

「21世紀へ向けたアフリカ開発と政策」

—African Development and Policy for the Next Century—

平成6年11月

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国総研セミナー

テーマ：「21世紀へ向けたアフリカ開発と政策」

日時：平成6年11月22日 14:00～16:00

場所：国際協力総合研修所 4階 400号室

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要 約

(1) 概観: 20世紀末のアフリカ

アフリカは世界経済の中で周縁化されていると言われている。しかし、21世紀へ向けた新たな国際開発の場では、むしろ中心的な存在である。アフリカ研究の多くは、こうした新たな現実を把握しておらず、再考が必要である。

過去10～15年ほどは、アフリカは援助国側にとって難問であった。1980年代のアフリカの危機を国内的理由だとする見方と、世界経済の変化に求める見方とがあるが、アフリカが直面しなければならなかったのは、構造調整という問題であった。そのために、さまざまなコンディショナリティーが用意され、とりわけ90年代になってからは、コンディショナリティーの規模は劇的に増大した。また、それとともに、ジェンダー、環境、軍縮といった要素も盛り込まれるようになり、90年代がアフリカにとってそうした条件を満たすだけの時代になってしまうとも懸念された。

また、それらコンディショナリティーにより、どれだけ構造調整が進むのかという問題がある。60年代のアフリカは社会科学の実験室と呼ばれたが、構造調整という面から見ると、今また実験室になっているように思われ、また、それは、移行状態にある他の国々に大きな影響をもたらしている。

しかしながら、90年代のアフリカは、構造調整期以前とは大きく異なっている。中産階級の減少、インフラや研究施設の荒廃、エイズの広がりといった問題がある。これらとは逆に、市民社会、NGO、報道、女性グループ、若者グループ等の台頭といった明るい材料もある。60～70年代のアフリカの独裁制は激減したが、各国は独立時よりも弱体化している。

アフリカがそうした変化に直面している時、北の国々(援助国)では経済的諸問題が進行しており、それが援助を南から引き上げようとする要因となっている。その中で、アフリカは南南関係という中での自立をつかむ好機を迎えたように見える。この流れが、北に対抗した地域的集団化につながるかも知れない。

これまでの冷戦構造は、今は南北間の緊張となっている。その中でも、移住や難民、麻薬や犯罪、環境、伝染病やエイズの蔓延等が世界的問題となっている。

象徴的なことは、これまで5年間アフリカとは無縁だったカナダの国防部が、アフリカの平和維持に関わってきたことである。また、NGOの役割が平和維持に関わってきている。北の国々には、様々なアフリカ関連の研究施設があるので、それら国々がアフリカから完全に手を引くことはありえないであろう。

(2)大陸の危機

今日のアフリカ文化は、以前より原理主義的になっている。しかし、これからは地域主義がアフリカにとって非常に重要な可能性になっていくように思われ、それも公式、非公式の両形態をとるようになるであろう。ウガンダ・シリングが近隣地域の共通通貨として使われているのがその例である。

アフリカの地域主義が重要であることのもう一つの理由は、種々の紛争が一国家の枠を越えており、平和維持のためには、地域機構等が見直されなければならないからである。90年代の安全保障は、軍事力とNGOの地域的連携によらなければならない。しかしこうしたことは、南北双方の国家予算減少の中において起きている。カナダとアフリカの関係は、国家的なものだけではなく、市民社会の構築、国家、多国間機関等が外交政策の一部になっているのである。

これら多数のアクター相互間の連携が、国連開発計画(UNDP)の人間開発報告書に謳われている、"human security"に関わる、より民主的で開放的なシステムの創造を通じてコミュニティが政治経済社会的に持続性を持つことができるような方法に力点を置いた、21世紀のアフリカ開発の再定義に寄与することができるかもしれない。

アフリカで民主化が起こっているかどうかという問題は、検討に値する。アフリカで起きている様々な変化の中では、単純な民主化は余り重要ではなくなって来ている。

持続可能な開発への展望は、現在の所、アフリカのどこの地域よりも南部アフリカにおいて良好に見える。それは、南アフリカ共和国での事態の推移と並んで、この地域が最も豊かかつ最も統合された地域であったことによると思われる。しかし、南アフリカ共和国の自由化が人種的不平等から挫折するというシナリオもある。

市民社会については、アフリカを地域やケースごとに区分して見る必要がある。第一に、平和維持にはコストがかかりすぎ、通常の開発戦略を行なう方がコストを少なくできるのではないかと思われる。第二に、アフリカ各国の成功例が南部アフリカに集中しているのは偶然ではないと考えること。第三に、複数政党制の維持の困難さに注意することである。しかし、最後に、アフリカ大陸を覆う様々なレベルでの市民社会の鳴動に対して、地域機構がもっと注意を払うべきであることを指摘しておく。

(3)南部アフリカの地域開発

南部アフリカ地域が直面している問題に、その経済構造がある。南部アフリカで地域開発が起これば、それは次第に大陸全体に広がるだろう。このことは、地域的關係がかなり長い歴史を持っていることによる。人の相互移動によって、この地域には均質な文化がある。また、各地の紛争による兵器を取り除くことがこの地域の戦略の一つなのである。

世界経済の変化は、南アフリカ共和国と南部アフリカの両方にとって大きな意味を持つ。鉱物資源への低需要や、高賃金であることから、アジアNICsのような例をたどることには問題があるが、太平洋地域とのつながりは、拡大傾向にある。

南部アフリカ地域および南アフリカ共和国は、経済的自由化、及び政治的自由化が同時に発生している重要なケースである。21世紀に向けてのシナリオとして、次の2つが考えられよう。楽観的シナリオは、強力な南アフリカ共和国が地域の資源を活用した地域統合を促す場合である。悲観的シナリオは、南アフリカ共和国で今後も紛争が続く、国内需要を満たすことが出来ない場合である。さらには、この地域が、西アフリカのように、混沌とした状態になることも考えられる。

(4) 20世紀末のカナダと北側のアフリカに対する反応

カナダは外交、援助、及び防衛に関する政策をレビューするプロセスを議会で定めた。これは大きな政策転換をもたらすものではないが、これまでに述べた点をいくつか反映している。先の首相のアジア訪問に見られるように、援助は外交戦略といった要素や、市民社会、環境といったものと結び付いている。同時に、カナダの防衛政策は、平和維持、平和創造に比重が置かれるようになっていく。

また、外交政策の援助面では、次の5つの要素が重要視されている。第一に、地域のサービス部門がそれぞれの役割を通じて協力を進める、地域主義である。第二に、カナダは、世銀、IMFが行なう経済改革や、構造調整を支持し、それを人的側面とのバランスをとりながら進めることに務める。第三に、民主化や政府を支援するプログラムの拡大である。第四に、人的資源開発への新たな関心である。そして最後に、緊急援助の問題である。これは、急速に平和維持に取って代わられつつある。

こうした政策の再構築は、21世紀を見据えて進められている。同時に、カナダが市民社会におけるNGOとの連携についての認識を深められなければこれらの政策を進めることはできない。アフリカが5年、10年、15年前に比べて大きく変わっている中で大変興味深い時期が到来したといえる。

Tuesday, 22nd November, 1994

**“AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT AND POLICY
FOR THE NEXT CENTURY”**

Dr. Timothy M. Shaw
Director
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DR. SHAW: It's a great pleasure for me to be in this Institute and with JICA, particularly as this is my first visit to Tokyo and to Japan. And I very much appreciate the opportunity to spend some time this afternoon talking with you about how African development and policy might look as we move towards the 21st century.

As the Moderator said, I thought it might be best if I presented my ideas in four parts. And between the parts, I will pause, so that if there are comments or debates, we can engage in them on that occasion.

I prefer to be informal, which is why I am sitting, I hope that's all right, and recall very fondly one of my first meetings with African leaders when, as the Moderator said, I was at Makerere University in Uganda, where Mwalimu Nyerere, the first president from the neighbouring country of Tanzania was visiting. And he came to the Great Hall and had about a thousand or so undergraduates attending. He just sat on the table, made a short presentation, and then engaged in a very long discussion. And as some of you, no doubt, would be aware, not only Africa but also Canada is very informal. So, I would like to make this presentation as informal and as useful as possible, in part because I would like to learn about any particular perspectives and debates in Japan about Africa and development.

What I will say is very much informed by two or three particular influences on myself. And so, in many ways it's not just my work; it reflects the work of many people concerned about African development at the end of the 20th century. Firstly, I am very pleased and honoured to be supervising a dozen or so Ph.D.'s, and I will refer to some of their work as I go through, because I learn much more than they do through these interactions.

Secondly, I am very pleased to edit a series of books on the international political economy, and through those have learned not just about Africa but also about development, structural adjustment, structural change, transitions elsewhere, gender, ecology, civil society etc.

And finally, at various times I have been pleased to serve as a consultant to various Canadian and international agencies. So, this presentation reflects, as does the paper that you have, some of my learning through those various perspectives. I will also try as I go along to refer to the paper you have in front of you, and the first initial presentation will be based on the first three or four pages in that paper.

i) Overview: Africa at the end of the twentieth-century

Firstly, let me just state what my thesis will be. And that is that we hear a lot about Africa being marginalized, Africa being peripheralized, in the world economy. Especially as we move towards the 21st century, and particularly given pressures towards globalization, where does Africa fit in a world of global companies, global communications, global ideas, even of course, global culture, global tastes, and global consumption?

And what I will argue is that Africa is indeed somewhat marginalized; but in a whole variety of ways it cannot be excluded and cannot be eliminated. Indeed, I will go on to suggest that in terms of new strategic and new security issues as well as a continuing concern for international development, for human development, for human security, that Africa is fairly central, and that we may yet, as citizens of this globe, come to appreciate Africa's values, Africa's resources, Africa's potential, and the role that it may yet play in the world economy.

But I also go on to suggest that so far, most of the analysis of Africa has not really come to grips with the new realities of the place of Africa in the changing global economy, of the place of Africa in the changing global ecology, of the place of Africa in global strategic and security issues; and that we, therefore, need to think both in terms of analysis and in terms of relationships and practice and in terms of policy, whether the policy is JICA's policy, CIDA's policy, UN policy, World Bank policy, exactly what is the

condition, the context of the continent.

So, I can, depending on your wishes, be a little more analytic or a little more policy-focussed. And so we will try and pick up clues that you give me in between each section in terms of where you would like the emphasis to be placed.

Africa, then, as we move towards discussing the 21st century, is, I would argue, a very different continent than it was a hundred years ago at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century. Then, of course, it was facing the early period of colonialism just after the Berlin Conference. And now there has once again been a Berlin Conference between SADC and the European Union, and it seems to me that one has to anticipate a whole variety of new relationships between the North and Africa as we move toward the 21st century.

Moreover, when I first went to Africa in the 1960's, there was a lot more optimism, a lot more enthusiasm, a lot more idealism in the Continent than there is now. So it seems to me that even over the last ten or twenty years, the mood in Africa, the place of Africa, has changed quite dramatically. And indeed the mood, in general, has swung from the optimism and the idealism of the nationalist period to a mood, if you like, of Afro-pessimism, a very somber and depressing mood, at the end of the 20th century. But I would argue that there is still cause for cautious optimism, informed optimism in Africa, as we move towards the 21st century.

The last ten or fifteen years have been very tough ones for the continent of Africa, just as they have been very difficult ones for many countries and many communities in the North. And I speak from some experience because structural changes in Canada are having a profound impact both on the Canadian aid budget, the Canadian defense budget, the Canadian university budget. And I will come back to this in my last section when I deal with Canadian and other policy responses.

In the African case, there is, of course, a debate about what caused the African crisis, and why the 1980's were such depressing ones for Africa both in terms of basic economic performance and in terms of human development

indicators. On the one hand, there are those who emphasize the internal policy failures: and I think particularly the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and some of the donors tend to emphasize the failures of African ideologies, African leaders, African governments, African performances, and therefore, emphasize domestic difficulties.

On the other hand, there are those from a more dependency perspective who would emphasize, that in a changing global political economy, it was very difficult for Africa, which had been integrated at the beginning of the 20th century, to produce commodities, to produce minerals, strategic materials, to function in a world in which those resources were no longer as valued and as much in demand and highly priced; and that, therefore, the problem confronting Africa in the 1980's was not of Africa's creation but was a function of the changing global economic environment. No matter whether you emphasize the internal or the external explanation, the prescription which Africa has had to deal with over the last ten or fifteen years has been a very singular one: essentially, the local African variety of neo-liberalism; that is structural adjustment.

Gradually, therefore, the fifty plus countries of Africa, in either formal ways or informal ways, have had to accept the various dictates and terms and conditionalities of structural adjustment programmes: liberalization, deregulation, devaluation, privatization, shrinking in the size and scope of the state, etc., etc.

And indeed, over the last five years, particularly in the 1990's, the scale of the conditionalities that Africa has confronted has grown dramatically. In the 1980's, the initial period of the structural adjustment, when African regimes were being encouraged to reform, the conditionalities were essentially economic: that if certain indicators were met, then various forms of assistance would be provided in proportion.

Secondly, in the 1990's, the number of conditionalities has grown to include questions of liberalization in the polity as well as the economy, particularly formal multi-party constitutions and formal multi-party elections, a gradual expectation that various gender regulations and measures will be

implemented.

Thirdly, a whole new emphasis was placed on the environment and ecology. And finally, fourthly, encouraged particularly by UNDP, a move towards demilitarization and the downsizing in the size and the role of the military was encouraged.

To some extent, therefore, some African analysts have lamented that Africa in the 1990's is going through another period of "recolonization". It may be marginal, but is still being expected to meet the terms of the outside world rather than the demands and the needs of its own peoples.

And there is a major debate, which I think is a very important one, over how compatible are the various conditionalities under structural adjustments and under international systems. In particular, is Africa to do structural adjustment, to deregulate, to privatize, to liberalize, to become part of the global economy? Does it need a strong state, or does it need a weak state? Is it really realistic to expect African populations to engage in dramatic economic change at the same time as they are being expected to become more democratic? And if one is indeed concerned with gender and with the environment, are those things necessarily compatible with economic liberalization which emphasizes non-traditional exports, flexibilization, et cetera.

These debates, it seems to me, are still unresolved. They are continuing to intensify. And they do have profound implications for what we mean by democratization and by participation, and whether democratization and participation are possible in a sustainable way throughout Africa at the end of the 1990's.

When I started studying Africa in the 1960's, in many ways Africa was a social laboratory. It was where particularly American, or I should say U.S., political scientists and social scientists went to experiment with their particular perspectives. And it seems to me that once again Africa is being something of a laboratory in terms of the dramatic scale and scope of the structural adjustments that it is passing through at the present time. These, of course, have profound implications for other countries and continents in transition such as Eastern Europe and parts of Central & Southeast Asia that were either part

of the socialist world, or like Myanmar, were very autonomous. And it seems to me that in general in the African case the record of structural adjustment is not particularly encouraging, and does suggest that rather broad aggregate changes are not necessarily particularly effective.

Nevertheless, structural adjustment does mean that Africa in a whole variety of ways has been reintegrated, albeit in different ways, back into the new global economy, with profound implications for relations between North and South and certainly for policies: aid policies, development policies, by the North and by international agencies.

For our purposes, let me just emphasize, then, that I think that what we mean by Africa in the 1990's is very different from Africa before the structural adjustment period; that we are indeed talking about transformed political economies and political cultures, with one or two important general implications, general characteristics, that I think have to be taken into account in terms of any informed academic or policy response (see table one).

Firstly, in particular, I realize this is not true in all the fifty countries of Africa, after ten or fifteen years of structural adjustments, there is hardly a middle class left in the Continent of Africa; the degrees of inequality have grown so there remain few very affluent communities and citizens of Africa. The old middle class of first generation professionals who animated the democracy movement and the nationalist movement in the 1950's and the 1960's has been severely eroded, precisely because government support for education, for health, for infrastructure, has declined very dramatically. And the private sector – the market – in the African case has not been strong enough to provide sufficient resources to compensate for the decline of government support. This is, I think, a particularly important issue in terms of the sustainability of moves towards democratization on the Continent: the fallacy of social composition.

Secondly, of course, as we all know, in terms of being in Africa, the infrastructures that had been built up over the Sixties and the Seventies has decayed very dramatically. And therefore, in a whole variety of ways, the resources of the Continent in terms of roads, railways, telecommunications,

factories, electrical production, are in much worse shape now than they were even at Independence.

Thirdly, related to that, there has been a decay in the character and the resourcefulness of many African institutions. Unhappily, most of the universities that I was privileged to lecture at in the 1960's and in the 1970's have decayed very dramatically. Some are bouncing, back as in Ghana and Uganda, but universities and other institutions in countries like Nigeria or Zambia are in fairly desperate shape.

To be sure, the private sector, in terms of some education, some health, has responded; but it does not yet have the resources to enable levels of education, levels of literacy, levels of health care in the 1990's to be what they were in the 1970's and at the beginning of the 1980's. I think the United Nations Human Development Report indicates continuing difficulties in Africa with even life expectancy declining rather than continuing to improve, as it had done in the first decade of uhuru.

This has also meant, fourth, in addition to the formal private sector, the growth of the informal sectors almost everywhere, so that the broad data, the figures on Africa's economies, are increasingly inaccurate because so much of the production, exchange, consumption even credit & capital are now informal rather than formal. And these informal sectors increasingly occur amongst African countries at a regional level rather than just within African countries.

There has also been, as many of us are aware living in Africa, a dramatic rise in the level of crime, in the level of drugs, in the level of AIDS. In other words, Africa is a much tougher and rougher environment than it was in the 1960's and the 1970's. And as I will suggest, this has profound implications for the North, because these strategic and security issues do not stop at borders. And as you know, Africa is the leading continent in terms of refugees, and one of the leading continents in terms of migration precisely because of economic and development difficulties.

If the negative side of structural change and adjustment is rather depressing, the one area I would point to in terms of optimism is a dramatic flowering of civil society, of non-governmental organizations, of the media, of

women's groups, of youth groups, etc., because people have to increasingly take their own control of facilities that the state no longer provides. If the state does not provide primary health care, is unable to provide primary literacy, is unable to provide higher education, then increasingly, non-state actors are stepping in and organizing institutions and infrastructures for communities. But even more than that, people are beginning to respond in a whole variety of ways to the transformed political economy and political culture of Africa, and this has led to a proliferation of civil society.

The one party, one man, African state of the 1960's and 1970's has largely disappeared. And even when now there may be authoritarian regimes, they can rarely monopolize the media, monopolize information in the way that they used to, in part because of changes in technology such as the fax machine, electronic mail, and satellite communications, etc.

I would take particular comfort and be very positive about the explosion of the media in Africa. Africa in the 1960's & 1970's, had rather state-centric and uncreative newspapers, television and radio. Africa in the 1990's, even if technically some of them are rather backward, has a very exciting media, which is much more critical of more regimes, much more accountable, than it used to be in earlier periods. And interestingly, the media is more diverse & is now particularly of two types: First, it is a business media & weekly newspapers which report on the private sector, the stock market, and development of investments, etc. And second, there is a more critical media that is engaged in investigative reporting. What this does mean is that in general the media in Africa is much more alive, much more readable and listenable to than it was before.

In general, then, I think, most analysts would argue that the state in Africa is much weaker, much smaller, much more contained than it was at independence and immediately afterwards. And in some ways, therefore, society and communities are somewhat more empowered. But whether this will provide the basis for sustainable forms of democratization is, it seems to me, debatable. And I will come on later in my presentation to look at some of the cases recently where democratization – positive democratization moves – have gone backwards,

as in countries like Nigeria. I think that this is primarily because the underlying support for the democratic movements are no longer present in Africa.

At the same time that Africa has been going through its own dramatic changes, the North, as we all know, whichever side of the Pacific Ocean it is, has been itself preoccupied with its own recession, with its own debts, with its own restructuring. And certainly in the Canadian case, dealing with globalization, dealing with our own debts, has had profound implications for our own budgets, our own priorities, our own development strategies.

This has meant, therefore, I think, a gradual disinterest and a retreat, at least from parts of the South; particularly, perhaps from the difficult parts of the South, like Africa or the Middle East or the new Central Asia. Perhaps it is different in the Pacific Rim where the newly industrializing countries and the near-newly industrializing countries remain important markets and opportunities.

But Africa as a whole is not even any more part of the Third World. It is part of the Fourth World of relatively least developed states. And in some instances — Somalia, Rwanda, Liberia, Sudan, Zaire etc., — are perhaps part of the Fifth World of disintegrating, anarchic areas.

The combination of structural changes in the North and structural adjustments in Africa and other parts of the South means, it seems to me, that the latter may have a growing opportunity to seize a greater degree of self-reliance for itself, particularly in terms of South-South relationships. And I will come on in a minute to questions of ways in which regional organizations and regional groupings in the South may themselves build towards, if not a G-77, then, at least a southern response to regional integration in the North. And I would suggest that it certainly has a capacity to disturb and endanger the apparent stability in the North.

This then leads me, at the end of this first part, then just to switch a little bit away from the new international division of labour. We should also look at ways in which security questions at the global level are changing after the Cold War (see table two). Remember that Africa was rather important in both World War I and World War II, and it certainly suffered dramatically from

some of the spill-over of the Cold War in the 1960's and the 1970's. Indeed, I think, one could still trace back some of the difficulties in, say, the Horn of Africa, to its position in the Cold War period.

We are now, however, faced, particularly in the North, by a whole set of new security issues, many of which happen to have either African roots, or many of which at least are present in Africa. So I refer here to some of the recent literature that has been creating quite a stir in the North, by people like James Kaplan on "The Coming Anarchy", by Tad Homer-Dickson on various ecological threats, and most recently by Samuel P. Huntington on the "Clash of Civilizations". These all point to ways in which the old East-West tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States and their allies are now increasingly being replaced by North-South tensions, that it seems to me again make Africa less marginal than it has come to appear to be.

Amongst the new security issues that are increasingly confronting analysts and policy-makers are, first, issues of migration and refugees. Again, Africa has the largest number of refugees, and certainly a continuing flow of migrants from Africa to the North, particularly from North Africa to the south of Europe.

Secondly, the whole area of drugs and crime: ie, both indigenously produced drugs, and also drugs that come through Africa to Europe and North America pose increasing problems.

Thirdly, the whole question of the environment, as Africa follows Southeast Asia and Latin America into chopping down its tropical forests: and so the implications for the rest of us in terms of oxygen, biodiversity, etc. are considerable.

And fourthly, the whole area of viruses, disease, the reappearance of malaria, the spread of AIDS, etc., pose profound implications for the whole world.

Symbolically, one of the major Canadian agencies now involved in Africa is an agency that historically has had no connection with Africa until the last five years. This is the Department of National Defense, the military, because increasingly Africa is one of the areas of the world along with Yugoslavia where peace-keeping and peace-making is a major activity. And one only has

to look at the cost of peace-keeping compared to the development budget, to begin to ask questions about whether peace-keeping is a very inefficient and expensive way to be involved in the South.

There have been some recent interesting developments in this regard that I will come on to in a minute, including the whole role of the non-governmental organizations is peace-building partnerships and attempting to keep the peace in Rwanda, in Liberia, etc. Such new coalitions have expanded even to the extent of, I think, asking the British and the French for logistical support to move of African troops around the Continent in terms of securing peace.

There are also, I would point out, as I am sure is apparent to anyone active in JICA, a whole group of institutions in the North in addition to aid agencies and the military, that are very much involved in Africa and the South -- especially non-governmental organizations and private consultants -- and, particularly in European and in North American diasporas. So, even if Canada or the United States, or Britain or France or Germany wished to withdraw from Africa, they would not be able to do so because there are significant African communities in Europe and North America that prevent that from happening.

Let me just put on my first overhead, which has come from the paper, just because I wanted to emphasize in terms of this overview the way in which Africa along with other parts of the world are part of the changing global economy.

Firstly, we see in Africa something perhaps we had not expected; ie., the growth of new states, like Eritrea, and now Somaliland, the old northern Somalia, and rumours about Zanzibar separating from mainland Tanzania. So, Africa may into the 21st century be a continent of considerably more states than before.

Secondly, quite clearly, Africa is marginal in terms of the Pacific Rim and in terms of the newly industrializing countries but remains important in terms of ecology & biodiversity. It also is a region in which there is a growth of new institutions, both non-official and official, and I will come onto some of them in the following sectors. There is also a whole group of new issues,

many of which do in fact have their origins in Africa, which mean that Africa cannot be ignored. And finally, and I will come back to this, I think it is important that we deal with the whole variety of new approaches. Some of the old analytic policy prescriptions and perspectives are no longer as valid as they used to be, and we need to be more creative in how we approach development on the continent.

Let me just pause here before I go on to my second section where I deal more with particular questions around Africa to see if there are any comments or clarifications. My next section will be on the African crisis, my third section will be on regional development in Southern Africa, and my final section will be on Northern, particularly Canadian responses.

QUESTION: I have two questions.

First one is about middle class. When you talk about no middle class being left, what is the definition of the middle class in Africa? Are you talking about the people who are working in say, the, urban area, or are you talking about like some kind of so rich in the rural area? Because I think most people are farmers in Africa, and you are talking like "middle class has left due to structural adjustment lending", or, I am not sure. Maybe some conditionalities may accelerate the situation, but I think the previous regime, the policy, may affect the deterioration of the middle class.

And actually I have a second question about civil society and media. But ion maybe I would better stop.

My question about the civil society and media: You said the authoritarian regime becomes too tough, to monopolize the media. But after that you said like sustainable democratization is quite debatable. So, what is the relationship between them? You see like the media is going to be liberalized, and because of that it will be difficult to sustain democratization, or this may help to accelerate democratization? That's all.

SHAW: Thank you. Let me try and respond to both those interesting questions in the same way.

I think you are right to ask me to define the middle class a little more. And I think that such concepts relate very closely to questions of civil society

and democracy at the present time.

Let me just go back a little bit historically. Most of the initial leaders of the nationalist movements in Africa after World War II came from an embryonic and growing middle class. This was the first generation of teachers, of doctors, of lawyers. And you are right, in general they were from the urban areas, from the cities. I think for a short period there may have been a rural middle class, particularly in the rural areas that were producing cash crops. But certainly soon after independence, as the price of cotton, coffee, tea, went down, so any potential rural middle class, I think, disappeared.

I would also agree with you that this middle class was quite vulnerable or in danger before structural adjustment, although I think, as you suggest, structural adjustment has accelerated its disappearance.

In the first decade or two of independence, the original middle class — the professionals, the doctors, the lawyers and the teachers, etc. — was in the sense superseded by a less educated and less enlightened middle class around the state — the politicians, the bureaucrats, the army officers, etc. And they, in a sense, were able by using the state to perpetuate their own relative affluence, their own property, into the period of structural adjustment. The older middle class, if you like, gradually disappeared at the beginning of structural adjustment. This new middle class has, I think, increasingly disappeared at the end of the period of structural adjustment.

And what is exciting, I think, about civil society is that perhaps it constitutes almost a third generation, another group of potential middle class leaders, who are coming up through very hard times, organizing educational groups, agricultural groups, health groups, various development agencies and cooperatives, etc. Sometimes, of course, the leaders of these new civil society movements, new social movements, new non-governmental organizations, may be helped by international agencies, because they have been targeted, I think quite rightly in many cases, by international donors.

And so, unlike the earlier period, when it was the doctors and lawyers, it is now, it seems to me, the leaders of civil society that are one of the major hopes for Africa into the 21st century.

In many ways, therefore, the prospects for democratization becomes a fight, a competition, between civil society, on the one hand, and the remaining African state, on the other; this is particularly so if the African state, as it is in many parts of Africa, is still a military state.

But, unlike the earlier middle classes, the earlier nationalist leaders, the new civil society occurs in a global environment in which there is instant communication: in which there are a large number of non-governmental organizations in the North connected with those in the South: in which there is media, there are faxes, there are satellite communications, there is Internet, electronic mail, etc. And to that extent, the development of civil society in Africa and the South is inseparable from the development of civil society in the North: whereas if perhaps, say, in the case of Kenya in the 1950's, Jomo Kenyatta was locked up by the British as a "dangerous" guerilla leader etc.,: there may have been questions in Parliament in London, but nothing very serious resulted. Now media attention is continuous. And just as say in the Gaza Strip, or in Indonesia, questions of human rights cannot be eliminated, in Africa, because of the new context, both technologies but also new interest in civil society, it seems to me that African civil society gets a lot of support and encouragement by being part of a global trend towards civil society.

I would argue myself — and I will come onto this and I would be happy to debate this — if Africa is going to be democratic, it is because of civil society; it is not because of a multi-party constitution or multi-party elections. I think you can have a fairly democratic polity without multi-party elections. I don't think you could have a sustainable democracy without civil society.

QUESTION: My question is also related to the issue of civil society, but what I would like to raise is the role of political parties. As you said, multi-parties and the constitutional multi-party system itself is never the guarantee of the sustainable democracy.

Actually, my experience also is that I have quite emphasized the role of civil society and its sustainable democracy. But I think that currently the problem, like in Zambia, is, the MMD coming up as a sort of rainbow, coalition again. It is now a little bit of a mess. But actually, for sustainable

democracy, I think the role of political parties in Africa is also quite important, and it is necessary to have some links with civil society. As I say, there are no sort of rules of the games and the political process in the foreseeable future in Africa.

So, I would like to get your comment on this issue of political parties in Africa. Thank you.

SHAW: Thank you. One of the issues I will come onto in a minute is the way in which donors have been quite active in encouraging a multiparty structure and process in parts of Africa, which I think is important. But by itself it cannot be sustained if the political culture, the political economy of the middle class, civil society, etc., etc., are not sufficiently supported.

One of the reasons why I commented about Africa in the 1960s as a laboratory for American political science is that's what I began to study as a student in Uganda and became very skeptical and very critical about. And I think one now has to look very carefully at where or how to define political parties, and where political parties in Africa get support. Because, as we all know in, say, the case of Algeria, if the "wrong" fundamentalist party wins, then suddenly we decide democracy is not what Algeria needs; it needs stability! And certainly as you must be aware, there are many political parties in Africa that tend to have an ethnic, religious regional basis rather than more broadly national policy, ideological distinctions.

So, how one defines political parties and multi-party constitutions seems to be very important. One of my Ph.Ds. at the moment is a Ugandan, who is very interested in the way in which in Uganda, under Museveni, has attempted to have a democratic process and system without political parties; because, as anybody who knows anything about the history of Uganda is aware, there is a very great danger that the political parties would merely become excuses for the Baganda and other forms of ethnic organization and potential separation.

And as I suggested in terms of the overhead, there is already a danger that if in fact Tanzania has a multi-party election, then there would only be one multi-party election in Tanzania because it will break up. And certainly Ethiopia is ripe for further fragmentation.

So, how one defines political party, it seems to me, is very important. And again, historically the early political parties in Africa had a major focus, which was independence, just as the liberation movements in Southern Africa had a major focus, which was independence.

That particular focus which united political movements has now evaporated. And it doesn't seem to me that at the present time issues like environment or gender or even secularism — a non-religious-based state — are yet sufficiently strong to become alternative focuses for political parties.

Also political parties in the 1960's did have links with trade union movements, with some of the educational and health movements, etc. I don't think there has yet been much analysis in Africa of the relationship between civil society and political parties. And indeed, this may be a very important area both for donors and also for scholars to begin to understand. The MMD, as you suggested, did of course have a link with the labour union in Zambia. But, as you know, what's the point of the link with the labour movement when labour is being laid-off in the copper mines and government doesn't give you much support.

But if, in fact, there can be links between either the media or trade unions or women's groups or youth groups, or human rights groups, and particularly with political parties, then it seems to me that one may be beginning to get political parties that would have a particular emphasis greater than or broader than one particular ethnic or religious or regional affiliation. But how you legislate this is, it seems to me, quite problematic.

To that extent, let me just suggest that maybe there is a growing revisionism or rethinking going on in Africa. We had perhaps the early optimistic, naive period in the late 1980's, I think, reinforced by Eastern Europe, where it seemed as if Africa would become democratic; everybody would become democratic. But, either because multi-parties didn't work; or because national conventions in French-speaking Africa didn't work — because they have this crazy situation in Zaire of two governments, etc., or because in the Nigerian case, say, the military came back in an even more brutal way than when it was in power before — maybe there is going to begin to be a rethinking, and perhaps some

more creative ideas are coming up. Clearly the cases like elections in Kenya suggest that the dominant state, dominant parties can and do rule, they can fragment the opposition. To be sure, the opposition is willing to be fragmented on ethnic, regional, leadership, and other lines, so that the regime comes back into power when the majority of the vote is split several ways.

So, some of the old questions that I know political scientists have been involved in — the basis of political support, the type of voting system, proportional representation or constituency basis — all remain relevant. And certainly in the South African case, all the intricacies of a national election and a regional election were important; in the Nigerian case they had local, state, and national elections but not the presidential election: so that the technicalities do in fact become quite important.

But I think particularly the link between civil society and political parties is crucial. The Zambian case, I think may go beyond the MMD; it was a honeymoon; it was only an intermediate stage between Kaunda and something else. It would be very ironic and perhaps a little depressing to consider it an intermediate stage between Kaunda and Kaunda; but — this is me speaking as an individual, not as an analyst — I just find it very depressing. But they had this opportunity in Zambia. And they may not, you know, in terms of the youth of Zambia, they may not get an opportunity like that again. And in the new Southern Africa, Zambia is becoming even more marginal.

But I think there are many many lessons to be derived from the last five years of formal multi-partyism and elections. And unfortunately, many of the donors have merely focussed on the elections or on the votes, whether they were free and fair. I am sure that in Zambia the election was more or less free and fair. The question is whether the political parties and the government opted for — the change of regime has continued to be free and fair; and that's where civil society was a crucial watch-dog role to play.

Shall I go on to Part 2? Much of what I want to say in Part 2 has already been anticipated by these useful questions, and I am sorry my old computer can only take a few pages, so I am dealing with Pages 6 to 12 or so in the draft that you have in front of you.

ii) Continental Crisis

I would like to start off this section and just go back to the discussion about whether Africa is becoming more or less marginal, by just reminding you what I said already about Robert Kaplan's article on West Africa in which he suggests i) that West Africa is the future; and ii) that the future is becoming much more chaotic, much more anarchic, much rougher, much more violent than in the past. And also Samuel Huntington, in his Foreign Affairs article, has been heavily criticized, but nevertheless he asked I think important questions about fundamentalisms.

And certainly, the culture in Africa is today much more characterized by fundamentalisms than before, whether these fundamentalisms are Islamic or Christian, or even a return to traditional forms of religion.

In addition to, however, the national level, let me just push the analysis a little bit further in terms of regionalism, because it seems to me that regionalism is a very important possibility for Africa. But regionalism would be redefined not just in terms of formal organizations — the East African Community, the West African Economic Community, the Southern African Development Community etc., — but also in terms of civil society and in terms of informal sectors.

Again, to go back to my Ugandan student, apparently in the last year or two, with all the instability around Uganda, in Rwanda, in Eastern Zaire, in Southern Sudan, etc., the currency that had been very unpopular, namely, the Ugandan shilling, has now become the regional currency! This is, without a regional organization, without a regional bank, but in terms of practice the Ugandan shilling is what everybody in Rwanda, Southern Sudan, etc., now uses.

And I think that one of the exciting possibilities in Africa into the 21st century, just as I think this is the case in the EU and NAFTA, to some extent, and also in APEC, is ways in which formal regionalism and informal regionalism can be brought together. So, much of the formal regionalism of the European Union, of NAFTA etc., has been top-down; by leaders of states and doesn't necessarily represent the interests of the local community. So that the possibility of civil society in Africa, being broader than just one state, and

reflecting regional interests, and those building into, in other words, grassroots or bottoms-up regionalism it seems to me is an important question and possibility that wasn't on the African agenda in the 1980's. Indeed, I think it's quite interesting that both the Asia Pacific Economic Community proposal and also the African Economic Community proposal are both talking about continental-scale communities by the year 2020; in other words, trying to plan for a fairly long, distant future.

There is also another reason why regionalism is very important in Africa, and that is the whole question of conflict and peace-keeping. So the situations in Somalia, in terms of the Horn of Africa, of Liberia in terms of the neighbouring countries and ECOWAS, and of Rwanda in terms of Central Africa; none of these can be confined within the space of one particular state. And therefore, in terms of peacekeeping, in terms of confidence-building, in terms of regional security, the regional level of organization and structuring needs to be looked at again.

I was at a very interesting workshop in my own university last month in which we had several members of the Canadian military along with several Canadian NGOs in the same room discussing peace-keeping, peace-making, peace-building, in parts of the South and Yugoslavia at the present time. And it was so interesting because the peace-keepers were basically saying, the soldiers with the blue berets were saying: "We can't keep the peace because there isn't any water, there isn't any structure, there isn't any industry." And at the same time, the NGOs were saying: "Well, we can't go in and help to rebuild institutions, infrastructures, farms, factories, without stability as peace." In other words, there is a growing recognition that, in the 1990's, peace-making, peace-building, has to involve a coalition of both the military and the NGO's. And it seems to me that a coalition particularly at a regional level becomes very important in this regard.

This, however, as I have already said, is happening at the time when the budgets are shrinking in the North as well as the South. And this, it seems to me — and I will come on to this again at the end — pushes us to recognize that African policy, African relations, often through, multilateral organizations

vis-a-vis the South, is no longer just official: ie., that Africa's policy in Canada, Africa's relations with Canada, include not only the Canadian states but also Canadian NGO's, Canadian multinationals, Canadian diasporas, etc. In other words, the building of civil society as well as the state and as well as the multilateral organizations is part of foreign policy.

And that if one thinks in those terms, then these new coalitions of the whole variety of actors might indeed be able to help redefine and refine African development into the 21st century, with a particular emphasis on what the United Nations Development Programme's latest Human Development Report refers to as "human security"; namely, ways in which communities can be, not just economically but also politically and socially, sustainable through the creation of more democratic, more open, more accountable systems. (see table three)

Let me just, however, at this stage suggest that Africa itself is increasingly heterogeneous and unequal. There are several issues that we have to recognize when we are dealing with Africa that complicate any global or continental analysis.

One of the issues that I would be happy to discuss, if you are interested, is the whole question of whether, to some extent, democratization is occurring in Africa at the same time as which, not only is the African state shrinking but democracy in Africa may be becoming less important because the crucial decisions are being made outside. In other words, given structural adjustments, given globalization, given regionalization, no particular African state has as much authority or control as it used to have. And that, indeed, there is a rise both within African states of sub-national interests — whether these be ethnic, religious, regional — and also the supra-national; that is at the regional or continental or global levels. To that extent, therefore, the whole issue of democratization at only one level becomes much less important.

I also then will talk here about the importance of mixed actor coalitions, which I will come onto again when I talk about the policies that increasingly responding to African opportunities and challenges require not just the state but also non-state actors, NGOs, companies, etc.

And here, again, I go back to the issue that we have been discussing already about various elements or necessities for sustainable democracy, and the way in which democratic practices and traditions are developed within countries and within NGOs, rather than merely at the national level, and then, again, the whole issue of how we are redefining foreign and security policies.

So, let me just suggest that whilst at one level we can talk about Africa as a whole, Africa is decreasingly homogeneous, and that in some ways structural adjustment has encouraged that. Some African states have done more in terms of meeting donor conditionalities than others, and some, like Botswana or Mauritius, had already begun to move towards both more democratic but also more open political economies.

In particular, and this begins to get me into the region that I wish to discuss, the prospects for sustainable development perhaps at the moment look better in Southern Africa than in Eastern or Western or the Northern regions. The North, I am not going to really discuss, but as you know, there has been a major conference among northern leaders about economic opportunities. The West, primarily I think because of the Liberian Civil War, and the aborted move towards democracy in Nigeria, is in some difficulty. East Africa may yet benefit from changes in southern Africa and changes in Ethiopia and the Horn. But it is, I think, in Southern Africa, at the present time, that there is the most optimism, partially because of the transition to majority rule in South Africa, but also partially because this was always the most affluent and the most integrated of the four or five regions of the continent. And if, in fact, a relatively strong and democratic South Africa, Zimbabwe and Botswana are able to be joined by successful peace agreements and elections in Angola and Mozambique, then perhaps some restructuring in Southern Africa will indeed be possible.

As you all know, already South Africa has joined the re-constituted Southern African Development Community, although the Southern African Customs Union continues. And there are already attempts to bring together some of these groups with the Economic Community of Eastern and Southern Africa, and the old Front-Line States, the old strategic alliance which is itself being

metamorphosed into a regional peace-making grouping.

I know from one of two of my Ph.D.'s that are now working in Southern Africa in international relations agencies that there has been a gradual move to establish regional confidence-building and peace-keeping structures in Southern Africa. So that some of the navies, some of the air forces, some of the armies are beginning to exchange much more information and are certainly more able to communicate directly than when the region was at war because of the South African de-stabilization programme.

On the other hand, and I will come back to this scenario in just a minute, there is of course a continued possibility that South Africa's transition will not be able to sustain itself primarily because of racial and ethnic inequalities. And in the South African case, the economic liberalization programme is occurring at the same time as the political liberalization, and that creates a considerable degree of stress.

Let me then just finish with civil society, by suggesting that we need to begin to break down Africa to look at a variety of regions and cases. And certainly, first, the recent examples of peace-keeping and peace-making in Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda, Angola etc. should give us a cause for thought — they have been very expensive in terms of human suffering, very expensive in terms of costs of peace-keeping, and until there is a sustainable economy and ecology recreated in these communities, it's very hard for local peoples to be secure & stable; so that, it seems to me, Africa in terms of the crises and sequences of development does indeed lead us to ask some very profound questions about whether it's better to engage in peace-keeping or better to engage in perhaps more general development strategies that may minimize the need for peace-keeping and confidence-building.

Secondly, one can certainly draw a lot of courage, and I think encouragement from the relative success stories in Africa — the rapid growth of Botswana, the continued growth of Mauritius, the success of Namibia in its period since Independence, and the continuing resilience of countries like Zimbabwe. I don't think it is a coincidence that therefore these relative success stories tend to be concentrated in one part of this Continent, which is Southern Africa.

Yet there have been cases of very intense structural adjustments like Ghana and like Uganda, economies that had of course bottomed out in terms of macroeconomic indicators, that have begun to bounce back.

But thirdly, I think one has to be very cautious about the difficulties of sustaining multi-party democracy. We have already in our discussion talked about the problems of, say, Kenya where the Moi regime managed to divide the opposition; Nigeria which is perhaps suffering under a more regressive regime than ever before; Zaire with its two governments; Sudan moving towards or having already become a fairly fundamentalist Islamic state, etc.

But finally, I would certainly draw considerable encouragement from the continued vibrancy of civil society throughout the continent, both at local and national and regional and continental levels. And it does seem to me that this is an area in which regional organizations and continental organizations, — the Organization of African Unity and the Economic Commission for Africa — should pay considerably more attention. And there are already a number of regional civil society organizations that are organizing to facilitate the growth of civil society, human rights & democratic development, at both regional and national levels. And related moves towards the media being more integrated at regional levels, it seems to me, are also very important.

So, a mixed diagnosis, but I think from out of that one needs to go back to some of the basic questions of what we mean by Africa, how its political economy, political culture & civil society are changing. And as I will suggest in my final two sections — one on Southern Africa, one on Canadian, Northern responses — that there seem to be the basis for re-evaluation or rethinking or redefining.

Let me pause once again here before I go on to the final two sections. **QUESTION:** My question might be a little bit picky, but I want to clarify one thing about the definition of success. So, you have said “success”. Is it like success according to IMF or World Bank, or you are talking about human development, or like GNP growth or something like that? Because when you talk about Botswana and Mauritius, it’s something that the World Bank often picks up about these countries. So, I just want to clarify that.

SHAW: I think that's a very well-taken comment.

Certainly, I would myself be very skeptical about defining success just in terms of the World Bank, in terms of undertaking reforms in terms of the economy growing. I would be concerned about the distribution and the sustainability of any growth. But I wasn't very scientific in my use of the term here.

I would define it in terms not just of economic growth and development but also ways in which that growth and development is enabling communities, civil society, institutions, to engage in sustainable human development and security, particularly along the lines of the human development report. But as you know, the human development report itself is largely restricted to empirical welfare indicators rather than social indicators or community indicators.

So, I think some of the additional criteria would be important such as some indication of the degree of freedom to articulate, freedom to organize, freedom to publish, assuming that all of those then add up to a more sustainable democratic arrangement.

But I think one of the issues that then leads to is the degrees of democracy within international organizations, the UN, IFIs etc., and degree of democracy within the private sector: ways in which private capital is organized whether there is appropriate financial and other forms of regulation in Africa to privatize. It seems to me one of the problems is the issue of monopolies or oligopolies: lack of anti-monopoly legislation, etc., which I think some of the donors are beginning to address with the possibilities for very rapid and dubious accumulation created under insider deals.

iii) Regional Development in Southern Africa

Let me go on and illustrate these features. I wanted to apply these two maps in terms of what I am talking about; and of course, now that South Africa has not only undergone a democratic transition, it also redefined state-market relations. I also wanted to give you some of the basic data from the human development report on Southern Africa. Again, a considerable degree of differences exist in the region. Botswana and South Africa do not have low —

development indicators: however, countries like Angola, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Zambia, have fairly unsatisfactory indicators. But also in terms of the indicators for South Africa, just to caution how unequal it remains and it has not been growing for the last several years, which have been characterized as a recession. There has been some improvement in the debt situation. But as I will suggest, one of the problems facing South Africa is the structure of its economy.

Let's then just talk quickly about Southern Africa as a case study of regional development. It of course contrasts with north, west, east and central Africa; but potentially, from an optimistic perspective, if regional development occurs in Southern Africa, it is likely to gradually spread up the continent.

This is, like many parts of Africa, a region in which there has been a fairly long history of regional relations. Ethnic communities across borders: the settlers, of course, moving up from the South, after the discovery of diamonds and golds; the flow of labour from the North to the South. So, gradually South African and Zimbabwean capital has spread throughout the region; the infrastructure — railways, roads, telecommunications, hydroelectricity — has also spread. And certainly, the ecology of Southern Africa, which is very delicate, is very much Savannah highveld, with water being a crucial strategic issue as consumption is growing. The weather is becoming, because of ecological changes, less reliable: but certainly the politics of water, the economics of water, are increasing in importance.

And even to some extent, partially because of the place of labour and the place of settlers, the lifestyle in Southern Africa, the culture in Southern Africa has a certain homogeneity to it.

However, this is also a region in which the protracted moves to independence have been very troubled, with liberation wars having only recently been concluded. South Africa, of course, as a regional power, was able to engage in a variety of forms of destabilization, particularly in Angola and Mozambique, the consequences of which are still continuing.

Indeed, I was going to say in the previous section, and I will say here now, that one of the strategic issues that Africa confronts — which I think the donors

are very aware of but it is a very expensive issue — is the cleaning up of the land and the communities of excessive weapons. In the post-Cold War period, the proliferation of AK-47s in Africa and elsewhere, but also the devastating impact of land mines left behind in the Horn of Africa, in Angola, in Mozambique, presumably also in Liberia and Rwanda, constitute very real development issues that anybody can see in the number of people, particularly children without one at both legs and arms in Ethiopia or Angola or Somalia. And it seems to me that this is a good cause for a new NGO; and I notice that Boutros Boutros Ghali, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, talked about this in a recent essay in Foreign Affairs. It seems to me that for non-governmental organizations to get rid of and prohibit land mines would be a very major contribution to international development and security in the 21st century.

Neo-liberalism and structural adjustment have also had a profound impact in Southern Africa along with its history of integration, and along with the difficulties of transition. And indeed, the South African case is a very interesting one in which the South African regime, before the recent election and before the transition, had already moved towards getting the old African settler state out of the economy by deregulating, downsizing, liberalizing, etc.

The new Southern Africa is also, it seems to me, a very interesting case of a new realism dawning in Africa. The liberation movements on coming to power in Mozambique, in Namibia, particularly, and now in South Africa, are perhaps much less radical and much less evangelical than one might expect. Unlike, say, the situation in Vietnam or the situation in Cambodia, the liberation movements in Southern Africa have been very pragmatic on coming to power, I think increasingly because of the structural adjustment reforms, that are required.

And as I already said, in the South African case, the South African state had already begun to commercialize, privatize, deregulate, etc. And one of the major demands of the new South African regime is not socialization or nationalization, but two other things. One is the dismantling of some of the very large oligopolies, the Anglo-American Corporation etc. And the other is

for affirmative action in terms of black education, black trainees, black ownership, black management, etc.

Civil society has also begun to shift in Southern Africa away from being very closely connected with the liberation movement, the ANC-SACP "Congress" coalition, and now being much more concerned with being a watchdog, with being part of civil society. And certainly, the anti-apartheid movements in the North have also moved in a somewhat similar direction. So, then, the transition in southern Africa, it seems to me, has had profound implications for many interests and organizations associated with Southern Africa over the years.

The issues, however, of the changing global economy have profound importance for both South and the Southern Africa. Even perhaps more than other parts of the continent, South Africa was brought into the world economy to produce gold and diamonds, and coal and iron ore; but the present demand for its basic products is rather weak. At the same time, it has a relatively high cost economy and high cost labour. So, for South Africa to even begin to aspire to be like the Asian NICs, to follow in the footsteps of, say, Mauritius or Indonesia or Malaysia is very problematic.

Nevertheless, it is beginning to develop its relations with the Pacific Rim as well as with Europe and North America. And I think it's not insignificant that Nelson Mandela has been in countries like Taiwan and Indonesia, rather than, say, to Russia or to China, which is what would have happened if he had become a President of an African state in the 1960's or the 1970's.

Southern Africa, then, is, it seems to me, a particularly acute and important case of the degree to which economic and political liberalizations can occur at the same time, and in particular, in South Africa at the same time. Let me then suggest two possible, very divergent scenarios for South and Southern Africa into the first part of the 21st century.

The optimistic scenario — and I was very interested at a recent Economist wrote about Southern Africa's opportunities, particularly in terms of peace in Angola and Mozambique, but in terms more broadly of regional integration — the optimistic scenario, then, is one of a strong South Africa encouraging

regional integration based on regional infrastructure, regional facilities, regional trade, regional capital, regional labour. Also reinforced by peace in Angola and Mozambique, the development — a further development — of a strong regional civil society — regional media and communications — with a revived and rebuilt regional infrastructure, particularly in Mozambique and Angola: with new attention to the regional ecology, particularly water, and perhaps with a degree of corporatist-type understanding between labour and capital in South Africa. Certainly I think that's what many of the smaller states of Southern Africa — Swaziland, Botswana, Namibia, Zambia, Malawi, etc. — hope for: if the South African economy, in particular, and perhaps the Zimbabwean economy, do not grow, then the prospects for sustainable growth and development in the rest of the region are quite problematic.

However, the pessimistic scenario is based on a continued decline and further conflict in South Africa, because South Africa does not have an easy niche or place in the global (political economy), and so is unable to satisfy internal demands for redistribution in as quick a way as the majority of repressed demand, and that there is growing regional fragmentation: the peace in Angola, for all sorts of reasons, doesn't stick. And I must confess that if I have nightmares these days that the new conservative majority in the United States, might once again decide that RENAMO & UNITA would save Africa from "communism", so that there still would be some support for such guerilla groups in some parts of the North.

Moreover, of course, there may continue to be fragmentation based on ethnic or regional affinities. So there could be a considerable rearranging of states or borders as democratic expressions continue.

There will also be a growing series of tensions as the South African regime, the new South African regime, continues to liberalize, deregulate, etc., because that affects its relationships with labour and the market.

Moreover, South Africa may increasingly begin to look like West Africa and the coming anarchy or the clash of cultures, because of the growing threat of migration from the North — from Zaire, Nigeria, Ghana, etc. — into South and Southern Africa. The growth of the drug business and organized crime in

South Africa, including organized business crime that the South African police and security forces are unable to deal with, the spread of viruses into Southern Africa, etc. are also new threats. So, the pessimistic scenario is in a sense of Southern Africa, firstly, not being able to fit into the global economy; secondly, continuing to struggle, particularly in Angola; but thirdly, of these new security issues coming even more than at present to affect, divert and disorganize Southern Africa.

I could go on and talk a little bit more about regional organizations, but let me leave it there and pause one final time before I go on and look at some of the implications of all this for Canadian and Northern responses to the new Africa in the 21st century.

So, if there are any comments on my rather rushed discussion about Southern Africa, I would like to pause and discuss.

QUESTION: Let me ask you one question. You just presented two scenarios. How long do you think it will take to see whether the prevailing scenario has been actually optimistic or pessimistic?

SHAW: I think quite quickly. I think it will be quite clear, and within the next five years — in other words, the year 2000 AD — whether the more optimistic or the more pessimistic scenario is likely to be closest to the truth. I think in reality there will be pieces of both. When I am depressed, I think the more pessimistic but when I am optimistic, I think the more optimistic scenario.

My central idea is that the South African economy really is, without any reference to the elections and the transitions, in a major structural crisis, which is exacerbated by the long-standing expectations in the black community. If in fact South Africa cannot find a place for itself in the changing world economy, and therefore cannot satisfy black expectations, then I think the present fairly pragmatic phase will pass very quickly.

There is still a very large labour movement in South Africa; there still is a large communist party; there are still remnants of the old separatist (Pan African) Congress. And I can see that these, exacerbated by migration from the North, exacerbated by problems of health, infrastructure, etc., could overwhelm the interim regime.

So, if in fact, the pessimistic scenario plays out, then I think that will affect the process of transition to a post-transitional government, and would very quickly spill back and affect negatively, democratic and peace processes in Angola, in Zimbabwe etc.

Shall I proceed and conclude, then, by looking at Canadian and Northern responses to a new Africa after fifteen years of structural adjustment, and given changes in the world economy and changes in the global strategic situation?

iv) Canadian & Northern Responses to Africa at the end of the Twentieth Century

This is informed by what is going on in Canada at the present time, where a new government has instituted a process of reviews by parliament of our foreign and aid and defense policies. So, much of what I will give you here is in a sense some flavour of some of the debates that are occurring in Canada. These will not necessarily lead to dramatic changes in policy, but I think do reflect some of the elements in the analysis that I have already suggested: in particular, how a small economy like Canada deals with the changing global economic and strategic situation, as symbolized by membership in NAFTA. (see table four)

Moreover, in the Canadian case, although some of these new security threats — migration, droughts, crime, viruses — are distant, other new security threats — such as pollution in the Arctic, such as the problems of fish stocks on both our coasts, the West Coast and the East Coast — are symptomatic of the need to have very innovative policies and structures in place. And all this, as I have said, occurs at a time when fiscal constraints in Canada are very intense. Therefore, there is every reason for the government to encourage a foreign policy that includes non-state actors, including NGOs, including businesses, as well as official actors.

I don't know whether the Japanese media covered it, but our Prime Minister has been very active in China, Indonesia & Vietnam, in the last two weeks with what is called "Team Canada". He took nine provincial leaders, obviously not Quebec, with him on this trip. And that included not just government officials

but also corporate officials. Similarly in Africa, Canadian foreign policy includes a very large role and place for non-governmental organizations, and a series of institutes across the country that are government funded, like the International Development Research Centre, a human rights institute in Montreal, and an International Institute for Sustainable Development in Winnipeg. So official development assistance has always had various diplomatic and strategic elements. But increasingly it is addressing some of the concerns of civil society and the environment.

At the present time, and I think reflecting what the parliamentary reports are suggesting, quite clearly Canada's defense policy will increasingly emphasize peace-keeping and peace-making, both on the oceans and on land, and also sovereignty and security defined in environmental and economic as well as strategic terms. Indeed, the drug dealers who now have their own little submarines to take drugs from, say, the coast of Latin America out to large ships for transport north become very useful, because our Navy has a lot of experience in chasing submarines. So, the whole question of drugs and crime becomes a very important one in terms of security.

That's the defense policy; now for the aid aspect of foreign policy. And here I emphasize five elements, many of which have a particular importance or resonance in the case of Southern Africa.

Firstly, regionalism. For reasons of pragmatism — because our budget is declining and for reasons of principle — that in the African case there may be too many states, and it is only regional groups that stand any chance of surviving in the new world economy — Canadian aid policy has for the last several years encouraged regional organizations, mainly formal regional organizations like SADC: but also I think increasingly regional groupings of civil society, of human rights, of women, of the media, etc. And it is increasingly also looking at ways to encourage peace-making, peace-building, confidence-building measures amongst regional militaries and security forces in Africa.

In the Southern African case, over the last several years, Canada has been quite active in terms of rebuilding railways and hydroelectric facilities: encouraging food security, because of the importance of that in terms of

combatting drought and desertification; it has also been very active in terms of human resource development and training; facilitating the transitions in Zimbabwe, in Namibia, in South Africa: and in providing electoral monitors for most of the elections in Southern Africa in the last five or ten years.

In this regard, I would just emphasize the whole question of new forms of "functionalism" that I think underlies some of these interests. In addition to civil society there is an interest in encouraging functional cooperation amongst regional railways, regional electricity authorities, regional water authorities, regional road transport authorities, regional telecommunications, etc., hoping that thereby there will be so much interaction and integration that will be much more difficult for fragmentation and conflict to occur.

Secondly, Canadian official development assistance, as with most of the Western donors, has been supportive of the World Bank and the IMF in terms of economic reforms and structural adjustment. But it has also attempted to, in a sense, balance some of its support for such reforms by looking particularly at the human dimensions or the form of such groups, providing support for the meeting of basic needs, particularly of women and children, and also in terms of victims of AIDS.

Much of this assistance is through local or international non-governmental organizations, partially because those are technically cheaper and quicker, and partially because of pressure within Canada to provide support for civil society groups that reinforce the process of democratization.

But in the Canadian political process, it is not just NGOs but also it is also the private sector that makes demands on the state. And so, some of these activities, particularly the larger projects, have been through private sector groups as well as NGOs. So, there is, if you like, a domestic debate about the most appropriate means of aid delivery and aid definition.

Thirdly, there is a growing programme in support of democratization and governments, both of a formal kind-supporting multi-party constitutions, observing elections both facilitating electoral lists as in the case of Namibia and providing legal training in terms of the electoral process, human rights, etc. — but also, support for informal civil society through NGOs, through the media,

through human rights groups, etc. And there is a Canadian consortium of NGOs, both at a continental level — Partnership Africa-Canada — that facilitates Canadian and African NGOs at a continental level, but also in terms of some particular countries. So there are consortia of Canadian NGOs operating in Mozambique, in Angola, and increasingly in South Africa.

Fourthly, there is a renewed interest in human resource development that, given the problems of African institutions, after structural adjustment there is a decline in African budgets, a new interest in primary education, higher education, technical education, institution-building, in Africa.

And finally, fifth, a traditional interest in emergencies, both ecological and conflictual, relief, etc. But this is now increasingly collapsed into a concern, not just for peace-keeping, but also for peace-building and peace-making. In other words, to learn from Somalia, Rwanda, Liberia, Angola etc. and to recognize that there have to be very creative and longer-term interventions involving both peace-keepers and NGOs. Otherwise, there isn't the basis for peace-making, for peace-building, the confidence-building measures, etc.

In short, and this is a happy conjuncture in terms of Canada, just as it seems to me there is a need to re-imagine, to re-define Africa, so, in the Canadian case, there is a process under way of reformulating policy, very much with an eye on the 21st century. So Canada may once again return to some forms of assistance in East Africa and in Cuba that we had withdrawn from in the last five years. But this will obviously be balanced by continued support, because of the nature of the Canadian diaspora, with Eastern Europe and with Central Asia as well as Africa.

But clearly, none of this is going to be possible unless there is a growing recognition in the Canadian case of partnerships with nongovernmental organizations in civil society in the South, in Africa, as well as in the North.

This leads me to conclude on a relatively optimistic note, not just in terms of Africa's prospects, but also in terms of the need for us to revisit Africa, to revise some of our assumptions and perceptions and practices, and therefore, our as well as their policies. And it does seem to me an exciting time to be engaged in these practices, because the nature of Africa is so different now than

it was five, ten or fifteen years ago.

In that regard, let me just conclude with this quotation from a recent policy paper concerned almost underlying issues in policies towards Africa in the 1990's and beyond:

“In short, reflective of the revisionist period and mood, who, what and why will define civil society, democracy and development in Africa at the start of the next century? I am encouraged that such a question can at least be posed when in previous decades responses were taken for granted: the African (“socialist”) project. In particular, given the resilience of the state, its subjection and reaction to continuous democratic pressures are crucial: the democratic processes of accountability, responsibility, transparency etc. I have suggested elsewhere that unless ecological, gender, and informal sector elements are recognised and prioritised in any foreseeable democratic formulation then sustainable development will remain elusive because the paradigm of adjustment will otherwise prevail as it did throughout the lost decade of the 1980s (Shaw 1992 & 1993). Hence the imperative of truly innovative policy and political struggles and alternatives which democratic pressures facilitate and require, but which authoritarian and corporatist regime machinations are still always ready to divert and dilute: the ongoing dialectics of African adjustment into the next century” to which Canadian and other Northern policies and institutions, official and non-official alike, must respond, hopefully with appropriate consultation and creativity.

Thank you.

* * * *

Table One

Amongst the central clusters of “African” issues now facing analysts, activists and policy-makers are:

- a) redefinition and diminution of the African state given the interrelated pressures of globalisation/regionalisms and structural adjustment/change, including recognition of varieties of political economies/cultures (ie Third to Fifth Worlds);
- b) appreciation of indigenous forms of participation, not just formal, multiparty constitutions and elections, legislatures and regimes, but particularly varieties of African civil society, including “ethnicity”, despite demise of the continent’s embryonic middle class over the last decade;
- c) recognition of the potential yet also limits of the market, especially in an historically over-regulated set of economies, including job-creation and basic welfare provision plus financial legislation especially related to privatisation, new stock markets, oligopolies etc;
- d) reaction to the increasing tensions between pressures for and against democratisation, centred on the new space for civil society but continued place of militaries, militia, old guards (and now gangs and private security agencies) etc;
- e) admission that economic and political liberalisations may not always be compatible in practice as sustained economic reforms, especially cutbacks in basic needs, essential infrastructures and formal employment may necessitate strong rather than weak regimes for effective “reform” interventions;
- f) responsiveness to the dilemmas of demands for ethnic “political” autonomy given that larger economic units remain imperative for the continent in an era of globalisation;
- g) appreciation of the roots of “crises” so that post-bipolar conflicts are neither ignored or simplified; ie contemporary struggles reflect a mix of both internal and external, long- and short-term causes, which any responses must factor-in in terms of peace-keeping/-making, NGO emergency and recovery relief, reconstruction of infrastructures and institutions etc;

- h) self-consciousness over variety of “new” interventions now “legitimated” in the NIDL/P, from SAPs and peace-keeping to emergency relief, election and human rights monitoring, NGO links, ecological, gender and religious organisations, global culture and media, debt rating agencies etc; and
- i) readiness to recognise and cooperate with “new” African regionalisms and (re)emerging regional powers, both of which constitute tentative responses to the rise of regionalisms globally, especially EU and NAFTA and the demise of bipolar logic; ie regional economic and strategic “powers” which may come to constitute a continental “concert” given the disappointments of the OAU and the decline of NAM.

Table Two

Reflective of its renewed role as social “laboratory” for strategies of economic and political change, Africa at the end of the twentieth century is increasingly characterised by the following central features, which any extra-continental policy should begin to take into account, as suggested in the final section for the case of Canada:

- a) internationalisation of the state in terms of relations and directions of economy, polity, society, ideology, ecology, population, culture etc;
- b) diminution of the state given cumulative impoverishment, internationalisation, adjustment, communication etc;
- c) erosion of democracy as national level of decreasing salience given SAP etc, producing the irony of democratic practices being advocated and advanced when they are simultaneously becoming less efficacious;
- d) rise of sub- and supra-state actors from internal as well as international “civil society” in response to novel challenges and opportunities as the state declines;
- e) onto new “mixed” actor coalitions to response to dialectic of globalisation and fragmentation, which may yet come to challenge and even supercede the established neo-liberal hegemony in terms of, say, labour/employment, gender, ecology, democracy, peace/security etc;
- f) popular pressures for sustainable democracy at all levels, from sub- to supra-national - ie from local communities/NGOs to non- and inter-governmental organisations at regional and global levels - in part in response to continued tendencies towards authoritarianism, corporatism, anarchy, inequalities etc; and
- g) redefinitions of foreign and security policy in terms of both actors (ie not just states) and contents (ie new “high politics” issues of crime/drugs, ecology, migration/refugees, gender etc) leading towards “popular” responses along with “new” functionalisms and regionalisms (see below); ie defined by communities rather than only by governments.

In brief, rather than being peripheral, in terms of confronting the new range of global issues, Africa may be in the avant garde, in part because it is especially vulnerable. Hence the considerable relevance of extra-continental actors, both state and non-state, recognising such new realities and responding to them with appropriate creativity and sensitivity

Table Three

At the global level, any situating of the “new” Africa has to take into account the following sets of novel variables, even if these may be essentially Northern in genesis and sometimes transitional in character (Mittelman 1995; Stubbs & Underhill 1994):


- a) new states from the regions of the Baltic and Turkic states and ex-Yugoslavia to Eritrea and Somaliland on the continent itself;
- b) new relations, particularly globalisation and regionalisation, including differentiation, especially between and within states, notably the rise of the NICs, near-NICs and “middle powers” like China & India and decline of Fourth and Fifth Worlds;
- c) new institutions including the diversity of intergovernmental (eg G-7, -15 & -24), transnational (especially MNCs, Southern as well as Northern, and NGOs, which include religious and “ethnic” communities, such as the Inuit Circumpolar Conference around the Arctic), and regional organisations (eg AEC, AFTA, NAFTA, PEAC & SADC);
- d) new issues from environment, gender and informal sectors to crime, debt, democracy, drugs, emergencies, flexibilisation, migration, ozone-depletion, satellite TV, viruses etc; and
- e) new approaches at the levels of both analysis and praxis, which stretch all the way from resilient neo-classicalism to unsettling post-modernism, including reserved realism and dependency plus forms of feminism and “new” institutionalism, “new” functionalism and “new” regionalism (Murphy & Tooze 1991).

Table Four

In short, both African and non-African state and non-state policy makers have to recognise that, at the turn of the millennium, the continent's development, foreign and security agenda has been quite redefined in the NIDL/P (Harbeson & Rothchild 1991):

- a) transformed stages, especially state-economy/society relations, with special reference to rise of civil society, demise of middle class and appearance of "new" ethnic-national or regional structures; ie second or third generation;
- b) transformed capitalisms, now centred around Pacific as well as Atlantic Rims, including attention to related factors of flexibilisation, feminisation, service sectors, post-industrialism/-Fordism etc (Miliband & Panitch 1992 & 1994); and
- c) transformed strategic context, from bipolar inter-state stalemate to multiple new security threats, such as ecology, migration, drugs and nuclear smuggling, religious fundamentalisms, viruses etc (Bennis & Moushabeck 1993; Kaplan 1994).

資 料



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