internally, the combination of poverty and unemployment poses a continuing threat to law and order. The growing gap between the capital Dili and rural areas, and between employed and unemployed people creates feelings of frustration with the government, especially in rural areas.

## **Research Purpose**

The international community now categorises Timor-Leste in the stage of sustainable development. Nevertheless, considering the fragility, sensitivity of the societies, potential threats and uncertainties for the future, it must be useful to study the relationship between development projects and the promotion of the peacebuilding and national reconciliation process in order to achieve sustainable development of the country. Thus the paper discusses how the development aid projects could or should promote the process of reconciliation and peacebuilding in post-conflict societies through the experiences of Timor-Leste. The following objectives are developed to achieve this aim:

- (1) To describe Ainaro district and explain the field research methodologies conducted in Ainaro
- (2) To analyse the activities and challenges of reconciliation process in Ainaro
- (3) To assess development aid projects implemented in Ainaro and examine their relation to the

promotion of reconciliation and peacebuilding

- (4) To suggest how the development aid projects should be designed, implemented and evaluated in post-conflict societies

## **Structure of the Paper**

Chapter 1 will describe the research area of Ainaro district; general data, history, economy, security, politics and people/communities. Then explain the field research methodology implemented in Ainaro; three field research approaches, questions asked and difficulties. Chapter 2 will draw the distance between national level and community level concerning the national reconciliation through two field case studies in Ainaro. Chapter 3 will list the development projects implemented in Ainaro, then examine three particular development projects in order to discuss how the development aid projects could or should promote the process of reconciliation and the peacebuilding at a community level. At the conclusion, suggestions will be made for the future development projects in post-conflict communities based on the lessons learned from the study.

## **Limitation of the Paper**

There are many literatures about the process of independence, 1999 violence and the international assistance after the violence. However, very few reports are found about the situation since 2002. The paper concentrates on the observation of current circumstances of Timor-Leste. The paper is written based on the field research and investigation by the author in particular places in Ainaro district, Timor-Leste. Therefore the results could not be reflected into the other countries or other areas of Timor-Leste. The paper analyses the particular development aid projects currently implemented in Ainaro. Further research must be required in the projects which focus on national reconciliation and peacebuilding. In addition, the paper is prepared based on the personal research by the author, thus the analysis and observation in this paper do not represent the view of any organisations, such as UNDP, UNOPS nor JICA.

# 1. Description of Ainaro District and Field Research Methodology

The paper is prepared based on the field research in Ainaro district, Timor-Leste. Therefore, it is important to describe the Ainaro district; its features, history, culture, people, communities and challenges, as well as to explain the research methodologies applied in the field in order to discuss the reconciliation process in Ainaro in the following chapter.

In this chapter, the author will describe the features of Ainaro; general information of Ainaro, its history, current situation of its economy, security and politics and the character of people and communities, then will explain research methodologies applied in the field research.


## 1-1 Description of Ainaro District

### 1-1-1 General

Ainaro is one of the 13 governmental and administrative divisions of Timor-Leste. It is located to the south west of the country and about 116km away from the capital, Dili. From Dili it takes about five hours by vehicle to reach the district. The roads are winding and narrow, climbing up to the mountains with amazing scenery. Although currently road rehabilitation is being carried out with the assistance of the government of Japan, certain levels of energy and patience are required to get there.

Ainaro consists of 4 sub-districts, 21 suco (villages)<sup>1</sup> and 132 aldeia (hamlets)<sup>2 3</sup>. Maubisse and Hato-Builico sub-districts, which are located in the central and northern regions, are dominated by a series of spectacular high mountain ranges. Ainaro and Hato-Udo sub-districts, which are in

Picture 1-1 Map of Ainaro



<sup>1</sup> Suco is an administrative division introduced by Portuguese colonial government. It was renamed as “desa” under Indonesian occupation. In the current government system it is again called “suco”. The number of suco, which the Timorese government admits is 443. Suco chiefs are not government officers and have been working voluntarily.

<sup>2</sup> Under the division of suco, aldeia is the smallest administrative division in Timor-Leste, although it is not counted as the governmental administration. Therefore aldeia chiefs have been working for the community voluntarily as well.

<sup>3</sup> See appendix 1: List of suco and aldeia in Ainaro district.

the south and on the coast, have terrain which descends into lowlands. During the rainy season, which is November up to June, there are heavy rainfalls and strong winds in mountainous areas in the north and central, with rainfall levels decreasing towards the south (UNDP, 2002a:1-2).

According to the census conducted in 2004 (UNFPA), Ainaro district (824 sq. km) has a population of 53,629 (see table 1-1). Two remarkable observations could be made regarding the population. Firstly, compared with 2001 data, the result of 2004 census shows substantial increases of population in this short amount of time. Implementing the idea of family planning should be required in the near future. Second, although it does not appear in the census data, a large number of the population, especially younger generation move to Dili or relatively bigger towns in the district in order to obtain better education and/or look for employment. This movement causes depopulation of remote areas. A primary school teacher in Cassa told me that the number of the children enrolled in the school at the village has been decreasing, because many parents now prefer to send their children to schools in Ainaro town<sup>4</sup>. It seems that people have been taking advantage of their new independence by being able to choose freely where they would like to live, work and study. On the other hand, it causes enormous changes in each family on their way of living and family structures, especially in remote areas. The policy to empower rural areas should be instituted immediately.

**Table 1-1 Population in Ainaro District**

Sub-district	No. of Households	Population		Total	2001 Suco Survey	Percent Difference
		Male	Female			
Ainaro	2,902	6,871	6,796	13,667	10,562	+29.4%
Hato Builico	2,333	5,453	5,343	10,796	9,770	+10.5%
Maubisse	4,816	10,097	10,075	20,172	17,623	+14.5%
Hato Udo	2,077	4,543	4,451	8,994	7,137	+26.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>12,128</b>	<b>26,964</b>	<b>26,665</b>	<b>53,629</b>	<b>45,092</b>	<b>+18.9%</b>

(Source: UNFPA, 2004)

Four indigenous languages are in use in Ainaro district: Tetun, Mumbai, Bunak and Kemak. Mumbai is the main indigenous language, however there is no strong identity based on its language among the people<sup>5</sup>. This is because there are several dialects within Mumbai. In addition, there are many similarities between national language of Tetun and Mumbai. Indonesian is widely used among the people, although its use has become less popular since independence.

### 1-1-2 History

One of the oldest kingdoms was in Ainaro. It seems that the traditions and customs succeeded

<sup>4</sup> Interviewed by the author on Sep. 18<sup>th</sup> 2004.

<sup>5</sup> For example, in Lospalos one of the indigenous language, Fataluko is strongly connected with people's identity.

from the past have been maintained relatively well among the people compared with other districts. According to a Liulai (king) in Ainaro<sup>6</sup>, originally there were two Liulais - Liulai Tais Metan and Liulai Tais Mutin at the time Ainaro was not named as Ainaro but called Sul. They had four sons and four daughters. Each of them established an “Uma Lisan”(totem house) to govern the area. They are the root of Liulais (rulers) of Ainaro, although there are many Liulais nowadays. The Liulai used to be very powerful, having a strong influence on the population. However, nowadays opinion on the Liulai is varying (Ospina and Hohe, 2001:48). In Ainaro the role of traditional leaders<sup>7</sup> such as Liulai and Lia Nain (guardian of rules and customs, traditional conflict mediator) is vague. A Lia Nain interviewed<sup>8</sup> told me that the primary responsibility to solve problem is on the government and police, although they still assist them in some areas. For minor problems in communities, traditional leaders are called to mediate the problem by organising meetings and letting the people who cause problems drink the local wine together in front of the community people as a symbol of the restoration of relationships. It seems that the role of Lia Nain is to make the community united beyond the problems, rather than to seek the justice and punish the criminals.

Ainaro, because of its inaccessible mountain terrain, was the last area in Timor to be penetrated by the Portuguese. The first Portuguese arrived in Ainaro in 1886. In 1888 their command station was built beside a tall tree – “Ai Naro”. The name is in the local tongue Mumbae. The name of the town originated from here (UNDP, 2002a:4). During the Indonesian occupation, Ainaro had one of the largest Indonesian military presences. On the other hand, Ainaro was the ideal base for armed opposition against Indonesian occupation, because of its mountainous surroundings. There were many people who had a “double standard life”, generally people worked for the Indonesian army, however, at the same time, they secretly supported guerrillas, who worked for the independence in the mountains. Therefore, the division of pro-independence and pro-autonomy is quite complicated. This makes the reconciliation process quite complicated as well.

Following the announcement of the result for the Popular Consultation in August 1999, the sub-districts of Ainaro, Hato-Udo and Hato Bulico suffered over 90% destruction. Maubisse sub-district sustained less damage (UNDP, 2002a:5). Most of the people in Ainaro, like other places in Timor-Leste, fled to the mountains for 1-3 months. Some people were taken to Atambua, West Timor by force. They were forced to spend 1-3 years under the severe conditions in the refugee camps.

In 2000 the “Go and Visit” programme started to promote the repatriation of the people, especially for ex pro-autonomy people and ex-militia members. The programme was implemented

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<sup>6</sup> Interviewed by the author in Feb. 2005.

<sup>7</sup> Ospina and Hohe (2001:43) described traditional power holders as follows; Liulai/dato – political power holder, Lia Nain – guardian of rules and customs and conflict mediator, Kuku Nain – ritual power holder, Deputy/ Helper – assistant of Liulai and Kuku Nain and Chefe Uma Kain – Chief of extended family.

<sup>8</sup> Interviewed by the author on 16 Feb. 2005.

several times in Ainaro. As a result of the programme, during the last four months of 2001, over 4,000 returnees returned to the district, the majority to suco Cassa and Beikala. The first four months of 2002 saw a slowing down in numbers returning – only 200 people returned during this period (UNDP, 2002a:3). According to the Ainaro District Administrator (DA)<sup>9</sup>, so far about 8,000 – 10,000 ex-militia family members have not come back despite the repatriation programme. The DA explained the reason why remaining people have not come back: Firstly, most of the houses were destroyed and financially it is difficult for them to come back to restore the house. Secondly, children have been educated in Indonesian in schools. They do not want to have the confusion of language issues in education interfering in further study<sup>10</sup>. Thirdly, there are few opportunities of employment even when they come back. Fourthly, they are scared of the people's attitude toward them when they return. Based on these constrains, the further repatriation programmes are not planned for Ainaro.

### 1-1-3 Economy

In Ainaro, like many other places in Timor-Leste, people depend on agriculture for their livelihood. In the lowlands of Ainaro and Hato-Udo sub-districts, people grow rice and maize. In the mountainous areas of Maubisse and Hato-Builico sub-districts, there are many coffee plantations and vegetable fields. In Hato-Udo sub-district there are several women's groups to make traditional tais (see the picture).

Economically Maubisse town is much more active than Ainaro town, although Ainaro town is the administrative centre of Ainaro district. Actually, Maubisse has the highest population in the Ainaro district. The reason for this is that Maubisse is the junction between Dili and Same or Suai.

**Picture 1-2 Tais Making in Cassa**



(Source: the author)


### 1-1-4 Security

The situation in Ainaro is quite calm like most other places in Timor-Leste. The crime rate remains low and has been decreasing since independence (see figure1-1). In terms of security issues, the government of Timor-Leste with the assistance of the UN has achieved a high level of success in the nation building. Most of the crimes are assaults among young generations and Domestic Violence (DV) (see figure 1-2). According to a women's organisation, Fokupers which assists the victims of DV, there are still many hidden victims behind the cases appearing in statistics.

<sup>9</sup> Interviewed by the author on 17 Feb. 2005.

<sup>10</sup> In Timor-Leste, Portuguese is now officially used in schools to teach.

**Figure 1-1 Crimes in Ainaro**




(Source: obtained from the UN Police and PNTL Ainaro)

**Table 1-2 Reported Violence on Women and Children**

Issue	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Rape	0	5	5	17	7	2
Attempt to Rape	9	0	4	1	2	2
Sexual Harassment	13	4	3	4	2	1
Child Abuse	5	1	1	10	12	1
Torture	0	10	10	1	3	0
Compulsory Marriage	0	0	0	0	1	0
Domestic Violence	10	36	35	38	16	10

(Source: obtained from Fokupers, 2004)

**Figure 1-2 Crime Statistics in Ainaro (2002-2004)**



(Source: obtained from the UN Police and PNTL Ainaro)

Despite the high level of security so far, there are several concerning issues for the future. First, there is the certain level of frustration felt toward the local police. It is not because of their way of work, but the choice of police officers. People complain that most of the police officers who worked under the Indonesian regime are again employed by the government of Timor-Leste. It is said that there are many ex pro-autonomy side people amongst the police officers. Given the ongoing and/or growing difficulties related to employment, this is taken as an unfair situation, especially for the people who struggled for independence for a long time. Another concerning issue is the violence between Martial Arts Groups. In Ainaro there are 14 Martial Arts Groups. According to both the UN Police and the local police in Ainaro, there are 3,190 Martial Arts Group members (see table 1-3). It is about 6% of the total population in Ainaro. The area with most of Martial Arts Groups is Ainaro sub-district<sup>11</sup>. Most of the members are young men. Each group has its own

<sup>11</sup> In August 2004, KORK members attacked TORK members' houses in aldeia No-ulu, suco Soro Craic. They burnt over 50 houses there. About 60 suspects were arrested and sent to Dili. At the time of writing this report in February 2005, three main criminals were jailed in Dili, while the others were released. Since this incident, there is no particular conflict among Martial Arts Groups in Ainaro.

uniform. There is a rumour that some of them are supported by political parties, although the reality is unknown. Due to many issues and information which are hidden underground, it is difficult to accurately assess and measure this security threat. This is the fragility the society encounters.

**Table 1-3 Martial Art Groups in Ainaro District**

No	Name of Group	No. of Each Group Members in Each Sub-district in Ainaro				Total No.
		Ainaro	Hato-Udo	Hato Bulico	Maubisse	
1	5-5	500	180	0	0	680
2	KORK	490	180	125	400	1,195
3	COLIMAU 2000	150	45	0	0	195
4	12-12	80	0	0	0	80
5	SORS	80	25	0	0	105
6	7-7	75	0	0	0	75
7	PSHT	70	175	100	150	495
8	KERA SATI	50	25	0	0	75
9	RAJAUNALI	45	80	0	0	125
10	TORK	40	0	0	0	40
11	ABU-ABU	40	0	0	0	40
12	SKMJ	35	0	0	0	35
13	KARATE	30	0	0	0	30
14	KUNGFU MASTER	0	20	0	0	20
Total		1,685	730	225	550	3,190

(Source: obtained from the UN Police/ PNTL in Ainaro, Sep. 2004)

### 1-1-5 Politics

There are 16 political parties in the country as the result of the election in 2001 (See Table 1-4 and Appendix 7). 4 parties are the major parties; FRETILIN (Frente Revolucionária do Timor-Leste Independente) is the leading party. PD (Partido Democrático) was founded by leaders of the student union and ran against FRETILIN, because its supporters believed their opposition to Indonesian rule had been undervalued by the returning leaders of the generation of 1975. PSD (Partido Social Democrata) is against FRETILIN from the right. And ASDT (Associação Social Democrata Timorese) supports FRETILIN and gives them the two-thirds majority in the parliament (Shoesmith, 2003:242).

In Ainaro, FRETILIN is the ruling party as well. However, as we see from the result of the election in 2001(see table 1-4), its influence among the people is relatively weak. Instead, ASDT and PPT (Partido do Povo de Timor) have strong influence, especially in Maubisse sub-district.



**Table 1-4 Result of the August 2001 Constituent Assembly Elections in Ainaro**

Political Party	Ainaro		Whole Country <sup>12</sup>
	Votes Obtained	% of total votes cast	% of total votes cast
FRETILIN	5,436	25.89	57.37
ASDT	2,969	14.14	7.84
PPT	2,826	13.46	2.01
PD	1,650	7.86	8.72
PSD	1,230	5.86	8.18
KOTA	1,211	5.77	2.13
UDT	1,005	4.79	2.36
PDC	743	3.53	1.98
PNT	561	2.67	2.21
PST	385	1.83	1.78
PTT	278	1.32	-
PDM	180	0.86	-
UDC/PDC	188	0.89	-
PARENTIL	155	0.73	-
APODETI	118	0.56	-
INDEPENDENTS	721	3.43	-

(Source: UNDP, 2002 and UNTAET Independent Electoral Commission, 2001)

It seems that frustration with the government (FRETILIN as the ruling party) is growing among the populations, because of the difficulties of their living situation. People informed me that the government promised them a lot of things, but most of them have not yet been implemented. Visible development for the people at the community level could be the key issue for the next election planned in 2006.

#### **1-1-6 People/ Communities**

Timor-Leste is comprised by communities of great variety. It is said that people and communities in each district of Timor-Leste have their own features. I feel indeed it is true. People establish very small and strong ties based on kinship. These tiny relationships consist of a small community. Therefore community size is quite small and differs one from another even in the same suco or aldeia. This makes it difficult for the people to have a sense of unity as either a suco or an aldeia. There is often no particular community leader who could bring the people together beyond the kinship ties. According to the road rehabilitation project in Ainaro, the company has to employ different workers for every one kilometre, because each community does not allow “outsiders” to work in their community. People think that the company should employ the community members

<sup>12</sup> See more details in Appendix 7: Political Parties in Timor-Leste

when it has some work in their community<sup>13</sup>.

In Ainaro at the sub-district level, each has its own features<sup>14</sup>. The most remarkable thing is the clear division between Maubisse sub-district and Ainaro sub-district. There are only about 40km between Maubisse and Ainaro. However, it takes about two hours by vehicle due to poor road conditions. Another reason is that Maubisse town is bigger than Ainaro town in the sense of population, economy and trade, although Ainaro is the administrative centre of Ainaro district. Therefore Maubisse people feel that Maubisse is the centre of Ainaro, which many Ainaro people disagree with<sup>15</sup>.

The churches influence on the people also differs between communities in Ainaro. This is because of the church attitude towards the independence movement under the Indonesian regime. In Maubisse the church played a key role supporting the independence movement, therefore, its influence among people is substantially strong. On the other hand in Ainaro, the priest during Indonesian regime supported the Indonesian authority<sup>16</sup>, therefore its influence among people is weak, although almost all the people are Roman Catholic.

People in every community are heavily traumatised by 24 years of Indonesian occupation and the 1999 violence. According to a national NGO Yayasan HAK, in Ainaro there is no community which can apply development project without the consideration for the healing from the past, except community of Bonuk, Hato-Udo sub-district and the whole communities in Hato-Builico sub-district<sup>17</sup>. There are many families that were divided into two groups of pro-independence and pro-autonomy. They continue their family ties beyond the past divisions. However, it cannot be denied that there is a high level of sensitivity among them, within a family.

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<sup>13</sup> Interviewed by the author in Jan. 2005.

<sup>14</sup> See table 1-5: Features of Each Sub-district.

<sup>15</sup> There are people who suggest that Maubisse should consist one district itself apart from Ainaro district in Maubisse. DA of Ainaro told me that he could welcome this idea, because it could ease the difficult financial situation of Ainaro, although he recognises there are people who are not happy to this idea.

<sup>16</sup> The former priest escaped to West Timor at the time of 1999 violence, together with all brothers. They have not come back to Ainaro.

<sup>17</sup> Interviewed by the author on 29 Sep. 2004.

**Table 1-5 Features of Each Sub-district in Ainaro**

<b>Issue</b>	<b>Ainaro</b>	<b>Hato-Udo</b>	<b>Maubisse</b>	<b>Hato-Builico</b>
<b>General</b>	Administrative centre	Rural area Lowest population	Highest population	Remote area, and difficult to reach
<b>Climate</b>	Medium	Hot, tropical atmosphere along the ocean	Mountainous area and cold	Mountainous area and very cold
<b>Destruction from 1999 Violence</b>	Seriously big	Seriously big	Relatively small	Seriously big
<b>Economy</b>	Active in rice and maize field	Active in ties making, rice and maize field	Active in coffee plantation and vegetable field Developed as the junction between Dili and Same, Suai/Ainaro	Active in coffee plantation and vegetable field
<b>Transportation</b>	Relatively better condition, compared with other sub-districts, although there are several places which do not have any public means.	Difficulties to reach, especially in rainy season because there is no bridge over the river	There are many public transportation to Dili. However, there is no transportation at all to the villages located away from main roads.	There is no transportation at all to the villages located away from main roads.
<b>Politics</b>			Many supporters of ASDT	
<b>Church Influence</b>	Relatively weak	Relatively weak	Very strong	?
<b>Martial Arts Group</b>	Very active	Active	Less active	Least active

(Source: the author)

## 1-2 Research Methodologies

The author applied three different approaches during the research period: observation through community empowerment work for a duration of six months, selected field research through home staying in two communities in Ainaro and interviews with the stakeholders in various organisations.

In the research, the author applied qualitative research methods, including one-to-one in-depth interviews, the life history method<sup>18</sup> and semi-grouped discussion<sup>19</sup>.

I collected the primary contacts and information for the field research through my daily activities in Ainaro, Timor-Leste and interviews with various organisations. Once the research started, the chain of person to person led to collect the information. It was essential to find an appropriate person to talk with. The site selection of field research was prepared in the same way. The suggestions and information given from the colleagues and friends in Ainaro were indispensable.

### **1-2-1 Observation through Community Empowerment Work**

The author has been working as a UNV (the United Nations Volunteer) entitled community empowerment advisor in the project called AMCAP (Ainaro and Manatuto Community Activation Project) in Ainaro, Timor-Leste since July 2004. It is a project implemented by UNOPS (the United Nations Office for Project Services). It is an agricultural project aiming to increase food security and incomes of poor households in Ainaro and Manatuto districts on an environmentally sustainable basis, using community focused participatory methodologies.

There were many opportunities to communicate with local communities and residents. Through the work, the author obtained a large amount of useful information about; the daily life of the people, the difficulties people are facing, traditions and customs of local communities and people in Ainaro. The best thing is that being able to observe the situation from the view of local community residents. The colleagues are the key persons of the research. In addition, the position in the UN makes it easy to develop contacts with various organisations, especially in UN agencies in Timor-Leste.

### **1-2-2 Selected Field Research**

Considering the closed communities of Timor-Leste and the characteristics of communities and people in Ainaro, as well as my research purpose, which concentrates on the view of the people at community level, the author selected two communities, Cassa and Manutasi, and stayed several days at a local residence in each community in order to conduct field research there.

It is said that Ainaro sub-district is the most critical area for reconciliation in Ainaro district. Conducting a research in Cassa was in mind from the beginning. Cassa is famous because it is where most of the militia members returned from West Timor. Many meetings to promote the national reconciliation were organised there. Luckily enough, one of the colleagues is from Cassa and her husband is the suco (village) chief of Cassa. The author found the perfect place to stay to conduct research in Cassa, and interviewed the suco chief, 2 aldeia (hamlet) chiefs, a Police Officer and community residents in 4 out of 5 aldeia in Cassa<sup>20</sup>.

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<sup>18</sup> In life history method, researchers interview and gather documentary material about a particular individual's life. Researchers ask open-ended questions to capture how the person understands his or her past (Newman, 1997:373).

<sup>19</sup> Semi-group discussion is a form of unstructured interview. It brings to the surface the differences among the participants and the contradictions within and between their replies (Bryman, 1988).

<sup>20</sup> See appendix 2: List of People Interviewed in Selected Field Research.

In the case of Manutasi, the situation was different from the one of Cassa. Through collecting information about the critical communities for reconciliation in Ainaro sub-district, Manutasi came up into the mind. Looking for a family in Manutasi who could host took more time than was expected. In the end, one of the colleagues introduced his relatives family. In Manutasi the author interviewed 2 aldeia chief and community residents in 3 out of 4 aldeia<sup>21</sup>.

### **1-2-3 Interviewing to the Stakeholders**

The author visited 2 projects implemented by UN agencies, 5 international NGOs, 5 local NGOs, another 5 organisations and 4 individuals, which were thought to be essential for the research<sup>22</sup>. The author developed contacts with these organizations easily, for they were quite helpful. Nevertheless, most of the organisations have their offices located in the capital Dili, which at times made it difficult for me to visit due to logistical and transportation reasons. Added, there were some difficulties in coordinating schedules with the proper information providers which mainly worked these out at main offices in Dili and not in the sub-offices.

Another thing to mention here visiting these organisations is not only for the research itself, but also for community empowerment work in the field. Although a large number of data was collected from each organisation, the information which specifically pertained to the research was limited.

### **1-2-4 Questions Asked <sup>23</sup>**

In interviews with organisations, three main things were asked: basic information about the organisation, the achievement and difficulties of their projects in the field and their view of the reconciliation and peacebuilding process of the country. In the communities, the author prepared two different types of questions: one for the community leaders and another one for community residents. With the community residents, the interview concentrated on their personal life: living conditions, difficulties in sustaining their livelihoods, their family history, especially their experiences since 1999. Then questions concerning reconciliation were asked based on their daily life: communication between the ex pro-autonomy side and the ex pro-independence side and their degree of acceptance towards the reconciliation principle of the central government. To the community leaders, more about their community as well as their work as a community leader were asked: the problems the community are facing, if there were/are any projects implemented by NGOs, people's attitude toward the work of community leaders. The author asked questions about security threats, especially about the issue of martial arts groups to both community leaders and community residents because the issue of martial arts groups seemed to be one of the serious threats for the many communities in Timor-Leste, especially in Ainaro district.

### **1-2-5 Difficulties**

There were several difficulties faced in conducting the field research: First of all, it was difficult

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<sup>21</sup> See appendix 2: List of People Interviewed in Selected Field Research.

<sup>22</sup> See appendix 3: List of Organisations or Projects Visited.

<sup>23</sup> See appendix 4: The List of Questions Asked.

to conduct research while working for community empowerment in the field, although the research was very useful for work. The language barrier was also a big issue. There was a high level of communication difficulty in interviewing people and listening to people. In Timor-Leste, most people speak Tetun. The author learned some Tetun to communicate with the people directly, but not enough to understand if people were talking too quickly. The biggest barrier for the research was a characteristic of communities and people in Timor-Leste. It seemed that people tend not to speak out about things, especially negative things. Every time the author had to read between the lines. The real meanings seemed to be always hidden behind the sentences. It was really confusing and complicating for an outsider. The same sentence could be taken in a totally different way by different recipients. In addition, as mentioned above, people in Timor-Leste maintain the identity of the very small community. Therefore people come from outside of the area are taken as outsiders, though as East Timorese they share the same culture and larger problems. This fact made it clear the need to find a person from inside the community to assist in interviews as people would not speak freely with an 'outsider'.

## **2. National Reconciliation in Timor-Leste – Distance between National Level and Community Level –**

Takeuchi (2002) indicates that “National Reconciliation” is the challenge of how to promote reintegration when a conflict or political oppression causes a serious chasm between the same nationals. It aims people to overcome the tragedies in the past. It focuses on how to expose human rights violations in the past and how to judge the perpetrators.

When the governments which were based on dictatorship or authoritarian rule in many Latin American countries were replaced by democratic ones in the 1970s, human rights abuses which had taken place under military governments emerged and were criticised. However, the ethical judgements often could not be delivered. In these kinds of circumstances “reconciliation” between victims and perpetrators were critically cited as a “compromise” without establishing justice. In 1995 the notion of reconciliation was spotlighted by Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) of South Africa, although it was not a complete new philosophy<sup>24</sup>. TRC of South Africa achieved great fame all over the world, because of its principle, which gives perpetrators amnesty through truth telling and seeks national reconciliation, not accusing the perpetrators in order to overcome the past tragedy of apartheid (Takeuchi, 2002). Generally TRC South Africa is taken as a successful case. However, the situation at the ground seems to be further complicated. According to a research conducted by Vora (2004), people perceived that the TRC was effective in bringing out the truth. On the other hand, it was perceived to have been much less successful in bringing about reconciliation.

Reconciliation is an ambiguous word. When people are reconciled, it happens based on their own thoughts. It is very much a personal process. Thus, there are many ways and many standards to be reconciled at a personal level. In some cases there may not even be a need for reconciliation. Furthermore, reconciliation is often restricted by political matters (Takeuchi, 2002). Under the name of national reconciliation, it could simply be used as a political tool.

In this chapter, the author will draw the distance between national level and community level concerning about the national reconciliation in Timor-Leste through two field case studies in Ainaro. Firstly the chapter will draw a picture of reconciliation at the national level – what the government of Timor-Leste aims to achieve through reconciliation, then describe reconciliation at a community level through examining the reconciliation process and challenges in the two communities in Ainaro.

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<sup>24</sup> Between 1974 and 1994, at least 15 truth commissions were established in various countries, such as Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Uruguay, El Salvador, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Chad, Zimbabwe, Germany, the Philippines (Hayner 1994, 1996).

## **2-1 Reconciliation at National Level: The Aims of the Government of Timor-Leste**

The government stance toward reconciliation could be described as “unity and forgiveness”, although the government has tried to establish a certain level of justice. In this section, I would like to describe what the government of Timor-Leste aims on reconciliation through the work of CAVR (Comissao de Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliacao de Timor Leste - The Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation).

The CAVR is an independent statutory authority that inquired into human rights violations committed on all sides, between April 1974 and October 1999, and facilitated community reconciliation with justice for those who committed less serious offences. The commission will not give amnesty (the CAVR homepage, 2005). The mandate of the CAVR covers three board areas, which are truth seeking, community reconciliation and report writing;

- (a) Truth Seeking: To inquire into the truth about human rights violations committed on all sides in the context of the political conflict between April 1974 and October 1999 through establishing a truth telling mechanism for victims and perpetrators to describe, acknowledge and record the incidents
- (b) Community Reconciliation: To facilitate community reconciliation for the lesser crimes, such as looting, burning and minor assault
- (c) Report Writing: To report on its findings and make recommendations to the government for further action on reconciliation and the promotion of human rights

First, CAVR collected statements from the victims and perpetrators in order to collect the real data about violations. CAVR employed statement takers<sup>25</sup> and spent 3 months in each sub-district. As the result, 7972 statements from victims were collected and the statements were gathered as victim’s reports. From perpetrators 1500 statements were collected. Out of 1500 statements, 1300 cases were proved as crimes<sup>26</sup>. Then the crime cases were sent to the general prosecutor’s office to divide the crime cases into two: serious crimes and lesser crimes. Only lesser crimes were sent back to CAVR to process. The CAVR pursued each lesser crime to reconciliation stage. At the reconciliation stage a perpetrator’s hearing meeting was organised for each case. NGO staff, church and community leaders were invited for the meeting as panels. After the offender confessed his/her crime, the permission to stay in the community as a member was given from the community residents. Once the permission was given, a document was prepared how the offender was to deal with the community in the future. 2-3 months after the meeting, the following up visits were conducted.

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<sup>25</sup> There were two state takers for victims and one for perpetrators in each district.

<sup>26</sup> Interviewed by the author to CAVR officer on 8 Sep. 2004.



It seems that CAVR was systematically organised and its works, especially collecting data and organising reconciliation meeting, were successfully performed. Actually all the stakeholders I interviewed in communities and in organisations evaluated CAVR positively. There is no doubt that CAVR achieved a great success and built up the first step of national reconciliation. On the other hand, it left a huge amount of challenges for the future. Firstly, there is no particular institution which succeeds the work of CAVR, despite there being the needs for further follow up in many cases in order to promote further reconciliation. Secondly, CAVR did not have the right to decide or recommend on the classification of serious crimes and lesser crimes, neither on the judgement of each serious crime. The judgements process of serious crimes is not clear and open for the public and this situation generates frustration among the population who seek justice. This causes negative effects on the community reconciliation process that the organisations like CAVR and a national NGO Yayasan HAK began.

The work, challenges and dilemmas of CAVR represent well the government circumstances and dilemmas on reconciliation. Firstly, the government's sincere effort on seeking justice and promoting reconciliation can be evaluated positively. In community-based reconciliation, the government stressed the reintegration of militias into society by returning to their villages, asking forgiveness and making amends by supporting victims and their families. The president Gusmao himself travelled widely in the country to ask people to understand this policy and promote the reintegration process. At the same time, he has stressed the need for healing through truth-telling. It is perceived that truth-telling gives perpetrators an opportunity to ask for forgiveness, and it gives victims an opportunity to overcome the tragedy in the past as well. This concept was widely accepted by the international community. Even at the community level, it was getting accepted and achieved the certain level of success, although there was much confusion and anger towards the idea at the early stage. Secondly, the government soon faced the reality that real justice cannot be met because of the internal politics of Indonesia. The government can press the establishment of justice inside Indonesia only in a soft manner, because it is clear that the relationship with other countries, especially strong neighbours like Indonesia is critical for a tiny, weak and fragile country like Timor-Leste. It can be said that this fact has weighted heavily on the government of Timor-Leste and led it to establish the principles of amnesty and reconciliation toward Indonesia externally. This politically motivated idea of reconciliation thus emphasises forgiveness internally even only limited justice could be met. In order to maintain the relationship with the government of Indonesia, Timor Leste's leaders claimed that they would not support the independence movement in Aceh and Papua. The government also tried hard to reassure them that Timor-Leste will not put pressure on Jakarta for human rights trials (Smith, 2004:289). At the time of report writing, there are no more activities planned to encourage the repatriation of ex-militia families who live in West Timor. The government motivation on reconciliation seems to be toned down now in front of so many challenges for the nation-building. However, this does not mean that reconciliation is not a big issue in the society of Timor-Leste.

## **2-2 Reconciliation at Community Level**

The previous section explained the politically sensitive circumstance of the central government on justice. However, how do the people at community level observe the process? Do they agree with the government stance? How do they perceive the development of reconciliation in their community? This section will describe the community reconciliation process through the case of Cassa and Manutasi Villages, Ainaro District and examine how successfully the central government principles have been accepted at the community level.

Both Cassa and Manutasi belong to Ainaro sub-district, where people were most seriously affected by Indonesian occupation and 1999 violence. Both villages had a huge number of militia members in the community during Indonesian occupation. Especially Cassa which was the base of a militia group called “Mahidi”, which actively engaged in violence through the whole Ainaro district. After independence, these two communities have had different experiences of the reconciliation process – In Cassa, many militia members have come back to the community from West Timor based on the government initiative for reconciliation. On the other hand, in Manutasi militia members have not come back yet, although many ex pro-autonomy side people, who were not militia, but supported consolidation to Indonesia, have come back. Cassa became famous as a symbol of community reconciliation. Many organisations, including CAVR and Yayasan HAK visited the community to organise various meetings aiming the reconciliation between ex pro-autonomy side and ex pro-independence side. On the contrary, in Manutasi people have never seen any organisations to promote reconciliation in the community.


### **2-2-1 Case Study 1: Reconciliation Process and Challenges in Cassa**

Cassa is located about 40km away from Ainaro town. It is located close to a river and there are huge rice fields along the river. Most of the people work in the field as farmers. Many houses are built in traditional style with thatched roof. Many women weave traditional clothes under their traditional houses. In the tropical circumstances they look quite beautiful.

As mentioned above, Cassa was the base of the pro-Indonesia militia called Mahidi. It became famous as a symbol of community reconciliation, because most of militias have come back. According to the community leaders, there was heightened tension when militia members returned. Several cases of violence broke out between ex pro-autonomy side and ex pro-independence side. However, through several meetings organised by various organisations to promote reconciliation, the situation became considerably calmer. There is no violence reported anymore. Suco chief told that people could work together now, although there were some considerations required. The author thought the reconciliation process here could be written as a success story at first. However, after two days of field research, complex reality was recognised. There was high level of sensitivity among the people in the community.

There are five aldeia in Cassa village, which are Boltama, Mau-suca, Lai-lima, Sivil and Quesemane. The centre of the village is Mau-suca. At the centre of Mau-suca, there is an invisible border. It divides the community into two – residents for ex pro-independent side and residents for ex pro-autonomy side. People try not to communicate each other beyond the invisible border and in this way they keep the stability as a community (See figure 2-1).

**Figure 2-1 Cassa Village Overview**



(Source: Made by the author)

Nobody mentioned about this border. The border was realised when coming back to the resident house in Mau-suca from the field research in Lai-lima and Sivil. Everybody asked “Weren’t you scared?” The author could not understand what they meant at first. Then it was gradually realised there might be something behind the sentence. The author stayed at the suco chief’s house for the field research in Cassa. He supported the independence. Almost everybody talked for the first two days seemed to be ex pro-independence side. Everybody told me that there were no problems for the relationship among people. All these factors noticed the border.

Several uneasy factors were recognised in the community during field research. Firstly, it seemed that aldeia Sivil, which belongs to ex pro-autonomy side, was the poorest area in Cassa. However, fear stops the poverty measure being applied here in order to choose a development aid project site. Secondly, there is not clear leadership in the community. There are of course community leaders, such as suco chief, aldeia chiefs. However, they work only on administrative matters. It seems that they do not have much social power in the community. The church here also does not have much respect from the people. Only a small number of the people attend Mass. This is unlikely when you consider the strong faith in Christianity in the country. Thirdly, people tend not to speak out on negative matters or about their anxiety, especially to outsiders. People have strong insider – outsider bias. People apply this measure to the Timorese people, who come from another community. Outsiders never become insiders. Building trust takes a lot of time. These

factors considered, however, the biggest concern is that there is no measurement of how serious each uneasy factor is growing underground.


### 2-2-2 Case Study 2: Reconciliation Process and Challenges in Manutasi

Manutasi is located next to Ainaro villa. It takes only 10 minutes from the town by a car. There are four aldeia in Manutasi – Hatumetaudu (Aldeia 1), Kanudu (Aldeia 2), Bahatelau (Aldeia 3) and Rebutudu (Aldeia 4)<sup>27</sup>. It is a hilly place and each hill consists of one aldeia. Aldeia 1 and 4 are at high altitude, having a relatively wide area for upland farming. On the contrary, Aldeia 2 is located at relatively low altitude, having paddy field in low land. The symbol of Manutasi is the statue of Maria along the main road, looking at us from the top of the hill, where we can view whole Ainaro town.

The author conducted the field research in Manutasi on 20<sup>th</sup>-22<sup>nd</sup> October 2004 and stayed in a residents house in Aldeia 3, who was a relative of the colleague. Because of the distance between Aldeia 1,2,3 and 4, the field research was not able to be conducted in Aldeia 1.

There is a rough division of house placements for ex pro-autonomy side and ex pro-independence side (See figure 2-2). Ex pro-independent side people live in relatively lower land and ex pro-autonomy side live in upper areas. However, people have to communicate every day in the community in order to lead their daily life. In Manutasi people gain their livelihood from agricultural activities in the farm or/and paddy field, as most of Timorese do. As you can see the figure below, people have to pass through other aldeia to go to the farming area or paddy field. In

**Figure 2-2 Manutasi Village Overview**



<sup>27</sup> People call each aldeia as number 1,2,3 and 4 instead of using each name of aldeia.

addition, people who stay in the upper areas have to cross other aldeia to reach the main road. There are many people who had two houses – One is in upper area next to their farm and another one is near to the main road.

Another factor that makes the relationship between the ex pro-autonomy side and the ex pro-independence side here deeply sensitive is that most of the residents in Manutasi were taken to Atambua in West Timor by force as militia hostages. People had to spend about 1-4 years in refugee camps in Atambua. Everybody interviewed expressed how hard their lives in the refugee camp were and how much they wanted to come back. People were totally under the control of militia in refugee camps. Many people finally came back home after independence in 2002. People who supported the autonomy side were also treated in the same way. Therefore people who supported autonomy feel that they are the victims of militia the same as people who supported independence. On the other hand, the ex pro-independence side never agree with this view. They expressed a high level of frustration and sensitivity between them. What makes their view totally different like this?

There were at least two reasons behind it. One might be financial frustration or current living situation. There were about 72 militia members living in Manutasi during Indonesian occupation. They used to live in Aldeia 1. As mentioned above, they have not yet come back from Atambua, West Timor. Therefore, people currently living in Aldeia 1 have relatively bigger farm land. Actually, it seemed ex pro-autonomy side people are slightly well off compared with the people of ex pro-independence side. There is no data to prove this and it is only based on personal observation. However, it is clear that this is what the ex pro-independence side people feel about their every day life. Another reason is relating to a psychological matter. Although people were taken to Atambua by force exactly the same way, it is clear that much more pressure and stress were experienced by the pro-independent side to survive in refugee camps controlled by militia that supported autonomy. Therefore it is reasonable for the people who supported independence to feel that they are different from the people who supported the consolidation of Indonesia.

People of ex pro-autonomy and ex pro-independence also have different views about the repatriation of militia families. While most ex pro-autonomy people accept their repatriation, ex pro-independence people do not want them to come back to the community. There are many families divided into two sides. They keep the family tie, but with having a certain level of sensitivity.

### **2-2-3 Lessons Learned from Case Studies**

What are we able to learn from the two case studies? Cassa and Manutasi cases have many similarities: Both are sucos in Ainaro sub-district in Ainaro district. Both were heavily affected by militia presence. And people in both communities are deeply traumatised and suffered from high sensitivities between the ex pro-independent side and the ex pro-autonomy side. On the other hand,

Cassa and Manutasi experienced in totally different ways, the reconciliation process after 1999. In Cassa people had a positive experience of the reconciliation process introduced by various organisations, although there are certain levels of sensitivity and division remaining. In Manutasi the reconciliation process has not yet started, despite the fact that there is high demand to seek reconciliation.

**Table 2-1 Comparative Study of Reconciliation Process in Cassa and Manutasi**

	Cassa	Manutasi
Sub-district	Ainaro	Ainaro
Aldeia in the suco	5 aldeia Mau-suca (villa), Boltama, Lai-lima, Sivil and Quesamau	4 aldeia Hatumetaulu, Kanudu, Bauhatulau and Rebutudu
Presence of militia members in the community during Indonesian occupation	It was the base of a militia group called Mahidi.	There were about 72 militia members in the community.
At the time of 1999 violence	People escaped to Aldeia Bonuk in Hato-Udo sub-district, where there was no destruction by militias for 1-3 months.	Many people were taken to Atambua in West Timor by force as militia's hostages. People had to spend 1-4 years in refugee camps in Atambua.
Repatriation of militia member	Most of militia members have come back from West Timor.	-Most of militia members have NOT come back from West Timor. -Ex pro-independence people don't want them to come back.
Relationship between ex pro-autonomy side and ex pro-independence side	-No violence anymore -There is the invisible border, which divide the resident places for ex pro-autonomy side and ex pro-independence side completely.	-No active violence -Situation is much more sensitive and complicated than Cassa -There is a rough division of resident places for the ex pro-autonomy side and the ex pro-independence side. However, people have to communicate often in the community.
Promotion of Reconciliation organized by external organisations	Many meetings were organized by many organizations, such as CAVR and Yayasan HAK.	Meetings were never organised by anybody.

(Source: the author)

In both communities of Cassa and Manutasi, the people's every day life continues even under the situation of high sensitivities. In both communities, substantial growing frustration is recognised among the people. The frustration does not necessarily come from the difficulties of establishing justice, but from the difficulty of sustaining everyday life. People, especially living in rural areas feel that they are ignored because most of the developmental profits are now only shared by a small number of people who have jobs in cities, especially in the capital Dili. It is clear that there was too much expectation on independence. People could not measure how difficult job of the nation building is. It seems that this causes distance between the central government and people in rural areas.

The concern for the future is that the growing frustration at the community level intensifies anti-government movements and it deepens the division inside the community at the same time. It could set back the gains that the reconciliation process achieved. In this sense, development projects have the high potentials to reduce the frustration among the people in communities and promote the process of reconciliation and peacebuilding. In the following chapter, I would like to examine the potential of development aid programmes in the relation to the process of reconciliation and peacebuilding.

### **3. Promotion of Community Reconciliation and Peacebuilding Process through Development Projects**

War-affected communities possess particular mutual characteristics. The evaluation report on post-conflict humanitarian assistance prepared by UNDP and the Japanese government (2002) concludes that many features in post-conflict situations affect all humanitarian assistance projects: Lack of baseline data and lack of reliable information relating to damages and needs of the communities lead the requirement of modification in planning and budgeting of projects. Security issues and the difficulties of arranging logistics delay the projects. The presence of international organisations and personnel raises the prices of every product dramatically in the country and makes for an unnatural economy. This also increases the project budget. Short term contract of staff in international organisations in war-affected countries makes cooperation among humanitarian assistance organisations, as well as the sustainability of projects, difficult physically. In many cases, the recipient government and its administration system are not existing or not viable enough. And there are lack of techniques and the people who have special skills and techniques. This increases the dependency of the recipient countries on international assistance.

This chapter will discuss how the development project could or should promote the community reconciliation and peacebuilding process at the community level. Firstly, the author will describe the development projects in Ainaro district. Secondly, the author will assess three particular development projects; aim, performance, implementation structure, relationship with local communities, relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact, sustainability, challenges and relation with promoting reconciliation process. Then discuss how the development project could or should promote the community reconciliation and peacebuilding process at the community level based on the lessons learned from project analysis in Ainaro.

#### **3-1 Development Aid Projects in Ainaro: Actors, Activities and Challenges**

There have been so many emergency relief projects implemented by various international organisations in Ainaro. Most of them were infrastructural projects, such as rehabilitation of buildings and/or water supply projects. Most of the projects were accomplished in a short time, therefore, it was difficult for me to trace the project in details. Now the country is in the term of bridging from emergency relief to long term development and the number of projects has decreased dramatically. In Ainaro the number of international and local NGOs present seems to be relatively smaller than the other districts. At the time of report writing in February 2005, 2 projects of the UN agencies (UNDP), 3 international NGOs, 3 local NGOs and 1 bilateral aid project were ongoing<sup>28</sup>. Four of them are district wide projects, while the others work in a particular area or sub-district. In

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<sup>28</sup> See appendix 5: Major Projects Implemented in Ainaro District.



terms of the field of work, there is a variety of projects. There are 3 projects for agriculture, 2 for infrastructure, 2 for micro credit, 1 for human rights and 1 for NGO networking. Communication between the projects is unfortunately not active.

### **3-2 Comparative Study of Three Development Aid Projects in Ainaro**

This section will assess in particular three development aid projects implemented in Ainaro: AMCAP (Ainaro and Manatuto Community Activation Project), RESPECT (Recovery, Employment and Stability Programme for Ex-combatants and Communities in Timor-Leste) and Road Construction Project<sup>29</sup>. There are several reasons to choose these three projects for in-depth assessment. Firstly, all these three projects are funded by the government of Japan, although the commitment of Japan is different between the projects<sup>30</sup>. It is useful to assess the Japanese commitment in post-conflict reconstruction through these different projects. Secondly, at the time of the research all these projects were ongoing in Ainaro. Therefore it is relatively easy to obtain the information about the projects.

The author set up eight indicators in order to assess the projects<sup>31</sup>; relevance, performance, implementation process, efficiency, impact, effectiveness, sustainability, challenges and relation with promoting the reconciliation and peacebuilding process. Relevance is to question whether the outputs, project purpose and overall goal are still in keeping with the priority needs and concerns. Performance is the achievement and outcome of each project so far. Implementation process is to assess how each project is organised on the ground, including the overview of implementation structure and the relationship with local communities. Efficiency is a measure of productivity of the implementation process how efficiently inputs are converted into output. Impact means positive and negative changes propagated directly or indirectly, as the result of project implementation. Effectiveness is a measure of achievement of project purpose relative to the degree to which the outputs have contributed to its achievement. Sustainability is extent to which the recipient country's institutions can continue to pursue the project benefits after the external aid is terminated. Challenges are problems or difficulties each project encounters. Relation with promoting the reconciliation and peacebuilding process is to assess if each project aims to promote the reconciliation and peacebuilding process. If it aims so, it measures how the project has contributed to the process on the ground.

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<sup>29</sup> Although AMCAP is conducted in Manatuto district and RESPECT is conducted in the whole country, in this research their activities in Ainaro are targeted and discussed.

<sup>30</sup> AMCAP is funded by the UN Trust Fund for Human Security. Government of Japan is the donor of the Fund.

<sup>31</sup> The criteria of five indicators (efficiency, effectiveness, impact, relevance and sustainability) are cited from monitoring and evaluation based on the PCM (Project Cycle Management), which was developed as a measurement tool for Japan's ODA project by FASID (the Foundation for Advanced Studies on International Development) (FASID, 1998).

### **3-2-1 Relevance**

It can be said that all three projects bear possible relevance. For AMCAP, rehabilitation and development of the agricultural sector is highly required in the situation that majority of the population depend on agriculture for their livelihood. Furthermore, assisting agriculture sector has a high potential to respond the growing frustration among the people in rural areas. For RESPECT, high unemployment rate has been one of the serious concerns in the country. Therefore the project has the certain level of relevance, although the project gives only the short term employments. For both AMCAP and RESPECT, the range of targeted beneficiaries is large. AMCAP beneficiaries are vulnerable farmers and household, while beneficiaries in RESPECT are vulnerable groups of society, including ex-combatants, disabled, widows and unemployed youths, that are identified in the communities themselves. The identification of vulnerable residents should be carefully examined and justified in each activity. The road is the basic infrastructure for people and the country. Considering the aspect of road as a public utility, the project bears a certain level of relevance, although it requires high cost and economic development of the area could not be expected a lot through this road rehabilitation.

### **3-2-2 Performance**

AMCAP is a project of UNDP (the United Nations Development Programme) /UNOPS (the United Nations Office for Project Service), started in 2002 for a five year project. Its aim is to increase food security and incomes of poor households on an environmentally sustainable basis, using community focused participatory methods. This is achieved through the development of sustainable upland farming systems, irrigation rehabilitation, livestock improvement, local seed multiplication capacity, and reforestation while improving technical capacities through a community training centre (UNDP/UNOPS, 2001). There are so many activities and it is difficult to write here all of them. Major achievements in Ainaro are as follows;

- 21 demonstration plots for upland farming are established
- 8 commercial tree nurseries are organised, which have general revenue
- 6 demonstration plots for lowland farming are implemented
- Various capacity building training on extension facilitators and village facilitators have been organised
- Regular chicken vaccinations, hygiene, nutrition and housing are implemented in 11 villages
- Establishment of ACTC (Ainaro Community Training Centre)
- Community baseline survey, PRA is implemented
- 13 SAGs (Self Affinity Groups) are formed

RESPECT is a UNDP project. It started in May 2003 for a two year project. Its aim is to support vulnerable groups of society, including ex-combatants, disabled, widows, jobless youths and other community inhabitants, with employment and skill development and other livelihood opportunities. The programme comprises three main components: agricultural development and reforestation,

infrastructure rehabilitation, and vocational training and micro-enterprise development (UNDP, 2002b and 2004b). So far all 17 Ainaro district level projects had been implemented and accomplished. The list of 17 projects is as follows (See table 3-1);

**Table 3-1 Ainaro District Project for RESPECT**

Sub-district	Project Name	No. of Employees	Amount(US\$)	Beneficiaries
Hato-Udo	Fence for water resources	20	4,506	4 aldeia
	Fence for water resources	20	2,500	4 aldeia
	Open new road	100	7,400	1 aldeia
	Build a bridge	40	7,369	1 sub-district
	Bridge rehabilitation		6,698	
Ainaro	Road rehabilitation	44	7,387	3 aldeia
	Community centre rehabilitation	10	5,600	1 suco
	Open new road	35	5,285	1 suco
	Water supply rehabilitation	10	3,964	3 aldeia
	Water supply rehabilitation	22	5,844	1 aldeia
	Community centre rehabilitation	20	7,316	1 suco
	Cede Suco construction		9,224	1 suco
	Drainage rehabilitation		4,968	
Hato-Builico	Bridge rehabilitation	20	5,592	3 aldeia
	Reforestation	250	3,445	1 suco
	Open new market	25	5,568	1 sub-district
Maubisse	Water supply rehabilitation	-	7,334	3 aldeia

(Source: RESPECT, 2004)

The road construction has started in October 2004 until March 2006. Compared with these two projects, the aim of road construction project is quite simple – to promote development of the area by constructing roads between Dili, Ainaro and Cassa. At the time of writing the report in February 2005, roads have been measured and levelled. The compound for its office as well as the accommodation of staff was established in Ainaro. Rehabilitation of channels beside the roads has been implemented in many places.

### **3-2-3 Implementation Process: implementation structure, relationship with local communities etc.**

Each project has its own implementation structure. The principle implementation body of AMCAP Ainaro<sup>32</sup> is at PCU (Project Coordination Unit) in Ainaro, which consisted of a national project coordinator as the head, national assistant project coordinator and 2 international UNVs

<sup>32</sup> AMCAP Manatuto has different operation system. In this report the another only discuss the case of Ainaro.

(the United Nations Volunteers)<sup>33</sup>. Under PCU, there are 7 extension facilitators and 7 TOT members as regular local staff of AMCAP. Under their supervision, there are 97 village volunteer facilitators<sup>34</sup>. UNOPS Dili supports administration matters and supervises the project. The key persons of the project are extension facilitators, TOT members and village facilitators, who directly work with communities. Their relationship with communities seems relatively good. More active approaches and commitments from them are highly required in the project. MAFF (The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery) is the counterpart of the project. However, small number of MAFF staff and their poor equipments at the ground level in Ainaro cause the anxiety toward the sustainability of activities in the future. The principle decision-making body of RESPECT district level projects is at DRC (District RESPECT Committee), which consists of local community leaders, such as the district administrator (DA), Community Development Officers (CDOs), sub-district chiefs and suco (village) chiefs<sup>35</sup>. RESPECT staff are in relatively small number and they assist and supervise DRC. The relationship of each community leader with their community and their capacity has a lot of influences on each project. The concern is that local power structure might affect on the decision making of each project design and implementation, although there are many members in DRC and the influence could not be so big. The project should have established a particular third party in order to check and justify each project. Despite the information campaigns, a particular project which community people see in their community leads the people to establish the image of RESPECT. This might have caused that the projects in Ainaro do not have much variety and concentrate on infrastructure rehabilitation. While AMCAP and RESPECT are basically run by Timorese nationals, the primary responsibility of the road construction project is on the outsider, Tobishima construction company. The relationship with local communities is basically on employment basis - employer and employee relationship. The active commitment with local communities cannot be seen, although the project has close relationship with the Ministry of Public Works.

#### **3-2-4 Efficiency/Impact**

Since AMCAP started in 2002, about 2 million US dollars has been spent on the project. Compared with the cost spent and the technical assistances the project have achieved, the efficiency of the project could be still low. AMCAP has about 30 local employees in Ainaro. In addition to each activity, AMCAP has provided many opportunities of work and capacity building for local residents. This could be counted as positive impact. Whether the project could create a long term positive impact among communities depends on the work of community workers, especially extension facilitators, TOT members and village volunteer facilitators. In other words the project has the potential to create considerable impact on communities. More active approaches

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<sup>33</sup> There used to be three international UNVs in AMCAP Ainaro. At the time of writing in March 2005, all of them left and another two international UNVs were working under the project.

<sup>34</sup> There are 21 suco (villages) in Ainaro. Each suco has 4-5 village volunteer facilitators for particular activity of nursery, reforestation, farming, livestock and women.

<sup>35</sup> There are two levels of projects in RESPECT: national and district level projects. In this paper I will discuss only district level projects implemented in Ainaro.

and commitments from them are highly required. Considering the cost of each project in RESPECT, which is not so high and an aspect of the project as QIP (Quick Impact Project), the efficiency could be evaluated positively. On the other hand, how each facility established could contribute effectively on the development of the community in the future should be studied and the results should be taken into account for the future activities in each area. The project aim of road construction is quite clear. Once the road is rehabilitated, its aim is accomplished. In this sense, the project is cost effective. On the other hand, it seems the economic effects on communities after the completion of project is not high. In this sense, the effectiveness is low, while the project requires a huge amount of money.

### **3-2-5 Effectiveness**

At the project sites of each activity of AMCAP, the technical support has achieved a certain level of success, especially in nursery groups and regular chicken vaccinations. On the other hand, there are so many activities going on in AMCAP and it is quite difficult to know what exactly happens in each activity. The project lacks an information sharing system, because everybody is busy on their own activities. In addition, most of the reports, which are prepared by UNDP cooperated with UNOPS such as quarterly report and an annual progress report, are not used as a reflective tool geared to improving the project implementation on the ground. This reduces the effectiveness of the project. In RESPECT, in regard to the aim of providing employment for vulnerable groups, a certain level of effectiveness is achieved, although the project only creates the short term employment. On the other hand, more consideration should have been made in the identification of vulnerable groups, which are identified in local communities themselves. This is because, especially in rural areas, there might be a possibility that employment opportunities might have been used in favour of local leaders or driven under the kinship relations. In every community along the roads, the road construction project employs thousands of local community people. In this sense, the project is effective in communities. The aim of the project is simple. Therefore the effectiveness could be examined by how the project moves smoothly in the planned budget and project term.

### **3-2-6 Sustainability**

Currently most of the activities heavily depend on AMCAP budget. Based on community activation approach & strategies, whereby the poor organise themselves into social affinity based Self-Reliant Groups (Munsoor, 2004), all activities should be linked up in order to maintain and expand what its technical support creates in communities. All the RESPECT projects in Ainaro are construction projects, such as building roads, community centres and rehabilitation of water supply systems. Therefore once the construction is completed, sustainability cannot be an issue. However, maintenance of each construction should be considered by assisting local government and communities through the possible future development assistance in each area. For the road construction, it depends on how well the government of Timor-Leste and the Ministry of Public Works can maintain the roads. Some considerations from the side of Japan will also be required for

the maintenance of the roads.

### **3-2-7 Challenges**

There are challenges at every level of implementation of the project in AMCAP. At the ground level, currently many activities are going on separately. Each activity lacks communication because everybody is busy on his/her activity. The passive attitude of community workers should also be transformed through the on-going capacity building training strategy. At the higher level, the administration system of UNOPS, which requires an approval for every activity from regional office in Bangkok and which causes delays in procurement necessary materials and payments, restricts the implementation of each activity in quite a limited way. UNOPS Dili should have more authority to control and supervise each activity. All the projects of RESPECT in Ainaro have been accomplished. Now the arrangement of the final payment is on process. Therefore, there is not much to say for the implementation at this stage. The experience and lessons learned through the project should be documented and shared among the development aid stakeholders in order to utilise the experience effectively in the future development plan and implementation. Like any other ODA (Official Development Assistance) project, this road construction project takes the self-sustained way of implementation. It has less commitment with communities. While this might not be a big issue for the project itself it could be asked, is it the only way or best way to implement the project. However, considering the ideology of development assistance, the project should consider how the project impacts on communities and how well the project contributes to the overall development of the project area.

### **3-2-8 Relation with Promoting the Reconciliation and Peacebuilding Process**

Promoting reconciliation is one of the objectives of AMCAP<sup>36</sup>. Although there is not particular consideration for this issue in implementation of each activity, most of the local staff are from the local communities of Ainaro. Therefore, it seems they have their own measures in choosing the activity sites. They tend to choose the place with less problems of reconciliation and communication among residents. It seemed that RESPECT planned to take a part in the peacebuilding process of the country, especially in DDR (Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration) of ex-combatants at the beginning<sup>37</sup>. However, at the project planning stage it was recognised that unemployment issue is not only for the ex-combatants but also for the wider

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<sup>36</sup> Project proposal of AMCAP (2001) states that the project assists in key aspects of community development, including healthcare, post-trauma community reconciliation and women's empowerment. These components combined together, with overriding focus on improved agricultural production and environmental restoration, will promote food security and livelihood of the rural poor.

<sup>37</sup> Project proposal of RESPECT (2002) states about the need to assist ex-combatants in programme justification as follows; The ex-combatants and the resistance network members comprise a large part of the society... A reintegration programme...has now ceased and those who were not given the opportunity to join the new defence force and the police...could pose a threat to the stability of the country... They have the potential to influence or mobilise unemployed youths, low-income rural communities and unsatisfied individuals to provoke social disturbances and unrest which could lead instability.

populations. The dissatisfaction and sensitivity towards the idea of DDR was also identified in society. Furthermore the definition of ex-combatants was not set by the government of Timor-Leste and it was difficult for UNDP alone to establish the definition, therefore ex-combatants turned out to be as a part of vulnerable groups, which were identified by each community itself in RESPECT projects. As a result, projects focused on community development as QIP (Quick Impact Project), especially at the district level<sup>38</sup>. Compared with these two projects, the road construction project does not have any relation with promoting reconciliation and the peacebuilding process. It is designed as a development project. In the implementation, especially in employing the local workers, the project has some problems. In the process of problem solving, the consideration of the past history of the particular community must be required.

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<sup>38</sup> RESPECT staff interviewed told that at the district level projects focus on community development, while projects focus on the issue of ex-combatants and peacebuilding at national level (interviewed by the author on Sep. 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2004).

**Table 3-2 Comparative Study of Three Development Aid Projects in Ainaro**

Issue	AMCAP (Ainaro)	RESPECT (Ainaro)	Road Construction
Project Aim	To increase food security and incomes of poor households on an environmentally sustainable basis, using community focused participatory methodologies.	To support vulnerable groups of society, including ex-combatants, disabled, widows, jobless youths and other community inhabitants, with employment and skill development and other livelihood opportunities.	To promote development of the area by constructing roads between Dili, Ainaro and Cassa.
Project Term	2002.01 –2006.12	2003.05 –2005.05	2004.10 – 2006.03
Funding Organisation	UNDP Trust Fund for Human Security (The government of Japan)	The government of Japan	The government of Japan
Field of Work	Agriculture (Reforestation, Nursery, Upland & Lowland farming and Livestock improvement)	Grants for the projects in the field of agriculture, infrastructure and vocational training	Construction of roads Dili – Ainaro – Cassa
Budget (US\$)	5 million (for both Ainaro and Manatuto districts)	4 million (for national level projects) 100,000 (for Ainaro district level projects)	13,920,000
Principle Decision Making Body	PCU (Project Coordination Unit)	DRC organised by community leaders (for district level projects)	Tobishima Construction Co. Ltd. (Japanese construction company)
Implementation Structure			



Issue	AMCAP (Ainaro)	RESPECT (Ainaro)	Road Construction
Beneficiaries	Vulnerable farmers and household in Ainaro and Manatuto districts.	Vulnerable groups of society, including ex-combatants, disabled, widows and unemployed youths.	Inhabitants along the roads Dili – Ainaro – Cassa
Performance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-21 demonstration plots for upland farming</li> <li>-8 tree commercial nurseries</li> <li>-6 demonstration plots for lowland farming</li> <li>-various capacity building trainings on extension facilitators and village volunteer facilitators</li> <li>-Regular chicken vaccinations, hygiene and nutrition in 11 villages</li> <li>-Establishment of ACTC</li> <li>-PRA</li> <li>-13 SAGs are formed</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-17 district projects in Ainaro have been accomplished.</li> <li>[17 Ainaro District Projects]</li> <li>-2 fences for water resources</li> <li>-3 rehabilitation/ building of road</li> <li>-3 rehabilitation/ building of bridge</li> <li>-3 community centre rehabilitation</li> <li>-3 water supply rehabilitation</li> <li>-1 reforestation</li> <li>-1 opening new market</li> <li>-1 drainage rehabilitation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Measurement of the roads</li> <li>-Levelling of the roads</li> <li>-Rehabilitation of channel beside the roads</li> <li>-Establishment of the office and accommodation in Ainaro</li> </ul>
Relationship with Local Communities and Other Organisations	The key persons are extension facilitators, TOT members and village volunteer facilitators. Although their relationship with communities is relatively good, their passive attitude on work, which depends on the project coordinator and international UNVs should be transformed. MAFF is the counterpart of the project. However, small number of MAFF staff and their poor equipments at the ground level in Ainaro cause the anxiety toward the sustainability of activities in the future.	The key persons for district projects are community leaders, who consist of DRC. Their relationship with their community and their capacity influences a lot on each project. The concern is that local power structure might affect on the decision making of each project design and implementation. The project should have established a particular third party in order to check and justify each project.	The relationship with local communities is basically on employment basis - employer and employee relationship. The active commitment with local communities cannot be seen, although the project has close relationship with the Ministry of Public Works.

Issue	AMCAP (Ainaro)	RESPECT (Ainaro)	Road Construction
Relevance	<p>Rehabilitation and development of agricultural sector is highly required in the situation that majority of the population depend on agriculture for their livelihood. Thus the project has a high level of relevance. The range of targeted beneficiaries is large. The identification of vulnerable residents should be carefully examined and justified in each activity.</p>	<p>High unemployment rate has been one of the serious concerns in the country. Thus the project has a certain level of relevance. The range of targeted beneficiaries is large. The identification of vulnerable residents should be carefully examined and justified in each activity.</p>	<p>Considering the aspect of road as a public utility, the project bears a certain level of relevance, although it requires high cost and economic development of the area could not be expected a lot through this road rehabilitation.</p>
Effectiveness	<p>The technical support has achieved a certain level of success. There are so many activities going on in AMCAP and it is quite difficult to know what exactly happens on each activity. The project lacks the information sharing system. More careful design and implementation of each activity is highly required. In addition, most of the reports prepared are not reflected well for the better implementation on the ground. It reduces the effectiveness of the project.</p>	<p>In the aim of providing employments, it has a certain level of effectiveness, although the projects only create the short term employments. On the other hand, more consideration should have been made in the identification of vulnerable groups, which are identified in local communities themselves in order to prevent the possibility that employment opportunities might have been used in favour of local leaders.</p>	<p>In every community along the roads, the project employs local community people. In this sense, the project is effective in communities. The aim of the project is simple. Therefore the effectiveness could be examined by how the project move smoothly in the planned budget and project term.</p>
Efficiency	<p>Since the project started in 2002, about 2 million US dollars have been spent on the project. Compared with the cost spent and the technical assistance the project achieved, the efficiency of the project could be still low. More active approaches and commitments are highly required from community workers.</p>	<p>Considering the cost of each project, which is not so high and an aspect of project as QIP, the efficiency could be evaluated positively. On the other hand, how each facility established could contribute effectively on the development of the community in the future should be studied and the results should be taken into account for the future activities in each area.</p>	<p>Once the road is rehabilitated, its aim is accomplished. In this sense, the project is cost effective. On the other hand, it seems the economic effects on communities after the completion of project is not high. In this sense, the effectiveness is low, while the project requires a huge amount of money.</p>

Issue	AMCAP (Ainaro)	RESPECT (Ainaro)	Road Construction
Impact	<p>For the project to create a long term impact among communities depends on the work of community workers. The project has a possibility to create considerable impact on communities.</p>	<p>Consideration for the maintenance and how to use facilities efficiently of each project are required in order to create longer term impact in each community.</p>	<p>Road is a fundamental infrastructure. Therefore the project creates good impact on communities along the road by providing better transportation and communication. On the other hand, the impact on local and national economy could not be big as the result of the project.</p>
Sustainability	<p>Currently most of the activities heavily depend on AMCAP budget. Based on community activation approach &amp; strategies, all the activities should be linked up in order to maintain and expand what its technical supports create in communities.</p>	<p>All the projects in Ainaro are construction projects. Therefore once the construction completed, sustainability cannot be an issue. However, maintenance of each construction should be considered by assisting local government and communities.</p>	<p>It depends on how well the government of Timor-Leste and the Ministry of Public Works could maintain the roads. Some considerations from the side of Japan will be also required for the maintenance of the roads.</p>
Challenges	<p>At the ground level, currently many activities are going on separately. Each activity lacks communication. At the higher level, administration system of UNOPS restricts the implementation of each activity in quite limited way.</p>	<p>All the projects are accomplished. Now the arrangement of the final payment is on process. Therefore, there is not much to say for the implementation at this stage. The experience and lessons learned through the project should be documented and shared among the development aid stakeholders.</p>	<p>It has less commitment with communities. This might not be a big issue for the project itself. However, considered the ideology of development assistance, the project should consider how the project affects on communities and how well the project contributes to the overall development of the project area.</p>
Relation with Promoting Reconciliation and Peacebuilding Process	<p>Promoting reconciliation is one of the objectives of AMCAP. Although there is not particular consideration for this issue in implementation, most of the local staff are from the local communities. Therefore, it seems they have their own measures in choosing the activity sites.</p>	<p>The project was planned to take a part in DDR of ex-combatants at the beginning. However, at the project planning stage ex-combatants turned out to be as a part of vulnerable groups, which were identified by each community itself because of various factors. As a result, projects focused on community development as QIP, especially at the district level.</p>	<p>It does not have any relation with promoting reconciliation and peacebuilding process. In employing the local workers, the project has some problems. In the process of problem solving, the consideration on the past history of particular community must be required.</p>

### **3-3 Development Aid Project and the Process of National Reconciliation and Peacebuilding**

This section will discuss how the development aid project could or should promote the process of reconciliation and peacebuilding in post-conflict communities based on the lessons learned from the current situation of communities and project circumstances implemented in Ainaro.

In chapter 2 we saw the situation of local communities which contain a high level of frustration and recognised the potential for improving the circumstances through development aid projects. On the other hand, however, in the last section we saw the reality of development aid projects that do not have the time to consider the reconciliation and peacebuilding process of communities, because each project itself possesses the challenges and difficulties in its implementation at the ground. How can we fill the gap between these realities? There might be no clear answer for this. However, I believe that each project has a high potential to promote the reconciliation and peacebuilding process. The question is how this could be achieved. I feel that the promotion of the reconciliation and peacebuilding process should not be emphasised a lot in projects. Considering the fragility of society and high sensitivity among people, the soft manner which aims co-existence of inhabitants should be applied in projects rather than directly aiming to promote reconciliation in order not to cause negative impact through the activities. Several recommendations could be made at the each stage of a project.

At the stage of project planning, detailed research about the project areas, communities and people should be conducted on the ground. This is because written data is often not reliable enough and does not show the real situation or does not follow the frequent changes of fragile societies. Each project should consider the peacebuilding process including the reconciliation process, for example taking into consideration the gender point of view. There is a need in planning a comprehensive project that involves or at least anticipates the future of a wider area to consider the national policy of the country. For example, in Maubisse town, Ainaro district, the water supply system has totally collapsed because of the lack of comprehensive project planning as well as the lack of leadership on this issue. In Maubisse several NGOs came to assist building water tanks after independence without considering the water supply system for the whole town. As a result, each tank is the possession of “the owner” and this makes connections to the water supply system quite complicated and produces chronic water problems, although there is a huge amount of water there. Before planning any project in war affected communities, the area, people living there, culture, traditions and power structure should also be carefully examined. At the implementation stage, each project should consider the fragility of post-conflict communities and pay careful attention to small changes or divisions in each community. A local NGO which has been working on community reconciliation, Yayasan HAK told me three important points required for outsiders to work in communities – sensitivity, openness and neutrality. Sensitivity is the sympathy toward the past tragedy as well as the current division within and beyond communities. Openness is the way of

work when all the information is shared with all the people in the project sites. Neutrality is the stance not to take a part in divisions of each community. It is also important to make good use of the opportunities of regular monitoring or ongoing evaluation, to identify each projects relation with the peacebuilding and reconciliation process. And especially in the communities of Timor-Leste, which consist of a small number of people in a small area, development aid projects should take the role of bridging communities through giving them opportunities to interact each other<sup>39</sup>. This could be the first step of mutual understanding. At the evaluation stage, each project should include the indicators to assess how the project has contributed to the process of reconciliation and peacebuilding process. Sustainability of each project should be carefully considered as well.

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<sup>39</sup> In divided societies, efforts to foster inter-community relations, including trade, information exchanges, and dialogue can play an important role in defusing inter-community tensions, breaking down long-standing social barriers, and fostering tolerance and understanding (OECD, 2001: 121).

## Conclusion

In chapter 1 we saw an example of community in Timor-Leste, which has a great variety of characteristics. People obtain the small sense of community based on their kinship. There are often no community leaders who could unite the whole community beyond the kinship. In addition, even in the same community, each family and each person has different experiences of Indonesian occupation and the violence following the referendum in 1999. This fact adds each community further complexity and division. In chapter 2 we saw there was a huge gap between the national level and the community level on reconciliation. The government stance of “unity and forgiveness” and its effort in establishing the first step of reconciliation was widely accepted and evaluated positively. However, the government soon faced the reality that real justice cannot be met because of the internal politics of Indonesia. While the government motivation on reconciliation seems to be toned down now in front of so many challenges for the nation-building, what we identified from the cases of Cassa and Manutasi as an example of community is the existence of high sensitivities between the ex pro-autonomy side and ex pro-independence side, and substantial growing frustration because of the difficulties in sustaining livelihoods among the people. It seems that the growing psychological gap between the capital Dili and remote areas causes distance between the central government and people in rural areas. This raises anxiety about the future reconciliation process as well as the process of sustainable nation-building. Under these circumstances, a possibility was identified in each development aid project to promote the reconciliation and peacebuilding process through reducing or/and minimising the frustration, especially in rural areas. Nevertheless, the reality of development projects at the ground level as described in chapter 3 showed the difficulties of operating daily activities of the projects. This is because the development work itself is such a difficult task to do. The features and complexities of war-affected communities add the task even more difficult. Consideration of promoting reconciliation and peacebuilding is an extra hard work for project implementers at the ground. Under these realities, how the development aid project could promote the reconciliation and peacebuilding process? I feel that the promotion of the reconciliation and peacebuilding process should not be emphasised a lot in development projects, although all projects implemented in war-affected communities should contain the view toward reconciliation and peacebuilding in the project strategies. Considering the fragility of society and high sensitivity among people, the soft manner which aims co-existence of inhabitants should be applied in projects implementation rather than directly aiming to promote reconciliation in order not to cause negative impact through the activities. Sensitivity, openness and neutrality should be always kept in minds among development aid workers as the basic working stances in communities. Regular monitoring or evaluation could be used as opportunities to identify each projects relation with the peacebuilding and reconciliation process. There are multiple ways in promoting the reconciliation and peacebuilding process. Each activity could contribute the process even in a limited way. Further study and research should be conducted on the projects which focus on the promotion of reconciliation in order to discuss the way the projects could contribute

reconciliation more.

In order to promote further reconciliation in Timor-Leste, several points should be recognised. Firstly, in Timor-Leste there is a traditional culture that seeks unity and harmony within a community rather than clarifying the justice and punishing the criminals in order not to maintain grudge. It is clearly seen in the work of traditional conflict mediator, Lian Nain. Therefore each community itself has potentials to promote the reconciliation. This culture should be recognised for the future reconciliation. Secondly, there is a great need of establishing identity as a nation of Timor-Leste among the people. The current sense of small identity based on the kinship could deepen the division among the people and prevent further reconciliation. It might be difficult for each project to address this issue. However, each project should take a role of bridging the communities and people through various activities, and promote to establish the wider sense of identity, which could unite beyond the kinship. Third, the gap and psychological distance between the capital Dili and rural areas should be minimised. In rural areas the concern and frustration about the centralisation of government administration and development in Dili are growing, although the government does not intend to do so. Much more attention should be paid in rural areas.

There are several things we could learn from the reconciliation challenges in Timor-Leste; First of all reconciliation is such a difficult task at every level. At the national level it is affected heavily by international relations. It is difficult for a small and fragile war-affected country, like Timor-Leste to influence international relations. At the community level, the reconciliation process is closely connected with the process of nation building, therefore it is difficult to assess or evaluate the reconciliation process by itself. On the other hand, the reconciliation process can be evaluated through the relationship with the nation building process. Secondly, the situation of reconciliation is quite different between war-affected countries and even between communities within a country, because each country, each community and each person has different experiences from each conflict and has different culture, and traditions. Thus at the national level each war-affected country should establish its own purpose, strategy and process on reconciliation as well as for nation building. At the community level, it is essential to recognise the different situations of each community. A flexible system needs to be designed and established to promote reconciliation under different circumstances and to meet the needs of each community based on its own situation. Thirdly, reconciliation requires long term processes and it can only be established by community people by their own desire. In addition, all projects face many difficulties on the ground in conflict-affected communities. Therefore it can be said that reconciliation should not be emphasised a lot in each project. However, each project in conflict-affected communities should be examined well from the view of reconciliation and peacebuilding process at each stage of a project.

Japan is one of the biggest donor in Timor-Leste. People very much appreciate the huge contribution from Japan. Massive assistance to Timor-Leste shows the stance of Japan which is eager to take an important role in post-war reconstruction. However, its assistance lacks

comprehensive strategy as “Japan” among a huge number of projects. Japan has many channels of providing assistance. Each channel has its own strategy and approaches of assistance. It seems that information sharing and communication cannot be systematised well among these channels. This leads the lack of consistency on Japanese assistance on the ground. For instance, the three projects described in chapter 3 are all funded by Japan. Although the degree of Japanese involvement differs one by one, local people as well as other international partners of assistance recognise that all the projects represent the government of Japan; its desire, aim and objectives. Under this circumstance, however, we cannot see any comprehensive strategy of Japan towards the reconstruction and peacebuilding of Timor-Leste among these three projects. This not only reduces the efficiency of assistance compared with the huge amount of money spent, but also confuses the recipient country, people on the ground and international partners of assistance what the government of Japan wants to do through these assistance. Specifically, in the projects which have international intermediate organisations such as AMCAP and RESPECT, there is not organised reporting system between implementing organisation and Japan. It causes frustration and confusion for both sides. In both projects, there are some commitments of Japanese personnel at various levels of the projects. However, this does not mean that the projects reflect the intention of Japanese government. The government of Japan should establish the protocol for reporting in each project funded in order to have better assistance as a donor as well as to conduct better activities on the ground.



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## Appendixes

### Appendix 1: List of Suco and Aldeia in Ainaro District

Sub-district	Suco	no.	Aldeia
Ainaro (7 suco)	Ainaro	7	Ainaro, Nugupu, Teliga, Builico, Hatomera, Lugatu, Sabagulau
	Cassa	5	Mau-suca, Boltama, Lai-lima, Sivil, Quesamau
	Mau Nuno	3	Mamalau, Aileu, Mau-sica
	Mau Ulo	5	Mau-ulupu, Mau-ululau, Hatulelo, Hatulau, Dagamesa
	Soro	4	Guar-udo, Ter-lola, Poelau, Leo-lala
	Manutasi	4	Hatumetaulu, Kanudu, Bauhatulau, Rebuitudu
	Soro Craic	4	Basar, Ailau, Riamori, No-ulu
Hato Udo (2 suco)	Leolima	11	Nunuboco, Raisoro, Hatseo, Soro-craic, Goulau, Groto, Luru, dausur, Aimerleu, Lesse, Bonuk
	Beikala	6	Ainaro-kik, Raimerlau, Baha, Ailora, Lebumera, Lessu
Hato Builico (3 suco)	Nuno moge	8	Nunomogelau, Hato-serakei, lebulau, tukaro-koiloko, hato-builico, Ceorema, Mausou Ramata, Laqueco
	Mauxiga	5	Mauxiga, Hatocero, Goulora, Leo-telo1, Leo-telo2
	Mulo	8	Mulo(Dare), Tatiri, Hautio, aituto, Manumera, Maulafulu, Blehetu, Guerudu
Maubisse (9 suco)	Maubisse	12	Liquitei, Hatufae, Telituku, Hatululi, kanumera, Koulala, rimori, urahou, Rileku, Sarlala, Maubisse, Hautadu
	Aituto	9	Lientuto, Ruslau, Goulolo, Aihou, Hatubiti, Maulefo, Lebotutu, Betulala, Airakalau
	Horai Kiik	4	Lauheli, Hatusao, Coumera, Cartolo
	Maulau	10	Usoluli, Lacamalica, Tarabula, hahimau, Aihosan, Malaria, hatulete, hatucade, Rita, Lumoluli
	Fatubessi	6	Hohulu,, Titibauria, Tutufili, Kaitara, Raebutilau, Casimedei
	Edi	6	Lobibo, Raimera, Demotete, Talitelo, Talale, Hebau
	Liulai	4	Rebean, Bertai, Hohonaro, Maumude
	Manetu	7	Kirikoli, Maulai, Hahitali, Leoboluli, Rusurau, Daulelo, Borulu
	Manelobas	4	Ernaro, kotomatan, Hautei, Hautilo

(Source: the author)

## **Appendix 2: List of People Interviewed in Selected Field Research**

Community (Suco) Person Interviewed

Visited

Cassa (17-20 Sep. 2004) Cassa Suco chief, Lailima aldeia chief, Quesemane aldeia chief, Local police officer based in Cassa, Community residents in Boltama, Mau-suca, Lai-lima and Civil aldeia

Manutasi (20-22 Oct. 2004) Hatumetaudu aldeia chief, Bahatelau aldeia chief, Community residents in Hatumetaudu, Bahatelau and Kanudu aldeia

(Source: the author)

### Appendix 3: List of Organisations or Projects Visited

	Name of Organisation/ Project	Field of Work	Location of Interview/ Investigation
UN Agencies	RESPECT (UNDP)	Creation of employment	Dili, Ainaro
	AMCAP (UNOPS)	Agriculture	Dili, Ainaro
International NGOs	CONCERN	Water and Sanitation	Dili
	CARE	Water and Sanitation	Dili
	PARC	Coffee production	Aianro
	CRS	Agriculture, Peace and Reconciliation, and Civil education	Dili, Ainaro
	GTZ	Small business promotion, Micro credit	Dili, Ainaro
Local NGOs	Yayasan HAK	Human rights, Reconciliation and Justice	Dili, Ainaro
	Moris Rasik	Micro Credit	Ainaro
	Fokpers	Women/ Gender	Dili
	GFFTL	Women/ Gender	Dili
	Kuna Buka Hatene	Women/ Gender	Dili
Others	CAVR	Reconciliation / Justice	Dili
	Suco Election Commission	Conduct suco election	Dili
	OMT	Women/ Gender	Ainaro
	OPMT	Women/ Gender	Ainaro
	Tobishima Construction Co. Ltd.	Road construction	Ainaro, Dili
Individuals	Government official	-	Dili
	Ainaro District Administrator	-	Ainaro
	Liulai Tais Metan	One of a traditional king	Ainaro
	Beluloko Lia Nain	A traditional conflict mediator	Ainaro

(Source: the author)

## Appendix 4: The List of Questions Asked

1. Questions about General Living Condition and Personal/Family History (Chiefs/ Community Residents)
  - 1-1 How many family members do you have?
  - 1-2 Do you have a job? / What is the source of livelihood?
  - 1-3 Where were you staying during the Indonesian occupation? How did you stay?
  - 1-4 Where were you when violence happened in 1999? How did you survive?
  - 1-5 What did you see in 1999 violence?
  - 1-6 Where did you live after 1999?
  - 1-7 Since independence in 2002, are there any changes or development on your living condition? If any, how and in which way?
  - 1-8 What are the difficulties of living?
  - 1-9 How do you feel about the international assistance in this country?
  
2. Questions about the Work of Community Leader and the Community (Suco chiefs/ Aldeia chiefs)
  - 2-1 Are you elected as the chief?
  - 2-2 What are the difficulties of the work as a chief?
  - 2-3 What are the problems of the community here?
  - 2-4 Are or were there any organisations working in the community?
  - 2-5 If there are/were, what kinds of work are/ were they?
  - 2-6 How is the attitude of community people toward your work as a chief? Are they cooperative or not?
  - 2-7 Do you stand for the next suco election as a candidate?
  - 2-8 Do you think it is good to have suco election?
  
3. Questions about Reconciliation (Chiefs/ Community Residents/ Organisations)
  - 3-1 Are there any sensitivities between ex pro-independent side and ex pro-autonomy side in the community?
  - 3-2 After 2 years of independence, are there any improvement on community reconciliation in your community?
  - 3-3 How do you think about the reconciliation programmes conducted by various organisations, such as CAVR and Yayasan HAK?
  - 3-4 What is required to promote further reconciliation at the community level?
  - 3-5 Do you think the development programmes could promote the reconciliation? If yes, why?
  - 3-6 It is clear that there is the certain level of limitation on justice. What do you see the connection between justice and reconciliation?

4. Questions about the organisation and its activities (Organisations)
  - 4-1 When did the organisation start working in Timor-Leste? / When was the organisation established?
  - 4-2 How many staff do you have?
  - 4-3 What kind of activities do you have? And where do you work?
  - 4-4 Do you have donors?
  - 4-5 Did you or do you have any difficulties to have activities in the field? If yes, what were/are the difficulties?
  - 4-6 During the activities in communities, did you see any difficulties or concern relating to reconciliation in the communities?
  
5. Questions about security (Chiefs/ Community Residents/ Police officers)
  - 5-1 Are there any security threats in the community?
  - 5-2 How many martial arts groups are there in the community?
  - 5-3 How many martial arts group members do you have in each group in the community?
  - 5-4 Are they (martial arts groups) active in the community?
  - 5-5 How do they affect to the people and the security of the community here?

## Appendix 5: Major Projects Implemented in Ainaro District

UN Agencies

Project Name	Implementing Organisation		Budget (US\$)	Project Term	Field of Work	Goals/ Objectives	Actual Activities
	Funding Donor						
CEP (The Community Empowerment and Local Governance Project)	The World Bank		18 million (for whole country)	2000.02 – 2003.12 (Completed)	Grants and Credit for various projects	- To provide a model for democratic, and transparent forum to increase community participation in the planning and decision-making process of development issues at the hamlet and village level	- Reconstruct the basic infrastructure - Support local economic activities - Establishment of village development council
AMCAP (Ainaro and Manatuto Community Activation Project)	UNOPS/ UNDP		5 million (for both Ainaro and Manatuto districts)	2002.01 – 2006.12	Agriculture	- To increase food security and incomes of poor households in Ainaro and Manatuto districts on an environmentally sustainable basis, using community focused participatory methodologies	- Reforestation - Nursery - Upland & Lowland farming - Livestock vaccination
	Japanese government (through UNDP Human Security Fund)						
RESPECT (Recovery, Employment and Stability Programme for Ex-combatants and Communities in Timor Leste)	UNDP		4 million (for national level projects) 100,000 (for Ainaro district level projects)	2003.05 – 2005.05	Grants for various projects	- To provide both short and medium/long term employment and sustainable livelihood opportunities to vulnerable groups of society, including ex-combatants, widows, unemployed youths	Grants for the projects in agricultural development, reforestation, infrastructure and vocational training
	Japanese government						
Civic Education Programme	CSO (Civil Society Organisations)/ UNDP			(Completed in Ainaro)	Civic education		Education on gender, human rights and voter's right on election etc.

(Source: the author)



NGOs

NGO Name	Field of Work	Office in Ainaro	Project Term	Actual Activities
GTZ	Small business promotion, Micro credit	Maubisse	Until June 2006 (Maubisse office)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Market rehabilitation</li> <li>- Private sector development</li> <li>- Business training; how to write proposals and report, and training on accounting</li> </ul>
CARE	Water and Sanitation, Agriculture	Maubisse	Completed in Ainaro (Capacity building project is expected.)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- seed distribution to women's groups</li> <li>- PRA in Maubisse</li> <li>- TOT workshop in Dare</li> <li>- Establish water supply system in communities of Hato-Builico</li> </ul>
CONCERN	Water and Sanitation, Education on sewing	Maubisse (closed)	Completed in Ainaro	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Water and sanitation projects for 200 primary schools (water tank an toilet building)</li> <li>- Education how to use sewing machines for women's groups to assist them to run small businesses</li> </ul>
CRS	Agriculture	Ainaro	1999-emergency relief 2002-development aid	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Organising 4 community groups for agricultural activities</li> <li>- Technical support for agricultural activities</li> </ul>
PARC	Coffee plantation	Maubisse		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Assisting 6 community groups for coffee plantation and other activities like agriculture</li> <li>- Capacity building training for the community groups</li> </ul>
NGO Forum	Networking NGOs, Capacity building of NGOs	Maubisse		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Bridging NGOs, making networks among NGOs</li> <li>- Problem solving and capacity building training</li> <li>- Having monthly meeting</li> </ul>
Yayasan HAK	Human rights	Maubisse	Aug. 1996 -	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Human rights monitoring</li> <li>- Education on human rights</li> <li>- Looking for the justice for victims of violence under the Indonesian occupation and 1999 violence</li> <li>- Victims' healing</li> </ul>
Moris Rasik	Micro credit	Maubisse, Ainaro		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Forming 30 centres (groups) for micro credit in Maubisse</li> <li>- Introducing Gramine Bank system to Timor-Leste</li> </ul>
Suhurama Group	Women's rights	Maubisse	Currently there are no activities because of the lack of fund	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Education on human rights, especially for women</li> <li>- Capacity building training for women</li> </ul>

(Source: the author)

## **Appendix 6: SWOT(Strength, Weakness, Opportunity and Threat) Analysis of Current Circumstances in Timor-Leste**

### *Strength/Opportunity*

The country enjoys the full support from the international community. Many donors have paid attention to the country since 1999 violence. Total ODA received reached 219.8 million US dollars in 2002, which meant each person received 297.6 US dollars for assistance (UNDP, 2004). The international community quickly responded the violence and established the UN mission in the country. They also have been interested in assisting the rehabilitation of the country. The multi-donor Trust Fund for East Timor (TEET) was set up in 2000 to coordinate the projects among donors. Around 175 million US dollars has been committed to the fund. The massive international presence in the country contributes the maintenance of security and gives many job opportunities to the people in the UN missions and various international organisations. Detailed baseline data surveys, such as population census, have been conducted with the assistance of various international organisations since 1999.

The country also achieved substantial economic growth in 2000-2001, growing rate of over 15% per year (See table below). In time, oil and gas revenues will start to underwrite state expenditures, although there are some sensitivities and difficulties about the relationship with the government of Australia. During the stay in Timor-Leste, I saw there are a lot of potentials for business chances and economic development. Everything could be started in the “new” way for the nation building.

**Economic Indicators of Timor-Leste**

<b>Issue</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>
GDP at current price (US\$)	270m	328m	397m	394m	
Real GDP growth (%)	-35.0	15.0	17.0	3.0	
Consumer price inflation (%)	140.0	3.0	0.0	5.0	4.0
Exports of goods fob (US\$)	52m	5m	4m	6m	
Imports of goods fob (US\$)	-119m	-218m	-216m	-186m	

(Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2004)

Politically the government has been trying to establish good relationship with foreign countries. Especially the government puts considerable diplomatic effort for the improvement of relationship with Indonesia. The international diplomacy of Timor-Leste is welcomed and supported by the international community. This could be very much essential and the only way for a tiny country like Timor-Leste to sustain the country.

At the ground level, people are basically very honest, polite and hard working. Once they are given some work, they are serious on the tasks. Under the brutal oppression and tyranny of

Indonesian military force<sup>40</sup>, people had continued the fighting for the justice for a long time. People are very proud of their guerrilla war against the Indonesian occupation. When this great patience and strong will in the societies and people's minds could be transferred well for the nation-building, the future of the country will be brighter. Strong family tie keep people in the societies<sup>41</sup> and social cohesion under the Roman Catholic Church are also positive tools.

### ***Weakness/ Threat***

As the result of 1999 violence, most of the infrastructures, such as roads, water and electricity supply systems, schools, hospitals, markets were destroyed. In addition, most of the people who have special skills and techniques, such as school teachers, doctors, lawyers had returned to Indonesia and there are few Timorese people who have such skills. Unemployment rate remains very high, especially among young generations. According to a report written by Shoemith (2003:233), unemployment in the capital, Dili is around 70%. With 50% of the population below 20 years of age, the pressure for jobs is unrelenting, with around 20,000 young people joining the current labour force of just over 300,000 each year. Despite the high unemployment rate, the salary rate is very high. It is said that it reaches three times more than the rate of Indonesia. This leads the capacity building of Timorese people more difficult and affects to promote national industries, which could stand in the severe international competition.

The massive international presence, on the other hand, has exerted negative effects. First, the country heavily depends on the foreign aid in every aspect of the country. In 2002 ODA occupied 56.6% of GDP (UNDP, 2002). There is ambiguous but forthcoming anxiety toward the self-sustainability in the future. Second, the substantial economic growth in 2000-2001 was created mainly by the international presence in the country. Actually, the Economist Intelligence Unit (2004) measured that the economic growth prospects in 2004-05 are limited. Third, the massive international presence causes high consumer price in Timor-Leste. The price is substantially expensive, compared with the standards of neighbouring countries. It can be said that massive international presence promoted the economy which cannot suit to the national capacity. This divides the society into two; the people who have work and afford to buy the goods and the people who cannot afford to buy them. Forth, the attitude of some internationals, who did not respect the communities and people of Timor-Leste, created hatred toward internationals among the people. When the UN mission was established, so many internationals arrived at once to the tiny country. At the beginning almost all cars on the roads belonged to the UN. People drove the cars so fast without caring the people along the roads. Many livestock were hit and dead. Many expensive shops and restaurants, which local people cannot afford to enter were established for internationals. People even threw stones to the UN cars.

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<sup>40</sup> It is estimated that about 200,000 people (one-third of the population) were killed directly and indirectly from late 1970s until 1980s in East Timor (Furusawa, 2002:37)

<sup>41</sup> Societies were organised into social groups, united through marriages and expressing their relationship through political alliances in the form of kinship.

As mentioned above, the country now enjoys high level of security. However, the country possesses several potential threats and unclearness of security after the UN PKF mission leaves in May 2005. Externally, pro-Indonesian militia still present an irritant to the border security of Timor-Leste. Internally, the combination of poverty and unemployment poses a continuing threat to law and order. In rural areas, one of the potential sources of conflict is land tenure (Smith, 2004:279). The fighting between martial arts groups is also a big issue. At the community level, many cases of domestic violence (DV) are reported (Min. of Interior, 2004). Above all these, the political instability toward the presidential election planned in 2006 could be the biggest threat for the future security<sup>42</sup>.

There are at least two issues which could raise as political threats. Firstly, there is the opposition between followers of President Gusmão and the Alkatiri government. The politics of Timor-Leste is “semi presidential system”, which is to say that executive power lies with the majority party (FRETILIN) in Parliament (Smith, 2004). Therefore, Gusmão’s relationship with FRETILIN has become quite rocky since his inauguration over the president’s rights (Smith, 2004:280). By late 2001, the UN was also aware that the division was widening and a potentially dangerous power structure was under way (Shoesmith, 2003:246). Another threat is that there is growing frustration toward the administration of the government. When people finally achieved their long-term dream of independence and obtained the freedom, it was clear that there were a full of expectations, hopes and ambitions for the bright future. After two years of independence, they can not be kept at the same level in front of severe reality and enormous challenges for the nation-building. It seems that all these expectations turned out to be the frustration toward the government. Many people complain about the poor living condition, which people feel it becomes even worse than before and the poor capacity of the government. The government policy over languages also creates the strong frustration among the people, especially among young generation. There are some 37 dialects in Timor-Leste (Nicol, 2002:24). The government set Tetun (the language most widely used in Timor-Leste) and Portuguese as official languages, and Indonesian and English as working language (Hull, 2004). As the result, many young generations, who do not understand Portuguese cannot have the jobs in the government<sup>43</sup>. It is easily predicted that growing politically motivated small scale conflicts could occur everywhere. One local NGO I interviewed told me that all the activities with men are manipulated by local politics in the communities. In addition, President Gusmão already declared that he was not going to stand for the next presidential election in 2006. This could also escalate the political competition and create political instability in the country.

Another concerning threat for the government administration is that the government officials aims to establish centralised and “strong” government. Timor-Leste is consisted of wide variety of small communities, each of which has its own identity, root and characteristics. It is recorded that in the past there were 47 kingdoms in East Timor. Societies were organised into social groups,

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<sup>42</sup> See appendix 7: Political Parties in Timor-Leste

<sup>43</sup> It is reported that less than 5% of the population understand Portuguese.

united through marriages and expressing their relationship through political alliances in the form of kinship (Soares, 1999:34). Considered the features of Timorese societies and traditions, it seems that the centralised system cannot respond the various demands of local communities. It could promote the resistance and even uprising against the central government among rural populations. Smith (2004:279) stated the fact that a crowd was so easy to mobilise was worrying and indicative of underlying tensions towards the government, the police and foreign business.

Most of the people sustain their livelihood in agricultural activities in Timor-Leste. Nevertheless, arable lands are small, not quite fertile and soil erosion can be seen everywhere. In addition, the government concentrates on education and health sectors rather than industrial sectors, including agriculture. There is no objection that the government spends the budget on education and health sector based on National Development Plan (NDI). On the other hand, there is the certain level of anxiety on the government decision. The circumstances of agricultural sector requires immediate improvements in so many ways. It directly affects on the lives of the majority of the people. For example, the only major agricultural exports in Timor-Leste is coffee. Nevertheless, the coffee price has decreased dramatically after the independence. People used to get about 70 cents from 1kg of coffee cherries under the Indonesian rule. Now people can get only 15 cents from the same amount of coffee cherries.

## SWOT Analysis for Current Circumstances of Timor-Leste

<p><b><u>STRENGTH</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Full support is given from the international community.</li> <li>- Many donors have been interested in assisting the country.</li> <li>- The Catholic Church contributes to social cohesion and stands as the core for civil society.</li> <li>- There is the certain security all over the country.</li> <li>- Many job opportunities are given to the people in international organisation.</li> <li>- People are basically very honest, polite and hard working.</li> <li>- People achieved their long-term dream of independence and obtained the freedom of movement, talking and doing something etc.</li> <li>- People keep substantial strong family ties.</li> <li>- People are very proud of their guerrilla war against the Indonesian occupation.</li> <li>- The country achieved substantial economic growth in 2000-01.</li> <li>- There are reliable baseline data of the country since 1999.</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>WEAKNESS</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The country heavily depends on the foreign aid.</li> <li>- Lack of basic infrastructures.</li> <li>- Lack of people who have special skills or techniques, such as doctors, lawyers etc.</li> <li>- No major industries in the country.</li> <li>- High unemployment rate, especially among young generations + high rate of monthly salary.</li> <li>- Most of the populations depend on agriculture for their livelihood. However, the lands are not so fertile and soil erosion occurs everywhere.</li> <li>- High rate of domestic violence (DV) cases.</li> <li>- Communities do not have the institutional power structure.</li> <li>- People are heavily traumatised through the history of foreign occupation.</li> <li>- Confusion of national languages.</li> <li>- Consumer price is substantially high.</li> </ul>
<p><b><u>OPPORTUNITY</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- There are a lot of potentials for business chances and economic development.</li> <li>- Considerable diplomatic effort goes into the improvement of relationship with Indonesia.</li> <li>- Everything could be started in the “new” way for the nation building.</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>THREATS</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Lack of leadership, which leads a lack of responsibility.</li> <li>- People are easily agitated by a rumour.</li> <li>- High level of frustration among the people.</li> <li>- It seems that the government officials aim the centralised and strong government.</li> <li>- Security threats and unlearnness after the UN PKF mission leaves in May 2005.</li> <li>- Certain level of fear and fragility in societies towards the next presidential election in 2006.</li> <li>- People tend to see foreigners as special persons, who stand over them. (There is hatred towards foreigners?)</li> <li>- Sensitivities remain between ex pro-Independent side and ex pro-autonomy side.</li> </ul>

(Source: made by the author)

## Appendix 7: Political Parties in Timor-Leste

No.	Full Name of the Party	Abbreviation of the Name	Result of the 2001 Election	
			% of the vote by party	Seats by party
1	Partido do Povo de Timor	PPT	2.01%	2
2	Partido Democrata Cristão	PDC	1.98%	2
3	Frente Revolucionária do Timor-Leste Independente	FRETILIN	57.37%	55
4	Partido Democrata' Cristão de Timor	UDC/ PDC	-	1
5	Partido Socialista de Timor	PST	1.78%	1
6	Klibur Oan Timor Asuwain	KOTA	2.13%	2
7	Partai Democratic Maubere	PDM	-	
8	Partido Trabalhista Timorese	PTT	-	
9	Partido Democrático	PD	8.72%	7
10	Partido Nationalista Timorese	PNT	2.21%	2
11	Associação Social' Democrata Timorese	ASDT	7.84%	6
12	Partido Social Democrata	PSD	8.18%	6
13	União Democrática Rimorese	UDT	2.36%	2
14	Partido Republika Nacional Timor Leste	PARENTIL	-	
15	Partai Liberal	PL	-	1
16	Associação Popular Democrática de Timor	APODETI PRO. REF.	-	

(Source: UNTAET Independent Electoral Commission, 2001)

## Appendix 8: The UN Missions in Timor-Leste

Mission	The UN Resolution	Mandates
UNTAET	1246 (11 June 1999)	-To organise and conduct a popular consultation
INTERFET (International Force, East Timor)	September 1999	-To restore peace and security in East Timor -To protect and support UNTAET in carrying out its tasks -To facilitate humanitarian assistance operations within force capabilities
UNTAET	1272 (25 Oct. 1999) 1392(31 Jan. 2002) for extension	-To provide security and maintain law and order throughout the territory of East Timor -To establish an effective administration -To assist in the development of civil and social services -To ensure the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation and development assistance -To support capacity building for self-government -To assist in the establishment of conditions for sustainable development
UNMISSET	1410 (17 May 2002)	-To provide assistance to core administrative structures critical to the viability and political stability of East Timor -To provide interim law enforcement and public security and to assist in the development of a new law enforcement agency in East Timor, the East Timor Police Service (ETPS) -To contribute to the maintenance of the external and internal security of East Timor
UNMISSET	1543 (14 May 2004) 1573 (16 Nov. 2004) for extension	-To support for the public administration and justice system of Timor-Leste and for justice in the area of serious crimes -To support for the development of law enforcement in Timor-Leste -To support for the security and stability of Timor-Leste

(Source: <http://www.un.org>, 2004)



## Background of the Author

### Education

- Mar. 1994 Graduated from Kashiwa-minami senior high school in Chiba, Japan  
Mar. 1998 BA in Education, Department of Languages, Sapporo University, Japan  
June 2004 MA in Post-war Recovery and Development Studies, Department of Politics, The University of York, UK

### Present Post

Since Jan. 2006 Consultant of Grass-root Grant Project (GGP) for the Embassy of Japan in Angola

### Employments

- Oct. 1998 - Mar. 1999 Solidarity Worker (volunteer) in a Danish NGO called ADPP (Ajuda Dezenvolviment de Povo para Povo) in Cabinda, Angola  
Apr. 2000 – Apr. 2002 JOCV (Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteer) entitled as a Community Development Advisor in Kenya  
Oct. 2003 – Mar. 2004 Intern in Humanitarian and Development Assistance Unit, IDCJ (International Development Centre of Japan) in Tokyo, Japan  
Dec. 2003 – Jul. 2004 Junior Research Assistant in JDS (Japan Development Service) Co. LTD in Tokyo, Japan  
Jul. 2004 – Jul. 2005 UNV (the United Nations Volunteer) entitled as a Community Empowerment Advisor in AMCAP project under UNDP/UNOPS in Ainaro, Timor-Leste  
Dec. 2005 – Jan. 2006 Joined the emergency relief for the earthquake in northern Pakistan as a member of JCCP (Japan Centre for Conflict Prevention)

## 経 歴

### 学歴

- 1994年3月 千葉県立柏南高等学校卒業  
1998年3月 札幌大学外国語学部ロシア語学科卒業  
2004年7月 英国ヨーク大学政治学部戦後復興と開発修士号取得

### 現職

2006年1月～ 在アンゴラ日本大使館草の根外部委嘱員

### 職歴

- 1998年10月～1999年03月 デンマークのNGOADPP (Ajuda Dezenvolviment de Povo para Povo) に参加。アンゴラ国カビンダ州でコミュニティー開発活動に従事  
2000年04月～2002年04月 青年海外協力隊村落開発普及員としてケニア国キスム県の現地 NGO においてコミュニティー開発活動に従事  
2003年10月～2004年03月 IDCJ 東京事務所人道開発支援室でのインターン  
2003年12月～2004年07月 開発コンサルタント会社 JDS においてリサーチアシスタント  
2004年07月～2005年07月 国連ボランティア (コミュニティーエンパワーメントアドバイザー) として東ティモールアイナロ県において UNDP/UNOPS のプロジェクト (AMCAP) に従事  
2005年12月～2006年01月 日本紛争予防センター (JCCP) からパキスタン北部地震緊急援助支援に参加、カシミール州で活動