

## CHAPTER 3

### STOCK-TAKING STUDY OF EXISTING PROJECTS

For the purpose of this study, two kinds of stock-taking studies would be relevant. Firstly, there are a number of on-going sectoral development programmes in the three districts of the region. The stated purpose of all of them are to bring about changes and improvements in the life of the people in those aspects which are of concern to those particular sectors.

Secondly, there is a large number of past and on-going rural development projects in the country all of which are donor-funded and cover one or more districts in different parts of the country. Some of them have even built the programmes around a pre-existing road project or one which is included in the current programme itself. Both of these programmes or projects would have very valuable lessons or implications for the designing the project to be implemented in the proposed Banepa-Sindhuli road corridor area.

#### 1. Development Programmes implemented in the districts:

There are a large number of different sectoral Ministries or Departments represented in the districts in the country including the three districts to be influenced by the proposed road corridor. For instance, the programmes implemented in the Sindhuli district are as follows:

##### 1.1. Horticultural farm:

This farm has been in existence for 20 years. Its current activities consist of producing vegetable seeds and seedlings, fruit saplings, root stock of mango plants, extension of the farm by another hectare, maintenance of the current farm of 2.2 ha, including extension activities to reach 50 families in Sindhuli and Ramechhap districts for which a sum of 35,000 rupees have been allocated for the purpose. Its total annual budget for the current fiscal year of 1994/95 (2051/52 in Nepali calendar) 1.3k million rupees including 0.4 million in foreign aid.

There is a total of 15 staff members who are headed by a Gazetted Class III Technical officer and includes 6 peons. The farm is aware of the problem the local people are currently facing due to the rotting away of the bottom part of the trunks of junar and orange plants. Their second problem has been lack of market or access to it for their products.

The farm further realizes that green vegetables are still not locally available. Therefore, there is a need for developing special programme and approach the farmers with it.

### 1.2. District Irrigation Office:

This is one of the regular offices of the government in the district. The current budget of the office is 13 million rupees which includes allocation for 3 new so-called Sector Irrigation projects, rehabilitation of one flood-damaged irrigation project, and survey of 2 more projects. Some 0.8 million rupees are allocated for river training activities in the district and are considered highly inadequate due to extensive local needs in this respect. Four Sector irrigation projects have already been completed providing irrigation facilities to 450 ha of farm land. There are 23 persons working in the office which is headed by a Class II Engineer and includes 9 overseers and 8 peons.

### 1.3. Nepal Electricity Authority:

Its annual activities include the extension of distribution lines in the district headquarter. Its annual budget consists of 2.3 million rupees and includes 1.2 million for capital development. The electricity is supplied to this district over a 45 km long 33KV distribution line from Dhalkewar in Dhanusha district in the terai which passes through dense and hilly forest areas too. But they have not vehicular support for regularly inspecting the line. It has a total of 21 staff under an Engineer. They need more money for being able to extend the electricity supply and feel that electricity-based industries such as in fruit processing should be encouraged for establishment.

### 1.4. District Agriculture Development Office:

The programmes of this office consists of holding field demonstrations in crops, livestock and crop protection, distribution of minikit in crops, horticulture, and livestock, organizing farmer competitions, establishing orchards for winter, evergreen and orange family fruits, holding agriculture fairs, organizing farmer study tours, organizing farmer groups for cereal crops, horticulture, livestock and crop protection, distribution of hibreed livestock namely buffalo, bull, pig, and goat for breed improvement, etc. The office has a total annual budget of 6.7 million rupees which includes 4 million in administrative expenses. Their programme also includes a component of sericulture development with an annual funding of 80,000 rupees,

Their achievements in the field include the use of improved varieties and techniques by the farmer, adoption of sericulture and beekeeping, extensive cultivation of junar, and wider livestock farming. Sericulture has been particularly beneficial for its income as well as the kimbu plants which are also useful as fodder to cattle. Beekeeping has been particularly beneficial for women in terms of more productive allocation of their time.

Their problems include the difficult terrain of the district, the need to increase the number of sub-district extension units, lack of buildings and other equipments and physical facilities

in the Service Centres and sub-centres, and need for transport facility. Other problems consist of the lack of market access for the horticultural products of the district, need for road links to such production areas, need for more reliable supply of agricultural inputs to outlying places, and need for rehabilitation of flood-damaged irrigation channels.

Future possible activities in the field consist of sericulture, beekeeping, cereal crops, cash crops, tea and coffee growing, large cardamon, spice crops, fruit growing of the orange family, improved livestock rearing, vegetable growing, soil improvement, fisheries, and market management. Eightynine employees man the office including 52 field level junior technicians.

#### 1.5. District Forest Office:

The forest office here performs the following functions: formation of forest user groups, preparation of management plans and handing over of forest to user groups, boundary demarcation, forest guard training, user group training, women training, afforestation, nursery management, etc. These activities are undertaken under specific different programmes with separate funding for each of them. The National and Contract Forest Development Programme has an allocation of 1.6 million rupees, Community Forest Programme 1.8 million, and Administrative Expenses 4.3 million. There are altogether a total of 124 staff including 20 Rangers, 48 Forest Guards, and 31 Armed Forest Guards. 3.1 million rupees are required only on salaries for the staff.

The problem of the Forest Office is mainly illegal tree felling and smuggling. The district forest of the Siwalik range borders on the terai region both in the east and the west and much smuggling takes place from those points. The people affected by the flood in the Kamala and Marin rivers too have moved to the forest areas in the Siwalik range. During election time, all forest officials were deputed to elected-related tasks and this became a wonderful opportunity for the smugglers to further plunder the forests. Even the workers of different political parties provided support and encouragement to these people to indulge in such acts.

#### 1.6. District Development Committee (DDC):

The DDC is an elective committee representing all the VDCs in the district of which there are 55. Small irrigation, drinking water, rural roads, trails, foot bridges, etc are the projects for which it provides grants received from the government to the VDCs and the User Committees. For the current fiscal year, the DDC has received 2.8 million rupees for drinking water projects, 2 million for rural roads, another 2 million in untied Development Grant, in addition to other administrative grants from the government. The office does not possess sufficient engineering staff. Most of the money is allocated to each VDC more or less equally. Most projects are small and therefore, they are quite numerous. During the last fiscal year, the DDC

claims to have built 77 kms of fair weather road, 426 drinking water projects, 17 irrigation projects, 12 buildings for health posts, VDC, schools etc. and the rehabilitation of 608 irrigation canals, embankments etc. damaged by the last year's floods. The Office has a staff capability of 87 persons of whom 55 are the Secretaries of different VDCs.

#### 1.7. District Health Office:

Several different programmes are run under this Office such as Leprosy Control, Control of Diarrhoeal Disease, Female Community Health Volunteer Programme, Nutrition, Respiratory Disease, Immunization, Family Planning and Maternal and Child Health, Kalazar and Malaria Control, etc. There are a total of 263 employees under the Office. It spends close to 5 million rupees in the current fiscal year, and has a total of 263 staff.

#### 1.8. Agricultural Development Bank:

The Bank first made its debut in the district 20 years ago. The Bank's lending has been growing steadily in the district. Last year it lent 20.5 million rupees and expects to raise its lending to 30 million in the current year. In order to reach different parts of this elongated district, it has established a branch office in the eastern part of the district and has a total of 6 Small Farmer Development Project Offices at different locations.

The Bank lends for the following purposes: cereal and cash crops, horticultural crops primarily junar, orange, lemon and lime, livestock primarily buffalo, goat, poultry, and pork, draught animals such as bullock and he-buffalo, irrigation (with 40-70% grant component), biogas plants (with 10,000 rupees in grant per plant), loan for the flood-affected, land development, capital loan for trading in agricultural inputs, agro-based industries, agricultural implements and machineries, and mills and cottage industries including any other income-generating projects except outright trading.

The Bank feels that given the huge amount of credit it has already extended for agricultural projects, the district should have had a big dairy industry and should have seen the abundant supply of milk and milk products. But far from it. However, noteworthy progress has been achieved in citrus production. But here again, there is an urgent need for dissemination of disease and pest control. Besides, the increased production must not suffer the same fate as that of the apples of Jumla and Helambu i.e. lack of market. The government's Food Research Laboratory should extend on priority basis training on the processing of the products to make jam, jelly, alcohol, pickles, etc.

According to the Bank, the district has great potentiality in the further expansion of citrus production including Junar. Cash crops like ginger, turmeric, banana, pineapple, groundnut etc. could replace less yielding cereal crops. Based on such product increase and diversification, several agro-based industries

could be set up in the district. In addition, investments could also be made in cold storage, weaving dhaka, carpet, skin and hide industries, etc. The Bank is in favour of rendering maximum service to the people, for money/capital has not been a problem with it.

#### 1.9. Agriculture Inputs Corporation:

Last fiscal year the Corporation sold some 1100 MT of chemical fertilizer, 12 mt of seeds and 3 MT of powder pesticides. It has a total of 8 staff and an administration budget of a little over 0.3 million.

#### 1.10. Cottage and Small Industries Development Committee:

The Committee Office in the district undertakes the following activities: skill development training, counselling and promotion of industries, industrial administration, and monitoring and studies. Its annual budget amounts to 0.7 million rupees. So far it has registered a total of 571 industries in the district with an estimated capital investment of 50.2 million rupees and stated employment of 1600 persons. There are a total of only 7 employees in the organization.

Its problems are lack of easily accessible credit for its trainees to start their own industries, supply of raw materials for the industries, development of appropriate technology and its dissemination to the potential industrialists, easy market for products of remote locations, and regular availability of timbe for furniture industries.

#### 1.11. District Buildings Office:

This office has a total of 9 staff under a Senior Divisional Engineer including 4 peons, and an annual allocation of 0.5 million rupees for administrative expenses and similar amount for the "construction and improvement" of the government buildings in the district. They plan to meet their target within the limitations of the budgetary resources.

#### 1.12. District Education Office:

Its annual programme has 6 components which comprise Women's Education, Basic and Primary Education Project, Non-formal Education, Primary Education, Scholarships, and Physical Education and Extra cullicular Activities. It has a total annual budget of 21.7 million rupees. Under Non-formal Education Programme, illiteracy is to be eradicated within 3 years of its implementation in a given village. The programme has recently entered its third year in the district. Its budget for administrative expenses is 1.2 million rupees. It has a total of 35 employees including 8 School Inspectors.

Its problems includes lack of transport facility to visit different villages in the district. Schools are also very poor and have no income other than government grants for teacher

salary and some money for stationary. For want of funds for travels, teachers too cannot come to the district office.

### 1.13. District Drinking Water Office:

The Office has a total of 24 drinking water projects under construction but plans to complete only 2 of them. Its annual budget amounts to 7.9 million rupees including 1.7 million for administrative expenses. It has a total of 48 staff including 13 peons. So far it has completed 27 drinking water projects in the district benefitting an estimated 35,000 people. Because of the remote locations and difficult terrain, it has difficulty bringing supplies to them. Because of political pressures, too many projects are included in its annual programme. But annual budget allocations are far too limited for each one of them resulting in long delays in their completion and escalation of costs in the process.

Other development-related offices in the district are the Earthquake-affected Area School Reconstruction Project and the Statistics Office (the latter for both Sindhuli and Ramechhap districts) of the National Planning Commission. However, there are also a number of other offices which are mainly of administrative nature like the District Administration Office of the Chief District Officer, Cadastral Survey Office, District Treasury, and District Post Office etc.

In Kavrepalanchok and Ramechhap districts too, the presence of the development-related offices are identical to those of Sindhuli as described above.

### Some conclusions deriving from the situation of the district offices:

A sample description of the government-run development programmes in Sindhuli district show the following:

- There is a wide variety of government interventions in the district which impinge on almost all aspects of rural development in the country. Many of the offices are also quite well-financed by the government and donors. Some of them have huge manpower capabilities. But it is obvious that they are not producing the kind of results that they seem to be able to create in the lives of the people. It has been quite pointedly expressed by the local Agriculture Development Bank office when it said that going by the amount of loan they have disbursed for agricultural development, the district by now should have been full of dairy industries and that milk and milk products should have been abundantly available.

- There are also a number of offices which lack the basic resources for such activities as travels, transport, equipments or even sufficient project allocation such as in the case of

drinking water. Some of them like the Buildings office have very minimal resources. So their presence in the district amounts only to service their tenure in the field offices while they are in the government.

- Staff absenteeism, temporary tenure of many staff, training and technical capability of staff also are problems. Motivation is low.

- The programmes are not designed with a clear view of the impact to be created by the allocation and expenditure of development resources. The emphasis is only on meeting the targets irrespective of whether they are also resulting in some benefits to the local population.

- None of the development offices have voiced any problem with the lack of coordination between offices, whereas an intended impact in the lives of the people can be created only by several agencies working together in unison. For instance, paddy production can be increased only by the Agricultural Development Office, the Agricultural Development Bank and the Agricultural Inputs Corporation working together. But since the focus on the intended impact is so very limited, it is little wonder that they do not realize the problem or complain about lack of coordination between different agencies.

- Associated with this problem is also the one of lack of any emphasis on building local beneficiary institutions and mobilization of beneficiary resources. While these two are some of the critical conditions necessary to be fulfilled for ensuring sustained development in the district, they have not been given sufficient priority in the programmes of the different development agencies in the district.

In sum, lack of professionalism, accountability and responsiveness have been some of the inherent problems in the current condition of government development organizations in the country at present. This has largely vitiated the potential for making contributions that they are otherwise endowed with.

## 2. Assessment of some past and on-going rural development projects:

As stated earlier, there have been a large number of donor-funded rural development projects in the country which has, at different times, covered large tracts of the country's territory. Some of the major ones of them are briefly described and assessed hereunder.

### 2.1. Jiri Multipurpose Development Project (JM DP):

Jiri is a small valley in Dolakha district adjoining both Kavrepalanchok and Ramechhap districts in the proposed road corridor region. While there is a Swiss-built road to Jiri at

present, in the 1960s it was two days' walk from the nearest road head at Barabise in Sindhupalchok district. Originally this place used to be the buffalo farm of the Rana rulers and later, it became the site of the FAO-sponsored Buffalo Breeding Project in 1957 implemented by Swiss technicians. Since the need for a wider integrated package was soon felt, in 1964 the Swiss NGO called the Swiss Association for Technical Assistance (SATA) rendered assistance to the government for a multisectoral development project which was called the Jiri Multipurpose Development Project or JMDP.

JMDP included several activities such as forest development, health, education, agriculture, animal husbandry, pasture development and different kinds of training programme. It was designated as "an experiment in mountain development". The project covered what was then called an "intensive area" in the vicinity of the project valley and an "extensive area" which brought assorted assistance to far-flung areas like Ramechhap and Solokhumbu.

For want of a road link, there was a STOL airfield and a single engine 7-seater pilatus porter piloted by a Swiss did all the ferrying of supplies and technicians to the project. The government wanted a road built to the valley but the Swiss was always seemed to disagree. So as a means of expressing its resentment at their perceived refusal, the government decided to take over the project from the Swiss in 1970 and funded it on its own. However, after about two years it was formally disbanded as an "integrated Project" and its different components were handed over to the concerned Ministries. It was the first formal demise of a rural development project in the country which came in 1972.

The project was headed by a Nepali General Manager but effectively run by a host of Swiss managers and technicians. The project was first under the Ministry of Agriculture and was later moved to Ministry of Home and Panchayat (the then version of present-day Local Development Ministry). This was part of the continuing squabble between the two Ministries already for several years.

Furthermore, the project was a Swiss-led, isolated undertaking and not a part of the larger rural development strategy in the country. The attitude of the participating Ministries was, at that time, described as one of "relaxed indifference". What happened was done by the Swiss technicians working there.

But not very much happened after all. What little planning was done occurred at the project site itself. The process consisted of putting together the activities identified by the staff themselves. There was no institutional mechanism to mobilize popular participation. Baseline survey was never undertaken and there was little trace of its contribution after the the shutters were pulled down on the project.



## 2.2. Integrated Hill Development Project (IHDP):

In 1974 a new Swiss-aided rural development project was borne in the same region but was based in a place called Dandapakhar in Sindhupalchok district. This time the project was conceived as a more integrated package including a 105 km-road link from Barabise at Kathmandu-Tibet road to the former Jiri valley. Once again the project consisted of all such sectors as agriculture, education, health, forestry, small scale and cottage industries, water management, women's programme, etc.

The project covered an area of 1200 sq. kms surrounding the road within a day's walk from it and consisted parts of two districts connected by the road namely Sindhupalchok and Dolakha. Three Service Centres were established at different points on the road and were seen as the staging point for the delivery of services in the region. The project area was characterized by a high degree of population density, big pressure on arable land (1000 persons per sq. km. of cultivated area), depleting forest, overgrazed pastures, soil erosion, and a heterogenous and largely illiterate population with an estimated food deficit of 20 percent. Therefore, the objective of the project was to improve "the standard and quality of life" of the people and the road was seen as the "backbone for integrated development activities of IHDP". If proven successful, the project approach was also to be replicated to other parts of the country.

A dichotomy of project activities had been worked out. The first category was defined as that requiring long gestation period and serving long-term needs of the area, and included such activities as forestry, erosion control, health and education. The second category was expected to bear "quicker" results such as agriculture, horticulture, etc. The project was designed as a fifteen year cooperation between the two governments. It was managed by a Nepali Manager assisted by an all-powerful Swiss Co-Manager and a contingent of 10 Swiss technicians each one of whom headed the sections of the project. A Project Coordinating Committee with representations from different participating Ministries functioned at the policy making and monitoring level.

In the field the project created a large corps of local volunteer leaders, formally designated by the project as Tuki which literally meant a small kerosene lamp used by the villagers. The Tuki was trained by the project in a range of sectors, was expected to assist a number of village households (range 16 to 145 households) in his area, and took part in a performance competition every three months, the winner receiving some rewards from the project.

Planning for the project was done at the Service Centre level based on demands made by the Tukis and the assessment of the project personnel. The village panchayats also submitted their demands as well as their concurrence to maintain the projects afterwards.

During its implementation the project had its share of problems.

There was problems in the flow of information between the centre and the project in the field. The problem of inter-ministerial coordination continued to plague it and there were constant problems in obtaining manpower for it from the Ministries. The village elites themselves were not quite sympathetic to the project goals of conserving the environment, because they needed to use more forest and their large flocks of livestock overgrazed the pastures.

But the major problem had to do with the coordination of the project activities conceived and implemented from the project office at Dandapakhar with those of the government departments represented at the district headquarters. The government's all-encompassing policy document for district administration and development called District Administration Plan formulated in 1974 with the King's blessings did not have provisions for independent existence for a district development outfit of the kind of IHDP. Issues such as these including the very dominant role of the Swiss experts marred its smooth functioning throughout the life of the project.

The Impact Assessment made by a Swiss consulting firm (INFRAS) in 1990 observed that the most striking and visible impact of the Lamosangu-Jiri road was on the structure of the settlements. The road induced rapid growth of two regional centres: Charikot (District Headquarter of Dolakha) and Jiri valley, fed by intra-regional migration from near road areas to those new centres. Many smaller settlements within the road corridor also increased in size.

The assessment also observed that the project contributed to increases in food production and to more diversified food consumption. But it went on to note that "while exports of agricultural products have always been low and have not significantly changed, imports have significantly increased: mainly agricultural inputs, construction materials, clothes and luxury goods. This growing imbalance in regional trade has been paid for by cash earnings in local development projects, and from seasonal and long-term migration to Kathmandu, the Terai and abroad." It also cautioned that the road and IHDP's "most visible impacts" have been physical infrastructures such as the road, schools, health posts and drinking water schemes. These new physical assets require maintenance which, in total, demand financial resources and skills beyond the region's capacity. "When external inputs are stopped, inability to maintain these assets could initiate prospective deterioration."

### 2.3. Rasuwa Nuwakot Rural Development Project (RNRDP):

Rasuwa and Nuwakot are two contiguous mountain and hill districts, situated immediately to the west of Kathmandu, with a combined population (1971) of 190,000 (The 1991 population of the two districts has been 282,004). Of the two districts, until recently, it was only Nuwakot which had a road link to Kathmandu which was constructed in the 1960s as part of a hydro-electric

project installed there. This place was also the scene of a government/FAO/UNDP multipurpose study project in 1967 and an FAO/IBRD cooperative programme study in 1974, the latter to identify and prepare a project for the development of the two districts. A 5-year Rasuwa Nuwakot Rural Development Project got underway in 1976 with an World Bank loan outlay of 8 million US dollars.

The project was "intended to support the Government's development strategy which seeks to balance economic growth with income distribution, provide for more equitable regional development and ensure productive benefits from previous road investments." To that end, the project consisted of activities in the fields of agronomical, horticultural, livestock and dairy development, hill terrace and river valley irrigation, agricultural inputs and credit, cooperatives, cottage industries, forestry and erosion control, health facilities and drinking water supply, and track, trail and footbridges. Specific targets were laid down in the Appraisal document of the project which stated that the project would increase annual production of paddy by 8400 tons, maize 5300 tons, wheat 1600 tons, millet 200 tons and potato and vegetables 200 tons.

At the district and village level, the project was implemented according to what was then called District Administration Plan which attempted to bring together the government offices and the elective institutions for the purpose of district development. At the sub-district level, Service Centres were created and the project activities were stipulated to be decentralized to those centres for service delivery to the panchayats in their areas. Annual planning in different fields were to be initiated by different Planning Committees in the district and was to be approved by the elective institution, the District Panchayat.

The project had been beset with many problems. When the Baseline survey was completed it was observed that there was a large section of the population that was comparatively disadvantaged. Their holdings were small, their alternative sources of income limited, their nutritional standards way below acceptable levels, their level of investment low, and they were less likely to use improved inputs. It noted that no special efforts were made to make project assistance primarily relevant and primarily given to the disadvantaged sections of the population, although they constituted the prime target group as defined by the project objectives.

During the implementation of the project itself, it was noted that the development agencies in the district spared for themselves the responsibility of assisting with the district planning. Targets were conveniently copied from the Appraisal document prepared much earlier by a World Bank team, irrespective of whether the ground realities were consistent with them or not. Thus, despite the provisions of the District Administration Plan requiring the preparation of an integrated District Development Plan annually for each of the districts, a genuine planning exercise was never undertaken in the two

districts.

An evaluation of the project conducted in 1982 reported limited impact of the of the project and identified design problems in this respect. It said that the goals of the project was not sufficiently focussed on the poor majority of the project area. Although the project was designed to be implemented by the concerned sectoral line departments, the evaluation noted that there was much confusion in the participating Ministries about their roles in the project. Inter-ministerial coordination continued to be a major problem. Mundane issues like the project allowance to selected employees of the different ministries always remained a bone of contention between different agencies involved in the project. In short, the intended benefits to the people targetted by the project failed to materialize.

The second phase of the project which had some 20 million dollars allocated to it remained equally lacklustre. It remained a frustrating experience for both the donor and recipient and finally led to its formal closure much before the latter phase could come to a formal conclusion.

#### 2.4. Mahakali IRDP:

The Mahakali Integrated Rural Development Project, funded by the World Bank, UNDP, and HMG, was implemented in 1979/80 for a period of five years with a total outlay of 161.4 million rupees and covered the three districts of the Mahakali Zone in Far Western Nepal namely Baitadi, Dandeldhura and Darchula with a combined population of 333,000 in 134 (then) village panchayats. The principal aim of the project was to raise agricultural production to levels whereby farmers could fully meet their family subsistence requirements. Accordingly, the project components consisted of agriculture, irrigation, village and cottage industries, forestry, soil and water conservation, and social services such as drinking water, rural works and other "Panchayat Development" activities. The project was implemented under the coordinating responsibility of the then Ministry of Panchayat and Local Development, now Ministry of Local Development, which appointed the Coordinator for the project for planning and implementing different sectoral components in an integrated manner.

The area was characterized by low land-man ratio (0.32 ha per capita), little use modern farming practices and credit, lack of food sufficiency for over 70 percent of households, high rural indebtedness, extensive seasonal outmigration to terai and India, poor health service delivery and low literacy rate. All these conditions made the area a fitting place for a resource-intensive integrated rural development project.

However, right from the start, the project had been marred by poor performance. The World Bank indicated in their Aide Memoire at that time the problem of "poor coordination" between different line agencies and lack of manpower and other supports

from the line ministries to the line agencies in the districts. They also mentioned that in the absence of any real authority over the line officers, the Project Coordinator had been largely ineffective (Pradhan, 1982). During the eight years that the project was implemented, very little in terms of integrated development was accomplished. The fact that the project area was situated so far away from the country's capital further compounded the problem of support for the project. The project was finally wound up as a failure in 1988. The project was initiated several years after the Rasuwa Nuwakot IRD Project but closed much earlier out of sheer exasperation.

#### 2.5. Karnali - Bheri Integrated Rural Development (K-BIRD) Project:

Although named after the Karnali and Bheri Zones in the Mid-Western Region of Nepal together with a total of 10 districts, the K-BIRD project was started in 1981 and never covered more than 3 districts of Jumla, Dailekh and Surkhet in its total lifetime of some 14 years in the country. Funded by the Canadian government, the project was designed with a total outlay of 15.6 crores for five years in which the Canadian contribution was to be 12.3 crores. Its main objective was to develop a series of integrated self-sustaining development projects and activities which would contribute towards the economic and social betterment of the residents of these districts. However, the project was also seen as an intervention "to provide a sound foundation for further funding of the 15 to 20 years programme seen as the minimum sustained effort required to achieve the above goal." So-called Confidence Building activities consisting mostly of small infrastructural schemes worth 2.6 million rupees were undertaken in the districts during the interim when the project itself was being designed. This special feature was intended to prevent "the loss of critical political support and lack of confidence."

The major components of the project were agriculture, irrigation, cottage industry, education, electricity, health and family planning, forest, soil and water conservation, public works and panchayat development. The project was organized along the same pattern more or less as other IRD projects in the country. The sectoral activities of the project were implemented through the line ministries, and the Ministry of Local Development (MLD) appointed the Project Coordinator. A team of Canadian "advisors", associated with the project, guided the project activities and controlled the project purse on behalf of the donor. Most of the project activities were implemented through the District Panchayats and the Village Panchayats and the line offices in the districts. Sub-district level Service Centres were also constructed at a number of places in the districts.

Despite years of effort and money spending, the project was largely a failure and achieved very little along the lines of the aforesaid goals. The Annual Monitoring Report for 1989/90

stated that "the measurable objectives are still poorly defined and the locations of projects are often unidentified in the a Annual Plan...The central ministries continued to make changes in the annual plan approved at the district level...Very few line agencies have apparently prepared their management plans." The Report also noted the problem of late release of funds, lack of feasibility studies, unfilled approved positions, and lack of data management capability. The main problem, therefore, had to do with the line agencies which, as elsewhere, looked at the Project activities as something "in addition to" their normal duty. Establishing inter-sectoral coordination and ensuring line agency commitments proved almost impossible to accomplish.

At the tail end of the project life in 1992, the Project developed a mechanism of bypassing the line agencies and directly implemented activities in such fields as drinking water, irrigation, school buildings and trails through the mechanism of what was dubbed as Quick Response Fund. Local people themselves selected and sited the proposed schemes, and the Project provided the necessary resources and technical support. The Project performance under this arrangement was said to be very satisfactory. But it came far too late in the life of the Project. The donor and the government decided to formally end the Project in July 1994. Some such activities continue to be funded by the donor through a Canadian NGO called CECI in Jumla and Surkhet districts and the package of the activities is even called "Mini K-BIRD" informally. Despite the Project's initial goal "to provide a sound foundation for further funding of 15 to 20 years' programme", the Project as a government-run entity formally (and abruptly) came to its end in 1994.

#### 2.6. Koshi Hill Area Rural Development Project (KHARDEP):

Funded by the British Government the KHARDEP project was implemented since 1979/80 in the four hill districts of Koshi Zone namely Sankhuwasabha, Terathum, Bhojpur and Dhankuta in the Eastern Region. KHARDEP started in mid-1977 "with a data collection and planning phase (Phase I)" which also included a few small projects in the field of irrigation, drinking water, trail improvement and primary schools.

Phase II of the Project represented the KHARDEP intervention in its fullness and got under way since late 1979. The objective of the project was "to strengthen local services and to help HMG/N promote balanced economic (and) social development of the Koshi Hill Area in order to gain maximum benefit from Dharan-Dhankuta road" which was built also with British assistance in answer to the call from His Majesty the King to link the Eastern Regional Headquarter of Dhankuta with the East-West Highway in the terai. The region itself was the homeland of the Rai and Limbu tribes which provided a large number of mercenaries for the British Gorkha regiments. The Project also recognized "the need for a long-term plan for the Koshi Hills development in order to reduce the wide disparity between its hills and the Terai-sub regions and the need to have a selective programme for

agriculture development, employment, and improvement in livestock sector and social services."

The Projectg incorporated a large number of sectors namely agricultural extension, livestock development, construction of irrigation schemes, roads and bridges, forestry, cooperatives, cottage industries, health, water supply, education and women's development. Project selection and planning was undertaken by the KHARDEP Coordinator's Office in association with HMG/N line agencies and district officials. Project implementation was the responsibility of the appropriate Central and District level offices of His Majesty's Government.

The Project was considered successful only in construction of infrastructures. Otherwise, its performance was marred by such bureaucratic problems as slow realease of funds, delays in filling vacancies in the district offices, and lack of coordination. Guided by such difficult experience with an "integrated package", the Third Phase of the Project got under way in 1987 with the revised objective "to improve the standard of living of the people of the four districts of the Koshi Hills, and to reduce the degradation of the environment" and with a reduced scope of activities. The major programme contents for the third phase were: agriculture, livestock, community forestry, road, local development support, Pakhribas Agriculture Centre and Uttarpani Agricultural Technical School. The Coordinator's Office was assisted by a consortium of expatriate consultants under the name of Programme Management Office.

The Phase I and II of the Project incurred an expenditure of 16,18,39,000 rupees and the the Third phase was budgeted a sum of 26,07,92,000 rupees. Like many other IRD projects, the organization structure adopted by this Project was to channelise Project resources through the line Ministries to the line agencies in the districts. The Ministry of Panchayat and Local Development appointed the "Coordinator" for the Project who had his office in Dhankuta and was assisted by a contingent of UK advisors.

Despite the laudable objectives of the Project, it had very little to show in terms of "strengthened local services" and "balanced socio-economic development of the Koshi Hill Areas" at the end of its lifetime. The Project came apart mor or less for the same reason as many other similar projects; they relied on the cooperation of the line agencies to deliver the goods to the people in the Project area which was not sufficiently forthcoming. The lack of cooperation from the line agencies was already in evidence in the Project as early as its third year of operation. A Pre-Review Assessment of the Project conducted at that time (quoted in Bharat B. Pradhan, 1982) stated that "KHARDEP is not a project. It is a collection of disparate activities whose only source of coherence and integration, if any, is the ODA advisors."

## 2.7. Sagarmatha Integrated Rural Development (SIRD) Project:

The SIRD Project was implemented in the Sagarmatha Zone in its two terai districts namely Siraha and Saptari and the "inner-terai" district of Udayapur whose combined population then was in the order of 848,000. The objectives of the Project were to strengthen the production, employment and income generating base in the rural economy of the three districts. Agriculture, irrigation, roads, forestry, rural market, village and cottage industry, soil and water conservation, and social services were the sectors included in the Project. Four different donor agencies namely the Asian Development Bank, the International Fund for Agriculture Development (IFAD), the European Economic Community (EEC) and the government of Nepal (HMG) cooperated in the Project with a total resource outlay of Rs. 450,120,000 including loans and grants from the donors making it the biggest ever rural development project in the country until then. The Project activities were implemented through the line Ministries, while the Ministry of Local Development provided the field-based Project Coordinator.

Because of the bureaucratic problems and the delay in the appointment of Chief Technical Advisor, the Project had a slow start, and though formally commenced in 1979/80, any serious work started only in 1980/81. Resources were only very slowly spent. The only sector which had been active was road construction.

Because of the problems in coordination and other bureaucratic deficiencies common to other similar projects, the SIRD Project too went through delays and time extensions. The initial 5-year project was first extended for four years and half which was again followed by an extension of one more year. The Project was formally closed in 1987.

## 2.8. Seti Integrated Rural Development Project:

Seti Zone in Far Western Development Region, comprising Doti, Achham, Bajhang and Bajura districts in the hills and Kailali in the Terai, has been one of the most remote, isolated and backward parts of the country. The 1991 population of the Zone was in the order of one million of whom 95 percent derives its livelihood from agriculture. Land holdings are small and rural incomes are low. With continuing population growth, more and more pressure is being put on limited land resources. Food deficit is endemic in the four hill districts of the five in the Zone. Basic services and infrastructures are poor. The Seti Integrated Rural Development Project has been formulated with the objectives of "alleviating the constraints on development in the Seti Zone and providing a foundation upon which future development activities can be built."

Project components consist of "(i) provision of transport infrastructure including the construction of 55 km dry season truckable track and the provision of 10 pedestrian suspension



bridges along major foot trails; (ii) irrigation of 2,200 ha in the Terai through the full utilization of 47 existing but unutilized and underutilized deep tubewells; (iii) support to agriculture extension and research through the provision of 23 agriculture service centers, incremental extension staff and upgrading of an existing research farm; and (iv) support to the rural development activities of the Ministry of Panchayat and Local Development through the strengthening of District Technical Offices, provision of funds for rural civil works, the construction and staffing of a Local Development and Women's Training Center and provision of support and training to Local Development Offices, District Technical Office and other Project staff." Three executing agencies and one participating agency are made individually responsible for their respective components. A Project Coordination Unit monitors the progress of project implementation through Local Development Officers.

The Project is designed primarily to improve access and provide basic agriculture support and rural services to the hills of the Project area and to relieve constraints on increased agricultural production in the Terai through the provision of quick yielding irrigation facilities. "Annual agriculture production at full development in the year 2000 is expected to increase by 22,600 mt of foodgrains valued at \$5.3 million. Substantial benefits are also expected through travel time savings and a reduction in non-productive rural labor."

The 7-year Project got under way since 1986 with a total outlay of 25 million US dollars including 5 million from HMG. The Project duration has already gone through one two-year extension with the closing date scheduled for December 1995 along with a scaling down of the Project cost to 21.6 million dollars including 4.3 million from HMG.

While no mid-term evaluation of the Project has been undertaken yet, "in general, the implementation of the project is seriously behind the schedule as envisaged in the project appraisal.... Lack of skilled manpower, shortage of construction materials, inexperienced contractors for civil works, difficulties in transportation of heavy construction materials on time, lack of incentives to the project staff, lack of expected coordination among the executing agencies, delay in selection and appointment of consultant and contractor, limited skills of the field personnel and remoteness of the project area" have hindered the project progress.

#### 2.9. Mechi Hill Development Programme:

The Netherlands Development Organization (SNV-Nepal)-funded Mechi Hill Development Programme is currently going through its Second Phase. The Programme is implemented in the three hill districts of Taplejung, Panchthar and Ilam in the easternmost Mechi Zone of Nepal which is situated at a distance of 250 km of Eagle flight and 700 km by road from Kathmandu. Of the total project area of 660,000 ha, 40% is considered arable, 26%

actually cultivated, 4% canal-irrigated, and 36% forested. Rice and maize are the main food crops, with millet used mainly for brewing. Tea, large cardamom, and potatoes are the cash crops. Majority of the northern hills households send labourers seasonally to Terai and India. The Indian and British Gurkha Regiments represent a considerable source of income and employment for the Rais, Limbus and Gurungs of the region. The population is estimated to be around 550,000 in 1991 and is of mixed ethnicity with Limbu being the most numerous (32%). There are a total of 138 Village Development Committees and 1 Municipality in the Project area.

Phase I of the Programme (1987-92) was a successor to an earlier Dutch-co-funded Terrace Irrigation Programme and covered one-third of the Mechi hills with several programmes such as water supply and irrigation, trails and small bridges, agriculture and women's development. Several lessons are said to have been learnt from Phase I and include such conclusions as that village development is done by the people; initiative and control over development should stay with the people; hill farmers need low-External Agricultural Input Technology; technical assistance intervention should go down to the ward level; women's involvement in sector projects should not be done by a third HMG-agency; user mobilization should be done by non-HMG staff; non-government organizations and staff must be involved and should be assisted and trained; the number of involved government agencies should be very limited; government staff should be replaced by NG-staff if not coming forward; intra-sectoral personnel management should be done by Regional Directors; inter-sectoral planning and coordination should be done by DDC; etc.

Like the first Phase, the Second Phase of the Programme (1992-1998) is guided by the objective "to assist the rural population in the three hill districts of the Mechi Zone in the visible and sustainable improvement of their living standards." The "Immediate Objectives" consist of Sustainable Community-led Development, Increased Food Production, Increased Farm Incomes, and Improved Nutrition and Sanitation.

The Programme is implemented through what it calls "the Cluster approach". The Project believes that "spreading of a Programme over a whole district results in enormous loss of supervision manpower time, and in a reduced possibility that also the powerless and poor are reached," and therefore, has opted for the Cluster Approach. This means the Project will be active only in a certain number of villages in two administrative areas i.e. Ilakas (sub-district wards consisting 3 to 6 Village Development Committees) at any given time. Every year, work in 3 to 4 new VDCs are started. After four years of work in a given set of VDCs, the Project moves on to new one leaving the old ones on their own. The Project intends to cover all the VDCs in the three district by the end of the proposed Third Phase of the Programme (1998-2005).

The Programme implementation is undertaken in four "stages". The

first stage consists of preparation of the Village Profile and Community Leader Training. The Second stage consists of Community-led Planning and Surveys/Designs of what it again calls "Stage I and Stage II activities". The latter Stage I activities are designated as Complementary Projects which consist of "small projects done by the people with assistance from Programme, mainly water supply and irrigation, but if preferred, also schools, bridges, bazaar improvement, village roads, and in mountainous areas, trails too." Construction is done by the villagers with assistance from group organizers and technical staff who are posted in the area. "Funding occurs directly from SNV to the User Committees. These projects will be assisted by NGOs and SNV which are responsible to the DDC in a similar way as the Line Agencies."

The latter Stage II activities consist of Sectoral Programme implemented by the Line Agencies. These are normally bigger sectoral activities which go through the steps of Survey/Design, User Trainings and Construction, are more time-consuming in preparation, and are undertaken in the last two years of the four years "via the appropriate District Line Agency with extra HMG-staff and some SNV-staff, lasting up to two years."

The Mechi Programme in many aspects is different from other IRD projects in the country: its limited coverage in any given year through the so-called Cluster Approach, involvement of only a very limited number of sectors, direct control of funding by SNV, and heavy presence of SNV and SNV-recruited officials in the projects. The slow coverage of the Programme districts had come in for criticism from the local leaders at the early stages of the Project. Since, the project has already left a number of Clusters on their own after their four year intervention, it would very interesting to see the sustainability of the interventions introduced by the Programme in them.

The total cost of the Programme for Phase II is estimated to be 230,263,904 rupees ( at the earlier exchange rate of Dfl 1.00 = NRs 23.00) of which 221,327,062 rupees or some 96 percent of the cost are borne by the SNV. Of the Dutch assistance, the largest single item of expenditure is "construction" with an allocation of 61,300,000 or about 28 percent of the total project cost. It is closely followed by SNV "personnel" and "consultancies" contribution for which a total sum of 54,263,009 rupees or some 25 percent of the total project cost is earmarked.

#### 2.10. Sindhuli District Flood Damaged Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project (SIREP)

Monsoon rains in September 1984 resulted in a flood in the Sindhuli district and destroyed some 4,400 ha of land and 758 village infrastructures, and caused the death of 155 persons and 1,070 heads of livestock. The flood left 2,200 households in need of the most basic necessities. Initial relief operations undertaken by several NGOs and the Nepal Red Cross Society mitigated only the most immediate effects of the flood disaster.

The district was already a food deficit area, and the damage caused to the farmlands and irrigations schemes further undermined the district's capacity to meet its food requirements.

In view of this serious situation, UNDP agreed in 1985 to finance US\$590,000 from its UN Emergency Operations Trust Fund to restore agricultural production and to create employment opportunities in the flood affected areas through rehabilitation of small scale irrigation schemes, drinking water schemes, schools, bridges, trails and bank protection/river training works.

Field activities commenced in February 1986 and ended in July 1987. The Project was mainly implemented by Nepalese nationals with assistance from an ILO Technical Assistance from Kathmandu. A total of 78 subprojects were constructed or rehabilitated, including 36 irrigation schemes, 17 bank protection/river training works, 15 community drinking water supply schemes, 7 schools, 2 pedestrian bridges and 3.6 km of mule track.

The conclusions drawn from the review of 10 of the 78 sub-projects five years later found that nine of the subprojects were still fully or partly operational. A major river training works at Gwang Khola, "for which a more capital intensive approach should have been adopted" has failed entirely. Two of the four irrigation schemes were endangered by continuous river bank erosion caused by increasing flood levels due to deforestation in the upper catchment areas, and the extension of another was not operational due to a design fault.

Several conclusions have been drawn from the review. Firstly, fast delivery of projects (78 projects in 18 months) is only possible if special procedures are developed and supervisory staff given strong incentives. Secondly, "it is unrealistic to expect investments in productive infrastructure such as irrigation schemes, undertaken over a short period, to have lasting results, as this requires careful investigation and appropriate designing with steady participation from beneficiaries over a longer time period." Thirdly, "the cost of rehabilitation or construction in small scale rural infrastructure currently appears to be high. Projects such as SIREP should be used for further research into simpler designs and technologies. This research should at all times be conducted with the active collaboration of farmers and local contractors...."

#### 2.11. Rapti Rural Development Project:

Begun in 1980/81 with USAID assistance in the five districts of the Rapti Zone in Mid-western Region of the country, this Rapti Rural Development project is one of the few such project still running in the country. The project has been guided by the USAID/Nepal Country Development Strategy Statement for US that "the overall goal for the AID program in Nepal is to assist

HMG/N to promote development in such a way as to meet the basic needs of Nepal's poor majority, with special attention to large, previously bypassed population in the Middle Hills". The project was, thus, designed to contribute to the achievement of this programme goal through emphasis on two project purposes: "a) to increase the measurable aspects of the quality of life, including income and production levels, of families in the Rapti Zone; and b) to improve local demand for, and control of, national level delivery systems for improved agriculture, health, education, resource management, and family planning."

In order to achieve these purposes, the project has been designed to:

- "improve food production and consumption quantitatively and qualitatively by households in the Zone;

- improve and increase income generating opportunities within the Zone which are accessible to poor farmers, landless laborers, occupational castes, and women;

- strengthen the capacity of panchayats and other local organizations to plan, implement and sustain local development efforts; and

- increase the availability and use of national delivery systems in the Zone."

Due to the inter-related nature of many of the problems in the Rapti Zone, the project also included activities related to other USAID/Nepal objectives listed in the aforesaid CDSS namely curtailing the process of environmental degradation, improving village health conditions, and control of rapid population growth. The project components were grouped into five "clusters" of closely related activities and/or implementing agencies namely Farming Systems, Renewable Resource management, Employment and Skill Development, Rural Works, and Institutional Development.

The planning and implementation of the project has been based on the HMG/N policies governing integrated rural development. Annual District Development Plans were needed to be formulated and included all activities to be implemented in the district. Central line ministries assumed direct responsibility for large scale activities. District line agencies were to implement or strongly support district, service centre and village authorities in implementing a broad range of activities such as agricultural extension, animal health and breeding activities, community forestry plantations activities, etc. The District and village Panchayats and local organizations had lead responsibility for smaller, less complex activities such as trail upgrading, small bridge construction, school upgrading, etc. Like in other IRD project, the Rapti Project also provided for the office of Coordinator who provided planning and implementation support to the districts in the Zone.

The project got under way with twentysix million seven hundred thousand dollars (then 31.8 crores rupees) of AID grant funding to 10 ministries and agencies of HMG/N over an initial period with a 21 percent HMG contribution valued at 7 million dollars (8.3 crores).

The second phase of the project started in 1987 under the name of Rapti Development Project with the goal to improve the balance among population, land and natural resources and thereby help HMG to achieve its aim of providing basic needs. The project purpose has been narrowed down to "increase agricultural and forestry production through local capacity building". Expected outputs have been : increased cereal and horticultural production, and livestock productivity, improved management of forests and natural resources, and increased HMG/N revenues and private investment. In contrast to the wide range of activities included in Phase I of the project, "the designers of Phase II decided to refocus the project to reduce the range of activities and concentrate on productive activities in agriculture and forestry." Despite this change, the 1990 evaluation of the project acknowledged that "the RDP remains complex and scarce management resources are still stretched over too many diverse components".

In terms of project achievements, its conclusions were tentative. It said " there is some evidence , of of it subjective, from many of the project activities that real progress is being made, but there are insufficient indicators derived from economic appraisals, including analysis of farm incomes, food self-sufficiency, and adoption of technology. This deficiency must be redressed."

In short, Rapti project has been evolving rather rapidly over the last decade of its implementation. Despite advances made in different sectors, management problems continue to affect its pace of progress. This has also been lamented in the Annual Progress Report for 2049/50. It said "Progress has been limited, however, by a number of issues, many of which have troubled the project from the beginning. They include ineffective commitment to and/or communication of RDP objectives and strategy, and limited progress in developing skills, confidence, and motivation among line agency staff. More effective action on these issues is essential if the project is to truly succeed during its remaining two years. This will require greater initiative, openness to change, and understanding among the many decision makers of the project's different organizations".

## 2.12. Gorkha Development Project:

The project which till recently went through the Planning and Orientation Phase (1991-94) has been implemented with the assistance of the Federal Republic of Germany starting 1991. The goal of the project has been to significantly and sustainably improve the living conditions of the inhabitants of Gorkha district. To that end three important project objectives have

been established and are as follows:

- Opportunities for gainful employment for a large majority of households are considerably enhanced;

- People at the grassroots are organized for self-reliant development; and

- Development institutions in the district are better organized with necessary competence and skills to assimilate and articulate people's demands and respond to them as appropriate based on the principle of decentralized planning and implementation.

Consistent with the Project purposes, a number of activities are being undertaken in the areas of institutional development, income generation, and infrastructural development. The project is implemented through a plurality of institutional channels comprising both government and non-government organizations including the District Development Committee (DDC) and the Village Development Committee (VDC) in the district. The DDC activities under the GDP consist mostly of infrastructure development projects funded under the Confidence Building Project of the latter. They generally consist of trails, drinking water projects and bridges. Limited sums of resources have also been provided to the DDC for the implementation of the Women's Development activities in a few selected VDCs.

In order to reach the project goals, the GDP has been supporting three NGOs in planning and implementing grassroot level programmes for alleviation of poverty. Of these NGOs, the Rural Self-Reliance Development Centre (RSDC) is dedicated to the cause of reaching the ultra poor in the communities. Its strategy includes the assignment of an external motivator who, having spent some time in rapport building, organizes the poor in what is known as Income Generating Groups (IGG).

A wide variety of social and economic development activities are undertaken both individually and collectively through the IGGs. Their major collective activities include mobilizing their own internal savings regularly, managing them as a loan fund for themselves, undertaking various community development activities like drinking water, sanitation, and literacy, and effecting social reforms like prohibition of drinking and gambling among their members. In terms of income generating projects, their savings are supplemented by the GDP by a small grant. The members borrow from the fund for a maximum of 1 year to undertake such activities like raising livestock, growing fruits and vegetables, or investing in traditional crafts such as fabricating copper pots. Even youngsters are organized into groups, do their own savings however modest, and engage in such creative pursuits as newspaper reading, oratory contest, pigeon raising for income etc. In places like Phujel where the programme has been implemented for the last three years, major transformations have taken place in the socio-economic situation of the members most of whom come from the untouchable castes.

This approach has since been extended to 27 of the 69 VDCs in the district.

Another NGO called SAPPROS (Support Activities for the Poor Producers of Nepal) has also been involved in the GDP for similar activities. This organization too was introduced to the project since 1991 essentially as an "alternative non-banker agency/carrier for the stated purpose of "managing the social and technical component of SFDP (leaving the credit component to ADB/N). As its initial activity in the community the NGO trained a batch of intra-VDC catalysts called the local contact persons (LCP) who were mostly instrumental in identifying village needs and prioritizing them. With their help and based on the Small Farmer groups created by the Small Farmer Development Project of the ADB/N in the village SAPPROS created an impressive array of local participatory institutions such infrastructure-specific user groups, a large number of savings groups of men and women, their federated entities at the ward level called Inter Groups, and similar federation at the VDC level called Small Farmer Development Main Committee.

The NGO has also introduced two highly innovative approaches in the VDCs where it has been working. One such approach is the community-managed Livestock Insurance Scheme under which large and small livestock are offered for insurance by the farmer at prevailing market price of the animals. There is a separate sub-committee under the Main Committee for managing the insurance activity. The value of premium is 8% of the agreed price of the livestock. The GDP gives a grant of 5% for it and the farmer himself pays 3% in cash. If the insured livestock died and the Inter Group found the case worthy of indemnification, the policy holder got compensated to a proportion of 80% of the value assigned to the animal. A separate Risk Fund is created by the committee for such indemnification. After necessary indemnification, the remainder of the premium money is deposited by the Main Committee in a local bank in the favour of the policy holder himself.

Another innovation has been the Labour Certificate Scheme. All infrastructural development projects in the community attracts a component of free labour from the residents which is normally 50% of the day's work. The person gets paid for the other 50% of his or her work. However, this payment is not made in cash. Instead a Labour Certificate is issued to him and the cash itself is again deposited in a local bank in favour of the person. In a VDC called Ghyalchok, for instance, more than half a million rupees have been collected in savings from different sources including the monthly savings of the Savings groups and user fees for infrastructures such as drinking water from the different user groups. The main committee meetings are regularly held and is open to any community member desirous to witness the proceedings. Transparency of management and universal participation by the beneficiaries stimulated by the savings of each of the members have been the keys to their successes.

The GDP is not without problems when it comes to its



relationship with the DDC which has until recently been disdainful of the funds going to the NGOs directly. It maintained that all GDP funds must pass through the decision-making process of the DDC. But the project document agreed upon between the two governments has provided for the plurality of institutional channels mentioned above. The relationship has all along been uneasy. Similarly, the Livestock insurance Scheme attracts much project resources for the premium grant of 5%. Thirdly, the NGO catalysts resident in the village has not been able to leave the communities on their own. They continue to be dependent on his interventions, guidance and other supports. This raises the issue of replicability of the approaches to a wider area. In the case of the SAPPROS intervention, informations are also lacking as to whether the poorest in the village are equally benefitting from the programme.

The preceding discussions on different past and present rural development projects are intended to provide a cross-sectional view of different kinds of rural development projects implemented in the country. While each one of them is different and distinctive from others, most of them seem to share a set of common problems. These problems could be classified into two categories namely the management problems and those having to do with programmatic deficiencies. These problems are dealt with in greater detail under Chapter 5 of this report.

#### 2.13. "Let Us Build Our Village Ourselves" (LUBOVO) Programme:

After the Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist Leninist) or in brief CPM-UML assumed the reins of power after their victory in the last mid-term poll in 1994, the new government presented a new revised budget to the parliament in which they introduced this new LUBOVO Programme under which each of the VDCs in the country are given a grant of 300,000 rupees which are expected to be matched local resource mobilization of similar magnitude for development works according to local priorities. The government has in the meantime also promulgated a set of "directives" for the planning and implementation of the Programme.

According to the stated objective of the Programme, the grant is intended to assist the VDC to consolidate their previous gains in rural development, to eliminate the weakness in its processes, and to make the speed of rural development "extensive, holistic and more accelerated". It is expected that the disbursement of the grant will "relieve the village people of the compulsion of having to be beholden to the District or the Centre even for the fulfillment of their minimal necessities and will instead generate a collective sense of self-reliance among them." Its objectives also includes such goals as strengthening local institutions for implementing development works, to enhance the use and productivity of local labour, skill and sources of resources, and to generate employment opportunities for providing "respite" to the people.

The Directives provides for an All Party Committee at the VDC level under the chairmanship of the VDC president, in which all the political parties with Unit Office in the VDC are to be represented. The purpose of the Committee is to assist the Assembly of the Users and the VDC in the selection of the projects, to monitor the timely implementation of the projects, to assist concerned agencies for timely release of money and construction materials and to ensure people's participation, to assist in the control of the misuse of resources and other irregularities, and to regularly report to the assembly of users, VDC and the people in general regarding those issues.

The projects to be selected for the programme should enhance income, employment and production in the communities, should benefit large population, particularly the disprivileged areas and their inhabitants, be feasible for completion in less cost and in one fiscal year with local skills and technology, and make maximum use of locally available materials. Examples of the projects that should be undertaken, according to the directives, would be the repair of small irrigation channels, river control, small embankments, terrace improvement, afforestation, environment conservation, water supply and sanitation, bridges and culverts, repair or construction of primary schools or VDC building, health post building construction or repair, construction of trails and tracks, and roads with the use of labour intensive technology, construction of micro hydro power plants and transmission lines, use of solar power for public purposes, etc. Two or more VDCs can join hands to undertake larger projects too.

Some restriction are also imposed on the use of resources. For instance, the moeny cannot be distributed among the wards on prorata basis, nor can it be used for the purpose of salaries and other administrative expenses. It cannot also be used as a deposit for e.g. getting a school approved, or for buying land and other capital goods, or on projects that have already been slated for funding by other agencies.

In order to ensure the sanctity of the VDC Act, the authority for the final approval of the selected projects has been vested with the VDC itself. The final list of approved projects are to be publicly displayed. The User Committees which must include at least one woman member, are made the exclusive institutions for the implementation of the projects. The agreement for the project is to be signed between the President of the User Committee and that of lthe VDC directly. The directives provide for the convening of User Assembly. They can however, be assisted by other NGOs and government agencies with the prior approval of the VDC. Should it be necessary to execute a project through the award of a contract for reasons of technology involved, it will be the VDC which will be responsible for implementing it on their behalf. The Directives also provide for the public display of the accounts by the User Committee for "People's Audit".

A District Technical Office is to be established under the DDC. The Local Development Officer is to pool together all the technicians available in the district line agencies under a Technician Management Committee which is to develop a Technical Manpower Allocation Plan. The VDCs also have the liberty to arrange their own source of technical manpower on their own or in concert with other VDCs. They can be employed also on contract or hired on the payment of fees. Local artisans such as Mistri, carpenters, masons and other skilled people can also be used for the purpose of the local projects.

To conclude, the Directives represent one of the most careful documents ever prepared by the Ministry of Local Development and leave no possible problem areas unaddressed. The Directives also includes several formats such as format for feasibility studies, account keeping, rate analysis, project agreement form including conditions of the agreement, simple format for account keeping by the user committee, format for the public display of accounts by the user committees, project evaluation form, and progress report form.

#### 2.14. Some Implications of the Past and On-going Rural Development Projects:

The preceding brief descriptions of past and on-going rural development projects have some important lessons for the designing of future similar interventions in the country.

##### - Bureaucratic deficiencies a major impediment:

Firstly, in the case of many an intervention such as the K-BIRD, KHARDEP, Seti Zone, Sagarmatha, Mahakali and Rapti projects, bureaucratic deficiencies have been prominent in the liquidation of those projects and had manifested themselves in such problems as lack of coordination, lack of personnel, lack of motivation on their part, lack of timely release of funds, lack of availability of materials, lack of priority by line agencies, etc. etc. Where the projects tried to steer clear of the bureaucracy as far as possible as in the Mechi programme, or the later stage of the K-BIRD project, etc. the projects seem to have been more productive of results.

##### - Strong donor presence, an illusory phenomenon:

In several projects such as the JM DP, IHDP, and KHARDEP from the past, and the on-going Mechi Programme, there has been heavy presence of donor officials presumably to provide on-the-spot and more professional and motivated direction to the projects. However, if the past such projects have been any guide, they have proven to be illusory. Even though they are successful in creating a semblance of action while they are still there, the past projects have shown that it is anything but a sustainable approach. In contrast, the GDP is basically a show run

exclusively by Nepali professionals, and its achievements have been relatively outstanding.

- NGOs represent more reliable support system:

In a host of approaches described above, NGO support system has been crucial and more effective. Such examples come from Gorkha Development Project and the Mechi Programme, to name the two. The catalytic role of the NGOs have been critical particularly in the Gorkha Development Project which has successfully adopted a number of rural development innovations not found in other such projects in the country.

- Beneficiary institution building is critical:

For a successful approach to sustainable rural development, beneficiary institution building and their participation in the identification of projects and ascertaining their priorities are critical. This has been well demonstrated in the case of the wide variety of activities in the Gorkha Development Project as well as in the later stage of the K-BIRD Project. Similar has been the lesson of experience of the Mechi Programme, although the programme still needs to be independently evaluated.

- Inter-sectoral coordination by recipients more effective:

Mechi Programme has demonstrated that the District Development Committees, as the forum for inter-sectoral coordination in the district, are more effective than the ones unsuccessfully attempted between line agencies or their central departments. Devolution of planning and related decision making to local bodies is essential to a successful planning coordination at the implementation stage.

- Sustained technical and managerial support essential:

As shown by such projects as GDP and Mechi Programme and also by SIREP to a certain extent, sustained technical and managerial support to local users is essential for successful completion of development project. In this case, SIREP serves as an outstanding example in that 78 projects were completed in a span of 18 months.

The above are some of the important lessons of experience from the projects briefly described above. While these variables are dealt with separately, these by nature also constitute mutually inter-locking propositions. Therefore, programme structures for future rural development projects could be more effective, if they could incorporate the critical features discussed above.

## CHAPTER 4

### INVENTORY FORMULATION OF LONG AND SHORT-TERM PROJECTS

The Indepth household studies, the specific issues studies as well as the studies done of the different programmes under the stock-taking studies have yielded the following possible long and short term projects for planning and implementation in the proposed project area.

#### 1. Possible Long term projects:

Given the situation in the proposed road corridor region as described in the preceding sections of this report, long-term projects under the following different headings or subject areas can be conceived for implementation.

##### 1.1. ENVIRONMENT-RELATED:

##### 1.1.1. Environment Impact Assessment of the proposed road corridor.

The construction of the proposed road is likely to unleash an immense dynamics in the otherwise serene region in the three watersheds in the region. Therefore, a continuous monitoring of the environmental impact of the road construction should be undertaken. Based on such studies or monitoring, it may be necessary to introduce mid-course corrections through programme or regulatory policy interventions to safeguard the quality of environment or even enhancing it. Since women are the basic users of forest resources in the villages, they would have an immense role to play in this regard. The women groups recommended in the final chapter could be the basic institutions to initiate and sustain such interventions in the communities in favour of environment conservation.

##### 1.1.2: Study of impact on the forest between Khurkot and Sindhuligadi whose present vegetation is quite rich:

While this activity could form part of the above EIA, this section, given its immense richness deserves special attention. With the construction of the road and increased accessibility, loggers may be tempted to this region as in the case of the forests in the Churia range adjoining Terai in the Sindhuli district as mentioned above.

##### 1.1.3. Integrated development of sub-watersheds in the region:

Since the geophysical condition of the road corridor region is very fragile, it may be necessary to conceive of the environmental conservation and management in terms of sub-watershed development. Altogether six

sub-watersheds have been identified between Kavrepalanchok and Sindhulimadi and have been identified in the enclosed map of the proposed road corridor region. This possibility and need have been discussed in greater detail in the paper on Environment Conservation given in Annex 4 to this report.

#### 1.1.4. Monitoring of natural systems:

Given the ecological diversity in the proposed region, different natural systems could be specifically identified and their developments monitored on a long term basis.

#### 1.1.5. Forest Conservation and management:

This should be one of the major challenges of development intervention in the region. Within the planning framework recommended (Chapter 5) for the development of the VDC, forest conservation could and should occupy a very important place. There are instances elsewhere in the country where local women have taken control of their forest and are doing a very effective job of protecting them from trespassers. This is an immense possibility and should be given serious consideration.

### 1.2. INFRASTRUCTURE-RELATED:

#### 1.2.1. Maintenance and protection of road infrastructure:

Local community participation could be explored to maintain the proposed road corridor at different points. While the possibility of such an approach has not been explored in the country, this does seem feasible.

#### 1.2.2: Construction of feeder roads:

Once the road is constructed, there are several villages in the vicinity of the road, some several hours distant, which want to build feeder roads to benefit from this road axis between two important market centres in the country. Therefore, a master plan should be developed so that the communities could participate in the realization of a coordinated network in this respect.

#### 1.2.3. Trail improvement:

With the construction of the road and expansion of economic activities, trails too would need to be improvised on a long-term basis.

### 1.3. SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT-RELATED:

In this field two programmes should be conceived on a long-term basis. They are as follows:

- Women Development Programme: this issue has been addressed

in the recommendation given in the next chapter.

- Improving health and sanitation; It involves serious health education of the local people, primarily women and children. But this can only be a long-term proposition.

#### 1.4. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT-RELATED

##### 1.4.1. Population control programme:

There are irrefutable signs that despite the hardship in the region, population is growing at a very fast rate. In order to restore the balance between humans, livestock and forest, population growth must be brought down to manageable rate. Through the network of organizations recommended in the next chapter, this is an attainable goal for the project and must be pursued with a long-term commitment.

##### 1.4.2. On-farm and Off-farm income generating activities:

##### 1.4.3. Small farmer entrepreneurship development:

Since land endowment for most of the poor people in the proposed region is quite limited, the increment in their prosperity and living standard cannot be attained only by enhancing their farm productivity. Therefore, they must be assisted to look for a combination of sources of income generation such as trading, small industries, agro-industries, etc. etc. He must develop an ability to scan a wider range of possibilities than just his farm or the outlet of short or long-term migration. One of the challenge for the project, therefore, would be to try to transform a small farmer to become a budding entrepreneur. This too has been addressed in the chapter on recommendations.

##### 1.4.4. Medium and large scale irrigation projects:

In some place like Sindhuli such kinds of irrigation projects is a possibility. In order to enhance agricultural productivity, feasible projects in this field should be undertaken.

##### 1.4.5. Horticulture development:

This sector has already become a proven success within the limitation posed by the present geography of the region. But given the fact that the region is bounded by two very important markets of the country, the possibilities for expansion of this sector is literally limitless. Therefore, there should be some kind of a master plan for horticulture development in the region.

##### 1.4.6. Small and big livestock development:

Again given the market for livestock and dairy products in both the ends of the proposed road corridor, this sector too should be developed on a long-term basis. Small livestock, as

recommended in the following chapter, can play a very crucial role in the development of women in the communities.

#### 1.4.7. Credit for small farmers:

One of the inherent disadvantages of small farmers is his lack of credit-worthiness. This deprives him from further chances of being able to move out of the poverty trap. Therefore, credit availability and accessibility for the small farmers should warrant long-term interest of the project.

## 2. Possible short-term projects:

Similarly, there are a number of short term projects that can be undertaken in the region and are as follows. They are more or less self-explanatory. The duration of being short-term is defined here as something that can be implemented and completed within 5 years.

### 2.1. Environment-related:

- Energy saving technology such as cookstoves, etc.
- Renewable non-forest energy such as biogas

### 2.2. Infrastructure-related:

- Small irrigation schemes
- Link roads
- Trail improvement
- Small hydel projects
- Rehabilitation of existing infrastructure
- River training
- Physical facilities for government offices at district and sub-district level

### 2.3. Social development-related:

- Female education
  - Non-formal education
  - Enhancing female school enrollment
- Incentive programme (hostel facilities, scholarships, etc)
- Drinking water projects



- Health infrastructures for existing health institutions in the form of buildings, equipments and funds for revolving medical supplies

#### 2.4. Economic development-related:

- Horticulture development: This can also be undertaken as a short-term undertaking particularly in the field of vegetables.
- Livestock development: breed improvement, veterinary services, etc.
- New cash crops; e.g. coffee
- Sericulture
- Poultry and feed development
- Exclusive credit for female borrowers for small livestock
- Priority for people from the road corridor region and the three districts in the construction jobs during road building: When the road construction gets under way there would be lots of construction jobs available. If the local people get priority in getting such jobs, this would mean lot of inflow of money in the household economies of the poor people. Should they participate in the development programme suggested in the following chapter, the availability of more capital to be invested by them in income-generating activity will accelerate their journey on the road to poverty alleviation.

#### 2.5. Institution-building related:

- Planning and monitoring system for the VDCs and other groups in the communities

The above are merely a list of possible projects. They need to be further investigated for developing detailed projects including cost estimates for them.

## CHAPTER 5

### RECOMMENDATION

#### 1. RECAPITULATION OF THE RESULTS OF DIFFERENT STUDIES:

##### 1.1. RECAPITULATION OF THE FINDINGS OF STUDY ON THE IDENTIFICATION AND CHARACTERIZATION OF THE PROPOSED ROAD CORRIDOR AREA:

The following section recapitulates the findings, conclusions and implications of the preceding chapters and then, in their context, leads on to the recommendation of a project that is most likely to effectively address the needs of the local people and help them alleviate their poverty and raise their living standards.

##### Geophysical characteristics:

1.1.1. The proposed Banepa Sindhuli Road Corridor passes through three topographic zones of Nepal namely the Mahabharat Lekh mountain range, the Midland Hills, and the Bhitri Madhesh (the Inner Terai or Doon Valley). The topography is highly diverse and ranges from 2,765m (Phulchoki peak on the Mahabharat range) to 640m (Sindhulimadi).

1.1.2. Midhills of Nepal are naturally fragile for the construction of infrastructures. Lessons learnt from other similar situation can be fruitfully employed for road construction in this region. Undertaking EIA should be considered.

1.1.3. One study based on aerial photographs and remote sensing has shown that between 1972 and 1990 the area under forest cover has significantly increased.

##### Environmental characteristics:

1.1.4. The watersheds adjoining the proposed road corridor have only 37% of land under forest cover with 10% crown coverage only. Cultivated land represents only 28%.

1.1.5. There are many degraded areas in the region. Accessible forests are overused. Steep topography, broken terrain, fragile geology and monsooning climate make the area vulnerable to environmental degradation.

1.1.6. Population increase, uncontrolled use of natural resources, unscientific agricultural activities on fragile mountain slopes and lack of environmental considerations have been the principal factors causing accelerated ecological degradation in the area. Nationally, it is said that 53% of all

natural catastrophes in the country are result from human activities.

1.1.7. Each hectare of cultivated land requires 1.3 ha of forest for fodder and bedding materials. Therefore, balance between humans, livestock, land and forest is a precondition for the sustainable development of the region.

The few development programmes currently under implementation in the districts of proposed road corridor have failed to take these issues into consideration. As a matter of fact, they simply have not been part of their agenda.

#### Population and ethnicity:

1.1.8. The road corridor districts of Kavrepalanchok, Ramechhap and Sindhuli are some of the populous mountain districts in the country with a combined total population of 736,000 which is about 4% of the country's total. Ethnically, it is very diverse and some 60 different castes and ethnic groups are represented in the three districts. Tamangs are the dominant population and the region represents the core of their "home" region.

1.1.9. A small sample of 300 households has been drawn from 6 different locations along the proposed road corridor and includes 11 different caste/ethnic groups.

1.1.10. Historical and cultural traditions set different caste/ethnic groups apart. Due to historically favoured access to political power and productive resources, such groups as Bahun, Chhetri and Newar are better privileged and this situation is reflected in their current socio-economic make-up. Other groups too have their own distinctiveness. The sample of 11 caste ethnic groups has, therefore, been divided into 4 different clusters and the member of each clusters share more or less common socio-economic characteristics. Bahun and Chhetri form one cluster, Newar another cluster, Tamang, Magar, and Gurung third cluster and Majhi, Bhujel, Kami, Damai and Sarki the last cluster.

1.1.11. The sample population is a young population with some 50% of it in the age brackets below 15 years. It indicates high growth rate of population and a built-in momentum for further growth in future years.

#### Household studies

1.1.12. Food production from their farms has been taken as the criterion to identify the economic status of household. Households with a food scarcity of 7 months or more in a year have been categories as Marginal, of between 4-6 months Small, of 1-3 months Medium and those without any scarcity as Large. In the total households, Marginal category has 17%, Small 23%, Medium 13.7% and Large 46.3%. In other words, 53.7% of population suffer from food scarcity of different durations in a year.

1.1.13. A strong association exists between the caste/ethnic and economic status of the households. For instance, of the 51 households in the Marginal category, only 2% belong to Cluster 1, and 45% and 27.5% in Clusters 3 and 4 respectively. Similarly, of the 139 households in Large category, 41.7% and 46.0% belong to Clusters 1 and 2 respectively.

1.1.14. Despite the region being a rural hinterland, agriculture is no longer the main occupation of all the people. The households reporting agriculture as the main occupation ranged between 42.2 and 70.9% in different sample settlements. Corollarily, a small proportion has reported agriculture as their secondary occupation.

1.1.15. Average land ownership of households consist of 15.85 ropani with a per capita distribution of a little over 2 ropani or 0.11 ha which is far below the national percapita of 0.24 ha.

1.1.16. Worse yet, land distribution is quite skewed. The average land ownership of Marginal households is only 0.5 ha but that of Large 1.1 ha.

1.1.17. Long- and short-term outmigration is widespread in the area, majority of them going to Kathmandu, and some to India. This is reflected in the composition of the sources of their cash income in which wages and salaries and trade and commerce figure importantly.

1.1.18. Crop yields are comparable to national average, but access to market, application of fertilizer and pesticides etc have facilitated increased yield rate.

1.1.19. A variety of livestock is kept by the villagers. But goat and buffalo are important sources of cash income and are therefore, kept in proportionately larger number.

1.1.20. Fruit trees are grown in large numbers. Average number of trees owned by Marginal households is 26.9 and that by Large is 53.4.

1.1.21. Institutional credit is availed by some households in the sample. But dependence on local money lenders is more widespread.

1.1.22. Literacy is only 28.7% which is well below the national average 39.3%. Female literacy is particularly low at 19.6%. School enrollment is also low.

1.1.23. Drinking water is accessible to only 44.3% of households. Health facilities and access to them are limited. Sanitation is almost non-existent. Lack of latrines is nearly universal.

#### Reanalysis of the poverty issues:

1.1.24. Nationally, some 40 -70% of the people are estimated to be under the poverty line. This massive poverty is not an

accidental phenomenon. There are several kinds of policy distortions at the macro level such as subsidizing the goods and services for the limited urban population, providing concessions to large scale agriculture and industrial enterprises, chronically under-funded anti-poverty programmes, and low investment in education depriving poor children from access to school.

1.1.25. For poor people the wages to be earned by their children are hedges against starvation and security for old age. With increasing population, therefore, they are caught in a increasing difficult downward spiral of degradation.

1.1.26. The poor suffer from chronic food deficit with adverse impact on their nutritional status.

1.1.27. Poor people are systematically out of low-interest institutional credit facilities.

In the programmes implemented in the proposed road corridor region, these issues are just not addressed.

#### Reanalysis of the issues regarding Women in Development:

1.1.28. Although the proportion of women in the so-called "economically active" category of population has been reported to be only 40.4%, in contrast to economically active men, the proportion of women engaged in agriculture is much higher and is reported to be 91%. They are overwhelmingly in agriculture.

1.1.29. In the 10-14 age-group the proportion of females in the "economically active" category is much higher suggesting that a disproportionate number of female children of school-going age are already out of school and winning bread for the households. This pattern is also representative of the situation in the road corridor districts.

1.1.30. Other disabilities of women include severe societal sactions against participation by women in public life. Politics, government and market affairs are totally monopolized by men.

1.1.31. Women have no right to landed property in their own right. They cannot inherit parental property of this kind.

1.1.32. What development programmes are implemented in the country, they are not gender neutral; they are more pro-men'

1.1.33. What few programmes for women's development are implemented in the country, their magnitude, contents and outreach have simply been too limited.

#### SOME IMPLICATIONS OF THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PROPOSED AREA:

The preceding discussions clearly show the following attributes

of the area:

- Poverty in the area is widespread. It is endowed with limited cultivated land. Majority of people suffer from different degrees of food scarcity. External employment constitutes a very important component of the household economy. With increase in population the situation can be expected only to grow worse.

- Some segments of the local population are poorer than others and are so due to acute stratification embedded in the social structure and traditions of the different caste/ethnic groups. Specifically targetted development interventions alone can be expected to have desired impact on their lives.

- Access to development benefits and resources are minimal at present. The whole array of development institutions in the area have minimal effect towards improving the living conditions of the people.

- Women's role is mainly confined to home and agriculture. While the general literacy level of the area is lower than the national average, that of women is much lower. Nothing short of specially targetted development intervention is required to have the women participate in their own development as well as of their household and community.

- People live in a fragile environment which has already gone through considerable degradation. Maintaining and carefully nurturing a balance between humans, livestock, agriculture and forest among others are absolutely essential for a sustainable process of development in the area.

As it is, the area is currently going through an accelerated and downward spiral of degradation. Specially designed interventions would be necessary to enable the people to achieve a turn-around in the situation and to benefit sufficiently from the construction of the proposed road corridor.

## 1.2. RE-ANALYSIS AND CONSIDERATION OF THE STOCK-TAKING STUDY:

Two kinds of stock-taking study have been undertaken namely the existing development programmes in the two districts of the Kavrepalanchok and Sindhuli and the different past and existing rural development projects in the country.

### 1.2.1. Re-analysis of the contribution of the existing development programmes in the districts:

Regarding the different development programmes being implemented in the districts, the following observations could be made:

- There are a large number of projects or programmes which are present in the district and represent a wide variety of

fields. In Sindhuli, for instance, there are offices or institutions relating to Electricity, Horticulture Farm, Irrigation, Agriculture Development, Livestock Development, Sericulture Development, Agricultural Credit, Agriculture Inputs, Forestry, Public Health, Cottage and Small Industries, Public Buildings, Education, Statistics, Drinking Water, Earthquake-damaged School Building Reconstruction including the office of the elected District Development Committee.

- Despite the wide range of development fields represented in the district, many problems afflict them rendering them largely ineffective in delivering goods to the people. Some of the common problems are:

- Lack of personnel or staff absenteeism,
- Lack of properly trained staff,
- Temporary tenure of many staff,
- Lack of sufficient budgetary resources for travels, necessary equipments, building facilities, etc.
- Lack of supervision,
- Too many under-funded projects like in drinking water which are undertaken to placate the overwhelming political pressure of the local leaders, etc.

As a result of these problems, the annual and trimesterly targets are fulfilled mostly in paper. Staff motivation is low and they lack in responsiveness to local needs.

- In addition, most of the programmes are implemented in the district only to fulfill their annual targets, so that the staff have can save their neck and job. The emphasis is in spending what resources they are given. Their concern does not extend upto whether the spending of such resources are also producing outputs and impacts that are valued by the local beneficiaries. As a result of this situation, while the development offices do end up spending what little resources have been given them, in most cases they do not end up also creating a desired impact in the life and economy of the local people. This fact is well evidenced in the earlier reports regarding the socio-economic situation in the six VDCs selected for detailed investigation for this study. Briefly stated, a wide gulf exists between the role expectation on the part of the local people, and the role perception and performance on the part of the development officials in the districts.

- Other problems that characterize those programmes have to do with the following:

- Lack of coordination and realization of its need between different related programmes,

- No attempt at building the institutional and management capacities of the local beneficiaries,
- Lack of emphasis in mobilizing beneficiary resources, etc.

Given such a situation it is little wonder that the current process of progressive deterioration of the living conditions of the people is not arrested.

#### 1.2.2. Re-analysis of the lessons of existing and past rural development projects in the country:

The country has a long history of donor-assisted rural development projects. Enormous sums of grant and loan money have been expended in those projects. But their contributions to the development of rural areas have been varied and often dubious. Two kinds of problems have afflicted several of those projects. The first kind has to do with the style of management and the second with the weaknesses inherent in their approaches.

##### 1.2.2.1. The Management Problems:

- Many of those projects have been designed by donor experts mostly in their own headquarters and were on purpose made different from other existing rural development projects in the country to ensure their own distinctiveness in the project they would fund. They were also guided by such professional hope that should the project they have designed prove to be effective, they could claim authorship to the approach, parade it as a matter of their personal achievement, and eventually, to reap a more mundane harvest that such successes would most likely bring in their train.

- Although, at the face of it, such projects were within the domain of the Nepal government's decision-making, practically they were controlled and directed by the expatriate donor officials who had the main power to the purse. Separate institutional arrangements were created mostly in the form of the so-called "Project Coordinator's Office" which they would use as their base camp to implement their designs. Sometimes an even more independent donor project office headed by the expatriate official/s would be created under the direct umbrella of the country representative of the donor country or institution and this would soon emerge as the hub of all important decisions regarding the rural development project.

Occasionally, expatriate officials themselves would head different sectoral Divisions of the Project with Nepali officials and technicians working as their assistants under the lure of higher emoluments and possible opportunity for foreign training and travels.

Such an arrangement would not have been necessarily counterproductive, had it not been for the fact that the



processes of the unfolding of the project in the country would be divorced from the mainstream development (or lack of it) of rural development in general in a country of which more than 90% of the people are rural. After it has been terminated, the projects generally have hardly little to show for the years of time and millions of dollars spent on them. Over the last two decades, almost half of the country had seen the implementation of one or the other donor-funded long-term rural development projects. But the current socio-economic conditions of those districts (low production, continued lack of employment opportunities, stark poverty, environmental degradation, high population growth rate, etc.) stand only as adverse testimony to that fact of donor assistance. For most donor officials, it suits them nonetheless. For them the posting to Nepal is only one of the many possible around the poorer parts of the globe. Whatever happens to Nepal by their dint does little to compromise their chances to move on.

- Thirdly, there is the problem with the government's commitment and capability to manage rural development in general and those heavily-funded projects in particular. It failed to go beyond the stage of rhetoric to develop and enunciate a clear understanding of the goals and processes of development and poverty alleviation in the rural areas and the overall institutional instrumentalities to achieve them. This lacuna at the core of the issue became manifest in many of its shortfalls such as failure to deploy required manpower to the projects, to establish necessary systems of coordination and integration at national and local levels, or to institute necessary institutional arrangements for ensuring beneficiary participation in the projects and their future sustainability. The multitude of donors with their stated objective of assisting the country to develop its rural areas did little in this regard other than jealously defending their own turfs.

#### 1.2.2.2. Programmatic Deficiencies:

Consequent to the shortfalls at the policy level, there were number of other programmatic deficiencies that characterized the project. Some of them have been as follows:

- Whatever the quality of performance, there exists development programmes of the government across almost all the sectors relevant to rural development such as agriculture, livestock, forest, education, etc. etc. Whenever a donor-funded rural development project with some of those very components are implemented in one or a few districts, then the problem of coordination between the two sets of rural development activities creeps in. While the implementation of the so-called regular government activities would never rise above being lacklustre, the donor-funded component of the same sectoral programme would never receive even lesser priority. In almost all the so-called IRD projects this problem remained throughout their lifetimes. Such components as buying vehicles, making other purchases, or undertaking civil construction works were attended to with

relative despatch, because most often than not they involved mundane consideration for the official who had the authority to make decisions to that effect.

- Overall plans were never formulated at the level of the Ministry nor at the local level. Whether the programme of a certain sector was producing desired impact in the lives of the people was never a question. Therefore, the compulsion for the coordination of different components and for trying to achieve optimal results from those investments was not necessarily required.

- It has been still worse at the village level. The fact the village society in Nepal has been highly stratified and that it needed special policies and approaches to target the poorer sections was not reflected in those programmes.

- Most of the projects also did not properly attend to institution building at the local level. Capacity building for planning, resource mobilization, project maintenance, etc. did not receive the priority and attention it deserved for sustainable development at the local level.

- Monitoring of the performance of the programmes have also not been undertaken in a manner worth the name. Even where a few donor-funded activities were producing some results in certain sectors, they were never seriously monitored by relevant agencies in the government with the result that the dissemination value of those innovations were lost to the country.

These have been some of the deficiencies that characterized the different donor-funded as well as government's regular rural development endeavours in the country. Thus, even after so many years of so-called rural development, the socio-economic indicators in the rural areas continue to be increasingly adverse. Population is outstripping the available resources in the villages. Agricultural production is stagnating. Environment is degrading. Social services are limited. Outmigration is intensifying, etc.

#### 1.2.2.3. Some positive lessons of experience:

There has, however, been some worthwhile experiences as well. Projects such as the Gorkha Development Project funded by the GTZ have shown that local people including the very poor and downtrodden can be organized to help themselves with initiatives to raise their living standards and even mobilize substantial sums of household financial resources. Some essential elements of their strategy have been:

- dedicated external catalysts working with the community to organize and train the local villagers,

- beneficiaries organized into savings and income generating groups and consistent mobilization of their resources,

- External and timely provision of locally needed technical support,
- Creating conditions for assisting individual farmers by the catalysts and fellow farmers to undertake income generating activities according to their own capacities,
- Generating peer pressures in the community for participating in development activities, and
- Helping local communities to institute a transparent and participatory decision-making system.

The rural development scene today is mix of many different kinds of negative and positive experiences. But there is little of monitoring going on so that the effective approaches can be singled out for further and wider dissemination in the country. As a result even the approaches that seem to work better than others have suffered from being applied on a small scale only. The practical implications of its wider expansion has not been sufficiently looked into.

### 1.3. IMPLICATIONS OF THE INVENTORY OF VALUABLE AND SUITABLE SHORT AND LONG-TERM RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS:

Given the highly underdeveloped nature of the settlements through which the proposed road corridor is expected to pass, there are many long and short-term development projects which the local people, leaders and officials would like to get implemented. However, it must be mentioned that there is no project other than the proposed Banepa-Sindhuli road project which is so very uppermost in their mind. The possibility of the construction of this road link has been conceived for over three decades and the urgency they have lent to this project matches the duration of their waiting and frustration. An overwhelming majority of them are convinced, rather naively, that their prosperity is right around the corner only if the road were to be built. They have not thought of too much beyond the construction of this highly coveted infrastructure project. Therefore, once the road is built, there will be many more projects that the people would like to undertake and would complement the existence of the valuable infrastructure.

Even from the present vantage point, however, a few long and short-term projects can be identified based on the opinion of the local people, their leaders, government officials and experts. Long-term projects, defined as those necessary to last over 5 years, would comprise of such activities as the following.

Possible long-term projects for rural development in the region:

Environment-related:

- Environmental Impact Assessment of the proposed road
- Study of impact on the forest between Khurkot and Sindhuligadi where the present vegetation is quite rich
- Integrated development of sub-watersheds in the region
- Monitoring of natural systems
- Forest conservation and management

Infrastructure-related:

- Maintenance and protection of road infrastructure
- Trail development and improvement connecting the road
- Construction of feeder roads

Social Development-related:

- Women development programme
- Improving health and sanitation

Economic Development-related:

- Population control programme
- On-farm and off-farm income generating activities
- Small farmer entrepreneurship development
- Medium and large-scale irrigation projects
- Horticulture development
- Sericulture development
- Small and big livestock development
- Credit outreach for small farmer

Possible Short-term projects:

(defined as implementable in less than 5 years)

Environment-related:

- Energy saving technology: e.g. cooking stove
- Renewable energy: biogas

Infrastructure-related:

- Small irrigation schemes
- Link roads
- Trail improvement
- Small hydel projects
- Existing infrastructure rehabilitation
- River training
- Physical facilities for development offices at district and sub-district level

Social development-related

- Female education
  - Enhancing school enrollment
  - Non-formal education
  - Incentives programme (hostel, scholarship, etc.)
- Drinking water projects
- Health infrastructure: buildings, equipments

Economic development-related:

- Horticulture development
- Livestock development: breed improvement, vet. service
- New cash crops: e.g. coffee
- Sericulture
- Poultry and feed development

- Exclusive credit for female borrowers

Institution building-related:

- Planning and monitoring system

The above are some of the possible long-term and short-term projects that can be undertaken for the development of the areas in the proposed road corridor region. However, many of these activities can be successfully performed only when there is a larger project framework within which they can be undertaken. It is in this context that the following recommendation of a rural development programme for the area is made.

## 2. RECOMMENDATION OF A SUITABLE RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

It is against the backdrop of the above experiences and assessments that the following project proposal has been advanced for implementation in the road corridor region.

### 2.1. Objective of the proposed project:

The socio-economic and environmental situation in the road corridor region, as discussed earlier, is going through a very important and momentous transition. Firstly, under the stress of increasing population pressure, shrinking percapita land availability and its skewed distribution between households, a substantial proportion of people is now making a transition to non-agricultural occupations for at least a sizeable part of their incomes through temporary outmigrations while they continue to retain their foothold in the agrarian village economy too.

Secondly, even under the difficult roadless geophysical condition, the villagers have generated some export potential in terms of horticultural, agricultural and livestock products. They see a great scope for its expansion with the construction of the road. And thirdly, under the mounting pressure of population, the fragile mountain environment has come under increasing stress with vast tracts of degraded forests dominating the landscapes in the region. The inhabitants of the region, thus, live in a very dynamic and volatile situation in which they have to continuously choose different possible agricultural and non-agricultural options for ensuring their subsistence or otherwise, enhancing their prosperity. They are continuously engaged in a balancing act between their needs and possible sources of subsistence. Therefore, the overall objective of the proposed project is to alleviate poverty in the region and to that end, to assist and enable its poor inhabitants to assess and choose between different possible agricultural and non-agricultural options towards achieving their social and economic betterment on a sustainable basis. The main thrust of this objective is to assist the poor farmers of the region to achieve a transition to becoming small entrepreneurs in their bid for social and economic advancement for themselves and the members of their households.

Specific objectives:

- To assist and enable the poor farmers to augment their agricultural and non-agricultural incomes and employment by choosing between different options and engaging them,
- To enhance farm production and productivity by adopting technical and other improvements,
- To ensure women's participation and mobilize their organized effort towards achieving their social and economic betterment,
- To mobilize maximum individual and communal resources for the social and economic development of the households and community,
- To assist the communities to restore, nurture and sustain a healthy ecological balance in their areas,
- To construct, manage and maintain necessary infrastructures in the communities with beneficiary participation and resources, and
- To establish a system of transparent decision-making system for planning and implementation of their development projects and programmes in the communities.

Strategy:

At the community and VDC level;

The strategy to be employed for the achievement of the above objectives will consist of the following components:

- Formation of Saving and Income Generating Groups (SIGG) of like minded individuals of 5-10 persons each in the community and encourage monthly savings and plan and implement individual and group income-generating activities;
- Formation of Women's Saving and Income-Generating Groups (WISGG), generating regular cash savings, and helping them plan and implement individual and groups income generating and other projects,
- Provide subsidies on interest on loans to be taken by members of SIGGs for individual and group income generating activities and thus widening the contacts with the commercial banks and the Agricultural Development Bank in the region/sub-regions for expanded credit flow for economic development in the groups and community,
- Provision of interest subsidy exclusively to members of

WSIGGs for small livestock loans (this is expected to have male members of the households encourage the females to join the SIGGs and benefit from this facility),

- Provision of interest subsidy to other borrowers for income generating activities to encourage them to borrow from existing commercial banks,

- Federate such SIGGs and WISGGs at the ward and VDC level for joint action where necessary such as building infrastructures or support services, etc. including obtaining external assistance for their programmes,

- Formation of user groups (UG) for the construction or development of community infrastructures such as irrigation systems, community forest, etc. and generating beneficiary resources for their upkeep and management,

- Identify and train local enthusiastic persons as village-level technicians in different fields such as horticulture, veterinary services, health, etc. for rendering necessary assistance to the SIGG members and to establish necessary linkage with and obtain support from the sub-district level support agencies like the Service Centre or the NGOs to be mentioned below, and

- Assist the VDC to develop detailed data base for their social and economic development and management of environment, and help them formulate long and short-term development plans in those fields and implement them, create user groups and backstop them, and encourage and support the saving and income generating groups of men and women including any other self-help groups in the VDC. The VDC plans will be a very important instrument for coordinating the inputs from the many different sources of assistance and using them in the most optimal manner. The VDC officials will be encouraged to advocate for and receive assistance from the different sources such as the DDC, different government offices, INGO and NGOs etc. based on such plans of the VDC. This is particularly important in view of the fact that the government has started a tradition of giving 300,000 rupees a year in grant to each VDC in the country. A proper plan alone will put such expanded resource availability to optimal use.

It is believed that the successful application of these strategies will lay the groundwork for a sustainable process of development in the region. They should result in enhanced internal capabilities of the communities and the individuals households therein for engaging in self-reliant development and should have developed expanded linkages with external institutions such as the commercial banks, regular market institutions, and other government and non-government organizations. The eventual withdrawal of the donor-funded development project should leave no dislocations or trauma behind in the communities.



### Support structure:

- Although theoretically there are government multipurpose Service Centres at the sub-district level, in many cases they stand in need of assistance in terms of infrastructure, equipments, manpower, etc. Therefore, NGOs from sub-region or from outside will be identified and supported to extend necessary assistance to the VDCs and the federated organizations of the local male and female SIGGs. Necessary assistance will also be extended to government agencies represented at the Service Centres to enable them to extend their assistance more effectively to the VDCs and the SIGGs in this respect.

The NGO is expected to assign trained catalysts to different VDC in the region to assist the VDC and the SIGGs in it in helping them plan and implement the project. Initially, the person is particularly expected to initiate a tradition whereby each individual poor member of such groups is encouraged to assess its own socio-economic situation and identify income-generating activities that he or she wants to undertake. Once a few individuals begin to have successful experience in this respect, it is expected to emerge and establish itself as a tradition on its own.

Where local NGOs are identified, a national-level NGO with sufficient experience in this respect will be identified to backstop the local NGOs in this respect. It will also undertake to liaise with different government and non-government agencies rendering assistance to the three districts so that their inputs could be coordinated at the level of the VDCs and the SIGGs.

All necessary technical and other supports necessary for the SIGGs and the VDCs will be extended through this outfit. Should the government be agreeable it will be these NGOs which will also extend support to the respective Service Centres mentioned above. It is hoped that with such assistance to the Service Centre, they could emerge as effective support institutions on their own to backstop the VDCs and SIGGs without such external NGO assistance eventually. Attempt will also be made to encourage the use of SIGGs, User Groups and the VDC resources to procure the services of the government technicians represented in the Service Centres.

### National level arrangement:

JICA should identify a project officer in consultation with the government who will be responsible for identifying the NGOs, drawing up detailed terms of reference for them, concluding agreements and monitoring the performance and impact at the community level. All JICA assistance for the rural development project should be channeled through this Project Office.

The Project Officer should also be responsible for lining up support from such important resource centres as the Horticulture Farm in Kirtipur in Kathmandu and the Sericulture Development

Project in Khopasi in Kavrepalanchok district. The latter is already represented in both the Kavrepalanchok and Sindhuli districts at the district level. Therefore, providing necessary logistical and other incentive support could bring the services to the doorstep of the SIGGs mentioned above.

#### Project components:

Given the objectives and strategies mentioned above, the proposed rural development project is expected to have the following components:

- Horticulture development with special emphasis on the development of junar, oranges, and lemons which have immense market in Kathmandu as well as in the terai.

- Sericulture development: Given the remoteness of the outlying regions in the district this could very well emerge as one of the important low-bulk high-price cash earner for the villagers.

- Infrastructure development: trails, feeder roads, irrigation channels, very small hydel projects, biogas, etc.

- Environment management: afforestation, community forest management, torrent control, river training, environment awareness promotion, etc.

- Women's development: literacy, school enrollment, non-formal education, livestock management training, maternal and child health training, nutrition management, energy-efficient stoves, forest management, etc.

- Livestock development: breed improvement, veterinary service, etc.

- Credit promotion: Providing subsidies on interest for women borrowers for small livestock, facilitating credit availability from banks, etc.

- Population control: Population education, providing temporary and permanent contraceptive facilities through local health posts.

- Health: Health and sanitation education, curative and preventive facilities, equipments and medicines on self-paying basis.

#### Project area:

The proposed road corridor directly influences the three districts of Kavrepalanchok, Ramechhap and Sindhuli. However, the proposed that rural development project would initially cover the immediate watersheds of the road corridor ( map enclosed in the report). This region consists of 25 VDCs in three districts and they are as follows:

<u>District</u>	<u>No.and Name of the VDC</u>	<u>Household No.</u>	<u>Population</u>
Sindhuli	1. Siddheswori (Sindhuli madi)	3080	16,759
	2. Bhadrakali Dhunge Bhyanjyang	619	3,621
	3. Jalkanya Chaupali	322	1,955
	4. Bhimeswor Khurkot	326	1,855
	5. Majhuwa	470	2,540
	6. Sitalpati	598	3,292
	7. Purano Jhangajholi	816	4,474
	8. Jhangajholi Ratmate	884	4,874
	9. Kuseswor Dumja	713	4,019
Ramechhap	10. Pakarbas	898	5,274
	11. Bhirpani	662	3,877
	12. Rakathum	478	3,102
	13. Khaniyapani	684	4,086
Kvrep'chok	14. Bhimpokhari	764	4,519
	15. Balting	405	2,212
	16. Mangaltar	564	3,533
	17. Sipali	430	2,456
	18. Khaharepangu	480	2,845
	19. Shikhar Ambote	702	3,995
	20. Katunjebesi	359	1,986
	21. Khanalthok Dapcha	788	4,549
	22. Daraune Pokhari (Dapcha)	575	3,138
	23. Balthali	496	2,473
	24. Chyasi	501	2,628
	25. Chalal	652	3,807

### Phasing and duration:

These 25 VDCs together represent only 12.2% of the 205 VDCs that are there in the three districts mentioned above. It is suggested that this coverage should be considered the first phase of the rural development project which should cover a duration of 3 years. This phase should be seen as an experimental period for the approach suggested above. Should it prove to be effective in meeting the objectives mentioned above, it should be extended to other areas of the three districts and should follow the construction of feeder roads to them.

### Organizational Structure:

The basic elements of the proposed organizational structure for the project would be as follows:

1. Technically, the project would be under the Ministry of Local Development of the government. The detailed project document to be prepared later would be jointly endorsed by the Ministry and JICA which will provide for the implementation of the project through the NGOs. The principal role of the Ministry will be to evaluate and endorse the project document, to supervise and monitor the implementation and impact of the project and based on them to provide guidelines for the future formulation/reformulation of the project.
2. The principal official of the project will be the Project Officer who would perform the following functions:
  - Represent JICA in the formulation and implementation of the project,
  - Identify the NGO(s) and assign responsibility to it/them to provide provide catalytic support to create SIGGs in the VDCs, to assist the VDCs in creating the database and formulating long- and short-term plans and implementing them,
  - Continuously monitor the planning and implementation of the programme in the project area, and provide guidelines to the concerned NGO(s),
  - Liaise with the government agencies, the DDCs and other related non-government institutions towards realizing an integrated framework for the implementation of activities emanating from multiple sources in the project area. and
  - Transfer resources to the NGOs for programme implementation and monitor their use at the local level,
  - To monitor the implementation of the project strategies and their effect in the villages,
  - Regularly publish reports on the project impact on the

lives of the local people.

3. Since the proposed project area covers parts of the three districts as mentioned above, three different NGOs will be assigned to work in the VDCs of the three districts. Depending on the availability of qualified and experienced NGOs they could be selected preferably from the districts themselves or from other areas outside if necessary. As indicated earlier, the NGOs will perform the following functions:

- Provide catalysts to work with the VDCs and the local people to create SIGGs in the communities, to federate them at the VDC level, to assist them in formulating plans and implementing them, mobilizing savings and investing them and undertaking other activities for their socio-economic welfare,

- Identify, train and deploy female catalysts to work in the villages to organize women SIGGs and to assist them in mobilizing savings, formulating and implementing their plans, and obtaining interest subsidy on the small livestock loan to be obtained from the ADBN and other commercial banks,

- Assist the VDCs to create a comprehensive data base for village planning and a system of regularly updating it, to formulate long- and short-term development plans designed to generate maximum local resources and mobilize and to coordinate different sources of external resources,

- Assist the VDCs to create a system of transparent decision-making and plan implementation based on the formation of user groups composed of direct beneficiaries,

- Assist SIGGs and User Groups in planning and implementing infrastructural projects, render them necessary assistance in terms of grants and technical assistance,

- Liaise with the DDC and other relevant organizations to mobilize the resources in the Service Centre as well as from outside as necessary and to ensure the provision of necessary technical support to the local groups namely the VDC, SIGGs, and User Groups, etc. based on their annual and long-term plans,

- Engage in constant search for innovative ideas and approaches for dissemination to the people in the project area, and to bring the local leaders into contact with such innovations in the country, and

- Regularly organize meetings or forums for the dissemination of the experience of the project villages to other interested people and professionals.

The catalytic NGO, for all practical purposes, would remain the kingpin of the whole project approach. Therefore, the NGO(s) to be selected for this purpose must have sufficient demonstrated capability to in terms of providing the above support and the

necessary manpower for that purpose.

4. At the VDC level and below no new functionaries are foreseen for the purpose of the proposed project. However, it will be the policy of the project to identify the local persons to be trained as village-level technicians in different fields who will be expected to provide services to fellow villagers and be compensated for them from them. Providing refresher training to such functionaries will be one of the important tasks of the catalyzing NGOS.

A diagram of the proposed organizational structure is given in the next page.

Diagram showing the Proposed Organizational Structure

Level	Government Structure	Local Institutions
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Central	HMG/N/JICA	
"	Ministry of Local Development	
	Project Officer	National-level NGO
District	-	District Development Committee/s
Sub- district	Service Centre	Local NGO/districts or National NGO
VDC		Village Development Committee
Ward		User Groups
		SIGGs (men/mixed and women)

Tentative estimate of cost for the proposed project:

The following is a very rough calculation of the likely cost of the proposed project. Should the proposed approach be acceptable, the cost estimates must be subjected to a detailed appraisal. What is given here under is only for the limited purpose of identifying the likely cost parameter of an intervention of this kind in the region.

1. Infrastructures in the VDCs (25): 300,000 rupees per year per VDC for 3 years of project duration = Rs. 22,500,000.
2. Horticulture development @ Rs. 20,000. per VDC per annum = Rs. 3,000,000.
3. Sericulture development @ Rs.25,000 per VDC per year = Rs.1,500,000.
4. Cost of interest subsidy to estimated 10,000 borrower members of women SIGGs for small livestock credit at Rs.500. per member per year: Rs.15,000,000.
5. Interest subsidy to other borrowers for income generating projects @ 300 rupees per borrower per year for estimated 8000 borrowers: Rs.12,000,000.
6. Population contro activity at 100 rupees per year per person for estimated 10,000 persons: Rs.3,000,000.
7. Planning support to VDCs at 25,000 a year per VDC for 1 year=Rs. 625,000.
8. Support to NGOs for 16 catalyts at one male and one female catalyts for an average of 3 VDCs per each male/female team at 6,000 rupees per month in salary and 2000 rupees in monthly allowance: Rs.4,600,000.
9. Non-formal education cost: Rs.1,000,000.
10. Overhead and administrative expenses for the contracting NGOs at 10% of the total estimated cost of the project: Rs. 6,000,000.
11. Estimated total round figure cost: Rs. 70,000,000.


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


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
## **Snap-shots along proposed Sindhuli-Banepa Road Corridor.**



**B.K. Shrestha**  
Nov. 1994



Over loaded buses ply between Sindhuli and Bardibas.




Sindhuli shops are served by trucks to bring in goods.



Forest office signboard stands high at Khurkot.




No meals are prepared without firewood.



B.K. Shrestha and the villagers re-open the road issue, along proposed Banepa-Sindhuli Road.



Jhangajholi : Radio repair shop seems flourishing.



Iron cables for suspension bridges travel on human back.




Porters' dilemma : The road will be a boon or a bane.



Hand carry baggages of Sindhuli travellers.



When the trucks will take off our loads ?



Sunkoshi Valley : Rich harvest of rice.



Sunkoshi : A fisherman village still has good harvest of fish.







Sunkoshi River : Clean water and rich fish. Rafting is an added prospect.




Sunkoshi is met by the Tamba Koshi.



Roshi Valley floor lush with paddy.



Roshi Valley hill slopes badly degraded.



A school building used for election campaign.



A little girl don't find time to attend school. She has to sell her Junar - oranges.



Sindhull : Housewife worshipping the religious Tulsi plant.



Khurkot : Market place in election temper.

