

3. QUESTIONNAIRE 集計結果

アンケート要約(回答者2名)

(相手国関係機関用)

フィリッピン

航空保安セミナー帰国研修員フォローアップチーム

公開技術セミナー

所属先：マニラ国際航空保安部

マクタンセブ国際空港事務局

職務：航空保全

安全効率的航空サービスの提供、民間航空の促進、活発化

JICA は下記目的及び目標を設定し、毎年航空保安セミナーを実施している。

(1) 目的

本セミナーは、研修員に航空保安の改善に必要な基礎知識(ICAO 関連規定を含む)を賦付することを目的とする。

(2) 目標

- 1) 国際的なハイジャック等防止体制及び対策に関する知識を修得する。
- 2) 日本のハイジャック等防止体制及び防止対策に関する知識を修得する。
- 3) ハイジャック等防止体制に関する知識を修得する。
- 4) 各国におけるハイジャック等の防止体制及び対策に関する問題点を検討しそれぞれの国における保安対策のあり方を探る。

フィリッピン研修員の現在までの総数は5名である。

質 問

1. 上記の目標は、貴国の当該分野の要請に応えるものであるか？

はい(2)

2. 貴国の当該分野の要請に、より忠実に応えるためには設定目的及び目標の変更が必要であるか？

いいえ(2)

3. JICA 研修コースの研修員候補者選考方法

通信運輸省と NEDA からの応募用紙をもとに、マニラ国際空港が掲示板で募集する。試験を行い、通過した者に選考委員会が面接を行う。さらに残った 2 人の候補者が NEDA で最終選考をうける。(マニラ国際空港)
空港での任務、学歴職務経験、勤務状態(マクタンセブ国際空港)

4. 通常、候補者の選考にどれくらいの期間を要するか？

1 ヶ月(マニラ)
2 週間(マクタンセブ)

5. 当研修コースの情報をどこから入手したか？(GI 入手先)

また、情報をスタッフにどの様につたえたか？

運輸省から入手
掲示板に発表する(マニラ)
運輸通信省選考委員による面接に候補者を受けさせる。(マクタンセブ)

6. 帰国後、研修員の評価を行うか？

いいえ(マニラ)
はい 知識の評価、施設の利用、指導的立場を与える。(マクタンセブ)

7. 帰国研修員の修得した知識及び情報をどの様に活用するのか？

できる限り評価する、安全設備に対しての意見を尊重する(マクタンセブ)
no comment (マニラ)

8. スタッフを同様の研修コース/セミナーのために海外(日本を除く)へ派遣したことがあるか？

はい(2)

開催国：U. S. A.

年度：1989

コース/セミナー名称：Airport Police Management

期間：2ヵ月

主催者：U. S. State Dept.

後援者：Anti-Terrorist Assistant Program

開催国：U. S. A.

年 度：1987

コース／セミナー名称：Airport Police Management Course

期 間：4 weeks

主催者：FAA

後援者：U. S. Government

開催国：U. S. A.

年 度：1989

コース／セミナー名称：Airport Police Management Course

期 間：4 weeks

主催者：FAA

後援者：U. S. Government

9. 日本以外の国で開催された研修コース／セミナーと比較した上で、本セミナー改善のための提言はあるか？

no comment (マニラ)

保安施設の資金不足により実際に施設拡充はなされていない(マクタンセブ)

10. その他要望

つぎのことを学びたい

航空保安セミナー(マニラ)

爆弾処理、薬物発見(マクタンセブ)

アンケート集計(回答者 5 名)

(帰国研修員用)

フィリッピン

航空保安セミナー帰国研修員フォローアップチーム

公開技術セミナー

1. 本セミナーの有効性について

- ① 本セミナーのプログラム(講義、見学、研修旅行)を通して得た経験/知識・技術を、帰国後日々の職務に活用できたか?

はい 5名(1名は両回答)

いいえ 1名 理由 空港ができたばかりで安全管理に運営上も財政上もすぐに取り掛かれない

- ② 研修項目別評価(1で「はい」と答えた者のみ回答、1名無記名、計4名)

	優	可	不可
1. 日本の航空行政の仕組みと現状	1名	3名	0名
2. 空港の管理と警務	2名	2名	0名
3. 国際的なハイジャック等の防止体制 及び防止対策	1名	3名	0名
4. 日本のハイジャック等の防止体制 及び防止対策	0名	4名	0名
5. 航空会社のハイジャック等防止対策	0名	4名	0名
6. 保安検査マニュアル	2名	1名	1名
7. 保安検査員に対する教育訓練と監査	1名	3名	0名
8. 保安検査機器	1名	2名	1名
9. 成田空港のハイジャック等防止対策と 施設見学	0名	4名	0名

③ どのような知識および経験(講義、見学、研修旅行)が役立ったか?

又、どの様に活用したのか? (2)の回答者のみに対する質問

「空港の管理と警務」	4名	ハイジャック等防止策の効果的な情報を得た
「空港の運営管理」	2名	客の流れが整然と行われている。ICAO基準の方向指示のサインを設置しようとしている。
「見学及び研修旅行」	2名	
「空港の特定地域の安全管理」	1名	搭乗前のエリアの安全性の保ち方を学んだ
「統計レポートの作成法」	1名	DOTCに提出するレポートに応用できる
「他国との空港の施設の比較」	1名	特に保安の面で違いがわかった

ローディングブリッジ操作の責任者として、いつも、搭乗前のホールディング・エリアを安全にしておく。搭乗口とローディングブリッジの入口は、搭乗時間以外はいつも鍵をかけておく必要がある。関係者以外はこの区域に出入りさせないためである。

航空行政	— 統計レポートの準備における知識を学び、DOTCへのレポートの提出に応用できる。
空港の管理	— 乗客の流れが組織的な指示とよい訓練によりとても良い。 これに関連して、ICAO基準による方向指示の設置を願いたい。
安全管理	— ハイジャックなどの国際的防止策を学んだ。

- ・ マクタンセブ国際空港が十分に機能を発揮し、十分な人員がX線や金属探知機の操作の訓練を受けた後、MCIAAの警務部が空港の安全をつかさどる。
- ・ 講義でICAO基準の安全をつかさどる。
- ・ 見学旅行、研修旅行でよく観察でき理解できた。
- ・ 航空術の歴史や他の航空会社の経験は運営体系、特に安全部門の改善に役に立った。

- ・ ハイジャック等の不法行為の防止対策について話し合わせ、意見の交換がなされ、有効的プログラムが立てられた。
- ・ 日本の空港は国際基準を満たしているよいモデルである。航空機の安全運行では日本の民間航空体系・運営は、最善のものである。

我国と他国の組織を比べてみた。

④ 研修成果を活用する上での問題点

無回答 1名

警備に配置されている人員の違いから、すぐには応用できない
歴史が浅く、航空の運営を軌道に乗せる段階であり、経済面でも警備にかけられない

エプロンに事務所をもつ会社の事務員がローディングブリッジのドアを利用してしまう。サテライトを通過して、乗客ターミナルへ行く近道だからである。

日本での民間航空 — 統計レポートの作成で他の乗客輸送手段の割合がないので他の乗客輸送手段を含めたレポートは作れない。

防止体制 — 人員の配置数が違うので、そのまま、自国に応用できない。

- ・ まだマクタンセブ国際空港はできたばかり(1990年12月18日)で警務部を含めまだ組織段階である。今はNACAHの指揮下のフィリピン国家警察航空安全隊によって守られている。この段階では、乗客の搭乗手続きや航空機の確保、運行部門に力を入れている。
- ・ 財政状態はよくなく基本的警備装置の要求は、今必要な通信、運輸設備や金属探知写真装置、双眼鏡、基本的知識などのため、かなえられない。

PMPと共に実施する。

⑤ 本セミナーのどの項目／部分が最も有益であったか？

- 航空運営 3名 民間航空の運営の仕方、国内線、国際線の組み合わせの経験、知識、政府の技術的、財政的援助はとても有効に思った
- 安全対策及びその意見交換 2名 他国の状態が分かりハイジャック等に対する知識や経験を得た
- 空港見学 2名 福岡、名古屋空港の見学が特によかった
空港の施設の違いが認識できた

- ・ 特定地域の安全意識を以前より持つようになった。
- ・ 空港運営で限られた人員と施設でのより良い運営方法を学び人々がこの範囲を出入りするのをもっと上手に扱う方法を学んだ。

福岡、名古屋空港の見学は特に有益だった。ここでの知識を国際線、国内線ターミナルの運営に近い将来応用できると思う。

日本の民間航空の体系、運営の仕方や財源の振り分け方など学んだ。日本政府の経済的技術的援助はとても有益である。我国の政治経済状態は民間航空の安全、運営に良い影響を与えていない。

- ・ 航空技術に対する対応
ハイジャックやサボタージュなどの不法行為の防止策を現在の技術、施設を利用して採用できる方法を話し合えたのが良かった。
- ・ 航空安全コントロールシステム
サボタージュやハイジャックに対応するのに重要な役割を果たす。

見学旅行 我国の空港の機能との違いが観察できた。

2. 本セミナーと同様の研修プログラム／セミナーに参加するため海外(日本を除く)へ派遣されたことがあるか？
- いいえ(全員なし)

(相手国関係機関用)

アンケート要約(回答者1名)

タイ

航空保安セミナー帰国研修員フォローアップチーム
—公開技術セミナー—

所属先：タイ航空局バンコク国際空港保安部

職務：航空保安

JICA は下記目的及び目標を設定し、毎年航空保安セミナーを実施している。

(1) 目的

本セミナーは、研修員に航空保安の改善に必要な基礎知識(ICAO 関連規定を含む)を賦与することを目的とする。

(2) 目標

- 1) 国際的なハイジャック等防止体制及び防止対策に関する知識を修得する。
- 2) 日本のハイジャック等防止体制及び防止対策に関する知識を修得する。
- 3) ハイジャック等防止検査体制に関する知識を修得する。
- 4) 各国におけるハイジャック等の防止対策及び対策に関する問題点を検討しそれぞれの国における保安対策のあり方を探る。

タイ帰国研修員の現在までの総数は8名である。

質 問

1. 上記の目的及び目標は、貴国の当該分野の要請に応えるものであるか？
はい
2. 貴国の当該分野の要請により忠実に応えるためには設定目的及び目標の変更が必要であるか？
いいえ
3. JICA 研修コースの研修員候補者選考法
航空保安スタッフのみに通知する。英語力、勤務年数を基準に選定する。さらに英語試験と面接によって、候補者を絞る(DTECの英語試験も合格しな

ければならない)。DOA と TG から候補者が出される。AAT、DOA、TG の候補者の中で最も学識があると思われる者が最終的に JICA 研修員に選ばれる。

4. 通常、候補者の選考にどれくらいの期間を要するか？

3 ヶ月

5. 当研修コースの情報をどこから入手したか？(GI 入手先)

また、情報をスタッフにどの様に伝えたか？

- ・ 通信運輸省より入手
- ・ 組織内の観覧で通知

6. 帰国後、研修員の評価を行うか？

いいえ

7. 帰国研修員の修得した知識及び情報をどの様に活用するのか？

適切な部署に就かせ、研修成果を当分野の職務に反映させる。

8. スタッフを同様の研修コース／セミナーのために海外(日本を除く)へ派遣したことがあるか？

はい

開催国：アメリカ合衆国

年 度：不明

コース／セミナー名称：FAA Civil Aviation Security Course

期 間：10 日間

主催者：FAA

後援者：FAA, Bangkok International Airport

開催国：シンガポール

年 度：不明

コース／セミナー名称：Airport Management

期 間：7 週間

主催者：Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore

後援者：Bangkok International Airport

開催国：フィリピン

年 度：不明

コース／セミナー名称：Aviation Security

期 間：3 週間

主催者：UNDP/IPAO

8. 日本以外の国で開催された研修コース／セミナーと比較した上で、本セミナー改善のための提言はあるか？

時間節約のため、研修は英語で行うべきであると思う。

9. その他要望

日本あるいはバンコクで航空保安研修／セミナーを開催して頂きたい。また、我々が研修に参加出来る様、タイ航空局あるいは通信運輸省にその情報を伝えて頂きたい。

(帰国研修員用)

アンケート集計(回答者 8 名)

タイ

航空保安セミナー帰国研修員フォローアップチーム
－公開技術セミナー－

1. 本セミナーの有益性について

① 本セミナーのプログラム(講義、見学、研修旅行)を通して得た経験/知識・技術を、帰国後日々の職務に活用できたか?

はい 6名

いいえ 2名 理由: ・ 保安の現場ではなく、事務畑の部署に就いているため、又、保安活動に関して何ら決定権のない立場にあるため。

・ 転職したため。

② 研修項目評価(①で「はい」と答えた者のみ回答)

	(優)	(可)	(不可)
1. 日本の航空行政の仕組みと現状	2名	4名	5名
2. 空港の管理と警務	3名	3名	0名
3. 国際的なハイジャック等の防止体制及び防止対策	3名	3名	0名
4. 日本のハイジャック等の防止体制及び防止対策	4名	4名	0名
5. 航空会社のハイジャック等防止対策	2名	4名	0名
6. 保安検査マニュアル	2名	4名	0名
7. 保安検査員に対する教育訓練と監査	4名	2名	0名
8. 保安検査機器	2名	4名	0名
9. 成田空港のハイジャック等防止対策と施設見学	2名	4名	0名

③ どのような知識及び経験(講義、見学、研修旅行)が役立ったか?

又、どの様に活用したのか?(②の回答者のみに対する質問)

- ・ 「空港の管理と警務」 2名
- ・ 「保安検査員に対する教育訓練と監査」 2名
タイの検査員に対する教育訓練に活用。
- ・ 「見学及び研修旅行」 2名
見学及び旅行で実際に目にした日本の空港保安システムをタイの国内線空港に導入
- ・ 「日本の/国際的なハイジャック等の防止体制及び防止対策」 2名
タイの空港におけるハイジャック防止体制及び対策の確立に活用。
- ・ 「成田空港のハイジャック等防止対策と施設見学」 1名
見学した集中監視警報システムを、タイの保安対策改善のため導入。
- ・ 「空港の管理」 1名
特に「請負システム」はタイの空港業務合理化の手がかりとなった。

④ 研修成果を活用する上での問題点

無回答 3名

ない 2名

- ・ 日本とタイの地勢の相違。
- ・ 日本と航空関連機関の体制及び労働システムの相違
- ・ 予算と人材の不足。

⑤ 本セミナーのどの項目/部分が最も有益であったか?

- ・ 非常に近代的かつ便利な日本の交通機関 2名
- ・ 関西国際空港の建設 2名
- ・ 成田、羽田、福岡空港の見学 2名
空港スタッフとの意見交換と通し、空港保安に関する多くの知識と経験を学び取ることができた。
- ・ 航空保安についての意見交換 2名
発言の機会を与えられたことが良かった。
- ・ カントリーレポート発表 1名
- ・ 見学及び研修旅行 1名

2. 本セミナーと同様の研修プログラム／セミナーに参加するため海外(日本を除く)へ派遣されたことがあるか?

はい 6名

いいえ 2名

参加年度:① 1980年、② 1982年

期 間:① 1.5週間、② 1ヵ月

コース／セミナー名称:①航空保安、②航空保安セミナー

開 催 国:①アメリカ合衆国、②フィリピン

主 催 者:① Federal Aviation Administration、② ICAO

後 援 者:①同上、② UNDP

参加年度:① 1984年、② 1991年

期 間:① 3週間、② 6週間

コース／セミナー名称:①航空保安セミナー、②教官のための航空保安研修

開 催 国:①フィリピン、②フィリピン

主 催 者:① ICAO、② ICAO

後 援 者:① UNDP、② UNDP

参加年度:1980年

期 間:1ヵ月

コース／セミナー名称:航空保安セミナー

開 催 国:フィリピン

主 催 者:ICAO

後 援 者:UNDP

参加年度:1984年

期 間:3週間

コース／セミナー名称:航空保安セミナー

開 催 国:フィリピン

主 催 者:ICAO

後 援 者:UNDP

参加年度：① 1986 年、② 1988 年

期 間：① 1 カ月、② 1 カ月

コース／セミナー名称：①航空保安セミナー、②民間国際航空保安

開 催 国：①フィリピン、②アメリカ合衆国

主 催 者：① ICAO、② FAA

後 援 者：① UNDP、②アメリカ合衆国

参加年度：1987 年

期 間：1 カ月

コース／セミナー名称：航空保安セミナー

開 催 国：フィリピン

主 催 者：ICAO

後 援 者：UNDP

3. 他国で開催された研修コース／セミナーと比較した上で、本セミナー改善のための提言はあるか。

無回答 3 名

- ・ ANNEX-17, 18 及び「保安マニュアル」をプログラムに加えるべきである。重要な規定及び勧告を取り上げ、研修員間でディスカッションを行うと良い。
- ・ ICAO 関連規定の最新版を配布すべきである。
- ・ JICA のセミナーは日本の航空保安に焦点を当てていたが、他国にもっと応用のきく内容(一般的な規定及び対策等)にするべきである。
- ・ フィリピンのセミナーより JICA のセミナーの方がより有益であった。
- ・ 宿泊施設(TIC)は他国のものより良かった。

別紙・質問表内の研修項目の応用度に係る集計

I T E M S		Applicability to your job		
		A	B	C
A : Excellent B : Fair C : Poor				
1. Civil Aviation in Japan		1 } 2 } 3	3 } 4 } 7	0 } 0 } 0
2. Airport Management & Security Guard		2 } 3 } 5	2 } 3 } 5	0 } 0 } 0
3. Countermeasures for Aviation Security	a. International Measures to prevent Acts of Unlawful Interference against Civil Aviation	1 } 3 } 4	3 } 3 } 6	0 } 0 } 0
	b. Countermeasures to prevent Acts of Unlawful Interference against Civil Aviation	0 } 4 } 4	4 } 4 } 8	0 } 0 } 0
4. Security Control Systems	a. Preventive Measures by Air Carriers against Acts of Unlawful Interference	0 } 2 } 2	4 } 4 } 8	0 } 0 } 0
	b. Manuals for Security Control	2 } 2 } 4	1 } 4 } 5	1 } 0 } 1
	c. Training of Aviation Security Personnel	1 } 4 } 5	3 } 2 } 5	0 } 0 } 0
	d. Outline of Equipment & Its Development	1 } 2 } 3	2 } 4 } 6	1 } 0 } 1
	e. Countermeasures to prevent Acts of Unlawful Interference against Civil Aviation in Narita Airport	0 } 2 } 2	4 } 4 } 8	0 } 0 } 0

*上段：フィリピン、その右側が合計

下段：タイ

4. 技術セミナー配布用レジュメ

GUIDELINES FOR SECURITY INSPECTION

September 1991
Civil Aviation Bureau,
Ministry of Transport
Japan

1. Objective

The guidelines specify measures for security inspection which airlines conduct on passengers and cabin baggage in order to prevent acts of unlawful interference such as hijacking, explosion of aircraft and so on.

2. Security Inspection

Security inspection requires officials in charge to use X-ray devices (hereinafter referred to as "X-ray") and metal detectors (hereinafter referred to as "detector") or other devices to detect whether or not passengers and/or their cabin baggage contain any articles, such as guns, swords, and explosives, which are banned from being carried onto the aircraft (hereinafter referred to as "banned articles").

3. Reason for Security Inspection

Security inspection against passengers should be conducted pursuant to transportation agreements on domestic and international passenger transportation, of both airlines. The transportation agreement is a contract, approved by the Minister of Transport, between airlines and passengers concerning air traffic.

4. Establishment of Inspection Sites

Security inspection should be carried out at designated inspection sites. Only ticketed passengers and officials approved of admission may enter inspection sites. Passengers who have not passed the security inspection will be unable to board the aircraft.

5. Measures for Security Inspection

(1) Security inspection should in principle, be conducted with the use of the following inspection devices.

① Cabin baggage aboard by passengers should be inspected by X-ray. If there is something suspicious present, the baggage should be opened for further inspection.

② Articles which passengers have on should be inspected by a detector. If a detector beeps or if there is something suspicious present, officials should conduct inspection by feeling a passengers in order to examine their belongings, so-called "body check."

(2) In cases where X-ray is not installed or out of order, a portable detector should be used on baggage or baggage should be opened for inspection.

(3) In cases where a detector is out of order or not available, passengers are subject to "body check."

6. Inspection Devices

Inspection devices to be used for inspection should meet the following requirements.

(1) X-ray

	Item	Performance
①	X-ray irradiation range	To show a whole figure subject to inspection
②	Identification capacity	AWG 34 (copper wire of 0.16 mm) or more
③	Fluoroscopy	10 mm (steel plate) or more
④	Identification and display of materials	To obtain information (such as an atomic number group) on materials of dangerous articles like explosives (To detect weapons made from plastic for the time being)

(2) Detector

	Item	Performance
①	Detecting capacity	To detect metals subject to inspection irrespective of direction and location of such metals
②	Fixation of sensitivity	To be operated by officials

7. Standards for The Number of Officials to be allocated

(1) Airports equipped with X-ray

- ① 4, 5 or 6 officials should be allocated for a set of detecting devices (an X-ray and a detector), taking into consideration the number of passengers. The number of officials for each task is 1 for "direction" (only in the case of 6 officials), 1 for "sorting," 1 for "monitoring," 2 for "open inspection" (1 in the case of 4 officials) and 1 for "body check."

(Note): The duties of each task

"Direction" ---- To request passengers for cooperation in inspection, request them to show a airline or boarding ticket for confirmation, request them to put their cabin baggage on an X-ray belt conveyer, and request them to walk through the detector.

"Sorting" ----- To separate baggage subject to open inspection, from those not subject to such inspection, in close contact with officials in charge of monitoring, and deliver the former to officials in charge of open inspection and the latter to passengers.

"Monitoring"----- To closely monitor the X-ray and judge whether or not cabin baggage contain any banned articles.

"Open inspection" --- To open baggage and inspect its contents.

"body check" --- To feel a passenger who causes the detector to beep or to use a portable detector in order to examine his/her belongings.

- ② In cases where an X-ray is out of order or not available, officials should take charge of "direction," "open inspection" and "body check."
- ③ An official is required to scrutinize X-ray images continually for not more than 30 minutes in principle and up to one hour at the maximum. He/She should not resume this duty for a further hour.

- (2) Airports not equipped with X-ray
Three officials should be allocated for each detector with 1 for "direction," 1 for "open inspection" and 1 for "body check."
- (3) Officials in charge should wear uniforms and have ID cards or other type of identification easily visible to passengers.

8. Instructions on Security Inspection

- ① In conducting a security inspection, all unidentifiable cabin baggage in the passengers' possession should be identified. If a passenger has something given or left by a stranger, it should be subject to an open inspection.
- ② Security inspection against passengers and their cabin baggage should be conducted simultaneously.
- ③ In cases where the X-ray image of baggages gives rise to suspicion, open inspection should be conducted immediately.
- ④ Emergency procedure should be established in advance to handle banned articles.
- ⑤ If explosives, weapons and other articles are discovered in cabin baggage, the baggage should be released to law enforcement officers immediately after informing a chief official in charge of inspection. In this case, security inspection should be suspended temporarily to stop entry of passengers.

- ⑥ In cases where passengers leave the inspection site after clearing security inspection, they should be subject to security inspection again prior to boarding.

9. Instructions on Special Passengers

(1) VIP

VIP, along with ordinary passengers, should be subject to security inspection. This should not apply in cases where officials of airlines, in charge of security confirm, that there will be no problem without security inspection against VIP and where VIP are accompanied by officials of the Ministry of Transport, in the airport concerned, or by persons designated by officials of airlines in charge of security.

(2) Diplomats

Even though a passenger may be granted diplomatic immunity under the Vienna Convention, such persons should be subject to routine security inspection. However, sealed diplomatic pouches, in their possession, must not be subject to open inspection. All other carry-on items should be processed in the normal manner. This should not apply in cases where airline officials, in charge of security, confirm that there will be no problem without security inspection against diplomats and where diplomats are accompanied by persons designated by officials of airlines in charge of security inspection.

(3) Late check-in passengers

Security inspection against late check-in passengers should be conducted quickly so that they will not miss their flight. However, keep in mind that there is a possibility that some passengers pretend to be rushing in order to skip security inspection.

(4) Group passengers

Security inspection should be carried out without fail against group passengers, for fear that suspicious passengers may slip among them.

10. Training of Officials in Charge of Inspection

Adequate level of security education and training should be given to recruited officials to make them skillful in security inspection.

GUIDELINES FOR SECURITY INSPECTION FOR CHECKED BAGGAGE

September 1991
Civil Aviation Bureau,
Ministry of Transport
Japan

1. Objective

The guidelines specify measures for inspection into checked baggage (hereinafter referred to as "checked baggage inspection") to be checked from passengers (hereinafter referred to as "checked baggage") in order to prevent acts of unlawful interference such as explosion of aircraft and so on.

2. Checked Baggage Inspection

Checked baggage inspection requires officials in charge to use X-ray devices (hereinafter referred to as "X-ray") or other devices to detect whether or not checked baggage of passengers contain any articles, such as explosives, which are banned from being transported (hereinafter referred to as "transport-banned articles").

3. Reason for Checked Baggage Inspection

Checked baggage inspection should be conducted pursuant to transportation agreements on domestic and international passenger transportation, of both airlines. The transportation agreement is a contract, approved by the Minister of Transport, between airlines and passengers concerning air traffic.

4. Measures for Checked Baggage Inspection

- (1) Checked baggage should be inspected by X-ray. If there is something suspicious present, the baggage should be opened for further inspection.
- (2) In cases where X-ray is not installed or out of order, checked baggage should be opened for inspection.

5. Inspection Devices

Inspection devices to be used for checked baggage inspection should meet the following requirements.

	Item	Performance
①	X-ray irradiation range	To show a whole figure subject to inspection
②	Identification capacity	AWG 34 (copper wire of 0.16 mm) or more
③	Fluoroscopy	10 mm (steel plate) or more
④	Identification and display of materials	To obtain information (such as an atomic number group) on materials of dangerous articles like explosives

6. Standards for the Number of Officials to be allocated

(1) X-ray inspection

- ① 3, or 4 officials should be allocated for each X-ray regarding inspection in front of a check-in counter. The number of officials for each task is 1 for "direction" 1 for "monitoring," and 2 for "open inspection" (1 in the case of 3 officials).

(Note): The duties of each task

"Direction" ---- To request passengers for cooperation in inspection, request them to show airline or boarding tickets for confirmation, and request them to put their checked baggage on an X-ray belt conveyer.

"Monitoring" --- To watch closely monitor the X-ray and judge whether or not checked baggage contain any transport-banned articles.

"Open inspection" --- To open baggage and inspect its contents.

- ② Regarding inspection at loading sites, the appropriate number of officials to be allocated should be determined, taking into consideration the amount of checked baggage.
- ③ In cases where the X-ray is out of order or not available, officials should take charge of "direction" (limited only to the front of a check-in counter) and "open inspection."
- ④ An official is required to scrutinize X-ray images continually for not more than 30 minutes in principle and up to one hour at the maximum. He/She should not resume this duty for a further hour.

(2) Open inspection

- ① Regarding inspection in front of a check-in counter, the appropriate number of officials to be allocated should be determined by the number of passengers.
- ② Regarding inspection at loading sites, the appropriate number of officials to be allocated should be determined by the amount of checked baggage.

- (3) Officials in charge should wear uniforms and have ID cards or other type of identification easily visible to passengers.

7. Management of Inspection Site

Regarding the inspection site in front of a check-in counter, partitions and others should be installed so that only passengers with airline or boarding tickets can enter an inspection site. This is to prevent transport-banned articles from being put into checked baggage after passing inspection.

It is necessary to take precautions that only passengers with tickets enter through an inspection site and not enter through the exit.

8. Instructions on Checked Baggage Inspection

- ① In conducting a checked baggage inspection, all unidentifiable checked baggage in the passengers' possession should be iden-

tified. If a passenger has something given or left by a stranger, it should be subject to an open inspection.

- ② In cases where an X-ray image of baggages gives rise to suspicion, open inspection should be conducted immediately.
- ③ A seal which identifies that checked baggage is confirmed safe after inspection should be attached to the baggage to prevent opening. For example, a "SECURITY" seal is attached to a lock of the baggage. Checked baggage should be returned to its legitimate owner without fail.
- ④ Emergency procedure should be established in advance to handle transport-banned articles.
- ⑤ If explosives, weapons and other articles are discovered in checked baggage, the baggage should be released to law enforcement officers immediately after informing a chief official in charge of inspection. In this case, security inspection should be suspended temporarily to stop entry of passengers.
- ⑥ In cases where passengers carry their checked baggage outside an inspection site after passing inspection, the seal mentioned in the above ③ should be removed from the baggage before it is carried outside. The baggage should be subject to checked baggage inspection again.
- ⑦ Regarding checked baggage after inspection, it is essential to ensure that articles, inside the baggage, will not be stolen, or replaced with other articles, and that transport-banned articles be placed into the baggage.

9. Instructions on Special Passengers

(1) VIP

VIP, along with ordinary passengers, should be subject to checked baggage inspection. This should not apply in cases where officials of airlines, in charge of security confirm, that there will be no problem without checked baggage inspection against VIP and where VIP are accompanied by officials of the Ministry of

Transport, in the airport concerned, or by persons designated by officials of airlines in charge of security.

(2) Diplomats

Even though a passenger may be granted diplomatic immunity under the Vienna Convention, such persons should be subject to routine checked baggage inspection. However, sealed diplomatic pouches, in their possession, must not be subject to open inspection. All other carry-on items should be processed in the normal manner. This should not apply in cases where airline officials, in charge of security, confirm that there will be no problem without checked baggage inspection against diplomats and where diplomats are accompanied by persons designated by officials of airlines in charge of security.

(3) Late check-in passengers

Checked baggage inspection against late check-in passengers should be conducted quickly so that they will not miss their flight. However, keep in mind that there is a possibility that some passengers pretend to be rushing in order to skip checked baggage inspection.

(4) Group passengers

Checked baggage inspection should be carried out without fail against group passengers, for fear that suspicious passengers may slip among them.

10. Training of Officials in Charge of Inspection

Adequate level of security education and training should be given to recruited officials to make them skillful in checked baggage inspection.

11. Others

The guidelines should apply only to international flights for the time being.

STANDARD OF SECURITY MEASURES

(1) Concept

This standard of measures is to be applied to overall air transport in general. There may be cases where limited application is made or limited application to a specified airport or to a specific flight is made.

(2) Measures

Items to be taken	PHASE I	PHASE II	PHASE E
① Restriction of carry on baggage	In principle, one piece of carry on baggage per passenger is applied.	Strict application of the left.	Same as in the left.
② Confirmation of identification	To require confirmation of identification (Note 1) of passengers behaving a well founded suspicion and notify to the police in the case one cannot be identified.	Same as in the left.	Same as in the left. To confirm whether the name of the airline ticket and passenger himself is matched, and if not and if there may be any suspicion, notify to the police.
③ Verification check	To make verification check (Note 2) for both passenger and one's passport when servicing or checking in a passenger with a data, and notify the police and other authorities concerned of the name or of the passport of the passenger who is considered to meet with the data.	Same as in the left.	Same as in the left.
④ Security inspection	Before boarding, all the passengers are subject to security inspection. (Note 3)	In addition to the left, a reinforced security inspection (Note 4) is made by instructing special attention to security inspectors together with making an additional assignment of airline (or its agent) staff for the inspection.	Same as in the left.
⑤ Monitoring of ground works	Person responsible for each ground work for departing flight makes security monitoring (Note 5) together with his own work. Cabin attendants make security check for cabin works.	In addition to the left, other staffs are assigned to assist and reinforce security monitoring (Note 5) of the responsible person for each ground work. Cabin attendants make security check for cabin works.	A special staff is assigned to make security monitoring (Note 5) for departing flights. Cabin attendants make security check for cabin works.
⑥ Security checks for transit passengers (Note 6)			All the transit passengers remain in or leave from aircraft depending on the circumstances of security systems at each airports. In case passengers leave aircraft, they are subject to security inspection (Note 3) when getting aboard again.

(Supplementary rules)

(Note 1): Confirmation of identification

To check passenger's nationality, address, name, birthday, sex, occupation, place for communication and hotels with airline ticket, passport and ID card confirming there is nothing suspicious.

(Note 2): Verification check

To check passenger and passport with the data distributed by the police or other authorities concerned, e.g. posters and member cards of the Japanese Red Army, materials to identify fabricated Japanese passports and wanted circulars for verification.

(Note 3): Security inspection

In principle, the inspection is carried out in accordance with the "guidelines for security inspection."

(Note 4): Reinforced security inspection

Person assigned by airline security staff or by the responsible security staff monitors security inspection site and gives instructions and guidance to inspectors for appropriate, quick and polite inspection. Inspectors ask passenger to show their passport in order to confirm that there is nothing suspicious about passenger.

(Note 5): Security monitoring

To monitor ground works in aircraft surrounding area, in order that banned articles are not handed to passengers or are not carried into aircraft during congestion of departure works on ramp area and identify suspicious person and check persons to go into aircraft.

(Note 6): Security measures for transit passengers

Transit passengers are to leave aircraft at an airport where there is equipped to keep them away from other passengers—for example, a waiting room exclusively for transit passengers—and with facilities for security inspection, and where required security measures are taken against transit passengers, otherwise, they are to remain in aircraft.

About the PHASE

Each PHASE is applied based on the following items.

PHASE	Degree of a threat
I (Precaution)	
II (Strict precaution)	Strict measures against terrorist acts are considered necessary in cases where state or government guests visit Japan, socially-significant events such as the Olympic games take place, terrorist acts are expected because of wars or conflicts and reliable information terrorism is obtained.
E (Emergency)	Extremely strict measures against terrorist acts are considered necessary in cases where there is highly strong possibility of terrorist acts for very important state or government guests or for a large number of such guests in Japan and information on highly possible terrorism is obtained.

STANDARD OF MEASURES TO PREVENT AIRCRAFT EXPLOSION (checked baggage, etc.)

(1) Concept

This standard of measures is to be applied to overall air transport in general. There may be cases where limited application is made or limited application to a specified airport or to a specific flight is made.

(2) Measures

Items to be taken	PHASE I	PHASE II	PHASE E
① Additional checked baggage	Additional check in of baggage is accepted only when a passenger and/or one's agent submits the airline ticket or the boarding pass.	Same as in the left.	Additional check in of baggage is accepted only when a passenger submits the airline ticket and/or the boarding pass. Passenger's agent may check in additional baggage only under special circumstances.
② Inspection for checked baggage	On domestic flights, a suspicious passenger's and suspicious checked baggage are subject to security inspection for checked baggage (Note 1). On international flights, all the checked baggage are subject to security inspection for checked baggage (Note 1).	All the baggage are subject to security inspection for checked baggage (Note 1).	Same as in the left.
③ Security management of loading articles	In transporting and loading of all the checked baggage and supplies and foods of cabin, monitoring is made to prevent any explosives. Security check for supplies and foods of cabin is made before being loaded.	Same as in the left.	Monitoring is reinforced for all the checked baggage and supplies and foods of cabin before being loaded. Security check for supplies and foods of cabin is made by a responsible person before loaded.
④ Verification of the number of passengers	Verification for the number of the passenger checked in and the number of the passenger actually aboard is made. Whenever there is a discrepancy, the cause is examined as soon as possible and appropriate measures are taken such as unload of checked baggage concerned.	Same as in the left.	Same as in the left.
⑤ Requirement for transit passengers to carry their baggage when leaving aircraft	Cabin attendants check cabin if there is any remained baggage (Note 2).	Same as in the left.	Same as in the left. Transit passengers are required to carry their baggage when they leave aircraft.

(Supplementary Rule)

(Note 1): Security inspection for checked baggage

In principle, the inspection is carried out in accordance with the "Guidelines for Security Inspection for Checked baggage." Measures for inspection are described as follows.

Measures for inspection	PHASE I	PHASE II	PHASE E
International flights at major airports	X-ray inspection	Same as in the left.	Same as in the left.
Other international flights	X-ray inspection or physical inspection	Same as in the left.	Same as in the left.
Domestic flights	X-ray inspection, or physical inspection or inspection by a metal detector	Same as in the left.	X-ray inspection or physical inspection

(Note 2): Confirmation of remained cabin baggage

In order to make it easier for cabin attendants to check remained cabin baggage, passengers are required to attach ID tags to carry on baggage, if necessary.

About the PHASE

Each PHASE is applied based on the following items.

PHASE	Degree of a threat
I (Precaution)	
II (Strict precaution)	Strict measures against terrorist acts are considered necessary in cases where state or government guests visit Japan, socially-significant events such as the Olympic games take place, terrorist acts are expected because of wars or conflicts and reliable information terrorism is obtained.
E (Emergency)	Extremely strict measures against terrorist acts are considered necessary in cases where there is highly strong possibility of terrorist acts for very important state or government guests or for a large number of such guests in Japan and information on highly possible terrorism is obtained.

STANDARD OF MEASURES TO PREVENT AIRCRAFT EXPLOSION (Air Cargo, etc.)

(1) Concept

This standard of measures is to be applied to overall air transport in general. There may be cases when limited application is made or limited application to a specified airport or to a specific flight (for example, international and domestic flight, passenger and cargo flight) is made.

(2) Measures to be taken by airlines

Items to be taken	PHASE I	PHASE II	PHASE E
<p>① Security management of cargo and mail handling area</p>	<p>Public access to cargo and mail handling area is restricted to prevent entry of outsiders and suspicious persons.</p>	<p>Restrictions on access to cargo and mail handling area is reinforced to prevent entry of outsiders and suspicious persons.</p>	<p>Same as in the left.</p>
<p>② Security measures in loading cargo</p>	<p>The following cargo is loaded only when safety is confirmed by general confirmation method (Note 2), retention for 24 hours (Note 3) or explosive inspection (Note 4). Special attention is paid in case a flight is designated.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Suspicious cargo of known shipper. (Note 5). All cargo of unknown shipper, except those offering no reason for doubt from the appearance (Note 6). Personal belongings (unaccompanied baggage) One unit of cargo carried directly by unknown shipper to an airport just before deadline. 	<p>The following cargo is loaded only when safety is confirmed by retention for 24 hours (Note 3) or explosive inspection (Note 4).</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Suspicious cargo of known shipper. (Note 5). All cargo of unknown shipper, except those offering no reason for doubt from the appearance (Note 6). Personal belongings (unaccompanied baggage) One unit of cargo carried directly by unknown shipper to an airport just before deadline. <p>All cargo is confirmed safety by a security check sheet.</p> <p>Unknown shipper cannot designate a specific flight.</p> <p>If necessary, cargo is not loaded in a designated flight except diplomatic pouches, newspapers, newspaper blocks, news films, manuscripts, animals, blood serum, radioisotope and other emergency articles, which can be identified safety by their type or by the package at a time of the acceptance.</p>	<p>All cargo is retained for 24 hours (Note 3) or subject to explosive inspection (Note 4). Except for the following cargo is loaded only when safety is confirmed by explosive inspection.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Suspicious cargo of known shipper. (Note 5). All cargo of unknown shipper, except those offering no reason for doubt from the appearance (Note 6). Personal belongings (unaccompanied baggage) One unit of cargo carried directly by unknown shipper to an airport just before deadline. <p>All cargo is confirmed safety by a security check sheet.</p> <p>If necessary, cargo is not loaded in designated flight except diplomatic pouches, newspapers, newspaper blocks, news films, manuscripts, animals, blood serum, radioisotope and other emergency articles, which can be identified safety by their type or by the package at a time of the acceptance.</p>

Items to be taken	PHASE I	PHASE II	PHASE E
③ Security measures in loading mail	Parcels are loaded only when the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications has taken its security measures at a time of the acceptance.	Same as in the left.	Same as in the left.
④ Security management of cargo and mail	In preparing, transporting and loading cargo and mail, security management is made to prevent explosives from being mixed in. When loading, reconfirmation of the number and re-checks of appearance is made to prevent suspicious articles from being mixed in.	Same as in the left. Security management of cargo and mail, and confirmation of the number and re-checks of appearance when loading, are reinforced.	Same as in the left.

(Note 6): Articles with no reason for doubt from the appearance

(1) Articles wrapped with clear vinyl or plastics.

(2) Live animals which are loaded only by a cage or by a container prepared by an airline)

(Supplementary Rule)

(Note 1): Definition of known shipper and Unknown shipper

Known shipper is that who have credit accounts with forwarding agents, air cargo agents and airlines, including that shipper* who have short-term loan credit to open credit account. Unknown shipper is that other than known shipper.

(*) Definition of shipper

- (1) For a general cargo, a shipper is the one described in Master Air Waybill issued by an airline.
- (2) For a consolidated cargo, a shipper is the one described in House Air Waybill issued by a forwarding agents.

(Note 2): Confirmation of safety by general confirmation method

At least any one of the following measures is taken.

- (1) Confirmation of safety by questioning
To observe consignor's attitude, countenance and his answer by questioning to confirm nothing suspicious.
- (2) Confirmation of safety by ID card, etc.
To confirm consignor with one's ID card or equivalents.
- (3) Confirmation of safety by invoice
To question consignor about the article if one's answer conforms to the detail of the invoice.

(*) Definition of consignor

Shipper or one's agent, who brings article to airlines to consign transportation.

(Note 3): Confirmation of safety by retention for 24 hours

All articles directly consigned by airlines at an airport are retained for 24 hours from the time of acceptance by airlines.

All articles consigned by forwarding agents or by air cargo agents are retained for 24 hours from the time of acceptance by them. In the case of transit cargo, retention hours are counted from the time when original airline accepted the cargo. In the case of parcels, they are retained 24 hours from the time when the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications is originally consigned them.

(Note 4): Confirmation of safety by explosive inspection

An inspection to confirm that no explosives (explosive compound, gunpowder, and inflammable substances or their mixture) exist in cargo and parcels. Such as X-Ray inspection and an explosive inspection specified separately or physical inspection.

(Note 5): Suspicious cargo of known shipper

- (1) Those articles shipped differently from an ordinary typical transactions.
- (2) Those articles which are suspicious judging from the appearance different from an ordinary form.
- (3) In cases where a person who is well considered to have consigned explosives judging from one's strange behavior and circumstances packs and consigns articles.

Examples of the above (1) to (3) are;

- a) Articles weighing unreasonably heavy from their size.
- b) Articles with sound (clock) or queer odor.
- c) Articles oddly packed in relation to their contents
- d) Articles considered consigned by another person.
- e) Articles with queer package (Goods with a seal off or with a sign of being packed again)

(Supplementary Rule)

(Note 1): Definition of known shipper and Unknown shipper

Known shipper is that who have credit accounts with forwarding agents, air cargo agents and airlines, including that shipper* who have short-term loan credit to open credit account. Unknown shipper is that other than known shipper.

(*) Definition of shipper

- (1) For a general cargo, a shipper is the one described in Master Air Waybill issued by an airline.
- (2) For a consolidated cargo, a shipper is the one described in House Air Waybill issued by a forwarding agents.

(Note 2): Confirmation of safety by general confirmation method

At least any one of the following measures is taken.

(1) Confirmation of safety by questioning

To observe consignor's attitude, countenance and his answer by questioning to confirm nothing suspicious.

(2) Confirmation of safety by ID card, etc.

To confirm consignor with one's ID card or equivalents.

(3) Confirmation of safety by invoice

To question consignor about the article if one's answer conforms to the detail of the invoice.

(*) Definition of consignor

Shipper or one's agent, who brings article to airlines to consign transportation.

(3) Measures to be taken by forwarding agents and air cargo agents.

Items to be taken	PHASE I	PHASE II	PHASE E
<p>① Security management of cargo handling area</p>	<p>A cargo handling area is appropriately managed to prevent entry of outsiders and suspicious persons.</p>	<p>Management of a cargo handling area is reinforced to prevent entry of outsiders and suspicious persons.</p>	<p>Same as in the left.</p>
<p>② Security measures in handled cargo</p>	<p>The following handled cargo is consigned to airlines only when safety is confirmed by general confirmation method (Note 2), retention for 24 hours (Note 3) or explosive inspection (Note 4). Special attention is paid in case a flight is designated. a. Suspicious cargo of known shipper (Note 5). b. All cargo of unknown shipper, except those offering no reason for doubt from the appearance (Note 6).</p>	<p>The following handled cargo is consigned to airlines only when safety is confirmed by retention for 24 hours (Note 3) or explosive inspection (Note 4). a. Suspicious cargo of known shipper (Note 5). b. All cargo of unknown shipper, except those offering no reason for doubt from the appearance (Note 6). All cargo is confirmed safe by a security check sheet. Unknown shipper cannot designate a specific flight. If necessary, cargo is not loaded in a designated flight except diplomatic pouches, newspaper, newspaper blocks, news films, manuscripts, animals, blood serum, radioisotope and other emergency articles, which can be identified safety by their type or by the package at a time of the acceptance.</p>	<p>All cargo is retained for 24 hours (Note 3) or subject to explosive inspection (Note 4). Except for the following handled cargo is consigned to airlines only when safety confirmed by explosive inspection. a. suspicious cargo of known shipper (Note 5). b. All cargo of unknown shipper, except those offering no reason for doubt from the appearance (Note 6). All cargo is confirmed safe by a security check sheet. Unknown shipper cannot designate a specific flight. If necessary, cargo is not loaded in a designated flight except diplomatic pouches, newspaper, newspaper blocks, news films, manuscripts, animals, blood serum, radioisotope and other emergency articles, which can be identified safety by their type or by the package at a time of the acceptance.</p>
<p>③ Security management of cargo</p>	<p>In entrust, transporting and consignment of cargo security management is made to prevent explosives from being mixed in. When cargo is entrusted and consigned, reconfirmation of the number and rechecks of appearance is made to prevent suspicious article from being mixed in.</p>	<p>Same as in the left. Security management of cargo and confirmation of the number and rechecks of appearance when cargo entrusted and consigned are reinforced.</p>	<p>Same as in the left.</p>

(Supplementary Rule)

(Note 1): Definition of known shipper and Unknown shipper

Known shipper is that who have credit accounts with forwarding agents or air cargo agents, including that shipper who have short-term loan credit to open credit account. Unknown shipper is that other than known shipper.

(*) Definition of shipper

- (1) For a general cargo, a shipper is the one described in Master Air Waybill issued by an airline.
- (2) For a consolidated cargo, a shipper is the one described in House Air Waybill issued by a forwarding agents.

(Note 2): Confirmation of safety by general confirmation method

At least any one of the following measures is taken.

- (1) Confirmation of safety by questioning
To observe consignor's attitude, countenance and his answer by questioning to confirm nothing suspicious.
 - (2) Confirmation of safety by ID card, etc.
To confirm consignor with one's ID card or equivalents.
 - (3) Confirmation of safety by invoice
To question consignor about the article if one's answer conforms to the detail of the invoice.
- (*) Definition of consignor
Shipper or one's agent who brings article to forwarding agent or air cargo agent to consign transportation.

(Note 3): Confirmation of safety retention for 24 hours (The time of retention can be a sum of retention by a forwarding agent or an air cargo agent and retention by airlines).

All articles consigned by forwarding agents or by air cargo agents are retained for 24 hours from the time of acceptance by them.

(Note 4): Confirmation of safety by explosive inspection

An inspection to confirm that no explosives (explosive compound, gunpowder, and inflammable substances or their mixture) exist in cargo. Such as X-RAY inspection and an explosive inspection specified separately or physical inspection.

(Note 5): Suspicious cargo of known shipper

- (1) Those articles shipped differently from an ordinary typical transactions.
- (2) Those articles which are suspicious judging from the appearance different from an ordinary form.
- (3) In cases where a person who is well considered to have consigned explosives judging from one's strange behavior and circumstances packs and consigns articles.

Examples of the above (1) to (3) are;

- a) Articles weighing unreasonably heavy from their size.
- b) Articles with sound (clock) or queer odor.
- c) Articles oddly packed in relation to their contents
- d) Articles considered consigned by another person.
- e) Articles with queer package (Goods with a seal off or with a sign of being packed again)

(Note 6): Articles with no reason for doubt from the appearance

- (1) Articles wrapped with clear vinyl or plastics.
- (2) Live animals which are loaded only by a cage or by a container prepared by forwarding agents or air cargo agents).

(4) Measures to be taken by the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications

Items to be taken	PHASE I	PHASE II	PHASE E
<p>① Security management of mail handling area.</p>	<p>A mail handling area is appropriately managed to prevent entry of outsiders and suspicious persons.</p>	<p>Management of a mail handling area is reinforced to prevent entry of outsiders and suspicious persons.</p>	<p>Same as in the left.</p>
<p>② Security measures in mail</p>	<p>Parcels are consigned to airlines only when they are subject to inspection at a time of acceptance (Note 2).</p>	<p>The following parcels are consigned to airlines only when safety is confirmed by retention for 24 hours (Note 3) or explosive inspection (Note 4). a. Suspicious parcels of known shipper. (Note 5). b. All parcels of unknown shipper, except those offering no reason for doubt from the appearance (Note 6). If necessary, parcels are not loaded in a designated flight except diplomatic pouches, newspaper, newspaper blocks, news films, manuscripts, animals, blood serum, radioisotope and other emergency articles, which can be identified safety by their type or the package at a time of the acceptance.</p>	<p>All the parcels are retained for 24 hours (Note 3) or subject to explosive inspection (Note 4). Except for the following parcels are consigned to airlines only when safety confirmed by explosive inspection. a. Suspicious parcels of known shipper (Note 5). b. All parcels of unknown shipper, except those offering no reason for doubt from the appearance (Note 6). If necessary, parcels are not loaded in a designated flight except diplomatic pouches, newspaper, newspaper blocks, news films, manuscripts, animals, blood serum, radioisotope and other emergency articles, which can be identified safety by their type or the package at a time of the acceptance.</p>
<p>③ Security management of mail</p>	<p>In entrust, transporting and consignment of mail, security management is made to prevent explosives from being mixed in. When mail is entrusted and consigned, reconfirmation of the number and re-check of appearance is made to prevent suspicious articles from being mixed in.</p>	<p>Same as in the left. Security management of mail and confirmation of the number and re-checks of appearance when mail is entrusted and consigned are reinforced.</p>	<p>Same as in the left.</p>

(Supplementary Rule)

(Note 1): Definition of known shipper and Unknown shipper

Known shipper is that forwarders of parcels with deferred payment, separate payment or separate instrument payment, and those who constantly or periodically use post offices which forward parcels. Unknown shipper is that other than known shipper.

(Note 2): Acceptance inspection

- (1) Regarding suspicious parcels of known shipper and all parcels of unknown shipper except those offering no reason for doubt from the appearance, a forwarder is required to declare for the contents of parcels.
- (2) Parcels are opened when they are considered suspicious under the above (1).
- (3) When a forwarder refuses to open one's parcels, parcels cannot be accepted.

(Note 3): Confirmation of safety retention for 24 hours

All parcels consigned by the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications are retained for 24 hours from the time of acceptance by that. The time of retention can be a sum of retention by the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications and retention by airlines.

(Note 4): Confirmation of safety by explosive inspection

An inspection to confirm that no explosives (explosive compound, gunpowder, and inflammable substances or their mixture) exist in parcels. Such as X-RAY inspection and an explosive inspection specified separately or physical inspection.

(Note 5): Suspicious parcels of known shipper

- (1) Those parcels accepted different from an ordinary typical forwarding.
- (2) Those parcels which are suspicion judging from the appearance different from an ordinary form.

(3) In cases where a person who is well considered to have consigned explosives judging from one's strange behavior and circumstances packs and consigns parcels.

Examples of the above (1) to (3) are;

- a) Parcel weighing unreasonably heavy from their size.
- b) Parcel with sound (clock) or queer odor.
- c) Parcel oddly packed in relation to their contents
- d) Parcel considered consigned by another person.
- e) Parcel with queer package (Goods with a seal off or with a sign of being packed again)

(Note 6): Parcels with no reason for doubt from the appearance

Parcels wrapped with clear vinyl or plastics.

About the PHASE

Each PHASE is applied based on the following items.

PHASE	Degree of a threat
I (Precaution)	
II (Strict precaution)	Strict measures against terrorist acts are considered necessary in cases where state or government guests visit Japan, socially-significant events such as the Olympic games take place, terrorist acts are expected because of wars or conflicts and reliable information terrorism is obtained.
E (Emergency)	Extremely strict measures against terrorist acts are considered necessary in cases where there is highly strong possibility of terrorist acts for very important state or government guests or for a large number of such guests in Japan and information on highly possible terrorism is obtained.

5. 当該国訪問機関に提出した英文所見

JAPAN INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AGENCY (JICA)
TOKYO INTERNATIONAL CENTRE (TIC)
49-5, 2-CHOME, NISHIHARA, SHIBUYA-KU,
TOKYO 151 JAPAN

Bangkok, August, 19, 1992

Dear Sir


It is my great pleasure to submit the summary report of the Follow-up Team for Ex-participants of Seminar on Aviation Security (former name - Seminar on Airport Management and Aviation Security).

The Team, which was dispatched by Japan International Cooperation Agency as a part of its technical follow-up programme for the returned participants of Aviation Security Seminar and consists of four members as mentioned below, arrived in Thailand on August 16, 1992 and then continued its follow-up activities for the period of three days.

Through the visit of this time, we could obtain many valuable comments and suggestions about this seminar from the competent authorities concerned and also from the ex-participants and other people around them. We are quite sure that the information we obtained should be greatly useful for the purpose of improving this seminar and also technical cooperation programme.

Finally I would like to express my heartiest appreciation for your warm hospitality and kind cooperation extended to us during our stay in your country.

Yours faithfully.



Tetsuya UZAWA
Leader, Follow-up Team for Ex-participants
of Seminar on Aviation Security

SUMMARY REPORT

The Technical Follow-Up Team for JICA Participants who attended Seminar on Aviation Security

I. OBJECTIVES:

The Follow-up Team visited ex-participants, their organizations and related organizations for the purpose of

- i) researching the overall sector of this training field in the countries the team visited, thus contributing to identification of problems and needs ex-participants may now have in their daily execution of work,
- ii) providing consultation through evaluation of the results of the training in Japan, thus checking the applicability of the training items and
- iii) improving the JICA's future training program in the field of Aviation Security.

II. PERIOD:

From August 16, 1992 to August 19, 1992.

III. MEMBERS

- (1) Tetsuya Uzawa (Team Leader)
Director,
Office of Unlawful Interference Prevention,
Civil Aviation Bureau,
Ministry of Transport
- (2) Yoshikazu Ishii (Technical Instructor)
Staff Director,
Security Administration,
Japan Airlines
- (3) Yukiharu Kobayashi (Planner & Coordinator)
Training Officer
Second Training Division,
Tokyo International Centre
Japan International Cooperation Agency

(4) Yoshiro Nagaoka (Special Advisor to the Team)
JICA Expert on Aviation Security
Assigned to Airport Service Division,
The Department of Aviation

IV. SCHEDULE OF THE FOLLOW-UP TEAM

1. 16(Sun.) Ar. Bangkok (17:05)
2. 17(Mon.)
 - Visit to JICA office for arrangement of the schedule
 - Courtesy Call to the Embassy of Japan
 - Courtesy Call to Department of Technical and Economic
Cooperation
 - Courtesy Call to Department of Aviation
 - Meeting with Ex-participants
3. 18(Tue.)
 - Courtesy Call to Airports Authority of Thailand
 - Meeting with Ex-participants
 - Observation to the related facilities
4. 19(Wed.)
 - Seminar on Enhancement of Civil Aviation Security
Measures at Imperial Hotel
 - Friendship Party Hosted by the Team
 - Report to JICA Office

Lv. Bangkok (22:10) JL-718

V. PERSONNEL IN THAILAND WITH WHOM THE TEAM MET

1. Department of Technical and Economic Cooperation

External Cooperation Division III

Ms. Tipsuda Nopmongcol

Chief of Japan Sub-Div

Ms. Mantana Thammachoti

Program Officer, Japan Sub-Div

Policy and Planning Division

Ms. Suthanone Fungtammasan

Chief of Training Analysis Sub-Div

Ms. Jitkasem Tantasiri

Program Officer Training Analysis Sub-Div

Ms. Srichit Tantisuwitkul

Program Officer, Training Analysis Sub-Div

2. Department of Aviation

Mr. Rungroj Sriprasertsook

Director General

Mr. Piyasak Chukes

Deputy Director General

Ms. Boonruay Chobchai

Director of Airports Service Division

3. Airports Authority of Thailand

Mr. Anake Udit

Deputy Managing Director (Administration)

Mr. Nirandra Theeranartsin

Director of Training & Development Division

Mr. Suthara Huangsuwan

Specialist, Phuket International Airport

Mr. Suthad Chimjarod

Administrative Personnel 5, Control & Inspection Div., Security Dept.

VI. EX-PARTICIPANTS WITH WHOM THE TEAM MET (Thailand)

<u>YEAR OF TRAINING</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>PRESENT POST</u>
1987	MR. M.L.YOM NGONROTH	AIRPORTS AUTHORITY OF THAILAND BANGKOK INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF SECURITY DEPT.
1988	MS. SAMERJAI CHUASUCHARIT	AIRPORTS AUTHORITY OF THAILAN BANGKOK INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT SECURITY DEPT., CONTROL & INSPECTION DIV., AIRPORT ADMINISTRATIVE PERSONNEL 6
1989	MR. WITHOON PHUMPHURK	DEPARTMENT OF AVIATION AIRPORTS SERVICE DIVISION TRANSPORT TECHNICIAN OFFICER
1990	MS. MONRUDEE GETTUPHAN	AIRPORTS AUTHORITY OF THAILAND SECURITY DEPARTMENT ADMINISTRATIVE SUB-DIVISION ADMINISTRATIVE PERSONNEL 6
1991	MR. CHOMNONG SARNAKSORN	DEPARTMENT OF AVIATION AIRPORT SERVICES DIVISION CHIEF, CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY BRANCH
1992	MR. SUCHART KANNIM	AIRPORTS AUTHORITY OF THAILAND BANGKOK INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT SECURITY DEPT., CONTROL & INSPECTION DIV., ADMINISTRATIVE PERSONNEL 5

four international airports. It seems to us that it is more effective and efficient to exchange the knowledge, techniques and experiences between DOA and AAT for the further improvement of aviation security in nationwide Thailand.

4. Selection of Applicants & Distribution of General Information

Most of ex-participants are working in Bangkok; in the center or headquarters of each organization. Selection of applicants and delivery of the General Information, therefore, may be diversified in the future so that the authorities concerned (DTEC, DOA, AAT and so on) can select eligible candidates from a wider range of sections and offices (e.g. local airports other than Bangkok) dealing with aviation security in nationwide Thailand.

5. Aviation Security in Thailand and the future

The system of aviation security, as we observed, is well-developed and well-organized. We were told that the international and domestic air traffic volumes have been, and will be, increased year by year. Therefore, the role of aviation security in Thailand has been, and will be so important in the future that the necessity of further training of personnels and of the transfer of the knowledge and techniques in the field of aviation security to nationwide Thailand is keenly felt by this Follow-Up Team.

Finally we would like to express our heartfelt gratitude to all the respective authorities concerned, their superiors and our dear ex-participants for their kind cooperation, assistance and hospitalities. We could not have carried out this work in the short time given to us if it had not been for tremendous help rendered by those kindness.

Thank you very much.

VIII. THE IMPRESSION OF THE TEAM

The impression the Team received through the visits to the organizations concerned and discussions with the ex-participants and their superiors is as follows:

1. Further Improvement of the Seminar Curriculum

Through the activities in Thailand, we have received many valuable information about the present situation of aviation security in Thailand, suggestions and comments from ex-participants. It is said that the seminar curriculum were suggestive and informative. However, taking their valuable opinions into consideration, we would like to continue to make further efforts to improve Aviation Security Seminar.

2. Results and Applicability of the Training in Japan

It is found some concrete examples of the training result. So, we would like to improve the seminar curriculum more applicable. In addition, we are impressed by the fact that ex-participants are occupying important positions in their services and have been in their senior posts, carrying out prominent work in their respective organizations. And, they were very cooperative to the team and we are very grateful. This is, we understand, one of results of the training in Japan.

3. Identification of Characteristics in terms of Aviation Security in Thailand

Overall, the system of aviation security is well-developed and well-organized as far as we discussed with ex-participants in DOA and AAT and observed Bangkok International Airport. However, still, we felt something *inadequate* in Golf Course near Bangkok International Airport.

Entities in the field of aviation security are divided; DOA is in charge of local airports and AAT is especially in charge of

VII. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Among 8 (eight) ex-participants, the Team could meet with the 6 (six) of them and they also cooperated with the Team in answering the Questionnaire which JICA had distributed in advance and questions by the Team when interviews.

Through the meeting with the ex-participants and officers of the related organizations, the Team could obtain their proposals for improving the seminar and precious information of the present situation in the field of aviation security in Thailand which will contribute to improving further/the seminar curriculum.

(1) Suggestions and opinions obtained all through the activities of the Team in Thailand for improving the ongoing seminar as follows:

a) Objectives on General Information

It is found that objectives written on General Information have completely accommodated the requirement in the field of aviation security in Thailand.

b) Identification of Problems in Thailand

It could not be found any serious technical problems except the following.

- Lack of budget and manpower
- Hard to apply the acquired knowledge in Japan to the aviation security system in domestic airports

c) Following subjects were found to be useful

1). Lectures

- Training of Security Personnel (How to improve and promote screening officers)
- Security and Airport Management (esp. by means of contract for rationalization)

- Manuals for Security Control
- Security Measures in Narita Airport (esp. fencing centralized monitoring)
- Supervision on screening training course
- Security Administration
- Countermeasures to prevent Acts of Unlawful Interference against Civil Aviation (for establishing measures in Thailand)

2). Practical training

- Observation to Hitachi Medico, Nitcha Denso, Nagasaki and Fukuoka (local) Airport

It is found that the above-mentioned subjects should be in the seminar curriculum continuously and be reorganized so that they can be more applicable in daily duties.

(2) Suggestions and opinions obtained all through the activities of the Team in Thailand for improving the future seminar as follows:

a) Request to improve the ongoing seminar programme

It is found that the following subjects should be added for the future participants in accordance with the needs of ex-participants and related organizations.

- Annex 17, 18 and Security Manuals
- Recent ICAO documents

JAPAN INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AGENCY (JICA)
TOKYO INTERNATIONAL CENTRE (TIC)
49-5, 2-CHOME, NISHIHARA, SHIBUYA-KU,
TOKYO 151 JAPAN

Manila, August, 14, 1992

Dear Sir


It is my great pleasure to submit the summary report of the Follow-up Team for Ex-participants of Seminar on Aviation Security (former name - Seminar on Airport Management and Aviation Security).

The Team, which was dispatched by Japan International Cooperation Agency as a part of its technical follow-up programme for the returned participants of Aviation Security Seminar and consists of three members as mentioned below, arrived in Republic of the Philippines on August 9, 1992 and then continued its follow-up activities for the period of five days.

Through the visit of this time, we could obtain many valuable comments and suggestions about this seminar from the competent authorities concerned and also from the ex-participants and other people around them. We are quite sure that the information we obtained should be greatly useful for the purpose of improving this seminar and also technical cooperation programme.

Finally I would like to express my heartiest appreciation for your warm hospitality and kind cooperation extended to us during our stay in your country.

Yours faithfully.



Tetsuya UZAWA

Leader, Follow-up Team for Ex-participants
of Seminar on Aviation Security

SUMMARY REPORT

The Technical Follow-Up Team for JICA Participants who attended Seminar on Aviation Security

I. OBJECTIVES:

The Follow-up Team visited ex-participants, their organizations and related organizations for the purpose of

- i) researching the overall sector of this training field in the countries the team visited, thus contributing to identification of problems and needs ex-participants may now have in their daily execution of work,
- ii) providing consultation through evaluation of the results of the training in Japan, thus checking the applicability of the training items and
- iii) improving the JICA's future training program in the field of Aviation Security.

II. PERIOD:

From August 9, 1992 to August 14, 1992.

III. MEMBERS

- (1) Tetsuya Uzawa
Director,
Office of Unlawful Interference Prevention,
Civil Aviation Bureau,
Ministry of Transport
- (2) Yoshikazu Ishii
Staff Director,
Security Administration,
Japan Airlines
- (3) Yukiharu Kobayashi
Staff
Second Training Division,
Tokyo International Centre
Japan International Cooperation Agency

IV. SCHEDULE OF THE FOLLOW-UP TEAM

1. Aug. 9 (Sun.) Ar. Manila (13:00) JL-741
2. Aug. 10 (Mon.)
 - Visit to JICA office for arrangement of the schedule
 - Courtesy Call to NEDA
 - Courtesy Call to Department of Transportation and
Communication (DOTC)
3. Aug. 11 (Tue.)
 - Visit to Air Transportation Office
 - Meeting with Ex-participants
 - Visit to Manila International Airport Authority
 - Meeting with Ex-participants
 - Observation to the related facilities
4. Aug. 12 (Wed.)
 - Courtesy Call to Civil Aviation Training Center (CATC)
 - Seminar on Enhancement of Civil Aviation Security Measures at CATC
 - Friendship Party Hosted by the Team
 - Report to JICA Office
5. Aug. 13 (Thu.)
 - Lv. Manila (16:30) PR-835
 - Ar. Cebu (17:35)
6. Aug. 14 (Fri.)
 - Visit to Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority
 - Meeting with Ex-participants
 - Observation to the related facilities
7. Aug. 15 (Sat.)
 - Collection of data and Report Making
 - Meeting in the Team
8. Aug. 16 (Sun.)
 - Lv. Cebu (11:00) PR-832
 - Ar. Manila (12:20)
 - Lv. Manila (14:55) TG-621

V. PERSONNEL IN PHILIPPINES WITH WHOM THE TEAM MET

1. NEDA

Ms. Carmencita J. Guiyab

Executive Officer, Special Committee on Scholarships

Ms. Aurora T. Collantes

Japan Desk Officer, Special Committee on Scholarships

2. Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC)

Hon. Jesus B. Garcia, JR.

Secretary

Mr. Valde Canes

Under Secretary

Atty. Graciano L. Sitchon

Chief Legal Officer

3. Air Transportation Office (ATO)

Mr. Gerardo C. Protacio

Assistant Secretary

4. Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA)

Mr. Guillermo G. Cunanan

General Manager

5. Civil Aviation Training Center

Mr. Reynaldo D. Fernando

Superintendent

6. Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority

Capt. Antonio Oppus

General Manager

VI. EX-PARTICIPANTS WITH WHOM THE TEAM MET (Philippines)

<u>YEAR OF TRAINING</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>PRESENT POST</u>
1988	MR. PEPITO M. DONAIRE	AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE TECHNICAL OPERATIONS DIVISION AIRPORT MANAGER
1989	MR. CELESTINO S. CONEL	MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY INTERNATIONAL TERMINAL OPERATIONS DIVISION TERMINAL SUPERVISOR C
1989	MR. EUSEBIO REYNOR CHITO C. ESTEBAN	MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY GROUND OPERATIONS DIVISION TERMINAL SUPERVISOR C
1990	MR. ROBERTO B. GALVEZ	MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY AIRPORT POLICE DEPARTMENT INTERNATIONAL PASSENGER TERMINAL DIVISION SPECIAL POLICE CORPORAL
1992	MR. JOSEPH V. TOGONON	MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY AIRPORT POLICE DIVISION DIVISION MANAGER

VII. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Among 5 (five) ex-participants, the Team could meet with the all of them and also they cooperated with the Team in answering the Questionnaire which JICA had distributed in advance and questions by the Team when interviews.

Through the meeting with the ex-participants and officers of the related organizations, the Team could obtain their proposals for improving the seminar and precious information of the present situation in the field of aviation security in Phillipines which will contribute to improving the seminar curriculum.

(1) Suggestions and opinions obtained all through the activities of the Team in Phillipines for improving the seminar as follows:

a) Objectives on General Information

We found that objectives written on General Information have completely accomodated the requirement in the field of aviation security in Phillipines.

b) Identification of Technical Problems in Phillipines

·Lack of statistical data → hard to prepare to statistical reports → no good analysis of the present situations

·Too many security personnels (ex. Airport Authorities, Phillipines National Police - Police Aviation Security Command) → hard coordination when applying knowledge which ex-participants acquired from the training in Japan

·Basic police equipments not enough

We found that we should take the above-mentioned problems into consideraion when we review and conduct our seminar curriculum.

c) Following subjects were found to be useful

- Manuals for Security control
- Outline of Equipments & Its Development
- Civil Aviation in Japan
- Airport Management & Security Guard
- International Measures/Standards of Aviation Security
- Preventive Measures by Airline Companies

We found that the above-mentioned subjects should be in the seminar curriculum continuously. However, it is difficult, ex-participants said, to apply to their daily duties concretely. So, these subjects should be reorganized so that they can be more applicable. (Still, we are glad to hear that some concrete examples are now carried out with the hints of the acquired knowledge/techniques in our seminar curriculum.)

VIII. THE IMPRESSION OF THE TEAM

The impression the Team received through the visits to the organizations concerned and discussions with the ex-participants and their superiors is as follows:

1. Further Improvement of the Seminar Curriculum

Through the activities in Philippines, we have received many valuable information about the present situation of aviation security in Phillipines, suggestions and comments from ex-participants. Among them, it is hard, they said to apply the acquired knowledge/techniques to daily duties concretely even though the seminar curriculum were still suggestive and informative due to the problems identified and mentioned in the above VII. (1), b). Taking their valuable opinions into consideration, we would like to make further efforts to improve Aviation Security Seminar.

2. Results and Applicability of the Training in Japan

We found, still, some concrete examples of the training result. So, we would like to improve the seminar curriculum more applicable. In addition, we are impressed by the fact that ex-participants are occupying important positions in their services and have been in their senior posts, carrying out prominent work in their respective organizations. And, they were very cooperative to the team and we are very grateful. This is, we understand, one of results of the training in Japan.

3. Identification of Characteristics in terms of Aviation Security in Phillipines

Overall, the system of aviation security is getting better. One of examples is the installation of Inspection Equipment at the Entrance Gate after Gulf War. However, still, we found the maintenance of the outside fence is not good.

Entities in the field of aviation security are divided; MIAA is in charge of overall ground and PNP is especially in charge of X-ray and body check. This may affect the problems mentioned in VII . (1), b).

4. Selection of Applicants & Distribution of General Information

Most of ex-participants were in the field, not in the position of policy-making for the field. Our seminar curriculum, of course, is useful for the personnels in the field, and also is more useful for the personnels in the position of policy-making for the field of aviation security. Selection of applicants and delivery of the General Information, therefore may be diversified in the future so that the authorities concerned (NEDA, DOTC, MIAA, MCIAA and so on) can select eligible candidates from a wider range of sections and offices (ex. PNP-ASCOM) dealing with aviation security in Phillipines.

Finally we would like to express our heartfelt gratitude to all the respective authorities concerned and our dear ex-participants and especially to Civil Aviation Training Center organizing the Seminar held on August 12 for their cooperation, assistance and hospitalities. We could not have carried out this work in the short time given to us if it had not been for tremendous help rendered by those attendances.

Thank you very much.

JICA