

国総研セミナー 価値観の変化と人口減少



平成 14 年 1 月

国際協力事業団
国際協力総合研修所

総 研

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表紙写真：バングラデシュ・ナルシンディの村(この村
では女性のための識字教育や収入創出活動、
性教育が行われている)
(写真：国際協力事業団)

国総研セミナー
「価値観の変化と人口減少」

1. 日時：平成 14 年 1 月 30 日(水)15:00～17:00
2. 場所：国際協力事業団 国際協力総合研修所 2 階 大会議室
3. 講師：Dr. Dirk J. van de Kaa(アムステルダム大学名誉教授)
4. 議事
 - (1) 開会
 - (2) 講演者紹介 尾崎美千生 国際協力事業団 国際協力専門員
 - (3) 講演 ダーク・J・ヴァンデカー アムステルダム大学名誉教授
 - (4) 質疑応答
 - (5) 閉会
5. 経緯

JICA では平成 13 年度より「第二次人口と開発分野別援助研究会」を開始いたしました。その中でアムステルダム大学のダーク・J・ヴァンデカー(Dr. Dirk J. van de Kaa)名誉教授を招聘し、「価値観の変化と人口減少」と題して講演をお願いいたしました。

ダーク・J・ヴァンデカー博士は、1971年にオーストラリア国立大学で人口学の博士号を取得後、同年から1987年までオランダ学際人口研究所(NIDI)の所長を務めると同時に、1977年から1998年までアムステルダム大学で人口学の教授を務めたオランダ人口学の第一人者です。

同博士には、先進国の少子化現象に関して多数の著書があり、主著である『ヨーロッパの第二の人口転換』(1987年)にて同博士の持論である「第二の人口転換」論を提唱しました。「第二の人口転換」論とは、1960年以降のヨーロッパで続いている出生率の低下、また、晩婚化や

晩産化などの結婚に関する変化は、19世紀から20世紀前半に亘って起こった「第一の人口転換」とは異なる現象であり、それをもたらしたのは、個人の自己実現・選択の自由を最優先することへ変化した近年の価値観である、というものです。

今回のセミナーでは、この「第二の人口転換」についてわかりやすく講演をしていただきました。

6. 講師略歴：1971 オーストラリア国立大学にて人口学の
博士号取得
1971-1987 オランダ学際人口研究所(NIDI)勤務
1977-1998 アムステルダム大学人口学教授
7. 要約：PP4 ～ 8 参照
8. 講演内容：PP9 ～ 参照

国際協力事業団 国総研セミナー
「価値観の変化と人口減少」
ダーク・ヴァン・デ・カー博士
アムステルダム大学名誉教授

IFIC Seminar, Japan International Cooperation Agency
“The Demographic Future of the More Developed Region”
Dr. Dirk J. van de Kaa
Professor Emeritus
University of Amsterdam

< 日時・開催場所 >

2002 年 1 月 30 日(水)午後 3:00 ~ 5:00
国際協力事業団 国際協力総合研修所
2 階 大会議室

< Date・Venue >

Wednesday, 30 January, 2002 3:00 ~ 5:00 PM
Large conference room,
the 2nd floor, IFIC, JICA

～ プログラム・Program ～

3:00 開会

Opening

3:00-3:10 講演者紹介

Introduction of the Lecturer

尾崎美千生
国際協力事業団
国際協力総合研修所
国際協力専門員

Mr. Michio Ozaki
Senior Advisor,
Institute for International Cooperation,
Japan International Cooperation Agency

3:10-4:00 講演

Lecture

ダーク・ヴァン・
デ・カー博士
アムステルダム大学
名誉教授

Dr. Dirk J. van de Kaa
Professor Emeritus,
University of Amsterdam

4:00-4:10 休憩

Break

4:10-5:00 質疑応答

Question and Answer

5:00 閉会

Closing

セミナー概要

<講演内容>

1. 我々は自分たちがホモサピエンスという種に属している動物であることを忘れてはならない。他の動物と同様、我々は子供を産む能力を与えられている。

子を産む能力は普通使っている能力よりもずっと大きい。では、女性は平均何人の子供を産む能力を持っているのであろうか。女性が25年間で平均20カ月に一回子供を産むとすると15人子供を産むことが可能であると言える。日本などでは能力の10%しか使っていないことになる。

2. 子どもを産みすぎないためには幾つかの方法があるが、子どもを産みすぎないために、伝統社会では遅く結婚する習慣があった。アイルランドでは30歳で結婚するのが平均だった。出生力をコントロールするその他の方法に、避妊、中絶、禁欲がある。また、母乳で育児している期間は次の子どもを授かる可能性は低下する。

3. 第一の人口転換とは、死亡率が低下し、出生率はそのままであると、人口増加率が一時的に増加するものの、死亡率の低下に伴い、出生率も低下するという、多産多死から少産少死に至る一連の転換のことである。先進国で第一の人口転換が起こったときには、余剰労働力が生じた結果、ヨーロッパからアメリカ、カナダ、オーストラリア、ニュージーランド、ラテン・アメリカに多数移住した。

4. 人口転換が起こった後に関する伝統的な仮説は出生率と死亡率はほぼ等しく推移するというものであった。しかし、この仮説は正しくなかった。出生率は死亡率よりも遙かに低下し、人口置き換え水準(一人の女性あたり2.1人の子どもを産む水準)を多くの国で下

回った。これが新しいアンバランスでいわゆる第二の人口転換である。第二の人口転換には多くの先進国が直面している。

5. 第一の人口転換は1830年頃始まり、主に利他的な理由に動機付けられていた。すなわち、親が子供に十分な教育を授けるために出生を抑制したのである。それに対して1965年頃始まった第二の人口転換は、個人的な理由による転換である。第一の人口転換の時には、望む家族の数に達してから、避妊を行った。しかし、経口ピルが市場に出回っている現在では、若い人たちは常に避妊をしている。妊娠したいときにのみ、避妊を止めるのである。子供を持ちたい時に、子供を持つことは親の生活を豊かにする。これを自己満足的な妊娠という。女性の中にはシングルマザーになることを選択するものもあるし、多くの片親の家族がある。また家族関係も多様化し、同棲という関係も増加している。
6. 出生率と家族のあり方だけではなく、死亡率も変化した。すなわち、社会的な死亡率から生物学的な死亡率への転換である。以前は社会的ステイタスが高ければ感染症にかかるリスクも下がるため、主に社会的要因により死亡率が決定していたが、先進国では現在、ほとんどの場合生物学的問題によってのみ死亡する。つまり社会環境よりも生物学的な条件によって寿命が決定する。
7. 国によって違いはあるが、概して同棲中の出生率が増加しているため、より重要になっている。1970年には概して出生率は置き換え水準以上の2.2～2.5であった。しかし1985年には出生率は低いレベルに移行し、1999年には出生率は置き換え水準以下になった。人口は減少に転じ、多くの国では移民を受け入れている。これについては一時的なものか恒久的なものなのかという疑問がある。

8. いわゆる「マテリアリスト」から「ポスト・マテリアリスト」への移行がある。より広い概念でいうと「モダニズム」から「ポスト・モダニズム」への移行がある。それでは一体「ポスト・マテリアリスト」や「ポスト・モダニズム」という概念は何なのであろうか。経済的に安定すると、人々は自由な時間を欲し、自己実現の機会、芸術的表現能力の発揮、生活の質に重きを置くようになる。そして、多様性が重んじられ、世界観に関し、異なった視点が持たれるようになった。
9. 1970年からEUではマテリアリズムにかかる評点が計算されているが、着実に上昇している。ポスト・マテリアリズムの評点は子供を持つ平均年齢に関係があり、ポスト・マテリアリズム的な態度は子どもが産まれる年齢に影響を持つ。南ヨーロッパや西ヨーロッパは比較的伝統的な社会であり、子どもの出産年齢は比較的低い。これはポスト・マテリアリズムの評点と出産年齢の相関を示している。ポスト・モダニズムは同棲の割合にも現れ、ポスト・モダニズムの女性は遅く結婚し、子どもを遅く産む。
10. 長期的な予測をすると出生率は若干上昇するであろうが、人口置き換え水準よりは下回るであろう。また、寿命は伸長するため、最適リスク戦略によれば、現在生まれただばかりの女性は100歳を超えるまで生きるかもしれない。他方、国際人口移動は増加するであろう。コントロールを試みても効果的に対処するのは難しいかもしれない。例えばEUは移民を受け入れる選択肢しかないが、1000人に対して、3~5人に抑えるだろう。第二の人口転換の後、高齢化が進み死亡率は若干上昇するだろう。出生率は低いままで、死亡率より若干低いレベルにとどまるであろう。そのため、人口増加率は若干マイナスになると思われる。いくらかの国は出生率が低下しないように対策をしなければならないと思われる。国際人口移動は増加す

るだろうが、その際移住者の権利に留意することが重要である。また、リプロダクティブ・ライツも重要である。先進国の将来は過去の状況とは異なり、開発途上国との関係を見なおさなければならない。

<質疑応答>

Q．図13、14のX軸のポスト・マテリアリスト・スコアとプロポーシオン・ポストモダンのインデックスは何を意味するのか。また、このインデックスをどういう形で取られたのか。

A．ポスト・マテリアリストかマテリアリストなのかを調べるために4つの点を考えなければならない。それらは「政府はもっと法と秩序に力を入れるべきである。」「人々は政府の重要決定に発言権を持つべきである。」「政府は物価の高騰と戦うべきである。」「人々はもっと自由を与えられるべきである。」という質問である。「物価と戦い、法と秩序を守るべきである」という人はマテリアリストであり、「国民はもっと政府の決定に発言すべきであるし、もっと自由になるべきである」という人はポストマテリアリストであると分類した。マテリアリストとポスト・マテリアリストの差を計算して評点になる。

Q．途上国と先進国の関係が変わっていくということについてもう少し詳しく説明して欲しい。

A．移民の問題が現在でもあるが、近い将来先進国が移民の流れに対処する問題を抱えるであろうということである。

Q．移民について、ヨーロッパでは移民や難民を多数受け入れているが、日本は工場を移転しているというように状況が異なると思うが如何か。

A．一時的な移民ということはある得ないため、恒久的な移民が敬遠する場合には、一時的な移民を受け入れるべきではない。政府の公

式見解として移民を希望しないオランダのような立場の国は、明確な移民政策を持つべきである。

Q . ポスト・マテリアリストとかポスト・モダンという分析の中に女性の要素があると思うが、女性のエンパワメントにこれらの概念がどのくらい有効であるか。

A . 途上国は女性の地位に対して大きくエンパワメントしなければならないが、男女それぞれが変わらなければならないため、女性だけをターゲットにしてはならない。

Q . 第二の人口転換論は出生率が置き換え水準まで戻らないという意味で悲観論であるが、一定の方向が長く続くとそれに反対する力がまた働いてくるのではないかと主張する人もいる。これに対するお考えは如何か。

A . 女性に子どもが何人欲しいかと聞くと平均2.2であるが、実際には晩婚化などで1人しか産めないという状況がある。アンバランスがあれば必ず自然にバランスに戻ると言うことは起こりうるが、近い将来のヨーロッパでは出生率増加ではなく、移民でバランスと取る可能性が高い。対策を実施すれば長期的に成功するかもしれないが、自動的に出生率が上がるという方向に行くとは思えない。

以 上

Introduction of the Lecturer

Mediator (Mr. Ozaki, Senior Advisor, Institute for International Cooperation, JICA)

Good afternoon everyone. Today we have with us Dr. Dirk J. van de Kaa, Professor Emeritus of University of Amsterdam. He is a renowned demographer in Europe as well as in the Netherlands. We have also with us Ms. Dirk J. van de Kaa, who is a sociologist. Please give a warm hand to Ms. Dirk J. van de Kaa.

You will find a profile about him on the handout you have on the table. Besides that, I would like to share with you a memory of the international conference in Amsterdam. Under the sponsorship of the UNFPA was the international Conference, “The Population Strategy in the 21st Century” held in 1989. I was attending the conference as a press reporter and it was Dr. Dirk J. van de Kaa who chaired the conference. I was extremely impressed with his fine chairpersonship and still remember it vividly.

In this seminar he is going to make a presentation on “The Demographic Future of the More Developed Region”. He has advocated the theory called “Second Demographic Transition”, which is well known in Europe but in Japan only among a few demographers. Therefore, today we would like to have the opportunity to hear more about “Second Demographic Transition”, too.

Much has been discussed on the declining fertility rate in Japan that is going to be a very important policy agenda item in Japan and I believe that today’s information will be of great help for us in order to proceed with our policy discussion.

Now we would like to go into the presentation by Dr. Dirk J. van de Kaa. Thank you.

Lecture

Dr. Dirk J. van de Kaa (Professor Emeritus, University of Amsterdam)

Thank you very much Mr. Chairman for that very kind introduction. I feel very privileged to be here and have the opportunity to exchange views with you. I must say that I feel a little tricked by the organizers. They asked me to prepare a talk to non-specialists.

I have been asked to talk about the demographic future of the more developed region because while you are working on the less developed region, it is important to know what happens in the rest of the world and what they mean for your work.

I will follow the Power Point presentation and you see the first statement is “People are Animals”. While it is not an original observation from me but made by Jim Vor Pal, who was the director of an important institute for demography in Germany, he meant to say that we never should forget that we also belong to certain species, the species of *Homo sapiens*. Just like other species, we are gifted with the possibility of reproduction. Just like for most other species, our capacity to reproduce is far more than what we normally use. We can discuss the question that women in less developed countries have a large number of children on average. But you may at the same time say, “Why do they have so few number of children in more developed countries?”

Have you ever thought about the reproductive capacity of women? How many children could each woman have on average if she were to spend her entire reproductive career trying to produce as many children as she could have? You can follow a fairly easy calculation.

Figure 1

Reproductive Capacity

Minimum average birth interval:

| | |
|----------------------------|------------|
| 1. gestation | 9 months |
| 2. pregnancy wastage | 2 months |
| 3. waiting time conception | 7.5 months |
| 4. post-partum infecund | 1.5 months |
| | <hr/> |
| | 20 months |

$$(45 - 15) - 5 = 25 * 12 = 300 \text{ months}$$

$$\text{Capacity } 300 : 20 = 15 \text{ children}$$

It depends of course on the interval between births. Normally there is a period of nine months of gestation, the pregnancy. Not all pregnancies are carried to term, so some pregnancy ends spontaneously. On average, that adds two months to an interval. The waiting time to conception is on average 7.5 month. It is not always the case that people want to have a child immediately after having one. On average, the waiting time is 7.5 months. After a child has been delivered, it takes a little while for pregnancy, for ovulation, for the possibility to conceive a child. That takes 1.5 years. These are calculations that have in fact been developed by John Bongaarts, who was here earlier. So it is just an average of 20 months. Now take the reproductive lifespan of a woman as between ages 45 and 15. That would be 30 years. However, as there are all sorts of problems due to complications of birth and illnesses and so on, in a certain period in their reproductive span women are not fertile. That reduces the reproductive lifespan to an effective fertile period of 25 years. 25 years times 12 months is 300 months. So the total capacity available is 300 months divided by 20 months, that is 15; consequently, you might say that if all women were to use their reproductive capacity to the full, we would on average have 15 children. As you all know, that has never been witnessed anywhere. The highest figure that I know is amongst the Christian sect in the

United States where it reached 11 children. Even in most developing countries, the figure is not as high as that. It is usually about 7 or 6 children.

This means that all populations have always had lower effective fertility than their capacity is. The problem we have now in most highly industrialized societies such as Japan is that the average number of children is only 1.5. This means that the effective usage of the capacity to reproduce is only 10 percent, which is a very low proportion.

This shows a classical family in the Netherlands.



It is a farmer's family. You see all the children line up, a little baby on the lap of the woman. Many of those large families left the Netherlands to migrate to the United States, to Australia and elsewhere when the Netherlands had an over capacity.

What determinants, what fraction is used during reproductive period? There are three main factors.

Figure 3

Proximate Determinants

- ♣ exposure (union)
- ♣ fertility control in union (contraception, abortus provocatus, abstinence)
- ♣ natural control in union (lactation, frequency intercourse, sterility, wastage, end fertility period)

The first is exposure. That means people have to have relations. A woman has to have relation with a man in order to be able to conceive a child. So the time spent in union is important. And in many traditional societies, people married very late indeed so as to reduce the time available to conceive children. Age of marriage of 30 was not uncommon and was the average age in Ireland for example. That was one possibility to reduce effective fertility. Second possibility to control fertility was in the union. You have the possibilities of contraception, abortion, and abstinence, or not having sexual relations. And in most traditional societies and in the less developed countries, you have the third very important factor which is called “natural control within union”, that is when women are breast-feeding their babies for a long period, say 20 or more months, that means the possibility of conceiving another child is much reduced. Also the frequency of intercourse sometimes reduced the possibility to conceive a child; it is the simple fact that woman goes back home to her parents, for example, to have the child delivered. Sterility may occur, pregnancy wastage and the fertility period may end earlier as I say due to complications in child birth and so on.

It is interesting to know that in most Western societies, for example in the Netherlands and possibly also in early Japan, before contraceptive usage fertility

control within union began; it was reducing the time span in union, which was the important factor. Natural control in union is the central point in many less developed countries, where breast-feeding is taking place for long periods of time.

Figure 4

Formula

$$TFR = I(m) * I(c) * I(a) * I(l) * TF$$

TFR = observed number of children

TF = number possible

m = proportion married

c = not-contracepting

a = abortions

l = lactational infecundability

As you see in Figure 4, you can establish the relationship between the total fertility rate what is effective born and the TF. The total capacity is reduced by the factors: marriage, contraception, abortion and lactational infecundability. All these factors are usually lower than 1 and maximum is 1. And they are always lower than 1 and as a result, the total capacity is reduced to the effective total fertility rate.

It is important to note that at certain times in modern societies mortality was reduced and an unbalance was created. Population began to grow much more rapidly than previous thought and it is when the first transition began. Population reacted by counteracting the affects of mortality decline led by controlling fertility within union. They reacted with relatively simple means, with interrupters such as condoms. It took a long period before the first transition was completed.

The first transition was you could best see as a reaction of a population against


an unprecedented high level of population growth caused by the decline in mortality. It was an unbalance and the assumption was that a new balance would result in that fertility has once declined to the levels that would be commensurate with the low levels of mortality.

During the period of rapid population growth, that is, the first demographic transition in the developed region, the population growth was enormous. There were, however, some parts of the world that were considered to belong to no one, and the population expanded in those parts. People migrated from Europe to the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, and also a large number did to Latin America. So you might say that the excess capacity of population resulted from the first demographic transition in European countries, mainly in Western Europe led to an explosion and a great expansion of the population to other parts of the world.

Europe increased its share of the world population from 18.2% in 1500 to 22.7% in 1950. There has been an increased contrast in demographic structure between less developed and the more developed countries. Since the International Conference on Population held in Mexico, efforts have been made to generate the transition in less developed regions. The efforts were to try and speed up the first demographic transition in the less developed regions in order to prevent the population of the world from growing too rapidly.

Figure 5


Model of First and Second Demographic Transitions



I have developed a graph as shown in Figure 5, which shows the classical lines of the first demographic transition. Here (Death rateの線) is the death rate. This (Birth rateの線) is the birth rate. In the beginning they were close together, which is a classic situation. And then the death rate started to decline and the birth rate declined only after that. As a result there came a period of high natural growth rate as shown in Figure 5, and during that period you got people leaving the now developed countries.

This was the classic model of demographic transition. The general assumption was that the birth rate and the death rate would become almost equal, so that the lines of the birth rate would then run parallel to that of death rate. The two rates would be in balance and either rate would have no further growth. This new situation would continue ever after. That was the idea of the classic theory of demographic transition.

When I studied demography, the thought was that we would go to this new situation, this new balance. That did not take place. That is another question that I will come back to slightly later in this lecture. There has been a great deal of research into the determinants of fertility levels. It is a very complicated thing but I would like to show you the sort of research that has taken place.



First of all, there are, of course always, social changes that have taken place. Changes in societies have different dimensions in Figure 6: Biological and technical factors, for example, for more recent time, the introduction of modern contraception; structural economic factors such as levels of income per capita and the cultural dimension, e.g. what people learn from their parents and what the society is like. Then there are various other aspects as shown in Level 2 that has played roles of determinants: improvement in health and sanitation; industrialization and urbanization; increased education and greater individualization, and normative regulation such as what the society impose on you. And then in Level 3 these are parts of the so-called proximate determinants: the economy of the family; the value of children; ideational change; and institutional change. All these factors played roles of determinants and have been researched extensively.

What we see currently is that fertility declines further than was expected in the more developed regions. To most demographers' great surprise, fertility did not decline to the required level to counteract mortality. Fertility declined much further than mortality. In fact fertility went far below the so-called replacement level. Replacement level is the one on which each woman would be replaced by a girl

who would live long enough to create offspring. It is a level of 2.1 children per woman to meet replacement level. For when a woman gets a boy, she would normally also get a girl. I will later show you the current levels of observed fertility that are much lower than 2.1. This seems to be creating a new unbalance and the so-called “Second Demographic Transition”. Second demographic transition is a new unbalanced situation, which we are now facing in most developed and highly industrialized countries. The question is what will happen to rectify this unbalance.

The idea that there were two transitions was developed by a colleague of mine, Ron Restagi and myself. That came about because both of us had been working in the field of comparative studies from the 1970s onwards and had published that. At a given time I was asked to prepare a special volume for a journal just like the Journal for Japanese population problems but this was for the Netherlands and he and I sat together and we started to discuss which person should write on what particular topic. Then when we reviewed, it seemed to us that all topics had undergone drastic change since mid 1965. We decided that it seemed as if a second demographic transition was taking place. It was a surprise for us and there was a great deal of excitement in fact to see that happened. We published it under the title “Two Demographic Transitions” but with a big question mark. We did that because the idea was new to us, we did not know how well we could defend it to our colleagues and we also wanted to make it difficult for people to joke about it, to say “Why didn’t you think of the “Third Transition” and maybe we will have a “Fourth Transition” and something like that. So we put a question mark first. When I started to think about it more and started to publish about it more, I came to the conclusion that it was really a topic, something that could be defended very well and then we call it “Europe’s Second Demographic Transition”.

If you want to contrast the first and the second transition, you might say that the first transition that began around 1830 and ended in 1965 was mainly motivated by altruistic reasons. Parents were concerned not to have more children than they

could provide for, not more children than they could give a proper education because they have discovered that it was important to have good education in order to get ahead in society. If you had to sell your labor and not to work on your father's farm or in your father's occupation, you had to have the necessary skills to make your time valuable. So investment in children was quite important for their parents. The parents moreover made sure that they did not have so many children. They wanted to have no more than they could care for and they invested heavily in the education of their children. To give an example, I am the middle of family of not more than three children. My parents married very late, so that they had not a long period of exposure and at the same time they made sure that they had no more children than three so that they could give us a proper education. The generation before that, they would normally have 6 or 7 children. The generation after has smaller families again. So we call this "The Altruistic Transition" because it was mainly motivated by parents who want to do the best they could for their children. There was also no divorce because if you divorce, you could not care for your children carefully. So even if people did not like each other very much, they stayed together for the benefit of the children.

In contrast, you may say that "The Second Demographic Transition", if you give one term, it is the "Individualistic Transition". It is now more about individual self-fulfillment. Self-fulfillment is used for one's own capacity that motivates people to the full. I will come back to that later.

It is fairly easy to denote what was happening and I once said when we have the situation where the King child, the child who was the center of the family. The King child had parents. For the parents who stay together for the King child, we now have a King pair with a child. It is only when the couple feel that the child will enrich their relationship and enrich their lives, that they will have a child. And one child usually gives all the satisfactions that the parents need. They do not necessarily have two or three, one child is maybe enough to have the experience of being a parent and so on. Of course ladies and gentlemen I have

exaggerated a little but I have made the points. Also there was a period when nearly everyone married, the golden age of marriage. Then cohabitation became more popular. You might think it as the dawn of cohabitation. Also, very effective and very important also was that while in the first transition, parents tried to begin conception, when their family was completed and use contraception to prevent the birth of further child. Now certainly after oral contraception became on the market, what you see is that young people contracept all the time; they use oral contraception for example, as this is quite normal. Only when they feel that the conception is desirable they stop using contraception. And then when they want to have a conception, this conception will enrich their life. We called it “Self-fulfilling Conception”. As a consequence, we have moved from the uniform family of parents with two or three children, the standard nuclear family, to a much more pluralistic family and house hold time. People live together in various relationships. Some women select to be single mothers. There are many single parent families and other families. There is marriage, there is remarriage, and there are all sorts of relationships, cohabitating relationships. So the family pattern has become much more complicated.

But it is not only fertility and family that have changed. Also there have been important changes in mortality. I have this “The Shift from Social Mortality to Biological Mortality”. The nature of this is as follows. While previously it depended a lot on your social status, your status in society, your exposure to infectious diseases and so on how long you would live. Now the important determinant is your biological characteristics. If you are lucky, you live healthy and you take care of yourself and you eat properly as most Japanese seem to do. You will find that it is only biological problems that will lead to the end of your life. Some sort of genetic, predetermined problem is then essential. There is an important shift from social to biological mortality. If any of you is lucky enough to have become a father or a mother recently, according to Jim Fopel, you might safely expect your child to live to reach their hundredth birthday. He thinks that

this is what currently born children in industrialized countries may expect. For other people it is a little mess than that. But he foresees a very important increase in life expectancy. Life expectancy determined as I say not by social circumstances, but by biological conditions. And also migration has been changing. At least that change has occurred in almost all industrialized countries. I know Japan is the exception. Where instead of an area where surplus population was sent to other parts of the world, they are now on the receiving end and they have become areas of centers of migration. Large numbers of people moved there controlled, documented and undocumented.

The second transition has really created a number of very important shifts, which occurred in virtually all industrialized countries. In Europe the child has become such a rarity that if one is born, they wrap it in a flag of the European. That is the King child. So few children are being born. And this one is a classical the pair with a King child. You can see that the two, the father and the mother, both care for the child and in fact the man is caring it like normally a woman would do. That is a bit of the change in attitude, which I will come to talk about later.

Figure 7

Two Norwegian Cohorts in 1988

| | 1945 | 1960 |
|---------------------------|------|------|
| Med. age 1st intercourse | 18.4 | 16.6 |
| Use of pill/IUD | 11% | 63% |
| At least 1 abortion > 20 | 5% | 18% |
| Med. age 1 child | 23.2 | 25.2 |
| Unmarried cohab. 1 child | 3% | 26% |
| Single at 1 child | 10% | 13% |
| Med. age 1 marriage | 22.1 | 24.7 |
| Med. age 1 cohabitation | 21.8 | 20.6 |
| % marriage prec. cohabit. | 14% | 60% |

Let me give an example of how this has affected various groups of people in Europe. As shown in Figure 7, I have taken two cohorts, two groups of women born in different times, 1945 and 1960. You see that the median age of intercourse has declined from the age of 18.4 to 16.6. Not the same figures but the similar change has occurred in Japan by the way. Going back to Figure 7, the use of pill in Norway has increased tremendously from 11% to 63%. This is perfectly contraceptive population. Having had at least one abortion is 5% then, now 18%. The median age at birth of the first child has gone up from 23 to 25. Unmarried cohabiting and then having a child is a rarity for this cohort and now 25% are not married when they have their first child. The percentage of conceiving first child of a single parent in 1960 is 13%. The median age of the first marriage has gone up. The median age of the first cohabitation has gone down. So women and men start living together at a younger age. The proportion of married couples that have cohabited before marriage has increased to 60%. It is quite normal for young girls in Norway to first live together with their boyfriends for a while before entering into marriage and sometimes they do not get married at all.


Figure 8

**Family Formation Women Aged 30-34
(early 90s)**

| | <u>Cum. % by 25</u> | | | <u>At birth 1st Ch.</u> | | |
|-------------|---------------------|------|-----|-------------------------|------|-----|
| | Nm | Marr | Coh | Nm | Marr | Coh |
| Sweden | 16 | 6 | 79 | 8 | 27 | 48 |
| France | 18 | 33 | 49 | 7 | 56 | 15 |
| Italy | 38 | 55 | 6 | 4 | 68 | 3 |
| Hungary | 10 | 75 | 16 | 5 | 81 | 4 |
| Netherlands | 24 | 31 | 44 | 2 | 61 | 6 |


Figure 8 shows data from the fertility and family surveys carried out in Europe,

family formation. I will give a number of countries to show you that it is certainly not uniform. The percentage of never married women at age 25 is only 16% in Sweden. It is 38% in Italy, which indicates that they marry very late. In the Netherlands it amounts to 24%. In France, Italy and Hungary marriage is still quite popular. The cohabitation rate in France is 49%. In Sweden 79% of women have cohabitated before the age of 25. And in Hungary where there is housing shortage, that is much less easy to cohabit. In the Netherlands the cohabitation rate is 44%. Now what was the status at the birth of the first child? You see that in Sweden it is quite normal to have a child while they are cohabiting. The survey shows the marriage rate is 27%, while the cohabitation rate is 48% when they have their first children. Marriage in the classical country, such as Italy, there are still people who tend to be married before they have a child and the same is true in Hungary's case. But on the whole, fertility within cohabiting relationship becomes more important.



How dramatic the shift in total fertility rate has been as shown in this figure 9, which shows fertility rates in 1999, 1985 and 1970. You see that in 1970 the fertility was normally over the replacement level, 2.2 to 2.5 children a woman. In

1985 the fertility rate has shifted to the lower level. The peak is 1.8 to 1.9 while you see that in nearly all 40 countries in 1999, the fertility rate is normally well below replacement level.



I cannot show all the figures in details, but figure 10, the list of European countries by the level of migration, shows how important migration has become. I have indicated in figure 10 that the countries written in italics are where fertility decline is actually occurring but where the rate of natural population growth is below zero. This means that there is negative population growth. In the right column of figure 10 you can see that most of the countries in the coulumn have immigration: Iceland; Ireland; Luxembourg; Norway and Slovenia. Even some countries of former Eastern Europe are still losing a little bit of its population but not very much at all, so that migration really has become a trend in those parts of the world.

Now we move to the 64,000 dollar question, Euro question, that is, whether it is seen temporary or permanent. We say immediately that the main problem which we face is that we cannot explain it as a temporary phenomenon. If there were indications that it was simply a temporary phenomenon, there would be no great

discussion about it. It is most likely that this is a more permanent change. What then is the explanation? Of course, as always, there are economic and social factors involved and it is no doubt that these are important, such as levels of income, labor force participation and so on. I do not deny that but what important are possibly also value changes, changes in the way people look at themselves and look at society. I am going to try to highlight value changes because if these are the determining factors, that means that for policy makers it is extremely difficult to influence what is taking place. This is because in doing so you have to change the ideas, the cultural representations that people have in their minds.

There are various possible explanations given in the literature. I will show a few of them. First, there could be a shift from the so-called “materialist orientation” to a “postmaterialist orientation” and a little wider concept, there could be a shift from a “modern” to a “postmodern orientation”. These terms are never very satisfactory but you need a label, and these terms are used in the literature. They are not my invention but these are what are used in the literature, whereas a second possible explanation suggests that civilization goes through various facets. Civilizations rise, they expand, then they contract and ultimately they go to their end. This had been witnessed for many civilizations. Some sees in the fact that people are not willing to reproduce at a sufficient level, as indicated by Western civilization, which has been so dominant in the world and which is still dominating to a large extend so that it is maybe reaching its end. I will leave that outside discussion because it is a very difficult thing to discuss and to find evidence for.

Figure 11

Postmaterialism - Postmodernism


- | | |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| ♣ Shift from emphasis on economic and physical security to individual self-expression and quality of life | ▪ Elusive concept, but central is incredulity of meta-narratives which underpin progress and modernity |
| ♣ Narrower concept than postmodernization | ▪ Favour diversity, emancipation, freedom, choice |
| ♣ Well-documented | ▪ Determine own life style, pattern of relations |


What are the concepts of “postmaterialism” and “postmodernism”? There is a slight difference between the two. “Postmodernism” is a somewhat wider concept. What it essentially means I think is what is stated in Figure 11. For normal people it is when you have economic security, when you have a house and when you can express yourself there is freedom. When there is a state of law and order in society, you become interested in the things that are scarce in society. For example, you become more interested in the environment, in the future of the whales, for example, and you wonder if we overfish the oceans. What is the quality of our lives? Can we only work or can we do other things as well? What is the relation of parents to their children? Do they want to have an intimate relation? How can people use all their talents and all their capacity to the best? People focus then on things that are becoming scarce: free time; the opportunity to self-fulfillment; to express yourself; to use your talents to express yourself artistically and the quality of life.

But that is a somewhat narrower concept on postmodernization, which is a more recent concept but very similar, and it has the advantage of having been well documented in a series of surveys.

Postmodernism is somewhat more illusive and as I have said that many people

do not like the concept. But, it essentially is that you no longer subscribe to the tenets that were underpinning the process of modernization. For example, working hard and diligently, and obeying authority are no longer considered to be very important things. Now you favor diversity, emancipation of women, emancipation of minorities, the freedom of choice and so on. You want to determine your own lifestyle and your own pattern of relations. In a way, I think that for most people the change in their minds has occurred, they would not themselves call it a change towards postmodernism but having a different view on the world and on themselves in the world.






As I said, the concept of postmaterialism has been studied extensively. In the European Union the postmaterialist score has been established from 1970 onwards and you see it steadily rising. This means that there is clearly a change in the attitude in the system in society. This is established at the individual level as well as in the various individual countries. That is the advantage of the concept. And you can see the postmaterialism. Postmaterialist score is related to the mean age at childbearing, and so a postmaterialist attitude has an effect on the age at which children are born. You can see in figure 13 that the countries where people say that the other aspects are very important in their life, they are usually the countries where births of children are late. Southern and Western Europe, the countries which you will find are less postmaterialist, more traditional you might say without disqualifying in these countries the birth of children is still relatively early. There seems to be a relationship between postmatelialist score and mean age at chlebearing.

There are two demographically relevant interpretations of the concept, postmodern and the change from modern to postmodern. The first is that you see postmodernism as a world view; people having another outlook, a new outlook on the society. And you can also look at it as a new historical era. You might say

that we have entered without us being aware of it in the mid 1960s the era of postmodernism, the Era when people no longer subscribe to the tenets of modernism, the tenets that fueled economic progress and the economic development of our societies, but to the tenets, which looks slightly different. In fact, Ronald Inglehart, professor for the U.S., has argued that as economic developments take place in modern societies, the development in value system will not be linear but there will be an inflection at a given time, modern societies will move on another trajectory and will become postmodern. Modernism will not increase but it will become gradually postmodern.

The concept, as I have said, has not been documented very well and it certainly looked at very critical but it would fit the explanation of the second demographic transition extremely well. It coincides certainly in timing.



I have tried to calculate the proportion Postmodern in different societies, which is not terribly easy because no surveys have been taken specifically to measure postmodernism. I did it by using existing data sources, The World Value Service, as figure 14 shows. To some extent, the results are promising. You can see that Finland, Sweden, West Germany, The Netherlands, Norway and France are

countries with fairly high level of Postmodernism, which is understandable. And it is much lower in Southern Europe and particularly also in Eastern Europe. And if you try to see whether there is a relationship between other factors, for example, proportion cohabiting, which is indicated in figure 14. You can see that the relationship at an aggregate level seems to exist. It also exists at the individual level in the sense that if you have a woman classified as postmodern, then on the whole her characteristics will be that she will marry late and that she will have her children late.

Figure 15

Evaluation

Probably rather permanent

- ♣ loss of influence in the world and de-colonization
- ♣ cannot keep house in order
- ♣ conservation priority over creation
- ♣ no children no future; rapid ageing
- ♣ demographic future depends on others; migrants
- ♣ multicultural stage reduces stability and cohesion
- ♣ observations fit cycle extremely well

Figure 16

Evaluation

Probably rather temporary

- ♣ Vitality and vigour of undiminished
- ♣ Investments in communication
- ♣ Scientific developments (biotechnology, informatics)
- ♣ Current demographic behaviour sensible
- ♣ Extension of European Union/creation Euroland


Let's now try and evaluate what the situation is. I have said that 64,000 Euro question, "is it a permanent state of affairs or a temporary state of affairs?" If you look at Figure 15, 16, you might say that it could be indeed a permanent state of affairs. The Western countries have lost a great deal of their influence in the world. They will find it also difficult to keep their own house in order. Conservation has become very important. You might say that if there have no children there is no future. They are clearly aging rapidly and important of these societies, of highly industrialized societies, for their demographic future, they no longer depend on themselves, but they depend on what people living thousands of kilometers away will be doing. For the Netherlands for example, chairman, let me make it clear, also for Germany and for other countries, whether the population grows or does not grow, depends not so much, I think, on what the women in the Netherlands are doing, but depends largely on whether people decide to move to our part of the world. It is also evident that as a consequence of this migration, something developed, which is called "multi-cultural society", a society where people from various origins have to live together and try to live together, certainly reduces stability, and introduces cohesion to some extent. And this is likely to be the thing of the future. So you might say it may fit extremely well the long-term cycle of a

civilization that has not a little passed its peak.

I can say it is clear that the vitality and vigor of the Western society is still very high indeed and military sense dominates the world. There are immense investments in communication, you see that what extend electronic communication and so on has already changed this society, which has happened elsewhere. Enormous investment in biotechnology and informatics and so on does nothing wrong at all. You might even say that the current demographic behaviors are sensible but we cannot continue to grow indefinitely; therefore it seems that people are so sensible that they behave that way and they see better what the future should be than the governments do. For Europe, a little less for Japan, since the European Union will be expanded, there will be a large economic power and we recently have the Euro. The creation of a new currency is a remarkable thing to happen and the thing that does not happen in a society, which is not looking at the future.

What are the long-term expectations? I would think that it looks likely that fertility will rise a little. This is a great deal of postponement of fertility taking place, but fertility will most likely remain below replacement level. The replacement level of 2.1 children per woman may differ a little from country to country, but it is likely to remain below replacement, 1.8, 1.7 children or something like that. Mortality, life expectancy is bound to increase in Japan for women, which is already close to the age of 85; it will most likely increase further. Biological evolutionists think that it may already be higher. And if you follow an optimal risk strategy, it could be well above a hundred years for women born now. I think on the whole migration will be strong. But the assumption is that migration will be controlled. This is extremely difficult to achieve. Certainly the countries of Europe find it impossible to deal with effectively. As a great deal of illegal undocumented migration has great pressure on all the borders and it goes a little against the characteristics of those countries to control migration strictly. But I would expect that ultimately the European community will see no other


solution than to agree on a joint migration policy that will I think as a consequence be positive, but it will try and control the inflow somewhat, say to 3 to 5 per 1000.



As a result, my prediction will be the second transition will have the following continuation that is mortality is a result of the aging of the population. The death rate will increase a little; fertility will remain low, and the birth rate will stabilize at a fairly low level, a little below the death rate. So the rate of natural growth will be negative but not dramatically so, I think also that some countries will find that they need to take actions to prevent fertility from becoming too low than now, levels of only 1.1 children per woman for certain countries. That will not decrease a little but there will be positive migration so that the new unbalance, which has been created by the exceptionally high decline of fertility, will result in a long-term period where that migration will occur.

Figure 18

Europe's Share in the Population of the World



As a result, predictions are that Europe's share of the population of the world will drop dramatically. Japan is of course in a similar situation over a somewhat longer period that will take place that is fairly dramatic. It will change its relation with the less developed countries very greatly indeed.

I think that the future is my concluding remarks. The demographic relationships between developed countries and those between the less and the more developed countries will be as such that the less developed countries will be more heterogeneous in terms of their demographic structure, some of the countries are already below the replacement level of fertility, but they will not be dominated so much about the level of fertility in those countries, but mainly about international migration. I think there will be a great deal of discussion in the future about the recruitment of well trained specialists with the payment. Their education would attract people from India, for example, information specialists. Who then pays for them? Does the country have a right of compensation? If people want to move in large numbers, such as from Algeria or from Morocco, want to move north do the governments have the right to try to restrain them and keep them in the country? That will be an important thing. Now the right of departure is considered to be absolute though it was not observed by the socialist countries.

How will this happen in the rest parts of the world? Then, the rights of the migrants, once they are in the countries of settlement, they become quite important. I am sure that the governments of the countries that send migrants will be highly interested in that particular question. Finally, but not least, Reproductive rights and women's rights will also remain important.

What is maybe concluded here is that the future of the more developed countries is not what it used to be and will not be any longer what we were used to. We have to re-conceive with our relationship with developing world. And I think that seems to be the right note and I will conclude this presentation for JICA. Thank you very much indeed.

Questions and Answers

Mediator

Dr. Dirk J. van de Kaa, thank you very much for a very important and a very meaningful presentation. We have 50 minutes left and we would like to use this time wisely and efficiently. We would like to receive questions for Dr. Dirk J. van de Kaa.

As Dr. Dirk J. van de Kaa has mentioned, we have many specialists in the audience but we also have some people who are not specialists so please feel free to ask questions even if they are very basic questions. Also feel free to ask questions about Europe and about the rest of the world. I think this audience is interested particularly in comparisons or similarities and differences between Europe and Japan. And I think another important discussion point would be developed and developing nations.

Q1

I apologize for being the first person to ask question since we should be working behind the scene, we should not ask first question. But I would like to ask some questions and I should have asked these earlier. On page 12 and 13, on graph 22 and graph 24, I would like to ask what is the x-axis, the Postmaterialist Score and Proportion Postmaterialist Score, what are the indexes? I do not understand what the indexes are. And I apologize for not having asked this question earlier. What do 010 to 034 mean?

Dr. Dirk J. van de Kaa

That is a very good question. I should perhaps explain first to determine whether someone is a Postmaterialist or a Materialist using four questions. People are given the following statements: The Government should pay more attention to law and order; People should have more say in important government decisions;

The Government should do more to fight rising prices; And people should have greater freedom.

If you choose law and order and fighting prices, then you are considered to be materialist. If you say people should have more say in government decisions and people should have greater individual freedom, then you are classified as postmaterialist.

And as to the Postmaterialist Score, if you only have one priority, you have a category mixed where people select not say 2 and 3, but have other combination that is a category mix. Now what Inglehart has done is he takes those that are Postmaterialists and those who are Materialists and takes the difference between the two. And that is the score, the Postmaterialist Score. It is 0.10. That is the score. So the Postmaterialist Score is simple, the difference between the proportion Materialists and the Postmaterialists is established using these four simple questions. In the paper that I used yesterday, I have indicated precisely how it is done. I will give you a copy so that you can have it for your record.

For Postmodernists, it is a little more complicated, these people has at least one element where they take a Postmaterialists priority, so they say people should have more say in government decisions or people should have greater freedom and then there were additional questions on whether religion plays an important role in their lives or no important role at all. So when they had a Postmaterialist orientation together with a great deal of secularization in the sense that they did not find that religion or God play an important role in their lives, then they are considered to be Postmodern.

The concept of Postmodernism and this is the simple proportion there of the total population question. The concept of Postmodernism is not so very easy and it is a controversial concept. I am not a Postmodernist myself so it is very difficult to establish what a Postmodernist is. I have written about it and I find it a difficult concept to deal with. But what it essentially means is that people do no longer believe the grand stories called the mythical narratives that traditionally kept

society together. For example, in our society, the Monarch, the king, was supposed to reign with the authority of the Gods, appointed to the post by God. We no longer believe that at all. We simply say the Queen or King is a normal person and she fulfills a certain function. But if we no longer like that, we say “Would you please go away?” Similarly, if you say we all have to work for the common good and if necessary to defend the home country against invaders and so on and we should all do military service. People also start questioning that.

The important other Mita narrative is that you live this life, you behave well, this is the Christian religion that I am referring to now, so that you will have a good after life, that you will go to heaven. Most of the people in Western European societies do not longer believe that. They may feel that there is something above their power and influence but frequently do not longer believe that they will go to heaven or that they will go to hell for that matter. So this again, Mita narrative is no longer usually subscribed to. This means that people say, we only have one life to live and that life we live between the time of birth and the time of death. And within that life, we should try as many experiences and live that life to the full as possible. So that is a more Postmodern attitude. Also people of my generation frequently have children that are of a marriageable age and I can see that at the time I was young, if I had said to my father, I am now going to cohabit, I met a nice girl and we want to setup a household, shame on the family. It would have been impossible. But nowadays, if a young boy or girl says, I want to establish a cohabiting relationship with my girlfriend, they will say, “Where are you going to live then?” “Shall we buy you a fridge?” “Can we help you in other ways to setup household?” The way in which you behaved or was supposed to behave is no longer in belief to the same extent. So I think a term, which I sometimes use is Postmodernism, that even in the best of families, they take a different attitude to those things than previously. I hope that this clarifies a little.

Q2

Thank you very much. As it was indicated by the chairman and also Dr. Dirk J. van de Kaa mentioned that the relation between the developed and the developing regions will change. And I would like you to elaborate on the change of the relation between the developed and the developing regions. How the change will take place?

Dr. Dirk J. van de Kaa

Yes, again I must say this is a very pertinent question. I cannot provide all the answers but I will try to respond as well as I can. I would foresee that in the near future, the developed countries will have a problem in dealing with the migration flows, the mobility of people that will increase as globalization increases. So you see already sometimes ships from Turkey or from other parts of the world, come to Southern Europe and they beached the ship and there are 500, 600 people on board and no one knows exactly what to do with it. The governments face a serious problem. In fact they would not like to take them but they have very little choice to grant them some sort of amnesty, which is problematic. Many people are coming undocumented. They tear up their passports before they come into the country. They flush them through the toilet and they say they come from Sudan or they come from Nigeria for example, and say "I have had to leave my country." When they are tested it turns out that they do not speak the Sudanese language, they speak another language, they are not from that area. But they have very little means to identify who that person is. Now even if they are identified, the country says, "We don't want to grant them political asylum because there is no reason for that, they could go back without being endangered to their own country." That country frequently says "We do not know Mrs. so and so, or Miss so and so, or Mr. so and so, we have never heard of that person, so we don't want to take the person back." So you can see that at the governmental level in discussions, there is an interest, I would expect, in the developed world, in the

industrialized societies, on the one hand, to want to have migrants from other parts of the world, but to want to be able to recruit those with special skills, those intellectually gifted. For example as the United States have already been doing. At the same time, do not want to be flooded with people for whom they do not see a future. This means that at the governmental level, there will be a discussion. “We are willing to aid development in your country but would you then please ensure that not during the nights or at other times, people leave your country to create problems in ours.” So I see that discussion about migrant issues will become more and more important between developed and developing world. Also if you have recruitment schemes, you have official assisted migrants coming to the country, the host country will of course be interested in them. What sorts of conditions are they living under, and there will be agreements in that regard. We in the Netherlands have a large number of people from Morocco to give one example. They are Muslims and they belong to Islam and they want to send Imams, religious teachers to the Netherlands. Now they come to the Netherlands frequently with the ideas from their own society. For example, they may say that certain minorities are condemned forever because they behave in ways contrary to Islam. In the Netherlands, you cannot say that because everyone is free in his or her religion. So then there is a problem frequently between the host government and the government of the country that has sent them. So I expect that relations and discussions in that area will become increasingly important. Let me stop here, I could say more but let me stop at this point. This is what I mean.

Q3

I would like to thank you for a very interesting and very entertaining presentation. I would like to address this question of Postmodernism. This is a very difficult concept and a very difficult way of thinking and I would like to ask, I would like to discuss the question of migrants or immigrants or refugees. In Europe, I know that you accept many immigrants and refugees. But in Japan, we

are now exporting our production to developing nations. Many Japanese companies are forced to send their plants, their manufacturing facilities to other countries rather than accept low wage labor. I think that the European nations are not doing that but doing the opposite. They are importing less expensive labor.

Dr. Dirk J. van de Kaa

Thank you very much indeed. That is a complicated but very interesting issue. Migration theories have it that if there is a difference between countries in the supply of labor and capital. So if you have on the one hand, countries with plentiful supply of labor and with the shortage of capital. And you have other areas where you have plentiful capital but a shortage of labor. Flows of capital and labor will come in to be. As you said you might export your industries to countries where wages are lower. And Japan is doing that. This also happens to some extent in the Western European countries. Philips for example has established factories in various parts of the world. When we buy refrigerator or a radio from Philips, that company frequently says, made in Taiwan, or some other countries. But at the same time, there is migration. Migration began already in the 1960s, mid 60s, late 60s, it began. This was officially begun by governments. They had agreements with Turkey and with Morocco that gas workers, as they were called, would come, they would work for a little while, and then they would go back to their own country. One thing I think one should avoid, if you do not want permanent migration, is to have temporary migration because there is no such thing as temporary migration. Experiences learned that people will fall in love, they will intermarry, and they will want to stay. If you have had a worker, you train him for two years, you do not want to see him leave and get someone new again. Moreover, the person himself, or herself does not want to leave. So that sort of migration always leads to permanent migration. But I must say, while in the beginning, the initiative was from the receiving country attracting people, now the opposite occurs. The countries of Europe do not want immigrants. Some argued that they

need them, but most governments' official attitude is, "No, we don't want them." But they come irrespective of what the host country desires. People in the Central Planning office in the Netherlands, economists mainly; say economically there is no advantage in attracting migrants. But nevertheless they come. They see a future for themselves and for their children. I have for some quite time now said that a country that is in the position, the Netherlands for example should develop a migrations policy. Because if you do not have a proper migration policy, which also allows economic migrations, and if you only take in people that you cannot possibly refuse or that you cannot send back, your selection from amongst the pool of migrants is very skewed, a very negative selection. That is why I think you should develop a more positive attitude towards migration. Whether this is also true for Japan, I cannot judge. I have been here for only a few days. I think it would be very presumptuous of me to try and give advice in the matter. I simply have presented what is happening in Europe and I can give information on that. But for Japan, I have no indication.

As concerned to the concept Postmodern, as I said, it is very controversial and it has not been very well documented. People, who are true postmodernist, will for example, say the following. When we describe something in words, we, normal people, have the feeling that what we describe is the world. They will argue that the description we give is what makes it. So we have the feeling that we describe what we see and they say, no the description we give is what it is. For example, if you say, this was an interesting lecture, that means the lecture was interesting. But if you say, the lecture was not interesting, it was the same lecture, but they say what we say about it determines its character. This is what true postmodernist will say. There is no credo; there are no articles of faith that you have to subscribe to in order to be a Postmodernist. And I think there are relatively few people who would consider themselves to be really postmodern. But many people, as I have indicated before, in their thinking, have accepted some of those Postmodernist ideas. One example perhaps, relating to births of children and craniological

problems, low fertility but at the same time having children is highly valued by Postmodernist and Postmaterialist people. If they feel that having a child will enrich their lives, they insist that they should have a child. If this requires medical intervention, they will do so. If they find another woman prepared to carry a child for them, they are willing to pay for it. So it is a very peculiar contradiction. On the one hand, people have low fertility, but if they feel having a child will enrich their lives, they will do that utmost to have the child. That is I think a Postmaterialist attitude, that you place very high value on the things that you have least of. If nature is scarce, you price it very highly. If your free time is scarce, you price it very highly. So it is a shift in preferences. Some say it is simple in economic consideration, things that are scarce, you tend to price it very much. Postmodern is a very illusive concept. I suggest that if you want to read about it, it is interesting but what I mean to say is that it is a shift in value system. If you see people having fewer children, it is not solely because of economic reasons, or because of labor force considerations, but essentially what people want to do with their lives. They may want to have a child but they do not want to spend their whole time caring for children. They want to have the privilege and the pleasures of having a child but not being bound to the home. There are so many competing interests and competing preferences that people have. I think that is the best way I can describe.

Q4

I am from JICA. For developing world, developing countries, of course the country where the birth rate or fertility rate is very high, there is a policy or cooperation to reduce their fertility rate, that is the part of our cooperation program. And Postmaterialism and Postmodernism in your analysis, I think there is a very big factor pertaining to female population, women. Of course in our program, you target at, or we aim at the women and we believe that empowerment for the women and the projects where we aimed at women seem to be quite useful so that we are able to grant the power to the women to make decision on their own.

That kind of program has been very actively pursued in our cooperation program. So with other conditions unchanged, the only women or female population comes up with postmodernism or postmaterialistic idea and how far that becomes effective if we only aim at women.

Dr. Dirk J. van de Kaa

Thank you very much. Yes, obviously one should not aim solely at women. I believe the famous feminist, Jemain Grial, once said a woman without a man is like a fish without a bicycle. What she meant to convey is that women can easily live without men. She, as a feminist, felt that there was no particular need to have a man. At least if you have a man, a husband, women want to have more than just a husband. So I think there are two aspects to your question. One is in developing countries, clearly, one should attempt to raise the status of women and give them greater empowerment. Frequently, they already have very great economic power. Frequently, they are the main income earner in the family, as you well know it. But the attitudes of the men have to change as well. So one cannot solely concentrate on the women. It is the combination of the two, which has to change. I find programs and projects that JICA carries out in that field very useful. And it seems particularly that schooling, education of women is decisive in determining their reproductive behavior. For the developed countries and I think that includes Japan, it obviously is important that men and wives, men and women work together. And you see that frequently. In a Dutch firm, it is quite normal for a man to say, my wife is now giving birth to our child, we have decided that she will work four days a week and I want to work four days a week. And the regulations stipulate that the employer cannot refuse it. It has to say yes if you want to work part-time with lower salary of course we have to agree. That makes that more of a partnership between the husband and the wife is possible. That is also a sort of postmodern idea. It is not the one sex that determines what is taking place. That will make it possible to increase fertility for example. I have seen cases where

husband and wife working jointly were able to spend more time with the children and raise a larger family. If I read the literature on Japan for example, papers that scholars write about the conditions in Japanese society, it could easily be. As this is true for most of the country in Western Europe, that the imbalance between what society wants and the conditions it creates for men and women, that is one of the important elements in lowering fertility. That sort of societies are not sufficiently geared to this new idea that people want to be able not to spend six days a week working from six to nine, but want to have four days and have more leisure time, more time with their families. This is a postmodern, postmaterialist attitude, and our governments on the whole are not sufficiently aware of this change in the thinking of the people.

Mediator

As the chairperson, I would like to ask two questions. These two questions are general questions. They may not be directly related to your presentation today. My first question is, your theory of the Second Demographic Transition, Dr. Dirk J. van de Kaa, talks about the below replacement fertility, which will continue and it will not return to replacement. I think that is a rather pessimistic view, but I think this is the trend. It is true in most developed nations. They say that homeostasis for the human species is very important that after a period of time, there will be a rebound phenomenon so there should be a natural balance, a naturally occurring balance. I would like to know what you think about this theory of homeostasis and the return to balance. My second question refers to the following. It is true that in the developed nations we see below replacement fertility, but we see in the developing nations, 70 million population increasing every year. So this is the reverse phenomenon, which is a very high population, and how does this effect the environment, resources, etc. And this is also leading to a very difficult relationship or conflict, the possibility of a conflict between the developed nations and the developing nations over environmental and resource

and other issues. What do you think about it?

Dr. Dirk J. van de Kaa

You are sitting close to me but not like the questions are. The questions are not so easy to tackle. First about whether fertility in the developed countries will remain low. I think that is very likely as I indicated in my evaluation. There is a possibility that there will be some increase. But it may remain for a while at least below replacement. I should stress that the theory of the Second Demographic Transition does not imply that fertility should necessarily be below replacement level. What it implies is that people plan their family very consciously. And it is only when they feel having children, or more children will enrich their lives that they will have. If you ask women how many children would you want to have on average, which you want to have, what do you consider to be the ideal number of children, and you calculate the averages. You will come almost invariably, over two or two, very close to two children per family. But reality is that postmaterialist women will place a very high value on the relationship with children begin having children fairly late, usually when they are in their mid thirties. In the Netherlands for example, peak fertility occurs at ages 35 to 39. So if you begin having your first child at that age, you will see there is not a great deal of time left to have a large family. Although they would like to have children, they are competing interests. When you ask them when they are 25, and when they are not married yet, how many children would you want to have, they say two or three most likely. But then they begin their education and time passes, then they get married, the relationship does not work out as well as they had expected, so maybe they cohabit for a while and so on. So it takes time and ultimately, even though they would want to have children, they have fewer. It is not impossible if our societies adjust more to the wishes of women and men, that fertility might go up to replacement level or beyond that. That there will be simple homeostasis, I find a little more difficult to accept. That an unbalance will seek to address itself? Yes I

agree, no doubt it is likely but I think for the time being that migration is the variable that certainly in Europe is working most strongly, not as yet an increase in fertility. Of course if for example, other societies, or certain societies are successful in persuading their population that a higher level of fertility will be desirable and that they could bring it up to say 0.8 child on average, or 0.9 child on average, I think that would be followed with very great interest. But so far I know a very few successful attempts. What you do see however is that in these Scandinavian countries and in France, to some extent in the United Kingdom, but in France, countries tend to have a somewhat higher fertility than others. But do not make the mistake of seeing that as ideal. For example, in the UK, there is a very large numbers of teenagers who get themselves pregnant at a very young age and then have the responsibility of caring for children, which they are unable to do. So this is not always a satisfactory situation. So I do not think that is automatic, but if for example, your Prime Minister or other people who is important in your society says, "Look here to the Japanese population, we have an issue here, we value having children for society, we think it is necessary and we look very positively at that." It may conceive over a somewhat longer period. But it would come automatically, I do not believe for one minute.

The relation between the developed region and the situation in the developed region, I think there is no great contrast, or no contradiction at least, between trying to stimulate fertility in developed countries and trying to reduce fertility in other parts of the world. As long as you keep in mind and revise your policies in such a way that they are always aimed at improving the well being of the population. If you do not do that, if you neglect that, as what was perhaps done somewhat in the past. I think the influence will be counter-effective, counter-productive. But in a way, I have always argued that there was problem at all, at least I do not see the problem in trying to do more for fertility in the Netherlands and at the same time, supporting Nigeria or another country in improving the lot of their population by stimulating family planning. Having seven children or

eight or more children is not always good for women at all. Why not give them the freedom to make a choice to decide how many they want to have. I am sure that for my generation and perhaps even for my parental generation, having at least a certain degree of freedom of your offspring was very important in liberating them and in allowing social mobility and allowing the increase in education and increase in the general level of education in our society. So we should not keep that away from other parts of the world I think.

Q5

Page fifteen; related to your long-term expectation on population, I would like to know your opinion. Generally in the developing countries, natural growth rate in urban areas is higher than increasing of the migration rate from the country to the urban in the developing countries. For the next 25 years, if it is possible to have a answer, I would like to know your opinion.

Dr. Dirk J. van de Kaa

Thank you very much. Yes, you are right. We draw attention to differences within country. We speak about it very generally. Obviously within the larger countries at least, there are substantial differences. In a country like the Netherlands, we are all urbanized. We are not as densely populated as Japan, but it is a very urbanized society. In France and in the United Kingdom and parts of Spain for example, the bigger countries, there are still differences between the rural and the urban areas. It is true that certainly in some parts of France, the rural areas become more or less depopulated. And fear of population decline is always very strong in France because they feel that that is not a good thing that people should remain in the rural areas. That does not seem to be taking place, with the result, in some of those areas, population is aging, the young people draw away, they go to the cities, they have their children there, they go to urban centers. So these areas lose a bit of their perspective. I would like to suggest to you that that

is not such a bad idea after all. Why not let certain areas in countries become a bit more nature like. Let biodiversity develop there and let it become area where people can go to recreate, and to enjoy nature. In the Netherlands for example, there are many discussions about supporting farmers, if they do not mow their grass earlier in the year, to let the birds have their eggs and hedge their young first and then do that. We pay farmers not to mow their grass very close to the borders of their land. Leave a meter or a meter and a half opened so that their various flowers can flower, have seed and make sure that their existence continues. I think that in some of those highly urbanized and highly industrialized countries, we are supporting the development of the rural areas in different ways from the past. Not simply give subsidies to increase the rural production, but to help in maintaining more pleasant environment. It is the concern about long-term development of the environment, which is partly at the background of the postmodern or the postmaterialist thinking.

Q6

Thank you very much. Yesterday, at the UN University, I had the pleasure of hearing your presentation and I was a little worried about whether you will be talking about the same thing. But you gave two different presentations and so I am very satisfied and happy that I attended both the lectures. Now I have a question for you on demographic transition. You spoke about demographic transition and I think it was very interesting that you took the movement of people and migration as a part of that concept of demographic transition. I think that in Japan, the migration of people link mainly to economic development and with the very fast pace of economic development. If we have any possibility of recovering that economic development, then there is a possibility that we will have a tremendous movement of people. But I think there is very, very minimal possibility of Japan recovering its economic strength. Even if we have some development in economic growth it will be very small. So we will not see a major movement of people

within the country or from outside in the form of migration, so we have to think of the demographic transition from another perspective in Asia, in East Asia, looking at Japan, China and Korea. The demographic transition, it is the first demographic transition and the second demographic transition show totally different patterns depending on the nation. So Korea, China and Japan have very different demographic transition. Maybe the pattern is similar but the stage or the timing are different. These all depend on the age-specific supply and demand of difference. In Japan we do not have sufficient labor or so we are told. So in a time when labor is lacking, when there is insufficient labor, then there is a demographic transition stage, which is different from the stage of demographic transition in China and in Korea. So at those different times, there are in different stages. So the Chinese stage of demographic transition does not match Korea's or Japan's because they are proceeding at different times, in different stages. So I think it is necessary to think about labor migration in terms of the different stage that the country is in. of course migration may depend on gender and age and intellectual ability and so forth. But the stage of the demographic transition that the nation is in will be very important. So the demographic transition will be very different from that of which we have experienced in the past. This will be true in Latin America and I am sure in Africa as well. So when we think of labor migration or the migration of people within the demographic transition, the different stages of development of different nations should be taken into consideration. Would you agree?

Dr. Dirk J. van de Kaa

Thank you very much indeed. As always, your comments are very thoughtful and wise. I think I agree with you on the fact that some countries of Asia have reached below level of replacement fertility very quickly. But by different process as occurred in Western Europe. No doubt this has important consequences for their future development certainly. I must say that preparing for these lectures in

Japan and the trip to Japan, have made me read much more about Japan and have made me aware how little I understand or what is going on in Asia. But I subscribe to what your thoughts are about that. I would like to conclude by reference to Professor just as yourself was and a student submitting a piece of writing to the Professor. This was in France, not in Japan. The Professor took a very long time to review the paper and the student became impatient. He thought, “What is wrong with my paper?” “I get no reaction at all. So he went ultimately to see the Professor and said, “Have you had time to look at my paper?” And he said, “Yes I have.” And he pulled it from his papers and the student saw it full with red arrows and halt parts, cross-out and so on. So he said “That is terrible.” And he said to the Professor, “Did I make such poor work?” “No.” the Professor said, “This was a very good paper but there is a problem with it, it had too many ideas in it.” He said, “You should learn at the young age that one good idea serves for a paper. In fact if the idea is quite good, you can write a book about it. And if the idea is extremely good, it will occupy you the rest of your life.” I had some twenty years ago the idea of the Second Transition and it seems to be occupying me all the time and I must say I have seldom had more pleasure than on this occasion when I talk to such a varied audience and I thank you very much indeed.

Mediator

Thank you very much Dr. Dirk J. van de Kaa for a very stimulating and interesting presentation and an interesting discussion. I am very happy that you have come to speak to us and very grateful that you have come all this way and in such cold weather to visit Japan. Thank you.

Thank you very much for your participations. This concludes our seminar.

