国総研セミナー・シリーズ
(95-9)

内戦終結国における良い統治

— Good Governance Policy in the Countries undergoing War to Peace Transitions
- with special reference to Cambodia, Nicaragua, El Salvador and Mozambique --

平成8年1月

国際協力事業団
国際協力総合研修所

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「国総研セミナー」とは・・・・・

国総研セミナーとは国際協力事業団国際協力総合研修所において行っているセミナーの略称で、国内外の有識者、援助関係者により、わが国の国際協力にかかわる関係者を対象に開発援助の現状、課題、展望等の情報を提供することを目的としています。

本出版物は、講師の了解を得て講演の要約をまとめたもので、編集の責任は国際協力総合研修所にあります。

国総研セミナー

テ ー マ：内戦終結国における良い統治
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- with special reference to Cambodia, Nicaragua, El Salvador and Mozambique

日　　時：平成8年1月25日（木）　　13：30～15：30

場　　所：国際協力総合研修所　大会議室

講　　師：Ms. Nicole Ball
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主な著作：*Security and Economy in the Third World* (1988), Princeton University Press
"*Adjusting to Reductions in Military Expenditure and Defense Procurement*", in Lamb, Geoffrey et. al (ed.), Military Expenditure and Economic Development (1992), World Bank Discussion papers; 185

要　約

1.　プロジェクトの背景

海外開発評議会(以下、ＯＤＣ)は、内戦終結から平和への移行過程にある諸国を支援するために、国際開発コミュニティー(the international development community)、特に開発協力主体がどのような役割を果たすべきかについて検討するための調査プロジェクト(以下、ＯＤＣ調査プロジェクト)を実施してきた。紛争が終結した諸国においては、破壊されたインフラ、人的資源の欠如、制度・組織の脆弱性等々といった難問が山積しているのであり、これら諸国が自力のみで復興を成し遂げるのは非常に困難といえる。したがってこれらの国々は、広い意味での国際協力、とりわけ国際援助をますます必要としている。

ＯＤＣ調査プロジェクトの対象となった諸国は、カンボディア、エル・サルヴァドル、ニカラグァ、モザンビークの四ヶ国である。プロジェクトの目標は、１)上記内戦終結国の再構築と政治的和解を支援するための各段階を確認すること、２)どのような性質の開発援助をどの程度行うのが妥当なのかを見きわめること、３)開発に関与する様々なアクター間における連携・協調関係をいかに促進するかを検討すること、４)国際協力の各ドナーがこれら諸国の能力の向上にどう貢献し得るかを検討すること、である。

本セミナーにおける主要論点は、１)内戦終結国の特徴、２)ＯＤＣ調査プロジェクトから得られた六つの教訓、３)統治(ガバナンス)との関連性、である。

2.　内戦終結国の特徴

内戦終結国の特徴は、１)組織・制度分野、２)経済・社会分野、３)治安分野、４)内戦から平和への移行過程の文脈に関わる分野、という四つのカテゴリーに分類される。

１)　組織・制度分野

内戦から脱した諸国の内部機構は極端に脆弱であり、基本的な政府の機能をも果たすことができない。政府が決定的な役割を果たせるよう国家機構を強化・再編する努力、例えば、物的・社会的インフラへの投資

や、経済開発の促進といった努力は非常に重要ではあるが、また困難でもある。これら諸国の特徴は、内戦終結後における権力闘争であり、政治的組織・制度の正統性が稀薄なことである。極端な政治的分極化と、国家がどちらの方向へ進むべきかについてコンセンサスが形成されていないことも、またその特徴である。さらに、政党がそれぞれに政綱やプログラムを表明することは稀である。むしろこれらの政党は、支配において常に発生する経済的特権・利益を引き出すために、権力を掌握のためのメカニズムとして機能しているのである。また、和平条約・協定で内戦が終結したため、紛争当事者達がそれぞれ自分が最終的に勝利したと錯覚している場合、その当事者らが政治的問題を解決するため歩み寄り、妥協に達するということは稀である。これもまた、内戦終結国におけるもう一つの特徴である。

2）経済・社会分野

内戦による被害は、物的インフラ、社会的・経済的インフラに集中する。内戦終結後、運輸、通信といった国内の基本的機能は完全に使用不能となる。紛争から脱した諸国のほとんどが、多額の負債を抱ているのも特徴として指摘されよう。また内戦によって、人的資源の不足、女性と男性の数の不均衡、環境破壊という重大な問題も発生する。戦闘は国家の社会構造を破壊し、いわば破壊の文化を生み出す。したがって紛争後、プロジェクトにおいて市民の協力関係を構築・醸成することは困難である。さらに、戦闘員、非戦闘員ともに、悲惨な戦争体験の結果、精神的に大きな痛手を負っていることは認識されなければならない。最後に、難民、国内避難民、元戦闘員といった人々を、紛争終結後、社会へ適切に再統合する際に生ずる諸問題の存在も、内戦終結国の特徴として挙げられよう。

3）治安分野

内戦終結国の特徴の一つは、和平後の予算において依然として大きな割合を占め、かつ主要な政治力として留まるような巨大化した軍事・治安維持組織である。非武装化されるべき反対武装勢力の存在などもその特徴として挙げられる。国家の軍隊が外的侵略から国家を守り、文民警察が国内の治安を維持する西側民主主義国家とは対照的に、内戦終結国

における軍隊は国内の治安に関心を持つ。またこれら軍隊が、警察力を掌握することも可能である。国内の軍事・治安維持組織は、人権を抑圧してきたという歴史を持つのであり、これら諸国において、文民社会がその責任性をコントロールできるようなことは稀である。むしろ、行政制度、立法制度、司法制度が、これら軍事・治安維持組織に従属している場合が多々ある。

4）内戦から平和への移行過程の文脈に関わる分野

内戦は、人々と地域の孤立化を生み出す。人の孤立化についていえば、戦闘員等の市民社会の復帰・再統合が問題化している。国内のある地域が、紛争によってその他の地域と断絶することもある。したがって、戦時中、国家レベルの意思決定に携わっていた者は往々にして、孤立化した地域及びそこで生活する人々の関心事項に不案内となってしまう。このことは、内戦終結後における紛争当事者による情報の独占によって、深刻な政治問題ともなる。政府はメディアをコントロールするが、反対勢力は、自らが統括している地域に流入する情報をコントロールしようとするからである。

和平協定という形式で内戦が終結した諸国に関していえば、平和移行プロセスの早期段階におけるその範囲や性質は、協定の内容によって規定される。これによって、通常長時間を要する国家の制度・組織の改革が、和平協定の規定に従ってかなり短期間で実施されなければならない。紛争当事者達が相互の妥協点を見いだすことが困難な状況において、このような短期間での改革は、紛争当事者達にとってかなりの圧力となる。そもそも、制度・組織の早急な改革などということは、紛争後の政治環境と相いれないニーズなのである。既述してきた内戦終結国の特徴の多くは、長期的な内戦を経験していないような諸国にも当てはまろう。しかしながら、内戦終結国は紛争後の諸問題に早急に対処しなければならないのであり、また、その政治環境と人的資源にも制限が加えられているため、問題がよりいっそう深刻なのである。

3. ＯＤＣ調査プロジェクトから得られた六つの教訓

本セミナーにおいて主題となる六つの教訓について検討する前に、和平プロセスについて若干の説明が必要となろう。なぜなら、ＯＤＣ調査プロ

ジェクトの調査対象国は、交渉による解決方法で内戦を終結した諸国であり、開発コミュニティー(development community)の役割は、和平プロセスの各段階、各フェーズによって異なってくるからである。和平プロセスは、二段階に区別され、それぞれの段階はさらに二フェーズずつに区分される。

和平プロセス

段階	紛争解決	平和構築
フェーズ	交渉 --- 停戦	移行 --- 平和強化

交渉のフェーズ目的は、交戦状態を停止するための重要課題に関して、紛争当事者が政治的な合意に達することであり、それには長期間が要される。他方、停戦のフェーズに関していえば、その期間が短いのが典型である。このフェーズの内容は、和平協定の調印や軍隊の解体等である。

平和構築の段階は、移行のフェーズと平和強化のフェーズに区分される。移行のフェーズは通常一年から二年が費やされ、その目的は、国内的、国際的に充分な正統性を有する政府を樹立することである。またもう一つの目的は、和平協定に定められている規定内容を実施することである。平和強化のフェーズにもまた、二つの目的がある。まずこのフェーズにおいて、移行のフェーズで十分に達成されなかった和平協定の規定内容を、確実に実施に移さなければならない。またこのフェーズでは、非常に基本的な改革が(未着手であれば)スタートされなければならない。

ＯＤＣ調査プログラムで得られた第一の教訓は、救援型援助も開発援助も、和平プロセスにおける移行のフェーズのニーズに合致しているとはいい難く、新しい援助形態の形成が望まれる、ということである。この新しい援助形態は、財政面で柔軟性を持ち、地域の状態・条件を考慮しているものでなければならない。さらに、援助プログラムに、紛争解決の技術及び目的を組み入れることは必須である。現在、世銀で企画進行中の紛争終結後における復興基金が、移行のフェーズのニーズに適した援助の一例となるかもしれない。

第二の教訓は、国際開発協力機関が、和平プロセスの全てのフェーズ、全過程に積極的に参加する必要がある、という点である。一般的に、ドナーは和平プロセスの初期段階には関与しないのだが、これは正しいことではない。なぜなら、ドナーの初期段階での参加により、経済的課題が現実的

な形で議論され、開発経済に関する見解が表明されるべきだからである。また和平プロセスへの早期の参加により、ドナーは援助計画を行うために要する時間と情報を得ることができるし、さらに紛争当事者も、どの程度の援助を受け取ることができるかについて予測し得るのである。平和強化のフェーズにおいて、和平協定の規定内容を実施に移すこと、基本的な改革を行うことが重要であることは既述した。多くの諸国で開発協力の予算が減少している事実を考量すれば、財源は効率的に活用されなければならない。またドナーは、移行のフェーズが終了し、平和維持軍が撤退した後においても、非常に重要な改革については支援を継続しなければならない(状況によるが、例えば六年から八年)。

治安部門の改革が平和強化において中核的要素となるということが、ＯＤＣ調査プログラムで得られた第三の教訓である。開発協力主体は、国際社会における他のメンバーと協力して、この改革の推進において活発な役割を果たしていく必要がある。またドナーは、文民と軍人の対話、そして全ての治安維持機能に対するシビリアン・コントロールを促進すべきである。

ＯＤＣ調査プログラムで得られた第四の教訓は、純粋に技術的見地のみから援助プログラムを選択、企画、実施することはできない、ということである。援助プログラムにも政治的考慮は必要であるし、それが長所にも短所にもなる。ドナーがこの点を認識し、政治的環境におけるマイナスの効果を極力抑え、その利点を最大限に引き出すことが肝心なのである。例えば、プログラムの実施主体の政治的背景を考慮に入れることは非常に重要である。

ＯＤＣ調査プログラムから学ぶ第五の教訓は、行政能力の強化に関わる問題である。内戦終結後における国家組織・制度の極端な脆弱性という視座に立てば、主要任務を実行する行政能力の強化は、平和構築の段階における早い時期に実行されるべきであろう。

最後に六番目の教訓は援助の調整に関する問題であり、これは特に重要な論点である。内戦が終結した環境下においては、ドナーの調整は一般的状況に比較してより困難であるし、またより重要でもある。和平プロセスにおいてドナーの調整が決定的に重要となる時期は、移行のフェーズである。国連の平和維持活動は、この点に関して多くの困難を抱え込む結果に至った。調整の問題における根本的な原因は、ドナー間の縄張り争いであ

り、ドナー自身が調整を受け入れようとしない姿勢にある。しかしながら、財源に限りがあるという事実に鑑みれば、ドナー間の調整の実施は必要不可欠な事項である。ドナー間の競争によって和平プロセスが失敗に終わることにでもなれば、それこそ悲劇である。次に、援助受入国政府もまた、受け入れる援助資源を調整する必要がある。内戦終結国における制度・組織の脆弱性のため、この問題はより一層深刻化しているのだが、ドナーもまたこれら援助受入政府に対して、援助の情報を提供する責任があるといえる。このことは、調整に関して検討されるべきもう一つの側面なのであり、ドナーは上述の諸問題に対処していく必要がある。

次に、以上の論点が、どのように統治に関連しているかについて論及する。

4. 統治との関連性

良い統治(グッド・ガバナンス)の内容

世　銀	1）公共部門の管理・運営 2）責任性 3）開発の法的枠組み 4）透明性と情報 関連問題 1）参加型開発 2）軍事費用の抑制 3）人権尊重
DAC	1）法の支配 2）公共部門の管理・運営 3）汚職取り締まり 4）軍事費用の抑制
JICA 参加型開発と良い統治： 分野別援助研究会	1）法・制度づくり 2）行政機能の強化 3）透明性 4）分権化 5）市場環境の整備 6）選挙支援 7）人権尊重 8）言論出版の自由

前頁の表は、世銀、ＤＡＣ、ＪＩＣＡ参加型開発と良い統治：分野別援助研究会がそれぞれ確認している良い統治(グッド・ガバナンス)の内容である。構成要素としての区別・認識に差異があるものの、上述の内容はかなり似かよっているのであり、これらが良い統治において重要課題であるという点に関しては基本的に合意が得られていることが窺える。

内戦終結国においては、統治構造を強化する能力が欠如している。この点を支援する方法はいくつかあるが、ここでは選挙及び正統性を有する政府の創設について特に強調しておきたい。和平プロセスにおける主要な目的は、国内的にも国際的にも正統性を充分に認められた政府を擁立することである。正統性を有する政府を実現するための有効な手段が選挙である。その第一の理由は、選挙は、国民が誰によって統治されたいのかを表明する良い方法であるからである。第二に外部のアクターにとっても、誰がカウンターパートであるのか、選挙によって明確になるという点が指摘される。

しかしながら、往々にして、選挙は国際社会が期待している結果をもたらさない。選挙によって、従来であればもっと長期間を要するであろう和平プロセスが、いわば形式的に終結するのであり、政治的分極化が進行する危険性をはらむこととなる。選挙結果が特定政党の利益のために利用されたり、国民の実質的な参加が選挙によって確保されないような場合、この問題は特に顕著化する。その解決策の一つが紛争終結国における国家統一政権の樹立であるが、これを実施するには国内における特殊な環境整備が必要であるし、またその実施を国民に強要するものであってはならない。この問題におけるもう一つの打開策の可能性は、内戦終結国における暫定政権の擁立である。この考えは、ある相当期間、国内において尊敬されている人物が暫定的に行政府の長を務め、また国内外からの適任者が各省庁の大臣として任命されるというものである。勿論、一つ解決策が、全ての内戦終結国に普遍的に適用可能というわけでない。肝心なのは、統治における改革の導因となるような環境を、内戦終結国において整備・創造していくことなのである。

The Good Governance Policy in the Countries Undergoing War-to-Peace Transitions With Special Reference to Cambodia, Nicaragua, El Salvador and Mozambique

Nicole Ball
Director, Program on Enhancing Security and Development
Overseas Development Council

Moderator: Thank you for joining today's IFIC seminar on good governance in the countries undergoing war-to-peace transition.

Today's lecturer is Ms. Nicole Ball from Overseas Development Council of the United States. The Overseas Development Council is a research institute on policy issues of the international development and development assistance. Miss Ball herself is the director of the Enhancing Security and Development Program of ODC, and she is leading a research program which is studying the issues relevant to the war-to-peace transitions in Cambodia, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Mozambique. She is studying the political, economic, and other factors which these countries are experiencing, as well as the strategies for the international aid donors to support their efforts for peace building. Today, Ms. Ball will talk about her research projects, first of all, and then she will also touch upon the issue of good governance, which is quite relevant to JICA and the other international donor community.

Ms. Ball: I want to thank you very much, both IFIC for hosting this meeting, and particularly, Mr. Iwanami and Miss Kitabayashi. And I want to thank you also for coming here and joining in what will be ultimately a discussion on what I think is a very important issue.

As Miss Kitabayashi said, what I'm going to say now is based on a two-year research project that I have been leading at the Overseas Development Council in Washington D.C. And we have been looking, considering the role of the international development community, the development cooperation agencies in particular, in helping countries move from a state of war to a state

of peace, and a state in which development becomes possible once again.

I want to give you, first of all, some background on this project, why did we decide two years ago, to look at this particular issue. First of all, the Cold War, as we all know, wasn't cold. There were approximately 150 wars going on between 1945 and 1990 when we say the Cold War ended, and those killed 45 million people. That means that every hour for the last fifty years, 100 people have been killed in wars. So that's not a Cold War situation. And it also means that many countries and many people, in many parts of the world are suffering the effect of prolonged warfare.

However, when the Cold War did end, it did open up possibilities for ending some of these wars also. But it also meant that other wars broke out; former Yugoslavia disintegrated, portions of the former Soviet Union still are fighting, and so on. And some of those conflicts, as in Bosnia we hope now, are being resolved. So there are many situations in which peace processes have been ongoing over the last five years.

Because of the magnitude of the problems that these countries face, which I will go into in a little bit more detail, infrastructure damage, human resource depletion, militarization, low legitimacy of governments, social trauma, institutional weaknesses, it's very difficult for these countries, on their own, to repair the damage of war. So they have increasingly sought the assistance of the international community broadly defined, and specifically, the development cooperation agencies.

Because of this background, in 1992, 1993 conversations that I had with, particularly bilateral donors but also people from the World Bank, indicated that the donors knew they had to be involved in these issues. But they were very uncertain about their ability to deliver the kinds of programs that would be needed in what was a very unfamiliar situation for them. Because of this, they felt that they were in a position of reacting to events. They weren't helping to shape them in positive directions. So there was a lot of concern among many donors that I spoke with about these issues. So I decided to look at donor responses to date, in some countries, to see what could be learned from their experiences thus far, because even if they were uncertain about what

they had been doing, they had been doing things; JICA, of course, has been involved in these countries, as well. So there was much to learn, I thought, from experience.

We decided to look at the experiences of four countries; Cambodia, which is of course, particularly of interest, I know, to Japan, but also El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Mozambique. One of the criteria we used for choosing these countries was the ability to collaborate with local researchers. And in fact, we were able to build local research teams in all the countries except Cambodia. Cambodia's human resource problems are so severe that it really was not possible to find suitable research partners who were not already terribly over-extended working in government or some other way. So we were not able to build a local research team there. But in the other three countries, we built research teams, and they prepared case studies of their countries for us as an input to this broader study. And they also helped us define the issues that we would look at, and that was, for me, in particular, very, very important; to be able to discuss with them what really were the important issues from their perspective.

This project had four major objectives. First, we thought maybe we could identify some very specific steps that would support reconstruction and political reconciliation in each of these four countries. And that would maybe act as a guide to the donor community as well as to the countries themselves. Secondly, we wanted to identify both the appropriate degree and the appropriate nature of development cooperation activities in these situations. Thirdly, we wanted to examine how we could promote collaboration amongst the various actors involved because there are many, many different kinds of actors.

You know from your own country, that many of your agencies and ministries have a role to play. And that is, of course, multiplied across every bilateral donor country, and of course, within the international community. So you have the United Nations, you have regional organizations, as well as the World Bank, UNDP, and development cooperation agencies. So we wanted to see how all this could fit together. And fourth, we hoped that we could contribute to capacity building in these countries. And that was the purpose

of building the research teams and involving local researchers in our project.

These were really quite ambitious goals. We've gone a way towards reaching each one of them. I won't say that we've reached them all, or all of them equally well. But, we have made a contribution, I think, in each of those categories. So that's the background to the project. That's how we started out.

What I would like to do now is to summarize for you some of the most important characteristics of countries that have recently experienced very lengthy civil wars. I know that there are many regional and country specialists here, and you probably don't really need me to repeat this, but I will in any case tell you what we found on the basis of our four countries. And then, you can see whether this fits, in fact, into other countries with which you are familiar.

Secondly, what I would like to do after discussing some of these characteristics is to run through the six major lessons, very briefly, that emerged from this work, and those are summarized in this handout. (shown in Appendix)

And finally, I will say a few things about governance, but I think at that point, first of all, you will be tired of hearing me speak, and secondly, you will be ready to speak yourselves, so I hope that you will be able to pick up the dialogue and ask questions and make comments so that I can learn from you, in fact, about the governance issue.

To begin with, what are the characteristics, what are some of the most important characteristics of postconflict countries that I think that development cooperation agencies need to take into account? I divide these characteristics into four categories: **institutional, economic and social, security related**, and something I call **contextual**, for lack of a better word, which means, related to the particular context of war-to-peace countries.

So what about the institutional characteristics? Well, state institutions in countries that have had very lengthy civil wars are extremely weak, and the state is incapable of fulfilling many if not most of the basic functions of government. So it's important both to strengthen and restructure the state apparatus so that government can function and can deliver the services and

fulfill the functions that government alone can fulfill. This includes investing in physical and social infrastructure, maintaining law and order, fostering economic development, those sorts of very broad things. But while at the same time it's important to restructure and strengthen these institutions, because the state institutions and the state is already so weak, it's very difficult for them to do it. And at the same time, the post-conflict environment, as I'm sure you know, is characterized very often by a vigorous competition for power. In another words, the war ends and somebody wins, or the war ends and there's a peace agreement, and you would think that that would be the end of the conflict. In fact, it's not. In fact it's just another stage in the conflict. So after the war is finished, the various parties continue to jockey for power, to try to get the best of the others. And this really influences a lot of activities in these countries at this time.

There are other problems, too. Political institutions have low legitimacy among the population. The war was fought to a large extent because some people felt that the government was not legitimate, was not representing their interests. And the end of the war does not resolve that problem entirely. There is extreme political polarization as a result of all of this, and there's a lack of consensus about the direction that the country should follow. There are a lot of questions being asked and there are not a lot of answers being received. The mechanisms that might reduce this competition for power, and bring the political groups closer together, are either very weak or they may not even exist at all. And this is true both in the public sector and in civil society, i.e. the non-governmental sector, the private sector.

All of this is complicated by the fact, as I said, that the state and the political leaders from all parties and all factions, everyone, at the end of the war, generally has very low regard in the eyes of the public. Many people feel that neither side supported their interests during the war, and that the situation is no better at the end of the war. And the continuing power struggle amongst the political elites only reinforces this attitude. Political parties are not, as a result, differentiated by their platforms or their programs. What they are is really a mechanism for gaining power so that those who belong to that

party can continue to reap the benefits that have traditionally accrued to political leaders. So people look at this in a very cynical way. Of course, people look at this in cynical ways in other countries that have not undergone these problems, these conflicts as well. But the situation is particularly severe in these countries.

In addition, when wars end in a stalemate so that a negotiated settlement, a peace treaty, is necessary, both sides tend to think that they've won. The opposition thinks they've won, because they've forced the government to come to the negotiating table, and the government thinks it's won because it hasn't been defeated, really. This unrealistic view of their political strength causes them to think that they are stronger than they are, and causes them to resist making the kinds of compromises that are necessary for political solutions to their problems to be found. That's some of the more important, I think, institutional and political characteristics of countries that have ended wars.

The social and economic characteristics are also probably pretty well known. We certainly know about the extent of damage and destruction that these wars can create. Civil wars, such as the ones that we have looked at, don't necessarily create a great deal of damage throughout the whole country. But physical infrastructure, both social and economic infrastructure, is very often a specific target. Therefore, in areas where fighting occurs, you can have quite extensive damage that needs to be repaired. You think about...what are the estimates: five percent of Bosnian industry is functioning, or something along those lines at the moment.

And that's after three or four years of war. It's quite phenomenal.

As a result, many basic functions are just not possible, just simply not possible; transportation, communication, education. Many of those are severely damaged and may be not possible at all. In addition, the composition of output, the nature of the economy changes, with subsistence agriculture becoming increasingly important and other kinds of activities becoming less important, particularly in the areas where the fighting occurs.

Post-conflict countries are also typically heavily indebted. Their debts are very high. This is not always the case. In the case of El Salvador, we found

that due to the good will of the United States government, which of course was financing a large part of the war any way, debt forgiveness was extensive. And that helped quite a lot. Also there were many Salvadorans who had fled to the United States and were sending a good deal of money back to El Salvador. And remittances have been an extremely important factor to the relative health of the Salvadoran economy in recent years. But nonetheless, most countries emerge from long wars with very high rates of debt, and military budgets that simply cannot be sustained in peace time.

They also experience severe human resource constraints due to the death, the injury and the immigration of skilled and professional personnel. And after wars, gender imbalances develop very often. More and more households are headed by women. In Rwanda and Cambodia, I think, the estimates are something like sixty or more percent of households headed by women. This has very significant implications, obviously, in societies where it is difficult for women for one reason or another, to acquire assets, which will enable them to work their land or to provide for their families. So this has very significant impact on dependent children as well as on the women themselves.

Wars, as we know, create considerable environmental damage and the increasingly widespread use of land mines; Cambodia, of course again, is another terrible example of this, but this is a problem elsewhere. The use of land mines can reduce the availability of agricultural land, sometimes significantly, until they are removed, and it can be very expensive to remove them.

Wars also severely, damage the social fabric of a country. Communities are destroyed. People are killed or they leave. People are set against each other. A culture of violence is created. There's a sense of, very often, impermanence and mistrust that makes it very difficult for people to collaborate with each other once the war is over, both to collaborate on anything at all and to collaborate on projects that have a very long term gestation. In another words, people just don't see the point of that after twenty years of war.

There's cultural impoverishment. Not long ago, I heard the Cambodian ambassador to the United States speak quite eloquently about that in his

country. It's the same in many other countries. And there are severe psychological effects as a result of traumatic war time experiences both for combatants and non-combatants. Noncombatants, of course, are increasingly the targets during these kinds of wars. As a result, you have a population that can be quite traumatized for a large part of the population.

Also when refugees, internally displaced people, and former combatants return to their homes, they can disrupt local society as well, because they've been away, they've acquired different social habits and customs in many cases than traditionally prevailed in their home areas, and this can be problematic. They can bring, generally it's wives, wives from other areas with different traditions, and that can be very disruptive depending on the society. Young people who have gone to the cities often find it, very difficult, well, not just young people, many people, but particularly young people, to readjust to rural life, if that's in fact where they're going back to. And ex-combatants may really have no memory of a life that was not ruled by the gun. One of the great tragedies of these wars is in fact child soldiers, and people who are forced, in particular, to take up arms at a very early stage in their life. They have no real experience as adults of civilian life. This makes it very, very difficult for them to adjust, they don't know what to expect, and generally what they expect is way out of line, and very unrealistic with what they'll find when they return to civilian life. So there are all sorts of disruptions that occur. So those are the some of the economic and social characteristics of these countries.

The third category of characteristics is, as I said, the security related characteristics. These are also pretty obvious. These countries have very large numbers of people under arms, larger than they can afford, or they need, or is desirable. They can't support them financially any more in peace time. They need the resources for other purposes. But these forces very often remain politically very strong and influential. This is a problem. There's also an armed opposition and paramilitary groups that usually need to be totally disbanded. And of course there are far too many small weapons in particular, in circulation. Particularly, people who have looked at Southern Africa or

Central America are aware of the way in which these weapons can circulate very rapidly through these regions with very negative consequences.

In contrast to democratic societies where the armed forces are oriented towards providing external security, and the police forces provide internal law and order, the police are often controlled by the armed forces, and the armed forces are often involved in internal security issues. And in fact, this is often a major contributing factor to the conflict. As a result of this, however, neither the police nor the armed forces perform their professional duties adequately. And given the very uncertain economic and political environment which follows these wars, creating a professional, apolitical or nonpolitical police force should be a very high priority.

Security forces, of course, often have a long history of human rights abuses. That again, as I say, is a contribution to the conflict. They're one of the dominant forces in society, in political life, and they may also be a major player in the economic sphere as well. They are not accustomed to being held accountable to civilian authorities. On the contrary, it's very often the case that civilian institutions, such as judicial systems, the executive branch, the legislative branch are in an important respect, subservient to the armed forces. Again, these characteristics are also found in countries that have not undergone lengthy wars of this nature, but they are particularly pronounced and problematic in this category of country.

Finally, there are, as I said, several what I call contextual characteristics, that I think are important to bring up. The first is that wars create isolation for individuals, and for geographic regions. People who are fighting, the combatants, and particularly the guerrilla forces, are frequently out of touch with civilian society for long periods of time. And I said earlier, this causes problems when they attempt to reintegrate themselves into civilian society. Regions of the country also where fighting occurs may be cut off for long periods of time from the rest of the country. And that means that the people who are making decisions very often about what happens in these countries when the war ends, did not live through the war in those areas, are unfamiliar with the situation in those areas, and the concerns of the people. This can create

significant political problems once the war is over. The impact of these kinds of isolation will be intensified by the extent that the parties to the conflict have a monopoly over information. Governments control the press and the media, such as it exists or may not exist terribly much, and the opposition also tries to control, for as long as possible, the inflow of information into areas that it has controlled. This really has very serious negative consequences once the war is over.

In countries where conflicts end with a negotiated peace agreement, in another words, no one party is able to vanquish the other, the scope and the nature of what occurs in the early stages of the transition to peace are heavily determined by the peace accords, and by the timetable that's established for implementing these peace accords. That means that institutional changes that would normally take quite a long period of time under other conditions, such as establishing an electoral system, reforming the judicial system, restructuring security forces, all of these are really long term affairs. A lot of progress often has to be made on these issues in a very short period of time according to a specific time table, and there's a lot of pressure on the parties to do this. And generally, many of these reforms need to be carried out to a significant extent within a year or two of the peace occurring. This places considerable pressure on the parties, in an environment where, as I have said, compromise is very difficult and the parties still tend to consider themselves really at war with each other. So the need to make these reforms very rapidly is really in contradiction to, in many respects, the political situation that exists after these conflicts.

Finally, as I've said several times already, many of the characteristics of these countries are also shared by countries that have not experienced lengthy civil wars. But the problem for post-conflict countries is that they have to deal with many of these very rapidly and nearly simultaneously. Obviously, they can't do it simultaneously. But they have to do it very fast. The environment is very politically charged, and they have extreme human resource constraints. And this really complicates the environment, not only for the people in the country but for the members of the international community who are trying to help them through this process.

Those are some of the characteristics, the institutional, economic and social, security, and other characteristics that we find among these countries, and they all have relevance to the activities of development cooperation agencies.

What I would like to do next is to turn to the six main lessons for development cooperation agencies that we identified as a result of this project. And I should say that these are lessons that we think are particularly important. Other people may have other lessons that they think are even more important, and may disagree with these, but we are putting these out sort of as a discussion point to obtain people's reactions to them.

Before I do that, I just wanted to say something about the stages that peace processes go through. As I said, there are two ways that wars end. Wars end either because when one party wins, or because there is a recognized stalemate, and they decide to negotiate. The countries that we looked at in our survey were primarily countries where war was ended with negotiated settlements. And I think many of the countries that we are concerned with, for example, Bosnia and Angola, if Liberia ever decides to end its war, and so on, will also be of this nature. And we found that the role for the development community was different at different points in this process. So we looked at the peace process, and we thought there were two stages to the peace process. One was conflict resolution, and the other was peace building.

Peace Process

Stages	Conflict Resolution	Peace Building
Phases	Negotiation----Cessation of Hostilities	Transition----Consolidation of Peace

In conflict resolution itself, we found two phases, one which could be quite long, which was the negotiations phase. The purpose of the negotiation phase is really to reach sufficient agreement on key issues so that the fighting can stop. Negotiations don't resolve conflicts, but they at least create political

agreements that enable fighting to stop. They can go on for a long time. They can break down many times. We had peace in Angola twice now, and maybe this is the second time, lucky, I don't know. Then you move on to the cessation of hostilities phase. That's typically quite short. It involves the signature of the peace accords, cease fire, separation of forces, and those things. But I think also that Angola has been in the cessation of hostilities period this time for quite a long time. It really just depends on the relationship between the parties, and how fast they can move through some of these stages.

When they have really got a permanent cease fire and have separated their forces and so on, then you can say that peace building begins. And peace building consists of again two phases, we think; the transition period and the consolidation of peace period. The transition period tends to be about one to two years. It's the length of time generally that the peace keeping operation is involved in the country and it starts with the signing of the peace accords also, or the separation of forces and so on. But it goes generally until a multi-party election has occurred. And the way it has been structured, multiparty elections occur, peace keeping operations withdraw, and success is declared. That usually lasts for a year or two. In the case of Bosnia, all of this is supposed to happen in twelve months. I'm very dubious about the ability of that to occur, but that's the plan.

The purpose of this period is really to establish a government that has sufficient legitimacy, both domestically and internationally, that can rule effectively. The purpose of this period is also to comply with the terms of the peace agreement, and also, if possible, to set in motion some fundamental reforms. Generally what is most often focused on, is in fact, complying with the peace agreements.

In the consolidation of peace phase, there are again two major objectives here. It's not possible to finish complying with all of the terms of the peace agreement. In El Salvador, for example, a requirement of the peace accords was, as I'm sure many of you know, to create a new national civil police force. Well, any police expert will tell you that it takes at least four to five years to get the force established. But the transition phase in El Salvador was really

about two years. So that means that it spills over and it continues. So a first objective of the consolidation of peace phase is to make sure that everything that's left over from that phase, in terms of the peace agreement, is finished. But secondary and equally important is that this is the time when many very fundamental reforms need to be started, if they haven't already been started, in the previous period.

So that's what we found looking at our four countries. I wanted to bring that up for you now because some of what we found in terms of lessons actually pertain to different phases of the peace process. I should also say that, whereas wars that end with one party victorious, in other words, they don't have a negotiated settlement, Ethiopia for example, those countries, nonetheless, have virtually the same problems as the countries that go through this. So while you don't have such nice phases in a sense, you have the same problems, and many of the lessons are relevant, although the time periods are not quite the same.

The first lesson that we identified was that neither relief aid nor development assistance are really terribly well suited to the demands of this transition phase of the peace process, and these are generally the two main types of assistance that donors have available to them. We felt that there is a need for a new type of assistance, which we very unoriginally have titled for the moment, post-conflict transition assistance. But the point is, what we want to say is that the content of this aid is somewhat different from relief aid and development aid, and the way in which this aid is delivered needs to be somewhat different from existing types of aid. I'll try to explain this a little bit.

Of these four phases of the peace process, the transition phase is the one that places the greatest demands, the greatest sustained continual demands on resources, everybody's resources; the international communities, the governments, local citizens, everybody. It's a really intense time. At the same time, many of the objectives that need to be met during this period simply are not ones that have been dealt with by traditional development assistance; military reform, political reform, judicial reform. These are fairly new kinds of

activities.

If you look at the three pages of this handout in Appendix, you'll see something that's titled: Box 10 - post-conflict transition assistance. And in this, we look at three major objectives: strengthen political institutions, consolidate internal and external security, and promote economic and social revitalization. We identify problems in each area and mechanisms that can be used to overcome these problems. And this defines, partially at least, the nature of the assistance that's required.

Some of this will be very familiar to anyone who has worked in development cooperation previously, but some of it is not. And even the activities or the problems that need to be resolved that are familiar are different because of the environment in which they need to be addressed. It's very important to have financial flexibility. It's very important to plan for contingencies, in another words, to expect that what you don't think is going to happen will happen and to plan for it in some way. It's very important to be sensitive to local conditions; always important to do that. Of course, all of these are always important, but even more so in these situations. And it's critical to incorporate conflict resolution techniques and objectives in programming at this point. Traditional development assistance just doesn't do this, or doesn't do it to the extent that it needs to be done. Therefore, it's important to begin thinking about how to incorporate both these objectives and these design and delivery characteristics into assistance.

The World Bank, for example, is in the process of creating a post-conflict reconstruction fund. This is going to be a fund, it won't be very big, initially about 60 million dollars, and it will be financed through the bank surplus. It will be available for any department or division of the Bank to use in a post-conflict situation. It will be available for critical needs. It will be available for these needs in the first six months or so, I think. I'm not sure that there is a time limit set, really, but in the initial phases of the transition after the fighting stops. So for example, a colleague of mine at the World Bank who works with demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants says he can't wait to get his hands on some of this money for the program he's planning in

Angola, and probably will be planning for Bosnia. So this relatively small amount of money that will be used for needs such as that. If you need two million dollars to buy spare parts to set a power plant back in motion, for example, those kinds of things. So they are creating this special fund which anybody will be able to draw on within the Bank's structure to give them additional financial flexibility, because they simply found that their normal ways of doing things just did not provide them with that flexibility. This is a problem that is replicated agency by agency by agency. So there is a need to think about the kind of assistance to provide, particularly in the transition phase, in a different way. So that was the first lesson that we thought we had learned.

The second lesson is that although this transition phase is very critical and demands a lot of resources, it's also very important for the international development cooperation agencies, or the development cooperation agencies, the bilateral international agencies, to participate actively in all phases of this peace process. And that means beginning to end.

Typically, donors have not been involved in the beginning stages. They haven't been invited to the peace negotiation table often, and I think that's a mistake. I think that's a very serious mistake, and we're beginning to see that negotiators see that it's a mistake also, because in fact, in the Guatemala peace process, U.N. and World Bank and I think some of the bilateral donors have been involved in discussions about what they might fund, what's feasible, and so on.

I think it's very important for donors to be involved in this first stage, and it doesn't require a lot of resources. But it's really very important because economic issues are often not put on the negotiating table in a very realistic fashion. An example from El Salvador. It was decided that in order to compensate the ex-combatants who belonged to the FMLN (Farabundo Marti Liberation Front), that they would be given, if they chose to take it, some land. It was specified that this land transfer would be completed within six months. Now, it was impossible for this land transfer to be completed within six months. The political situation, the institutional situation in El Salvador made it absolutely impossible. In fact, this requirement ended up by holding up the

peace process for a period of time, and required the intervention of the Secretary General of the United Nations to create a compromise, and so on and so forth. This is not to say that the involvement of development cooperation agencies would have found the optimal solution during negotiations, but I don't think you would have had a six month requirement. I think people would have understood that this was impossible, and they would have found or tried to find some other solution. So I think that it's important to have a developmental economic voice at the negotiating table.

Secondly, I think that the involvement of the donors at this phase will be important to facilitate donor planning, because very often what has happened is that peace agreements are signed, and various terms and programs are promised, and somebody turns around to the development cooperation agencies and says; O.K., now you do it, and they say; We don't know how to do this. We need three months or six months or ten months or a year to plan this.

Negotiations, as I say, go on for a long time. This gives ample time for advanced planning. I think that this is very important. So that is another positive aspect of involving the donors, because the donors then become aware of what's being discussed, and can give information about the amount of resources, and the kind of resources that might be available to help implement the peace agreement.

Also I think this latter point is very important because the parties to the conflict, the parties who are negotiating, have very unrealistic expectations about what they will be able to receive. It's become quite amazing within Africa, the way in which military organizations have learned from recent peace processes. There is an expectation that there will be a lot of money available for ex-combatant reintegration programs. This is not always the case. But there is an expectation, and it's very interesting to talk to different people from different countries. They say, well, in the case of Uganda, the donors gave so much and so much, so we assume... Not necessarily the case. And I think it's very important to manage expectations as best one can. It's not always possible.

Now, when we get to the consolidation of peace phase, which is the other

end of the peace process, as I said earlier, it's first of all important to ensure that the terms of the peace accord have been fully complied with. Then, it's important that key reforms that probably were not explicitly included in the peace treaty, and almost certainly could not be dealt with in this very short one to two year, very intense period, very politically charged period, that these key reforms, many of which are listed in this thing that says Box 10, that these are placed on the agenda of the government. I think that it's very important through consultative groups, through round tables, whatever mechanism, bilateral consultations, that the development cooperation community makes sure that these issues remain on the agenda.

Also, of course, development cooperation budgets are declining in many countries. And therefore, it's important to use resources efficiently. So it's important to be able, to the extent possible, to continue to support these very important reforms. Because often what happens when the transition phase is over is that there's a new government, the peace keeping force leaves, and everybody says, the peace process has been concluded successfully. And many of the objectives that are very important, somehow fall by the wayside and people think that they can go back to doing development as normal. But that in the fact is not always correct. And in fact, it may be very dangerous to think that. So it's important to remember that resources need to be applied for these purposes, not just after a year or two, but farther down the road. I would say for another five, six, seven, eight years easily, depending on what the issue is. But that depends.

The third lesson that we extracted from the study was that reform of the security sector is a central element in the consolidation of peace. And in collaboration with other members of the international community, in other words, not by themselves by any means, but in collaboration, development cooperation agencies need to play a vigorous role in promoting this reform. In particular, I would say that assistance should be provided to develop good budgeting, good governance practices in the security sector, to expand the pool of civilian security analysts, and there are about two in every country at the end of a war, if that, and to put the police force under civilian control. In

addition, I think that donors should be encouraging civilian military dialogue and civilian control over all the security forces. As I say, this is not something necessarily that the donor should have the sole responsibility for, but also perhaps, in some cases, not even taking the lead.

In the United States, there's a lot of interest in generating civilian military dialogue both in Southern Africa and particularly in Central America, but also South America. And there, the State Department and the Defense Department have been taking the lead, and they've been quite active, and I think they've been doing some good things. But USAID has been involved with them. And I think that's the kind of thing that we need to see more of.

A fourth lesson is that, because peace building activities are inherently political, and as I say, are implemented in extremely politicized environments, you cannot approach program selection, program design, or program implementation from a purely technical point of view. Political considerations have to be taken into account, and they can both be a strength and a weakness. And it's important that donors recognize this and work to minimize the negative effects of the political environment, and maximize the positive ones. For example, it's very important to take into account the political background of implementing agencies.

I'll give you another example from El Salvador where the United States decided to channel all of the assistance it provided, nearly all of it; some of it went through the UNDP, but all the rest went through an agency of the Salvadoran government called the Secretariat for National Reconstruction. The Secretariat for National Reconstruction had started its life as the organization that was created with the assistance of the United States to implement economic counter insurgency policies during the war. So it had a very particular political background. It was an arm of a government that was extremely unpopular. Not only that, but many of the personnel who had been in the previous organization were carried forward, so you don't have much of a change. Not surprisingly, the FMLN took one look at this, and said, no thank you, we really don't want to have anything to do with this. This caused problems in terms of developing programs, in terms of political reconciliation, in terms of developing a

collaborative working relationship between the government and the FMLN as well as the United States. They had a lot and lot of problems.

Now that's an extreme case. I mean, we were involved in that war in a very intimate way. But there are similar cases. Everybody has a political background in these environments, and it's very important to understand what that political background is, and not to make mistakes of that nature.

A fifth lesson that we have extracted from our four cases was that strengthening the government's capacity to perform key tasks has not received the attention that it deserves as early in the peace building stage as we think should occur, given the very extreme weaknesses of institutions in post-conflict environments. Of course, I don't want to minimize the difficulty of this task, and everyone who works for JICA knows about this much better than I do certainly. But it is very clear from what we have seen from the experience of post-conflict countries, that the longer you postpone institution strengthening, the weaker the institutions become and the bigger the problem is at the end of the transition phase. And very often, the international community assumes the responsibility in one way or another for functions of the government or for certain peace building activities during the transition phase, particularly when there are peace keeping operations in the country. They do this, because it's more efficient, and because the administration is weak, and they do it also for reasons of equity, because the opposition, as I suggested in the Salvador case that I just quoted, is very uneasy with dealing with the government. And so the international community often says, O.K., bypass the government, create sort of a temporary organization that will deliver these benefits, and sometimes that's necessary. But I think also more attention needs to be paid to strengthening the government so that it can fulfill its key functions as soon as one can do that. I'm sure this is an area in which those of you present can teach me a lot, and I look forward to hearing about your experiences in this particular area.

The sixth and last lesson that we thought was particularly important was that wars create the conditions under which some very fundamental economic and political restructuring can occur. And in order to capitalize on the fairly

short window of opportunity to affect this, to create this change, it's very, very important that the donors be coordinated. Now, donor coordination, we all know, is very difficult under all circumstances. I mean, the DAC's been talking about it forever. But in post-conflict environments, not only is it more difficult, it's also more important. The most critical point for donor coordination during the peace process is the transition phase. Of course, that's where most resources are being applied most intensively. In countries where there are negotiated peace settlements, and the U.N. has a peace keeping operation in town, they have sought to coordinate these activities. So that's Angola, that's Mozambique, that's Cambodia, that's El Salvador, and different models have been tried, but they've all suffered from a number of problems, such as inadequate involvement not only of the local government, but also of the local donor community. The local donor community feels bypassed. Unclear lines of authority; who does what, when, how? Poorly coordinated hand-off of programs that continue across the transition/consolidation of peace divide.

But I don't want to blame the U.N. entirely here. They've tried different models. Some of them have worked better than others. We're trying something a little bit different in Bosnia. But the problem really is that nobody wants to be coordinated. The donors don't want to be coordinated. The donors want to maintain their own little piece of turf, and everybody knows that. But I think that this is really a problem that has to be tackled head on, because in these situations in particular, first of all, resources are wasted, and in this environment, as I said, where resources are so limited, that should not occur. But also peace processes are very fragile. There are many ways in which they can go wrong, and they can break down. And it would be tragic really, I think, if competition amongst the donors would in some way contribute to the breakdown of the peace process. Now, this has never happened before, and maybe it won't happen. I don't know. But I think that it is really very important for the donors to think very seriously about this issue, particularly in post-conflict environments.

In addition, the donors have to coordinate obviously, but governments have to also be in a position where they can coordinate the resources that they

receive. Of course, that also was a problem of long standing in developing countries. Because of the institutional weakness of post-conflict countries, the problem again is more severe. But donors here have a responsibility as well. They need to provide these governments with details of the assistance that they are providing these governments. And this often doesn't work. You read the minutes of the March 1995 consultative group meeting for Mozambique, and you have a statement by the IMF representative begging his colleagues to give the Mozambique government information about the resources that they are providing them. He ends with saying, this is very important. Well, of course it's very important. I was recently told by a colleague in the Dutch Embassy in Managua; same problem. For years, and years, and years, we're going to create a database, we're going to put all the information into a database, and it doesn't happen.

So I just would say that there are lots of institutional weaknesses on the side of the government. They may not be interested in coordinating either. There are lots of reasons why they wouldn't be. But really, donors need to deal with this. It's not acceptable. So that is another component, I think, of coordination that's need to be taken a look at.

Those are the six main lessons as I say.

I guess, what I need to turn to now is, how does all of this relate to governance? The DAC, the World Bank, and the JICA Study Group on Participatory Development and Good Governance, all have listed critical elements of good governance. They all state the same thing in slightly different ways.

Contents of Good Governance

World Bank	1) Public Sector management 2) Accountability 3) Legal framework for development 4) Transparency, more information
Plus	1) Participatory development 2) Reduced military budget 3) Human right protection
DAC	1) Rule of Law 2) Public-sector management 3) Control corruption 4) Reduce military spending
JICA	1) Institution strengthening 2) Strengthen administrative capacity 3) Transparency 4) Decentralization 5) Enhance environment for market economy 6) Electoral assistance 7) Human rights 8) Freedom of expression

For the DAC, the four critical areas are, rule of law, public sector management, controlling corruption, which I have to say I didn't really stress, but corruption is a problem in lots of places; wars really intensify problems of corruption; and reduce military spending. Reducing military spending is not just reducing military spending, but also reducing the power of the military and increasing civilian control over the military.

The World Bank says, there are also four, for them, particularly important issues from their perspective of a purely economic institution; public sector management, accountability, creating a legal framework for development...so a little bit different from rule of law by DAC...and transparency; more information. Plus the World Bank says, there are a number of issues that are not for them good governance, but are quite intimately related, and that's participatory development, again reduced military budgets, and protection of human rights. This is, in some respects, still outside the Bank's scope of activity, although people are talking about it a good deal more. The military budgets, demilitarization, demobilization assistance is becoming increasingly important for them.

The JICA Study Group pointed out, I think, eight main areas where it thought that attention should be devoted; institution strengthening, strengthening administrative capacity, transparency, decentralization, enhancing the environment for market economy, providing electoral assistance, protecting human rights, and guaranteeing freedom of expression.

As I said, these are all very similar. Each of these things has lots of different components to it, but basically, everybody is in agreement that these are some of the most important issues.

It's clear that post-conflict countries have both a very great need for good governance, and at the same time, they have very little capacity to strengthen their own governance structures entirely on their own. So there is a very important role again for the international community and the development cooperation agencies to support them in these efforts. There are obviously several ways of doing this. Some ways are more direct than others. I think policy dialogue is one that is extremely important, and of course, the DAC pays considerable attention to that. Policy dialogue is really the first stage, and needs to be continued throughout the whole process, talking about the importance of many of these issues.

But I do want to bring up one particular issue which is...it certainly comes in the proposals of the JICA Study Group, and is related to a lot of this as well, and that has to do with the electoral process. As I've said several times,

the major objective of peace processes is to install a government with adequate legitimacy, both internally and externally, so that it can rule effectively. It doesn't necessarily resolve all the legitimacy problems, but it's a first step. And it's also the case that when you have such a government, you've taken a step toward resolving one of the root causes of the conflict, and you're making an important contribution to fostering national reconciliation.

In order to obtain this government that is sufficiently legitimate in the eyes of the people to enable it to operate, the international community has tended to promote elections. There are two reasons why I think that has been the case. The first is that elections simply are a very good way for people to express their opinion about whom they want to be governed by. And secondly, when you have an election, it's very clear for the external actors, who their counterparts are. So it just clarifies that for them as well. So internally and externally, it has a lot of benefits.

As a result of this, virtually all post-conflict countries, countries that have had civil wars, hold either presidential elections or legislative elections, or combinations thereof, within a year or two after the war ends. That's even the case in countries that don't have negotiated settlements. In Ethiopia, for example, there recently was an election that had a lot of problems, but it was considered to be a sort of end point. This is a problem, because one of the effects of this tendency to hold elections is that it puts this end to the transition process.

But elections frequently fail to produce the outcomes that are sought, particularly by the international community, because they put an artificial end to a process that really has to go on for a very much longer time, and they contribute to polarization as well. This problem is magnified when the results of elections are not enforced, if the results of elections are manipulated to the benefit of one party or the other, or when the political system continues to be structured in such a way, despite the elections, that people can really not participate in a meaningful way in the governing process.

There are a number of ideas about how to overcome this particular problem. One is to create a government of national unity. This was

spectacularly successful, as far as people believe, in South Africa. So people have now decided that this is, particularly in the U.S. government in any case, this is a model or pattern for other countries that are emerging from these prolonged conflicts. The problem is, however, that you probably need very special internal circumstances to be able to adopt this model. It's not something that you can necessarily force on people. And you certainly need to do this in the negotiation phase, not tacked on at the end.

There was a very strong attempt in the case of Mozambique, after the peace agreement was signed but before the elections were held, to get the government and the opposition, but particularly the government, to agree that there would be, irrespective of what the outcome of the elections were, a government of national unity created. It got to the point that somebody would appear in Maputo, either from the U.N. or the U.S. or Britain, about once every week or two delivering this message and hammering it home over a period of months, and this was taken very badly by the Mozambique government. Now perhaps in the long run, this was in their own interests. I think it probably would have been, but it should have been negotiated in at the front end. An attempt should not have been made to force it on them at the end. And the attempt did not work. And that's very unfortunate.

Another possibility which I don't think is considered very much, but I think we're beginning to hear people talk about it a little bit, is to phase in an elected government over a longer period of time. And the idea would be that, perhaps over a five year period, you would have a caretaker government. It would be clearly an interim government, and the executive branch, for example, would be headed by a respected individual from the country. Ministers would be appointed, and people would be found from within political groupings or the ranks of technocrats both at home and abroad. Obviously, it's not easy simply to find these people. Nelson Mandelas do not grow under every rock, obviously. But there are, nonetheless, opportunities in many countries.

This at least would be an option that people could consider, starting with then, an election for a constituent assembly, and then the legislature, and then

finally the chief executive over, as I say, a longer period. This is not an answer for every country. But this would enable the political polarization to be reduced, and reforms to be started, and reforms in some of these very key areas. So these kinds of issues could be tackled early on in a somewhat less political atmosphere.

So I think that there is not one model that works for every country. I think that we need to think very much about how we can create an environment in post-conflict countries that will be conducive to the kinds of governance reforms that, I think we probably all agree, are necessary in these countries.

Q & A

Moderator: Thank you, Ms. Ball. You mentioned several very interesting insights on the common features of the peace processes, differences of the countries, and also compared three organizations' approach to the governance.

Actually, Ms. Ball is visiting Japan to study about this governance issue in relation to these war-to-peace transition countries, and interviewed several Japanese people from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, JICA and from the Study Group. So I think she will be interested in listening to your opinions or comments about the role of the development assistance for this kind of governance issues in these countries. So if you have questions, comments, in particular, or in general, please take up the microphone. (pause)

QUESTION 1: May I ask you something about your experience from these few days interviewing Japanese aid practitioners and policy makers and academics, about the impression of the Japanese approach to the good governance issues. Is there any difference from the opinions or approaches in the United States or international organizations?

Ms. Ball: Well, there are differences between the United States and many European countries and Japan's approach. We do tend to favor a more direct approach in many cases. In other words, favoring programs designed specifically to attack some of these problems. It's quite clear to me after

discussing with JICA colleagues that...of course, JICA's role is technical assistance, but in fact, institution strengthening and administrative strengthening, administrative capacity, and public sector management strengthening, and so on, much of this is built in to specific projects. It really is a different way of getting at some of the same issues. I think, probably we are more comfortable dealing head on, say, with human rights issues. We have a lot of non-governmental organizations in the United States in particular, that are concerned about promoting human rights, and pressure our government from the NGO side quite a lot to implement programs and take stances and not allow our aid to be used in ways that would harm human rights, and so on.

So I would say that as in many things, we Americans tend to go straight for the point, and sometimes miss the point as a result, whereas in this country, there's more of a sort of support underneath in a way, not quite so directly, but, I think, trying to get at many of the same issues.

It's been very good for me to meet with people and learn both specifically what Japan is doing, the assistance it's providing in many countries, and to appreciate more fully the approach that is used here, which is, as I say, different from our approach often.

QUESTION 2: I enjoyed your explanation very much, and it was very interesting from a theoretical point of view. But, some points seem to me, very difficult to implement. For example, you mentioned about the engagement of development agencies in four stages or phases of peace process.

The Japanese government and also JICA, we are very security conscious. One case is in Peru. Some years ago, an expert was killed in Peru, and we withdrew all the experts from that country. Also in Cambodian case, once conflict seemed to be resolved, but the area which we can dispatch our experts was very limited. So to keep the presence of development agencies is a rather difficult issue. Even in the case of Mozambique, I think, we didn't have any representatives in that country. We didn't have embassies, we didn't have any representatives from JICA or OECF. So the information was very limited.

Under this constraints, in our ministry we are studying how we can do.

One approach is under these constraints, without dispatching our presence of personnel, we are studying how to use international agencies and so on. If you have any concrete suggestions to overcome these constraints, I'm very happy.

Ms. Ball: Well, I probably haven't thought of anything that you haven't thought of, obviously. But one point simply is, and this is something that the World Bank, for example, has recently been thinking about a lot, I know, that when an organization is not present in the country, sometimes that means nobody is paying any attention whatsoever. In the Foreign Ministry that would not be the case, but in the Bank or in JICA or USAID, if you don't have programs, you tend to shut down desks. Then a very simple way is to enable people to spend some time collecting as much information and being as familiar as possible with that country. Somalia and Bosnia, I think were the two examples that they've used recently where staff people have fought very hard, not to spend all of their time prior to the peace agreements working on these countries, but to have some time within the region that they belong to, somebody assigned to monitor that a little bit. So even if you don't have a presence, simply to collect what information there is.

You know, in Cambodia, it was the non-governmental organizations that were the first ones that were there, and they provided a lot of information, I think, to the international community once embassies started to go in, and aid agencies started to go in again.

So I think that it's increasingly recognized that particularly some of the major non-governmental organizations are a source, at least, of information, and that they should be drawn on to the extent possible. But obviously, they don't go everywhere either. Some embassies go in before others. Some are always there. The diplomatic community moves in at different rates. I think the U.S. opened its aid mission in Maputo in '89, or something like that, which was three years before the peace agreement was signed, and so on, and I guess there just has to be more of that kind of cooperation.

As I say, I don't think I haven't thought of anything that you haven't thought of. I think it's just necessary to recognize that some commitment has

to be made, even if the institution is not physically present in the country. And that's somebody making a decision to allow somebody to gather as much information as possible. But also, if one becomes involved, if the international community as a group, the major donors to a country or the potential major donors to a country, become involved during negotiations, one objective should be to create relationships with the parties to the conflict that will enable them to get as rapid, safe access as possible. It will give you some information early on perhaps, but also it will build the kind of relationship which will, to the extent that they can control their people. They cannot prevent every single person from kidnapping somebody if they so desire. But they can help to create an environment where people can go in sooner, you might get information out from them. And you can also try to develop relations with, I'm thinking here of supporters of the opposition groups who will be going back and forth perhaps between those areas where fighting has occurred, areas where access may be very difficult. So you'll want to try to cultivate some of those groups as well. That's all.

But I'd be happy to answer any other questions about these boxes. Please point out more areas where you think that this doesn't make complete sense. That's why I put it together was to try to both separate things out and make it clearer. But if it's not properly separated, then it does not become clearer or it's not accurate.

QUESTION 3: We are principally not working with the political institutions if we talk about the foreign aid activities. Political institutions probably contains also establishment of political parties as well as stability of them, in the context of people's participation, motivated for political activities. On the other hand, in the second box, consolidate international and external security; as somebody else mentioned already, we are not familiar with any activities on those issues, the security itself. For example, de-mining in Cambodia is not our activities as part of technical assistance.

Ms. Ball: I see. I understand. You've put your finger on a difference between...which relates to your first question with regard to political institution

building. You would probably, I think in the Japanese context, focus more on strengthening administrative capacity and that sort of thing, whereas, as I say, we have no hesitation in going right to the political party thing. We do that. Yes. And you don't.

I think that one of the points about this whole issue, and one of the points about coordination is precisely what you've put your finger on, which is that you, both in the context of what Japanese aid feels comfortable doing and JICA as an organization with its particular mandate, will do certain things. USAID or Swedish SEDA or UNDP will do other sorts of things. And will feel comfortable with other things.

Sometimes institutions move into new areas. I understand that, for example, security sector issues have just not been issues that most development cooperation agencies have dealt with, ever, at all, except of course, again for USAID which for many years did things that we don't like to admit that they did, but they did; train police forces to do things, not to protect citizens, but in fact, to repress citizens, and those sort of things. But by in large, development cooperation agencies did not get into that area. The problem is that, certainly in the countries that we're dealing with here, countries that have had these very long internal wars, if we ignore this area, if the international community ignores this area, we will not be able to help them fully recover from these wars, and we will not help them create an environment in which such wars will not recur.

Now, as I said, it's not necessarily the role of development cooperation agencies to take on some of these tasks. But it does happen that Swedish SIDA, USAID, I think British ODA, and some of the others have financed mine clearance activities. They haven't done them, but they've financed them. I know, they've done it in Mozambique and in other places. So it just happens that for some of these countries that's acceptable. UNDP has coordinated such activities. The World Bank is now taking an incredible lead in the area of ex-combatant reintegration, which even three years ago, they would not have thought that they were doing. But now they are asked into every single situation.

So it's possible for organizations both to focus on particular topics or areas

that are most amenable to their own interests and capabilities. It's also possible for organizations to get into new areas. It may be that JICA will never, ever do anything in the security area. And that will be a decision that the Ministry of Foreign Affaris will make. But it also may be that there are components of this that technical assistance could support, technical cooperation could support. Because, to my of thinking, a lot of this has to do, a lot of the factors that are related to governance as well, are not military-specific. You're setting up a system that will insure accountability in the military sector, which is really, really important. And I'm sure you understand from your experience with your ASEAN partners that a lot of money can go in this direction, and that it's important for the governments to be accountable and transparent in this area. Well, that's just something you either do in the education sector, or you do in the security sector.

So I don't exclude the possibility that a technical cooperation agency couldn't help in this area, but a political decision will be made. That's simply it. And different countries and institutions will make different decisions. Hopefully, when you put it all together, and this is why coordination is so critical, when you put it together it comes out as a whole. You don't touch that and AID will, fine. That's O.K. It gets done somehow. And it's something that has to be done for the country. So that's why coordination is really important.

QUESTION 4: You have just mentioned that development agencies have roles to play even in security field. On that point, I have two questions. One question is, what is the role? You've mentioned that they can play a role in the field of re-insertion of the ex-combatants into the civil life. Do you mean that is the vocational training or something like that? Or do you have in your mind other activities which development agencies can do? This is my question number one. And the second question is, I personally am not sure if the vocational training is efficient or not; this kind of, let's say, supply-side approach, I am not sure if it is very efficient manner or not. Especially in the post-conflict countries, as you mentioned earlier, economic or social

infrastructures have been destroyed, so I suppose that there may not be any employment. So this kind of supply-side approach seems to me is not so effective. I am not sure my JICA colleagues have some ideas, but this is my second question.

Ms. Ball: Well, I'll actually do the second question first. I'm very dubious about the value of specifically vocational training, in this situation, for that group of people, if that's the only part of the program. Excombatant reintegration programs can have lots of components. It's not just vocational training. There can be salary subsidies, and I personally think those are very useful, because I think that ex-combatants lack experience of civilian life for many years. They don't know what to expect. They've been in a very difficult and different kind of situation. I think that they need time to simply look around themselves and see what the world looks like, and see what their options may be. I think that therefore, a subsidy program can be very important. That would be a short-term kind of program. It's been used in various places, Uganda being one of them, and it can take various forms, it can take the form of financial assistance that lasts for a period of time, it can include material assistance like deliveries of food or housing materials are very popular, whatever. Vouchers for health care, vouchers for children's education. I mean, there's various components. I think, that, as a sort of short-term safety net kind of concept is very important.

And then, there are other things that you can do. I think that you've pointed out quite correctly that, what's the point of training somebody if there's no job that they can do? I think that job generation should be the first objective. And I also think that it really is not sensible to provide a large amount of targeted assistance for ex-combatants for a long period of time, in a situation where there are a lot of people who are refugees, or have been refugees, or internally displaced, and simply a lot of people who may not be refugees or internally displaced, but suffering from the effects of war.

Some of us who have been looking at it recently feel pretty strongly that it would be a good idea to combine assistance for ex-combatants with assistance to either other vulnerable groups, and/or, particularly hard hit regions, in other

words, regions where the fighting was most intense. So that what you would have would be more community oriented or vulnerable group oriented than excombatant oriented. And that's important for political reconciliation purposes also. And I just think it seems more reasonable, economically, to try to regenerate economic activity in an area so that you have public works programs, or whatever an area or community needs. And then you make sure that ex-combatants get involved in that to some extent. And you won't find employment for all of them right away.

Now, what I think is very dubious is a program that exists simply as a program to teach ex-combatants or any group, to do something, whatever they're going to become; carpenters, electricians, this that or the next thing, and then, expect them to become self-employed on top of it. I mean, I just think that's an incredible recipe.

There's one program that I looked at in Mozambique, for example, where the idea was to train about 35 people to be shoe repairmen and shoemakers in a particular district in Mozambique, and then they were all going to go off and be self-employed. There was just no way that the area was going to be able to support all of these people. And the people who had this program, who were funding this program, they had not done any market survey of needs, and their very strong suspicion was that most of these people would not succeed in becoming self-employed. Well, what are you doing? Then, in that case, just give them money, attach them to rehabilitation projects and leave it at that. I just don't see the point of that kind of training. It raises expectation; I'm going to be employed as such-as-such, and I don't have the capacity to do it. My ILO colleagues would not be very happy with that conclusion.

I'm sorry. That was a long answer to the first question. Development cooperation agencies' role in security sector form.; yes, demobilization, reintegration support is one. But I think that it would be very helpful if somebody provided governments with technical assistance in defense budgeting. It may simply be that somebody gives money to hire somebody else. I'm not suggesting that JICA personnel or AID personnel or UNDP personnel themselves become experts and go out. But that's what you do. You find

the appropriate person, you put them in the right place.

I just think that this is an issue that needs to be brought up to the governments. You cannot ignore this issue. You can't have well-functioning budgets in the agricultural sector, the finance ministry, and so on and so forth, and then just leave a huge portion of the budget untouched. So I think, it's partly a policy dialogue. And in your country, this is probably the Ministry's job, not JICA's job. But also once you've had that dialogue, and you get to a point where perhaps the government is convinced that it needs some assistance there, then you provide them with an assistant. That kind of thing.

Most of these countries don't have military industries, but that's another area where you can help privatize, for example, military industries and that sort of thing. I think that it's important to provide scholarships and other sorts of assistance for training civilians in military related matters. I know that a lot of people, the Swedes and Americans in particular, have provided a lot of scholarships to people in Mozambique, for example, to continue their education, at the masters level or Ph.D. level, and this could be one area in which they were encouraged to do it.

Militaries argue, well, that they have to take care of all of this because there are no civilian experts. Of course, there's no civilian experts. The physical environment for civilian experts, has been extremely dangerous. You don't want to be a military civilian expert in these countries. So there are not very many. And the military uses this as an excuse to continue its monopoly.

Well, somehow you've got to break it, and the first step is to develop civilian analysts. O.K., so go and get people educated. You can give money to do that. I don't know if JICA does it, but any aid agency can do that. Aid agencies have been doing that. So those kinds of things are what I'm thinking of, and it doesn't involve you getting involved with the military per se, but it does help create an environment in which there will be more accountability and more transparency. That's what I mean.

Moderator: Thank you very much. The discussion is approaching to the more concrete issues, but unfortunately, we don't have any time left.

Today, we discussed a number of interesting things. we have assumed that these kinds of governance issues have been preconditions for us to implement the aid programs, but these days, we can not count on these preconditions, but rather, we have to tackle it in our own way. And, we have to think about the way we tackle them from now on. Some of the recommendations from Ms. Ball will come in April as a report to JICA, so we are going to distribute the report to the interested people. We also are glad to distribute this report by the Aid Study Group on the participatory development and good governance. Thank you very much. Thank you, Ms Ball.

Appendix

BOX 10. POST-CONFLICT TRANSITION ASSISTANCE

OBJECTIVE

Strengthen political institutions

PROBLEMS TO BE ADDRESSED

Governments lack legitimacy
Weak state incapable of fulfilling basic functions of government
Overcentralization, resultant weakness of regional and local mechanisms
Weak rule of law, significant human rights abuses
Minimal experience with representative, participatory government
Considerable disaffection with political leaders; leaders as rulers, not public servants
Poorly developed concept of "loyal opposition"
Weak political parties; disintegrating wartime political coalitions
Predominance of power politics; lack of consensus on direction country should take; insufficiently developed "rules of the game;" highly polarized society
Perception of all parties to conflict in "no clear winner situations" that their side has "won;" leading to unrealistic view of political strength
Absence of mechanisms to mediate intra-societal disputes
Weak civil society organizations

MECHANISMS

Strengthening electoral process
Legal/judicial reforms aimed at creating system that provides for, *inter alia*, systematized dispute settlement, equality before law for all citizens
Legislative strengthening activities
Strengthening public administration
Institutionalization of respect for human rights
Identifying appropriate role for central government
Strengthening local/regional governments
Strengthening civil society strengthening
Supporting truth commissions
Reconciliation efforts, both specific programs and infusing spirit of reconciliation into all activities

BOX 10. POST-CONFLICT TRANSITION ASSISTANCE

OBJECTIVE

Consolidate internal and external security

PROBLEMS TO BE ADDRESSED

Bloated security establishment that must be reduced
Armed opposition that must be disbanded/disarmed
Armed forces control over internal security function
Impunity
Lack of public accountability of security forces
Lack of civilian control over security forces
Lack of mechanisms to evaluate true security needs and how much military security to buy
Security force involvement in political system/economy
Lack of personal security for citizens

MECHANISMS

Education of civilians in security-related issues
Demobilization of ex-combatants
Disbandment of paramilitary organizations
Termination of extra-legal forms of recruitment
Redefinition of doctrine/missions of security forces
Separation of internal and external security functions
Restructuring of security forces based on doctrines/missions and budgetary framework
Evaluation of officers from former security forces (including armed opposition) prior to induction into new forces
Military-police educations reforms stressing role of security forces in democratic societies
Institutionalization of transparency and accountability
Reconciliation efforts, both specific programs and infusing spirit of reconciliation into all activities
Weapons buy-back schemes
Regional security initiatives

BOX 10. POST-CONFLICT TRANSITION ASSISTANCE

OBJECTIVE

Promote economic and social revitalization

PROBLEMS TO BE ADDRESSED

Extensive damage to economic and social infrastructure
High level of debt
Unsustainably high military budgets
Landmines hamper resumption of economic activities
Highly skewed distribution of income, wealth, and assets
Multiple claims to land and assets
Need to reintegrate severely war-affected populations (refugees, internally displaced, ex-combatants, child soldiers, disabled, women, orphans)
Environmental degradation due to over-exploitation of natural resources, wartime population movements, destruction of physical infrastructure
Severely weakened social fabric (destruction of communities, creation of culture of violence, fostering sense of impermanence and mistrust)
Social disruptions created by influx of returnees
Abysmal social indicators (infant mortality, literacy rates, access to clean water/sanitation, malnutrition)

MECHANISMS

Rehabilitation and reconstruction of infrastructure (health and education services, water and sanitation systems, banking system, roads, bridges, telecommunications, market places, irrigation systems)
Support for resumption of basic economic activities (such as seeds/tools/fertilizers/fuel)
Community revitalization
Reintegration of most-severely war-affected groups
Skills upgrading
Employment generation, including credit, vocational training, management training, apprenticeships, microenterprise assistance
Mine clearance
Strengthening local capacity to address problems
Regional economic initiatives

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