

資料 28

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# Future Direction of Aid Modalities in Africa

## Discussion Paper

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### 1. Evolution of Aid Modalities in Africa

#### Rise and Fall of Project and Program Aids

Most Western countries initiated aid programs in Africa in the 1960s in the wake of independence from former colonial states. In this period, donors encouraged African governments to plan their countries development, and urged the adoption of policies encouraging industrial growth. In the 1970s, the focus of aid shifted increasingly to poverty alleviation with a priority on projects to develop rural areas. Project aids were largely used by donors when they provided aid for infrastructure and social services especially in the 1960s, for poverty alleviation and rural development in the 1970s. By the end of the 1970s, the project aid modality was established across all sectors in the portfolios of most donors (Lancaster, 1999, p45-46). Project aid is attractive from the donors' point of view. It is highly visible to peoples both in donor and recipient countries. It is technologically straightforward, consisting of transplants of technology already available in the donor country (Mosley and Ecckhout, 2000, p133).

In the 1980s with the economic crisis in Africa and debt defaults associated with it, donors were forced to reconsider the effectiveness of project aid modality. Discourse now focused on the role of economic policies as impediments to growth and the importance of stabilization and structural adjustment reforms. In this period, donors needed an instrument that was quick-disbursing, that would bring about policy change, and that would build government capacity in Africa. Project aid could not meet these donors' needs. In this situation, for several donors, financial program aid came to occupy a growing proportion for foreign aid budgets. Foreign aid was used in large part as balance of payment support for governments committed to economic-reform programs based on a neoclassical economic vision of free markets, private investment-led growth, and minimal government intervention in the economy (Lancaster, 2000, p46).

In addition to inability to deal with the crisis situation, project aid has been criticized in terms of ownership, fragmentation, and weak impact on the sector level (World Bank, 2000, p1). According to these critics, project aid tends to be donor driven which undermines local ownership, commitment, and hence has negative effects on project sustainability. Project aid is also

likely to be fragmented, leading to uncoordinated multiplicity of aid projects, and to disperse government capacity over many small units. The concentration of attention and funds on specific projects leads to the lack of an overall view of the sector as a whole, and to the lack of sufficient attention to policy, administrative and institutional environments under which projects must operate. Furthermore, project aid tends to have weak impact on solving basic problems at the sector level. Ad hoc, enclave-type approaches ignore the lack of coherent sector policies, system and budgets. Through fungibility, project aid allows shifts in government spending to non-priority items, especially into political patronage in the case of a corrupt government (Mosley and Eeckhout, 2000, p135).

Program assistance has proved to be helpful in particular circumstances, such as emergencies. Structural adjustment operations (SALs) were able to achieve large and rapid injections of money into countries in crisis, and were particularly effective in improving balance of payments. Sectoral adjustment operations (Secals) could lead to increased expenditures for the sector concerned in some countries. However, SALs did not usually control how funds were spent within sectors, and were less effective in promoting long term sectoral objectives. Secals focused almost exclusively on increased finance for the sector, but increased financing for the sector does not necessarily mean improving sector outputs and performance (World Bank, 2001, p2).

### Reaction to a Growing Dissatisfaction

In the 1990s, because of the limitation on the extent of reforms and the continuation of low growth rates in most of Africa, donor agencies turned to look for other causes of lagging growth. Much attention was now paid to the quality of governance in African countries and the capacity of their governments to manage their economies (Lancaster, 1999, p47). Poverty alleviation and improvements in the socio-economic welfare of vulnerable households were again emphasized as the overarching objective of development. Poverty reduction – in its broader sense – measured in terms of output rather than inputs was seen as the primary goal to strive for (Thorbeck, 2000, p44). In addition to these factors, a growing dissatisfaction with both the project and program approaches has led to the rise of Sector-wide Approaches (SWAPs) and budgetary support as major aid modalities in Africa.

### Present Situation of Aid Modalities in Africa

As a result, there are at present various aid modalities used as instruments of providing aid in Africa (CIDA, 2000, p2). In stand-alone projects, donor-funded activities are outside of government's sector program. Donor funds are fed into project accounts accessed only by an intermediary agency that is accountable to the donor. In terms of SWAPs, there are basically

three types of modalities, i.e., project type aid, earmarked funds, and sector budgetary support (pooled funds). In project type aid, donor-funded activities support the government's sector framework but are managed as projects. For example, donor-funded activities rely on donor management systems, reporting, contracting, etc. In earmarked funds, donor funding supports the government's sector policy framework. Dedicated accounts are used for financing but with conditionalities or performance agreements linked to their release. In sector budgetary support, donors provide funds pooled with other donors. Although some preconditions may apply to the release of donor funds, this modality relied increasingly on common procedures, e.g., appraisal, reporting, monitoring and evaluation, and joint review processes. Unlike sector budgetary support, budgetary support is provided by donors to the government which is not linked to a specific sector program. In return, donors usually engage in policy dialogue with the government on the total budget, not just for a specific sector.

## 2. Rise of Sector-wide Approaches (SWAPs) and Budgetary Support

SWAPs are expected to address the weaknesses of project and program approaches and to achieve greater overall impact with development assistance. The main features include (World Bank, 2001, p4):

- All key donors sign on to the program. Aid coordination is made under the leadership of the recipient government with broad consultation with stakeholders.
- A comprehensive sector policy framework is formulated, which is sector-wide scope, covering all relevant areas, policies, programs, and projects. Based on an overall policy for the sector, a strategy of measures to achieve policy objectives over the medium term are formulated, which is then translated into a program of specific intervention in the near term.
- Expenditure framework is formulated including an overall expenditure program, and intrasectoral spending plan, derived from program priority. This is followed by joint reviews of actual performance against the plans, and adjustments as appropriate.
- The capacity of government is enhanced through common implementation structures and procedures (harmonization of donor procedures) and use and strengthening of government institutions, procedures, and staff.

A significant nature of SWAPs is the incorporation of two aspirations in operational terms: 1) full recipient responsibility for the framework, and for preparation and implementation of programs to be supported by donors, and 2) effective co-ordination of donor inputs into such programs (Andersen, 2000, p181). Another distinguished feature is that SWAPs emphasize process, and do not define everything in advance as does a project. The emphasis is to

track improvement over time, not to meet ex ante standards.

### Strengths and Weaknesses of SWAPs

The advantages of SWAPs are that they can deal with most of the shortcomings of project and program approaches. Activities and projects under the SWAPs cannot be fragmented, utilizing developing government institutions and procedures. It is expected that SWAPs offer scope for greater domestic ownership and provide an effective mechanism for aid coordination. Furthermore, SWAPs can combine policy reform and institutional support as well as provision of substantial budgetary funds through the selected public sector organization. In particular they can be designed to create a supportive policy environment for the delivery of services to beneficiaries, which may have wider potential impact than projects (Killick, 2000, p 245).

However, there are barriers that hinder the effective promotion of SWAPs in many countries. First, SWAPs are not appropriate in all countries (World Bank, 2000, p8). A country should have macro economic and political stability. Sector programs need adequate and stable financing which cannot be realized under conditions of high inflation or excess deficit spending. The country should have political stability because a long-term program cannot be developed or sustained in a context of rapidly changing regimes. Second, the country should have intention to take an integrated and collaborative approach and strong commitment to take leadership of the process. Third, the country must have at least the minimum level of institutional capacity to handle the development and implementation of the program. According to some observers, these preconditions for starting to develop a sector program may limit its application to a few developing countries.

Second, there are factors that work against harmonization of donors' procedures. The objective of common procedures is to reduce the administrative burden placed on the government by different procedures and from donor to donor (World Bank, 2000, p11). However, this requires donors to compromise on their own internal procedures. Harmonization can be easily achieved in areas such as reporting formats and timing, common performance indicators, joint missions, procedures and norms for technical assistance. It is difficult to promote harmonization in the areas of procurement and financial management. This is because of the need for some donors to be associated with specific inputs or components, i.e. "showing the flag", and/or of narrow commercial interests, such as tied procurement. Some donors also fear the loss of direct control over the use of their funds because there is a risk of waste or misapplication. Beside these factors, the harmonization may be hindered by resentment and jealousy that often exist between donors in the case of real or imagined dominance by certain donors. Some donors may be simply unable to finance recurrent costs, and cannot or do not want to change their practices to accommodate new joint methods

(World Bank, 2001, p11). These factors tend to limit the number of donors that can participate in SWAPs.

This limitation can be seen in the application of pooled fund in developing countries. The ultimate objective of SWAPs is sector budgetary support, that is, pooling of donor resources of government funds (World Bank, 2001, p31). Under this modality, donors do not earmark their funds in which different funds from different donors would no longer be identified separately. However, there are only a few examples of pooling of funds in sector-wide projects in the World Bank (World Bank, 2001, p31). These include: the Zambia technical assistance and health district funds; common disbursements under the Bangladesh health sector program; district funds under the Senegal health program; preparation studies for the Zambia education program; and health sector program and local government reform program in Tanzania. Instead of pooling, most sector-wide programs thus far earmark funds (World Bank, 2001, p31).

Third, there is a risk of sustainability. As in the case of Zambia health, the progress of SWAPs may be blocked due to client policy changes that are inconsistent with the agreed framework (World Bank, 2001, p5). Moreover, a question arises about who can guarantee the continuity of donors' support to the promotion of SWAPs in the future. Since SWAPs deal with medium and long-term planning issues, the effectiveness of SWAPs requires the long-term commitment of donors' support. However it is possible that the present supportive policy of donor agencies might change because of change in leaders of donor agencies, changes in economic situation or public opinion in donor countries.

Fourth, SWAPs cannot deal with many important issues that transcend a sector. Poverty alleviation, for example, is a multi-sectoral issue that requires a holistic approach, which cannot be meaningfully broken down into sectoral issues (Mosley and Eeckhout, 2000, p151). Programs to improve administrative and institutional environments cannot be addressed effectively by SWAPs either. For example, the execution of civil service reform (including reviews of the public payment structure and improve the management quality) or the establishment of a medium-term budget expenditure framework involves all ministerial bodies in the development of such a framework (Mosley and Eeckhout, 2000, p151).

### **Strengths and Weaknesses of Budgetary Support**

Under budget support, like pooled funds in SWAPs, donors do not earmark their funds in which different funds from different donors would no longer be identified separately. Unlike sector budgetary support, however, budgetary support provided by donors is not linked to a specific sector program. A rationale to introduce budgetary support is that it can enhance government ownership, hence sustainability, since it gives full power

regarding the management of funds to government that provide public services to citizens. It is cost-effective in a sense that budget support can reduce transaction costs significantly of both donors and the recipient government. It can provide a facility flexible enough for the recipient government to utilize resources for priority programs. From donor's perspective, budget support can increase its impact by joint efforts with other donors, make aid more effective by minimizing transaction cost and by giving influence on the recipient government in such areas as financial management reform, public service reform, and good governance. Furthermore, budgetary support can overcome the limitation of SWAPs by dealing with multi-sectoral issues such as poverty reduction and civil service reforms.

Nevertheless, budgetary support also has weaknesses that are similar to but more serious than those of SWAPs. It has problems of limitation of its application to a few developing countries since it requires a high level of government capacity in terms of planning, implementation, evaluation and monitoring as well as good governance. It may limit donors' participation due to the problems of flag down, harmonization, and loss of direct control of donors' funds. The continuity of donors' support is also uncertain in the case of a change in political leaders and outbreak of political problems in developing countries as well as policy change on the side of donors. The withdrawal of foreign aid has the most devastating effects on overall development planning in budgetary support. Moreover, since the recipient government should be accountable for performance and result not only to its nationals but also to donors, the influence of donors on overall policy and institutional environment become the biggest in this modality.

### **Do They Really Enhance Local Ownership?**

It should be recognized that the application of SWAPs and budgetary support to many developing countries is likely to bring about a fundamental problem that may contradict the most important rationale of these aid modalities. Although it is claimed that a potential benefit of SWAPs and budgetary support is to enhance local ownership, there exists tension between the enhancement of local ownership and promotion of these aid modalities in Africa. Most SWAPs and budgetary support have been used in low-income and aid-dependent countries with multiple active donors (World Bank, 2001, p5). In these countries, it is very difficult to meet a basic precondition for these modalities as well as for successful foreign aid in general, namely full recipient responsibility for the framework, and for preparation and implementation of programs supported by donors (Andersen, 2000, p181). For many African countries, it is difficult to carry out this task in practice due to weak human capacity to practice full ownership, including in a sector program context (Andersen, 2000, p185). Ownership is of particular importance in the planning phase because of the political decision-making and value judgements involved. However, the subsequent design of sector



programs is often handicapped by lack of specialized personnel as well as by non-existent or very weak sectoral planning units. As a result, donors may involve in the process to assist the preparation of the program. This entails the risk of ownership. Donor representatives may feel tempted to influence sector authorities to adopt policies and program designs, and eventually insist on conditionalities, with which the government may not be in full agreement. The recipient government nevertheless accepts the interference in order to please the donor as this may substantially increase the chances of getting financial support for a program (Andersen, 2000, p186). As Andersen points out, genuine ownership of the development programs is unlikely to take root until citizens of the recipient countries are equipped and allowed to take full responsibility of government functions with limited and highly skilled expert assistance from outside (Andersen, 2000, p186).

Second, it is also very difficult for low income and aid-dependent countries to meet another basic precondition for SWAPs and budgetary support. Under these aid modalities, in principle, aid coordination should be made under the leadership of the recipient government. In practice, however, since the government is not able to take the lead in donor co-ordination, one of the larger donors, together with the government, tends to carry out this task. In this situation, in order to maintain the ownership of a program, the government needs to have the willpower to say to donors: "Here is my program in this sector; if you wish to help me implement it, you are most welcome. If you wish to do something different, I regret that you are not welcome in this sector in this country" (Harrold, 1995, p13). However, it is very difficult for a government of a poor and aid-dependent country to make such a blunt statement vis-à-vis a major donor because it entails the risk of losing the aid money (Andersen, 2000, p183).

Furthermore, the whole process of SWAPs and budgetary support itself entail the risk of undermining local ownership. In addition to enhance local ownership, another rationale (or rather a major objective) of participating in SWAPs and budgetary support for donors is to promote policy changes, public sector reforms, and good governance that are conducive to development in recipient countries. Thus these reforms are introduced as part of SWAPs and budgetary support and come laden with conditionality. The reform measures are usually donor import in which outsiders introduce, even impose, reforms intended to change the way that sovereign governments organize themselves and spend their money. Donor agencies are likely to craft the reforms, finance them, and play a big role in implementation. Positive effects of donor involvement are to provide ideas on how to proceed, technical help and money for training and implementation. This gives an impetus for the recipient government to undertake reforms or make them speed up (Berg, 2000, p291). A negative effect of donor sponsorship is that policy changes and reform programs introduced as conditions to support SWAPs and budgets can undermine local ownership of the reforms. According to Berg (2000, p299), experience of past failed reforms of public sector management as part of

conditioned policy loans shows that governments usually accept these reform programs because they are hard pressed for money. Their leaders did not believe in the reforms, or believed in them half-heartedly. As a result, they did not make sufficient efforts to develop local backing. There were few public debates over rationale and content of reform programs. The specific conditionalities in adjustment loans were usually unknown to the general public, and were often not revealed even to fairly senior officials. Almost everybody regarded these conditioned reform programs as imposed by the Bretton Woods institutions. Under these circumstances it was hard to have the kind of general and open dialogues that nourished true ownership. Elliot Berg's analysis implies that there is a great risk that the reform programs under SWAPs and budgetary support in Africa may follow the same path as past failed reforms of public sector management.

### Rethinking Project Aid

Ownership has been used extensively in the aid policy and debate in recent years. It is based on the acknowledgement that the recipient country must own its country's development to achieve sustainable changes (Selvervik, 2000, p18). One of the rationales to introduce SWAPs and budgetary support is that they can enhance local ownership. This contradicts our views on the relationship between SWAPs, budgetary support and ownership. In order to make our arguments clear, different kinds of ownership should be distinguished, namely ownership at the project (micro) level and ownership at the sector and macro level (or overall ownership at the national level). As critics of project aid insist, project aid was likely to undermine local ownership at project level. However, many project aids have not undermined overall ownership at the sector and national level (if it is not part of conditioned policy loans). Because donors directly control the projects and are accountable to their results, donors tend not to interfere with the sector and overall policy and administrative system of the recipient government. This is both the strength and weakness of project aids. Project aids can speed up development process if recipient governments are reform-oriented with relatively good administrative and institutional environment. The costs of donors' withdrawal of their support for the recipient governments are smaller than SWAPs and budgetary support since basic national development plan and sector plan are not largely influenced by project aids. Project aids do not work if the governments are corrupt without policy and institutional environments conducive to development. SWAPs and budgetary support can be designed to address these issues. Nevertheless, donor sponsored reforms tend to be donor driven and hence cannot enhance ownership and sustain reform programs at the sector and macro levels if the governments are not reform-minded and if they fail to develop local backing.

Second, many of the shortcomings of project aid pointed out by many scholars and officials are not the fundamental flaws of project assistance. The

problems of project aid such as uncoordinated fragmentation, donor driven, and weak impact at the sectoral level, can be solved if project aids are well integrated into sector policy, strategy and programs of the recipient country. The donor-driven nature of project aids can be modified if projects are designed to meet genuine local needs based on active participation of the beneficiary especially in the planning process. The effectiveness of project aid is diminished unless there are supportive overall policies, institutional and economic environments under which projects must operate (Cassels, p7). However, these constraints can be overcome if projects are operated within SWAPs and with budgetary support that can be designed to address these issues.

Third, a major strength of project assistance is that it can transfer technologies and development ideas from donors to recipient countries. Each donor has its own comparative advantages with respect to technologies, know-how and ideas that were achieved by their experiences in the country and are not substitutable to those in other countries. Developing countries can choose technologies and ideas most suitable to their society by the use of project assistance of each donor. Since the 1980s, technical cooperation has been severely criticized. The criticisms include its supply driven nature, excessive emphasis on tangible and measurable output as opposed to institution building, and the establishment of parallel project management unit. They also include insufficient emphasis on training, excessive reliance on long-term resident expatriate advisers, failure of the expert-counterpart model, and massive distortions in the market of technical cooperation (Berg, 1993). These criticisms are related to the shortcomings of the way of delivering past technical assistance, and should not underplay the significance of idea and technology transfer themselves to promote development in the recipient countries.

Fourth, project assistance can allow donors to act as innovators in development approaches through specific interventions. With their greater resources and ability to take risks, they can support pilot ventures that can establish approaches and activities, which, if successful, can be 'scaled up' and replicated by domestic authorities (Healey and Killick, 2000, p228). China has proved its power to make excellent use of project aid to pilot new activities, which are then taken up with local finance. A country like China with low dependence is likely to prefer project aid to policy conditional program aid. If aid dependence is low but sector policy or management is weak, project support and technical cooperation are still likely to be the most appropriate instruments to facilitate policy development and pilot new approaches (ODI, 2001, p65).

In addition, unlike SWAPs and budgetary support, project aids can be applied to many developing countries. Even if recipient governments do not have sufficient capacity to manage sector programs, donors may use project aids since donors can handle the execution of the projects by themselves.

When donors are not happy with the recipient policy, donors may choose project aids through NGOs. Project aids should be used in post-conflict countries since political and economic stabilities in those countries are not certain in the foreseeable future.

### 3. Future direction of aid modalities in Tanzania

#### Impact of the Helleiner Report

In Tanzania, there has been a significant shift from project aids to SWAPs, and now from SWAPs to budgetary support. This development dates back to the mid 1990's when aid fatigue, rising corruption and lack of progress in reducing poverty generated strong debate on the effectiveness of aid (TAS, 2002, p6). It was also the time when Tanzania's relations with donors were strained mainly due to serious slippage in revenue collection and rising corruption. In mid-1994, the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Danish government assembled a group of independent advisers on development co-operation issues between Tanzania and donors. The report submitted by this group – the Helleiner report (1995) – and the adoption of the Agreed Notes in January 1997 set in motion the process for building a new relationship.

The report offered a list of recommendations with respect to ownership, partnership, responsibilities of the Government of Tanzania (GoT) such as civil service reform, budgetary reform and economic management, social sector strategy, dealing with corruption, as well as to immediate risks and requirements (Helleiner et al, 1995). The recommendations implied radical changes in the relationship between the donors and the GoT in order to enhance the effectiveness of foreign aid. These include:

- The need for the GoT to insist on preparing the first draft of all policy documents
- The need for donors to be willing to withhold or delay aid until the local conditions necessary for ownership are satisfied
- The need to shift from the existing situation of an uncoordinated proliferation of projects to a more rationalized and focused program
- The need to adopt a sectoral focus or concentration
- The importance of harmonizing country programs with Tanzania's own prioritization of projects
- The need to develop a vision for long-term development and to draw up supportive strategies and investment programs
- The need for full disclosure of committed donor resources for the purposes of proper budgetary planning

- The need to plan a gradual decline in external support for Tanzania

An independent review of the implementation of the Agreed Notes in March 1999 reported significant progress on almost all the provisions. These include macroeconomic management (preparation of PFP), aid co-ordination (implementation of SWAPs, PER/MTEF, Quarterly sector consultations, MDF/PRBS, CBF), and democracy and governance (multiparty system, formulation of Vision 2025, National Poverty Eradication Strategy, National Anti Corruption Strategy). According to this review, areas that still face problems include:

- Separate/parallel donor systems/procedures on procurement, recruitment and staff remuneration, accounting, reporting formats, monitoring, and management of projects which tax heavily the limited Government capacity
- Fragmented and uncoordinated project support which reduces efficiency and effectiveness
- Management and disbursements of resources outside the Government system (exchequer) undermining transparency and accountability
- Heavy dependency on TA/consultants in executing projects which is very costly
- Unsynchronized Country Assistance Strategies (CAS)
- Inadequate Government capacity

### **Move Toward Basket Funding and Budgetary Support**

A significant change in donors' aid policies can be seen in many areas. In Tanzania donors have moved into basket funding for a range of programs or processes. They include Public Expenditure Review, Local Government Reform Program, Agricultural Strategy, Rural Development Strategy, Road Program including TANROADS, Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, Public Policy Reform Program, Legal sector, Health sector, Education sector, and Agricultural sector.

The World Bank has strongly supported this trend, and now moves progressively from basket funding to budget support funding (UNDP, p22). World Bank is providing increasingly more support to budget support, about 30-40 percent of World Bank funding. Most of the Adjustment Programs were in the form of budget support including Programmatic Structural Adjustment Credit (SAC I and PSAC I) and Poverty Reduction Support Credit. DFID is ahead of the donors in this type of funding, offering about 60% of total aid volume for budget support in Tanzania. Beside UK, the governments of Denmark, Ireland, Sweden, Netherlands, and of Switzerland also strongly support Poverty Reduction Budgetary Support (PRBS).

The Government of Tanzania (GoT) also seems to prefer budget support funding to other aid modalities. This is implied by the following demands made to donors in Tanzania Assistance Strategy (TAS) in 2002.

- As far as possible adopt the joint actions approach and harmonized rules and procedures (formulation, supervision and evaluation missions; accounting, disbursement and reporting; annual consultations, etc.) with the view to enhance government capacity. The initiatives on basket funds in health, education, LGRP and the PRBS provide a basis for the way forward
- As far as possible untie aid and provide technical assistance for capacity building. Some donors have completely untied aid while others are still constrained by policy stance and legal framework
- Adopt the MTEF with the view to improve the predictability of resources
- As far as possible donor support approaches which increase aid effectiveness
- Decentralize authority on decision making to the country missions in order to expedite and deepen consultations

At the CG meeting in 2001, the President of GoT also insisted:

While considerable progress has been made in preparing and costing sector specific interventions to alleviate poverty, the existing international financing mechanisms are, it seems to us, still largely similar to those of the preceding years. In our view, there is a pressing need to review these mechanisms, in order to ensure realistic, effective, and more flexible support for interventions aimed at reducing poverty.

In this connection, the Government welcomes the increased willingness of the international partners to support our poverty reduction programmes on a "basket" and sector-wide basis, or through projects conforming to the poverty reduction strategy. More flexible and untied forms of international assistance are critical to our poverty reduction efforts at this stage, when it is becoming increasingly important to embark on more cost-effective and imaginative programmes for the benefit of the poor.

### **Risk of Ownership**

It is understandable that the GoT prefers budgetary support over SWAPs and project aid given the fact that Tanzania is a donor dependent country which has serious debt problem. Around 25-30 percent of the total Government budget and 80 percent of the development budget are dependent on foreign aid/finances. Tanzania has development co-operation

programs with over 50 Governments/donors, international financial institutions and NGO covering hundreds of projects virtually in all sectors (TAS, 2002, p6). In this situation, fragmented and uncoordinated project aids reduce efficiency and effectiveness of assistance, and cannot meet pressing needs of the country.

However, this movement entails risks that may undermine local ownership of the reforms. First, although it is claimed that Tanzania is taking ownership and leadership, it still appears the whole process is still by and large donor-driven. There are many evidences to support this. The World Bank chairs the CG meeting, not the Ministry of Finance. The secretariat and analytical processes for PER are provided by the World Bank although using Tanzanian economists from the University of Dar es Salaam. The PRSP similarly is under heavy external influence. Meanwhile in the sector ministries technical advisers are involved in the development and monitoring of SWAP (UNDP, 2001, p22). The donor-driven nature of the reform process is also seen by the statement made by the President of GoT at the CG meeting in September 2001,

“---- (We) would like to request that our international partners, including the Bretton Woods institutions, consult more closely with the beneficiary countries in elaborating or reviewing poverty-reduction facilities and related operational issues, such as PRSP process. ---- (It) remains vitally important that we too are so convinced, our own views having been taken on board.” (Statement by the President of the United Republic of Tanzania, his Excellency Benjamin William Mkapa, at the Consultative Group Meeting for Tanzania, 7 September 2001, p10)

Second, there are few general and open dialogues about reform programs that nourished true ownership in Tanzania. Since not enough effort has been made to make the public aware of the change, very few people are aware of the acclaimed changes in partnership and aid practice. Only a few people have been engaged in the changes in the Ministries, consultancy and civil society (UNDP, 2001, p22). Public debate over the rationale and content of reform programs is rare. A report on Joint Mid-Term Evaluation of EC, DFID and IA Support to the Education Sector Development Programme Design, Preparation and Management Process also concludes:

Projects were hastily formulated without significant consultation between government, donors, stakeholders or primary beneficiaries. As a result, the projects were poorly designed and made overly optimistic assumptions about GoT capacity and readiness to embark upon preparation of a full education programme to be funded (eventually) through project support (Ministry of Education and Culture, 2000, p36).

In this situation, it is possible that many Tanzanians regard these reform programs as imposed by donors and the Bretton Woods institutions. The experience of Structural Adjustment Programs in many countries indicates that reform programs sponsored by aid donors may well fail for lack of sufficient local support (Berg, 2000, p299).

Third, GoT has to recognize that as it receives more foreign assistance from budgetary support, donors' influence of overall developmental planning and budget allocation inevitably increases, regardless of whether the influence is good or bad. Without the donor impetus, reforms might not have been undertaken at all, or would have been long delayed. A risk is that as GoT becomes more reliant on budgetary support, its overall development planning and implementation will also depend on donors' policies and preferences that are largely dependent on economic situations in donor countries, the opinion of their public and parliament, and the view of political leaders about the performance of GoT with respect to poverty reduction, governance, democracy and human rights. For example, in the case of the outbreak of some particular political or military incident against human rights from the donors' point of view, donors may withdraw all of their money from budget support because of fungibility problems as well as strong domestic political pressure. This has devastating effects on GoT's overall development planning and implementation in the future.

Fourth, there is a tension between conditionalities attached to common basket fund and budgetary support and local ownership. The idea of moving from project to SWAPs and budgetary support in its pure and untied version is not easily accepted in aid constituencies. As a sort of compensation for relaxing direct control over aid resources, aid was made conditional on recipient governments conducting sound economic and other policies, transparent and efficient financial and public sector managements and other measures. For some donor organizations, the main objectives in participating in SWAPs and budgetary support may be even to acquire information and have influence on GoT's policies, institutions and governance situations. This entails risks. First of all, many reform programs that were introduced as part of the conditions for some supports tend to undermine local ownership of the reforms and had other reform-weakening effects. The second risk is that those conditionalities (or steps to taken) may not work and that continuing support for common basket fund and budgetary support may give negative incentives for GoT to conduct genuine reforms. As experience of structural adjustment programs shows that the adjustment money was kept coming even if the recipient governments did not implement fully reform programs. This is because none of the parties to a structural adjustment programs wanted to see it failed. A cessation of disbursements was a personal defeat for responsible donor staff and the organizations they work for as well as relevant local officials. On the other hand, the continuity of the money flow contributed to the creation of a no-sanctions atmosphere, diminished the credibility of specific reforms, and contributed to the persistence of a soft



budget constraint in general. Since the avoidance costs of non-compliance were reduced, decision-makers shifted their calculations of the costs and benefits of reform implementation in the direction of non-implementation (Berg, 2000, p301).

Fifth, many reform measures and performance management systems are donor imports. They have been crafted by donors, and usually with little local input. Nevertheless, as shown by the experience of public sector management programs under structural adjustment in many countries, donors have proved to be imperfect designers and implementers of such reforms. According to Berg (2000), the general problem has been aid agency failure to adapt programs to fit country-specific conditions. Most reform programs that have ended badly were not based on bad ideas. They were not brought down not because of basic conceptual flaw but because of failure to foresee or adapt to blockages in implementation and in the post-implementation environment. Berg maintains that the main donor weakness has been inflexibility, a sluggish response to emerging implementation difficulties, and an inability to tailor programs to the specific features of low income country environments (Berg, 2000, p301).

The tendency of donor agencies' to have an illusion about the universal applicability of their domestic policies and institutions may be one of the reasons why donors are not good at design and implementation of reform programs in developing countries. Donor agencies tend to introduce their own values, policies and institutions to poor countries without sufficient consideration of local context. The second reason may be the lack of sufficient local participation in selection and application of new Western idea into each developing country. According to economic anthropologist Keiji Maegawa, any non-Western country which succeeds in marketization do not accept the market mechanism wholeheartedly in which the existing socio-economic structure is not simply destroyed, replaced, or abandoned. The structure of the base society remains surprisingly intact even after a drastic change in the economic mechanism. He explains:

Many nations and societies have adopted Western institutions and objects --- in order to survive (or by their own choice). However, it is important to recognize that they did not accept Western inventions in their original forms. Any item in culture will change its meaning when transplanted to another culture, as seen widely in ethnography around the world. --- The essence of what has been called "modernization" is the adaptive acceptance of Western civilization under the persistent form of the existing culture. That is, actors in the existing system have adapted to the new system by reinterpreting each element of Western culture (i.e., "civilization") in their own value structure, modifying yet maintaining the existing institutions. I shall call this "translative adaptation." (Maegawa 1994, cited in Ohno and Ohno, p13)

One of the serious problems in recent movements in Tanzania is the lack of this process of translative adaptation by Tanzanians when many reform programs were hastily introduced by donor agencies. If this trend is continued, reform programs sponsored by donors may not sustain, which tend to perpetuate aid dependency of Tanzania.

As a result of these factors, it may be difficult for Tanzanians to enhance ownership of the recent changes, to maintain strong commitment to them, which may have negative effects on the sustainability of the on-going reform programs.

#### 4. Recommendations

- (1) Donor agencies should make sure periodically of the genuine commitment of GoT to the PRSP process and reform programs. Tension between conditionality and ownership can be relaxed only when GoT really wants to reform their financial and public sector management and to promote pro-poor economic and social policy. Experience of structural adjustment in Africa shows that reform-minded governments can use external pressure (i.e., conditionality) to persuade and contain strong opposition groups that favor status quo. The pervasiveness of fungibility also draws attention to the importance of selectivity in the choice of recipient governments. Despite donor efforts to tie their assistance to preferred categories, governments can use the extra resources provided through development assistance largely as they choose. Therefore what difference aid makes depends on how recipient governments respond to the resources thereby provided. Ownership is all (Healey and Killick, 2000, p243).
- (2) Donor agencies should consult with GoT more closely in elaborating or reviewing poverty-reduction facilities and related operational issues, such as PRSP process. There seems to be a gap between donors' insistence of local ownership and their actual behavior on the ground. Limited consultation with GoT will undermine their ownership of PRSP and related reform processes. It should be remembered that ownership means full recipient government responsibility for the design of development programs (Andersen, 2000, p185).
- (3) It should be noticed that it is GoT that has to take full responsibility for the results of the on-going reform programs. In the case of the failure of the programs, donors will not take responsibility for the results of their advices. The role of donor agencies is to act as a facilitator of PRSP process by providing idea, technology, know how, and money. It is GoT's responsibility for putting those offered by donors into concrete shape.
- (4) GoT should make more efforts to develop broad-based local support for

the reform programs. As a UNDP report points out, so few people are aware of the changes going on, even in Universities. Only a few people have been engaged in the changes in the central and local government as well as civil society. This situation must be changed since sustainable reform programs require sufficient local backing regardless of the change in political leadership in the near future. In order to develop broad-based local support for reform programs, GoT should consult more closely with stakeholders at all levels of government and at the community level in elaborating and reviewing the programs.

- (5) Related to the above point, GoT should promote local participation in the whole process of PRSP. Sufficient local participation is required not only to develop broad-based local support but also to adapt programs to fit country and local specific conditions. Present donor import reform programs should not be accepted wholeheartedly. It is Tanzanian people who adapt to the new programs by reinterpreting each element of programs in their own value structure, modifying yet maintaining the existing institutions. This process is the key for the programs to sustain by adapting them to fit local context.
- (6) Donor agencies and GoT should make a sub-optimal choice first, and to move gradually to an ideal model as situation permits. It is important to recognize that many donors should participate in SWAPs. What is vital now for aid dependent countries like Tanzania is to move stand-alone projects as many as possible to project type aid in a sector reform program. In doing so, the present fragmented aid projects can be integrated to a single sector strategy and program. To this end, it is not wise to stick to ideal type of SWAPs such as pooled funds and harmonization of procurement (untied aid) that may exclude some of important donors for Tanzania. Each aid modality has its own strengths and weaknesses. No single aid modality is perfect. Therefore the issue is not which modality to choose, but how to combine various modalities to maximize total impact of aid on the sector level. By keeping SWAPs open to any donor, GoT can also broaden the scope of maneuver and utilize comparative advantages possessed by each donor.
- (7) It is worth to consider a regional approach to development in the context of SWAPs. The regional approach here refers to one in which a donor supports agreed sector program activities in a particular geographical area. Difficulties in donor coordination at the program implementation phase can be eased if different donors focus their activities on different geographical areas. The regional approach can also solve the problem of sector assistance in a decentralized government system. The on-going decentralization process in Tanzania may complicate the implementation of sector-wide programs because it raises questions as to whether and how foreign donors should become involved with decentralized local governments. However, the regional approach

should not complicate implementation of the national program. Because of the fungibility of funds, the geographical concentration of donor allocations will merely substitute for a central government allocation, which may then be allocated to another area, or to other public services in the same or other areas. Even if a donor wishes to finance specified public services in excess of minimum national standards in a selected geographical area, it would seem logical and justifiable, seen from a national and central government point of view since it can make reductions in the block grant, equal to the donor financing of services (p191). Furthermore, the regional approach can allow the central government to scale up and replicate successful pilot projects innovated by donors, promote donors' competition for best practices, and to utilize comparative advantages of each donor with respect to idea, technology, know how and money.

- (8) Both donors and GoT should plan a gradual decline in external support for Tanzania. Aid dependence of Tanzania is serious given the fact that around 25-30 percent of the total Government budget and 80 percent of the development budget are dependent on foreign aid/finance. Especially the rise of budgetary support as a major aid modality may create an unhealthy relationship between donors and GoT. For donors, the continuing budgetary support may loose incentive for GoT to make serious reforms, and in the worst case may lead to a situation in which all the donor money will dry up. For GoT, it is against their principle of self-help since their whole development process will be largely influenced by donors' preferences. In the worst case, some donors may withdraw all of their support in the case that donors are unhappy with GoT's policies regarding democracy and human rights in Tanzania. In order to avoid these worst situations, both donors and GoT should make efforts to reduce aid dependence of Tanzania gradually but as soon as possible.

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農業プロジェクト・プログラム要約表（案）



Summary of Agricultural Projects/Programmes in Tanzania

S/N	Project Name/Title	Objective	Scope	Implementing Agent	Location	Target Area	Start Date	Duration	Completion Date	Budget (\$ Million)	Donor
1	Agricultural Sector programme Support	Increase income and improve nutrition of poorer sections of smallholders particularly female farmers	Regional -specific	MAFS & Others	Dodoma, Iringa, Mbeya and Morogoro	Increasing agricultural production	1998	5	2002	37.9	DANIDA
(i)	ASPS-Institution support component	Enhance the institutional capacity of both central and local government	Institutional-based	MAFS & others	Country-wide	Support MAFS and decentralization	1998	5	2002		
(ii)	ASPS-Irrigation component	Raise small holder income and land productivity	Sector-based	MAFS & others	Dodoma, Iringa, Mbeya & Morogoro	Advise and training in agronomy and water management and rehabilitation of irrigation infrastructure	1998	5	2002		
(iii)	ASPS-PASS: Private agricultural sector support	Strengthening of active participation of private sector in agriculture sector	Sector-based	MAFS & others	Dodoma, Iringa, Mbeya And Morogoro	Private sector capacity building	1998	5	2002		
2	Special Programme for Food Security	To draw conclusion from all agro-ecological for making policy decisions to remove constraints in production and to expedite increase in food production for improving livelihood of small farmers at the selected site.	Only 3 districts	MAFS	Morogoro (2) & Dodoma (1)	Water control management, crop intensification, diversification, capacity building and socio-economic constraints analysis	1995	3	na	0.80	FAO
3	Stabex 1994 & 1999	Promotion of sustainable economic growth through improving the well-fare of poor people	Sector-based	MAFS	County-wide	Increase productivity for coffee, cotton and tea	1990	10	2000	32.1	EU
4	Land management project	Sustainable land use management	District-specific	PO-RALG	Babati, Kileleshwa, Simanjiro & Singida rural	Enhance legal and regulatory framework for land use	1997	4	2001	17.3	SIDA
5	Eastern Zone Client Oriented and Extension project	Promote agricultural research and extension activities	Research zones -based	MAFS	Morogoro and Tanga	Farmers and district councils needs	1999	3	2002	1.1	Ireland Aid
6	National agricultural extension project	Increased agricultural production the farmers accessibility to extension services	County-based	MAFS	Except Southern High lands	Promote effective agricultural services delivery to farmers	1999	3	2002	32.9	WB
7	Participatory Irrigation Dev Programme	Increase farmers income And food security	Regional specific	MAFS	Arusha, Dodoma, Singida, Mwanza, Shinyanga and Tabora	Increase food production through improved irrigation infrastructures	2001	6	2007	25.4	IFAD & others

Efficient river basin management and smallholder irrigation scheme	Strengthen the governments capacity to manage resources and address water related environmental concern and improve irrigation efficiency of smallholder traditional irrigation schemes	Water-basins-specific MAFS/MWLD	Pangani and Rufiji Basins	1997	6	2003	20.3	WB

9) Tanzania livestock marketing project	Improve and enhance livestock Marketing efficiency	14 regions	MWLD	Central, Northern and Southern Highlands Zones	Improve livestock marketing facilities	1994	9	2003	13.9	ADB
10) Tanzania agricultural research project (TARPI)		County-based	MAFS	County-wide	Promote client oriented Services	1998	5	2003	44.9	WB
11) Mweza Irrigation scheme Kilosa	Increase agricultural Production and Income	Malalo village	MAFS	Kilosa district	Increase agricultural production	2000	2	2002	8	Gov Japan
12) Soil fertility reclamation and Agricultural intensification project	Increase agricultural production/productivity	County-based	MAFS	County-wide	To improve soil fertility	2001	5	2006	65.2	WB
13) Rural Financial service programme	Make credit accessible to rural Farmers for agricultural investment	Phase I: 10 districts	PMO	Dodoma, Iringa, Mbeya and Kilimanjaro regions	Facilitate rural credit accessibility	2001	9	2010	23.8	IFAD
14) Agricultural sector management Programme, Phase II for Strategic Agricultural Partnership Project		na	na	na		na	na	na	na	WB
15) Agricultural marketing systems development programme	Improve marketing efficiency and participation	26 District in 7 regions	PMO	Kilimanjaro and Mbeya	Marketing of agricultural products	2002	7	2009	43.0	IFAD & others
16) National Coconut Dev Programme	Promote production and utilization of coconut products and by-products	Area-specific	MAFS	Coastal zone	Breeding, integrated plant protection, coconut processing and coconut based cropping system	1993	12	2005	10.0	GTZ
17) Urban Vegetable promotion Project	Assist urban farmers improve production of vegetables in Dar-es-salaam	City-based	MAFS	Dar-es-salaam urban	Vegetable producers with special focus on women gardeners	1996	5	2001	0.7	GTZ
18) Mara Farmers Initiatives	Reduce food insecurity, alleviate poverty through increasing incomes and increase local capability to solve local problems as well as strengthen the democratic process of local	Region-specific	MAFS	Mara region	Crop development and diversification, smallholder livestock development, water resources, farm to market road	1996	7	2003	19.4	IFAD

	government													
19 Kilimanjaro Agricultural training center Phase II	Disseminate the successful experience of lower Moshji farmers to other rice farming areas in the country	Crop specific	MAFS	Kilimanjaro	rehabilitation, farm input supply, human health control and capacity building	2001	5	2006	0.3	JICA				

20	Verification study on small scale Horticultural development for poverty alleviation to farmers	Formulation of mid and long term master plan on small scale horticultural development in order to increase farmers income	Region-specific	MAFS/Coast region	Coast region	Small scale farmers particularly women and youth	2000	3	2003	na	JICA
21	Client oriented research programme (Lake zone)	Promotion of research activities	Research zone-specific	MAFS	Lake & Northern Research zones	Client-oriented needs	na	na	1.7	Netherlands	
22	Southern highlands smallholder dairy development project	Integrate the project activities sustainably into the private sector structure	Region-specific	MWLD	Mbeya and Iringa	Milk processing and marketing, private sector development	2000	3	2002	na	Swiss
23	Rural integrated development programme	Improve well-being and sustainable livelihoods of the people	Region-specific	PO-RALG	Mtwara and Lindi	Public service, civic small enterprise and participatory methods development	na	na	Na	na	FINIDA
24	Kagera agricultural and environmental mgt project	Rehabilitate the region adversely affected by refuge influx and reverse the long term declined in agricultural production	Region-specific	PO-RALG	Kagera region	Natural resource management, seed production, participation, health,	1997	6	2003	24.1	IFAD/BSF
25	Coffee and cotton marketing improvement project	Test measures and systems that can be introduced to minimize the constraints hampering effective marketing of coffee and cotton	na	MCM?	na	Private warehouse, collateralizable warehouse receipt, market information, commodity trade finance, quality	na	na	na	na	na

26	District development support	Poverty reduction/eradication	District-specific	PO-RALG	Kilosa, Kilombero, Mteza and Ulanga districts	assurance and certification system District development programmes	na	3yrs phases	Na	9.0		Ireland Aid					
25	District rural development programme (phase II)	Support the process of local development and that contributes effectively to improve rural income and poverty alleviation	District-specific	PO-RALG	11 districts in Arusha, Kagera and Shinyanga	Capacity building and decentralization	1996	7	2003	45.5		Netherlands					
28	Smallholder dairy support programme	Increase production and strengthen market efficiency	Region-specific	PMU & private sector	Kagera and Tanga		2000	5	2005	3.2		Netherlands					

29	District rural development programme (SNV)	Improvement of socio-economic conditions in the areas	District specific	PO-RALG	Monduli, Konda and Songea	Local governance	1997	6	2003	12.3		Netherlands
30	Kagera community development programme	Improve the standard of living for the rural community, fight malnutrition and assist in development of rural resources and income	Region-specific	PMO	Kagera	Propagation and diffusion of improved banana varieties and ox-mechanization	1999	6	2005	6.0		Belgium Embassy
31	Study on irrigation master plan	Food security, economic growth, remove sectoral constraints, rehabilitation, upgrading and development of irrigation infrastructure	Country-based	MAFS	National	Sector policy review, coordination, planning, monitoring, management information system and research, institutional building, participation, cost recovery and commercialization and infrastructure improvement	2001	3	2004	na		JICA
32	Madeira Smallholder development project		Region-specific	MAFS	Mbeya		1996	3	1999	28.0		AfDB
33	Southern Zone Agricultural Research Project		Research-zone specific	MAFS	Mtwara		na	na	na	2.9		DFID
34	Grant Aid for Food Aid (KR)		Country-based	MAFS	National		na	na	2002	4.1		Gov Japan
35	Grant Aid for increase of food production (KR2)		Country-based	MAFS	National		na	na	2002	6.4		
36	Integrated pests management		MAFS, region specific	MAFS	MAFS, Arusha, Kilimanjaro		1993	10	2003	7.2		GTZ

	Region-specific	MAFS/SUA	Morogoro	na	na	na	na	Ireland Aid
37) Sokoine extension project								
38) Rehabilitation training & research Institutes	Country-based	MAFS/SUA	National	na	na	na	na	Netherlands
39) Research and training in Agricultural components- collaboration part of TARP-ii	Research-zone specific	MAFS/SUA	Southern & Eastern Research zones	2001	4	2005	5.5	NORAD
40) Regional rinderpest programme	Country-based	MWLD	National/Regional	1995	5	2000	0.09	Austrian Dev Cooperation
41) Tick fever control programme	Country-based	MWLD	National	1999	2	2001	1.3	Austrian Dev Cooperation
42) Pan Africa control of epizootics in Tanzania	Country-based	MWLD	National	2001	3	2004	3.5	EU

		MWLD	Tanga and Kagera	na	na	na	na	EU
43) Farmers in use controlled area								
44) Slaughterhouse facilities, Arusha	Area-specific	Municipal council	Arusha Municipality	1993	8	2001	0.89	Austrian Dev Cooperation
45) Milk marketing (phase 1) institutional support to Dairy Board and national dairy master plan	Country-based	NGO (Austroproject)	National	2001	2	2003	0.011	Austrian Dev Cooperation
46) Improvement of milk marketing in Dar-	Area-based	NGO(Austroproject)	Greater Dar	2001	2	2003	0.59	Austrian Dev Cooperation
47) Improvement of milk marketing in Mara region	Region-specific	NGO(Austroproject)	Mara region	2001	2	2003	0.59	Austrian Dev Cooperation
48) Kasulu district development programme	Area-specific	PO-RALG-Kasulu	Kasulu district	2001	2	2003	0.50	Austrian Dev Cooperation

Note: na means not available

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LOCATION OF AGRICULTURAL PROJECTS/PROGRAMMES BY  
REGIONS IN TANZANIA BY 2001



KEY

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| 1 Agricultural Sector Programme Support                  | 19 District rural development programme (phase III)         |
| 2 Special Programme For Food Security                    | 20 Smallholder dairy support programme                      |
| 3 Land Management Project                                | 21 District rural development programme (SNV)               |
| 4 Eastern Zone Client Oriented And Extension             | 22 Kagera community development programme                   |
| 5 National Agricultural Extension Project                | 23 Madira Smallholder development project                   |
| 6 Participatory Irrigation Dev Programme                 | 24 Southern Zone Agricultural Research Project              |
| 7 River Basin Mgt And Smallholder Irrigation Improvement | 25 Integrated pests management                              |
| 8 Tanzania Livestock Marketing Project                   | 26 Slaughterhouse facilities, Arusha                        |
| 9 Mwega Irrigation Scheme Kilosa                         | 27 Milk marketing (phase 1) Institutional support           |
| 10 Rural Financial Service Programme                     | 28 Improvement of milk marketing in Dar-                    |
| 11 Agricultural Marketing Systems Development Programme  | 29 Improvement of milk marketing in Mara region             |
| 12 National Coconut Dev Programme                        | 30 Kasulu district development programme                    |
| 13 Urban Vegetable Promotion Project                     | 31 Sokolne extension project                                |
| 14 Mara Farmers Initiatives Programme                    | 32 Farmers in use use controlled area                       |
| 15 Kilimanjaro Agricultural Training Center Phase        | 33 Rural Integrated Development Programme                   |
| 16 Verification Study (Horticultural Development Coast)  | 34 District development support                             |
| 17 Client Oriented Research Programme (Lake Zone)        | 35 Coffee and cotton marketing improvement project          |
| 18 Southern Highlands Smallholder Dairy Dev Project      | 36 Kagera Agricultural And Environmental Mgt Project        |
| N1 ASPs-Institutional Support                            | N7 Rehabilitation of Training & Research Institutions       |
| N2 Stabex 1994 & 1999                                    | N8 Tick Fever Control Programme                             |
| N3 Tanzania Agricultural Research (TARP II)              | N9 Pan Africa Control of Epizootics                         |
| N4 Study on Irrigation Master plan                       | N10 Regional Rinder Pests Programme                         |
| N5 Grant Aid for Food Aid (KR)                           | N11 Soil fertility Recapitalization & Agric Intensification |



LOCATION OF AGRICULTURAL PROJECTS/PROGRAMME IN TANZANIA BY DISTRICTS

S/N	Project Name	Project Coverage			
		National	Region	Districts	
1	ASPS-Institutional Support	Yes	All	All	
2	Stabex 1994 & 1999	Yes	All	All	
3	Tanzania Agricultural Research TARP-II	Yes	All	All	
4	Study on Irrigation Master Plan	Yes	All	All	
5	Grant Aid for food Aid (KR)	Yes	All	All	
6	Rehabilitations of Training and Research Institutions	Yes	All	All	
7	Tick Fever Control Programme	Yes	All	All	
8	Pan Africa Control of Epizootics	Yes	All	All	
9	Regional Rinder pests Programme	Yes	All	All	
10	Soil Fertility Recapitalization and Agricultural Intensification	Yes	All	All	
11	Participatory Irrigation Development Programme		Arusha	Babati	Karatu
			Dodoma	Dodoma	Mbulu
			Singida	Manyoni	Mpwapwa
			Mwanza	Kwimba	
			Tabora	Igunga	Magu
			Shinyanga	Shinyanga	
			Mara	Musoma	Meatu
			Dar	Temeke	Serengeti
			Mtwara	Masasi	Kinondoni
			Lindi	Lindi	Newala
			Kagera	Biharamulo	Kilwa
			Kagera	Biharamulo	Muleba
			Ruvuma	Songea	Muleba
			Dodoma	Kondoa	
			Arusha	Monduli	
			Morogoro	Ulanga	Kilombero
			Tanga	Muheza	
			Morogoro	Kilosa	
			Arusha	Arusha (M)	
			Kigoma	Kasulu	
			Morogoro	Kilombero	Morogoro
12	Mara Farmers Initiative Project		Mtwara	Mtwara	Tandahimba
13	Urban Vegetable promotion Project		Lindi	Liwale	Ruangwa
14	Rural integrated development Programme		Kagera	Bukoba	Karagwe
15	Kagera Agricultural and environmental Management Project		Kagera	Bukoba	Karagwe
16	Kagera Community Development Programme		Ruvuma	Songea	Karagwe
17	District Rural Development Programme (SNV)		Dodoma	Kondoa	
			Arusha	Monduli	
			Morogoro	Ulanga	
			Tanga	Muheza	
18	District Development Support (Irish Aid)		Morogoro	Kilosa	
19	Mwega Irrigation Scheme		Arusha	Arusha (M)	
20	Slaughterhouse Facilities		Kigoma	Kasulu	
21	Kasulu District Development Programme		Morogoro	Kilombero	
22					

Special Programme for Food security		Dodoma		Dodoma		Mpwapwa		Babati					
23	Land Management Project	Arusha	Kieto		Simanjiro								
		Singida	Singida ®										
24	Agricultural Sector Programme Support	Dodoma	Kongwa										
		Iringa	Mafinga		Njombe								
		Mbeya	Ludewa		Mbozi								
		Morogoro	Ulanga		Kilimbero		Morogoro (R)						
		Mwanza	Mwanza		Sengerema		Geita		Kwimba		Magu		
		Mara	Serengeti		Bunda		Tarime		Musoma				
		Shinyanga	Shinyanga		Kahama		Maswa		Bariadi		Meatu		
		Morogoro	Morogoro ®		Ulanga		Kilosa						
		Coast	Rufiji		Bagamoyo								
		Arusha	Arumeru		Arusha		Monduli		Babati				
25	Coffee and Cotton Marketing Improvement Project	Kilimanjaro	Moshi ®		Hai		Same		Rombo		Mwanga		
		Kagera	Bukoba		Karagwe		Biharamulo		Ngara				
		Mbeya	Mbeya ®		Mbozi		Rungwe						
		Ruvuma	Songea		Mbinga								
		Dar	Temke		Ijala		Kinondoni						
		Mara	Musoma		Bunda		Tarime		Serengeti				
		Shinyanga	Shinyanga		Bariadi		Magu & Meatu		Kahama		Maswa		
		Arusha	Karatu										
		Mbeya	Mbeya		Rungwe		Mbozi						
		Iringa	Iringa		Mufindi		Makete		Ludewa		Njombe		
30	Verification Study on small Scale Horticultural Development For Poverty Alleviation to Farmers	Coast	Kisarawe		Rufiji		Kibaha		Mkuranga		Mafia		
		Dar	Temke		Ijala		Kinondoni						
		Coast	Mafia		Kibaha		Mkuranga		Kisarawe		Rufiji		
		Lindi	Lindi		Kilwa		Nachingwea		Liwale				
		Mtwara	Masasi		Nevala		Mtwara						
		Tanga	Mubeza		Korogwe		Handeni		Lushoto		Tanga		
		Morogoro	Morogoro		Kilosa		Ifakara						
		31	National Coconut Development Programme										

32	Tanzania Livestock Marketing Project	Tabora Kagera Mwanza Mara Shinyanga Dodoma Kigoma Kilimanjaro Arusha Tanga Coast Dar	Tabora Bukoba Mwanza Musoma Shinyanga Dodoma kasulu Hai Arumemru Tanga Kibaha Temeke	Igunga Karagwe Geita Tarime Kahama Kondoa Kibondo Moshi Ngorongoro Korogwe Mkuranga Ilala	Urambo Biharamulo Sengereme Senrengeti Bariadi Mpwapwa Kigoma Rombo Monduli Muheza Rufiji Kinondoni	Nzega Muleba Kwimba Bunda Maswa	Ngara Magu Meatu Mwanga Kiteto Handeni Bagamoyo
33	Eastern Zone Client Research and Extension oriented Programme	Morogoro Tanga Kilimanjaro Mtwara Mbeya Morogoro Mwanza Kagera Kagera Arusha Shinyanga Kagera Mbeya Iringa Ruvuma Rukwa Dodoma Singida Kilimanjaro	Research Institution Located at Ilonga in Kilosa District Research Institution Located at Mingano in Tanga District Research Institution Located at Moshi @ District Training Institution Located at Nafendenele in Mtwara District Research Institution Located at Uyole in Mbeya District Research institution Located at Ilonga at Kilosa District Research Institution Located at Ukiiguru in Kwimba district Research Institution Located at Mwaruku in Bukoba district Biharamulo Mbulu Maswa Biharamulo Mbeya @ Mufindi Songea Sumbavanga Dodoma @ Singida @ Moshi	Bukoba Meatu Bukombe Bukoba Rungwe Njombe Mbinga Mkasi Mpwapwa Iramba Mwanga	Karagwe Karatu Kahama Karagwe Mbarali	Muleba Muleba Kyela	Ngara
34	Kilimanjaro Agricultural Training center Phase II						
35	Southern Zone Agricultural Research Project						
36	Research and training in agriculture, component of TARP II						
37	Client Oriented Research Programme						
38	District Rural Development Programme Phase III						
39	Small Dairy Support Programme						
40	Rural financial Service Programme						



資料 30

ファイナンシャル・メカニズム説明ペーパー



## JICA-RADAG の活動のご報告

(ファイナンシャル・アドバイザー・グループの活動)

JICA-RADAG

### (ご参考) 今後の ASDP 作成スケジュール

3月15日	ASDP 第1ドラフト配付 (済)
3月21日	FASWOG タスクフォースでのプレゼンテーション
3月28日	ステークホルダー・ワークショップ (30-40名の出席を予定)
4月12日	ファイナル・ドラフトの配付

### 1. ファイナンシャル・アドバイザー・グループ (FAG) のメンバー

メンバー (4人): プレッタ (財務省)、シャンカンゴ (保健省)、フィオナ (アイルランド大使館)、佐々木 (JICA)

### 2. FAG の作業の概要

- ・教育 SP のファイナンシャル・マニュアルをベースに、農業セクターに合うようにアレンジした文書を作成した。
- ・2月11日の第1回会合以来、計 18 回、合計 100 時間以上の作業会合を開催して完成させた。

### 3. ファイナンシャル・メカニズム (ASDP ドラフトの Ch4-5) のポイント

- (1) さまざまなモダリティによって実現されることを文中に明記。(p3 の図を参照)

#### 中央レベルのファンディング (5.3.1)(p72)

- a. 政府財政資金 From domestic revenues collected by the Government
- b. ASDP バスケットファンド
- c. 財政支援
- d. マルチ及び二国間プロジェクト (MTEF を含む政府財政プロセスに反映されることが好ましい)


地方（県）レベルのファンディング（5.3.2）（p73）

- a. 中央政府からの財政資金（Conditional grants from Central Government）
- b. 地方の税収
- c. ASDP バスケットファンドからのグラント
- d. マルチ及び二国間プロジェクト（Multilateral/Bilateral Projects）
- e. NGOs/CBOs のプロジェクト

（2）バスケット・ファンドには、**イヤーマークと、ノン・イヤーマーク（General）の2通りがある**ことを文中に明記。タンザニア側が作成する各種の会計報告も、イヤーマーク分と、ノン・イヤーマーク分に分けて作成される仕組みを採用することを明記。



Figure2. Fund Flow and Budgeting (p76)



#### 4. 今後の展開と課題

- (1) 上記で説明した二国間プロジェクトの存続の確認と、バスケット・ファンドにおけるイヤーマークの適用の確認に加え、以下の一文をファイナンス・メカニズムに関する説明部分の冒頭に入れることで一旦合意。

##### 1. 目的と背景

ASDP は、ASDS の実施プログラムである。それは、全てのステークホルダーに開かれており、参加することが奨励される。ASDP は、バスケット・ファンド、政府財政収入、財政支援、国際機関及び二国間プロジェクトを含む様々なモダリティで実施される。

##### (原文) 1. OBJECTIVE AND PURPOSE OF THIS CHAPTER

ASDP is an implementation program of ASDS. It is open to all stakeholders who are encouraged to engage with the ASDP process. The ASDP will be implemented by various modalities, including ASDP basket funding, budget GOT own revenues, multilateral/ bilateral projects and other appropriate modalities suitable to the relevant stakeholders.

- (2) しかし、ファイナンス・メカニズムに関する説明文書を統合したASDPフレームワーク・ドキュメント（3/15 配付）からは、この一文が削られていた。
- (3) 現在、ASDP フレームワーク・ドキュメントに対して各ドナーがコメントを提出する段階にあり、JICA/ JICA-RADAG として、上記の合意された一文の復活を求めるコメントを策定して提出する準備を進めている。また、3月21日のASDPタスクフォースでも指摘していく見込みである。

(終)

資料 3 1

ESRF 報告書目次



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資料 3 2

今後の ASDP 関連業務表





	Mar.02	Apr.02	May.02	Jun.02	Jul.02	Aug.02	Sep.02	Oct.02	Nov.02	Dec.02	Jan.03	Feb.03	Mar.03	Apr.03	May.03	Jun.03
ASDP																
1. Frame Work Document	Ver1.0 to be released on March 16th.	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
		.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
		.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
2-1. Sub-Programme Document (for 2002.7-2007.6)	Ver1.0 to be released on March 16th.	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
		.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
2-2. Implementation part of the Sub-Programme Document (for 2002.7-2003.6)	Ver1.0 to be released on March 16th.	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
		.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
3. Rolling Plan (for 2002.7-2005.6)	Ver1.0 to be released on March 16th.	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
		.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
4. Financial Manual	Draft reports submitted in February.	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
		.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
5-1. DADP	Draft reports submitted in February.	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
		.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
5-2. DADP preparation manual	Draft reports submitted in February.	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
		.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
6. MoT (one or two)	Draft reports submitted in February.	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
		.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

	Mar.02	Apr.02	May.02	Jun.02	Jul.02	Aug.02	Sep.02	Oct.02	Nov.02	Dec.02	Jan.03	Feb.03	Mar.03	Apr.03	May.03	Jun.03
EOJ/JICA's possible Input																
Sector Project Grant (SCG)																
In-Kind Contribution (IIC:V)																
earmarked Funding (IIC:V)																



資料 33

ASDP Sub-Programme Document の一例



## 23. RURAL INFRASTRUCTURE SUB-PROGRAMME 5.1

### 1. Introduction

The Agricultural Sector Development Strategy (ASDS) and the Rural Development Strategy (RDS) have put much emphasis on the need to improve rural infrastructure, particularly rural transport infrastructure, which is critical to agricultural development and rural development in general. Rural infrastructure provides access to markets and information, technology, credit and input on timely basis.

Tanzania is a large country. The policy framework for the rural transport sector is to have a road network that is well maintained, serving all parts of the economy, one which is integrated to other modes of transport, and providing services that are safe and non-expensive.

However, most of the rural roads in Tanzania are in a poor condition, and are a major constraint to agricultural development, as it limits access to production and market centres. The total road network in Tanzania is estimated at 85,000 km, out of which 10,300 km are trunk roads, 24,700 km regional roads, 20,000 km district roads, 27,550 km feeder roads, and 2,450 km of urban roads. The district and feeder roads (47,550 km) comprise the basic rural road infrastructure under the Local Government Authorities at district level. Taking into account this extensive network, and the limited financial resources to support improvement and maintenance of the entire network, it is worthwhile identifying roads for improvement that can support agricultural development and therefore poverty reduction.

### 2. General Objective

The general objective of the rural infrastructure sub-programme is facilitating the improvement and maintenance of rural infrastructure in order to support agricultural growth and overall rural development.

### 3. Immediate objectives and key interventions

The immediate objectives of the sub-programme is the identification of rural transport needs for agricultural development, and to facilitate the participation of communities and private sector in the rehabilitation and maintenance of rural transport infrastructure, as exemplified in table 23.1 below:-

Table 23.1

S/No.	Immediate objectives	Key interventions
1.	Rural infrastructure improved (under RDS)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Establish rural transport needs for agricultural development.</li> <li>• Develop a mechanism for incorporating demand-driven rural infrastructure component in DDPs.</li> <li>• Develop incentive mechanism to attract private investments in rural infrastructure.</li> </ul>

4. Sub-programme activities, responsibilities, and resource requirements.

The Rural Infrastructure Sub-Programme will be implemented by PO-RALG with the collaboration of the Ministry of Works, Regional Secretariats and Local Government Authorities. The activities are elaborated in tables 23.2, 23.3 and 23.4 below for the different interventions. Total cost for implementation of the sub-programme is estimated to be US\$259,800 or Tshs.254,604,000/= (Exchange rate 1 US Dollar = Tshs.980/=).

Table 23.2: Rural Infrastructure Sub-Programme: Activities, Responsibilities and Indicators

S/No.	Activities	Responsibility	Completion Date	Verifiable Indicators	Means of verification	Assumptions
5.1.1	Output: Study report on Rural Transport needs for Agricultural Development Identified					
5.1.1.1	Preparation of terms of reference for a study of rural transport needs for agricultural development.	DRC	9/2002	TOR Document in place by September 2002.	PO-RALG reports	
5.1.1.2	Identify and select consultant and government task force team	DRC	12/2002	Consultant and Government Team in place by December 2002.	PO-RALG/ (MoW) reports.	Availability of resources and co-operation of MoW.
5.1.1.3	Undertake fieldwork to collect data.	DRC	2/2003	Field data collected by February 2003.	Consultant/Government Task Force Team data reports.	Availability of resources and cooperation of Regional Secretariat and District Council levels.
5.1.1.4	Analyze and compile field collected data.	DRC	3/2003	Analyzed and compiled data in place by March 2003.	Analyzed and compiled data in place.	Resources availability.
5.1.1.5	Finalize study report on rural transport needs for agricultural development.	DRC	4/2003	Study report on rural Transport needs for Agricultural Development in place by April 2003.	-PO-RALG reports -LGAs reports -M&E reports.	Resource availability.
5.1.1.6	Print copies of study report and disseminate to stakeholders as guide for planning and implementation	DRC	05/2003	1000 copies of study report on transport needs for agriculture produced by May 2003	PO-RALG reports	Fund available

S/No	Activity	Responsibility	End Date	Objectively Verifiable Indicators	Means of Verification	Assumptions
5.1.2	Output: Mechanism for Incorporating Demand Driven Rural Infrastructure Development					
5.1.2.1	Prepare TOR for developing a mechanism for incorporating demand driven rural infrastructure in DDPs.	DRC	8/2002	Terms of Reference in place by August 2002	PO-RALG Reports.	Availability of resources.
5.1.2.2	Hire Consultant to develop the mechanism guide.	DRC	10/2002	Expert and contract in place by October 2002.	PO-RALG Reports.	Availability of resources.
5.1.2.3	Prepare draft of the stakeholders.	DRC	12/2002	Draft guide in place by December 2002.	PO-RALG Reports.	Availability of resources.
5.1.2.4	Distribute draft report to stakeholders for comments.	DRC	1/2003	Report stakeholders comments prepared by January 2003	PO-RALG Reports.	Stakeholders to make comments timely.
5.1.2.5	Finalise the draft guide and seek approval for its use.	DRC	2/2003	Final report in place and approved by February 2003.	PO-RALG Reports.	Approval provided to on time.
5.1.2.6	Print copies and disseminate the guide to all stakeholders.	DRC	03/2003	Number of copies distributed by March 2003.	LGA Reports.	Availability of resources.



S/No	Activity	Responsibility	End Date	Objectively Verifiable Indicators	Means Of Verification	Assumptions
5.1.3	Output: Incentive mechanism for private investments in rural infrastructure established					
5.1.3.1	Prepare TOR for study of incentive mechanism to attract private investment in rural infrastructure. Identify and select of consultant.	DRC	12/2002	TOR document in place by December 2002.	PO-RALG reports.	
5.1.3.2	Undertake the incentive study and design of mechanism.	DRC	01/2003	Consultants selected by January, 2003.	PO-RALG reports.	
5.1.3.3	Distribute draft to stakeholders for comments on progressed incentive mechanism	DRC/	03/2003	Draft incentive mechanism document in place by March, 2003.	PO-RALG reports.	Availability of resources.
5.1.3.4	Finalize incentive mechanism incorporating workshop comments.	DRC/	04/2003	Report on stakeholders comments prepared by April 2003	PO-RALG reports.	Stakeholders comments made and received timely
5.1.3.5	Process approval of incentive mechanism for implementation.	DRC	04/2003	Final report on incentive mechanism in place by April 2003.	PO-RALG reports.	Availability of resources.
5.1.3.6	Print, disseminate and publicize incentive mechanism.	DRC	05/2003	Approval of incentive mechanisms by May 2003.	PO-RALG reports	Approval provided on time.
5.1.3.7		DRC	05/2003	Number of copies printed and disseminated by May 2003.	PO-RALG reports	Availability of resources.

Table 23.3 Financial Cost of the Rural Infrastructure Sub-Programme is US \$

Output: 5.1.1 Study Report on Rural Transport Needs for Agriculture Development Established

No.	Other resources	Unit of Measure	Unit cost	2002/03		2003/04		2004/05		2005/06		2006/07	
				Qty	Total cost	Qty	Total cost	Qty	Total cost	Qty	Total cost	Qty	Total cost
5.1.1.3	1 lead consultant for 20 days	Week	1,750	4	7								
	7 Consultant engineers (local) for 20 days	Week	3500	4	14								
	7 Consultant Economist (local) for 20 days	Week	3500	4	14								
	DSA for 1 lead Consultants for 20 days	Day	40	20	0.8								
	DSA for 14 other Consultants (Engineers and Economists) for 20 days (280 days)	day	40	280	11.2								
	DSA for 7 Drivers for 20 days (140 person days)	Day	20	140	2.8								
	Fuel for 7 vehicles at 6000ls each (42000ls)	L/Res	-0.6	4200	2.5								
	Sub Total				52.3								
5.1.1.4	1 Lead Consultant for 15 days	Week	1750	3	5								
	7 Consultants (engineers) for 15 days	Week	3500	3	10.5								
	7 Consultants (economists) for 15 days	Week	3500	3	10.5								
	DSA for 2 Drivers for 15 days	Day			0.6								
	DSA for 2 Secretaries for 20 days each	Day			0.8								
	Miscellaneous/sundry items	/sum			2								
	Sub - total				29.7								
5.1.1.5	1 lead consultant for 10 days	Week	1750	2	3.5								
	Document production 1000 copies	No.	20	1000	20.0								
	Document postage 1000 copies	No.	5	1000	5								
	Sub-total				28.5								
Output: 5.1.2 Mechanism for Incorporating Demand Driven Rural Infrastructure Developed													
5.1.2.3	1 Consultant for 40 days	Week	1750	8	14								
	Sub-total				14								
5.1.2.4	Letter to District Council												
	Print and bind 200 copies of draft mechanism for comments	No.	20	200	4								
	Postage for 200 copies	No.	5	200	1								
	Sub-total				5								
5.1.2.5	Consultant for 10 days	Week	1750	2	3.5								
	Sub-total				3.5								

		No.	20	2000	400					400
5.1.2.6	Printing/binding 2000 copies of guide	No.	5	2000	10	-	-	-	-	10
	Postage for 2000 copies to be disseminated -	No.			50	-	-	-	-	50
	<b>Sub-total</b>									
	<b>Output: 5.1.3 Incentive Mechanism for Private Investments in Rural Infrastructures Established</b>		500	1	5					5
5.1.3.2	Communication and advertising costs				5					5
	<b>Sub-total</b>		1750	12	21					21
5.1.3.3	Consultant for 60 days to study and design incentive mechanism	Week			21					4
	<b>Sub-total</b>									
	Printing and binding 200 copies of draft report on incentive mechanism for comments	Each	20	200	4					1
5.1.3.4	Postage for 200 copies	Each	5	200	1					5.0
	<b>Sub-total</b>		1750	3	5.3					5.3
5.1.3.5	Consultant for 15 days	Week			5.3					40
	<b>Sub-total</b>									
5.1.3.7	Printing and binding 200 copies of draft report on incentive mechanism report	Each	20	2000	40					10
	Postage of 2000 copies	Each	5	2000	10					50.3
	<b>Sub-total</b>			50.3						259.8
	<b>Sub-Programme total</b>									



ASDP Sub-Programme Document 費用要約表



Summary of Sub Program Costs

No.	Sub Programme	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	2005/06	2006/07	Total
1	Institutional	13,016,961	10,479,204	7,707,145	5,195,110	7,742,248	44,140,668
2	Commercial Sector Support	3,002,517	3,616,023	3,136,509	2,837,464	45,250	12,639,763
3	Cooperative Promotion	210,007	455,308	436,578	313,278	281,007	1,696,178
4	Agro Mechanization	321,964	173,173	296,612	173,173	321,357	1,286,279
5	Agro Processing	268,945	157,012	273,673	122,755	150,000	972,385
6	Agricultural Extension	7,661,088	8,504,876	8,313,486	6,395,332	6,292,509	37,167,291
7	Crop Protection	4,805,162	525,509	241,550	51,306	8,823	5,632,350
8	Agricultural Research	5,533,214	2,765,829	2,151,902	2,238,591	1,603,673	14,293,209
9	Agricultural Training	6,173,545	5,483,334	5,758,027	4,627,775	4,561,678	26,604,359
10	Soil Conservation and Soil Fertility	590,684	657,929	511,704	296,153	299,010	2,355,480
11	Irrigation and Water Management	1,459,812	1,581,181	1,901,122	1,379,000	535,092	6,856,207
12	Agricultural Information	3,944,629	1,527,419	1,089,018	848,570	1,048,386	8,458,022
13	Post-Harvest Management	268,855	88,611	86,022	86,022	86,022	615,532
14	Range Management Development and Management	3,160,353	4,495,514	3,324,983	1,454,630	1,729,175	14,164,655
15	Animal Health	11,569,479	9,895,810	7,196,867	7,337,869	4,193,194	39,993,219
16	Agricultural Financing	727,993	256,032	462,485	220,032	180,313	1,846,855
17	Cooperative Inspectorate	235,611	51,624	4,885	34,740	37,689	364,549
18	Agricultural Inputs	2,650,805	2,096,167	1,418,144	566,235	566,235	7,297,586
19	Marketing Infrastructure	7,699,044	6,823,656	6,074,575	2,784,025	1,182,346	24,563,646
20	Contract Farming/ Service	266,408	411,510	563,442	124,910	123,198	1,489,468
21	Marketing Research and Promotion	239,497	139,080	100,560	94,080	79,080	652,297

22	Rural Infrastructure	259,800	0	0	0	0	260,000
23	Other Crosscutting Issues	771,750	272,581	242,226	219,016	197,151	1,702,724
<b>TOTAL BUDGET ASDP</b>		<b>74,578,583</b>	<b>60,257,382</b>	<b>51,293,515</b>	<b>37,376,546</b>	<b>31,239,916</b>	<b>254,745,942</b>

