

APPENDIX 2.

**'IMPROVED GOVERNANCE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA:
A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK'**

SECOND DRAFT

**Improved Governance and Sustainable Development In Africa
A Conceptual Framework**

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**A RAPID RESPONSE FACILITY TO SUPPORT
IMPROVED GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA**

**Improved Governance and Sustainable Development In Africa
A Conceptual Framework**

1. Introduction and Summary

Governance is broadly defined as the managerial dimension of political processes -- the manner in which people within a given polity organize to make and implement decisions about the use of public resources. Governance reform involves not only bringing about changes in the way that state institutions operate, but also altering the nature of state-society relations, in particular by empowering non-governmental organizations and by making government organizations more responsive and accountable to the citizenry.

The ultimate objective of governance reform is democratic governance, in which the application of principles of accountability, transparency, the rule of law and popular participation generate national systems of governance that are responsive to the needs and preferences of the citizenry, respect human and political rights and promote broad-based sustainable economic growth.

Governance has moved to the forefront of the development agenda in Africa during the 1990s, as the donor community has increasingly come to believe that resolving the current economic crisis requires significant improvements in the governance of most countries in the region. This assessment is based on the view that in recent years many donor sponsored projects and economic reform programs have been technically sound, but have failed to reach their objectives because public institutions have performed in a deficient manner. African governance has too often been characterized by the corruption and incompetence of public officials acting behind a veil of secrecy, by extremely lax budgetary and accounting systems, the arbitrary and inconsistent application of laws, and little or no participation in decision making by non-state organizations.

Sustained and broad-based economic growth is unlikely in such an environment, because there is too much uncertainty and risk for long term investment to take place. This exemplifies the point that government action creates the institutional context in which markets operate, and that effective governance is necessary for the private sector to spearhead sound development. Governments provide key public goods such as infrastructure that all businesses use. They provide a properly functioning legal system, which is similarly critical for economic agents as it provides predictability, secure property rights and an effective means to arbitrate disputes.

Improving governance in Africa thus has the objective of creating effective and participatory public institutions that garner broad popular legitimacy and are able to promote

sustainable economic growth. Most experts have identified four overlapping and complementary components to democratic governance: public accountability, the rule of law, participation, and transparency. Each involves a series of measures designed to improve how public institutions function and interact with social and economic forces. A program of assistance needs to promote these four components of governance within the executive branch of government, the legislative and the judiciary. This text emphasizes the public sector, while a companion piece discusses civil society, but it should be recognized that the two are inextricably linked: democratic governance requires a strong civil society and vice versa.

Democratic governance, the objective of governance reform, should be distinguished from both the more narrow concept of governmental efficiency and from the more specific and normative notion of "democracy". Democratic governance certainly includes efficient public management and governmental efficiency, but in addition it incorporates broader issues such as the quality of state-society interactions. On the other hand, democratic governance is not linked closely to a specific type of political regime. Although authoritarian political rule is clearly not compatible with democratic governance, which requires some degree of pluralism and participation, there is no presumption that democratic governance necessarily implies a specific type of pluralist political regime.

2. Governance and Sustainable Development

One of the major developmental lessons of the 1970s was that "getting the prices right" was a necessary condition of economic growth in Africa (World Bank, 1981). Experts agreed that Africa's economic crisis had resulted from wrong headed economic policies. Inappropriate price signals to producers and consumers created incentives to engage in behavior that was inimical to the long term health of African economies. This problem was particularly severe in agriculture, where inadequate government producer prices for cash crops such as cocoa, coffee and cotton had resulted in stagnation or even decreases in the production of what was often a significant proportion of total exports and government revenues. The 1980s witnessed extensive attention to micro-economic policy reform, as donors focused on improving incentives through price liberalization and deregulation, notably in agricultural inputs and marketing, credit reform, currency devaluation (Sandbrook, 1993; World Bank, 1989).

A decade of these efforts has had but a minimal impact on Africa's troubled economies, however. When and where African governments adopted them, structural adjustment reforms did not generate the kind of economic response from the private sector that donors had hoped. In most countries of the continent, economic stagnation and decline have continued and debt burdens have worsened. By the late 1980s, donors and independent scholars were forced to ponder why economic reform measures did not have the same impact in Africa that they were having in East Asia or Latin America (Corbo et al., 1992). Increasingly, they have decided that the real root of Africa's economic problems are as much related to mal-governance as to wrong headed economic policies.

This argument had long been made by academics (Sandbrook, 1986; Callaghy, 1986).

It was explicitly accepted by the donor community only with the publication by the World Bank of its 1989 report, *From Crisis to Sustainable Growth*, which openly argued that Africa's economic crisis was at root a "crisis in governance" (p. 60). The Bank now argued that getting the prices right is a necessary but not sufficient condition of economic success, and that market prices are ineffectual and even perverse in their effects if certain social institutions are not functioning properly (World Bank, 1991; Brautigam, 1992). In particular, all sorts of non-price factors affect the quality of incentives, and unless they are addressed, price reform by itself will not have the desired impact. These arguments have long existed in the "institutionalist" economics literature, ably surveyed by Eggerstsson (1990, see also North, 1990).

The major non-price factor identified in this literature as essential to economic growth is the quality of public governance. Communities must ensure that a host of public goods and services are provided regularly and predictably for the market to function well. Private economic agents need regular access to information, for example, on which to base their decisions. Sustained long term investment requires a climate of stability and civil order, as well as long term guarantees about the sanctity of property rights (Eggerstsson, 1990). Finally, economic growth benefits from the existence of a well maintained public infrastructure (roads, bridges), as well as the provision of such services as police services, legal enforcement, education, and a sound environment. These elements are all *public goods*, goods or services that will not be fully provided by the private sector because an individual investor cannot capture all the benefits accruing from their production. For example, an economic agent that invests in a police force can not easily charge other economic agents for enjoying the benefits of law and order. As a result, public goods must be supplied communally by some governing body, as a result of a general consensus that the provision of these goods and services is desirable to the economy as a whole.

Although non-state actors can play significant roles in the provision of public goods, realistically, some part of the state apparatus has to play a leading role. For example, even if much "rule making" can be privately formulated and maintained, notably by associations within civil society, it will remain often necessary and usually efficient for some higher authority to enforce the rules.

As donors have rethought the relationship between the state and economic growth, they have come to focus on the developmental costs of Africa's record of poor governance. An assortment of governance shortcomings have discouraged long term investment and lessened the ability of economic agents to prosper. Investors lack information about existing laws that are relevant to their activities, because governments fail to publish and disseminate regular revisions of the law codes, often continue to apply some laws after they have been rescinded and fail to apply others. An outdated, ill-suited and inconsistently applied regulatory apparatus constrains the economy and lends itself to the arbitrary and sometimes corrupt exercise of discretionary power by an often incompetent administration (Gray, 1993). Government decisions are made with little transparency and the citizenry is not allowed to participate in the elaboration and design of economic policies; there are significant differences between announced policy and the policies actually implemented; basic budgetary information is not made public while national statistics are not reliable. In turn, citizens resist or flout public authority, because it is widely viewed as not legitimate; tax evasion or customs fraud are endemic, for example.

Improving these areas is now perceived as a pre-requisite of renewed sustainable economic growth in Africa. Investor confidence about predictable, transparent and competent governance must be achieved before African countries will attract significant infusion of private capital. State authority must be perceived as legitimate, or citizens will not accept the responsibilities and citizenship, let alone the austerity demanded by economic reform. The lesson from Latin America and Asia suggests further more that private entrepreneurs will wait up to several years after the introduction of reforms to make sure they are sustained before they are confident enough about the sustainability of the reforms to risk their assets. Thus, the impact of governance reforms on investment and growth is unlikely to be immediate, and will have to be assessed within a 3-5 year time horizon.

3. Governance and Democracy

Democratic governance does not necessarily imply a specific political regime type, but it is true that respect for human rights and basic political freedoms, as well as substantial popular participation are inherent components of democratic governance. For example, it is difficult to imagine an authoritarian regime making headway on the openness component of governance without increasing political pluralism. Because it increases the discretionary power of office holders, governments are unlikely to increase the transparency of decision making processes unless they are forced to do so by opposition parties, the media, or by independent judiciaries and legislatures. It is likewise difficult to see how to improve the rule of law, without strengthening the independence of the judiciary. In practical terms, then, governance reforms are likely to entail political liberalization and democratization in authoritarian political systems. At the same time, there is no reason to think that democratic governance is not compatible with a wide variety of constitutional forms and types of open political systems. There is no reason to believe that American democracy is more likely to promote good governance than Japanese or Austrian democracy.

The reasons for this link between governance and political reform can be understood if attention is focused briefly on the underlying causes for poor governance in African states. To some extent, poor governance is caused by a lack of training and experience within the state apparatus. To a much larger extent, however, poor governance has its roots in the nature of political authority in these countries. Power is concentrated in small numbers of individuals, as a result not of constitutionally granted legitimacy, but rather of a) clan or ethnic ties and b) control over the means of coercion and repression (Chazan et al, 1991). In the absence of legitimacy, political elites rule through intimidation and through the discretionary distribution of state resources to selected clients. State power is used to control economic activity and divert it for political ends (Callaghy, 1984; Joseph, 1987; Bayart, 1990). In such political systems, governance is necessarily characterized by an absence of transparency and predictability, arbitrary abuses of power, and the inconsistent application of laws (Theobald, 1990).

Sustained political reform is thus clearly a necessary condition for improved governance in Africa today. Is it a sufficient condition? The relationships between regime type, economic performance and government performance are extremely complex and likely to be affected by a host of cultural, historical, sociological and ideological factors, as well as

by the extent of available natural endowments. The correlation across African states between the quality of governance and the degree of political freedoms and rights is far from clear. Some authoritarian regimes have demonstrated better governance than others. Gambia, a working democracy with regular elections and one of the freer presses in West Africa, is afflicted by many of the symptoms of mal-governance of its more authoritarian neighbors. Ghana on the other hand has improved its governance quality under the Rawlings regime, on the other hand, without undergoing significant political liberalization (Herbst, 1992).

If we look outside of Africa, it is similarly difficult to establish clear relationships between simple regime type and economic performance. A number of recent surveys seem to demonstrate that although sustained rapid growth has typically occurred in authoritarian regimes, they can also be associated with economic fiascos, while many democracies have achieved quite enviable economic records (Kohli, 1986; Sirowy and Inkeles, 1990; Bollen and Jackman, 1985). Moreover, there is some evidence that the economic growth promoted by authoritarian regimes is less broad-based and equitable than the growth promoted by more pluralistic regimes. Ultimately, the difference between a Korea and a Kenya lies less in the extent of political pluralism and human rights in the two countries, and more in the quality of governance which seems considerably higher in Korea. Good governance thus appears to be linked not only to political pluralism but also to other factors.

In brief, on balance, the continuation of the present round of political reform in Africa is likely to improve governance in many states, but it would be erroneous to expect dramatic improvements in the absence of other sociological, institutional and cultural changes.

The donors' advocacy of governance reform and democratization are closely intertwined in Africa, and in some cases, the two terms are almost used interchangeably. This should not obscure the fact that the promotion of each serves different and only partly overlapping objectives. The donors are today united in their belief that good governance is a prerequisite for rapid growth in Africa. Because there is much less consensus about the relationship between economic growth and specific types of democratic rule, the advocates of democracy have been more likely to advocate democratization as a good in itself, rather than as an instrument for economic development.

Regardless of its impact on economic growth, democracy should remain a desirable goal in any political system, amply justified by philosophical and humanistic concerns. For donors, as for Africans, therefore, it should be an end in itself for African states (See Ake, 1990, 1992). On the other hand, the donors' interest in governance is based on the perceived link between governance reform and economic performance. At least since the 1989 World Bank report, *From Crisis to Sustainable Growth*, the donor community has accepted the premise that the economic crisis is at root a crisis of governance and that African states need to undergo dramatic improvements in governance before they overcome the current economic crisis. Good governance is thus in large part not an end in itself, but rather an instrument to reach more satisfactory economic performance (World Bank, 1991). For its part, USAID has come to advocate democratic governance as an instrument to promote broad-based sustainable economic development that reconciles growth with popular participation and equity concerns.

Governance reforms should thus be driven by pragmatic concerns. Promoting greater accountability or transparency is desirable in the present African context, but they are not

ends in themselves. Indeed, it is easy to think of contexts in which too much transparency would be counterproductive, for example, or in which one would want to limit accountability (eg, the accountability of public officials to narrow interest groups). Some economic policy decisions such as whether or not to devalue the currency and by how much have to be conducted secretly to be effective.

4. The Components of Governance

Democratic governance is usually meant to include several distinct if overlapping components: accountability, the rule of law, participation and institutional pluralism, and transparency. Each of these components is critically important to democratic governance, and they are all mutually reinforcing. In other words, high levels of accountability will be difficult to attain without widespread participation and/or transparency. Similarly, the rule of law will not significantly improve governance if the principles of public accountability are not widely respected.

The following four sections examines each of these elements of democratic governance. Each element is defined and related to the overall concept of governance, its links to sustainable and broad-based development are clarified and some general guidelines regarding the best means of improving them are provided.

Accountability

Accountability is defined as *the ability to hold public actors and their representatives to act according to norms of conduct that are in the public interest*. Public accountability implies that clear rules of conduct are known and broadly accepted and that public officials who do not respect these rules in their public actions will be disciplined or replaced through regular and legal processes. It is now widely agreed that public institutions are much more likely to be effective and supportive of economic development and of the general welfare of the population if public officials are held accountable for their actions.

Accountability is comprised of two distinct but related sub-processes (Moore, p. 42-43): first, an *appraisal* process through which the performance of the state is assessed; and a *sanctioning* process, through which poor performance is penalized and good performance is rewarded. Effective accountability requires that both these processes be present. Appraisal capacity in the absence of sanctions will lead only to frustration and cynicism about inadequate institutional performance; while sanctioning capacity will serve little positive purpose in the absence of the ability to appropriately evaluate performance. Each of these sub-processes in turn involve other components of governance: thus, appraising state performance involves transparency and open information, while sanctioning inappropriate state performance is more likely when the legal system functions well.

Evidence from an extremely wide set of historical periods and different cultural settings suggests that the absence of public accountability is likely to exact a significant cost in development performance. If public officials are not accountable to the public, they are more

likely to act a) in their own interests or b) in the interests of small numbers of privileged elites. Governmental performance is likelier to be diminished and its benefits withheld from large segments of the population. This same evidence suggests that large, hierarchical, centralized bureaucracies without strong external masters, competitors, or alternatives are the least likely to be responsive to their clients/citizens or accountable for their mistakes.

There are several costs associated with low levels of accountability. First, scarce public resources are less likely to be efficiently used, as the provision of public goods and services will be of low quality, inadequate or inappropriate in every area in which the state is a significant provider. While the quality of public investment is likely to decrease, government consumption will increase in the form of higher salaries, perks and privileges, and featherbedding. It is almost universally true in Africa that large increases in state budgets have not resulted in improved services or policy making capacities.

Second, low levels of accountability increase the likelihood that there are significant differences between stated government policy objectives and actual policy implementation. There are typically no instruments for citizens to make sure that governments undertake the policies they have committed themselves to.

The accountability of state institutions requires both a) internal mechanisms that increase the capacity of state institutions to regulate themselves; but also b) external mechanisms that can impose accountability from outside the state. Internal mechanisms include for example processes that make public servants more accountable to their superiors within the bureaucracy; in the French tradition, for example, most Francophone African states have the *Inspection Générale de l'État*, a corps of inspectors which reports directly to the presidency on the efficiency and probity of the central administration. There can also be independent scrutiny mechanisms within the state apparatus, such as an Auditor-General, Ombudsman, or in the French system, the *Cour des Comptes*, that report to the legislature, or some other external authority. In addition, professional associations such as the Bar, are useful instruments of accountability: they promote professional standards and norms of behavior by allowing members of the profession to judge and in some cases sanction peers that do not perform adequately.

On the other extreme, external mechanisms monitor and sanction state performance from the outside. These include societal mechanisms of accountability, such as information regarding public satisfaction about governmental services. The media, neighborhood and village associations, professional groups, business associations and more informal mechanisms (market groups, ethnic associations etc) can provide valuable information about governmental performance that serve to promote accountability. The ultimate external institution of accountability is of course elections, in which populations sanction poor governmental performance by voting incumbents out of office.

In between these two extremes are mechanisms of accountability that involve different institutions within the state. Such mechanisms of accountability come from a system of checks and balances between the branches of government in a democratic government. For example,

1. the legislature is endowed with the power to monitor and evaluate the performance of the government and of the permanent bureaucracy. In

- turn, the citizenry arbitrates disputes between the legislature and executive by voting in regular and routine elections.
2. the Judiciary is empowered to investigate and sanction illegal actions within both the executive and the legislature.

Progress on accountability will require the strengthening of both internal and external mechanisms. Widespread skepticism about the ability of the state to discipline itself is grounded in several decades of failed civil service reform, public management projects and institutional development efforts (Dia, 1993a). Many experts have argued that the impetus for increased accountability must come from the outside and must be wrested from the state that is bound to try to defend its discretionary powers. The need for external mechanisms is indeed motivating the recent emphasis on the strengthening of civil society, viewed as necessary to counterbalance the power of the state.

Yet, the limits of external mechanisms must also be perceived. External monitoring of public sector performance can never be fully effective as there is always likely to be significant information asymmetries between the state apparatus and outside organizations, and state agents are likely to be able to find ways of getting around external controls. Because it controls much of the public agenda, has disproportionate financial and organizational means and controls much of the flow regarding public information, the state apparatus can never be fully accountable to outside forces. Indeed, in a complex area such as public finance, the cost of effective external oversight is likely to be prohibitively high and may in the final analysis not be realistic. Certainly the appraisal component of public sector accountability will typically require some internal mechanisms to be effective, even if the ultimate impetus for the sanctioning of inadequate public sector performance will probably come from outside the state. As a result, a combination of internal and external mechanisms is probably necessary to increase accountability appreciably, and democratic governance interventions need to devise new programs to strengthen existing or invent new internal mechanisms of accountability, in addition to the programs designed to strengthen civil society.

Transparency and Open Information

Transparency is defined as *the widespread, timely and accessible availability of information regarding public decision making and implementation processes*. It captures the notion that there is a wide number of circumstances in which public access to information is unambiguously good. It is linked to other elements of democratic governance: transparency makes accountability easier to achieve, for example, and widespread popular participation in decision making processes is not possible unless information is widely disseminated.

The governance literature has identified three primary benefits of open information and transparency: a) greater economic efficiency and growth; b) greater public sector accountability and less corruption; and c) improved public decision making processes.

Economic Efficiency: Most experts agree that economic efficiency and sustained growth requires that economic agents benefit from access to timely, relevant and reliable information. The absence of such information leaves economic agents uncertain about economic conditions and their evolution over time, and they are likely to view long investments as risky.

Markets with incomplete information and/or information asymmetries are inherently inefficient and will not function properly without state intervention.

Markets themselves provide much of that information and economic agents themselves are likely to invest in the collection of information, when such investments are clearly profitable. Nonetheless, it must be recognized that information is often a public good, so that governments have a critical role to play providing information, or helping to make it public; government's role is central not only in providing information about budgetary, monetary and fiscal matters, but also in the collection of various social, economic and technical data that economic agents use to make their investment decisions.

Examples include timely and accurate data on inflation to allow investors to calculate real rates of return, as well as other national accounts data that inform regarding the health of the macro-economy; data on technical and quality standards for manufacturers, importers and exporters, on rules and regulation for domestic agents, and so on.

Controlling corruption: Corrupt, illegal and unethical behavior thrives on secrecy and the absence of transparency, as it cannot withstand scrutiny (Klitgaard, 1988; Heidenheimer, 1989). By itself, transparency can not completely eliminate corruption, but it can lessen it by making it more costly and raising the possibility of discovery and sanction. The complete end of public corruption depends on the development and widespread internalization of new norms of behavior within the public service. Without these broad cultural changes that can only come slowly, public officials will always find ways of escaping public scrutiny to engage in profitable acts of corruption. In the meantime, however, greater transparency is likely to be one of the most effective weapons to reducing the incidence of corruption.

Corruption involving the government often entail areas in which the government is intervening in some manner (Klitgaard, 1988). Thus, the easiest way of eliminating corruption such as customs fraud, smuggling or tax evasion is to eliminate the government subsidy, tax or tariff that made the corruption possible in the first place. Decisions by government to intervene in the economy and contravene the free play of markets has to take into account the cost of the corruption made possible by its policy. In many circumstances, however, government intervention is justified by other factors and eliminating it is not a realistic option. In such circumstances, greater transparency and the free flow of information is the best mechanism for circumscribing corruption. Thus, widely accessible and detailed accounting and budgeting records are a critical instrument for ensuring institutional probity. Well kept records makes supervision possible as well as external monitoring and sanction. Accounting requirement and open budgetary procedures are also a useful tool for limiting private sector corruption. Opening up decision making processes to the public similarly facilitates participatory decision making and lessens the opportunities for collusive and corrupt behavior.

Improving decision making: Many observers have argued that decision making is improved by public debate. Even when government officials are irreproachable from an ethical perspective, their policy choices and performance are still likely to be improved by public scrutiny and debate. The disadvantages and side costs of specific policy choices are more likely to be discerned, and alternative policies are more likely to be considered. An informed public debate about policy is not a guarantee of good policy. Providing widespread

information may allow certain segments of the population to hijack the debate on behalf of their own narrow interests. Governments need to be at least somewhat protected from the pressures of special interests and powerful minorities. Providing information and thus ammunition to such groups may not advance the public interest. Nonetheless, the danger that policy decisions will be made in the public interest is probably on balance abetted by the flow of information and transparency. Policies that promote narrow parochial interests and lack widespread popularity are less likely to result from an open process than from a closed one. Public information is the first step to meaningful participation, another objective of governance reform (see below).

The Rule of Law

By the rule of law, is meant *the existence of a legal system, or stable set of rule, sufficiently insulated from the locus of political authority that all citizens, regardless of their power and wealth, have a minimum degree of confidence that their rights under the law will be upheld if they follow its rules.* The key characteristic of such a legal system is that rules are applied predictably and consistently. People need to know the rules in advance and need to know the penalty for transgression. Law, or in other words a stable set of rules, is understood in this context quite broadly to mean the regulatory environment, legislation, courts' decisions, and also customary law in its various guises.

The rule of law has two major dimensions: a formal dimension which includes the factors necessary to making a system of rule effective (The World Bank, 1991). These are that rules are known in advance, that they are enforced regularly and consistently, and that they serve a clear purpose and are eliminated when that purpose is no longer served effectively. Secondly, they have a substantive dimension, which refers to the content of laws, including such concepts as justice, fairness and liberty (the World Bank, 1991).

The rule of law has a) economic implications and b) broader political implications, notably for the rights of citizens.

Economic Implications: Laws are essential for managing conflict and allocating resources in a manner that is legitimate to the citizenry and broadly supportive of welfare and economic development. Most economists agree that the cornerstone of a successful economy is secure and stable property rights, without which long term investment is risky and uncertain. Farmers will not work a field if they believe there's a strong likelihood that the fruit of their labor will be taken from them. Entrepreneurs will not build factories and accrue inventory if they think that someone can come and take them away from them if their investments are profitable. All too often in recent African history, investors have discovered that the legal system provided inadequate protection from the exactions of corrupt officials or unscrupulous business partners. As a result, they have either invested their capital in other parts of the world or they have invested in short term speculative activities that do not benefit the economy in the long term. Rather than invest in productive assets and technological advance, investors tend to invest in socially wasteful rent-seeking activities in such economic systems, lowering the long term growth rate.

The rule of law implies on the other hand that property rights are secure and stable. It indicates that the discretionary power of decision makers is carefully circumscribed, and that

rules will be applied consistently without regard to power or wealth. The rule of law implies the existence of a system of adjudication that can resolve disputes between social and economic actors, both state and non-state and even at the initiation of the non-state actor, in an impartial, consistent and transparent manner. Laws need not only to be in the books, but also applied regularly and consistently. Judgments need to be faithfully carried out.

Such a legal environment helps reassure entrepreneurs that the economic environment is predictable enough to make rational long term investments. In addition, a well functioning legal system can increase economic efficiency because it decreases the cost of economic transactions. It should be noted that some rules undermine economic growth: inappropriate regulations or legal limits and controls on investment can discourage entrepreneurs, for example. In these circumstances no rules may be preferable to bad rules. Nonetheless, an emerging conclusion from the literature is that an absence of stable rules does exact long term economic costs.

Adjudication need not be in the American mode of an adversarial court proceeding, but can take any number of other forms, from quasi-official tribunals (ie. a labor board) that are empowered to arbitrate conflict and make legally binding decisions; to private non-judicial methods of arbitration. Particularly in the country side, long standing traditions of conflict arbitration exist that can be tapped into and adapted to suit current needs. More generally, this underscores the notion that the state need not play the central role in establishing or enforcing rule based behavior, that often can have resulted from community based customary norms.

b. Political Implications: These economic implications of stable rules and of the rule of law are but one limited facet of their overall implications. More generally and in political terms, the rule of law implies that public governance is based, however imperfectly, on impersonal rule and principle, rather than on the preferences and material interests of a small number of powerful individuals. The opposite of the rule of law is the rule of men. The rule of law plays a critical role in protecting citizens from the state, without which political participation and contestation is impossible. Here, the concern is with the substantive aspect of the rule of law. The governance literature has tended to argue that at least minimal levels of justice, fairness and liberty have to be embodied in the rule of law for governance to improve.

In brief, a strong legal system that includes such notions as equality before the law, due process or independence of the judiciary, is perhaps the fundamental cornerstone of democratic governance. If principles of transparency and open information are not codified in rules that are well known, legitimate and enforceable, they will be respected by the powerful only when that serves their purpose. Similarly, accountability is meaningful only in the context of a legal system, which establishes clear norms of behavior and a mechanism for punishment when these are not respected.

Participation and Institutional Pluralism

Participation and institutional pluralism refer to *the existence of a large and diverse set of non-state institutions and organizations that allow citizens to freely and constructively participate in national decision making.* Non state organizations that participate themselves or that promote the participation of individuals in politics serve to

empower citizens vis a vis the state, and enhance their "voice" in the public arena. Participation can involve any element of civil and political society, from political parties to church organizations, to unions, farmer groups and business associations. It includes institutions such as the university and media which inform and encourage participation. It encompasses activities such as informing, lobbying, voting, protesting, writing and various other means of persuasion through which individual citizens and various groups try to peacefully impact decision making. But more than the existence of specific organizations, inclusive participation requires the existence of a public space, or arenas, in which public debates can take place. The term institutional pluralism captures the notion that in a participatory political system, state institutions do not monopolize or try to eliminate these arenas, but share them with other institutions, including some which do not share the state's policy preferences. It further implies that policy outcomes reflect the preferences of a majority at the conclusion of a participatory process, but that the minority which does not share those preferences not be punished in any way, and be allowed to participate in subsequent policy debates.

Participation has long been theorized to be a fundamental component of democracy. In Dahl's classic statement of democratic theory (Dahl, 1971, pp. 2-4)), democratic rule requires that all citizens have the opportunity a) to formulate preferences through freedom of expression, notably by forming and joining independent associations; b) to signify their preferences to their fellow citizens and to the government; and c) to have their preferences weighted equally by the government, regardless of the content or source of the preferences. The right to political participation (along with the right of expressing disagreement with the government, which Dahl calls "contestation") is thus central to Dahl's notion of democracy. When participation is not allowed or circumscribed by the government, decision making is made by a small proportion of the population, and rule is essentially "oligarchic". Dahl focuses mostly on individuals and tends to underemphasize the importance of institutional pluralism in empowering individual citizens. Yet non-state organizations aggregate interests and represent them in the political system, giving voice and power to individuals who otherwise might not have their preferences registered. They can be considered as critical intermediaries between citizens and the state.

The governance literature has perceived participation and institutional pluralism as fundamental components of democratic governance as well. They overlap considerably with the other components of governance, but are particularly important in the context of democratic governance, and well worth a separate discussion. First, participation and institutional pluralism improves decision making by subjecting policy proposals to scrutiny and increasing the number and sources of inputs into the process. Policy dilemmas subjected to the "market place of ideas" are more likely to result in sound policy. Different interests and values can be confronted and gauged. Needs and problems that otherwise would not filter up to decision makers can be brought to their attention. The process is also likely to result in more broadly legitimate policies, which can be useful when the state faces difficult and potentially unpopular choices. In particular, widespread participation and institutional pluralism will facilitate the generation of policies that promote broad-based sustainable economic development.

Second, by empowering individuals vis-a-vis the government, institutional pluralism is essential to public accountability. Institutions can monitor the state's performance, determine

whether or not policy implementation is in keeping with promises, and can sanction performance when it is not. Similarly, if institutions outside of the state do not take advantage of it, transparent public policy processes will not lead to improved governance. Thus, in general, popular participation can be a powerful check on state power.

Indeed, too powerful in the estimation of some scholars, who suggest that governments such as those in Africa need to make difficult decisions and that popular participation in decision making will only complicate matters. Since Huntington (1968), many political scientists have worried that the institutionalization of the state in many Third World countries is not advanced enough for states to effectively process popular demands. More recently and in the context of the politics of structural adjustment, many scholars suggest that decision makers need to be insulated from popular pressures to be effective on behalf of the public good (Nelson, 1984; Lal, 1983). The danger that popular participation will overwhelm decision makers is a particularly relevant one in Africa, where state structures are already weak, ineffectual and permeated by societal interests in the form of clientelism.

The danger is a real one, and governance reform should be aware of the need to promote the institutionalization of state structures, notably through civil service reform and improvements in public management. The intolerance of the state for public participation has sometimes been motivated by the understandable wish to protect and cover up its own weaknesses. Nonetheless, the asymmetries in power, information and resources between the state and civil society in Africa are such, that the first priority must be in enhancing the abilities and resources of the latter.

Third, moreover, institutional pluralism and participation leads to a strong associational life and a vibrant civil society, which creates informal norms of behavior and obligation which reinforce the sense of community of citizens. Many scholars and political theorists now argue that there is a positive correlation between economic growth on the one hand and this sense of community and civic virtue on the other hand (Putnam, 1992). Historically, countries where state power is embedded in societies with civic virtues appear to be characterized by effective governments that promote economic growth (Evans, 1992).

There are several distinct approaches to increasing participation. First, various civic, economic and political organizations need to be strengthened and in some cases created if they do not already exist. In a first stage, this may imply attention to the legal system which has established an array of regulations and laws that undermine the ability of individuals to create such organizations separately from the state, or that restrict their activities. The state may enjoy a statutory monopoly on unions, trade and professional associations and the press, for example, that needs to be revoked before such independent groups can flourish. Censorship laws, or laws limiting the right to strike and demonstrate need to be reformed. Other states have relied on non-legal mechanisms to weaken these groups. It may be important to protect fledgling associations from the intimidation, coercion and even violence of the state; that will usually entail the elaboration of a legal environment which effectively guarantees rights of political participation.

Even when such rights are guaranteed, associations may be quite weak and in need of assistance. Surveying the recent experience in Africa, the speed and dynamism with which civic organizations emerge once the authoritarian state withdraws is quite striking. Yet, an array of long term technical and financial assistance will be necessary before most African

countries exhibit a comparably rich collection of civic associations as exist in the west. Most organizations appear to be suffering from the ills that afflict the society they emerge from: poverty, shortage of technical skills, corruption and so on. Given the poverty of their members, many organizations find it difficult to attract the resources needed for strengthening themselves. The NGO sector has attracted its share of opportunistic entrepreneurs, who have been tempted by the sector's rapid growth and donor support to undertake short term schemes of dubious merit, wasting resources and the good will of the community.

Second, decentralization and deconcentration of the state apparatus itself will help increase participation in Africa. At present, the formal governance structures of African states are typically highly centralized. As Wunsch argues, "Almost without exception, African governance today denies all but the most minute and routine authority to sub-national authorities" (Wunsch, 1992; see also Mawhood, 1983). decentralization involves not only administrative devolution of decision making and budgetary autonomy from the central government to local, county, provincial, or departmental authorities, but also shrinking the size and prerogatives of the central state in favor of a greater reliance on non-state organizations and on market forces. By this definition, privatization and economic liberalization are forms of decentralization.

Insofar as decentralization limits the power of centralized bureaucracies in the capital and redistributes power to new, smaller and more participatory institutions, it enhances institutional pluralism. Provincial and municipal governmental bodies may often be more responsive to the needs of citizens, particularly in democratic polities with regular local elections.

Third, the role of the media is critical, and governance programs need to include measures to strengthen news organizations. An independent media is critical to disseminating information and empowering non-state actors. The press can inform the citizenry about policy issues, and can investigate and publicize abuses. Even the weakest free press raises the potential cost of abuses of power by the state, and thus serves as a deterrent. The press as an institution is thus critical to the effectiveness of transparency.

In the context of this discussion of institutional pluralism, the press is also relevant as a series of private organizations. One of the most striking characteristics of the lack of pluralism in authoritarian regimes is the manipulation of information by the state to suit its own needs. Pluralism in the area of information requires a strong and vibrant press that challenges the state's hegemony in the production and distribution of data. This implies changes in censorship laws; it also implies improving the training of journalists, publishers, print, radio and television technicians; the development of professional standards and ethics in the media, and assistance to ensure the financial viability of media companies. By itself, the removal of censorship and government monopolies may not significantly strengthen the independent media, whose influence may initially be limited to a small number of educated individuals in the capital. The recent evidence from Africa suggests the independent media is usually limited to a small number of underfinanced and not always very professional weekly newspapers.

5. Modes of Intervention

Attempts to reform and improve governance in Africa are likely to be extremely country specific. In every country, the nature of governance deficiencies are different, as is the relationship between regime type (eg. how much political pluralism is tolerated) and governance, the urgency of reform and the demand for change. Programs to promote democratic governance will necessarily have to tailor each intervention to these country specificities. Nonetheless, several general principles of intervention in the area of governance appear in the literature and need to inform donor efforts. In no particular order, several general guidelines follow:

Emphasize aid to non-state institutions before the transition: First, governance interventions should be sensitive to the degree of progress the political system has made in its transition to democratic rule. In countries in which the transition has either stalled in its early phases or has yet to begin, there may be little potential for improving state accountability or transparency through mechanisms and institutions within the state. It may for example be naive to expect that donor assisted efforts to improve public management within the executive branch will result in a significant impact on the quality of governance, as there is likely to be very little commitment on the part of political leaders to enhancing democratic governance. A program which emphasizes institutional development within the central administration to the detriment of intervention in civil society is unlikely to achieve democratic governance objectives.

Instead, in countries in the early stages of their transitions, governance programs should emphasize non-state organizations for as much of the governance aid as possible. Within the state, organizations outside of the executive branch of government, notably the judiciary and the legislature should receive most of the aid.

This principle emerges from the realization that the state's performance will improve most if external forces are empowered and strengthened so that they can bring pressure to bear on the state to increase its accountability and the transparency of governmental processes. The reinforcement of civil society puts pressures even on authoritarian governments, and can serve to pave the way for subsequent democratization. This is indeed one of the key insights of the recent governance literature. Thus, civic associations should be targeted for much of the governance assistance in pre-transition states.

Aid to the state, on the other hand, should be targeted at the judiciary and the legislature, and the primary objective of such aid should be to enhance their independence from the executive branch. Aid to those branches of government might be particularly desirable in states undergoing a critical phase of their transition, since the strengthening of the other branches of government will typically serve to check and balance the power of the executive branch, which typically houses the last holdouts in a protracted transition. For example, assistance that helps to professionalize the judiciary can only increase its independence from the executive and lead to checks on arbitrary abuses of power.

Emphasize state institutions after the transition: On the other hand, in countries which have reached the final stages of the democratic transition or have completed it, governance programs should focus special attention on the instruments of democratic governance that are internal to the state itself. In the fledgling democratic state, it will be particularly important to create or strengthen emerging traditions of democratic governance; for example, institutional instruments that establish legislative oversight over the central administration, or anti-corruption procedures. Similarly, governance programs can promote decentralization objectives with projects to increase the capacities of local government. In states which have completed their transition, strengthening the state's policy making and economic planning capacities can be the first step to a fully participatory policy process involving other state actors and civil society. Strengthening state institutions after the transition should be aimed at helping states process societal demands more effectively and more transparently.

When Aiding the State, Distinguish Governance from Traditional Institution Building: Nonetheless, projects within the executive branch should clearly distinguish themselves from past donor activities in institution building and public management, or else these projects will fail for the same reasons so many of their predecessors did (Dia, 1993a and 1993b; the World Bank, 1991b) and they will little advance the governance agenda. Activities should be clearly tied to the governance agenda rather than to more traditional institution building objectives. Examples of governance aid to the state include the following:

State Finances: The decision making processes surrounding how the state manages its resources are key to governance because they largely determine the weight of the state on the economy. In addition, they are areas in which governance has typically been the most strongly conditioned by patrimonial and authoritarian practices. This includes the budgetary process, public procurement, tax and tariff collection, and so on. It does not include tax reform, however important that is in many countries, because tax reform is a more traditional component of micro-economic policy reform in structural adjustment programs. The objective should be to increase the accountability, transparency and popular participation in these processes, which have long been the private domain of a small group of powerful elites, acting with virtually no accountability. In many countries, the budgetary process has been so corrupted that the normal channels of the central administration have been virtually excluded from the process. To change this, measures might include assisting the central administrative units in charge of formulating and monitoring the budget, helping the government release more timely information to the legislature and public, decreasing the importance of off-budget expenditures, or limiting expenditures under the control of the Presidency.

Tax and tariff collection is another area where many African governments need assistance, since non-payment (often by politically powerful individuals and businesses) undermines the state's revenue base. Finally, public procurement procedures in many countries need to be reinforced and made more transparent.

Other measures would seek to improve state management of its finances by empowering organizations outside of the executive. The legislature in particular should be provided technical assistance to increase its capacity to monitor the budgetary

process and contest executive priorities, eventually leading to an informed national legislative debate about the budget. Similarly, donor efforts could focus on disseminating budget and procurement data to the media, to increase their transparency and the possibility of accountability.

National data: National economic and social data have continued to deteriorate in Africa. In many countries, even basic economic data are no longer available on a timely basis, making even basic policy analysis a futile exercise in "planning without facts" (Mosley, 1992). In some countries, data is no longer being collected as statistical units have been starved of operating funds. In other countries, the data exists, but there is no money to publish and disseminate it. The paucity of good data weakens governance in a number of ways, and assistance is needed to rebuild or improve data collection and dissemination systems.

Auditor general/Ombudsman: Aid can play a role in strengthening internal performance monitoring and disciplinary mechanisms within the state, such as the office of auditor general or ombudsman, or the Inspection Générale.

Attack State Monopolies: One of the lessons from the governance literature is that institutional monopolies in the governance realm are as destructive as they are in the economic realm. Governance reform thus needs to include trying to eliminate statutory monopolies, when they are not clearly justified. For example, state monopolies in the media: An independent written press is emerging in many African states, as many governments have lessened their censorship. On the other hand, in most countries, a strict state monopoly on radio and television is maintained. Radio in particular is a powerful medium that reaches far more households than the written press. It could also be a powerful instrument for participatory development. Donors need to actively promote the end of the government monopoly on the airwaves. A healthy institutional pluralism should also be encouraged in such areas as education, research, or even justice (see below).

Respect Indigenous Institutions: Next, stable democratic governance requires that public institutions are "at one with the social values of the societies in which they are embedded" (Landell-Mills, 1992a, p. 546). It is now widely agreed that one of the underlying causes of mal-governance in Africa was the practice of simply importing European institutions at the end of the colonial era and after independence, without adapting them to fit African sociological and cultural realities (Dia, 1991). Transparency, accountability, the rule of law and participation are universal concepts, but they can be achieved through many different types of institutions. Governance reforms are more likely to succeed and to be sustained if they have strong cultural resonance, and enjoy popular backing.

Indigenous institutions which have evolved out of local traditions should for example be empowered and strengthened when they can play a significant governance role. This is not to make the excessively romantic suggestion that traditional African institutions were all inherently democratic or efficient, although some undoubtedly were (Ayilley, 1991). Nonetheless, indigenous institutions are more likely to generate a sense of ownership by local populations, providing them with a legitimacy that many formal institutions of the state today

do not enjoy. At a minimum, governance reform should not make a-priori assumptions about the superiority of certain institutional structures; rather it should be tolerant of efforts to adapt traditional institutional forms, and to experiment until appropriate structures evolve over time.

Promote the Rule of Law: Promoting the rule of law should be a critical component of any democratic governance program because it simultaneously strengthens the state and civil society. Rule based behavior will strengthen state capacities and reinforce progressive elements within the state, but at the same time it will protect non-state actors from arbitrary abuses of power. Program activities might include:

Training for Judges: In many countries, judges are ill-trained, and lack professionalism. Their status and independence has been undermined too often in the past, and strengthening the corps of judges is urgent. This can be done by improving their training, particularly in specialized areas -- notably commercial law -- where training is particularly deficient at the present. It also involves finding ways to increase their independence vis a vis the state executive, and formulating mechanisms for identifying and disciplining corrupt and incompetent judges;

Official Gazette: in many countries, new laws are not systematically published on a timely basis or made widely available. The result is confusion regarding the legal code and much greater possibility for arbitrary and discretionary decision making. This leads to chronic problems, particularly in the context of commercial law, where it provides disincentives to private investment. Yet, there is no reason to believe that such a publication would be very difficult or expensive to publish. USAID could finance technical assistance in desk-top publishing and finance the dissemination costs.

Private arbitration: Setting up private mechanisms of arbitration may be a desirable option when the public judicial system is particularly inefficient. All that is needed is an arbitration procedure that is credible to two sides of a dispute, and a legal framework that ensures the enforcement of the awards. This solution may be particularly appealing in the countryside, where it would build on traditional mechanisms of arbitration.

Avoid New Aid Dependencies: There is always a danger that the recipients of aid grow dependent on it and that it smother their independence and sense of initiative. This danger is particularly relevant for an aid program that will focus on small and often young associations in the non-governmental sector. It is important that the development of civil society be the natural outgrowth of perceived needs and citizens' desires, rather than the fads, and/or bureaucratic needs of the donors. Governance programs should develop strategies to deal with this danger. Although this is an area in need of further study, several elements of such a strategy can be deduced from aid's experience in other areas. First, aid should focus on organizations that have already demonstrated the ability to raise revenues for their activities, that have a large number of active members, and that practice good governance themselves. Second, a significant proportion of the aid should go to intermediary and umbrella organizations for distribution down to grass roots level organizations. These organizations will encourage the consolidation and institutionalization of the NGO sector. Aid efforts in general should promote coordination, cooperation and unity among associations. Third, the recipient

institutions of aid should be active participants in the design and implementation of governance projects. This last point is particularly relevant for the state sector, where the extent to which the recipient institution is pro-active and takes initiatives.

Good Governance Starts at Home: A final general principle that should guide USAID interventions in the area of governance is that the intervention itself should apply principles of good governance to project design and implementation. That is to say that governance projects should be transparent, accountable and decentralized to every extent possible, without undermining effectiveness. Attention to governance issues will make USAID more credible to its clients in the recipient countries and will provide project personnel and project beneficiaries with experience in the benefits of good governance. An example might include involving local associations in the funding decisions of small grant projects to grass roots organizations. Associations thus involved would be able to judge for themselves the benefits of impartial, transparent and non-partisan decision making.

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APPENDIX 3.

**"DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION OF SOLDIERS:
FINDINGS FROM AFRICA"**

DRAFT

Demobilization and Reintegration of Soldiers: Findings from Africa

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December 1, 1995

DRAFT

The last 30 years have offered enormous opportunities and challenges to the countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Important progress has been recorded in economic and social sectors, although the gains have often come more slowly and unevenly than anticipated, especially during the 1980s. In consequence, economic stagnation has combined with deteriorating terms of trade, rapid population growth, exceptionally high levels of indebtedness, and the effects of prolonged conflict to produce an economic crisis of significant proportions.

In the political arena, one-party rule, military juntas, and authoritarian regimes have far outnumbered multiparty systems, offering citizens little opportunity to provide input into the decisions which shape their lives. The crisis in governance has intensified the economic crisis as resources have been put to unproductive uses, retarding efforts to achieve sustained development. The crisis in governance has also contributed importantly to the conflicts that have afflicted the region. Some of these have resulted from protracted decolonization struggles and from foreign military intervention. Prior to 1990, African conflicts were often exacerbated by the Cold War. But in many cases, domestic political and economic inequalities have played a central role.

Fundamental to both improved governance and sustained economic and social development is a re-examination of the role of the security sector. While the armed forces can play an important role in nation-building, they can also severely constrain national well-being by absorbing too many resources, preventing the growth of responsible, accountable government, and encouraging conflict over compromise. In these respects, the military has imposed a heavy burden on sub-Saharan Africa. Reducing the size and political power of the security sector can substantially increase economic and political stability and thereby significantly enhance a country's long-term development prospects.

Restructuring the security sector involves demobilizing troops, separating internal and external security functions, enhancing transparency, accountability, and civilian control, reassessing missions, and, in some cases, creating entirely new security forces. This chapter focusses solely on the demobilization of troops, their initial reinsertion into civilian life, and their long-term reintegration as productive members of society. Seven African countries have significantly reduced the size of their security forces since the early 1980s--Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Namibia, Uganda and Zimbabwe. The coming years could witness troop reductions in perhaps another half dozen or so African states. Development cooperation agencies have increasingly been asked to provide technical and financial support. A review of recent demobilization and reintegration efforts suggests that while some unresolved questions remain, considerable valuable experience has been accumulated.

This chapter begins by describing the four phases of the demobilization-reintegration process and identifying the roles played by the various actors involved. Three categories of lessons are then discussed: general lessons, lessons pertaining to assembly and discharge and lessons applicable to reinsertion and reintegration.

The Demobilization-Reintegration Process

While military life sometimes provides soldiers with technical and administrative skills that will stand them in good stead in civilian life, most African ex-combatants constitute a specially disadvantaged group. The typical veteran is semi-literate at best, unskilled, with few personal possessions, often no housing or land, but frequently many dependents. Some are also physically and psychologically handicapped by wartime experiences. Many find it difficult to take independent initiatives and cope with the ordinary demands of civilian life. Even when they possess a marketable skill, such as mechanic or driver, ex-combatants tend to have little or no experience in the labor market, having taken up arms at an early age. They also tend to have an imperfect understanding of the state of the economy. In consequence, ex-combatants often have unrealistic assumptions about civilian life and require a period of adjustment to assess their personal situation and options. These characteristics are particularly relevant for former foot soldiers, whose opportunities for education and personal advancement were more limited than those of the officer corps, and for members of the armed opposition.

Donors and NGOs have sometimes been reluctant to assist veterans following conflicts, because of their role in uprooting non-combatants from their homes and causing considerable loss of life, destruction of physical infrastructure, and suffering. Still, peace agreements often specify such assistance, and, from a political standpoint, it may be very difficult to avoid aid to demobilized soldiers even if it is not mandated by peace accords in view of their capacity to disrupt the peace process. Demobilization-reintegration programs for ex-combatants and, in some cases, their families have been and will continue to be part of the transition landscape in Africa (World Bank 1993; Colletta, Kostner, and Wiederhofer, 1996).

The demobilization-reintegration process consists of four major phases through which soldiers progressively pass: assembly, discharge, short-term reinsertion, and longer-term reintegration. The first two constitute the demobilization stage; the latter two, the reintegration stage. The duration of these four phases varies from country to country, but experience from Africa and elsewhere suggests that donors should anticipate remaining involved for three to four years.

Assembly

Soldiers are typically assembled, or cantoned, as the first step in the demobilization-reintegration process. Following conflicts, assembly has primarily political and security objectives: to account for all combatants and their weapons and, where wars end without a clear winner, to build confidence between the former warring parties that each side will maintain the commitments expressed in the peace accords. Some soldiers are exempt from cantonnement in order to maintain the functioning of the armed forces. Senior officers may also not be required to enter assembly areas.

The precise needs of cantoned troops vary considerably. When confined to barracks as most government troops are, the requirement for supplementary shelter, food, clothing, sanitation facilities, and medical care may be minimal. However, governments, which often

owe their troops substantial back pay, may not have the resources to provide for soldiers' basic needs during cantonment. Opposition forces typically require that everything be provided for them, and they often need this assistance urgently. Finally, cantoned soldiers may have special health needs, particularly members of the armed opposition who have frequently only had access to very basic medical care for many years. Prior to discharge, soldiers often receive orientations to help them adjust to civilian life.

Because of the political context in which they occur, post-conflict demobilization processes governed by negotiated settlements rarely, if ever, adhere to the timetables established by peace agreements. As the cantonment period is extended, provisioning the encamped soldiers becomes more costly, and new needs are created. For example, it can be difficult to avoid providing some services such as basic medical care for the soldiers' families who progressively join them in assembly areas as well as to nearby civilians.

Discharge

When large numbers of soldiers are demobilized, they are generally discharged over a period of time. From a social and economic perspective, it may be preferable to discharge troops over a several year period. For political-military reasons, however, post-conflict demobilizations, particularly those governed by negotiated settlements, are often required to be completed within the space of one year, and the discharge of troops may be closely linked to compliance with other provisions of the peace accords.

Box 1. Menu of Potential Support to Ex-combatants During the Assembly and Discharge Phases

Assembly

Food
Shelter
Clothing
Sanitation
Medical exams
Medical care
Basic education
Leisure activities
Orientation on adjusting to civilian life, including financial counselling, health counselling, civic duties, income generation, for soldiers and spouses
Assistance to child soldiers
Census
Discharge documentation

Discharge

Short-term food supplements
Transport
Orientation on conditions in district of residence
Orientation on conditions of residence
First tranche of reinsertion benefits

Upon discharge, soldiers are generally transported to their home districts which tends to be less expensive and safer than independent travel and facilitates the initial geographic dispersal of ex-combatants. They are usually provided with food or funds to purchase food for the journey. In some cases, veterans are required to attend post-discharge orientation meetings upon their arrival in their home districts. In addition, soldiers often receive some portion of their reinsertion benefits at the point of discharge.

Reinsertion

Reinsertion assistance is a form of transitory safety net that provides veterans with the basic necessities of life--such as shelter, medical care, food, clothing, and household goods--for a period of between several months and two years. Delivery methods include cash payments, vouchers (for medical care and children's school fees), and in-kind transfers (housing material, food, clothing, transportation). Some reinsertion programs have offered special support to physically handicapped veterans. Psychological problems have received less attention. Some assistance has been provided to help veterans regenerate their traditional coping skills through the creation of bodies to which soldiers can turn for advice and information.

Box 2. Menu of Potential Support to Ex-combatants During the Reinsertion and Reintegration Phases

Reinsertion

- Food supplements
- Clothing and personal items
- Housing material
- Short term medical care
- Basic household goods
- Land
- Basic agricultural supplies (seeds/tools)
- Severance pay/other cash allowances
- Veteran/spouse information/counselling
- Assistance to child soldiers
- Rehabilitation for physically/mentally disabled soldiers

Reintegration

- Job generation, including public works, community development, microenterprises, salary supplements to employers, cooperatives
- Job placement services
- Training, including apprenticeships, formal vocational training, managerial/administrative training
- Credit schemes
- Education
- Agricultural extension services
- Veteran/spouse information/counselling
- Rehabilitation for physically/mentally disabled soldiers

Reintegration

The objective of reintegration is the incorporation of the veteran and his family into civilian society and the attainment of financial independence through involvement in productive activities. Refugees, internally displaced persons, and veterans have many needs in common, and donors increasingly agree that programs to reintegrate ex-combatants into civilian life in post-conflict environments are most appropriately linked with economic revitalization activities at the community level. To date, however, most assistance has been targeted on ex-combatants. The most frequently employed mechanisms are cash payments, counselling (employment and psychological), vocational training, apprenticeships, formal education, job generation, support for job search, access to land, credits, technical assistance, and support in identifying market needs.

Major Actors

The demobilization-reintegration process is both highly politically charged and administratively complex. Governments frequently request economic and technical assistance to devise a framework for demobilization-reintegration efforts, and to develop and implement specific programs for demobilized soldiers. They may also require external political support to overcome obstacles to the timely completion of the demobilization process. In addition, for a variety of reasons, programs are frequently implemented by non-governmental organizations, both domestic and international, and by public international organizations. Figure 1 summarizes the major actors in the demobilization-reintegration process and the roles each commonly plays during its four phases.

General Lessons

1. Flexibility in planning and implementation is crucial. Post-conflict demobilizations are particularly vulnerable to delays and other program changes. All involved should anticipate and plan for the unexpected. Demobilization is inherently a political process and, as such, is subject to a variety of political pressures: to slow implementation, to speed implementation, to change the beneficiary pool, to alter the benefits package. Following

conflicts with no clear winner, these pressures are particularly strong. Personnel have to be able to adapt rapidly to new circumstances. Enhanced flexibility does not, in and of itself, solve all problems. However, without the ability to respond to changing circumstances, programs face an even greater chance of failure.

Box 3. The Importance of Flexibility

"A plan is an agreed-upon basis for change."

United Nations peacekeeping official,

Figure 1. Roles of the Major Participants in Demobilization-Reintegration Process Following Civil Wars

Government	In principle, governments are involved in assembly, discharge, reinsertion, and reintegration. In practice, peace agreements governing the transition in countries with no clear winner may be required to cede some of their responsibilities to other actors. Government tasks range from identifying assembly areas, provisioning assembly areas and selecting soldiers for discharge through developing benefits packages for assembly, reinsertion, and reintegration, and identifying implementing agencies to ensuring that programs for ex-combatants harmonize with government priorities, delivering benefits, and monitoring reinsertion and reintegration programs.
Armed opposition	The armed opposition typically participates in selecting assembly areas and developing benefits packages for assembly, reinsertion, and reintegration. It may also participate in delivering benefits.
Demobilized soldiers	Demobilized soldiers frequently have little input into the demobilization-reintegration process. They have, however, sometimes been involved in developing and implementing benefits packages and counselling other ex-combatants.
UN peacekeeping operation	UN PKOs have provided military, technical and political support for the demobilization process. UN troops have helped select, establish, monitor, and provision assembly areas and disarm combatants. UN staff have participated in the discharge of soldiers and monitored their transport to home districts. UN staff have helped design and implement programs for assembly, reinsertion, and reintegration programs. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General has played an important role in helping to overcome political obstacles to demobilization.
UN development and humanitarian assistance bodies	UN development and humanitarian assistance bodies have participated in the development, implementation and monitoring of reinsertion and reintegration programs. They have also provided funding for such programs.
Bilateral governments	Bilateral governments have supported the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in creating conditions conducive to demobilization.
Bilateral aid agencies	Bilateral aid agencies have participated in the development, implementation and monitoring of reinsertion and reintegration programs. They have also provided funding for such programs.
NGOs/PIOs	Non-governmental organizations and public international organizations have participated in the development, implementation and monitoring of reinsertion and reintegration programs.
World Bank	The World Bank has participated in the development, implementation and monitoring of reinsertion and reintegration programs. It has also provided funding for such programs.

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2. Flexible, quick disbursing funds are essential to the success of demobilization and reintegration programs. The importance of financial flexibility has been stressed time and again by development practitioners involved in demobilization-reintegration efforts, but this lesson has not yet been fully internalized by development assistance bureaucracies. Although both relief aid and development assistance are routinely employed in demobilization-reintegration efforts, neither are well-suited to this purpose. Development assistance is slow disbursing and the more accessible relief aid is often limited to activities that save lives. Mechanisms urgently need to be developed to speed disbursement, including means of overriding any restrictions on assistance to military organizations where necessary.

One possible mechanism would be a "transition/post-conflict waiver authority" to support demobilization-reintegration activities. Alternatively, donors could co-finance structural adjustment loans with the multilateral development banks to increase the volume of quick-disbursing funds available to governments. Redirecting funds already appropriated for other programs offers a third option that donors frequently use, but significant funds are not always available for this purpose.

Equally important, special attention needs to be given to UN procurement practices in view of the central role accorded UN peacekeeping operations when conflicts end in negotiated settlements. One means of increasing the flexibility of UN funding would be to provide PKOs with reasonable local expenditure authority so that only major expenditures would have to be referred to New York.

3. For demobilization-reintegration to proceed smoothly and with maximum possible effectiveness, planning should begin well before troops enter assembly areas. This means that donors should be prepared to act early on, ideally before wars actually end. Governments invariably require financial and technical assistance to plan as well as implement their demobilization-reintegration programs. Thus, if planning is to begin early, donor support must begin early. Adequate lead time will facilitate the timely delivery of assistance, and enable donors to determine if ongoing programs--health care, vocational training, credit, and so on--could be expanded to meet the needs of ex-combatants.

There are three additional reasons in favor of early donor involvement. First, it is possible that the process of reaching peace agreements could be expedited if the parties to the conflict knew that specific programs would be available to ease the difficult transition to civilian life for their soldiers. Second, when wars end in negotiated settlements, demobilization tends to begin before a legitimated government is established which, at present, generally occurs through internationally supervised elections. Indeed, demobilization may be a pre-condition for holding the elections. Under these conditions, mistrust of transitional governments among the armed opposition may necessitate some degree of international supervision of the demobilization-reintegration process. Third, post-conflict countries typically suffer from extreme institutional weakness. Their governments are overextended and unable to fulfill key functions and deliver critical services. It would be helpful in these situations for the donors to work with appropriate government officials (at the national, regional, and local levels), relevant international NGOs and multilateral institutions,

representatives of the opposition, local communities and non-governmental bodies, and the soldiers themselves to plan demobilization-reintegration activities.

4. As with any development program, a key element in the success of the demobilization-reintegration process is adequate institutional support. Three functions that must be fulfilled are: a) strategic planning, b) coordination within the government and with the donor community, and c) oversight of implementing bodies. The governments of wartorn countries invariably have substantial institution-strengthening needs. If they are to develop the capacity to fulfill key functions and deliver essential services, some level of material and technical assistance will be necessary. The planners of demobilization-reintegration efforts should, therefore, incorporate institution-strengthening and human resource capacity-building into their programs where appropriate and feasible.

a) **Strategic planning.** In order to assess institutional needs, donors might encourage the establishment of an informal forum in which donors, the government, and the armed opposition could engage in dialogue on: 1) the overall policy and institutional framework within which demobilization-reintegration activities will occur; 2) the key tasks for government and the appropriate level of government to assume responsibility for each task; 3) methods of incorporating the views of the soldiers to be demobilized; and 4) the specific roles that individual donor agencies and NGOs will play to help implement demobilization-reintegration programs.

b) **Coordination.** Recent experience suggests that a civilian, quasi-governmental commission is the best mechanism for guiding the overall demobilization-reintegration process and effecting coordination between the country undergoing demobilization and the donor community (Colletta, Kostner, and Wiederhofer 1996, p. 16). The primary objective must, however, be to assist veterans, not create an elaborate administrative structure. In addition, donors must make every effort to encourage such commissions to operate in a problem-solving mode and to avoid falling prey to the post-conflict power struggles that afflict countries when conflicts end with no clear winner.

To facilitate donor-government coordination, the resident donor community should appoint a lead donor--a bilateral aid agency, the World Bank, or UNDP. Where demobilization occurs as part of a peace process supervised by the United Nations, a PKO may be responsible for coordination. In these cases, an effort must be made to draw as much as possible on existing donor coordination mechanisms--both formal and informal. Whatever the donor coordination mechanism employed, it is critical that the individual responsible for overall coordination possess a collaborative, inclusive personal style. It is also important that the donors give priority to veterans' needs rather than to their own interests, something which has often not occurred in recent demobilization-reintegration efforts.

c) **Implementation oversight.** Local oversight mechanisms are typically discredited or severely weakened in countries that have experienced lengthy civil wars. One means of strengthening local capacity would be to constitute community-based committees composed of government representatives, community leaders, local NGOs, businessmen, and other local

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citizens, including ex-combatants. Such committees could initially provide input on project/program design and implementation and ultimately assume oversight responsibility. Involving local representatives in this way should increase the community's stake in the successful incorporation of veterans.

Although time-consuming to establish, the return on investment from such committees is likely in most cases to outweigh the costs in terms of more appropriate programs, enhanced local capacity, and more rapid social integration of ex-combatants. If this approach is to succeed, however, local participation must be genuine. Community members must be consulted, not informed; authority must be progressively transferred from central and regional governments to local entities (Colletta, Kostner, Sitani, and Wiederhofer 1996, pp. 44-45, 53).

5. Program planners should take into account the needs of special vulnerable groups. The disabled, the chronically ill, child soldiers, and women are among those most frequently cited as requiring special attention. In some African countries, a significant number of the soldiers discharged from military service are infected with HIV. Other veterans carry the physical and psychological scars of lengthy wars. Female combatants and the wives of male veterans face a variety of social and economic constraints and burdens which derive to a large extent from the traditional role of women in African societies. If not overcome, these can cause considerable hardship for the women and their children. Child soldiers are a particularly unfortunate legacy of war.¹ Even soldiers who are in their twenties at the time of demobilization may need special assistance because they have had no experience of civilian life as an adult. Although there have been some efforts to address the problems of these special vulnerable groups, they have generally received less attention than warranted (Colletta, Kostner, and Wiederhofer 1996, pp. 13-14).

6. A crucial component of any demobilization/reintegration scheme is an effective monitoring and evaluation capacity. To conserve increasingly scarce resources, it is vital that assistance reaches its intended beneficiaries, that programs are cost-effective, and that leakage is minimized. In addition, monitoring and evaluation in the course of project execution enable mid-course corrections that can be extremely valuable in terms of maximizing beneficiary satisfaction by making adjustments in program content and the way in which benefits are delivered. A unified database is critical to these functions and should be created at the beginning of the demobilization-reintegration process.

Lessons from the Assembly and Discharge Phases

1. Lengthy periods in assembly areas prior to demobilization can create significant political and social problems and increase costs substantially. They should accordingly be avoided whenever possible. It is widely understood that there are significant economic, political and social benefits to minimizing the amount of time troops spend in assembly areas (Refugee Policy Group 1994, p. 10). Nonetheless, demobilizations following wars that end without a clear winner invariably encounter political obstacles to rapid discharge. It is therefore critical that planners of post-conflict demobilizations under these conditions develop

contingency plans on the assumption that significant delays will occur in implementing the peace process and that soldiers will remain in assembly areas considerably longer than anticipated in the peace accords timetable.

2. One method of mitigating problems associated with lengthy periods in assembly areas is to update cantoned troops regularly on the status of the demobilization process and, whenever possible, avoid communicating "dates certain" to them. Although it is probably impossible to eliminate the frustration of long encampment periods, explaining the complexity of the process to the soldiers and keeping them constantly updated on progress (or the lack thereof) may help to mitigate some of the tensions that develop. In order to facilitate this communication, it is important to ensure that as many of the personnel supervising assembly as possible speak local languages.

3. It is desirable to begin preparing soldiers for civilian life prior to discharge. Soldiers can usefully receive information on a broad range of subjects that will assist them reintegrate into civilian life. It is desirable to include soldiers' wives (or husbands) in these orientations whenever possible. Where soldiers are encamped for lengthy periods of time, the pre-discharge orientation can be more detailed than in situations where they are assembled for

Box 4. Uganda Veterans Assistance Board Pre-discharge Orientation for Soldiers and Their Wives

Soldiers were demobilized in three phases in Uganda between 1992 and 1995. During this period, the content of the pre-discharge orientation was progressively refined. As a result, the length of the orientation sessions was extended from a short briefing prior to mustering out in phase I to at least 20 hours spread over five days in phase III. During phase I, soldiers' wives were not included; during phase III, the sessions were conducted jointly with wives to the extent possible.

The eight phase III pre-discharge orientation modules were:

- entitlements (banking and installments, education and health, roofing materials)
- veterans' associations and veterans' experience to date (projects undertaken, economic opportunities, personal finances)
- women's legal rights and civil responsibilities
- services and cost-sharing at local health facilities
- household health issues (preventive care, first aid)
- AIDS/HIV (basic information, access to counseling and support resource)
- PTA fees and importance of basic education for veterans' children
- women's legal rights issues (basic education for both veterans and veterans' wives).

Source: Nat Colletta, Markus Kostner, Emilio Mondo, and Ingo Wiederhofer, *From Swords to Ploughshares: Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in Uganda* Working Paper (Washington, DC: Africa Technical Department, The World Bank,

a shorter time, and basic skills enhancement can be provided as well. However, assembly periods should never be lengthened solely to provide soldiers with training.

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Upon arrival in their home district, it may be helpful to provide a post-discharge orientation before veterans and their families disperse. The purpose of this exercise would be to familiarize the new arrivals with the local economic situation, customary rights of women, and other relevant information and to acquaint them with representatives of local government and relevant NGOs (Colletta, Kostner, and Wiederhofer 1996, pp. 8-9).

4. **Child soldiers should not undergo assembly.** Every effort should be made to identify child soldiers, to remove them from assembly areas or encampments around assembly areas, provide them with psychological counselling if at all possible, and reunite them with their families. Armed forces frequently refuse to admit that they have child soldiers in their ranks and to give relief workers early access to the children. Donors need to make every effort to overcome these obstacles, and should be supported in their efforts by the key members of the diplomatic community, including the Secretary-General's Special Representative.

5. If time permits, it is desirable to conduct a trial run of assembly-discharge activities in order to fine tune the process. By discharging some 400 soldiers several weeks before the formal start of the demobilization process, the Uganda Veterans Assistance Board was able to identify program design and implementation weaknesses and make a number of adjustments to their procedures. Some of the lessons learned were that: 1) It is desirable to have military escorts accompanying veterans and their families during transportation to the district reception centers; 2) It is desirable to take out group insurance to protect against the loss or theft of benefits distributed at the time of discharge during transport to the districts; and 3) It is important to fully prepare reception and temporary sleeping arrangements at the district reception point to accommodate veterans and their families await transport to their home villages.

Lessons from the Reinsertion and Reintegration Phases

1. Demobilization-reintegration programs should include a combination of benefits, which are available to all demobilized soldiers, and opportunities, which are available to ex-combatants who meet certain criteria. In order to minimize the potential for discontent among veterans, the distinction between benefits and opportunities needs to be communicated clearly and consistently. Providing all veterans with relatively short-term reinsertion benefits that function as a transitory safety net addresses both real physical needs and the psychological need for formal recognition of personal sacrifices during their years of military service. Where different benefit packages are provided--based on the personal characteristics (female, child soldier, disabled), destination (rural or urban), or intended occupation--every effort should be made to develop packages of roughly equivalent value. In addition, it probably is preferable to distribute only benefits to soldiers as long as they remain in large groups, that is, during the assembly and transport phases.

Longer-term reintegration assistance should be presented as a series of opportunities since it is highly unlikely that employment, training, and education opportunities can be

provided to all veterans, particularly in post-conflict societies where the lives of large numbers of people have been disrupted by war and resources are exceptionally constrained.

2. The benefits package should consist of short-term reinsertion subsidies, in cash or in-kind, to tide soldiers over the initial period of return home. Opportunities should include medium- and long-term assistance aimed at identifying immediate employment openings, supporting economic revitalization, promoting community development, and increasing longer-term employment possibilities. In order to minimize the potential for demobilization-reintegration programs to increase polarization among social groups, it is important to limit the number of targeted programs and shift as early as possible to community-based programs and/or programs benefitting all of the most-severely war-affected populations.

a) Short-term reinsertion assistance. Short-term reinsertion assistance can provide ex-combatants with a vital breathing space while they establish themselves in the civilian economy. It also reduces the burden that veterans and their dependents place on the communities to which they return and enhances veterans' self-esteem by ensuring that they will be able to finance their basic needs. Reinsertion assistance in the form of cash can help to remonetize the economy and stimulate local production of basic goods and services. The duration of reinsertion programs depends on local circumstances but should probably be six to twelve months. The value of the reinsertion package should take account of regional variations in purchasing power, as well as the local cultural environment and mode of subsistence. It is important, of course, that this assistance not come to be considered an entitlement. Therefore, a termination date should be established at the start of the demobilization process and communicated clearly and consistently to veterans.

While financial payments arguably provide the demobilized and their families with greatest flexibility and are the least costly method of providing benefits, the most appropriate method of delivering reinsertion assistance--cash payments, in-kind assistance, vouchers--depends on local conditions. Each of these methods should be considered during the planning phase. When cash payments are the chosen form of assistance, payments spread over several installments with an option of advances for investment purposes are preferable to lump-sum payments. Cash payments can also be used to strengthen the capacity of local financial institutions.

Donors should be aware of the ways in which the type of assistance they offer influences program design, costs, and outcomes. Whatever form their assistance takes, donors should make every effort to provide it in a timely fashion to avoid the negative impact that disbursement delays can have on program beneficiaries.

b) Medium- and long-term reintegration support. Demobilized soldiers and their spouses require three types of assistance to facilitate their productive reintegration into the civilian economy: 1) information about economic and social programs from which they could benefit; 2) information about specific job opportunities; 3) means of acquiring or upgrading skills essential for employment.

Past experience has demonstrated the value of both information (benefits and opportunities) and referral (employment and training) services for ex-combatants, even in countries where the local economy is extremely weak and job opportunities outside the family agriculture sector are limited. In the future, however, it would be worthwhile examining if this function could be targeted on the community as a whole. Since a growing economy provides the best hope for long-term reintegration, it makes good sense to focus as many resources as possible on strengthening the local economy.

Box 5. Donor Influence on the Housing Component of Reinsertion Assistance in Uganda

"...the following assistance was rendered to a veteran for erecting a simple house: 20 galvanized corrugated iron (GCI) sheets and five GCI ridges in kind as well as in-cash contributions to the purchase of poles, doors, windows, nails, vents, and skilled labor.

"...it was initially contemplated to provide veterans with a total cash package to reduce logistical and transaction costs of procuring, storing, transporting, and distributing such large amounts of iron sheets and ridges. However, one donor willing to entirely support this component could only contribute to the program through commodity provisions....

"...While pledged in autumn of 1992 [for phase I demobilization, December 1992-July 1993], actual delivery took place between December 1993 and February 1994....

"Phase II procurement experienced similar delays, this time due to the late arrival of funds and procurement procedures....Consequently, the arrival of the iron sheets for phase II veterans is now expected in August/September 1995....

"Ideally, a veteran would receive the in-kind housing benefits immediately after returning to the community. Only then would he/she be able to make full use of this component. Until the house was built, a period of maybe one to three months, he/she was expected to stay with relatives or friends. As a result of the delays, however, many veterans did not have adequate shelter for a prolonged period of time after arrival, though few veterans were actually homeless two or three months after discharge....

"Because in-kind and cash benefits were not provided at the same time, in fact more than one year apart, many veterans were not able to save the cash components until the sheets arrived...."

As a result of this experience, it has been decided that cash payments equivalent to the value of the iron sheets would be substituted for the sheets themselves during the third round of demobilization.

Source: Nat Colletta, Markus Kostner, Emilio Mondo, and Ingo Wiederhofer *From Swords to Houghshares: Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in Uganda*, Working Paper (Washington, DC: Africa Technical Department, The World Bank, 1996), pp. 37-39.

A community information and referral capacity could be established to provide community members with referrals to employment and training opportunities. This capacity

could be attached to existing local government offices or be lodged in a community center. In the latter case, it could possibly house NGOs and other agencies providing a variety of information and services and even become the locus of community-based conflict management and reconciliation efforts where necessary and appropriate. Nat Colletta. 1993. "War-to-Peace Transition in Uganda." *Finance and Development* June: in either case, the objective would be to designate specific staff members to work solely with veterans and their families. It is important, particularly in the first months following demobilization, that there is a place to which veterans can turn for advice and support.

Rather than establish job and credit schemes specifically for veterans, additional funding could be made available to existing community-development, microenterprise, public-works and other relevant programs to enable them to absorb a certain number of ex-combatants or their spouses into ongoing activities. Resources could be allocated on a priority basis to districts with particularly high concentrations of veterans and low employment opportunities.

A number of recent African ex-combatant reintegration efforts have included training programs intended to raise skill levels and enable some ex-combatants to become self-employed. These experiences suggest that such programs are not an efficient use of limited resources, particularly in countries with limited employment opportunities and weak training infrastructure. Rather, future reintegration schemes for demobilized soldiers should concentrate first of all on developing apprenticeship opportunities which help overcome the training-employment disconnect and various problems associated with training centers, such as quality, capacity and geographic distribution. According to the World Bank, apprenticeships are "the most feasible and cost-effective element for the majority of urban ex-combatants" (Colletta, Kostner, and Wiederhofer 1996, p. 13). An additional priority would be to provide vouchers for formal education and vocational training to qualified veterans. Incentives can also be offered to private-sector firms to hire veterans.

3. Surveys of 1) the socio-economic characteristics and employment aspirations of soldiers and 2) the local opportunity structure and institutional capacity will result in more appropriate programs and help manage expectations. In the absence of detailed information, donors often make unwarranted assumptions about demobilized soldiers, the capacity of the economy to absorb labor in specific sectors, and the ability of institutions, such as training facilities and local governments, to contribute to reintegration efforts.

In Africa, reintegration planners commonly anticipate that the agricultural sector will absorb most veterans and that by virtue of their peasant background, most veterans know how to farm. Reality is often quite different. Government troops in particular are frequently urbanized. In many countries, many farmers find that off-farm employment is necessary to supplement the family income. Equally important, in no country does a peasant background guarantee that an individual has the necessary skills to become a successful farmer. Indeed, many African soldiers have entered military service at an early age and spent long periods under arms.

One reason why demobilization-reintegration programs are based on untested assumptions in post-conflict environments is the difficulty that almost always exists in

Box 6. The Importance of Assessing the Local Opportunity Structure

In 1994, the German Technical Cooperation Agency (GTZ) agreed to finance an on-the-job training program for 30 demobilized soldiers in Manica province in Mozambique through its Open Reintegration Fund. One-third of the trainees were to become shoemakers while the remainder were to become shoe repairmen. All were to receive kits and start-up material to help them establish themselves in the informal sector. While GTZ believed that there would be a demand for shoemakers and shoe repairmen, no market survey was conducted to verify this. In addition, once training got underway, it was realized that the self-employed shoemakers would experience difficulty in obtaining raw materials on a sustained basis. A second project was established in order to provide the newly employed shoemakers with raw materials at reasonable prices. It can be predicted, however, that most of the trainees who attempt to become self-employed will end up concentrated in a small area and that only a few of them will survive in the medium- to long-term. Indeed, GTZ has recognized that some trainees may not succeed in establishing viable businesses.

Source: Author's interviews

obtaining information about the intended beneficiaries and particular localities prior to the end of hostilities. In countries where wars end without a clear victor, this situation often extends into the early days of the peace process when levels of mistrust are still very high. The speed with which programs have to be developed can also limit local input.

It is possible that access to beneficiaries could be increased and implementation facilitated if donors engaged the parties to the conflict in discussions of reintegration-reinsertion issue during the course of peace negotiations. It may also be possible to overcome some of the constraints on obtaining timely information on the local situation by adapting strategies that have worked in similar circumstances. For example, vocational training programs for ex-combatants could usefully be viewed as a special form of adult basic education program (UNDP 1993, p.72).

4. It is important to promise no more than can be delivered. Governments emerging from long periods of civil strife which are eager to consolidate their power, reward loyal followers, or enhance their legitimacy frequently promise benefits that they cannot deliver. In view of the economic constraints facing most countries undergoing demobilization, it is difficult for governments to finance extensive benefits packages. In addition, the highly contentious political environment that characterizes many post-conflict countries can complicate government efforts to redistribute assets such as land.

Unfulfilled promises to ex-combatants only exacerbate the political problems facing

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these governments. It is important for donors to assist governments in shaping programs that are as realistic as possible, thereby avoiding frustrations and resentments that can all too easily generate social discontent.

5. Reinsertion-reintegration is a family affair. One clear lesson from recent African experience is that reinsertion-reintegration programs should be aimed at the soldier and his dependents, not just the soldier him/herself. Programs that do not take into account the fact that many veterans must provide for dependents (and frequently a sizable number) will not provide the degree of support these former soldiers need and may delay their productive reintegration into society.

6. Reinsertion-reintegration is also a community affair. The more community support veterans receive, the greater their chance of rapid reintegration. Since extended families can be an important support to newly demobilized soldiers, veterans should be encouraged to take up residence in communities where family members reside. For a variety of reasons, however, including past personal experience with the security forces, communities may have negative attitudes toward demobilized soldiers. It would therefore be desirable to survey communities during the planning phase to ascertain their attitudes and their capacity to assist veterans. Where necessary, community sensitization efforts can be undertaken to enhance local understanding of challenges facing veterans and their families and the role that the community can play in helping them make the transition to civilian life. One method of strengthening community acceptance of veterans and their families would be to provide communities which absorb a substantial number of veterans with some tangible benefit, such as the resources to finance a rehabilitation project chosen by the community.

Conclusion

The lessons outlined in this chapter constitute a first step toward charting a course for demobilization-reintegration efforts during the first three to four years following the cessation of hostilities. They are based on a growing body of very recent evaluations of demobilization and reintegration activities.² These evaluations suggest that additional longer-term investigations of beneficiaries and detailed cost analyses would be fruitful.

In addition, it would be helpful for donor agencies to meet at a senior policymaker level--perhaps under the auspices of the World Bank or the OECD Development Assistance Committee--to discuss a broad framework for demobilization and, especially, reintegration assistance and to develop a preliminary division of labor. Conclusions reached as the result of such a meeting should be communicated clearly and consistently to field staff. In particular, it would be helpful if field staff could receive guidance on the issues pertaining to country-level donor coordination.

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NOTES

1. According to "The Convention on the Rights of the Child," adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on November 20, 1989, entered into force on September 2, 1990, "...a child means every human being below the age of eighteen years unless, under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier" (Article 1).

2. In addition to the items cited in the text, this chapter has made use of the following reports: Ball 1995, Clark 1995, Colletta and Ball 1993, Colletta, Kostner, Wiederhofer and Woldu 1996, Colletta, Kostner, Mondo, and Wiederhofer 1996, International Labour Office 1995a & 1995b, Klingebiel *et al.* 1995, and Organization of African Unity and Global Coalition for Africa 1995.

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