



DATA COLLECTION SURVEY

on the Venezuelan
Refugee and Migrant
Situation in the
Republic of Colombia

2020



SAYARA
INTERNATIONAL

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AAHF	Action Against Hunger Foundation
ADRA	Adventist Development and Relief Agency
AECID	Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation
APC	Presidential Agency for International Cooperation
BMZ	German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development
BCV	Central Bank of Venezuela
CATI	Computer-assisted telephone interviewing
CERF	United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund
CNPV	National Population and Housing Census
CONPES	Consejo Nacional de Política Económica y Social
DRA	Dutch Relief Alliance
DRC	Danish Refugee Council
ENCOVI	National Survey of Living Conditions
EU	European Union
GBV	Gender-Based Violence
GCF	Global Concessional Financing Facility
GDC	German Development Cooperation
GIFMM	Interagency Group on Mixed Migration Flows
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GEIH	Colombian Large Integrated Household Survey
GIFMM	Inter-Agency Group on Mixed Migration Flows

ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent
ILO	International Labor Organization
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IPUMS	Integrated Public Use Microdata Series
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
JRS	Jesuit Refugee Service
LAC	Latin America and the Caribbean
MA	Metropolitan Area
NGO	Non-governmental organization
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
OAS	Organization of American States
OCHA	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
ODA	Official Development Assistance
PADF	Pan American Development Foundation
PAHO	Pan American Health Organization
PEP	Permiso Especial de Permanencia
R4V	Response For Venezuela
RAMV	Registro Administrativo de Migrantes Venezolanos
RITA	International Network for Transformation and Support
RMRP	Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan
SECO	State Secretariat for Economic Affairs of Switzerland
SDC	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
TdH	Terre des Hommes
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UN-HABITAT	United Nations Human Settlements Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund

UN Women	United Nations Program for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women
UNHCR	The UN Refugee Agency
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VMR-CR	Venezuelan Migrants Refugees and Colombian Returnees
WB	World Bank
WFP	World Food Program survey
WHO	World Health Organization

GLOSSARY

Refugees and Migrants

UNHCR defines refugees as “persons fleeing armed conflict or persecution”, and migrants are those who choose to move not because of a direct threat of persecution or death but mainly to improve their lives by finding work, or in some cases for education, family reunion, or other reasons. When migrants and refugees are mentioned in this report, it is understood that there is a “mixed migration flow” in the case of the departures from Venezuela, and for both categories of people, moving is not easy and requires effort (UNHCR, 2007): “Migration and refugees protection are two different but complementary themes, especially with regard to those situations in which refugees travel together with a large number of people who do not need international protection or whose motivations are different from those that justify the granting of international protection. This is what we call mixed migration flows, which characterize the current Venezuelan regional migratory dynamics.”



INTRODUCTION

Recent migration from Venezuela has represented a major challenge for Colombia, which has traditionally been the source of significant migratory flows, with Venezuela as the most prominent destination. There is a notable growth, since 2015, of arrivals of Venezuelans and also of returning Colombians, in many cases representing complete households. Over the past two years, the precipitated mass movement of migrants in precarious condition and in need of urgent care, in some cases while in transit, added to the complexity to meeting migrant's needs.

In Colombia, according to official figures, as of March 31, 2020, there were 1,809,872 Venezuelans, 784,234 regular and 1,025,638 irregulars. Moreover, several hundred thousand Colombians have returned (between 400,000 and 600,000), in many cases accompanied by Venezuelan couples and children born there. Integration of incoming migrants is one of the greatest challenges facing the country, due to the vulnerability of these migrants, especially those who have an irregular migration status.

Figure 1.
Concentration of Migrants at National Level, Colombia, 2019



With a total

48.910.936
population


The **GECH-2019**
estimates those

2.039.337
born abroad


Of these,

1.912.672
were born in
Venezuela

Inhabitants of Colombia according to place of birth



Foreigners Birthplace



To support the Colombian government and the migrant and refugee community, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) commissioned a research study from Sayara International, that would shed light on the needs of migrants, refugees, returnees and receiving communities, the institutional and international response, as well as, their financial and service delivery challenges, whose provision of which is affected by the pressure exerted by the continuous flow of migrants and refugees. In particular, the aims of the research are to identify:

1. The social, economic and political factors in Venezuela that triggered mass migration and a continuous flow of migrants.
2. Assistance plans and collaborative initiatives by governments in the Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) region, multilateral organizations, and bilateral donors to support refugees, migrant populations, and host countries.
3. The situation of Venezuelan refugees and migrants in Colombia and the needs of the central and local governments regarding infrastructure and social services to support the incoming population, as well as, to maintain quality services for the existing Colombian population, including issues such as electricity, transportation, water, sanitation, education and health.
4. Potential borrowers of Japanese ODA loans, with general information on: organization, finances, capacity of external indebtedness, experience of acquisition of ODA

loans and processes completed to obtain them. Also, corporate guidelines on issues such as: transparency, access to information, gender, environmental and social issues.

In addition, an ODA loan framework is proposed, as a means of negotiating with the Colombian government, as well as, suggestions for projects and sources of cooperation. Finally, the study provides a reflection on the future of Venezuelan migration in the medium and long term (5 and 10 years).

CONCLUSIONS

ON THE CONDITIONS THAT HAVE SPURRED MIGRATION

The magnitude of the economic, social and political crisis in Venezuela is projected to continue to drive migration flows, once border closure are reopened, with a similar intensity experienced prior to the start of the COVID19 pandemic. The crisis conditions, in which the destination countries will find themselves in as a result of the pandemic, will be less serious than the turmoil experienced in Venezuela. However, it is expected that there will be changes in migration flows, as Venezuelan migrants move within the Colombia-to-Peru corridor, and in some cases return to Venezuela, depending on regional government's migration policies and measures to address the COVID19 pandemic.

ON THE SITUATION OF MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES

High degrees of precariousness prevail in the living conditions and access to rights by migrants, which is further exacerbated by the economic inactivity and the social isolation resulting from the COVID19 pandemic. The situation is particularly complex for Venezuelans, compared to Colombian returnee's and for women, especially in the context of increasing xenophobia. Irregular migration increases the vulnerability of Venezuelan migrants and refugees, and limits their access to the right to work, which is mitigated by temporary regularization, a status enjoyed by a proportional minority.

ABOUT THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

Multilateral organizations and bilateral donors, as well as other assistance and cooperation institutions, have responded to the crisis, coordinating at the LAC level in the Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants of Venezuela (R4V), which in Colombia is expressed in the Interagency Group on Mixed Migration Flows (GIFMM), chaired by IOM and UNHCR. Initially, efforts have been directed towards humanitarian assistance and the coverage of

immediate basic needs. The governments of the region have responded in different ways, conditioned by their local budget and resources as well as regularization policies, which limit granting access to rights to migrants, mainly those related to healthcare, education, housing and WASH.

In Colombia, despite the efforts made by national and local levels, whose institutions have accessed resources from donor funds and have even resorted to loans with the Multilateral Bank to finance the care needs of migration issues, there remains an unmet need for financial support. Those needs are more noticeable in the health, education, family welfare, aqueduct and energy sectors, in addition to, services provided to important groups of indigenous populations.

COLOMBIA AS A POTENTIAL APPLICANT FOR JAPANESE ODA LOANS

Although different authorities told the consulting team that at the moment there is no government interest in financing the care of the migrant phenomenon through the contracting of external credit operations with governments, some considerations are provided for the framework of an ODA Loan program with the Colombian Government, related to: the Colombian Government's debt policy; the need for a financial cooperation agreement; and the importance of prior technical cooperation actions, as a strategy to advance mutual knowledge and trust.

Additionally, the consultancy found that, in general, the Colombian State has significant experience in the process and management of ODA and that there are clear and reliable procedures in this regard and guidelines regarding sensitive issues such as transparency, gender and environmental protection, including prior consultation mechanisms with project-sensitive communities.

OPPORTUNITIES

In response to the priorities established by the national government, opportunities for international cooperation in various fields, including ODA, were identified, associated with JICA's interest in contributing to the country's infrastructure and long-term actions that benefit not only the migrant, refugee and returnee population, but also to other vulnerable communities that also lack access to primary services.

The following are potential opportunities for funding:



Health care:

Expansion and improvement of hospital and public health infrastructure and provision of technological equipment and top-level care teams to verify health status and screenings. This is even more pressing need to face the current pandemic.



Education:

Expanding access to education through improvements and expansion of infrastructure, construction of new classrooms and sanitation facilities.



Protection of vulnerable groups:

Mobile Protection Units, for attention to children and adolescents; construction and provision of infrastructure for care and shelter services for mothers and children; and solutions for drinking water and basic sanitation for populations in irregular settlements (inhabited by both locals, migrants and refugees' communities).



Information technology and communications:

Strengthening of information systems that allow registration and characterization of the migrant population, as well as, verification of entry and length-of-stay in the country; and strengthen migration governance through the use of big data and digital communication interfaces between migrants, local communities and institutions.



Economic inclusion of migrants:


Contribution to the strategy of income generation for immigrants in relation to the infrastructure that allows expanding the options of access of the migrant population to the certification programs of competences and professional training; and support for the promotion of local economic development, through investment in public works, creation of special economic zones, stimulation of tourism development and strengthening of the Orange Economy.

METHODOLOGY



In the complex context of the Venezuelan migration into Colombia, JICA proposes to bring to bear Japanese resources and expertise in support of the efforts of the Colombian national government and local institutions to increase infrastructure for the provision of basic services, which may include water, sanitation, solid waste management, electricity, transportation, education, and health. To inform decision-making on the most appropriate and impactful sectoral focus, delivery mechanisms, partners, and implementation methodology for these resources, JICA required to assess and analyze (a) the drivers, needs, and demands (now and in the future) of both migrant and host populations; (b) international donor action and coordination mechanisms; and (c) national and local government capacity to respond through systems that support accountable borrowing and are geared to transparent and equitable resource distribution, taking into account the needs of both refugee and host communities and the social, conflict, gender, and environmental impact of resource provision; d) review of predictive analysis by experts on the impact of the COVID19 pandemic in the Venezuelan migration flow in South America.

Based on JICA's research objectives, a series of interrelated activities were designed into three phases: (i) pre-research engagement; (ii) core research; and (iii) analysis and reporting. The research team described each stage, its purpose, process, participants, and outputs in more detail below.



Phase 1:

Pre-research Engagement

During this phase, the team of experts engaged with a comprise group of key stakeholders (KSH) including Government of Colombia partners at national and local levels, donor partner organizations, and non-state stakeholders (e.g. NGOs, academic institutions, national and international think-tanks, and Venezuelan diaspora CSOs) who were consulted as part of the research activities. The KSH were involved during interviews to enrich and validate the findings of the literature review, as well as three collaborative causes, effects, and scenarios analysis workshops carried out in Bogotá.

Given the requirement for a rapid research process and the extent of information already available from current literature, the team analyzed and collate key data and findings from the written evidence divide into four categories: 1) migration studies, 2) official policy and programming documents, 3) socio-economic and political backdrop, and 4) lessons learned from comparative analysis.



Phase 2:

Core Research

During this phase, the team of experts undertook core primary research, specifically (a) the Migration Crisis Needs Assessment, (b) Donor Response Mapping, and (c) the Public Financial Institutional Assessment.

This component of the research was carried out in four municipalities of Colombia Venezuelan migrants tend to settle in major cities and large urban centers with greater capacity to provide work opportunities and better livelihoods. However, Colombian cities already face challenges providing essential services such as clean water, electricity, and transportation.

Based on these criteria, the team chose to cover large urban areas, intermediate cities, and border and semi-rural municipalities. Indicatively, selected **Bogotá** (main capital city and largest urban area), **Medellín** and **Barranquilla** (urban intermediate cities), and **Yopal** (semi-rural border municipality). Due to the extensive research already carried out in Norte de Santander (**Cúcuta** and **Villa del Rosario**), a thorough literature review provided sufficient information to cover this geographical area.

Due to COVID-19 and the subsequent policies of mandatory social isolation implemented by the Colombia government, field research methodologies as well as qualitative and quantitative instruments were adapted to digital tools through different online platforms. Forty-eight semi-structured interviews and 20 surveys were carried out with key participants in Bogotá D.C., Barranquilla, Medellín, and Yopal. In total, 492 VMR-CR responded to the surveys. The information was complemented by 24 semi-structured interviews with individuals selected from this same population.

In order to inform a potential cooperation agreement between JICA and the Colombian Government, a mapping of key donors was conducted through the [literature review](#) of donor policy, programming and project documents as well as key interviews with local governmental and nongovernmental actors.

READ MORE ABOUT FIELD RESEARCH METHODOLOGY IN THE SECTION “FIELDWORK METHODOLOGY WITH VMR-CR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS”

Finally, the team assessed the opportunities for potential cooperation programs and ODA loan operation between JICA and the Colombian Government. In order to identify such opportunities the team of experts carried out in-depth interviews and review of official documentation provided by Ministry of Finance and National Planning Department, Ministry of Health and Social Protection; Ministry of Education; Colombia Migration (from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs); Ministry of Energy Ministry of Housing and Territory (Vice Ministry of Water); all potential implementors of a ODA loan. Information provided was analyzed against a set of financial indicators for public institutions, which worked as a guide to assess programming, reporting and experience of each institution with international cooperation and ODA loans.



Phase 3: Analysis and Reporting

During Phase 3 the research team continued close partnership with Colombian and international stakeholders by conducting findings validation surveys; produce the draft and final research outputs; and facilitated a presentation to JICA and host government and international partners.

LIMITATIONS

Research methods and analysis used for this study are limited when seeking to forecast socio-economic future scenarios, Venezuelan migration flow, and priorities of the Colombian Government regarding external debt and cooperation agreements.

The forecast for the short and medium-term regarding Venezuelan migrations rests on two basic assumptions: 1) the persistence of the Venezuelan crisis; and 2) the policies (both individual and regional) of South American and Caribbean nations in relation to migration. The probability of compliance with the first seems higher than that of the second, which will depend, among other things, on political stability within each country and the impact on national economies due to the ongoing economic crisis associated with the pandemic, as well as the resilience of each country depending on its connection with the global economy. Both factors will impact migratory flow behavior, not only within Venezuela and Colombia, but the region as a whole.

On the other hand, this report and its findings do not aim to represent the Colombian government or be an interlocutor of its interests. The study is an exploration of how the country's institutions are addressing and looking to address, in the medium-and-long-term, the most pressing needs related to Venezuelan migration. The final status in regards to the government priorities will be defined in a potential negotiation phase between JICA and the Colombian government when seeking to sign a cooperation agreement. In that scenario, the findings of this study present a preliminary panorama to inform decisions and further steps.



RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN VENEZUELA



POLITICAL SITUATION

For many, the Venezuelan political crisis began in 1999 with the rise to power of Hugo Chávez, due to the so-called “Bolivarian Revolution” seeking to establish the “Socialism of the 21st century” and the transition from a “representative democracy” for a system of “participatory democracy” designed to empower Venezuelan citizens (González, 2019). These changes did not benefit the traditional elites, which he sought to displace, and ultimately gave “the Chavismo” wide popular support, that permitted him to achieve successive electoral victories. As a result of the political changes Venezuela experienced broad social polarization (Bernal-Meza, 2017; Alfaro, 2018; and González, 2019), which persists to date.

In the Latin American region and Carriben region, Chavista ideology developed a strategy to strengthen a left-wing pole made up of Bolivarian revolutionaries and allies, to contribute to the weakening of the hegemony of the “North American Imperialism” (Bernal-Meza, 2017). The United States accepted the challenge and became the “natural leader” of the opposition pole, which grouped sectors from the rightwing. Countries aligned with one side and the other have changed over the years, depending on the electoral results and changes in government, but the continental polarization continued and has negatively impacted sub-regional integration projects as important as Mercosur, Unasur and the Audenian Community-CAN.

For the anti-chavez supporters, the political crisis began with the succession of Maduro, after the formal repudiation of his election in 2013 by the opposition, which the government subsequently ended up being accepted in practice (Altamirano, 2019). From there, according to Bull and Rosales (2020), Venezuela would have transitioned from a limited democracy to an authoritarian regime.

The first massive protests against and in favor of the Nicolás Maduro's government took place in February 2014. The country's worsening economic situation were related to the drop in oil prices and an exhaustion of the President's political discourse among his own followers, contributed to the victory of the opposition in the elections of representatives to the National Assembly in December 6, 2015 (Sánchez, 2016). These events and the ideological and political distance between the executive and legislative powers, lead to a new focus of tensions in the country.

Protests in Venezuela in response to the political crisis, reached its peak between April and July 2017, leaving more than 120 people dead. In 2018, although mass demonstrations did not occur, the "largest number of spontaneous protests (more than 12 thousand throughout the year) occurred in the entire country, demanding economic and social rights, due to the serious deterioration of living conditions" (Amnesty International, 2019: 4).

From January 21 to 25 of 2019, in 12 out of the 23 Venezuelan states, at least 47 people reportedly died during the protests, all of them from gunshot wounds. On January 10, 2019, Nicolás Maduro was sworn-in a new presidential term after the elections held in May 2018¹. On January 15, the National Assembly, dominated by the opposition, issued the "Agreement on the Declaration of Usurpation of the Presidency of the Republic by Nicolás Maduro Moros and the Constitution Validity Restoration," declaring "legally ineffective the de facto situation created by Nicolas Maduro" and agreeing on a "political and economic transition" where the president of the National Assembly was in charge of "ensuring compliance with legal regulations" (Amnesty International, 2020). The United States' refusal to recognize Maduro, which was imitated by about 40 western countries, and the restrictions imposed on his regime, ended with a political confrontation between the USA, China and Russia at the United Nations. With Venezuela's oil wealth as a background, its situation has become a matter of global geopolitics, in which other countries from outside the region, such as Turkey and Iran, have been seeking to play a role in the politics of Venezuela (Altamirano, 2019; Pantoulas and Mc Coy, 2019).

In January of 2019, Juan Guaidó, declared in charge of the National Assembly, announced that he would call for a new national election, invoking article of the constitution 233. On the 23rd of January, 2019, Guaidó was sworn-in as president in charge of Venezuela and was recognized by the United States of America, the European Parliament and the secretary

¹ Maduro won with a broad advantage, but the elections were not carried out under formal observation by the United Nations or by the OAS, whose General Assembly, in June 2018, described the situation in Venezuela as an economic, political, social and humanitarian crisis, ultimately declaring that such electoral process lacked legitimacy (Altamirano, 2019).

general of the Organization of American States (OAS), among others. In addition, he was accepted as the Venezuelan president in the Lima Group.² In this regard, Dithurbide affirms that North American diplomacy seeks to isolate Maduro in the region, as a form of pressure that seeks an opening of the regime “in line with the traditional policy of promoting a democracy that is liberal, representative and preferably with a market-oriented economic model”(2019: 71).

A year later, Guaidó’s image of being capable of opposing Maduro was diluted, and his international support weakened as result of being unable to consolidate power internally. This is demonstrated by the results of the Meganalisis (2020) survey, carried out between the end of January and early February: where only 10.1% said they trusted the directives of the National Assembly chaired by Guaidó; 63.8% said they no longer believed, trusted, or supported Guaidó; and 12.1% said they had never done so.

However, the above does not necessarily represent support for Maduro, as 79.9% of respondents claimed they do want Maduro and the Chavismo out of power; meanwhile, only 10.4% said otherwise, and 9.6% said they do not know (Meganalisis, 2020)³. These results indicate that Maduro’s regime remains effective at keeping itself in power, independent of the majority, despite popular opinion and the wishes of the international community. Thus, the potential for continued emigration remains real.

For Alekséenko and Pyatakov, the Venezuelan internal political crisis, since last year, have been in a phase of “protracted conflict”, with a probable increase in pressure in different ways, concluded that “Resistance to adversity, already manifested by the Venezuelan leadership, gives reasons for estimating that if the political and economic support of its main extra-regional allies, which are Russia and China, is maintained, Venezuela will be able to overcome the new challenges”(2019: 77-78).

2 The Lima Group is formed by the governments of Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela. More information is provided below.

3 This is a corporate survey financed and conducted by Meganalisis, an opinion research company with 11 years in the market. The survey focuses on topics of general interest for Venezuelans and openly discloses parts of the survey results on its website (<http://www.encuestadorameganalisis.com>), while the complete report can only be accessed by Meganalisis clients. According to the company’s datasheet, the survey aimed to highlight the social, economic, and political conditions in Venezuela. Using the computer-assisted telephone interviewing (CATI) technique, 1,480 people were selected through a simple random sampling and interviewed in the 23 Venezuelan states and the Capital District, including state capitals and rural populations. The estimated margin of error was 2.8%, and the confidence level was 97.0%.

ECONOMIC SITUATION

In the search for explanations to the economic crisis, a fraction of the public opinion focuses on the regime's actions, to which they react to very harshly. There are even those who see them as an expression of a preconceived plan that would misuse national resources by elites associated with the government (Andreani, 2018). On the opposite side are those who attribute all responsibility of the current situation to the sanctions imposed by the United States. For example, "these sanctions have led to the collapse of the economy and the national currency; it forced 3 million Venezuelans to migrate to neighboring countries, especially Colombia" (Muhammed, 2020: 224). Surely, the real causes go beyond the two stated extremes, although some of them may lie within the stated causes.

Regardless of whether or not the previous point of view is accepted, it is clear that the fall of the Venezuelan economy in recent years is dramatic, as Vera (2018) recently presented:

- The Venezuelan economy has accumulated, in the last four years, an abysmal fall in GDP (close to 40%), which not only affects companies due to the absence of imported supplies and producer and capital goods but also the general population that is devoted to the search for essential goods for subsistence.
- The Central Bank of Venezuela (BCV) has run out of operational international reserves.
- To cover the external imbalance, the Maduro government has cut down imports (across the spectrum of goods and services) by almost 76% in the same period. The economy has run out of legal or official exchange markets, putting it at the mercy of an illicit parallel market, which increases economic volatility and black-market activity.
- The accelerated process of inflation, which retrospectively dates back to the end of 2012, has completely ended the transitory and cyclical achievements of the Bolivarian Revolution social development programs.
- The persistent dependency on an exportable natural resource whose income exhibits highly volatile behavior, the tendency to accumulate fiscal deficit management, the excessive weight of the State in the economy, the lack of dynamism by the non-oil private sector to achieve international projection, the high dependency on imports, the chronic overvaluation of the currency, and the secular fall in productivity, are all factors that combine to a crisis in Venezuela.

- The first major cut on imports began at the end of 2012 and continued into 2013. In 2013, the value of imports decreased by 13% compared to 2012. In 2014, 2015, and 2016, annual cuts in imports were respectively 17%, 30%, and 51%. An additional 25% of adjustment is estimated to have occurred in 2017. In perspective, imports of 66 billion dollars in 2012 went to just 12.3 billion in 2017.

Although recent figures are scarce, the results of the Meganalysis (2020) survey (of which more details are given in the following section) suggest some positive changes. When respondents were asked to evaluate the food supply in stores and supermarkets during the last months of 2019 and in January 2020, in comparison to 2017 and 2018, 74.9% agreed with the following statement: "It has changed a lot, people get much more food compared to 2017 and 2018." Meanwhile, 22.3% said, "It has changed a little, people get a bit more food than in 2017 and 2018." Lastly, only 2.7% said that "nothing has changed, the shelves are still empty, food is not available as it was back in 2017 and 2018."

The above, to some extent, could be the result of remittances, which consists of Colombian Peso (COP) used as the main currency in the Venezuelan areas near the Colombian border, and the US Dollar used in the center, as well as other parts of the country. The same survey demonstrates the impact of remittances when showing the results in response to the following question: "How often do you think dollars are managed and used to pay for your household expenses? Where, 8.1% of respondents replied "always, all the time"; 10.1% "very frequently"; 31% "not very often"; and 50.7% "dollars are never used".

SITUATION OF PUBLIC SERVICES

In recent years, the water, electricity, and gas services provided by the Venezuelan state have progressively deteriorated. The World Food Program survey (WFP, 2019), with a sample size of 8,375 respondents, and the Meganálisis (2020), with a sample size of 1,480, provide key information shown in Table 1.

Table 1.
Venezuela. Water, Electricity and Gas Supply, Coverage Indicators and Service Quality, 2019 – 2020

Service	Coverage		Quality	
	WFP 2019	Meganálisis 2020	WFP 2019	Meganálisis 2020
Water	25% have no access to a source of clean drinking water.		4 out of 10 households have daily supply disruptions.	82.7% stated that the drinking water does not run continuously. 83.3% stated that clean water only runs between once and twice a week. 15.1% stated that clean water only runs every 2 or 3 weeks or once every month.
Electricity			Average electricity interruptions = 15 days out of a month. 4 out of 10 households experience daily interruptions.	43.5% describe electricity supply as “dreadful” both in their community and household. 35% describe it as “irregular”
Gas (propane)		94.5% of households need and use domestic gas for cooking.	72% of households have irregular supply. 43% reduced the number of meals per day due to the lack of gas.	57.1% claim it takes between 1 to 2 months to get gas; 39.6% said between 1 to 3 weeks.

Source: WFP, 2019 and Meganálisis 2020

Regarding health services, a survey in 104 healthcare centers, commissioned by the National Assembly and conducted in May 2018, showed a dramatic shortage of essential medicines, catheters, surgical supplies, and infant food. It also showed that hospital laboratories and nutrition services operated intermittently or were completely inoperative. As for intensive care units, 14% had closed their facilities, and the vast majority that remain open reported intermittent failures due to the lack of supplies.

The study showed that intermittent water and electricity services affected healthcare facilities as well as households. The study demonstrated important differences on how public and private institutions were affected, with private institutions experiencing a lower impact. Some wealthy institutions were able to continue to provide their usual services (Jones and Pozzebon, 2018). A year earlier, the 2017 National Hospital Survey⁴ revealed a 75% shortage of surgical material and that 78% of public healthcare centers lacked general medications (Vera, 2018: 90). On the other hand, the health section of the National Survey of Living Conditions (ENCOVI) of 2017 showed that more than 68% of the population lacked healthcare insurance, while in 2014, the proportion was close to 50% (González and Rincón, 2017).

The crisis in Venezuela has also impacted education services. The ENCOVI 2017 survey showed a decrease in the number of students enrolled in the education system between 2014 and 2017 among those aged three to 24, from 78% (2014) to 71% (2017). An estimated one million children and adolescents (three to 17 years old) were out of school. Moreover, among those enrolled in school, 46% did not attend classes regularly, mostly due to lack of food or water, electricity, or transportation services (Freitez, 2017).

⁴ This survey has been conducted by Médicos por la Salud every year since 2014 in response to the absence of official figures on health issues in Venezuela and as an alternative “to show the crisis that [...] existed but no one spoke about” (<https://www.encuestanacionaldehospitales.com/la-encuesta>).

RESPONSES BY LATIN AMERICA AND CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES AND RELEVANT MULTILATERAL ORGANIZATIONS

Government representatives of 12 regional governments gathered in August 2017 to find a peaceful solution to the Venezuelan crisis. During the meeting, government officials signed a statement in this regard, known as the *Lima Declaration*, which led to the creation of the Lima Group. The initial signatories included the following countries: Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, and Peru. Later, the governments of Guyana, Haiti, Saint Lucia, and Bolivia joined the group. In February 2019, Venezuela joined the group, represented by Juan Guaidó, the interim president. Barbados, the United States, Granada, and Jamaica attended and oversaw the process, which was also supported by OAS and the EU from the beginning.

In accordance with the request of the Secretary General of the United Nations to UNHCR and IOM on April 12, 2018, the Regional Interagency Coordination Platform was established to direct and coordinate the regional response to refugees and migrants from Venezuela. The Regional Platform aims to address the protection, assistance, and integration needs of both Venezuelan refugees and migrants in the affected states of Latin America and the Caribbean, by complementing and strengthening the national and regional responses of governments, in line with the principles described in the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants. The Platform focuses on regional strategy and country-specific support, information management, communication (messages and reports) and resource mobilization. Currently, the Regional Platform is made up of 41 participating organizations, including 17 UN agencies, 15 NGOs, five donors, two international financial institutions, and the Red Cross Movement. The Regional Platform is being replicated at national levels through the establishment and strengthening of local coordination mechanisms, in close collaboration with host governments. Taking into account the participants of the national platforms, more than 170 actors collaborate and coordinate through various support groups (in information management, communication/fundraising) and other thematic working groups (support spaces, gender violence, communication with communities, and integration). Among the achievements made include the 2020 Response Plan for Refugees and Migrants, referred to later in this report.

Latin American and Caribbean countries receiving migrants have also sought solutions to specific regional challenges through the *Quito Process*, which specifically focuses on the migration situation independent of the Venezuelan political crisis. These efforts consider both the multinational and multidimensional nature of the migration situation. In September 2018, eleven states signed the Quito Declaration (See Annex 1) on human mobility of

Venezuelan citizens in the region. Regional participation continues to expand in subsequent rounds of meetings (November 2018; April and July 2019). Specifically, the Quito Action Plan (Quito II)⁵ and the Roadmap of the Buenos Aires Chapter (Quito IV), (See Annex 2) describe coordination of specific measures aimed at responding to the migration crisis. In that sense, the Quito process facilitates collaboration between states through the Regional Interagency Coordination Platform.

5 <https://www.cancilleria.gob.ec/la-ii-reunion-internacional-de-quito-concluye-con-la-firma-del-plan-de-accion-sobre-la-movilidad-humana-de-nacionalidad-venezolanos-en-la-region/>.



REFUGEE AND MIGRANT SITUATION OF VENEZUELA



CURRENT AND PROJECTED NUMBER OF VENEZUELAN REFUGEES AND MIGRANTS

The Coordination Platform for Venezuelan Refugees and Migrants (referred hereinafter as “the Inter-Agency Platform” or “the Platform”) estimated that there were 4.5 million Venezuelan migrants in the world as of October 2019, with Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) having received 3.7 million. The figures are projected to grow to 6.5 million and 5.5 million, respectively, by December 2020. Added to that, LAC countries will receive 680,000 returnees and 2.1 million migrants in pendular migration, especially in the borders (R4V, 2020).

The Platform’s official website reported that there were 4,933,920 Venezuelan migrants and refugees in LAC and the world by March 5, 2020. This figure is composed of the number of migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers reported by host governments. The site warns that “the figure does not necessarily imply individual identification, or registration of each

individual, and includes a degree of estimation, according to the statistical data processing methodology used by each government.” It also warns that the real figures may be even higher, given that many of the government data sources are incomplete. Many sources do not count Venezuelans without regular immigration status, return migration from Venezuela, or the pendular movements that occur especially in border areas⁶.

The predictions confirm that Venezuelans’ intentions to emigrate remain high, although there is a decreasing tendency to do so. According to a recent survey conducted between January 23 and February 7, 2020, 28.7% of respondents expressed that there were people in their home or direct family group planning to leave the country (Meganalisis, 2020). Rather, two years ago, at the beginning of 2018, 41% of them expressed their intention to emigrate in the next 12 months. Although these data come from two different sources, the resulting decrease seems evident, especially considering that the most recent question allowed the interviewee to think not only about their personal situation but also about their family environment, providing greater possibilities of an affirmative response.

Notwithstanding, migration, particularly occurring in the current Venezuelan case, has a high degree of unpredictability. Some of the circumstances which affect migration might be related to a country’s internal situation and have already been referenced in the previous chapter. On the other hand, migration may also be linked to the policies and responses in the destination countries, which will be touched on later in this chapter. Regardless of the scale, the migratory flows from Venezuela will continue to be relevant in the short and medium term. The new migratory corridors will likely be maintained, due to a “call effect” of Venezuelan migrants that encourage the migration of friends and relatives, family reunification, and potential return of Colombian citizens currently based in Venezuela.

ESTIMATED DESTINATION BY NUMBER AND COUNTRY

For the estimations detailed in the previous section, the Platform takes the administrative records from governments regarding the residence and regular stay permits granted to Venezuelans. In the case of LAC countries, the estimates amount to 2,446,351 Venezuelan residents (see Table 2), excluding tourist permits, “but possibly including non-valid residence permits and duplicate or triplicate cases (one person with more than one permit granted) in some countries”.

⁶ <https://data2.unhcr.org/es/situations/platform>

Table 2.
Latin America and the Caribbean: Residence and Regular Residence Permits Granted to Venezuelans. Updated on March 5, 2020

Country	Date of data sourcing	Venezuelan residents
Colombia	Dec/31/2019	754,085
Peru	Feb/07/2020	628,976
Chile	Jun/30/2019	472,827
Argentina	Dec/20/2019	188,041
Brazil	Nov/30/2019	123,507
Ecuador	May/31/2019	107,052
Panama	Feb/29/2020	74,802
Mexico	Dec/31/2019	52,982
Uruguay	Dec/31/2019	15,606
Guyana	Nov/11/2019	11,881
Dominican Republic	Jun/30/2019	7,946
Costa Rica	Dec/31/2019	6,164
Curazao	Dec/31/2018	1,291
Paraguay	Jan/08/2020	1,191
Total		2,446,351

Source: Response to Venezuelans, Coordination Platform for Venezuelan Refugees and Migrants, <https://data2.unhcr.org/es/situations/platform>

Second, the Platform examines the statistics of refugee status applications. Out of a total of 805,895 Venezuelans by March 5, 618,593 are based in LAC (Table 3), and the rest in the United States, Spain, Canada, and a group of unspecified countries. It is noted that “in some countries, individual records may be linked to a case (group of individuals) and not just to a single person.”

Table 3.**Latin America and the Caribbean: Request for Refugee Status by Country**

Country	Date of data sourcing	Venezuelan applicants
Peru	Jan/06/2020	394,195
Brazil	Nov/30/2019	129,988
Mexico	Dec/31/2019	18,500
Trinidad and Tobago	Jan/31/2020	17,391
Costa Rica	Jun/30/2019	16,236
Ecuador	Dec/31/2018	13,535
Panama	Dec/31/2019	11,205
Colombia	May/08/2019	5,303
Canada	Jan/31/2019	4,273
Chile	Dec/31/2019	3,499
Argentina	Dec/31/2019	3,457
Uruguay	Jan/31/2020	632
Curazao	Dec/31/2019	379
Total		618,593

Source: Response to Venezuelans, Coordination Platform for Venezuelan Refugees and Migrants,
<https://data2.unhcr.org/es/situations/platform>

Finally, the Platform collects the figures of recognized Venezuelan refugees as a basis for its estimates. Besides the LAC data presented in Table 4, 99,684 Venezuelan refugees in the United States, Canada and Spain are reported, twice the number reported in the LAC region (50,811).

Table 4.
Latin America and the Caribbean: Recognized Venezuelan Refugees

Country	Date of data sourcing	Venezuelan refugees
Brazil	Jan/31/2020	37,467
Ecuador	Dec/05/2019	6,692
Mexico	Dec/05/2019	3,561
Peru	Dec/31/2019	1,225
Trinidad and Tobago	Jul/05/2019	1,196
Argentina	Dec/05/2019	268
Costa Rica	Oct/31/2019	262
Colombia	Dec/05/2019	140
Total		50,811

Source: Response to Venezuelans, Coordination Platform for Venezuelan Refugees and Migrants, <https://data2.unhcr.org/es/situations/platform>

SITUATION FACED BY REFUGEES AND MIGRANTS IN RECEIVING COUNTRIES

The first situation that Venezuelan migrants in LAC must face is their admittance to their destination countries. Before the crisis, permission was granted relatively easily and did not involve particular visa requirements. Nowadays, this has changed substantially. In practice, there are several countries that close their doors to those who do not comply with visa requirements, which are often difficult for migrants to attain (see Tables 5 and 6).

Table 5.
Entry Requirements for Venezuelans in Case-Study Countries,
2015 Versus 2019

Country	Visa Required in Advance for Entry?		Passport Required for Entry?		Accepts Expired Passports from-Venezuelans for Entry? (Dec 2019)
	End of 2015	Dec. 2019	End of 2015	Dec. 2019	
Argentina	No	No	No	No	Yes, national identity documents or passports that expired within the past two years
Brazil	No	No	No	No	Yes, passports that expired up to five years prior
Chile	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes, passports issued in 2013 or later that have expired, until April 18, 2021
Colombia	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes, passports that expired up to two years prior
Costa Rica	No	No	Yes	Yes	No, but will accept passports within a day of expiring
Ecuador	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Guyana	Yes	No*	Yes	No*	No*
Mexico	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
Peru	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes, passports that expired before August 28, 2018 accepted until August 28, 2023, and passports that expired August 28, 2018 or later accepted for up to five years after their expiration date
Trinidad and Tobago	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Uruguay	No	No	No	No	No

* In theory, Venezuelans need a visa and a (valid) passport to enter Guyana, but in practice, this is not enforced.

Source: Selee and Bolter, 2020: 9

Table 6.
Visa Requirements for Venezuelans Introduced Between Mid-2017
and the End of 2019, by Country

Country	Effective Date	Visas Used by Venezuelans	Application Locations	Requirements	Cost
Panama	October 1, 2017	Multiple-entry visa	Caracas, Venezuela	Copies of two forms of identification, including passport Hotel reservation and travel itinerary Proof of economic solvency (at least USD 500)	USD 50
Peru	June 15, 2019	Humanitarian visa	Caracas and Puerto Ordaz, Venezuela; Bogotá, Medellín, and Leticia, Colombia; and Cuenca, Guayaquil, Quito, Machala, and Loja, Ecuador	Passport Apostilled criminal record from Venezuela Copy of national identity document For minors, travel document permitting exit from Venezuela or other country	Free
Trinidad and Tobago	June 17, 2019	Tourist / business visa	Caracas, Venezuela	Passport Copy of national identity document Letter from employer Bank statements Copy of flight and hotel reservations Copy of birth certificate, for minors under 17	Unclear
Chile	June 22, 2019	Tourist visa Democratic Responsibility Visa	Chilean consulate in any country	<u>Tourist visa:</u> Passport Proof of economic solvency <u>Democratic Responsibility Visa:</u> Passport Apostilled criminal record from Venezuela Travel document from country in which the application is submitted	USD 50 USD 30
Ecuador	August 26, 2019	Humanitarian visa	Caracas, Venezuela; Bogotá, Colombia; and Lima, Peru	Passport Apostilled criminal record from Venezuela	USD 50

The case of Peru, presented in a recent Amnesty International report (2020), serves as a clear example. According to the report, the humanitarian visa, which has been in force since June 2019, has proved to be a rejection mechanism for those who own it but are unable to present entry and exit stamps from Ecuador. Likewise, “the changes in asylum procedures in the border between Peru and Ecuador, which have never been officially communicated, seem to be part of a deliberate policy of rejection of new arrivals from Venezuela” (p. 4).

On the other hand, Panama decreed that, as of October 2017, Venezuelans entering national territory must get a visa stamped by the Consulate (Executive Decree No. 473 of August 23, 2017). More recently, Ecuador applied the same policy from August 26, 2019 (González and García, 2019). The procedures and costs that visas entail, including the difficulty in acquiring the Venezuelan passport, become obstacles that are difficult or even impossible to overcome for many migrants. (see: Gandini, Prieto and Lozano, 2019: 21).

Notwithstanding, restrictions of entry to a country rarely discourage migrants, especially if their circumstances are particularly critical. As a result, they must often follow routes and use mechanisms that put their personal safety at risk. As a consequence, these people join others who might have exceeded the authorized time for their stay, no longer meet the requirements for it or have irregular migratory status (Table 7). These conditions can result in new migrants being treated as second-class citizens, often facing exploitation and not having adequate access to services.

Table 7.
Venezuelans with Special Regular Statutes as a Share of Total Venezuelan Population,
Select Countries, Mid- to Late 2019

Country	Type of Status/Permit	Number of Venezuelans with This Regular Status	Share with This Status of All Venezuelans in the Country
Colombia	Special Stay Permit (Permiso Especial de Permanencia, PEP)	598,000	37%
Peru	Temporary Stay Permit (Permiso Temporal de Permanencia, PTP)	420,000	49%
Ecuador	Exceptional Visa for Humanitarian Reasons	15,000	4%
Brazil	Temporary Residence Permit	97,000	43%
Trinidad and Tobago	Six-Month Work Permit Exemption	17,000	79%

Notes: Ecuador’s special regularization process is ongoing through March 2020. There are strong reasons to suspect that the Venezuelan population in Trinidad and Tobago may be far larger than reported and the percent regularized thus much smaller; these calculations are based on the official figures provided by governments and international institutions.

In general, LAC governments have dealt with the arrival of Venezuelans without putting in place a system to provide them refugee status, and have tried a wide variety of provisional mechanisms, which have rarely lasted longer than two years, although in some cases they have been renewed. Despite there being large groups of migrants, which make use of such entry mechanisms, they often end up in irregular living situations.

The following section details some of the procedures or instruments used in the region for the regularization of Venezuelans' residency in LAC receiving countries.

With regard to the general situation of Venezuelan (and Nicaraguan) migrants and their access to basic services in LAC, Selee and Bolter (2020: 2) made the following analysis:

Public education systems are generally open to newcomers, but face capacity challenges. Most countries in the region, with the exception of Trinidad and Tobago, facilitate access to primary and secondary education for newly arrived migrants, regardless of their immigration status. However, school enrollment requirements and students overcrowding become barriers for some migrant families, and as a result, many of their children spend months (or more time) outside of school.

New migrants from Nicaragua and Venezuela have higher rates of participation in the labor force, but most have informal jobs. In most receiving countries, migrants tend to have a higher professional or technical training compared to natives, but their educational qualifications have barriers to be recognized. As a result, many cannot find a job that matches their skills. Most suffer to be granted with a credit, which makes it difficult to undertake projects within the formal economy. These barriers undermine the potential economic gains that receiving countries would obtain from these migratory flows.

RESPONSE AND CHALLENGES FACED BY RECEIVING COUNTRIES IN LAC

The responses of the LAC governments to the Venezuelan exodus have differed and included innumerable policies and legal arrangements, both within and outside the humanitarian protection framework. These measures include temporary residence permits, employment and humanitarian visas, and channels under regional integration agreements such as Mercosur and the Union of South American Nations Unasur (which is at risk of breaking down due to the perception of some new South American presidents that such coalition might strength a leftist political block in the region, including Venezuela). In legal terms, Argentina

and Uruguay have been the most welcoming countries in the region for Venezuelan migrants, both granting unrestricted visas to Venezuelans under the Mercosur Residence Agreement, which allows migrants to live and work in the country for a renewable period of two years, including time extensions to meet these requirements⁷.

While several countries have devised new special legal arrangements to address Venezuelan immigration, such as Peru, Colombia and Chile, others such as Ecuador, Mexico and Panama have provided legal ways to stay using pre-existing immigration channels (Feline Freier and Parent, 2018). Beyond the legal aspects, governments are facing the challenge of meeting the multiple needs of Venezuelan migrants, such as providing work opportunities, healthcare, and access to housing. In addition, governments must address the risks of exploitation and abuse, in particular linked to gender violence; family separation, which can lead to the appearance of unaccompanied and separated children; and the increase of xenophobia. All of the preceding factors have a local integration dimension and entail additional social and cultural obstacles that must be addressed.

Despite the progress made in the last three years, governments in receiving countries are under enormous pressure. The efforts and resources needed to address short and long-term migrant needs often vary and may need to be implemented simultaneously, resulting in the eruption of tensions regarding access to public services and the guarantee of financial aid for migrants. Government efforts can often result in negative public opinion towards the Venezuelan population, resulting in the rise of xenophobia and acts of discrimination towards migrants.

In light of this situation, it is not only of paramount importance that the impacts of the crisis on the LAC region are addressed, but also that the humanitarian situation in Venezuela is quickly resolved, since both dimensions are inextricably connected. The provision of humanitarian assistance for vulnerable populations that is separate from political objectives remains crucial. To face up to the numerous challenges, a concerted multi-front effort, both in the context of the Quito Process and the Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan (RMRP), with the cooperation of the Regional Inter-Institutional Coordination Platform, is of great relevance (R4V, 2020: 11).

⁷ Through the provisions of the DNM 594 (February 2018), based on the Mercosur Residence Agreement, the General Directorate of Immigration of Argentina simplified procedures for Venezuelans. Through Resolution 230 of the Argentina Ministry of Education (February 2018), the validation of university degrees and diplomas conferred by universities recognized by the Venezuelan authorities was authorized.

ESTIMATED FINANCING AND TIMEFRAME REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO SITUATION

Although there are currently no estimates of the funds that regional governments might require to adequately attend to the Venezuelan migration flows into their territories, there is a detailed estimate of the 2020 RMRP's demands in order to address the crisis in 17 LAC countries. The RMRP, which has 137 partners and requires 1,350 million dollars to achieve its aims, is expected to assist 2.47 million Venezuelan refugees and migrants at their destinations, 378,000 in a pendular migration situation, 264,000 returnees, and 877,000 members of the host communities (R4V, 2020).

According to the same Plan, there is a wide range of urgent and ongoing humanitarian and developmental needs in key sectors, which require a continuous and extensive response from governments. These needs range from health to education and legal advice and necessitate more international support and more concerted efforts in order to strengthen strategic and operational coordination. Regional governments must be included in the plans and bigger investment into the communities hosting refugees and migrants is required, since many of them have pre-existing needs and vulnerable populations.

POSSIBLE FUTURE SCENARIOS FOR MIGRANTS

Given its importance, the RMRP's planning assumptions for 2020 are included below. They indicate the most comprehensive information-based scenario:

During 2019, and despite the continuous outflow from Venezuela, policy changes, as well as other factors, resulted in changes to overall population projections and planning assumptions for 2020 in the LAC region. In the second half of the year, along the Andean Corridor, a decrease in the number of incoming refugees and migrants into Ecuador, Peru and Chile was noted following the introduction of new or renewed entry requirements. Some RMRP partners observed an increase in the number of irregular entries along some borders and transiting along dangerous routes.

This Plan envisages that the majority of refugees and migrants from Venezuela will continue to arrive in Colombia, with an increased proportion of them remaining in the country for an indeterminate period of time. When compared to 2019, the rate of regular entries into Ecuador, Peru, Chile and to a lesser extent to countries of the Southern Cone may decrease following the new entry requirements. Brazil will continue to receive a substantial number

of refugees and migrants and the Caribbean, Central America and Mexico will also see a continuous number of arrivals, either directly or through secondary movements. Some key assumptions for RMRP 2020 include:

- Refugee and migrant outflows from Venezuela will continue in 2020 albeit with fluctuations at different times of the year;
- The number of people undertaking pendular movements will increase, however many may remain in host countries for longer periods;
- States sharing a common border with Venezuela will largely continue to allow refugees and migrants from Venezuela access to their territories, provide access to regularization mechanisms and, in line with the principle of non-refoulement, will continue providing access to asylum;
- States will continue their efforts to provide pathways for residency and regular stays, generally without restrictions, nor limitations in accessing basic services. However, in some states, documentation requirements and high application fees may hinder access to regular stays;
- Countries will require continued institutional strengthening considering overstretched services and capacities due to the scale of current and foreseen arrivals;
- Numbers of asylum-seekers will continue to increase albeit with variations in applications across countries. Some states will apply the expanded regional refugee definition of the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, while others will apply the refugee definition of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol;
- The number of Venezuelans in an irregular situation will continue to rise and thus create barriers to accessing rights and services in receiving countries;
- The needs and vulnerabilities of refugees and migrants from Venezuela, will evolve in 2020. Joint assessments with RMRP partners and authorities will be scaled-up;
- Overstretched national capacities, as well as the economic and political difficulties in some host countries may adversely affect refugees and migrants from Venezuela;
- Women and girls will continue to be disproportionately affected in this crisis, especially in terms of the risks presented by Gender-Based Violence (GBV) and human trafficking;

- Registration and profiling systems will be instituted and/or strengthened, and supported;
- The ability of refugees and migrants to return to Venezuela on a permanent basis is not envisaged in the short or medium term;
- More States will continue to recognize the growing risks of statelessness and, in conjunction with RMRP partners, take political and legislative steps to prevent and reduce these risks;
- States will continue to address discrimination and xenophobia, including through awareness campaigns, strengthened media relations and outreach, and social media activity.

EVOLUTION OF THE MIGRATION FLOW FROM VENEZUELA INTOCOLOMBIA AND THE COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

February, 2018

Creation of the Special Migration Group (GEM) made up of the National Police, ICBF, DIAN, and Colombia Migration with the aim of exercising control over the proper use of migration tools such as the TMF and the PEP


June 8, 2018

The implementation of the Venezuelan Migrant Administrative Registry (RAMV).

November 23, 2018

CONPES issues the Strategy for Attention to Migration from Venezuela, and identified actions in 2021, for an estimated cost of 422,779 million pesos.

December 1st, 2018



2017



February, 2017

Migration Colombia announces the launch of the Pre Registration for the Border Mobility Card (TMF)

July 28, 2017

Foreign Ministry and Migration Colombia implement a Special Permit to Stay (PEP) for Venezuelan citizens. Venezuelan take-up residence with PEP mainly in: Bogotá, Medellín, Barranquilla, Cali and Bucaramanga.

December 1st, 2017



March 31, 2020

COVID 19. Mandatory isolation measures with an impact on the migrant population, especially those in the informal sector of the economy.

June, 2020


Fear of the current pandemic, added to factors such as unemployment, lack of access to the health system and eviction from homes, caused the departure of foreign citizens.

2019

February 2019


Health Sector Response Plan to the migratory phenomenon.

December 31st, 2019



2020

April 30, 2020



By April 30th, 2020
81,000 Venezuelans left Colombia

Migration Colombia announced that around **30,000 registered Venezuelans** intended to return to their country, but due to the restrictions imposed by the Nicolás Maduro government, only **5,000 migrants can cross the border into Venezuela each month**. By April 30, nearly 81,000 Venezuelans had left the country.

**Data and information taken from Migration Colombia. Void in numbers reflect non disclosed information.



SITUATION IN COLOMBIA AS A RECEIVING COUNTRY




CURRENT AND PROJECTED NUMBER OF REFUGEES AND MIGRANTS, INCLUDING COLOMBIAN RETURNEES IN COLOMBIA

Based on microdata taken from the Colombian Large Integrated Household Survey (GEIH)⁸ conducted in 2019, we estimate that, from a total of 48,910,936 inhabitants, approximately 2,039,337 of Colombian residents were born abroad. The majority of these (1,912,672) are from Venezuela.

The high number of Venezuelan residents is a key issue of concern. In addition, the speed of growth of this particular subset of the population is also concerning. As shown in Figure 2, in just three years, between 2016 and 2019, the Venezuelan population in Colombia rose by a factor of 10, coming to represent nearly 4% of the country's inhabitants. This is in comparison to 2015, when it had been just 0.3%. Few countries, especially Colombia given its current difficulties, would be prepared to respond to such a situation. Accordingly, responses to these challenges have been ad hoc in nature.

⁸ The National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE) has conducted household surveys since the late 1960s. Data collection for the last Integrated Household Survey began in 2006, focusing on its Central Market Module. It covered the national territory and included 23 metropolitan areas and major cities, as well as the rest of urban and rural areas at the municipal level. In the Vulnerability Indexes, we detail how we managed the corresponding microdata.


Figure 2.
Colombia: Stock of Residents Born in Venezuela. Biannual Averages, 2013-2019



Source: Compiled based on microdata of the GEIH

Figure 3 shows the underlying growth rates in Figure 1 and allows for the identification of a tendency for year on year reduction in the growth rate between 2018 and 2019. If the situation remains relatively stable, especially in Venezuela, it is reasonable to project that these rates will continue unchanged, ultimately resulting in biannual growth levels between 15% and 20% in 2020. This would mean that, by the end of 2020, there would be around 2.8 million Venezuelans in Colombia.

Figure 3.
Colombia: Percentage of Biannual Growth of the Stock of Residents Born in Venezuela, 2013-2019



Source: Compiled based on data of Figure 2

The push and pull factors in Colombia are multifaceted - both immigration and emigration can result in the medium term. Ultimately, as long as the economic crisis persists, the flow is expected to continue to be significant, although with downward growth rates and a relatively steady annual number of up to 100,000 people. Under certain, less likely conditions, 200,000 might be expected. Our projection is consistent with the trends in the first section regarding the development of the situation in Venezuela and with the growth levels expected by the Coordination Platform for Venezuelan Refugees and Migrants, which projects the total number of emigrants from Venezuela to Latin America and the Caribbean (See Chapter 2).

Regardless of the actual number, it is reasonable to predict that Venezuelan populations in Colombia will become more and more of a permanent feature of the country. As their conditions improve, family reunification will become a significant factor affecting the rate of migration. This is true even if the overall rate stabilizes. In this regard, it should be noted that, according to a survey conducted at the end of 2019, 54% of Venezuelans living in Colombia had plans to bring their family to live with them⁹.

Nevertheless, the migration flow from Venezuela to Colombia is not solely constituted of Venezuelans. There are also Colombian returnees, who in many cases bring their partners, children, or other Venezuelan people, some of whom may qualify for Colombian nationality. To understand the nature of returnees residing in Venezuela in the five years before the implementation of the most recent survey, it is also possible to use the GEIH. Microdata allows us to estimate that around 335,765 people returned from Venezuela between 2014 and 2019. On the other hand, the estimate of returnees during the year prior to the survey, 2018, was 47,356, a number that suggests a decreasing rate of the return.

With regard to asylum and refugee status, it is clear that Colombia does not grant it systematically. While there were 5,033 applications for refugee status by Venezuelans on May 8, 2019, the most recent available data, from December 5 of the same year, shows that only 140 people with that nationality have been recognized as refugees.

In regard to the characteristics of Venezuelan migrants in Colombia, they are predominantly young males (by a small quantitative difference), at labor-age, with the majority having high school educations. These factors play in favor of their integration to the Colombians system, as well as in favor of the rejuvenation of Colombian society as a whole. Figures 4 and 5 show a comparison between characteristics of Colombian-born and foreign residents, as well as the age range of those Venezuelan migrants interviewed in the GEIH.

9 Venezuelan migrants have their say. <https://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/la-primer-encuesta-para-conocer-que-piensen-y-como-viven-los-venezolanos-q/604701>

Figure 4.


Characteristics of the Population in Colombia by Place of Birth, Colombia, 2019

Characteristic	Born in Colombia	Born abroad
Average schooling of the population over 20 and older	9,1	10,7
Average age	32,4	24,1
Average household size (people)	4,2	5,0

Source: Compiled based on microdata of the GEIH

Figure 5.

Percentage Distribution Of Those Born in Venezuela Interviewed by the GEIH, Colombia, 2019



Source: Compiled based on microdata of the GEIH

On the other hand, Figure 6 provides a glance at the Venezuelan migrants' precarious living conditions, which will also be discussed in detail in the Vulnerability Rating section.

Figure 6.
Negative Living Condition in Colombian by Place of Birth, Colombia, 2019

Characteristic	Colombia	Another Country
Uninsured, non-contributor and non-beneficiary of health insurance	6,3	73,3
In the last twelve months, did not seek a doctor or hospital services, due to lack of affordability of healthcare service and/or insurance	2,7	16,1
Including living room, the home has only one room	4,9	19,6
Cleaning, bathroom and sanitary facilities are shared with people from other homes	4,1	17,0
Population between 3 and 24 years old who are not accessing education services (considering all levels of education)	31,5	66,5

Source: Compiled based on microdata of the GEIH

ESTIMATED GEOGRAPHICAL AREA OF VENEZUELAN REFUGEES AND MIGRANTS IN COLOMBIA, INCLUDING COLOMBIAN RETURNEES

Table 8 (as well as Figure 7 and 8) show the percentage distribution of the population of emigrants born in Venezuela and the percentage distribution of Colombian returnees. The reason for the heterogeneity in the distribution over the national territory has to do with the different dynamics of both flows. While newcomers are generally searching for the best places to work and make a living, generally leading them to big cities, returnees rely on the support of people who are part of their social networks in their places of origin, to which they usually wish to go back.

The distribution is also shaped by the interactions that both countries have historically had on their shared borders. In the past, the flow of people from Colombia to Venezuela mostly took place by land. The same is true of the opposite route, which predominates today as the direction of migration. Regardless of the direction, travel by land forces migrants to move directly to the most easily accessible areas. Consequently, Cúcuta, Barranquilla, Santa Marta, Bucaramanga, Cartagena, Riohacha and Valledupar are among the main destinations for Venezuelans (as they were also important places of origin in the case of the Colombian emigration to Venezuela).

A relevant fact is that, given the link between the place of origin and return, 22.7% of returnees have settled in rural areas, which shows the low importance that studies on Colombian emigration have traditionally assigned to international migration from the countryside. In the case of Venezuelans, their rural location reaches 9.9%.

Table 8.
Colombia: Percentage Distribution of People Born in Venezuela and Colombian Returnees Living in Venezuela in 2014, by Place of Residence, 2019


Place of residence	People born in Venezuela	Returnees living in Venezuela in 2014
Bogotá, D.C.	23.1	13.4
Medellín, M.A.*	8.6	5.1
Cúcuta, M.A.	6.2	6.3
Cali, M.A.	6.1	3.9
Barranquilla, M.A.	5.6	9.0
Santa Marta	2.9	1.7
Bucaramanga, M.A.	2.6	3.1
Cartagena	2.2	4.1
Riohacha	1.9	1.0
Valledupar	1.7	1.5
Pereira, M.A.	1.3	0.6
Other capital cities	4.1	3.2
Rest of the country	33.7	47.1
Total	100	100

Source: Compiled based on microdata from the 2019 GEIH

* Metropolitan Area

Figure 7.


Venezuelan-born Interviewed by GEIH in Colombia, 2019



	%	Aggregate
Bogotá DC	23,1	23,1
Medellín MA	8,6	31,7
Cúcuta MA	6,2	37,7
Cali MA	6,1	44,0
Barranquilla MA	5,6	49,6
Santa Marta	2,9	52,5
Bucaramanga MA	2,6	55,0
Cartagena	2,2	57,2
Riohacha	1,9	59,1
Valledupar	1,7	60,9
Pereira MA	1,3	62,1
Otras ciudades capitales	4,1	66,3
Resto del país	33,7	100,0

*MA: Metropolitan Area

Figure 8.
Colombian Returnees Interviewed by GEIH in Colombia, 2019



VULNERABILITY RATING (VR)

The vulnerability indicators refer to the possibility of being affected by natural events, such as natural disasters (of natural or anthropic origin), climate changes, economic crises, social shocks, poverty, etc. These possibilities are defined by the exposure to the risk in question, determined, among other things and depending on the type of vulnerability that is discussed, by: the characteristics of the habitat (seismic zone, tornadoes, hurricanes, unhealthy, unsafe, etc.), the activities and habits of individuals (dangerous jobs or sports, substance use, etc.) or personal conditions (genetic load, age, sex, etc.). It also includes the capability of people (and communities or society in general) to face risks, either preventing them or responding to their consequences.

The vulnerability index is paramount, given that the objective is to collect information for the eventual application of development aid resources in, infrastructure related to access to public services that may have been affected, or may be affected later, by the increase in demand caused by the massive arrival of Venezuelan immigrants and returnees to Colombia. Measurement of ad hoc vulnerability, should be based on the deficits or low quality of access to services offered by infrastructures, which end up impacting the total population in concentrated areas of arriving migrants and that compromise the health, well-being and life of inhabitants.¹⁰

When constructing composite social indicators, the best, may not be the most accurate or most elaborated, are most commonly produced from reliable information available periodically and regularly. For these reasons, the Great Integrated Household Survey (GEIH) was identified as a data source for construction of the composite indicator.

The National Statistical Administrative Department - DANE, which carried out the survey, provides its microdata, which includes, data on the place of birth, the place of residence 5 years prior and the place of residence 1 year before the survey, which facilitates differentiation between migrants and returnees, as well as, the main countries of residence, including Venezuela.

The GEIH is an ideal source for development of the composite indicator because, since 2006, the GEIH was continuously collected and published each month. This makes it feasible to recalculate and measure the evolution over time of vulnerability, to estimate the impact of possible investments in infrastructure, including those of the ODA, and also on other administrative measures, such as migrant regularization plans.

For 2019, the GEIH includes collected data on 756,063 people, including 24,055 inhabitants born abroad, 22,570 born in Venezuela. In addition, it contains a group of 9,853 people born in Colombia who lived in Venezuela five years prior to the survey, which permits the analysis of an important group of returnees and the estimation of their vulnerability. Such information is contained in monthly folders, with 25 files per month (300 files per year): one referring to migrations, 8 on metropolitan areas, 8 on municipal seats and 8 on other areas. The 8 mentioned include: general characteristics of people, employment status, persons economically active, other activities and benefits received during the week, other income, housing access and conditions. This module must be merged with the migration module to be able to identify the target populations of migrants, returnees and others).

Given the size and quality of the survey, as well as the inclusion in the microdata of the expansion factors, it is possible to infer, with high levels of confidence and low margins of error, results for three geographic areas included in this consultancy: the capital district of Bogotá,

¹⁰ This does not mean that the vulnerability of populations depends, exclusively, on the capacity of the existing infrastructure, since it is understood that linked to it there are other factors, eventually determining access to services.

the metropolitan areas of Medellín and Barranquilla, as well as, the Cúcuta metropolitan area, which is presented as additional information plus, like Maicao and Arauca.

For Yopal, together with Maicao and the municipality of Arauca, the situation is different, since the sample size corresponding to each of them in the GEIH is relatively small and the detailed analysis of their results lack the statistical representativeness of the corresponding to big cities.

As an alternative, in the last three cases, the results of the 2018 National Population and Housing Census (CNPV) are used in the analysis. By the time the CNPV survey was applied (mid-year) a significant part of migration from Venezuela had established arrived and in some cases established residence in Colombia.

The CNPV and the GEIH contain a wide range of questions, which inform their socio-demographic and employment characteristics, as well as, the conditions of their home and the type of housing they live in, household characteristics, and access to basic services. Some of these variables were selected to represent the levels of enjoyment, or deprivation, and access to important rights associated with wellbeing, as a result of improvements of expansion of infrastructure (which is of particular interest to JICA's ODA).

For this purpose, the negative (no) values of the variables, which indicate the degree of lack of access, in terms of percentage, to education, health and home services (water, energy and sewerage), were selected in the analysis. Insofar as these variables correspond to proportions of populations effectively deprived of these services, these figures represent effective risks that a person in that community, depending on their relationship with migration, lacks access to these services. The relationship with migration is defined here according to the person's membership in one of the following groups: born in the municipality where they were surveyed (non-migrants and part of the returnees); born in another municipality in the country (internal immigration); born abroad (international immigration); born in Colombia, but resident 5 years ago in another country (part of the return). Thus, one would be facing vulnerabilities by sector, if it is accepted that the indicator is representative of what you want to measure.

In an annex to this section, methodological annotations are given on the way in which microdata was processed, especially the GEIH.

ABOUT THE METHODOLOGY

In 2005, the integration of the three most important DANE household surveys were proposed: the Continuous Household Survey (ECH), the National Income and Expenditure Survey (ENIG) and the Quality of Life Survey (ECV), with the purpose of expanding the thematic scope of

the research and reducing the cost of the application. As a result of this proposal, only some modules of the ECV and ENIG could be applied. The integration of these surveys were not fully effective. In 2006, considering the review of international experiences and to fulfill the thematic scope of household surveys, the design of the Great Integrated Household Survey (GEIH) began. The GEIH is the result of a structural framework of the Social Survey System in a span of 10 years (intercensal period) where in the first year the ECH was integrated with the ENIG and later the ECH was integrated with the CVD. In the following stages, periodic modules were carried out to deepen the study of specific phenomena or to monitor phenomena that were measured in depth at the GEIH in the first year.

Consequently, the variables to be improved in each investigation were reviewed, comparing the result of the previous periods. It was concluded that the central focus of the GEIH should be that of the ECH Labor Market due to its continuous nature and for being the largest and most comprehensive. The others were included as specific modules and subsamples of the GEIH.

With the inclusion, in the fourth quarter of 2012, of the eight capital cities of the new departments: Arauca, Yopal, Mocoa, Leticia, Inírida, San José del Guaviare, Mitú, Vichada, the GEIH reached coverage in all the departmental capitals, some with its metropolitan areas (see Table 9). In other important cities, and in the cabeceras (urban nuclei of the municipalities) and populated centers and dispersed rural areas of more than 443 municipalities in the country, the GEIH reached approximately 58,200 households each quarter. As of April 2015, the collection of information from the GEIH began in the municipality of Buenaventura, with representative results delivered on an annual basis. (DANE, 2016; DANE 2019).

The objectives of the GEIH is to provide basic information on the socio-demographic characteristics of the population, including, among other variables of special interest for this work: sex, age, education, general characteristics of the home and household, access to public services and the social protection system.

The GEIH is collected throughout the year, with some quarterly variations in its format, corresponding to selective application of modules, according to the frequency needs of the information contained in them. The publication of the microdata, as well as of the complementary documentation, is carried out monthly, during the month following the application of a module, as part of the National Data Archive - ANDA. However, the minimum accumulation of data, by geographic disaggregation, recommended by DANE to maintain statistical representativeness with the expected precision, measured in terms of sampling error less than or equal to 5% with a level of reliability of 95%, for The main indicators is as follows:

- **Monthly:** for the group of 13 large capital cities and their metropolitan areas, the group of 11 intermediate capital cities and for the national total.

- **Quarterly:** for capital cities (large and intermediate) with their corresponding metropolitan areas and for the country as a whole by area (cabecera, populated urban centers and dispersed rural areas).
- **Semiannual:** for capital cities (large and intermediate), large regions (Atlantic, Eastern, Central, Pacific and Bogotá) and for headwaters and populated centers and scattered rural areas and for the national total by area (cabecera and populated urban centers and scattered rural areas).
- **Annual:** for the capital city with its metropolitan area, by major regions and area (cabecera and populated urban centers and scattered rural areas) and by departments.

The capital cities included in the GEIH and their classification are presented in the following table.

Table 9.
Departmental Capitals Included in the GEIH, 2019

Large cities and metropolitan areas	Intermediate cities	New departments integrated in GEIH
Bogotá	Tunja	Mitú
Medellín - Valle de Aburrá	Florencia	Yopal
Cali - Yumbo	Popayán	Inírida
Barranquilla - Soledad	Valledupar	Leticia
Bucaramanga - Floridablanca - Girón - Piedecuesta	Quibdó	Arauca
Manizales - Villamaría	Neiva	Mocoa
Pasto	Riohacha	Puerto Carreño
Pereira - Dosquebradas - La Virginia	Santa Marta	San José del Guaviare
Ibagué	Armenia	
Cúcuta - Villa del Rosario - Los Patios - El Zulia	Sincelejo	
Villavicencio	San Andrés	
Montería		
Cartagena		

Sources: DANE, 2016 and 2020

Although the Vulnerability index included all cities listed above from the GEIH, Bogotá, Barranquilla, Medellín and Cúcuta, are part of the group of large cities, whose data is reported on a trimester basis. The sample of collected data for these major cities is representative on a quarterly basis. Nonetheless, annual data from these large cities were analyzed to improve the precision of the results, in and to being able to represent other topics that are also important for the study, such as, the distribution of immigrants and returnees by departments.

Considering that migrants are a relatively scarce population within the total population of Colombia, around 4%, and even fewer returnees, the strategy of adding the different stages of the survey applied throughout the year enabled us to draw more reliable results in the analysis. As an important international reference, the United States Census Bureau performed a similar operation with the American Community Survey. With this survey and annual microdata, the Census Bureau arguments for combining the databases and performing integrated analysis of data collected during the two, three- and five-year surveys. In relation to this procedure, the agency argued: "The 5-year estimates from the ACS are" period "estimates that represent data collected over a period of time. The primary advantage of using multiyear estimates is the increased statistical reliability of the data for less populated areas and small population subgroups"¹¹.

The expansion factors, contained within the databases, allow population estimates to be made from the sample data. DANE has calculated them through three components: the weight of each element in the sample in the universe investigated, the density of housing in the segment at the time of the survey and coverage for non-response. To calculate the weights of the elements in recent years, the population projections of the 2005 census for 2011 were used as a reference.

The 2019 microdata, used in the Vulnerability Index, are located, along with their documentation, at the addresses http://microdatos.dane.gov.co/index.php/catalog/599/related_materials and http://microdatos.dane.gov.co/index.php/catalog/599/get_microdata. The files are archived in three compressed files per month, each corresponding to a different format: csv, dta and spss. For this work, the SPSS was utilized for the analysis.

The files contained in each folder correspond to three different data sets: those related to large cities and their metropolitan areas, identified as "area"; others identified as "cabecera", containing data from all urban areas; and those of "rest", which include data from populated centers outside the important cities, as well as data from dispersed rural areas.

The specific files of each one of the mentioned sets are: general characteristics (people); unemployed; work force; inactive; busy; other activities and aids in the week; Other income; and housing and homes. For the purposes of calculating the indices, only the file of people

11 <https://www.census.gov/data/developers/data-sets/acs-5year.html>

and that of housing and households are required, which must be merged in order to associate people with the characteristics of the households they occupy.

It should be clarified that none of the related files contain the variables that allow us to approach the migratory status. They are elsewhere (http://microdatos.dane.gov.co/index.php/catalog/641/get_microdata), in files identified as “migration module”, which contain:

- Person’s place of birth: this municipality, another municipality, another country and which country.
- Where you lived five years ago, with the same response alternatives.
- Where I lived a year ago, too, with equal chances of response.

The previous module had to be merged, too, with the already merged people and household and housing modules. For this operation, using the SPSS program, the people file was the base file and was merged through the “merge files” option from the “data” menu, selecting “add variables”, to the files of homes and households. Then the migration module was added to the resulting file, following the same procedure. DIRECTORY, which identifies the dwelling, and SEQUENCE_P and ORDER, which identify the home and the person within it, were used as binding variables for the merger.

Prior to the previous procedure, the monthly files of each type were merged (people, households and dwellings, migration), with the alternative “add cases” of the “merge files” option.

Since the weights or expansion factors are calculated to estimate the population month by month, the estimates obtained, whether they are frequencies or means, must be averaged by dividing by 12, or by the number of months that are involved in the operation.

The data from the National Population and Housing Census (CNPV) - 2018 are presented as an alternative for calculating the Vulnerability Index in the small cities that are part of the study: Yopal, Arauca and Maicao, which lacked statistical representativity within the GEIH. As it was a population count and not a sample, the results obtained directly from the microdata were used.

SECTORAL VULNERABILITIES

The proportions of disparities of the selected services, measured in each case by a single variable, which was considered sufficiently representative of the level of access of the populations to these services (which, for their operation, demand, among other things,

important infrastructures), are presented below. Disparities are described by the text of the question in the GEIH, per sector, in percentage terms. The calculations were made for the areas and population groups detailed above.



EDUCATION

Table 10.
Percentage of People Between 3 and 24 not Attending School (at Any Educational Level),
by Place of Birth, According to Location, 2018-2019

	Place of birth				
	Surveyed municipality	Another country (internal migrants)	Another country, including Venezuela	Venezuela	Colombians living in another country 5 years ago
Bogotá, D.C. (GEIH, 2019)	24.0	29.5	65.5	67.8	38.7
Medellin M.A. (GEIH, 2019)	27.8	29.9	60.3	64.9	39.8
Barranquilla M.A. (GEIH, 2019)	31.8	31.0	67.9	68.8	49.1
Cúcuta M.A. (GEIH, 2019)	31.9	31.3	64.4	64.5	44.7
Yopal (CNPV, 2018) *	27.2	40.8	79.4	ND	47.7
Maicao (CNPV, 2018)	7.2	7.2	5.9	ND	2.4
Arauca (CNPV, 2018)	4.6	4.1	30.8	ND	4.5

* From 5 to 24 years old

Source: Compiled based on microdata of the four stages of the GEIH, 2019 and the CNPV, 2018.



Table 11.

Percentage of Non-Members, Non-Contributors, or Non-Beneficiaries of Health Service Companies, by Place of Birth, According to Location, 2018-2019

	Place of birth				Colombians living in another country 5 years ago
	Surveyed municipality	Another country (internal migrants)	Another country, including Venezuela	Venezuela	
Bogotá, D.C. (GEIH, 2019)	6.9	8.2	72.6	78.1	26.2
Medellin M.A. (GEIH, 2019)	3.3	4.8	61.3	68.2	18.9
Barranquilla M.A. (GEIH, 2019)	5.9	7.3	70.4	72.0	40.0
Cúcuta M.A. (GEIH, 2019)	6.9	7.9	79.9	80.5	36.8
Yopal (CNPV, 2018) *	43.9	38.1	78.9	-	35.4
Maicao (CNPV, 2018)	39.2	34.8	69.7	-	37.2
Arauca (CNPV, 2018)	22.5	19.7	54.1	-	32.9

* People who experienced health problems in the past 30 days and did not request attention to health provider companies.

Source: Compiled based on microdata of the four stages of the GEIH, 2019 and the CNPV, 2018.



HOME SERVICES

Water

Table 12.

Percentage of People Whose Drinking Water Supply is not Primarily Obtained from Aqueduct Pipes, Place of Birth, According to Location, 2018-2019

	Place of birth				Colombians living in another country 5 years ago
	Surveyed municipality	Another country (internal migrants)	Another country, including Venezuela	Venezuela	
Bogotá, D.C. (GEIH, 2019)	1.0	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.5
Medellin M.A. (GEIH, 2019)	0.8	0.5	0.9	0.9	0
Barranquilla M.A. (GEIH, 2019)	1.0	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.2
Cúcuta M.A. (GEIH, 2019)	1.3	1.6	3.0	3.0	4.6
Yopal (CNPV, 2018)	34,6	37,2	24,1	-	18.8
Maicao (CNPV, 2018)	13.6	13.9	22.5	-	13.7
Arauca (CNPV, 2018)	36.8	33.2	45.8	-	35.7

Source: Compiled based on microdata of the four stages of the GEIH, 2019 and the CNPV, 2018.

Electricity and Gas

Table 13.

Percentage of People Whose Homes Do Not Have Grid-Connected Electricity or Natural Gas for Cooking, by Place of Birth, According to Location, 2018-2019

	Place of birth				
	Surveyed municipality	Another country (internal migrants)	Another country, including Venezuela	Venezuela	Colombians living in another country 5 years ago
Bogotá, D.C. (GEIH, 2019)	3.7	4.4	6.7	6.3	9.1
Medellin M.A. (GEIH, 2019)	18.0	17.9	29.3	31.9	17.5
Barranquilla M.A. (GEIH, 2019)	1.3	1.9	1.1	1.2	6.8
Cúcuta M.A. (GEIH, 2019)	33.4	27.4	53.4	53.8	38.5
Yopal* (CNPV, 2018)	11.9	11.2	11.0	-	13.8
Maicao (CNPV, 2018)	98.7	98.9	99.2	-	98.7
Arauca (CNPV, 2018)	36.3	29.7	55.4	-	41.3

* People with no domestic gas

Source: Compiled based on microdata of the four stages of the GEIH, 2019 and the CNPV, 2018.

Wastewater disposal

Table 14.

Percentage of People Whose Homes Do Not Have a Toilet Connected to a Sewer System, by Place of Birth, According to Location, 2018-2019

	Place of birth				
	Surveyed municipality	Another country (internal migrants)	Another country, including Venezuela	Venezuela	Colombians living in another country 5 years ago
Bogotá, D.C. (GEIH, 2019)	0.8	0.7	0.1	0.1	0
Medellin M.A. (GEIH, 2019)	2.0	2.3	4.1	4.8	1.7
Barranquilla M.A. (GEIH, 2019)	1.8	3.8	4.9	5.1	6.2
Cúcuta M.A. (GEIH, 2019)	2.5	3.0	3.6	3.6	0
Yopal (CNPV, 2018)	8.5	9.9	4.5	-	6.8
Maicao (CNPV, 2018)	16.2	17.0	28.8	-	16.5
Arauca (CNPV, 2018)	32.8	27.9	40.9	-	31.5

Source: Compiled based on microdata of the four stages of the GEIH, 2019 and the CNPV, 2018.



INTEGRATION OF SECTORAL VULNERABILITIES

As a first step to develop a composite vulnerability index, we integrated the average by sector¹², area of study, and place of birth (migration status). The results, which are presented in the table below, although average percentages, should be understood as scales to differentiate levels of vulnerability instead of absolute figures. If these figures were standardized and the maximum value were, for example, 100 or 1, and the others were calculated again, their usefulness and meaning would remain the same.

Table 15 .
Consolidated Percentage (Simple Average) of Deprivation by Birthplace, by Location, 2018-2019

	Place of birth				
	Surveyed municipality	Another country (internal migrants)	Another country, including Venezuela	Venezuela	Colombians living in another country 5 years ago
Bogotá, D.C. (GEIH, 2019)	7.3	8.7	29.1	30.6	14.9
Education	24.0	29.5	65.5	67.8	38.7
Health	6.9	8.2	72.6	78.1	26.2
Water	1.0	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.5
Electricity and gas	3.7	4.4	6.7	6.3	9.1
Sewage system	0.8	0.7	0.1	0.1	0
Medellin M.A. (GEIH, 2019)	10.4	11.1	31.2	34.1	15.6
Education	27.8	29.9	60.3	64.9	39.8
Health	3.3	4.8	61.3	68.2	18.9
Water	0.8	0.5	0.9	0.9	0
Electricity and gas	18.0	17.9	29.3	31.9	17.5
Sewage system	2.0	2.3	4.1	4.8	1.7

¹² Averages are used as a way to soften the large differences that exist between the numbers by sector, which suggest different levels of importance, which we do not want to assume.

Barranquilla M.A. (GEIH, 2019)	8.4	8.9	28.9	29.5	20.5
Education	31.8	31.0	67.9	68.8	49.1
Health	5.9	7.3	70.4	72.0	40.0
Water	1.0	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.2
Electricity and gas	1.3	1.9	1.1	1.2	6.8
Sewage system	1.8	3.8	4.9	5.1	6.2
Cúcuta M.A. (GEIH, 2019)	15.2	14.2	40.9	41.1	24.9
Education	31.9	31.3	64.4	64.5	44.7
Health	6.9	7.9	79.9	80.5	36.8
Water	1.3	1.6	3.0	3.0	4.6
Electricity and gas	33.4	27.4	53.4	53.8	38.5
Sewage system	2.5	3.0	3.6	3.6	0
Yopal (CNPV, 2018)	24,0	26,4	38,8	-	31,8
Education	21.3	35.4	75.6	-	84.1
Health	43.9	38.1	78.9	-	35.4
Water	34,6	37,2	24,1	-	18.8
Gas	11.9	11.2	11.0	-	13.8
Sewage system	8.5	9.9	4.5	-	6.8
Arauca (CNPV, 2018)	34,5	33,7	50,2	-	34,1
Education	4.6	4.1	30.8	-	4.5
Health	39.2	34.8	69.7	-	37.2
Water	13.6	13.9	22.5	-	13.7
Gas	98.7	98.9	99.2	-	98.7
Sewage system	16.2	17.0	28.8	-	16.5
Maicao (2018 CNPV)	29,9	25,5	49,7	-	30,4
Education	7.2	7.2	50.9	-	2.4
Health	36.3	29.7	55.4	-	41.3
Water	36.8	33.2	45.8	-	35.7
Gas	36.3	29.7	55.4	-	41.3
Sewage system	32.8	27.9	40.9	-	31.5

Source: Compiled based on microdata of the four stages of the GEIH, 2019 and the CNPV, 2018.



INTEGRATION OF POPULATION DIFFERENCES

Differences in population structures determine different vulnerabilities and consequences when there is a lack in the access to services. It is common to take as examples of especially vulnerable populations the under 15 (children) and over 64 (elderly) groups, both excluded from the “working-age population,” as well as women of childbearing age (15 to 49 years old). The following table shows the percentage of such groups and their representativeness in the populations of interest for this study.

Topics in which the referred populations have special demands for services, not included in the sector vulnerabilities and that are associated with infrastructure, are, for example: recreational parks and sports venues; maternal and child care and geriatric centers; and battered women’s shelters.

To capture the particular effects that the parity of sectoral and visible services have on these populations, and in the absence of other indicators with the same population composition, the consultancy decided, to increase the averages of Table 15 to equal percentages of the aggregates of Table 16.

Table 16.

Percentage of Persons Belonging to Particularly Vulnerable Population Groups, by Place of Birth, According to Locality, 2018-2019

Risk factor	Place of birth				
	Surveyed municipality	Another country (internal migrants)	Another country, including Venezuela	Venezuela	Colombians living in another country 5 years ago
Bogotá, D.C. (GEIH, 2019)	58.2	57.9	58.6	59.9	57.1
Under 15	22.6	20.1	25.9	26.6	25.7
Over 64	7.1	11.5	1.5	1.3	3.3
Women between 15 to 49	28.5	26.2	31.2	32	28.1
Medellin M.A. (GEIH, 2019)	57.2	56.6	58.8	60.7	60.5
Under 15	19.2	18	25.7	27	23.9
Over 64	9.5	12	2.2	2.6	10.2

Women between 15 to 49	28.5	26.6	30.9	31.1	26.4
Barranquilla M.A. (GEIH, 2019)	58.4	58	61.7	63.3	61.5
Under 15	25.2	22.7	28.4	29	28.9
Over 64	6.3	9	1.7	2.5	4.8
Women between 15 to 49	26.9	26.3	31.6	31.8	27.8
Cúcuta M.A. (GEIH, 2019)	61.5	58.9	64.4	65.6	66.0
Under 15	26.7	22.4	3.4	34.1	32.9
Over 64	6	10.4	two	3	5.9
Women between 15 to 49	28.8	26.1	28.4	28.5	27.2
Yopal municipality (CNPV, 2018)	71.8	52.1	64.4	-	51.3
Under 15	45.5	10.9	25.5	-	10.7
Over 64	1.4	6.4	1.0	-	2.3
Women between 15 to 49	24.9	34.8	37.9	-	38.3
Arauca (CNPV, 2018)	71.8	52.1	64.4	-	51.3
Under 15	34.7	10.4	31.3	-	25.3
Over 64	3.5	9.4	1.1	-	3.2
Women between 15 to 49	27.5	29.3	33.7	-	28.0
Maicao (CNPV, 2018)	68.2	50.0	68.7	-	52.2
Under 15	39.2	9.2	35.7	-	11.2
Over 64	1.8	12.2	1.4	-	5.5
Women between 15 to 49	27.2	28.6	31.6	-	35.5

Source: Compiled based on microdata of the four stages of the GEIH, 2019 and the CNPV, 2018.

As result, demonstrated in the next table, the new indicators on vulnerability are without the decimal figures that could provide an idea of false precision.

Table 17.
Summary, Vulnerability Indicators Adjusted by Place of Birth, According to Location, 2018-2019

	Place of birth				Colombians living in another country 5 years ago
	Surveyed municipality	Another country (internal migrants)	Another country, including Venezuela	Venezuela	
Bogotá, D.C. (GEIH, 2019)	12	14	46	49	23
Medellin M.A. (GEIH, 2019)	16	17	50	55	25
Barranquilla M.A. (GEIH, 2019)	13	14	47	48	33
Cúcuta M.A. (GEIH, 2019)	25	23	67	68	41
Yopal (CNPV, 2018)	32	34	61	-	38
Arauca (CNPV, 2018)	57	50	83	-	53
Maicao (CNPV, 2018)	50	38	84	-	46

The vulnerability indicators, obtained for the populations in Table 18 and Table 19, was constructed to show the association of the numerical values of the indicator with qualitative levels of vulnerability, which correspond well to those conditions.

The indicator was calibrated for six disparate populations in the country: the three cabeceras (La Tola and Mosquera, in Nariño; and San Jacinto, in Bolívar) and the three rural areas or “rest” (Puerto Colombia in Guainía ; and Taraira and Pacoa, in Vaupés) with higher Unsatisfied Basic Needs - NBI, according to the measurements presented by DANE, based on the results of the 2018 census, for all Colombia municipalities. The results were vulnerabilities between 76 and 143, so it was decided to leave the upper range open.

Table 18.
Scale of Social Vulnerability Associated with Service Infrastructure

Rank indicator	Vulnerability
Lower than 20	Low
20 - 39	Medium-low
40 - 59	Medium-high
60 - 79	High
More than 80	Very high

Source: Own elaboration

Finally, table 19 classifies the populations studied by their qualitative degree of social vulnerability.

Table 19.
Populations Studied According to Degree of Vulnerability, 2018 and 2019

Vulnerability Level	Born in the municipality	Born on another municipality	Born outside Colombia	Returnees
Low	Bogotá, Medellín A.M., Barranquilla A.M.	Bogotá, Medellín A.M., Barranquilla A.M.		
Medium-low	Cúcuta A.M., Yopal urban area	Cúcuta A.M., Yopal urban area, Maicao urban area		Bogotá, Medellín A.M., Barranquilla A.M., Yopal
Medium-high	Arauca urban area, Maicao urban area	Arauca urban area	Bogotá, Medellín A.M., Barranquilla A.M.	Cúcuta A.M., Arauca urban area, Maicao urban area
High			Cúcuta A.M., Yopal urban area	
Very high			Arauca urban area, Maicao urban area	

FIELDWORK METHODOLOGY WITH VMR-CR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

The following chapters present challenges faced in the medium term (within 5 to 10 years) by the Colombian central and local governments, as well as VMR-CR. The analysis is based on findings from the fieldwork in the cities of Bogotá D.C., Medellín, Barranquilla, and Yopal. This information was complemented by a literature review on the subject of Venezuelan migrants and refugees, as well as of Colombian returnees from Venezuela, specifically regarding their access to health services, education, basic sanitation, and social inclusion. The literature review focused on the municipalities of Arauca, Maicao, and San José de Cúcuta. Sources consulted for the literature review included bibliographic databases and institutional repositories where research articles, regulations, research reports, journalistic reports, and master's and doctoral theses are located. The sources highlight the experiences of Venezuelan migrants and refugees in Colombia, as well as of Colombian returnees (VMR-CR).

Due to COVID-19 and the subsequent policies of mandatory social isolation implemented by the Colombia government, field research methodologies as well as qualitative and quantitative instruments were adapted to digital tools through different online platforms. Forty-eight semi-structured interviews and 20 surveys were carried out with key participants in Bogotá D.C., Barranquilla, Medellín, and Yopal, offering an overview of the situation faced by VMR-CR in these four cities. The participants were selected based on their role in public entities, private organizations, non-governmental organizations, international cooperation entities, and multilateral organizations that provide some kind of services to VMR-CR.

Different organizations, VMR-CR leaders, and representatives collaborated with the research team to help reach the target audience by providing contact details (with individuals' permission) and disseminating the survey through social media and working groups, hence ensuring that respondents fit the previously-defined inclusion criteria. In total, 492 VMR-CR responded to the surveys. The information was complemented by 24 semi-structured interviews with individuals selected from this same population.

Finally, it is important to note that the situations described in this section may vary due to the current context of the pandemic in Colombia and neighboring countries, which may be worsening vulnerability for this population, as well as for host communities in Colombia.

The figures below present socio-demographic data on the surveyed VMR-CR population:

Figure 9.
Surveyed VMR-CR in Bogotá D.C, Barranquilla, Medellín, and Yopal
Disaggregated by Gender




Figure 10.
Surveyed VMR-CR in Bogotá D.C, Barranquilla, Medellín, and Yopal
Disaggregated by Age






Figure 11.
Surveyed VMR-CR in Bogotá D.C, Barranquilla, Medellín, and Yopal
Disaggregated by Type of Migration



Source: Authors' elaboration, 2020

Figure 12.
Surveyed VMR-CR in Bogotá D.C, Barranquilla, Medellín, and Yopal
Disaggregated by Population Group



Source: Authors' elaboration, 2020

DISCUSSION OF RESULTS

Perception surveys were carried out among Venezuelan migrants and refugees, as well as Colombian returnees, with the objective of ascertaining their opinions on the quality of the utilities and social services accessed by them in Bogotá, D.C., Barranquilla, Medellín and Yopal. Their responses exposed some differences between these cities, which could serve as insights when considering where to prioritize potential intervention actions intended to improve the services offered to vulnerable populations.

To start, respondents were asked to rate the services they had received at health institutions as “very bad”, “bad”, “fair”, “good” or “very good”. The results showed that the cities where the health services were best valued were Barranquilla, where 48.4% of the respondents rated it as “good”; and Medellín, where 37.5% used the same rating. Bogotá, D.C. stands out with 37.0% of respondents rating its services as “good” and 22.5% as “very good”. Conversely, Yopal obtained one of the lowest evaluations in relation to the health care provided, with 25.8% of the respondents rating it as “bad”. It is possible that these perceptions arise from factors like the available infrastructure of the municipalities to satisfy citizens’ demands. For instance, small cities like Yopal do not have the necessary physical infrastructure, equipment and personnel to adequately meet the needs emerging from the massive arrival of Venezuelan migrants and refugees, as well as of Colombian returnees.

Regarding educational services, select aspects were assessed using the following Likert scale: 1) strongly disagree, 2) disagree, 3) neither agree nor disagree, 4) agree, and 5) strongly agree. This level of measurement was used to rate the statement: “The facilities of the educational institution are spacious, comfortable, functional and adequately equipped”. In response, 10% of those surveyed in Yopal, 4.8% in Bogotá, D.C., 1.6% in Medellín and 0.78% in Barranquilla “strongly disagreed”. As in the health care provision detailed above, the surveyed in Yopal also showed the overall most negative perceptions on the provision of educational services, which can be explained by the shortcomings and poor infrastructure that this municipality must use to meet demands that may have considerably increased due to the migratory flows from Venezuela.

In respect to potable water, Venezuelan migrants and refugees, as well as Colombian returnees, were asked if they received permanent supply of it in their households. The permanence of the service was rated according to the following scale: “always”, “almost always”, “sometimes” and “almost never”. The results showed that 12.5% of the respondents in Medellín, 5.5% in Barranquilla, 4.0% in Bogotá, D.C. and 1.7% in Yopal had access to this service “sometimes”, while 1.6% of those surveyed in Barranquilla stated that they “almost never” had potable water in their households. The reason for these responses may depend on the fact that, on their arrival into the country, migrants and refugees are located in precarious and marginal city areas, where the quality and coverage of basic services are poor. Additionally, the participants were asked about the quality of the water, to which 4.2%

located in Medellín, 1.6% in Bogotá, D.C. and 0.8% in Barranquilla stated that it was of “bad” quality, while in the municipality of Yopal 0% of responses corresponded to this category. As for electric power, only 3.3% of surveyees in Medellín and 0.78% in Barranquilla stated that they “almost never” had access to this service. They were also asked to rate the price of its provision according to the following scale: “very fair”, “fair”, “normal”, “unfair” and “very unfair”. In this case, 18.0% of the respondents in Barranquilla stated that the price of the electric energy service was “unfair”, a perception that was shared by participants from the cities of Medellín (5.8%), Bogotá, D.C. (5.6%) and Yopal (5.0%). An explanation for the low ratings associated with this service can be found in the semi-structured interviews conducted with Venezuelan migrants and refugees and Colombian returnees, in which members of this population stated that all utilities are subsidized in Venezuela, and therefore the cost to consumers was very low, a benefit that they do not receive in Colombia.

On the other hand, Venezuelan migrants and refugees as well as Colombian returnees were asked about their perspective regarding the migratory flow from Venezuela in the coming years, for which a Likert scale was again used. One of the statements included was: “The arrival of Venezuelan migrants to this municipality will grow over the next five years”, to which 28.9% of the surveyees located in Barranquilla, 9.7% in Bogotá, D.C., 7.5% in Medellín and only 0.8% in Yopal responded “strongly agree”; and in the latter municipality, 50% of the participants stated that they would “strongly disagree”. The wide range in responses between participants residing in Barranquilla and Yopal on this topic could be explained, in part, by the different numbers of migrants based in each city, the easier arrival to Barranquilla from Venezuela, and the greater likelihood of labor opportunities offered by this city.

In addition, respondents were asked about the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with the following statement: “The arrival of new Venezuelan migrants and refugees will affect the provision and quality of public services in Colombia in the next 5 years”, to which 22.6% of those located in Barranquilla replied “strongly agree”, as did 8.9% in Bogotá, D.C., 5.8% in Medellín and only 1.6% in Yopal. Out of the four cities examined in the study, Yopal had the highest percentage of respondents - 58.3% - who chose to “strongly disagree” with this statement. The perception highly differs between the cities, possibly due to the number of migrants residing in them, but also depending on the coverage and quality of utilities and social services which the VMR-CR can access.

Finally, based on the semi-structured interviews conducted with Venezuelan migrants and refugees and Colombian returnees (VMR-CR), it was possible to demonstrate the difference in perceptions of social integration processes in the four cities. These perceptions are largely determined by the discrimination, violence or xenophobia situations experienced by VMR-CR, both in social and institutional spheres, especially in public institutions, by health personnel or police authorities. In this sense, it was observed that the Venezuelan migrants and refugees residing in Yopal are the ones who experience most discrimination, highlighting the language and behaviour that comes from the municipal administration and has permeated

wider society (with officials there stating that limited resources in the municipality must be prioritized for use by the Colombian population). Conversely, Bogotá, D.C. and Medellín were identified as the cities with the more favourable conditions for social integration, with the interviewed migrants stating that access to health and educational services has become the first step to effectively incorporate themselves into the host society.

CHALLENGES FACING AND CHALLENGES FACED IN THE MEDIUM TERM -FROM 5 TO 10 YEARS- BY VENEZUELAN REFUGEES AND MIGRANTS INCLUDING COLOMBIAN RETURNEES IN COLOMBIA

NEEDS IDENTIFIED IN THE OPULATION OF VENEZUELAN MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES AND COLOMBIAN RETURNEES FROM VENEZUELA IN THE CITIES OF BOGOTÁ, D.C, BARRANQUILLA, MEDELLÍN, AND YOPAL

The analysis presented in this section is based on data collected through interviews with, and surveys of, VMR-CR in the cities of Bogotá D.C., Barranquilla, Medellín, and Yopal. The table below highlights identified needs and related barriers to accessing critical services: health, education, utilities, sanitation, and the labor market.

Moreover, the section will explore the special needs of women, children, adolescents, and the LGBT+ population.

Table 20.
Needs Identified Among VMR-CR Residing in Bogotá D.C.,
Barranquilla, Medellín, and Yopal

Identified needs	Barriers
Inclusion in the labor market	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lack of access to identification documents and limited access to the Special Stay Permit (SSP), the Special Stay Permit for the Promotion of Formalization (SSPPF), a work visa, or a Foreigner's Identification Card. Lack of access to the validation and homologation¹ of degrees. Lack of access to job training. Lack of support for entrepreneurship. Xenophobia and exploitation in the workplace.
Access to and coverage of health services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lack of access to the General System of Social Security in Health (GSSSH). Poor health care coverage. Institutional discrimination in the healthcare system.
Access to education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lack of knowledge of the schooling processes for Venezuelan children and adolescents. Lack of access to school places by Venezuelan migrant and refugee children/adolescents.

BARRIERS TO MEETING THE BASIC NEEDS OF VMR-CR IN COLOMBIA

Lack of identification documents

"The truth is that one of the first limitations is the lack of documents, since in Venezuela itself it is very difficult to get the passport: you either have to pay a lot or deal with a process that takes a long time. In our ignorance, we never thought that we would leave our country, we thought that everything was always going to be fine. Now, we see the system taking advantage of the situation and making the issuance of that document very difficult. Now everything is subjected to a bribe or extortion."

Pedro, 31 years old, Bogotá, D.C.

A majority of the interviewed Venezuelan migrants and refugees lack a passport or any type of documentation that would have allowed them to identify themselves in Colombia, which makes it more difficult to regularize their immigration status in the country. The main reasons they are unable to obtain a passport are the high issuing costs (around 200 USD) and the long period of time that the Venezuelan government agencies can take to finalize this administrative process (up to two years).

Given their precarious living conditions in their own country and the urgency of their needs, Venezuelans are often pushed to migrate without first obtaining an international identification document, therefore exacerbating their vulnerability. Colombian returnees, on the other hand, overcome this barrier as their nationality gives them the right to be issued a Colombian passport and identification card (or cédula).

Irregularity or precarious regularity of their immigration status

"The permit and passport requirement is also limiting. I have a sister who does not have a permit and has had a hard time getting a job."

Juan, 34 years old, Barranquilla

In response to the migration flow, the Colombian government has facilitated an Administrative Registry of Venezuelan Migrants (RAV) to identify and support VMR-CR. Nevertheless, the lack of passports among the Venezuelan migrant and refugee population limits their access to any type of permit that allows them to formally work in Colombia, such as the Special Stay Permit (SSP), the Special Stay Permit for the Promotion of Formalization (SSPPF), a work visa, or a Foreigner's Identification Card. This situation becomes a barrier for migrants and refugees to access health, education, housing, and other public and social services in the country. Moreover, they are then excluded from the formal labor market, which forces them into informal employment, causing some to be bound to irregular jobs and/or be victimized by labor exploitation.

As stated in the "Study on the Possibilities of Labor Connection of the Migrant Venezuelan Population in Bogotá, Barranquilla, and Cartagena" (2019), "the SPP does not replace the identification document. Companies usually require a passport or a Foreigner's Identification Card, a requirement that irregular and regular migrants often do not meet due to the forced conditions in which they had to leave their country. Most of the migrants who accessed the SSP-RAV face the same issue as, even though they managed to obtain the work permit, they do not have an identification document that allows them to be hired and access the institutional offer that these documents provide" (Pan American Development Foundation, p. 60).

Difficulties in the validation and homologation of studies

"I have not had access to anything. In fact, it is quite complicated to approve a degree here [Colombia] or to have the right to continue studying, first because of the demand and second because the requirements are many, the level of requirement is high, practically demanding you to start the study all over again to be approved."

Pablo, 24 years old, Medellín

As shown in the vulnerability rating, compared to the Colombian workforce, VMR-CR are typically younger and more educated, which could facilitate access to the formal labor market. However, this population faces problems in validating their credentials in Colombia. The main issue is obtaining apostilled certificates and diplomas from the Venezuelan government because, just as with the procedure to issue a passport, the cost and duration of the process deters Venezuelans from making this arrangement before migrating.

Conversely, those migrants and refugees who have the necessary documents to start the validation or homologation of their professional credentials still have to undergo expensive procedures in Colombia - which in most cases they cannot complete, because they lack either the economic resources, time, or access to required information. Therefore, VMR-CR encounter a series of economic and accessibility-related difficulties, both in Venezuela and Colombia, that make their professional validation unfeasible, marginalizing them in the formal labor market and preventing the leverage of their skilled labor in some economic sectors. This situation has been evidenced in other research. For example, in the study on the migrant Venezuelan population in Bogotá, Barranquilla, and Cartagena referenced above, only 5.3% of the research participants "had validated their professional qualifications" (Pan American Development Foundation, 2019, p.60).

Difficulties in acquiring job skills

"I went to National Learning Service (SENA) with the intention of studying, but they told me that I could not enroll in basic courses since the SPP or my passport did not allow me to study. The only option was to have a Foreigner's Identification Card, otherwise, I could not access any courses."

Pilar, 27 years old, Yopal

Most VMR-CR lack the resources to meet their basic needs and access to services, such as higher education. Given these conditions, the best or only option, for most of them, is to enroll in the National Learning Service (SENA), the Colombian public institution aimed at developing vocational training programs for the local labor force as a means of increasing the competitiveness of Colombia's enterprises and promoting employment. VMR-CR, just like Colombians, can access SENA programs at no cost, representing an opportunity for Venezuelan migrants and refugees to gain practical skills regardless of their migrant status (Marulanda, Cubillos, Ochoa, and Parra; 2018), which can help facilitate their proper integration into the host society.

However, VMR-CR face challenges in accessing SENA and other technical institutions' certified job training, especially for those who only have a high school diploma and want to receive some type of technical training to improve their job opportunities. Such difficulty can be attributed to a lack of legal documentation, apostilled degrees (as mentioned previously), or knowledge of the requirements and administrative procedures to be admitted.

Stigma, social and institutional discrimination

"In health centers when they immediately recognize the [Venezuelan] accent, they say that we will not be attended to if we do not have a stay permit, that we must return to our country [Venezuela] to be attended to there."

Salomé, 37 years old, Medellín

Some interviewees expressed feeling discriminated against in the workplace, in public spaces, and when seeking basic services, like in health and education institutions. Such discrimination is due to the stigmatized labels attributed to VMR-CR, such as that they are "criminals," "illegals," or "foreign competition."

Experiences of labor discrimination result in Venezuelans building a "perception of inferiority [of themselves] with respect to the labor force of the country where the migrants arrive, because they have to bear and endure degrading situations or psycho-physical-emotional aggressions caused by xenophobia" (Aguado, 2018, p. 47). This inferiority complex prevents them from reporting labor exploitation, as they normalize it and consider such experiences of exploitation as inherent to their status as migrants.

Regarding health, the World Health Organization asserts that "discrimination in health care centers is a widespread phenomenon throughout the world and takes many forms. It constitutes a violation of the most fundamental human rights protected by international treaties and by national laws and constitutions" (WHO, 2017, p.2). Venezuelan migrants and

refugees, and Colombian returnees alike, face discrimination from some officials within health institutions.

The migrants interviewed for this study did not indicate that officials in educational institutions had discriminated against them, instead discussing the lack of available places in education programs and their inability to provide required documents, such as passports and grade certificates.

As the socio-economic situation in Colombia worsens due to the effects of COVID-19, access to resources, formal labor opportunities, and basic services becomes scarcer and more difficult to secure. The pandemic could eventually intensify discrimination against the most vulnerable VMR-CR, further disenfranchising this population and creating a wider gap between them and the host community.

Hence, it is necessary that in the short, medium, and long term, employees of all public and private health institutions, and the governmental entities that oversee them, are continuously educated and trained in human rights - ensuring a strong level of awareness regarding their ongoing roles in the fight against discrimination and for access to barrier-free health services. Moreover, it is critical to continue strengthening communication campaigns to inform and educate VMR-CR about their rights according to the Colombian law, international agreements, and international human rights law, as well as how to access the legal and institutional protections to which they are entitled.

Low rate of membership in the general system of social security in health (GSSSH) and insufficient coverage of medical care

"One goes [to the doctor] and does not receive attention due to being Venezuelan. In the P.A.T.H. [Points of Attention for Timely Health] they do not take care of Venezuelans, they ask for papers and as one is undocumented, they do not attend to you. This happens regardless of your health condition."

Diana, 29 years old, Barranquilla

To be in the health contributory scheme and be entitled to health services offered by the two different health promoting entities (EPSs) in the country, and to be part of the General System of Social Security in Health (GSSSH), VMR-CR must hold a regular immigration status and a recognized identification card (either a passport or a Foreigner's Identification Card issued by the Colombian government), and they must also make a monthly financial contribution. Only those who hold the SSP and do not have financial capacity are accepted

into the subsidized regime of the GSSSH. These requirements leave many VMR-CR unable to access health services and outside the reach of the healthcare system.

According to data from the Norwegian Refugee Council (2019), 97% of VMR-CR are not registered in the GSSSH. The same NGO stated: “35,548 migrants from Venezuela were included in the contributory scheme in 2018 and 7,589 into the subsidized regime. This means that only 3% (out of the total number estimated for the same year) of the migrant population was insured, while 5% of the estimated regular population was registered in the GSSSH” (Pinto, Baracaldo, and Aliaga; 2019; p. 213). This data correlates to the results obtained in the survey on VMR-CR perceptions of the quality of health care services carried out in the cities of Bogotá D.C., Barranquilla, Medellín, and Yopal, where 96% of respondents stated that they were not registered in the GSSSH.

Consequently, as the majority of VMR-CR do not have access to the GSSSH, other organizations assume health care service provision. For instance, the Colombian Red Cross received 18% of the cases that require medical assistance and also provides medicines without requiring any type of documentation (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2019). According to data reported in the study “Identification of protection needs of the Venezuelan population” (2019), only 15% of those surveyed had received medical care in Colombia. This figure differs from the numbers obtained in this survey, where 31% of surveyed VMR-CR in Bogotá D.C., Barranquilla, Medellín, and Yopal expressed that they had received medical attention at least once since their arrival in Colombia, compared to 69% who had not sought or accessed health care services. In addition, the survey carried out in these four cities showed that 71% of respondents had not requested any type of health services in the last twelve months.

Increase in the demand for health care services and deficiencies in the general system of social security in health (GSSSH)

“My 19-year-old daughter has an implant in her arm. It was placed for free at a United Nations center located near the Botanical Garden of Medellín.”

Ester, 41 years old, Medellín

According to the World Bank Group (2018), the Colombian GSSSH does not have the capacity to supply the health care services demanded by VMR-CR newcomers, due to historical deficiencies that limit the capacity to adapt and respond to abrupt changes in the population. Furthermore, “the population prioritized by the Capitation Payment Unit (CPU) to be financed under the subsidized scheme, and the non-covered low-income population, is planned and allocated retrospectively, not prospectively” (World Bank Group, 2018, p. 91). Likewise, the

World Bank Group stated that “Health Services Provider Institutions (IPSS) must be self-sustainable and do not receive budget allocations for the provision of services to populations that are not registered in the system, such as Venezuelan migrants who are irregularly in the country and who constitute the bulk of the migratory flow in Colombia” (2018, p. 91).

Regarding the IPSSs, there is a need to establish multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary teams, composed of doctors, psychologists, social workers, and nurses. These professionals should work collaboratively in the field, recognizing the specific contexts and realities of the lives of migrants and refugees; operating inside and outside hospital facilities, through the management of mobile units, assigned spaces, or infrastructure linked to the public healthcare network. In addition, a psychosocial approach must be considered as a cornerstone of health interventions with VMR-CR. This will require the expansion of infrastructure, the acquisition of new equipment, and flexibility in health care provision based on the specific needs of migrant and refugee populations. One example is the use of remote-based health care services, in addition to strengthening the process of channeling cases to go beyond the level of ambulatory care, which would allow for the strengthening of referral and counter-referral strategies.

Information gathered in the cities of Bogotá, D.C., and Medellín shows the results achieved in terms of health care provision for VMR-CR. In Bogotá, “according to data from the District Health Secretariat, in 2018, 2,077 Venezuelans received urgent medical attention in hospitals that were part of the public network” (Bogotá Como Vamos, August 10, 2019). In Medellín, Venezuelans with “an irregular status are guaranteed the provision of first-rate health services in initial emergency care through Metrosalud” (Mayor’s Office of Medellín, February 12, 2020). While 10,097 Venezuelans have benefitted from emergency care, the Mayor’s Office of Medellín “[continues] to intensify efforts to expand registration of the uninsured low-income population, since factors such as internal displacement, migration of Venezuelans and returnees... increases the numbers.”

Moreover, the Bogotá Mayor’s 2016-2019 accountability report, issued on September 17, 2019, stated that only 8,176 Venezuelans with an SSP were registered in the subsidized health scheme (Mayor’s Office of Bogotá, 2019). Medellín, on the other hand, as of January 31, 2020, reported 35% growth in the number of Venezuelans insured compared to the first quarter of 2019 (Mayor’s Office of Medellín, February 12, 2020). Likewise, Barranquilla District Mayor’s Office reported that “among the population included in the GSSSH, 2,624 were Venezuelan migrants and refugees, a number that stands out (Barranquilla Mayor’s Office, November 7, 2019).

Finally, it is important to highlight that no evidence was found to conclude that the quality of health care services in the four cities has been negatively affected by an increase in demand by VMR-CR. Rather, data indicates that problems in the provision, quality, and coverage of health care services are the result of pre-existing shortcomings in the Colombian system

Increased demand for school places by VMR-CR children and adolescent

"My daughters are currently out of the education system. I went [to the school] and they did not have available places. I think that the government should improve the service since it is helping the migrant population. It should also expand its capacity."

Salomé, 37 years old, Medellín

The lack of infrastructure capacity and budget limitations of the education system in Colombia has negatively affected access to education for VMR-CR children and youth. This is critical as "in the case of foreign minors, education accessibility is particularly relevant. Accessibility implies the State's obligation to ensure coverage for all people in conditions of equality and free from all forms of discrimination, as well as geographic availability and economic affordability" (Palacio, Ospina, and Alfaro, 2019, p. 16). However, in the case of Colombia, this continues to be an issue, affecting not just VMR-CR children and adolescents but also the host population. As of March 2020, there were 325,755 Venezuelan children and adolescents enrolled in school in Colombia, of which 96% were in public schools located in 1,015 municipalities across the country.

In addition to the increase in the demand for school places, administrative personnel within the educational institutions lack knowledge and information on the school enrollment process for VMR-CR, as do VMR-CR themselves. The Attention Route for Venezuelan Migrants provides information on the process that parents must undergo to enroll their children: "All that needs to be done for enrolling children and adolescents from Venezuela, into preschool, primary, and secondary level, is for the parent to approach the educational institution or the Secretariat of Education and request a place. Subsequently, the institution's general dean will have a period of a maximum of 30 working days to include the student in the Foreigners Report within the Information System" (National Unit for Disaster Risk Management, 2018, p. 8).

In fact, the Ministry of National Education and the Migration Colombia Agency, in Joint Circular 16 of April 10, 2018, guaranteed the right to education for all children in Colombia: "This public service must be guaranteed at the preschool, primary, and secondary levels, by providing access to educational institutions to all children and adolescents who are in Colombian territory, regardless of their nationality or migratory status" (pg. 1). This document also established the enrollment procedures for Venezuelan children.

However, some VMR-CR interviewed for the present study expressed that the process was not this simple, indicating that the educational institutions require their children to have

some type of residence permit in order to access, or remain in, school. Their testimonies reveal a discrepancy between the information provided by VMR-CR and institution officials. These findings are consistent with those reported by the Norwegian Refugee Council: “the surveyed people have the perception that the main barrier to access education is due to the difficulty of accessing legal documents, despite the fact that the national authorities have established mechanisms that should guarantee access for all boys and girls who are in Colombian territory regardless of nationality” (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2019, p. 26).

Access to potable water, utilities, and appropriate housing

“Housing access is an odyssey. It has been the most complicated issue while being away from my country, where I had my own house. Renting a small house for a family is expensive [in Colombia], so many of us opt for renting rooms because there are fewer obstacles given our nationality or documentation issues.”

Saraí, 26 years old, Medellín

The coverage of residential utility services around Colombia varies between areas. The survey carried out in the four cities showed that 70% of surveyed VMR-CR have permanent access to potable water and 25% had access most of the time. Additionally, 4% indicated intermittent access, and 1% said they almost never had access to potable water. Regarding their perceptions on the quality of the water they receive in their homes, 24% described the water quality as “very good,” 61% “good,” and 14% “fair.” Moreover, 1% indicated that their water quality was “poor”; these respondents were all from Barranquilla.

Regarding electricity, 68% of respondents stated that they always have access to electric power service at home, 27% almost always had access, 4% sometimes, and 1% never. Once again, the last group was made up of respondents living in the city of Barranquilla. Thus, although there are shortcomings in the other cities (Bogotá D.C., Medellín, and Yopal), Barranquilla respondents were most likely to have negative perceptions about drinking water and electricity services, both in terms of coverage and quality.

Most VMR-CR are not able to rent homes, either because of rental costs or because they lack the legal documentation required by tenants. These families must resort to other non-formal alternatives, which results in a multitude of problems, like overcrowded multi-family housing and poor hygiene and living conditions. For example, according to the Norwegian Refugee Council: “On average, eight people live in houses with an average size of 69 square meters...48% said that the state of these dwellings is fair or poor” (2019, p. 23). In more extreme cases, like in the municipality of Maicao, the lack of housing forces families to

“sleep on the street, or in places that do not have accommodation with decent conditions, which has strongly affected them, both emotionally and physically” (Sayara International, 2018, p. 24).

Given that VMR-CR children are often unable to attend school, they must remain at home when their guardians go to work. This leaves VMR-CR children living in overcrowded houses vulnerable to harassment or sexual violence from their cohabitants.

Implications and the social cost of not removing these barriers

The different barriers experienced by VMR-CR when seeking access to public services not only affect their quality of life, but also negatively influence the overall host society into hindering their integration process. This leads to conflicts and social tensions that can range from labor exploitation to discrimination and violence towards VMR-CR.

Given the obstacles faced by this population, and the pre-existing social conflicts and disparities suffered by host communities, tensions may have their origin in the inadequate coverage of public services in the different municipalities of Colombia. The study carried out in Maicao by Sayara International (2018) highlighted this idea as the root of the problem: “an idea of competition for scarce resources perceived between the low-income Venezuelan migrants and the locals, both in the same socioeconomic conditions, [leads] to permanent tension between the two groups” (Restrepo and Jaramillo, 2018).

The lack of regularization of their immigration status makes VMR-CR vulnerable to labor exploitation (reflected in long working hours with wages below the minimum established by law), inaccessibility to GSSSH, and the denial of other social benefits guaranteed under the law (e.g. retirement). Furthermore, it is possible that irregular migration may reduce the wage rates of low-skilled and expendable workers, especially in border areas with the highest concentration of VMR-CR: “If migrants and natives are substitutable, it could result in downward pressure on the wage rates due to increased competition for jobs, at least until capital is replenished” (Bahar, Dooley, and Huang; 2018; p. 9). In addition, having more regularized migrants and refugees could positively increase the number of registrations in the GSSSH, and therefore generate more income for the healthcare system.

Difficulties in the process of validating professional credentials, mentioned above leads to a loss of human capital, which Colombia could benefit from given VMR-CR’s professional training and work experience in specific sectors of the economy. It also slows social integration, as their job expectations are not met, limiting opportunities to scale up in the Colombian socio-economic system.

Likewise, access to health services must be guaranteed to all residents in Colombia, regardless

of their nationality. Exclusion from health care can result in the increased vulnerability of the VMR-CR population. Such a situation can foster higher spending from both migrants and the GSSSH and, in general, would deprive migrants of their rights - negatively influencing their health, decreasing the results of public health programs implemented in Colombia, increasing spending on health services over a long period of time, and decreasing the effectiveness of social integration processes.

Like health, basic and higher education becomes one of the most important mechanisms to ensure the social integration of VMR-CR and to avoid family separation. When schooling cannot be guaranteed, Venezuelan children and adolescents are sent back to their home country. The separation from their closest support network increases the risks of being recruited by illegal armed groups or becoming victims of networks dedicated to child exploitation and human trafficking. The schooling of migrant and refugee children and adolescents improves their position in society by facilitating awareness of cultural diversity, encouraging the elimination of stereotypes and promoting respect and understanding. These aspects are important for both Colombian and Venezuelan children, as they ensure integration into the host society and reduce discrimination.

Finally, the social implications of not removing barriers to access to public services, including employment, can be evidenced in the increase of food insecurity leading to health problems, especially for children and adolescents and other individuals in vulnerable conditions.

Eliminating barriers that curtail the rights by VMR-CR must be a priority for the national and local governments so that international human right standards are met. As the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights stated: "Every person under the jurisdiction of the State in question must enjoy the rights set forth in the Covenant. This includes asylum seekers and refugees, as well as other migrants, even if their situation in the country in question is irregular" (Declaration of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 2017, p. 1).

CHALLENGES FACING THE COLOMBIAN CENTRAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN RESPONSE TO THE INFLUX IN THE MEDIUM TERM (FIVE TO TEN YEARS)

PROVISION OF HUMANITARIAN AND EMERGENCY CARE, AND INTEGRATION OF VMR-CR

Humanitarian assistance provides VMR-CR with initial financial or material support to address the most basic and pressing needs, but it is expected that after receiving this assistance, they can autonomously undertake their integration into the host society - firstly, by accessing the work market. In this regard, international organizations like the UNHCR and the Norwegian Refugee Council, and local companies like the Association of Venezuelans in the Colombian Plains (Llanovencol), develop action items aimed at ensuring basic necessities for Venezuelan migrants and refugees. An example is temporary financial support for housing (from one to three months, or more) to cover rent costs while VMR-CR secure more permanent solutions for their subsistence. It must be emphasized that the financial situations of these families have worsened in recent months due to the mandatory confinement decreed by the Colombian government as a measure to prevent the spread of COVID-19.

Civil society organizations and local government agencies can be considered primary agents of intervention in terms of social inclusion, not only because they implement integration routes through the provision of basic services, but also due to their capacity to identify the population based on socio-cultural recognition. In that respect, “civil society organizations and some local governments stand in for the lack of government policies, by providing legal, social, and even medical attention to resident foreigners...in need of it” (ECLAC, 2018, p. 11). This exposes the need to design coordinated actions aimed at permanently integrating their efforts in the humanitarian responses to VMR-CR.

Although it is important to strengthen humanitarian assistance, the main challenge for central and local governments is to establish permanent mechanisms and strategies aimed at supporting VMR-CR social integration, which would require investments in infrastructure to ensure their access to all public and social services and guarantee the full exercise of their rights in Colombia.

REGULARIZATION OF MIGRATORY STATUS AND INTER-INSTITUTIONAL COORDINATION

The biggest challenge for the Colombian central government is related to the regularization processes of Venezuelans currently residing in national territory. As of February 29, 2020, and according to figures from Migration Colombia, more than 1,825,000 Venezuelans were based in the country, of which 44% (800,000) had a regular status, while the rest (over 1,025,000) were residing irregularly.

The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), in its publication “Social Protection and Migration: A Look at Vulnerabilities Throughout the Migration Cycle and People’s Lives,” stated that “the absence of registration and, consequently, the lack of documentation translates into a series of disadvantages such as being forced to leave the country...but, above all, by not having up-to-date birth certificates or immigration documentation, irregular migrants are prevented from exercising their human rights, which affects their future development...This is a matter of concern as, given the mandatory nature of the documentation, it becomes an exclusion factor in practice” (ECLAC, 2018, p. 89).

Accordingly, the national government must continue boosting strategies to ensure access to legal immigration status and ensure, at the same time, that local governments implement them in an efficient way. Joint efforts between national and local actors aimed at promoting regularization not only integrate and legitimize VMR-CR rights, but also promote economic and social development nationwide. Regarding this benefit, the general director of Migration Colombia, Juan Francisco Espinosa Palacios, expressed the following:

“There is a big interest of the Municipal Administration to implement further inclusion actions for these people in social and economic activities. Of the 79,000 beneficiaries of the new permit that was issued, Medellín hosts at least 11,000. In other words, that population is starting a formalization process that will help the city.”

Migration Colombia, February 12, 2020

Community-based organizations, especially those with VMR-CR participants, can be considered first-hand institutional actors, due to their hosting capacity, as well as their comparative credibility and recognition among VMR-CR. Authors such as Correa, Díaz, Gómez, and Sarmiento affirm that it is important “to promote the prioritization of actions to build confidence among different actors involved in the migration phenomenon, which would favor effective and efficient integration of each one of them” (2019, p. 20).

The lack of effective regularization of VMR-CR in the cities where they reside not only becomes a barrier to access basic services, such as health care, education, and work, but also implies a series of discrepancies between the local and national governments, as expressed by one of the public officials interviewed:

“The regularization of migrants, which is a national government’s function, is a bottleneck that prevents our services from being carried out in an inclusive manner. The lack of regularization produces difficulties when seeking services and also gaps in the relationship between the national and the district government.”

Secretary of Social Integration, Bogotá D.C., 2020

The need to regularize the Venezuelan migrant population in Colombia exposes the urgency of expanding the existing institutional offerings and developing joint and coordinated strategies, with greater coverage and scope over the next five to ten years. These should focus mainly on the regularization of those one million Venezuelans and more who are most likely to stay permanently in Colombia. Regardless of the increase in the migratory flow derived from the economic, social, and political crisis in Venezuela, the current migrants and refugees in Colombia have indicated that they do not consider returning to Venezuela as a possibility while conditions there do not improve.

In conclusion, the regularization process requires complementary and coordinated actions between the national government and territorial entities - among them, effective communications and awareness campaigns. Such actions would improve the Colombian government’s capacity for response and management, in order to prioritize migrants’ access to regular immigration status and to expand institutional capacity and infrastructure for this purpose. In this regard, authors Correa, Díaz, Gómez, and Sarmiento commented: “Each action would need to be integrated as a system and enable surveillance, control, and feedback processes” (2019, p. 20).

EXPANSION OF VACCINATION COVERAGE

Access to vaccination programs in Colombia has become another challenge for the GSSSH, since “migration has brought a reappearance of diseases previously controlled such as measles and rubella, and an increase in immunological diseases that are preventable and STDs.” Due to the precarious health care available in Venezuela, the Colombian Ministry of Health and Social Protection reported 452 measles cases between March 2018 and January 2020, of which 66.4% had been imported. According to the Ministry’s data from February 29, 2020, 1,929,606 doses of vaccines have been administered, of which 33% were distributed in Norte de Santander, 29% in other municipalities, 14% in La Guajira, 9% in Arauca, 9% in

Antioquia, and the remaining 6% in Bogotá, D.C. This means that 56% of these vaccines were administered in departments bordering Venezuela. Meanwhile, in Bogotá D.C. (one of the cities with the highest number of VMR-CR), 15,622 vaccines were distributed to Venezuelans between infancy and 15 years old (Bogotá Como Vamos, August 10, 2019).

Colombian authorities also face challenges in controlling the migration flow across illegal border crossings (“trochas”) which make the registration and regularization of migrants, as well as access to vaccinations and health care services, difficult. In the context of a global pandemic, containing the spread of COVID-19 at the borders and carrying out a mass vaccination campaign (in the case that a vaccine is developed and made available for mass use) would be a challenge, especially in protecting the most vulnerable populations.

Therefore, migration flows require preventative public health measures aimed at reducing the spread of diseases, protecting not only the VMR-CR population but also the host communities. ECLAC (2018) pointed out that mobility from one country to another carries a public health risk, therefore immunization policies focused on moving populations constitute a means of preventing greater harm.

VALIDATION AND HOMOLOGATION OF PROFESSIONAL DEGREES AND CERTIFICATION OF LABOR COMPETENCIES

Another challenge facing the national government is the long processes for validating foreign degrees, specifically those obtained in Venezuela. “Due to the deterioration in the assurance systems of educational quality in Venezuela, applications for the validation of degrees from that country must be processed through the longest and most detailed verification mechanism, which carries high costs for both applicants and the Ministry” (World Bank Group, 2018, p. 99). In addition, according to the World Bank Group (2018), the number of applications for degree accreditation went up from 6,000 in 2012 to 12,000 in 2017, and totalled 9,000 applications for only the period covering January - May in 2018.

The central government should implement actions for the validation of degrees in Colombia, which will require recognizing the particularities of VMR-CR. This includes re-evaluating the charges made by the Ministry of National Education for validation, as well as shortening the length of the procedure. These two aspects determine the possibility of migrants inserting themselves more appropriately into a workplace, with consideration of their technical and professional skills and knowledge.

In this regard, another one of the national government’s biggest challenges, given the complex diplomatic relationship between Colombia and Venezuela, is opening channels for the verification of degrees and certifications, as well as facilitating the transfer of information and implementation of agreements. Such systems must be in place in order to guarantee

the authenticity of the information and avoid fraud and other risks that can result from false professionals.

EXPANSION OF ACCESS TO JOB TRAINING

Besides the validation of degrees mentioned above, it will be necessary to design programs that help recognize or verify the professional credentials of VMR-CR. Since technical job training does not require access to formal higher education, local governments could expand and strengthen skill training or validation programs for VMR-CR. This would contribute to achieving local integration.

That being said, before the Venezuelan exodus, the national government was already facing shortages of the necessary resources to deliver skills training programs to the most vulnerable communities in Colombia, and to access formal employment.

PROMOTION OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND ACCESS TO THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM

As a legal requirement, regularization not only becomes a barrier to accessing basic services like health care, education, and employment, but it also prevents access to financial benefits, an emerging need of VMR-CR looking to establish themselves in the country. A clear example is access to credit and bank accounts, which in many cases are necessary to buy property, start an entrepreneurship project, or send money to relatives back in Venezuela.

Regarding the importance of financial inclusion for VMR-CR, ECLAC stated: “This variable can significantly affect the well-being of the entire family group. People are at a great disadvantage when it is not possible for them to access credit or save money to send remittances to their places of origin. In general, the first requirement for banking is to have up-to-date immigration documentation, meaning that those migrants who remain in an irregular condition will not be able to access the financial system. This affects the possibilities to start an enterprise or accumulate resources with a view to obtaining assets, which could be the source of income for the family” (ECLAC, 2018, p. 95).

The lack of access to financial services of this type directly obstructs the improvement of quality of life and contribution to the socioeconomic development of the country as a whole, increasing vulnerability and marginalization. In the Colombian context, the above is especially concerning, given the popularity of private, informal, and illegal lending systems, to which people with little income need to resort, further exacerbating their vulnerability.

The Colombian government faces the challenge of working alongside the national banking system (including private and public banks, as well as nonprofit credit and financial programs)

to set up a special mechanism to provide financial services and support to disenfranchised low-income communities. One of the core challenges is the integration of aid, cash injections and loan/credit programs into a more robust banking strategy that allows more flexible requirements related to migration status and legal documentation. One such path to address this challenge, would involve a program through the National Guarantee Fund (Fondo Nacional de Garantías¹³) aimed at building trust amongst the banking sector by facilitating guarantees that encourage the financial system to address the needs of this community.

EXPANSION OF COVERAGE AND AFFILIATION TO THE GENERAL SYSTEM OF SOCIAL SECURITY IN HEALTH (GSSSH)

As previously mentioned, the number of VMR-CR registered in the GSSSH is very low. The Colombian Ministry of Health and Social Protection reported that, as of February 29, 2020, of the 687,311 Venezuelans that are holders of the SSP, 188,159 are affiliated with the GSSSH, of which 60.3% are under the contributory regime and 39.7% are under the subsidized regime.

Therefore, the challenge of the national government will be to ensure access to health services for VMR-CR, which requires it to implement strategies aimed at increasing mechanisms for the regularization of VMR-CR - therefore making it possible for them to comply with the legal requirements to access the GSSSH. In this regard, the national government has established the Health Sector Response Plan to the Migratory Phenomenon, which reported that “the particularities of the migratory situation and the understanding that its regularization as well as the incorporation of the population who meets requirements into the health insurance are fundamental factors to advance in guaranteeing the right to health of these populations” (Ministry of Health of Colombia, 2019, p. 62). In addition, the testimonies of key interviewees about the migratory process from Venezuela to Colombia suggest that the flows will continue to increase, and thus the irregularity levels, impacting the provision of public and social services, including access to health care.

In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, expanding health care to all inhabitants of the Colombian territory (nationals and migrants) is particularly challenging, not only because national and local governments must allocate and deploy significant human and economic resources, but also due to coordination efforts with other national and international entities to cover the most remote and marginalized communities. Among these vulnerable communities are VMR-CR who, in light of social distancing policies, have been forced to continue being displaced in search of alternative sources of subsistence.

13 The Fondo Nacional de Garantías was constituted by the Government of Colombia seeking to improve access to credit for small and medium-sized companies, through a model of granting guarantees in which the fund enters as guarantor of the debt in case of default before financial intermediaries.

Consequently, it is necessary to design and implement coordinated actions for the provision of health services through the different institutions that are part of the sector, especially considering the population with irregular immigration status and people who, despite being regular in the country, are not registered in the GSSSH. In addition, the national and local governments and associated entities must guarantee access to social security for the most vulnerable population groups through the Identification System of Potential Beneficiaries for Social Programs (SISBEN), as access to state programs is determined by the categorization of SISBEN, which prioritizes socioeconomic strata 1 and 2, corresponding to poverty and extreme poverty, located in specific sectors within municipalities. Therefore, it will be necessary to categorize VMR-CR and their families living in conditions of poverty and extreme poverty by the SISBEN designations in order to provide them with access to the social welfare programs offered by the Colombian State. However, those VMR-CR who are not regularly in the country cannot access the SISBEN survey, which contributes to their exclusion and social marginalization.

It should be noted that VMR-CR can be further classified into vulnerable population groups to be considered in social integration strategies. Among them are pregnant and lactating women, the elderly, individuals with diverse sexual orientations and gender identities, and people with disabilities, who must require intersectional attention to reduce their individual and social vulnerability. In this regard, it can be said that “the population of irregular Venezuelan migrants is made up of a high percentage of vulnerable populations, including women (49.7% of the total irregular population), minors (27% of irregular migrants, of which 43% are in early childhood), ethnic populations, including indigenous people, mostly of the Wayuu ethnic group (6% of the irregular population), and elderly or pregnant women (almost 2.6% and 2% of the irregular migrant population, respectively). The ARVM also identified the presence of 333 transgender migrants, as well as 11,648 (2.6%) people with disabilities” (World Bank Group, 2018, p. 85-86). Some of these populations are addressed in this study in the section entitled Gender and Migration.

Local administrations and the national government attempt to assist the most vulnerable populations from Venezuela (particularly irregular migrants and refugees) by providing a differential approach, with a special focus on children and adolescents due to their bigger risks of exposure to food insecurity, sexual violence, and child exploitation, among others.

ADAPTATION OF THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM TO MEET THE PARTICULARITIES OF VMR-CR CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS

The mixed migratory flows coming from Venezuela lead to increased demand for places in basic education institutions for “more than 233,000 students, which would represent a major collapse for the system. The potential demand for educational services includes school-aged children and young people who (i) entered legally or are returnees with Colombian nationality

and have immediate access to education by meeting all legal requirements (about 137,000 children between 6 and 17 years old); (ii) entered irregularly (about 96,000 children) and need additional requirements to be enrolled” (World Bank Group, 2018, p. 97).

Regarding schooling of Venezuelan children and adolescents in the country, the World Bank Group stated that “the majority did not legally enter Colombia. It is estimated that 88% (104,173) of irregular children do not have documents that potentially allow them to regularize their migratory situation in Colombia (such as a passport, TMF, or Foreigners’ Identification Card)” (2018, p. 98). This situation becomes one of the main challenges that both the national and local governments must face, not only in order for children and adolescents to access the educational system but also to ensure their permanence in the system. This pressing situation is reflected in some of the testimonies of public officials, like the following example:

“No adaptation had to be made to accommodate them because the Secretariat has the same registration procedure. However, what represented a challenge was the lack of documentation, so institutional arrangements were made depending on other entities such as the Secretariat of Integration, the Mayor’s Office, and other entities at the national level.”

Bogotá Department of Education, Bogotá, D.C, 2020

In this context, the Colombian educational system should recognize the specificities of this population, referring firstly to the legal requirements and secondly, to the recognition of special conditions in terms of skills and knowledge that children from Venezuela could bring. It must be taken into account that approximately 80% of Venezuelan students in Colombia have an irregular immigration status, which will hinder their opportunities for progress and access to higher education, vocational training, and job placement.

Concerning the permanence of Venezuelan students in the Colombian educational system, their adaptation process must be taken into account, as learning will depend on it and will be reflected in the academic performance of the students. However, according to the publication “Academic Adaptation of Migrant Students in a Border Context,” this process tends to “justify the absence of attention to their particularities, denying the difference and rationalizing the status quo. Apparently, the only mechanisms designed to support the migrant student and their family refer to administrative support and, in particular cases, to extra help in the classroom as a personal initiative of teachers. This last fact accounts for a certain orphanhood of the institutions to face the challenge of diversity, making it urgent that the public policy that favours inclusion and represses discrimination is linked to government initiatives that allow the conditions for its fulfilment” (Bustos and Gairín, 2017, p. 214).

Thus, learning adaptation processes are presented as an emerging need, derived from the vulnerabilities associated with the process of welcoming VMR-CR to the educational system. In order to address this obstacle, the local and national governments need to allocate resources to hire administrative personnel, teachers, psychologists, and social workers. Moreover, special training and awareness campaigns within all public and private education institutions must be carried out in order to provide knowledge and tools to support the social integration of VMR-CR.

SEXUAL AND REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH WITH A DIFFERENTIAL APPROACH

Sexual and reproductive health, with its focus on promotion and prevention, requires that local authorities create strategies in order to control the rate of unwanted pregnancies at fertile ages and the epidemiological curves of sexually transmitted infections. This includes educational processes and the provision of family planning centers for the promotion of, and access to, contraceptive methods, tests for infectious diseases, treatments, and surgical procedures (an analysis of the sexual and reproductive health of VMR-CR is expanded in the Gender and Migration section of this report).

Data found in the research of the World Bank Group brings attention to the sexual and reproductive health of pregnant VMR-CR: “There is an increase in reported cases of migrants with congenital syphilis (which is preventable when diagnosed in prenatal care). Between weeks 1 and 21 of 2017, 9 cases were reported, meanwhile in 2018, 22 cases were reported in the same period of time. Gestational syphilis also presented an increase from 12 to 52 cases, and HIV/AIDS figures increased from 28 to 109 between weeks 1-21 of 2018. All three present a significant increase between 2017 and 2018” (2018, p. 93). The above shows a pressing need to create and/or expand strategies to ensure access to monitoring and treatment programs dedicated to controlling threatening infectious diseases, such as HIV/AIDS, Hepatitis B, and tuberculosis, among others.

EXPANSION OF THE COVERAGE OF THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

The continuous arrival of VMR-CR to the different cities of Colombia has increased the demand for education services. In Bogotá D.C., the District Education Secretariat reported that during 2018, the monthly rate of enrollment was almost 1,000 students. By March 2020, there were 44,672 children from Venezuela enrolled in the official system. This growth trend observed since 2019 is attributed, according to the Secretariat, to the increasing arrival of the VMR-CR population to the capital and to the regularization actions carried out by the national government responding to the urgency of this situation (Bulletin of Educational Attention in Bogotá, July 09, 2019).

Similarly, the Mayor's Office of Medellín stated in the Education Information Bulletin that "Medellín has 229 public and 332 private educational institutions, which have received 24,588 Venezuelan children and youth" (March 11, 2020). The interviewed official from the Secretariat of Education of Medellín also affirmed that the integration of VMR-CR in the primary and secondary levels of education requires the expansion of the coverage of the School Alimentation Program (SAP).

Therefore, the increase in demand for school places will also necessitate expansion of other social programs linked to it, like the SAP. In Barranquilla, the link is evident, since the number of children and adolescents enrolled is proportional to the beneficiaries of SAP; thus "1,852 Venezuelan and returnee children and youth started to be served last year (2019) by the District through an agreement with the UN World Food Program. By signing a new agreement for 2020, 3,300 students will benefit from nutritional support provided in the public schools of Barranquilla" (Mayor's Office of Barranquilla, January 28, 2020).

In parallel, the Mayor's Office of the municipality of Yopal announced, on March 5, 2020 through an institutional statement, the presence of 1,154 Venezuelans enrolled in the different public educational institutions of the city. However, the municipal administration is emphatic about the need for the Colombian State to regulate access to the provision of educational services for migrants and refugees: "A total of 510 Venezuelan students are enrolled in official schools, who must present the documentation required by Colombian law. Without documents, it is impossible for the school's dean to assign a place to a foreign student" (Mayor's Office of Yopal, January 27, 2020).

Although the national government currently has a route in place for the access of Venezuelan children and adolescents to education, in most situations they have an irregular immigration status in the country, which prevents their schooling. For this and other reasons, "it is expected that between 70,000 and 120,000 migrant children and young people of school age are out of the system or attend schools without being formally enrolled" (World Bank Group, 2018, p. 98).

CHALLENGES FACING AND CHALLENGES FACED IN THE MEDIUM TERM -FROM 5 TO 10 YEARS- BY THE COLOMBIAN CENTRAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN RESPONSE TO THE INFLUX, WITH A FOCUS ON INFRASTRUCTURE NEEDS

EXPANSION OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND PUBLIC SERVICE INFRASTRUCTURE BASED ON INCREASED DEMAND

Colombia presents a great disparity in the number of hospital and medical care centers among the country's different cities and departments (for more information, refer to the vulnerability rating). The current pandemic also represents another pressing factor for the Colombian government, which already presented a shortage in the number of emergency care units and hospital beds before COVID-19. Overall, local and national administrations must develop mechanisms to expand coverage to vulnerable communities, and quickly prepare and equip medical centers to not only respond to a pandemic that has overwhelmed the healthcare system, but to also expand access to a growing population with special needs.

In the area of health, the interventions implemented by multilateral organizations to reach VMR-CR (such as UNHCR, USAID, and the NCR, among other) have focused on guaranteeing access to basic health services, through the strengthening of emergency services, care for pregnant women during prenatal check-ups, reduction of maternal and child health risks, care for newborns, and other situations that may affect the fundamental right to life. Additionally, activities related to primary medical assistance, the strengthening of the immune response through vaccination systems, and the promotion of sexual and reproductive health have been undertaken.

Below are the four primary medium- and long-term challenges in health care:

According to the External Assessment of Quality of Care in the Health Sector in Colombia developed by World Bank and IFC in July 2019, Colombia has made major investments in improving the supply of health human resources. However, the supply of doctors, nurses, and hospital beds remains low compared to OECD countries. According to the RETHUS database, the number of doctors has increased by 34% over just six years, to a level of 128,354 as of 2017. The number of nurses have increased by 47%. Despite these increases, Colombia has a physician to population ratio of 2.1 per 1000 inhabitants, which is lower

than the OECD median of 3.2 and lower than the conservative benchmark of 2.6. This ratio is, however, comparable to other Latin American countries with similar income levels. For nursing, Colombia has both nurses and auxiliary nurses (1.26 and 5.16 per 1000 habitants), but relies more on the latter compared to other countries. When both types of nurses are grouped together, the total number of nursing professional to population ratio, again, is among the lower end of OECD countries (benchmark 8 per 1000). Hospital bed capacity, at 1.7 beds per 1,000, is also at the lower end of OECD countries and lower than the benchmark of 2.5 (World Bank, 2019).

Therefore, increase of human resources for health care both inside and outside hospital facilities must be a priority, since the health care providing entities must have the necessary personnel to face the demands caused by the arrival of VMR-CR. This will allow for the expansion of the coverage of health services for both migrants and the most vulnerable Colombian populations. The increase of health personnel will also enable reaching the places of residence of those VMR-CR who, for different reasons such as unawareness, irregular immigration status, or fear, do not visit health institutions.

Expansion of physical infrastructure of public institutions that provide health services at different levels, so as to ensure access for the most vulnerable populations, including VMR-CR, to quality medical services with wide coverage. Health entities located in the border municipalities should be prioritized in this regard, since they are the ones receiving the greatest demand from migrants and refugees and usually have deficits in infrastructure, equipment, and health personnel.

Strengthening public health surveillance systems due to the arrival of so-called imported diseases (such as measles), is a product of migratory flows from Venezuela in recent years, and most recently, COVID-19. Appropriate measures must be taken to deal with these situations, such as the extension of vaccination initiatives, an activity currently carried out by the Ministry of Health and Social Protection.

Design of strategies to reach VMR-CR with chronic diseases and in need of public health services. This includes diagnostic exams, treatment and monitoring, and providing specialist care for irregular migrants suffering from diseases (such as tuberculosis, malaria, HIV/AIDS, COVID-19, among others) and who are excluded from health services due to their immigration status. This includes strategies like temporary or mobile care units in order to facilitate coverage in the most remote and underserved areas.

Regarding educational services, physical infrastructure needs to be expanded, especially to grant access to primary and secondary level students. The expansion should be prioritized in border municipalities, in which the capacity of the educational system to meet demand is lower.

While the central and local governments have promoted and expanded virtual education as a cost-efficient way to deliver opportunities for the people of Colombia, rural and underserved communities often do not have connectivity, because of a lack of either infrastructure or economic resources.

Also worth considering is the expansion of the School Alimentation Program (SAP) for primary and secondary students, which is directly linked to public education services and therefore depends on the expansion of school coverage and infrastructure. Furthermore, it will be essential to ensure that the resources allocated to this program are not subject to corruption, which has occurred in some municipalities in Colombia and is widely reported by the national media such as the media outlets *El Tiempo*, *El Espectador* and *Semana*.

Concerning housing, potable water, and basic sanitation, enabling migrant and refugee families to achieve decent living conditions is crucial for true integration. This requires increased investment and an improved response capacity of local authorities, as “even when coverage in water and basic sanitation is high, the growth of human settlements as a result of migration has demanded contingency responses in this sector” (World Bank Group, 2018, p.115). Accordingly, access to housing should be improved through the design of strategies that include rental payments for migrants, refugees, and returnees who, due to multiple economic and administrative barriers, cannot access decent quality housing.

In addition, access to potable water supplies in some areas of the country need to be increased, as evidenced by the surveys conducted in Barranquilla, illustrating that “both the population of Venezuelan migrants and Colombian citizens who returned from Venezuela require water and sanitation solutions for the short, medium, and long term” (World Bank Group, 2018, p. 115). According to the World Bank Group (2018), basic sanitation and potable water actions should be prioritized in the departments of Norte de Santander, La Guajira, and Arauca in the short and long term, especially for the connection of households to aqueduct and conventional sewerage systems.

ADAPTATION OF THE INSTITUTIONAL ARCHITECTURE IN ORDER TO FOSTER SOCIAL INTEGRATION OF VMR-CR

In terms of progress in social integration, Bogotá has the program called SuperCADE Social, which, according to a bulletin issued on January 24, 2019 by the Mayor’s Office of Bogotá, has operated in the city’s transport terminal since October 2018, reaching almost 8,000 people, of which 98% are Venezuelan. There, they receive advice and guidance on how to start their regularization process, supplies of food and travel kits, and psychosocial care when individuals or families are in conditions of migratory vulnerability. In addition, Bogotá’s Migrant Assistance Center provides temporary accommodation to 3,641 VMR-CR.

SUPER CADE Social is a joint program where different organizations provide services to migrants which include: the General Secretariat of the Mayor's Office of Bogotá, IOM, Migration Colombia, the Colombian Red Cross, Distrital Secretary of Government, Secretary for Social Integration, Personería of Bogotá, High Council for Victims, Peace and Reconciliation, Bethany and Plan International.

During 2020, the City Hall of Bogotá destined approximately 357M USD for the Social Integration Sector. This budget includes investment for projects aimed at vulnerable populations, including Venezuelan migrants and refugees, as well as, Colombian returnees. One of the services is the Comprehensive Center for Attention to Migrants (CIAM), which seeks to provide psychosocial and legal advice to migrants, humanitarian support and stabilization, and, referrals to other care and services.

In Medellín, a total of 8,456 Venezuelans have benefited from food assistance, in addition to shelter and humanitarian transport services, for which a care phonenumber has been established. According to the Information Bulletin issued on February 12, 2020, "Medellín consolidated its leadership to focus on the population of Venezuelan migrants, the reason why the Migration Management Table for Medellín and Antioquia was installed. This will allow them to join forces and focus the institutional offer in order to positively impact this population" (Mayor's Office of Medellín, February 12, 2020).

On February 28, 2020, the Mayor's Office of Barranquilla reported that 1,260 families had received assistance in its Center for Local Integration of Migrants between January and February of the current year. According to the district administration, this site (managed by the Government Secretariat), aims to provide guidance on all the procedures required of the migrant and refugee population and offers basic services they need in order to guarantee access to their rights in terms of social inclusion, which includes service referrals, mental health support, childcare, and sexual and reproduction health services. The following are a list of migrant and refugee services provided by government and civil society actors:

- ◇ Psychosocial support through the Red Cross Psychosocial Listening Center program.

- ◇ Legal advice through Plan International and FUPAD in relation to immigration status and others that the migrant population requires.

- ◇ Unique return registration for Colombian returnees (Through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs page).

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- ◇ Affiliation to government services through a census list administered by the Ministry of Health for the migrant population with PEP and returnees.

 - ◇ Coordination with Profamilia to provide family planning programs through methods such as, IUD and subdermal implants, among others.

 - ◇ Registering cases of refugee applications with the legal office of the Universidad del Norte who works with UNHCR.

 - ◇ Registering cases of refugee applications with the legal office of the Universidad del Norte who works with UNHCR.

 - ◇ Child protection services for children provided by Fundación Plan.

 - ◇ Improving education coverage and capacity of the Secretary of Education.

 - ◇ Printing and renewal of PEP cards.

 - ◇ Referrals of HIV patients to the Ministry of Health, the Red Cross and other entities that handle anti-retrovirals.

 - ◇ Coordination with civil society organizations to work with the community and make use of the public centers and spaces for their activities.

In an official statement issued on March 5, 2020, the Municipal Mayor's Office of Yopal proposed "to build a temporary shelter for migrants, where they will receive food and accommodation for a maximum period of 15 days. After this time, migrants must continue on their way, and those who have entered illegally may be deported or returned to the border area by the authorities (Mayor's Office of Yopal, March 5, 2020).

Furthermore, in small municipalities such as Yopal, where the mixed migratory flows coming from Venezuela and the presence of illegal armed groups¹⁴ converge, a climate of xenophobia and discrimination becomes a barrier to the processes of social integration for the Venezuelan population. This situation has already been identified in other studies, such as that of the World Bank Group: "In some areas, illegal groups exercise strict control over the actions, movements, and activities of the Venezuelan population, generating suspicion

¹⁴ For further information about the armed conflict refer to the chapter "Conflict and Venezuelan Migration to Colombia". On the armed conflict and its risks for public interventions and infrastructure, refer to the section "Possible Risks, Unknown Variables Requiring Further Study in the Suggested Framework".

and mistrust between the locals and a perception of insecurity derived from their presence in the community” (2018, p. 84).

The above highlights differences between local administrations’ institutional architecture and management of migratory flows¹⁵. In larger cities, there is an integrated physical and personnel infrastructure to face the challenges of the arrival of VMR-CR. In the case of small cities like Yopal, where there is not the necessary infrastructure, their policies are aimed at the expulsion of VMR-CR rather than their integration. As it can be observed below, the differences in the GDP at the municipal and department level, shows a remarkable difference between the territories of this study.

Table 21.

GDP at the Department Antioquia, Bogota D.C., Atlantico, and Casanare, Provided by the National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE) 2015-2018

Department	2015	2016	2017	2018*
COLOMBIA	804.692	863.782	920.471	985.931
Antioquia	115.446	126.022	132.369	141.866
Atlántico	35.716	38.575	40.875	43.426
Bogotá D.C.	206.478	221.456	236.786	252.511
Casanare	13.305	11.667	13.145	15.672

Source: DANE, March 27, 2020.

Table 22.

GDP of the Municipalities of Colombia and their Estimated GDP Per Capita According to the Figures Provided by the National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE) for the Year 2017

Municipality	Department	GDP (billions of Colombian Pesos)	GDP per capita (PIB Colombian Pesos)
Bogota D.C.	Cundinamarca	212.196	26.259.526
Medellín	Antioquia	51.535	20.544.355
Barranquilla	Atlántico	24.430	19.884.010
Yopal	Casanare	4.435	30.336.776

Source: DANE, March 27, 2020.

¹⁵ On January 1, 2020, local leaders (Governors and mayors), councilors, deputies and councilors, assumed their positions until December 31, 2023. The following elections will be held in October 2023. The conservative wing parties and other small parties lead a great majority of Governorships. Based on political alignments and alliances, the governments and mayors have implemented a response to the migratory phenomenon, with different nuances depending on their capacity and budget, which varies according to their Gross Domestic Product.

One of the main challenges is to consolidate a coordinated national system so that national policies are implemented in the municipalities while adapting to the specific needs and characteristics of each region. This would guarantee the effective exercise of VMR-CR rights as well as alignment with the financial and technical needs of each municipality.

UNIVERSALIZATION OF ACCESS TO SERVICES IN DECENT CONDITIONS

The universalization of access to services means meeting the specific needs of different population groups so that they are guaranteed basic and universal levels of well-being and the exercise of their rights. In this sense, “the expansion and universalization of social protection systems underlie several goals of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. This entails for countries, especially developing ones, the progressive expansion of coverage, financing, and instruments and benefits granted by such systems” (ECLAC, 2018, p. 11). For that reason, the Colombian government must undertake actions to grant coverage and improve the quality of services, such as health care, education, water, basic sanitation, and electrical energy to all people within their territory, including VMR-CR. ECLAC also stated: “The problems surrounding migrants’ access to social protection and decent work are not only key as mechanisms for social inclusion, but are part of the broader and more global commitment to the guarantee and effective exercise of human rights” (2018, p. 97).

Finally, it is important to emphasize that despite the constantly changing flow of migrants and refugees, and the pressure and responsibility placed upon host departments and municipalities to address them, there is no specific estimate in the budget on the amount necessary to cover the infrastructure demand of VMR-CR arrivals. In fact, several entities such as academic institutions and international cooperation agencies, emphasize the need for improved estimation of the population size to estimate of infrastructure needs per region.

ASSISTANCE PLANS AND COLLABORATIVE INITIATIVES BY MULTILATERAL ORGANIZATIONS, BILATERAL DONORS, AND THE COLOMBIAN CENTRAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FOCUSED ON VENEZUELAN MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES, AND RETURNEES IN COLOMBIA (VMR-CR)

DONOR MAPPING: COLLABORATIVE INITIATIVES BY MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL ORGANIZATIONS FOCUSED ON VMR-CR

The international organizations working in Colombia to meet the needs of VMR-CR can be divided into three groups: international non-governmental organizations focusing on humanitarian actions, international development cooperation agencies with a presence in Colombia, and multilateral organizations which financially invest in and develop interventions targeting VMR-CR.

The first group consists of international non-governmental organizations that carry out humanitarian actions and interventions in health and economic and social development with this population. This includes organizations such as Diakonie of Germany, Ford Foundation of the United States, War Child of the United Kingdom, Terre des Hommes of Switzerland, and Mercy Corps of North America, among others.

The activities of these international organizations are focused on certain vulnerable populations, such as children and adolescents or women, and they carry out actions almost exclusively in response to their institutional mission. For example, Save the Children develops strategies to confront the cross-border crisis between Colombia and Venezuela¹⁶, based on an assessment of multi-sectoral need, providing protection for Venezuelan children through the installation of child-friendly safe spaces in the departments of Arauca and La Guajira.

Of the 26 international non-governmental organizations identified in Colombian territory that carry out activities with Venezuelan migrants and refugees, 17 undertake technical actions¹⁷

¹⁶ To better understand the crisis and conflict dynamic in the border please read the section "Conflict and Venezuelan Migration to Colombia"

¹⁷ Technical assistance is non-financial assistance provided by local or international specialists. This may include information and knowledge sharing, advisory, skills training, knowledge transfer, and consulting services, and may also involve the transfer of technical data. The objective of the technical assistance is to maximize the quality of the implementation and the impact of the project by supporting administration, management, policy development, capacity building, among others. Thus,

for humanitarian assistance; 14 develop protection activities for children and adolescents, such as nurseries and childcare centers; 11 provide technical assistance in health matters; 10 install sanitation units (mobile or temporary bathrooms equipped with toilet, shower and sink); eight offer medical equipment and supplies; eight assist in food and hygiene; and eight offer technical assistance for disaster management like landslides and floods. To a lesser extent, temporary accommodation services are offered through shelters, infrastructure, and technical assistance for the provision of drinking water and basic sanitation. Additionally, subsidies for economic development are provided such as credits or resources to start a small business.

The second group of organizations consists of international development cooperation agencies with a presence in Colombia. Among them are the Spanish Agency of International Cooperation for Development (AECID), the German Corporation for International Cooperation (GIZ), the Official International Program for Development Aid of the Government of Ireland (Irish Aid), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Japan International Cooperation Agency and others listed in this section.

The role of international cooperation in Colombia is important in promoting and providing technical and financial support for activities related to care for VMR-CR arriving in the country. For instance, USAID has provided nearly 40 million dollars to strengthen the capacity of the Colombian government and civil society to address the humanitarian crisis created by the increase population flow from Venezuela. This aid is implemented through various projects in areas of relief that have the greatest impacts on Venezuelan migration in Colombia, and include actions of direct emergency assistance, protection assistance, socio-economic and cultural integration, and capacity building. USAID provides aid by working with Colombian authorities at the national, departmental, and municipal levels in the implementation of public policies to regularize the immigration status of Venezuelans and to facilitate their insertion into the labor market. In addition, USAID has supported awareness raising initiatives to protect human rights and prevent xenophobia, violence, and discrimination against VMR-CR through different programs. Among them, USAID supports UNHCR's national anti-xenophobia campaign "Somos Panas Colombia", which uses social media and traditional media to educate both Colombian and Venezuelans, as well as shed light on the benefits of migration.

11 governmental agencies for international cooperation have been identified in the mapping of donors present in Colombia with initiatives for VMR-CR. Of those, eight finance programs related to the protection of children and adolescents from the neighboring country, six finance or develop technical assistance actions in the health sector, six provide food assistance, through the construction of community canteens or alimentation programs, and six offer technical assistance for humanitarian care. To a lesser extent, activities related to temporary accommodation and the construction of sanitary units are also developed. Within the review,

technical actions can be each of the activities carried out within the framework of technical cooperation assistance.

initiatives related to habitability or basic sanitation, such as housing, road infrastructure, drinking water, sewerage, or solid waste collection and disposal, were not identified; neither were environmental actions or programs, including disaster management, irregular human settlements management, and community participation.

The third group of entities is composed of multilateral organizations, such as the United Nations (UN), Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), World Health Organization (WHO), and International Organization for Migration (IOM), which financially invest in and develop interventions targeting VMR-CR.

The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), for example, delivers contraceptives in the border cities of Cúcuta and Maicao, reaching more than 2,600 women in 2018, and organizes workshops to prevent gender-based violence. Both these strategic technical support actions of UNFPA are aimed at promoting integrated and cross-border approaches directed at women and girls. In general, multilateral organizations concentrate their efforts in the areas of children protection, education, humanitarian care, and health.

MAIN DONORS AND FUNDS

EUROPEAN COMMISSION

The external actions of the European Union have traditionally focused on three main fronts: trade policy, development cooperation and the political dimension. These elements offer valuable instruments for implementing a plausible foreign policy in the fields of diplomacy, economics and trade. With the aim to adapt the external policies and priorities of the European Union to contemporary challenges, the EC promotes the defense of human rights, the preservation of international peace and security and the prevention of conflicts as part of the fundamental objectives of the EU's foreign policy.

The activities of the delegation in Colombia include:

- ◇ Representation of the European Union before the national authorities of Colombia.

- ◇ Coordination with the Embassies of the Member States of the EU accredited in Colombia .

- ◇ Cooperation with public entities and civil society organizations in Colombia.

- ◇ Promotion of trade through the agreement between Colombia and the European Union.
- ◇ Direct humanitarian aid through the ECHO offices.
- ◇ Information through our communication section, the website and social networks.

For the year 2019 the money allocated by the European Commission was 10 million euros.

CENTRAL FUND FOR ACTION IN EMERGENCY CASES (CERF)

The Central Fund for Emergency Action (CERF) is a humanitarian fund established by the General Assembly of the United Nations (UN) in 2006 to provide more effective and reliable humanitarian assistance to people affected by natural disasters and armed conflicts. The Fund is replenished annually through contributions from governments and the private sector. Furthermore, it constitutes a reserve fund for humanitarian action.

CERF donations in Colombia include the departments of La Guajira and Norte de Santander, as follows:

Table 23.
CERF Contributions in Colombia Years 2016-2018

Year	Department	Amount (US \$)
2016	Norte de Santander	5,341,028
2017	La Guajira	208,636,678
	Norte de Santander	3,827,915
2018	La Guajira	8,500,637
	Norte de Santander	2,206,181

Source: Financial Tracking Service, OCH A. 2020.

UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (USAID)

USAID's efforts in Colombia focus on three specific areas:

- 1 Democracy, human rights and governance: Contributes to the efforts of civil society and the government of Colombia to improve respect for human rights, increase access to justice and social services in remote and conflict-affected areas, strengthen unions and promote transparency.
- 2 Environment and climate change: Supports the Colombian government's efforts to reduce threats to biodiversity and ecosystems, and strengthen environmental governance to conserve protected areas and ethnic territories.
- 3 Crisis and conflict: Supports the efforts of the Colombian government to restore security and social services in prioritized municipalities where the lack of governance has opened an opportunity for non-state actors to operate. Activities seek to improve living conditions through licit economic opportunities, building local institutional capacity to respond to social needs, expanding access to financial services and supporting the implementation of the land and rural development strategy from Colombia.

For this purpose, 40 million dollars have been allocated.

GOVERNMENT OF FRANCE

The French Development Agency initiated its activities in Colombia since late 2009 with the mandate drawn up for an emerging country: support for "green and solidarity growth". The Bogotá AFD office has implemented a 2014-2018 intervention strategy that includes three thematic objectives:

- ◇ Promote convergence and sustainable development of the territories.
- ◇ Promote mitigation of climate change and adaptation of policies.
- ◇ Accompany social cohesion policies, including those for reducing inequality.

This strategy also has two cross-cutting objectives which are the contribution to economic diplomacy and France's commitments in relation to the climate change. Among the AFD loans, a first line of credit of 300M USD was signed in late June 2020 during the visit of the French Prime Minister to Colombia. The accumulated total of AFD loans to Colombia, since 2009, amounts to 2,000 MUSD, of which 811M USD are for operations that contribute

directly to post-conflict issues. These loans are mainly related to rural development, land ownership and cadaster.

France completes its participation through the European Union budget in the European Trust Fund for Colombia for an amount of 95,000M euros (launched in December 2016) through a direct and bilateral contribution of 3M euros.

GOVERNMENT OF THE NETHERLANDS

Netherlands cooperation is based on commercial diplomacy. Likewise, they have expressed their support for the process of stabilization and construction of peaceful coexistence in Colombia and the implementation of the agreement with the FARC, and through contributions to the Trust Fund of the European Union and humanitarian demining initiatives in Colombian territory. The Netherlands is an ally of Colombia in various multilateral forums. It includes topics of common interest such as education, environment, solid waste management, water resource management, sustainable energy, comprehensive water management, river transport, agriculture, cadastre, air services, and coastal protection, among others.

In 2018 the contributions of the Government of the Netherlands were 4M euros.

GOVERNMENT OF SWEDEN

The Embassy aims to promote relations between Sweden and Latin America, promoting trade between the countries, personal and human exchange, cooperation for sustainable development. We have the support of a large number of Consulates, both in Colombia and in other countries, which are under our supervision.

Sweden has contributed to support the humanitarian situations caused by the armed conflict in Colombia through its support to the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Humanitarian Donors Fund and NGOs. Since 2018, humanitarian funds have also been allocated for the migratory situation of Venezuelan citizens to Colombia. In addition, it also co-finances the joint appeal of UNHCR and IOM, the United Nations organizations that assist refugees and migrants.

During 2018, a total of approximately 8.22M USD has been allocated for humanitarian aid in Colombia. Unlike cooperation resources, humanitarian funds are global in nature and are therefore allocated directly from Stockholm.

In 2019 Sweden allocated 7.2 M USD (approximately) for humanitarian aid.

GOVERNMENT OF SWITZERLAND

Switzerland's overall goal in the area of cooperation is to support Colombia to achieve sustainable peace and economic development that creates opportunities for all. To do so, the government of Switzerland has designed two strategies:

◇ SECO strategy

SECO is responsible for the development and implementation of economic and trade policy measures with partner countries. Its main objectives are the integration of partner countries in the world economy and the promotion of their sustainable economic growth.

◇ SDC - DSH strategy

Humanitarian Aid and Development (SDC) and the Division of Human Security (DSH) have combined their humanitarian aid, sustainable development, peacebuilding and human rights programs in the Cooperation Strategy 2017-2020.

Contributions from the Swiss Government have reached 7.7M USD.

GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN

The appointed advisor for International Cooperation of the Embassy of Japan , Mr. Oscar Mauricio Rojas Bulla, pointed out that the Japan has provided, through the Kusanone (Community Assistance Projects), 731 projects with a value of up to 200 billion Colombian Pesos (about 544M USD) in projects between the years 1 989 and 2019. These projects have included:

◇ Humanitarian demining

◇ Educational infrastructure

◇ Libraries

◇ Social Infrastructure

◇ Water treatment plants

◇ Vocational training

◇ Health Science education - medical equipment to improve learning process

In addition, Japan has provided about 4,000 million pesos to support the contingency of COVID19 through to Kusanone.

In addition, according to OCHA, a total funding from the Government of Japan within the Regional Response Plan for refugees and migrants (from Venezuela) reaches the amounts of 7,5M USD, which were mainly intended for assistance grants through the UN implemented across the region (see table below).

Table 24.
Regional Plan of Response to Refugees and Migrants (from Venezuela) Donations Made by the Government of Japan

Organization Target	Description	Intervention Area	Amount (US \$)
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees	Grant Assistance through UN	AOI 1 - Direct Emergency Assistance	997, 068
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees	Grant Assistance through UN	AOI 2 - Protection Assistance	1495, 600
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees	Grant Assistance through UN	AOI 1 - Direct Emergency Assistance	1, 379, 167
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees	Grant Assistance through UN	AOI 2 - Protection Assistance	1, 865, 962
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees	Grant Assistance through UN	AOI 3 - Socio Economic and Cultural Integration	550, 266
International Plan	Protection of Venezuelan refugees / migrants and people in host communities in Piura and Cusco, Peru	AOI 2 - Protection Assistance AOI 4 - Capacity Building	463, 220
International Organization for Migration	Provision of shelter and humanitarian transportation, DTM implementation, rapid infrastructure interventions	AOI 1 - Direct Emergency Assistance	762, 135
International Organization for Migration	Registration and documentation assistance	AOI 2 - Protection Assistance	19, 387

Source: Financial Tracking Service, OCHA. 2020.

Donations made by the Government of Japan to the Regional Response Plan for refugees and migrants have been invested in the following projects carried out in Colombia:

Table 25.
Project HSAMR19-AOI1; AOI2; AOI3; AOI4-156330-1, UNHCR Colombia

Intervention Area	Amount (US \$)	Percentage
AOI 1 - Direct Emergency Assistance	\$ 11,011,765	30.59%
AOI 2 - Protection Assistance	\$ 19,641,176	54.56%
AOI 3 - Socio Economic and Cultural Integration	\$ 4,235,294	11.76%
AOI 4 - Capacity Building	\$ 1,111,765	3.09%
Total	\$ 36,000,000	100%

Source: Financial Tracking Service, OCHA. 2020.

Table 26.
HSAMR19-AOI1 Project; AOI2; AOI3; AOI4-156247-1 IOM Colombia

Intervention Area	Amount (US \$)	Percentage
AOI 1 - Direct Emergency Assistance	\$ 20,134,000	39.24%
AOI 2 - Protection Assistance	\$ 2,700,000	5.26%
AOI 3 - Socio Economic and Cultural Integration	\$ 16,281,600	31.73%
AOI 4 - Capacity Building	\$ 12,200,000	23.77%
Total	\$ 51,315,600	100%

Source: Financial Tracking Service, OCHA. 2020.

It is necessary to clarify that the projects mentioned on the tables above include donations from the different agencies and governments, and not only the contributions made by the Government of Japan.

Additionally, the Government of Japan has made the following contributions to the IDB:

Table 27.
Contributions of the Government of Japan to the IDB

Fund	Contribution (US \$ M)	Condition
Japan Special Fund	235.5	Untied
Japan Special Fund Poverty Reduction Program	71.5	Untied
Japanese Trust Fund for Consultancy Services	43.8	Tied
Multi-donor Disaster Prevention Trust Fund	9.0	Untied
Sustainable Emerging Cities Multi-donor	5.0	Untied
Sustainable Energy and Climate Change Initiative Multi-Donor Fund	10.0	Untied
Total	374.7	

GCFF SUPPORT FOR COLOMBIA

The Global Fund for Concessional Financing (GCFF) was launched in 2016 at the initiative of the United Nations, the Islamic Development Bank and the World Bank. It was created in response to the effects of the Syrian refugee crisis in Jordan and Lebanon, which opened its borders to its neighbors fleeing violence and persecution. As a result, these two countries have a greater number of refugees as part of their general population than any other country in the world. The provision of this global public good has caused considerable fiscal and financial stress and tense public infrastructure and services, such as water, education and health.

The GCFF was created to bridge the gap by using contributions from supporting countries to provide concessional financing to Jordan and Lebanon, providing loans that address the impact of the Syrian refugee crisis and benefit both refugees and to host communities.

In January 2019, Colombia was added as a beneficiary country of the GCFF to address the impacts of the Venezuelan crisis on its economy. Since its launch, the GCFF has received more than 695M USD in commitments from ten supporting countries, i.e. any country or intergovernmental entity that enters into a Contribution Agreement that commits the minimum amount required to the Trust Fund. Of these, the Fund disbursed 584M USD in concessional amounts, which in turn have leveraged more than 3B USD in much-needed concessional financing to support refugees and their host communities in Jordan, Lebanon and Colombia.

The first project supported by GCFF in Colombia is the Second Financing for Sustainable, Competitive and Migratory Development of Colombia. The 750M USD project received 31.5M USD in concessional financing and was approved by the World Bank Board on May 21, 2019.

This project aims to provide the Colombian Government with technical assistance and tools to address the serious development challenges posed by the sudden increase in population flows from Venezuela, which has exacerbated the humanitarian situation of border communities.

In this context, the project will support the Government of Colombia in its efforts to promote safe and orderly migration in the following areas:

- ◇ Establishment of a migrant registry;

- ◇ Greater awareness in the communities to promote integration;

- ◇ Creating availability of basic services for arriving populations;

- ◇ Provision of technical assistance to increase the capacity of different state institutions at the national and local levels that have responsibilities related to refugees and migrants;

- ◇ Building structural and long-term state capacity by providing technical assistance and carrying out promotional activities that will be reflected and adopted in specific regulations, such as laws, decrees and other regulations, as well as strategic and far-reaching public policies.

Through these activities, the intervention seeks to comprehensively respond to the needs of the migrant population and promote the general stability of the community and social and cultural integration (GCFE 2019).

Tables below shows desegregated funding allocated:

Table 28.
Cumulative Funding Decisions (Per GCF Trust Fund Windows)
in Millions of US Dollars

CUMULATIVE FUNDING DECISIONS (PER GCF TRUST FUND WINDOWS)
IN MILLIONS OF US DOLLARS

Concessionality	ISA	Global	Lebanon/ Jordan	Jordan	Lebanon	Total
Colombia - Fiscal Sustainability, Competitiveness and Migration Development	WB	31.50	-	-	-	31.50
Jordan - Ain Ghazal Wastewater	EBRD	-	1.95	-	-	1.95
Jordan - Economic Opportunities	WB	-	11.24	39.76	-	51.00
Jordan - Energy and Water Development Policy Loan	WB	-	-	25.00	-	25.00
Jordan - West Irbid Wastewater	EBRD	-	2.50	-	-	2.50
Jordan - Emergency Health	WB	-	7.95	5.95	-	13.90
	IsDB	-	12.01	8.99	-	21.00
Jordan - Emergency Health (Additional Financing)	WB	-	18.17	40.73	-	58.90
Jordan - Education Reform Support	WB	-	41.88	10.42	-	52.30
Jordan - First Equitable Growth and Job Creation	WB	11.26	18.45	81.29	-	111.00
Lebanon - Roads and Employment	WB	-	28.91	-	16.49	45.40
Lebanon - Health Resilience	WB	-	24.16	-	0.04	24.20
	IsDB	-	5.89	-	0.01	5.90
Lebanon - Greater Beirut Public Transport	WB	25.39	32.35	-	12.07	69.80
Lebanon - National Jobs P4R	WB	41.34	22.52	-	6.25	70.10
		109.48	227.98	212.14	34.85	584.45
ISA Costs						
EBRD		-	0.17	-	-	0.17
IsDB		-	0.05	0.01	0.00	0.07
WB		0.07	0.15	0.12	0.02	0.36
		0.07	0.37	0.13	0.02	0.60
Administrative Budget						
Coordination Unit		0.19	0.45	0.50	0.03	1.16
Trustee		0.14	0.41	0.46	0.02	1.04
		0.33	0.85	0.96	0.05	2.20
Total Funding Decisions		109.88	229.21	213.23	34.93	587.25

Note: Totals may not add up due to rounding

Table 29.
Pledge and Contributions as of June 30, 2019 in in Millions of US Dollars

PLEDGES AND CONTRIBUTIONS AS OF JUNE 30, 2019 IN MILLIONS

Supporting Country	Curr	Pledge in Curr. of Contribution	USDeq. a/	Effective (or signed) Contribution in Currency of Contribution					Receipts in Currency of Contribution				Receipts in USDeq. b/
				Global	Lebanon/Jordan	Jordan	Lebanon	Total	Global	Lebanon/Jordan	Jordan	Lebanon	
Canada	CAD	57.00	43.46	17.00	40.00	-	-	57.00	17.00	40.00	-	-	43.46
Denmark	DKK	437.10	68.33	437.10	-	-	-	437.10	437.10	-	-	-	68.33
European Commission	EUR	5.00	5.36	-	5.00	-	-	5.00	-	5.00	-	-	5.36
Germany	EUR	91.48	102.67	-	67.65	23.83	-	91.48	-	62.32	21.16	-	93.57
Japan	USD	120.00	120.00	-	60.00	25.00	-	85.00	-	60.00	25.00	-	85.00
Japan c/	JPY	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Netherlands	EUR	53.00	61.43	3.00	20.00	-	30.00	53.00	3.00	20.00	-	30.00	61.43
Norway	NOK	265.20	31.21	30.00	235.20	-	-	265.20	30.00	235.20	-	-	31.21
Sweden	SEK	180.00	20.24	-	180.00	-	-	180.00	-	180.00	-	-	20.24
Sweden	USD	30.00	30.00	10.00	20.00	-	-	30.00	10.00	20.00	-	-	30.00
United Kingdom d/	USD	40.30	40.30	-	-	40.30	-	40.30	-	-	40.30	-	40.30
United Kingdom	GBP	73.50	97.77	8.00	-	65.50	-	73.50	8.00	-	65.50	-	97.77
United States	USD	75.00	75.00	-	-	35.00	-	35.00	-	-	35.00	-	35.00
Total			695.78										611.67

a/ Represents (1) actual US dollar value of paid-in cash contributions and (2) June 30, 2019 value of pledges outstanding, contribution amounts pending FX, and unpaid amounts.

b/ Represents actual USD receipts

c/ Japan pledges to provide JPY 100bn in additional loans that may be used by IBRD to generate additional grant contribution amounts

d/ Represents grant amount only

Note: totals may not add up due to rounding

Source GFC 2018-2019

INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK SPECIAL GRANT FUND

The Assembly of Governors of the Inter-American Development Bank, which the government of Japan actively participated in, approved the use of its Special Grant Fund to support operations that help countries integrate immigrants into their local communities and contribute to their development. The initiative arose in response to a sudden increase in unprecedented intraregional migratory flows that impacted countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. The initiative will allow the use of the Bank's grant facility, which, in combination with economic and social development operations, will help recipient countries offer better access to health, education, housing, security and other services to struggling communities for integrating newcomers. According to the approved proposal, the IDB will contribute US \$ 100 million from its Fund, while the donor community is expected to contribute additional resources. These grant funds will be combined with Bank financing operations for US \$ 800 million.

The IDB Special Grant Fund was created in 2007 for special circumstances that may arise in specific countries or projects. At the beginning of the year, the IDB created a special team and an inter-sectoral working group to coordinate the Bank's response together with operational departments that prepare operations and provide other resources to the countries. Grant funds will be used to accelerate the design, testing, and implementation of projects that

address the challenges posed by large-scale, sudden cross-border migrations at the local level in various sectors, including improved access to education and health services, such as also to formal jobs, and infrastructure, such as drinking water, basic sanitation and housing.

Refer to Annex 8 for Desegregated Information on Donation Source, Description, Sector, Amount and Funding Status, as Displayed in the Financial Tracking Service (FTS)

Table 30 and regional maps provide a comprehensive list of activities and programs focused on attention and protection of Venezuelan migrants, refugees and returnees in Colombia.

Table 30.

Donor Mapping. Collaborative Initiatives by Multilateral and Bilateral Organizations

Project	Responsible	Implementing entity	Intervention areas	Donors
GIFMM	UNHCR	IOM, UNHCR, International NGOs, Red Cross.	Humanitarian - Health - Education - Habitability and Sanitation - Economic Development	UNHCR, IOM
RMRP		UNHCR, Red Cross Colombiana, Profamilia, Hospitals		IOM, UNHCR, ONGs, Red Cross
Campaign: Somos Panas Colombia		UNHCR, Colombian Government	Sensitization	UNHCR
The Workshop Schools	European Commission	European Commission	Economic Development	European Commission
Expansion of the National Response to HIV with a focus on vulnerability in prioritized departments and cities	HIV Project Global Fund	HIV Project Global Fund	Education - Health	HIV Project Global Fund
Stabilization and Emergency Program	IOM	IOM	Humanitarian - Economic Development	IOM
Venezuela's migration crisis and its impact on children in Colombia	Save the Children Colombia	Save the Children Colombia	Humanitarian - Environmental Management	Save the Children Colombia
Health clinics for Venezuelans in Colombia	Americares Region Colombia	Americares Region Colombia, Ministry of Health and Social Protection of Colombia	Humanitarian - Health - Environmental Management	USAID
Humanitarian assistance and protection to receiving Venezuelan and Colombian migrant families in Saravena	Lutheran World Federation	Lutheran World Federation	Humanitarian - Environmental Management	Lutheran World Federation
Humanitarian response in water, sanitation and hygiene to save the lives of boys, girls, youth, women and men				

Project	Responsible	Implementing entity	Intervention areas	Donors
Venezuelan children in Colombia need help	UNICEF	UNICEF	Humanitarian - Education - Health	UNICEF
Migration: ICRC Action	ICRC	ICRC, Colombian Red Cross	Humanitarian - Health - Education - Habitability and Sanitation - Economic Development - Environmental Management	ICRC
Reconnecting travelers with their families in times of uncertainty in Venezuela	International Humanitarian Commission of Inquiry	International Humanitarian Commission of Inquiry	Humanitarian	International Humanitarian Commission of Inquiry
Support for the Care of Pregnant Women, Newborn Boys and Girls, Migrants from Venezuela	Korean Government	Korean Government, E.S.E. University Hospital University Erasmo Meoz	Humanitarian - Health	Korean Government
Families make the difference	International Rescue Committee	International Rescue Committee	Humanitarian - Health - Education	International Rescue Committee
Psychosocial support for Venezuelan migrants in Colombia	AAHF	AAHF	Humanitarian - Health - Environmental Management	AAHF
ADRA Colombia provides aid to thousands of migrants - Venezuelans	ADRA	ADRA, Seventh-day Adventist Church	Humanitarian - Health - Environmental Management	Information not available
Response to the immigration emergency: Take my hand	SOS Children's Villages Colombia	SOS Children's Villages Colombia with government institutions	Humanitarian - Health - Environmental Management	SOS Children's Villages Colombia
Thousands of Venezuelan migrants receive the helping hand of Ayuda en Acción Colombia	Help in Action	Help in Action, AECID	Humanitarian - Health	Help in Action
Germany funds humanitarian aid for Venezuelans in Colombia and Ecuador	Caritas Germany	JRS, Religious Adorers, Caritas Germany and Caritas Ecuador	Humanitarian	JRS, Religiosas Adoratrices, Caritas Germany, Caritas Ecuador
Migration and Trafficking: Welcoming, protecting, promoting and integrating migrants and refugees	Social Pastoral: Caritas Colombia	The ecclesial jurisdictions of the Diocese of Riohacha, Diocese of Cúcuta, Apostolic Vicariate of Puerto Carreño, Archdiocese of Bogotá, Archdiocese of Barranquilla and Arauca	Humanitarian - Habitability and Sanitation	Social Pastoral: Caritas Colombia
DRC helps every step of the way	DRC	DRC	Humanitarian - Economic Development - Health - Education - Habitability and Sanitation	DRC
Regional Refugee Program	NRC	NRC	Humanitarian	NRC
Program: Integrating Horizons - Human mobility, a contribution to intercultural wealth	PADF	Office of Population, Refugees and Migration of the United States Department of State	Humanitarian - Economic development	PADF

Project	Responsible	Implementing entity	Intervention areas	Donors
Program in response to the situation of Venezuelan migrants and refugees	ILO	ILO	Economic development	ILO
Tracking Venezuelan users on Facebook	iMMAP	iMMAP	Information Application	UNHCR, IOM, OFDA, OCHA
Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP)	OCHA	OCHA	Humanitarian	UN (OCHA)
OXFAM: Yes, but not here!	OXFAM International	OXFAM International	Investigation	OXFAM International
Human Rights in Action	OHCHR	OHCHR	Humanitarian	OHCHR
The Country Cooperation Strategy (ECP)	PAHO / WHO	PAHO / WHO	Humanitaria -Salud - Environmental Management	CERF
Joint Response Venezuela Migration Project	International Plan for Colombian Children Foundation	SOS Children's Villages, Save The Children, Social Pastoral, Tierra de Hombres and PLAN Foundation	Humanitarian - Health	DRA
RET International	Information not available	Information not available	Information not available	Information not available
Crisis in Venezuela: Thousands of Children, Road to Exile	TdH	TdH	Humanitarian - Health - Environmental Management	TdH
TECHO	TECHO	RITA	Humanitarian - Habitability and Sanitation - Health	TECHO Mío-Hábitat Digno Foundation, GTZ
For the dignity of migrant women: Comprehensive response to the emergency	UNFPA	UNFPA	Humanitarian - Education	UNFPA
Reconstructing the social structure: Venezuelan and Colombian migrant women eliminating cultural barriers	UN Women	USAID	Humanitarian - Education	UN Women
Housing project through the help of UN Habitat	UN-HABITAT	UN-HABITAT	Habitability and Sanitation	UN-HABITAT
Opportunity Frontier	UNDP	UNDP	Education - Economic Development	GIFMM, Border Management Unit
Junior Project	War Child	War Child	Humanitarian - Education	War Child
Assistance for Venezuelans in Colombia, as the regional migrant crisis deepens	World Vision	World Vision	Humanitarian - Health - Economic Development	USAID, CIR, Mercy Corps, Save the Children, World Vision
UNHCR and AECID join forces to support the Venezuelan population in Colombia	AECID, UNHCR	UNHCR	Humanitarian - Health	AECID, UNHCR
Local Coordination Teams - LCT	CERF	CERF	Humanitarian	Government and private sector contributions

Project	Responsible	Implementing entity	Intervention areas	Donors
Ford Foundation	Ford Foundation	Ford Foundation	Support Agency	Ford Foundation
SI FRONTERA	GTZ	APC, Ecuador: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Human Mobility	Humanitarian - Health - Education - Economic Development	BMZ
Irish Aid	Irish Aid	Information not available	Information not available	Information not available
GIFMM	Norwegian Government	Norwegian Government	Humanitarian - Health	Norwegian Government
USAID's support to Colombia for the Venezuelan Crisis	USAID	USAID	Humanitarian - Health - Habitability and Sanitation - Environmental Management	United States Government
France reaches out to Venezuelans through UNHCR	French Government	ACNUR	Humanitarian - Health - Education - Economic Development	French Government
Italy to donate €500,000 to improve the situation of Venezuelan migrants	Italian Government	United Nations High Commissioner	Humanitarian	Italian Government
Investment in the GIFMM at the head of IOM and UNHCR	Dutch Government	GIFMM, IOM and UNHCR	Humanitarian - Health	Dutch Government
Humanitarian aid to Colombia	Swedish Government	IOM, UNHCR	Humanitarian - Health	Swedish Government
IDB Migration Initiative (Drinking water and sanitation program for La Guajira)				
NRC: Protection, humanitarian assistance and durable solutions for people affected by the armed conflict in Chocó and by the humanitarian crisis on the Colombia-Venezuela border	Swiss Government	Swiss Government	Humanitarian-Habitability and Sanitation - Economic Development	Swiss Government
Improve services for migrants from Venezuela and support host communities in Colombia	World Bank	GCCF	Humanitarian - Health	Canada, Netherlands, Norway, United Kingdom
Diakonie	Diakonie	Information not available	Information not available	Information not available
Programs for Migrants and Displaced People				
Humanitarian service points	IFRC	National Society of the Red Cross	Humanitarian - Health - Habitability and Sanitation - Economic Development - Environmental Management	IFRC
Migrants' rights in action				European Union

Project	Responsible	Implementing entity	Intervention areas	Donors
Program: Ven Esperanza - Antioquia - La Guajira	Mercy Corps	Alliance between International Rescue Committee, Save the Children, World Vision and Mercy Corps	Humanitarian - Health - Habitability and Sanitation - Economic Development	USAID, Food For Peace
Program: Emergency Response Venezuela - La Guajira		Mercy Corps		LDS Charities.
Route for Safe and Informed Human Mobility	JRS	SJM, Episcopal Commission for the Pastoral Care of Migrants and Itinerants of Argentina, CNR, UNHCR	Humanitarian	JRS
Colombia: Jesuit Refugee Service arrive in Arauca (Colombia) and Apure (Venezuela) to address crises of displaced persons and refugees		JRS and support from the national offices of Colombia, Venezuela and the regional office of LAC		
IDB and Switzerland partner to address migration challenges in Colombia	IDB	IDB	Economic Development - Habitability and Sanitation	SECO, SDC
Support for the Drinking Water and Basic Sanitation Program of the Department of La Guajira	IDB			IDB
Technical response to strengthen capacities and financial support to overcome the challenges facing migration in the Americas	IDB	Ministry of Labor and Ministry of Housing (Territory), among others	Health - Education - Employability - Water - Basic Sanitation - Electricity - Housing - Economic Subsidy - Registration	IDB

ANDINEAN Region



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AMAZONIAN Region



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❤️ Health

🙏 Humanitarian

🌱 Economic development

CARIBBEAN Region



La Guajira

Magdalena

Atlántico

Cesar

Sucre

Bolívar

Córdoba

Antioquia



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
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COLOMBIA'S CAPACITY FOR THE PROVISION OF PUBLIC SERVICES AND ESTIMATION OF FINANCING NEEDS FOR THE DEMAND OF INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT

Public services are inherent to the social purpose of the State. It is the duty of the State to ensure their efficient provision to all the inhabitants of the national territory. Public services will be subject to the juridical regime determined by the law, may be provided by the State directly or indirectly, by organized communities, or by individuals. In any case, the State is responsible for the regulation, control, and application of such services. If for reasons of sovereignty or social interest, the State, by means of a law approved by the majority of the members of both chambers upon the initiative of the government, should decide to assign to itself specific strategic or public service activities, it must first indemnify fully those individuals who by virtue of the said law are deprived of the exercise of a lawful activity.

Article 365 of the Colombian Constitution

Assistance to the population from Venezuela (migrants, those in transit, pendular migrants, or returnees) represents significant costs for the Colombian State. The Memoirs of the Ministry of Finance of the year 2018 - 2019, states that "in the short term the costs associated with migration would generate an increase in the deficit of 0.6% in the short term. However, in the long term, a sustained increase in collection is expected, accompanied by lower migration expenses, taking the fiscal balance to positive variations". This statement, of course, did not account for the effects of COVID.

An overview of public services and the current capacity is presented below, followed by costs by area of care on an annual basis for those that recur. It is important to clarify that, in general, there are differences between the valuations presented by different sources, with the most specialized, detailed, or recent data being preferred.



HEALTH SECTOR

The General System of Social Security in Health (GSSSH), established in 1993, is regulated by the Ministry of Health and Social Protection of Colombia. It is a public system, mainly funded by social security contributions and the national budget. It is considered a mixed system as both public and private entities provide the services and manage insurance processes.

It has two insurance schemes. One is subsidized and serves the population without payment capacity. The second is the contributory scheme, composed of people with an employment relationship and/or payment capacity, such as formal and independent workers, and retirees, who make a monthly contribution from their salary to support the health system. There are some additional schemes for teachers and those employed in the military forces.

The Health Services Provider Institutions (IPSs), such as hospitals, clinics, pharmaceutical laboratories and medical offices, among others, are the entities that provide the users of the healthcare services, while the Enterprises for Health Promotion (EPSs) are the insurance entities assigned to serve as intermediaries and administrators of the resources provided by the state.

The hospital care system is managed by both the public and private sector. In 2017, according to Hernández, there were 5,010 IPSs in total - of which 905 were public and 4,105 were private. All the hospitals combined had 80,000 beds available, which represented a ratio of 1.7 beds per 1,000 inhabitants, in contrast to the world average of 3.5 beds per 1,000. Hernández (2017) adds that reaching the world average in Colombia would require an investment of approximately EUR 16 billion.

Regarding the public sector, there was a slight increase in the IPSs registered in 2020, in comparison to 2017. It is evident that a large proportion of these are of municipal nature (see Table 31).

Table 31.
Public IPSs in Colombia, by Care Level And Territorial Classification

Territorial classification	Care level			Total
	First	Second	Third	
National	2		2	4
Departmental	108	104	16	228
District	2		4	6
Municipal	682	8	3	693
Indigenous	31			31
Total	825	112	25	962

Source: Ministry of Health and Social Protection, Hospital Information System. Consulted on 03/26/2020

However, the resources available for public IPSs in 2018 are detailed in Table 32, which shows the total number of hospital beds (25,993) was less than half of the number reported across both public and private IPSs a year earlier in 2017 (80,000).

Table 32.
Installed Capacity in Public IPSs, by Type of Resource, Colombia, 2018

Resource	Amount
Hospital beds	25,993
Observation beds	9,236
Outpatient clinics	10,455
Medical offices in emergency rooms	1,965
Operating rooms	541
Obstetric delivery tables	1,168
Dental units	3,861

Source: Ministry of Health and Social Protection, Hospital Information System. Consulted on 03/26/2020

Considering the ODA possibilities for JICA, especially in the areas of technical assistance and volunteering, it is recommended to consider the following conclusion of a study carried out by the Spanish Government on the Colombian health sector (albeit whose focus was the market for entrepreneurs and investors):

“The health sector is very important in Colombia and it offers different opportunities for companies that are interested in being part of it. On the one hand, there are on-going projects funded by public-private partnerships (PPP) for the construction of new hospitals, single-company free economic zones benefited from tariff discounts and VAT exemption, as well as hospitals to be built in post-conflict zones. On the other hand, there are opportunities for information technology companies in relation to the digitization of the clinical records, which are intended to be unified in Colombian health institutions. And finally, as Colombia is recognized worldwide as a leading country in the provision of medical and health services, an increasingly strong market niche is open.”

For the geographic areas examined, detailed and comparable information on the infrastructure has not been available for review. However, approximate figures for departments and major administrative areas¹⁸ in target municipalities are presented below (see Table 33).

Table 33.
Installed Capacity and Beds per 1,000 Inhabitants, by Type, in the Colombian Departments Where the Target Municipalities are Located, 2018

Department	Hospital beds		Medical offices	Obstetric delivery tables and operating rooms	Dental units
	Total	Hosp. beds per 1,000 inhab.*			
Antioquia (Medellín and its metropolitan area)	4,587	0,72	2,495	210	497
Atlántico (Barranquilla and its metropolitan area)	738	0,29	251	38	87
Arauca (Arauca)	345	1,32	96	19	31
Bogotá D.C. (Bogotá, D.C.)	3,828	0,52	1,144	87	234
Casanare (Yopal)	429	1,02	137	27	43
La Guajira (Maicao)	505	0,57	161	33	47
Norte de Santander (Cúcuta and its metropolitan area)	1,293	0,87	412	81	125
Colombia	35,246	0.73	12,420	1,709	3,861

*Authors' calculations based on population projections provided by DANE in 2008.19

Source: Ministry of Health and Social Protection, Hospital Information System. Consulted on 03/26/2020

¹⁸ For this purpose, the Capital District of Bogotá is considered an area with departmental hierarchy.

¹⁹ <https://www.dane.gov.co/files/censo2018/proyecciones-de-poblacion/anexos-proyecciones-poblacion-desagregacion-2018-2020.xls>

It should be noted that in the face of the emergency caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, an effort to expand the installed capacity has been made, particularly in relation to the number of beds in the intensive care units (ICUs). Therefore, the above figures should be revised when the pandemic crisis is over, as conditions are expected to have improved in that respect.

COSTS FOR THE COLOMBIAN STATE - HEALTH

According to the Ministry of Health and Social Protection, between 2017 and the end of February 2020, the amount invoiced for emergency health care provided to the population from Venezuela was USD 131 million. These services included general physical check-up, as well as selecting and classifying those patients that require clinical care as established by Resolution 5596 of December 24, 2015. It is important to highlight that the costs of care to patients who are not insured are covered by the territorial entities. Such a population would include not only migrants or refugees that tend to establish residence, but also others in transit, pendular migrants, and Colombian returnees. Based on that figure and the number of services provided, it appears that the cost to the Colombian State for emergency health care for VMR-CR during 2019 was in the range of USD 76.2 million. Assuming an approximate growth of 25% in the Venezuelan population in Colombia between mid-2019 and mid-2020, this cost could be estimated at USD 95.6 million for 2020.

Refer to Annex 7 “Infographics Response to Venezuelan Migrants and Refugees Healthcare Needs” to know more details about services provided to this population by the Colombian state in cooperation with non-governmental actors.

Estimates for growth of the migrant population and returnees from Venezuela may vary given the peculiar socio-economic dynamics resulting from the pandemic. While some migrants have returned from Colombia to Venezuela, this number is relatively low, and it is expected that the exodus of Venezuelan citizens will continue, given the precarious conditions in Venezuela (and other host nations) that may worsen as a result of COVID-19, among other factors already mentioned in previous chapters of this report.

The expenditure on vaccinations for the Venezuelan population between 2017 and 2019, in total, was COP 27,719 million (Minsalud, 2020). To estimate the total for 2019, it was assumed that this expense was distributed equally per year. Thus a total of USD 5.4 million was estimated in vaccinations during 2019. Applying an adjustment of 25% for population growth, the cost of vaccinations for 2020 would rise to USD 6.8 million.

As stated in the World Bank Group study (2018), in relation to the population with an SSP, a partial alternative to spending on emergency care (and also vaccinations) would be to affiliate the uninsured Venezuelan population settled in the country with the GSSSH, regardless of their migration status. Assuming the regularization of the entire Venezuelan population, extrapolating from the figures of settled and affiliated for February (Ministry of Health

and Social Protection, 2020), it would be necessary to insure 650,099 people, with 39.7% belonging to the subsidized regime. With the same per capita cost used by the World Bank (2018), adjusted for inflation, that insurance would have represented a disbursement of USD 173 million in 2019.

Additionally, the Border Management Unit (2020) reports that, within the costs assumed by the Colombian State to provide basic services to Venezuelan migrants and to support their integration, a plan for sexual and reproductive health services for migrants and hospital infrastructure is budgeted at USD 54 million and USD 40 million, respectively. Regarding the level of implementation and duration, no details are provided in the consulted document.

Finally, using the World Bank study, other annual costs are identified and presented in Table 34. These reflect the corresponding adjustments for inflation and increases in the population to be attended to, and they have been converted into USD.

Table 34.
Needs of the health sector derived from migration during 2020, in USD millions

Human resources (teams working out of the hospitals)	12.5
Technical assistance to territorial entities	1.0
Transfer to territorial entities, public health management, and collective interventions	14.7
Strengthening of Public Health Surveillance	0.9
Distribution of supplies, medicines, and devices in receiving territories	21.7
Development of human talent in health	0.6
Attention to pregnant women	8.1
Total	59.5

Source: Authors' calculations, based on data from the World Bank

The table below shows desegregated budget specifically for pregnant women. This could be explained by international guidelines based on evidence on similar migration phenomenon. The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) warns that "if access to reproductive health services is lacking, complications during pregnancy and childbirth can cause maternal and infant mortality, low birth weight and other harmful outcomes" (UNFPA, 2006, p. 63). In addition, it is necessary to include reproductive health services during the migration journey to design interventions, since "migrant women tend to have a higher incidence of unwanted pregnancies, due to poor access to contraceptives and lack of information about them and the way to obtain them" (UNFPA, 2006, p. 36).

Additionally, there are specific needs for priority care based on the life cycle and the degree of vulnerability of migrants, where children and adolescents, pregnant women, infants and the elderly, become populations of special attention in terms of Health. To address this, ECLAC reports that there are groups of migrants that deserve to be considered as a priority by the health system of the host country, including pregnant and lactating women (ECLAC, 2018).

The strengthening of the health system will allow VMR-CR to access basic health services, in areas such as, emergency services, prenatal check-ups for pregnant women, care for newborns, reduction of maternal and child health risks, and other emergency situations that may affect the fundamental right to life.



EDUCATION SECTOR

By 2016, Colombia had more than 53,000 educational centers or schools integrated into approximately 20,000 major institutions, with nearly eleven million students registered (see Table 35). The significance of publicly financed schools for the provision of primary and secondary levels of education was evident - with approximately four times the number of students and centers in the public sector compared to those with private funding. On the contrary, at the tertiary level the enrollment of students and the number of educational centers was mostly privately financed.

Table 35.
Students, Institutions and Educational Centers, by Sector

Level	Variables	Total	Public sector	Private sector
Primary and secondary (including preschool)	Enrolled students	10,194,880	8,305,033	1,889,847
	Institutions	19,467	9,892	9,575
	Centers	53,060	43,480	9,580
	Students/institution	524	840	197
	Students/center	192	191	197
Tertiary (Higher education)	Enrolled students	529,534	243,701	285,833
	Institutions	288	62	226
	Centers	348	87	261
	Students/institution	1,839	3,931	1,265
	Students/center	1,522	2,801	1,095

Total	Enrolled students	10,724,414	8,548,734	2,175,680
	Institutions	19,755	9,954	9,801
	Centers	53,408	43,567	9,841
	Students/institution	543	859	222
	Students/center	201	196	221

Source: Authors' elaboration based on information provided by the Integrated Registration System (SIMAT) of the Colombian Ministry of National Education in 2017²⁰.

In relation to the areas covered by this study, Table 35 shows the number of students and educational centers in the public sector. Although the data does not indicate the sufficiency or insufficiency of the educational infrastructure²¹ (as is the case for Table 36), other aspects such as geographical distribution were taken into account.

Table 36.

Students and Schools (Centers) in the Public Sector, at Primary and Secondary Levels, by Area, in the Municipalities of Study, 2016

Municipalities	Urban areas			Rural areas		
	Students	Centers	Students per center	Students	Centers	Students per center
Medellín	359,437	371	969	11,798	49	241
Barbosa	4,006	3	1,335	4,417	47	94
Bello	68,333	57	1,199	1,712	6	285
Caldas	9,478	13	729	1,944	15	130
Copacabana	10,067	14	719	1,001	10	100
Envigado	15,334	19	807	1,419	5	284
Girardota	4,285	5	857	2,023	25	81

20 <http://bi.mineducacion.gov.co:8380/eportal/web/planeacion-basica>, Consulted on 03/28/2020

21 In order to determine infrastructure sufficiency, indicators such as square meters per student and type of area of the educational center (classrooms, recreation spaces, administrative offices, etc.) are required, but they are not currently available. Although the Early Childhood, Preschool, Basic and Middle Information System of the Colombian Ministry of National Education hosts a page called "Interactive Consultation System on Educational Infrastructure" (<https://www.mineducacion.gov.co/sistemasinfo/sistemas/SICIED-Sistema-Interactivo-de-Consulta-de-Infraestructura-Educativa/>), it does not contain information and it is reported to be in a test phase. According to the same page, this system will allow the quantification, evaluation and qualification of the educational infrastructure status, based on the parameters of the Colombian Technical Standard ICONTEC - NTC 4595 (Planning and Design of School Facilities and Environments).

Itagüí	32,937	33	998	2,330	4	583
La Estrella	6,887	8	861	0	0	
Sabaneta	4,942	5	988	1,894	4	474
Barranquilla	203,904	210	971	0	0	
Galapa	7,189	5	1,438	1,810	4	453
Malambo	19,299	13	1,485	1,410	4	353
Puerto Colombia	5,428	7	775	519	1	519
Soledad	81,050	44	1,842	62	1	62
Bogotá, D.C.	810,991	681	1,191	7,941	44	180
Maicao	28,343	38	746	17,224	145	119
Cúcuta	113,694	158	720	5,711	62	92
El Zulia	3,407	4	852	2,403	41	59
Los Patios	11,050	18	614	699	7	100
Puerto Santander	1,855	3	618	32	2	16
San Cayetano	962	2	481	848	7	121
Villa del Rosario	14,888	24	620	618	4	155
Arauca	14,588	25	584	3,562	68	52
Yopal	27,617	24	1,151	6,714	68	99
Colombia	1,859,971	1,784	1,043	78,091	623	125

Source: Mineducación.gov.co. Planeación Básica²²

As a strategy to face the educational infrastructure deficit, Colombia has assigned schools with different class shifts (with up to three: morning, afternoon, and night). This resulted in shorter study hours and complications in attending extracurricular activities, among other situations that led to indexes of low quality of the public education. In order to address this issue, the previous government stated the need to establish a full-time school system.

This purpose was made explicit in the National Development Plan 2014–2018 which recognized the barriers posed by the infrastructure deficit and set the following goal:

To build 51,045 classrooms and complementary infrastructure in 100% of conventional public educational institutions by 2025²³. To achieve this, a National Plan for Educational Infrastructure to ensure effectiveness in execution and resources allocation will be created. The plan envisions the construction of 70% of the classrooms during the four-year period, therefore it must include a schedule for the construction of new educational centers, the expansion of the current ones, and a land normalization plan (DNP, 2014: 79).

This issue was addressed in the CONPES 3831 document of the National Council for Economic and Social Policy, which declared the strategic importance of the National Plan for Educational Infrastructure in order to establish the full-time school system and reduce the aforementioned four-year goal to 60% (about 31,000 classrooms)²⁴. The infrastructure deficits presented in the document were calculated from the 2013 enrollment registries with a focus on the four largest cities under study. Other municipalities that are part of their metropolitan areas (see table below) (CONPES, 2015) accounted for almost a third of the total deficit, that may have been amplified due to the recent demand by Venezuelan migrants and returnees.

Table 37.
Classroom Deficit in the Largest Cities Included in the Study, 2013

Municipality	Classrooms	Deficit as a percentage of enrollment	Percentage of total deficit
Bogotá	9,219	40.7	18.0
Medellín	3,888	42.4	7.6
Barranquilla	1,420	29.3	2.8
Cúcuta	1,043	33.2	2.0
Total	15,570		30.4

Source: (CONPES, 2015: 24)

COSTS FOR THE COLOMBIAN STATE - EDUCATION

For education, the Border Management Unit (2020) estimates an expenditure of USD 160 million for 2020. The amount corresponds to 325,755 Venezuelan children enrolled, as of March 2020, in primary and secondary institutions in the country, 96% of whom are in public schooling. It also includes access for 134,576 children to the SAP. That expense does not

²³ At that moment, the demand increase caused by the arrival of Venezuelans was not taken into account.

²⁴ The classrooms would be designed for 35 students in the primary level, and 40 students in the secondary level (CONPES, 2015: 23).

include transportation, which the World Bank (2018) estimated at COP 1,685,080 (USD 513) per student for 2019. However, considering the low levels of school attendance of Venezuelan children and adolescents (suggesting a high unmet potential demand), requirements would be significantly higher. The same unit also reports an investment in educational infrastructure and resources for USD 7.7 million, whose details are not provided.

FAMILY WELFARE SYSTEM

After presenting data on childcare expenses during 2018 and 2019, the Border Management Unit values the annual cost of including this population group in the Family Welfare System, regardless of immigration status, at USD 45 million.

PUBLIC UTILITIES SECTOR

According to the Colombian Constitution, it is the duty of the state to obtain efficiency in the utilities provision, ensure free competition, accept the participation of individuals and underline the regulatory role of the state. Law 142 of 1994 (Public Housing Services Law), established the general guidelines for the provision of household utilities, the procedures, and mechanisms for their regulation, control, and surveillance.

1.1 Electricity

Electricity in Colombia is mainly provided through the National Interconnected System (SIN). In the non-interconnected zones - including in some isolated areas of the Amazon and the Chocó biodiversity hotspot - small hydropower plants, small fossil fuel-powered plants and, exceptionally, alternative energy sources supply the electricity demand. All the areas considered within the study are covered by the SIN.

1.1.1 National Interconnected System (SIN)

The SIN allows the exchange of energy between regional systems, in order to achieve the best performance of the country's energy capacity. The operation of the SIN is in charge of XM²⁵, a subsidiary company of Interconexión Eléctrica S.A. E.S.P. (ISA)²⁶, which is a mixed public-private, joint-stock national utility company and is regulated by the Ministry of Mines and Energy. XM is also responsible for the administration of the Wholesale Energy Market (MEM), which operates in accordance with the conditions of supply and demand, trading energy among regional companies that provide services to the populations covered in this study.

25 <http://www.xm.com.co/Paginas/Home.aspx>

26 <http://www.isa.co/es/Paginas/default.aspx>

With regards to energy generation, the SIN had 24 reservoirs and 214 plants throughout Colombia at the end of 2018. The number is broken down in Table 38, by energy source and type of management - that is, depending on whether the delivery is or is not centralized.

Table 38.
Colombian National Interconnected System. Generation Plants, by Type of Delivery and Energy Source, December 31, 2018

Source	Centralized delivery	Non-centralized delivery
Hydropower	28	116
Thermal	34	34
Solar		1
Wind		1
Total	62	152

Source: XM, 2019: 79

On the same date, SIN's net effective capacity was 17,312 megawatts (MW), it is presented by source and type of delivery in Table 39. Maintaining the increasing trend of recent years, the energy generation in 2018 was 68,943 GWh (Gigawatt hours), 3.4% higher than in 2017 (XM, 2019: 124).

Table 39.
Colombian National Interconnected System. Net effective Capacity, by Type of Delivery and Energy Source, December 31, 2018

Source	Centralized delivery	Non-centralized delivery
Hydropower	10,974	859
Thermal	5,087	172
Wind		18
Cogenerators (source not identified)		149
Self-generators (source not identified)		53
Total	16,061	1,251

Source: XM, 2019: 122

SIN's power transmission is mainly carried out by ISA Intercolombia,²⁷ another subsidiary of ISA, dedicated to the transport of high-voltage electrical energy in the country. It is a mixed public-private utility provider, incorporated as a joint-stock company in charge of managing, operating and maintaining the electrical assets owned by ISA in Colombia. The extension of the transmission lines used by the SIN exceeds 26,000 kilometers (see Table 40).

Table 40.
Colombian National Interconnected System. Length of Transmission Lines, by Voltage, December 31, 2018

Voltage (kV)	Length (km)
110 - 115	11,138
138	16
220 - 230	12,914
500	2,546
Total	26,314

Source: XM, 2019: 79

According to the following indicators and benchmarks for 2018, the quality of the energy delivered to the wholesale market can be considered good: 15 voltage outside of range events, below the limit of 20; 0 slow frequency variations, below the limit of 2; 52 transitory frequency variations, below the limit of 90; 0.0424% of unmet demand due to foreseen causes, with a limit of 0.0333%; 0.0339% of unmet demand due to unforeseen causes, below the limit of 0.065% (XM, 2019: 80).

Public, private or mixed distribution companies buying energy in the unregulated wholesale market subsequently deliver it to end users, including residential ones, at prices regulated by national authorities, within certain thresholds and with differences determined by socioeconomic stratum.²⁸ Prices, quality, and coverage differ between operators.

27 <http://www.isaintercolombia.com/>

28 Socioeconomic stratification is a classification of residential properties that must have access to public services. It is mainly carried out to differentially charge residential utilities by stratum, assigning subsidies and collecting contributions". (<https://www.dane.gov.co/index.php/69-espanol/geoestadistica/estratificacion/468-estratificacion-socioeconomica>). The strata range from 1 to 6, with 1 being the lowest income.

1.1.2 Non-Interconnected Zones

Non-interconnected zones (ZNI) are generally border, coastal, island and biodiverse lands under urban consolidation processes, and collective territories of national ethnic communities, which together represent approximately 52% of the Colombian territory - with a population of nearly two million people. In 2017, there were 200,556 residential energy users in these zones, who were served by 110 providers: 29 authorized organizations, 32 municipalities, 4 public joint-stock companies, 11 mixed joint-stock companies, 26 private joint-stock companies, 6 state-owned industrial and commercial companies, a marginal producer, and a departmental government (Vaupés), (Superintendency, 2017).

According to the Delegated Superintendency of Energy and Fuel Gas (2017), the ZNI is integrated by the Archipelago of San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina, four departmental capitals (Amazonas, Vichada, Guainía and Vaupés), 17 departments, 97 municipalities, 37 urban municipal areas and 1,728 localities. These areas are characterized by having high levels of unmet basic needs, low population density, low levels of average consumption, low payment capacity, and low levels of company debt collection. This is compounded by high service provision costs, high levels of electricity losses (due to fraudulent connections and poor quality transmission system), and low measurement capacity of users' consumption.

1.1.3 Coverage

The national electricity coverage, under both the SIN and ZNI systems, reached 96.3% of inhabited households in 2018 (data collected from households with people present at the time of the census), with some evident disparities between the urban areas of the municipalities, where coverage is nearly 100%, and the dispersed rural settlements (see Table 41).

Table 41.
Residential Electricity Coverage in the Target Municipalities

Municipalities	Total	Urban areas	Populated centers	Rural scattered settlements
Medellín	99.5	99.5	99.3	96.8
Other municipalities of Medellín metropolitan area	99.6	99.7	99.3	98.9
Barranquilla	99.6	99.6		82.2
Other municipalities of Barranquilla's metropolitan area	99.0	99.4	97.5	87.0

Bogotá, D.C.	99.8	99.8	98.1	95.7
Maicao	68.0	95.7	50.4	14.7
Cúcuta	98.7	98.9	95.6	83.0
Other municipalities of Cúcuta's metropolitan area	96.1	98.5	94.3	88.6
Arauca	93.7	96.7	88.4	71.2
Yopal	97.9	98.8	98.1	88.5
Colombia	96.3	99.2	95.7	81.4

Observation: The percentages of the other municipalities in the corresponding metropolitan areas were calculated as averages of each municipality's coverage.

Source: DANE, National Population and Housing Census (CNPV), Municipal Chart 8V, 2018²⁹

1.1.4 Natural Gas

Natural gas is a mixture of light hydrocarbons, mainly constituted by methane, which can be found freely in reservoirs or oil pools, and sometimes needs to be subjected to treatments in order to obtain certain quality conditions. The country has three main sources of natural gas connected to the national gas pipeline system: the Ballena fields in La Guajira, the Cusiana and Cupiagua fields in Casanare, and some fields in Córdoba and Sucre, as well as other fields with lower productions (CREG, 2016: 8).

The Manager of the Natural Gas Market in Colombia (*Gestor del Mercado de Gas Natural en Colombia*) is responsible for collecting, centralizing and making public the transactional and operational information of the sector with the aim of optimizing the use of available infrastructure for the supply and transport of gas, and demonstrating transparency in the primary and secondary markets. This entity is part of the Management of Energy Markets of the Bolsa Mercantil de Colombia S.A., which does not exercise control or have sanctioning functions nor participates in business, given its role as an intermediary and facilitating agent.³⁰

In 2017, natural gas production in Colombia totalled 332 giga cubic feet (GPC) (UPME, 2018), while the proven reserves in 2018 were 3,782 GPC (Promigas, 2019). For the marketing year between December 2019 and November 2020, the country has an average production

²⁹ <https://www.dane.gov.co/files/censo2018/informacion-tecnica/CNPV-2018-VIHOPE-v3.xls>


³⁰ <http://movil.bmcbec.com.co/nosotros>

potential (national offer) of 1,235 Giga BTU³¹ per day (GBTUD). Likewise, according to projections by the Energy and Mining Planning Unit (UPME), the average demand for the same period would be 1,177 GBTUD (BMC, 2019: 9).

With regards to gas transportation from the production centers to stations in the distribution areas, the country had a 7,460-kilometer gas pipeline network in 2018 (see Map 1), which was operated by seven different companies.³² From the stations that receive the gas, pipe networks then distribute it to the end users' connecting points.

Figure 13.

Main Areas of Natural Gas Production and Gas Pipeline Network in Colombia, 2016



Source: CREG, 2016: 9

In 2018, 41 distributors delivered gas in 741 municipalities of 27 Colombian departments (Promigas, 2019), serving more than nine million users, the vast majority of them (98.2%) of residential nature (see Table 42).

31 British Thermal Unit.

32 <http://www.promigas.com/Es/Paginas/informeFinanciero/colombia/01.aspx>

Table 42.
Users of Natural Gas in Colombia, by Type, December 2018

Type	Users
Residential	9,015,879
Commercial	165,348
Industrial	4,813
Total	9,186,040

Source: UPME, 2018: 36

Gas users are classified in two groups: regulated and non-regulated. The first group is composed of those whose consumption is less than 100,000 f³ per day or its equivalent in m³, such as small industrial and commercial users and all the residential users classified by socioeconomic strata (Table 43). The non-regulated, which includes those who consume more than 100,000 f³ per day or its equivalent in m³, are gas-based electricity plants (thermoelectric) and large industrial and commercial users.

Table 43.
Distribution of Colombian Natural Gas Users, by Socioeconomic Level, December 2018

Stratum	Amount	%
1	2,015,331	22
2	3,339,496	37
3	2,341,740	26
4	816,312	9
5	315,006	3
6	187,994	2
Total	9,015,879	100

Source: UPME, 2018: 37

As expected, the gas connections and coverage were mainly concentrated in the urban centers. Table 44 shows the proportions of connected households in 2018.

Table 44.
Residential Coverage of Natural Gas Service in the Target Municipalities and Colombia, by Area, 2018

Municipalities	Total	Urban areas	Populated centers	Rural scattered settlements
Medellín	77.4	78.5	15.4	6.0
Other municipalities of Medellín metropolitan area ¹	72.4	84.5	39.3	25.3
Barranquilla	95.0	95.1		20.2
Other municipalities of Barranquilla's metropolitan area ²	89.0	91.3	76.5	18.7
Bogotá D.C.	94.3	94.4	68.3	22.0
Maicao	41.0	62.7	18.8	0.3
Cúcuta	63.4	65.6	3.6	4.2
Other municipalities of Cúcuta's metropolitan area ³	39.6	49.3	8.5	2.5
Arauca	1.7	1.9	0.7	0.6
Yopal	84.6	87.6	90.0	54.5
Colombia	67.3	82.1	33.8	5.4

Observation: The percentages of the other municipalities in the corresponding metropolitan areas were calculated as averages of each municipality's coverage.

Source: DANE, National Population and Housing Census (CNPV), Municipal Chart 8V, 2018³³

1.2 Water

1.2.1 General Conditions

The annual water demand of Colombian households in 2016 was estimated at 2,747.2 million m³, which represented 7.4% of the country's total water demand, with losses of 852.6 million m³ (IDEAM, 2019: 171). In 2019, the majority of urban households in the country received their water supply from an aqueduct, yet that was not the case for 48% of rural households and for 4.6% of the urban households (see Table 45).

Table 45.
**Source of Water for Human Consumption in Colombian Households,
by Sector, 2019**

Source	Urban	Rural	Total
Aqueduct using pipelines	95.4	52.0	84.8
From another source using pipelines	0.5	13.8	3.8
Well with pump	0,5	6.1	1.8
Well without pump, cistern or drill	0.1	7.3	1.8
Rain water	0.6	5.4	1.8
River, stream or spring	0.1	10.6	2.6
Public basin	0.1	0.2	0.1
Tank car	0.3	1.3	0.6
Water seller	0.5	1.7	0.8
Bottled or bagged water	2.0	1.5	1.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Author's elaboration based on microdata from the four stages of the GEIH, 2019

In the municipalities included in the study, the aqueduct supply coverage in 2018 varied widely, depending on geographic location. For example, in the rural areas of Maicao and Arauca it only reached 1.3% and 3.6%, respectively, while in the urban areas of Bogotá and Barranquilla it was 99.5% and 99%, respectively (see Table 46).

Table 46.
**Residential Coverage of the Aqueduct Supply in the Target Municipalities,
by Sector, 2019**

Municipalities	Total	Urban areas	Populated centers	Rural scattered settlements
Medellín	98,4	98,7	87,9	70,6
Other municipalities of Medellín metropolitan area	93,5	98,7	80,4	74,8

Barranquilla	99,0	99,0		47,5
Other municipalities of Barranquilla's metropolitan area	96,0	97,0	90,6	45,3
Bogotá D.C.	99,5	99,5	69,1	71,6
Maicao	42,1	63,7	21,4	1,3
Cúcuta	94,8	96,6	57,7	26,5
Other municipalities of Cúcuta's metropolitan area	88,0	94,3	70,9	36,4
Arauca	76,5	87,2	6,9	3,6
Yopal	89,1	96,8	92,7	16,3

Observation: The percentages of the other municipalities in the corresponding metropolitan areas were calculated as averages of each municipality's coverage.

Source: DANE, National Population and Housing Census (CNPV), Municipal Chart 8V, 2018.³⁴


A study carried out at the end of 2017 found that there were, across all of Colombia's municipalities 2,397 providers of aqueduct and sewerage services in urban or rural areas. The report noted that:

The infrastructure for water provision of rural aqueducts can simply consist of a basic catchment structure with hose ducts or flexible pipes for water distribution to three, four or five scattered plots or houses. This type of technological systems, as well as the social and economic conditions of the users that are supplied through them, are outside the regulatory and institutional frameworks, which makes it difficult to monitor them, (Superservicios - DNP, 2018: 8).

The majority of these providers "are registered as authorized organizations like communal councils, cooperative public administrators and user associations" (Superservicios - DNP, 2018: 8). At the other end of the scale, there are large companies, including those located in the target municipalities, which are detailed below.

Important elements include the available infrastructure, supply continuity and water quality. Map 2 presents data about supply continuity, where the categories correspond to the requirements ordered by national resolutions,³⁵ in terms of daily hours of service: 0 to 10, insufficient; 10.1-18, suboptimal; 18.1 to 23, sufficient; and 23.1 to 24, continuous.

Figure 14.
Average Monthly Continuity of the Aqueduct Service in Colombia, 2017




Source: Superservicios - DNP, 2018: 33

35 Resolution 2115 of 2007 of the Ministry of Social Protection and the Ministry of Environment, Housing and Territorial Development, by means of which characteristics, basic instruments and frequency of the control and surveillance system for the quality of water for human consumption are indicated.

The Risk Index for the Quality of Water for Human Consumption (IRCA) “rates the risk level of disease occurrence associated with the non-compliance to the physical, chemical and microbiological standards of water for human consumption. IRCA assigns a value in the range of 0 (not risky) to 100 (highly risky for human health.)”³⁶ Figure 14 shows the large disparity in the values between urban and rural areas (between 2007 to 2017), presenting a tendency to improve the water quality - therefore shrinking the gap. It should be noted that in 114 of the 428 municipal capitals that are vulnerable to shortages in the dry season, the lack of infrastructure appears to be a principal cause of risk (IDEAM, 2019: 396-415).


Figure 15.
Index for the Quality of Water for Human Consumption (IRCA)



Source: Ministry of Health and Social Protection, 2019: 47

When analyzed by municipalities water quality is a matter of concern, even in urban areas which tend to have higher national IRCA averages than the rural areas (see Map 3). In 2017, a report on the water quality of 886 municipalities showed that 22% of them (195) presented an incidence of Acute Diarrheal Disease (ADD) higher than the 50th percentile. Similarly, these municipalities had medium to high risk IRCA levels, indicating that non-potable water (not suitable for consumption) and the presence of ADD cases are correlated (Ministry of Health and Social Protection, 2019: 242).

Figure 16.
Quality of Urban Water in Colombia, by Municipalities, 2017



Source: Superservicios - DNP, 2018: 25

1.2.2 Infrastructure of the companies providing the aqueduct service in the target municipalities

Relevant data on the infrastructure of the water provider companies in the municipalities included in this study are presented below, including their supply sources, catchment, treatment, conduction, and distribution technologies. The specific datapoints are based on the information available on the website of each company and the Superintendency of Residential Public Utilities, as well as other official entities. As such, the following information has been mostly quoted from those sources.

EPM AGUAS³⁷

Empresas Públicas de Medellín (EPM) is a residential utility company, created as a state-owned industrial and commercial company owned by the Municipality of Medellín, providing the services of electric power, gas network, water and sanitation. With the Aguas sub-division, it serves 10 municipalities in the Aburrá Valley: Medellín, Bello, Envigado, Itagüí, La Estrella, Sabaneta, Copacabana, Girardota, Caldas and Barbosa, with a total of 974,781 customers. EPM Aguas has 10 water treatment plants located in the Aburrá Valley: Caldas, San Antonio de Prado, Aguas Frías, San Cristóbal, La Ayurá, La Cascada, La Montaña, Villa Hermosa, Manantiales, and Barbosa. The three most relevant ones in terms of infrastructure size and water treatment capacity are:

a) Manantiales, which is located in Bello and Copacabana plots, has a conventional treatment capacity of 9 m³ per second. It carries out chemical oxidation, adsorption, coagulation, flocculation, sedimentation, filtration, and disinfection processes; b) La Ayurá, which is the purification plant that provides the potable water to the interconnected aqueduct system and has an installed capacity of 9.20 m³ per second. It is supplied by the Buey, Piedras and Pantanillo rivers, and the Las Palmas and Porteros streams, which are tributaries of the La Fe reservoir whose useful capacity is 12.1 million m³; c) Villa Hermosa, a purification plant that processes water from the Piedras Blancas reservoir, which used to generate energy in El Toldo. It combines conventional treatment, where each of the processes is performed in different structures (such as channels, flocculators, settlers and filters), with high residence times and compact treatment. The coagulation, flocculation and sedimentation processes occur in the same unit and then the water is transferred to the filters with low residence times.

EPM's aqueduct networks have a length of 3,580 kilometers. As in other companies of this kind, the networks are constantly expanded to meet new demands, as is evident by recent works that extended and interconnected 10 new kilometers (Tamayo, 2019).

ACUEDUCTO, AGUA Y ALCANTARILLADO DE BOGOTÁ EAAB-ESP³⁸

³⁷ <https://www.epm.com.co/site/home/nuestra-empresa/nuestros-servicios/agua>

³⁸ https://www.acueducto.com.co/wps/portal/EAB2/Home/inicio!/ut/p/z1/hY5BCslwEEXP4iLb5pugqLtUpCKIVARrNhjrrjG2KWlqr2_AIVBxYBbz581jqKQZlbV6mUJ5Y2tVhvksp5dpusR4BrZDegDSdL7nCT-

The Empresa de Acueducto y Alcantarillado de Bogotá - E.S.P. was created as an Industrial and Commercial Company of the Capital District and is a provider of residential public utilities. Endowed with legal status, administrative autonomy and independent patrimony, it had more than 2,120,000 users in 2018, of which around 94% were based in the city of Bogotá, and the rest in the municipalities of Soacha and Gachancipá.

Supply systems:

a) Chingaza, which includes the Chuza and San Rafael reservoirs and the Río Blanco subsystem, and it also has the Francisco Wiesner non-conventional direct filtration treatment plant.
b) Sumapaz, the upper basin of the Tunjuelo River, which includes the La Regadera and Chisacá reservoirs and the Los Tunjos Lagoon. It has the conventional treatment plants of La Laguna and El Dorado as well as the Cerros Orientales subsystem, where the Vitelma and Yomasa treatment plants are located. c) Tibitoc System, Northern Wing, includes the Aposentos, Neusa, Sisga and Tominé reservoirs. Although not owned by the Bogotá Aqueduct, they have the function of regulating the Bogotá River. It has the Tibitoc conventional treatment plant, which is operated directly by the EAAB-ESP.

The conduction and distribution system includes parent and minor networks for the conduction and distribution of drinking water extending over more than 8,000 km. This includes the pipes that carry water from the treatment plants to storage and compensation tanks, as well as the pumping stations that supply households, industries, and institutions with potable water. The pumping stations also grant the supply to the water distributors in Bogotá and municipalities such as La Calera, Chía, Cajicá, Tocancipá, Gachancipá, Sopó, Cota, Funza, Madrid, Mosquera and Soacha, among others.

EAAB has a control center for the operation of the aqueduct matrix system through an automated protocol. Its purpose is to enhance the efficiency of the aqueduct systems through automated supervision, control, operation, and real-time data collection from treatment plants, pumping stations, storage tanks, control structures, and valves installed in the matrix networks that enable the macro management of the aqueduct infrastructure (EAAB, 2018).

TRIPLE A S.A. E.S.P.³⁹

The Sociedad de Acueducto, Alcantarillado y Aseo de Barranquilla S.A. E.S.P. (Triple A S.A. E.S.P.) is the aqueduct, sewerage, and sanitation company of Barranquilla. It covers all of the water supply in the Barranquilla district and 14 neighboring municipalities: Puerto Colombia, Soledad, Galapa, Tubará, Juan de Acosta, Usiacurí, Piojó, Sabanalarga, Ponedera, Sabanagrande, Santo Tomás, Baranoa, Polonuevo and Palmar de Varela. In total, it has more than 2.8 million users.

[yZMPp6R8gwxo_SiDcywFEID6wmAPJng0CX44NIUVpr593RX3ls4JKp_-aaRd1LsQP75t2QUdQ932k8k7futzbKLdV6JA2LUFjnVclwUrEjGBtK01gapMbO-R92NbTbEhHmyrDc1K-tml0egOHroG0/dz/d5/L2dBISEvZ0FBIS9nQSEh/](https://www.aaa.com.co/somos-triple-a/)

39 <https://www.aaa.com.co/somos-triple-a/>

Triple A captures water from the Magdalena River at four points: Las Flores (near the mouth of the Magdalena River), Barranquilla, Sabanagrande, and Ponedera. Next, the water collected at those four points is transported to six plants in Barranquilla, one in Sabanagrande and one in Sabanalarga for purification treatment. Among the Triple A customers, 79% are classified in the socioeconomic strata 1, 2 and 3.

Water is distributed to households and companies through pumping stations and 3,400 kilometers of networks. Distribution to the main operator companies is carried out at the Acueducto ETAP, El Recreo, Ciudadela, and Las Delicias stations in Barranquilla and at the stations of the municipalities of Galapa, Puerto Colombia, Sabanagrande, Sabanalarga, Tubará, Piojó, and Usiacurí.

AGUAS KPITAL CÚCUTA S.A. E.S.P.⁴⁰

We are pleased to present the organization's results as of December 31, 2018, a year in which the anomalous situation of the city produced by the crisis in Venezuela became more complex and, as a response to it, we supplied the vital liquid not only to the inhabitants of the city but also to the floating population displaced from the neighbor country. To a certain extent, the consequences of this situation have been negative due to the increase of the irregular connections in some houses where a large number of Venezuelans are living, so our goal to lower the index of unaccounted water supply was only reached partially. On the other hand, there were also positive consequences, such as the increase of cubic-meter consumption, which helped meet the income-related goals.

Hugo Iván Vergel, General Manager (Aguas Kpital Cúcuta, 2019a: 10)

Aguas Kpital Cúcuta S.A. E.S.P. is the company in charge of the operation, expansion, rehabilitation, maintenance, and commercial management of the infrastructure of Cúcuta's public aqueduct and sewerage system. At the end of 2018, the company reported a coverage of 99.6% of the aqueduct service, due to the registration of 4,778 new users, from 179,365 in 2017 to 184,143 in the following year.

The aqueduct system of Cúcuta collects water from the Pamplonita and Zulia rivers. The Pamplonita River supplies the plant of El Pórtico, which has a treatment capacity of 1,600 liters per second and uses a gravity system. The Zulia River likewise supplies the Carmen de Tonchalá plant, which has a treatment capacity of 1,000 liters per second and uses a pumping system.

The length of the distribution network is 1,254 kilometers, of which 892 kilometers correspond to the Pamplonita system and 362 kilometers to the Zulia system. 19% of the distribution pipes correspond to the matrix network, with diameters between 8 and 36 inches; 76% are for the secondary network, with diameters from 3 to 6 inches; and the remaining 5% are for a smaller network, with diameters less than 3 inches (Aguas Kpital Cúcuta, 2019b: 234).

EMPRESA DE ACUEDUCTO, ALCANTARILLADO Y ASEO DE YOPAL ESP (E.A.A.A.Y. E.I.C.E ESP)⁴¹

Empresa de Acueducto, Alcantarillado y Aseo de Yopal is the company that provides the residential services of aqueduct, sewerage, sanitation and other complementary activities in the municipality of Yopal. It is a state-owned industrial and commercial company with legal status, administrative and financial autonomy, and independent capital.

The treatment plants for superficial waters (river water and seawater) in the La Vega Treatment System consist of an alternative plant (Module 1) and a grouped plant (Module 2). The monthly volume of water supplied during the first three quarters of 2019 was between 396,540 and 450,600 m³ by Module 1, and between 297,358 and 475,279 m³ by Module 2 (EICE, 2019: 20).

Currently, the city has underground water treatment plants (deep wells) that are connected to the distribution networks. These, together with the conduction networks, exceed 386 kilometers in length. Among the 14 existing wells, those that maintained continuous operation during 2019 were Núcleo Urbano II that supplies the Comuna 6, which is not connected to the distribution matrix network; Pozo Central de Abastos 2, which maintains the pressure in the upper part of the Comuna 5; and Pozo Estadio, where tank trucks are loaded.

The total number of users supplied in 2019 was 29,533 in January, and 17,624 in April. The communities that do not access an aqueduct service, generally those located in outskirt areas, are supplied by tank trucks, and in the same period during 2019, delivered between 1,814 and 2,821 m³ of water per month. During the summer period water tends to be delivered through public pools in Pozo Estadio and Pozo Braulio. In general, demand increases during drought periods (January to April), ranging between 3,220 m³ and 2,010 m³ per month in 2019.

(EICE, 2019: 37)

EMPRESA MUNICIPAL DE SERVICIOS PÚBLICOS DE ARAUCA (EMSERPA E.I.C.E. E.S.P.)⁴²

EMSERPA is a state-owned industrial and commercial company. It has a municipal reach, providing aqueduct, sewerage, and sanitation services in the urban area of Arauca. The Arauca aqueduct is supplied by the Arauca River, whose variable flow (according to measurements made in 2015) ranges between less than 200 and 600 liters per second. The river water

41 <https://www.eaaay.gov.co/>

42 <https://www.emserpa.gov.co/sitio/es/>

has high turbidity, high coloration, presence of detergents, high concentrations of fertilizers, ferric and ferrous ions, low conductivity and microbial activity.

The water catchment is carried out from a barge at a 12-meter depth and together with a double adduction mechanism helps maintain the necessary flow to supply the treatment plant. The treatment plant is of a conventional type: it has a capacity of 400 liters per second and performs processes of catchment, adduction, sand removal, coagulation (fast mix), flocculation (slow mix), sedimentation, alkalinity correction, filtration, chlorination, and pumping to the urban areas.

Moreover, in 2015, the production of treated water in the dry season totaled approximately 18,860 m³ per day, and did not affect the supply to users. The distribution network has an approximate length of 160 kilometers and, as the delivery is not scheduled by sectors, the pressure of the water tends to decrease. The lack of hydraulic capacity of the parent networks has resulted in excessive losses and high hydraulic gradients, resulting in a lower quality of the provision and likewise higher operating costs (EMSERPA, 2015).

AGUAS DE LA PENÍNSULA S.A E.S.P.⁴³

Aguas de la Península provides drinking water in sectorized schedules to the inhabitants of the urban area of Maicao and the corregimientos of Carraipía and Paraguachón (in the latter, only the Renacer urbanization is covered). The service is expected to be extended in the coming months to other areas of Paraguachón and reach La Raya and 17 indigenous communities. The company has submitted the project and designs for the Five-Year Investment Plan to the municipal, departmental and national governments. The plan aims to reach full coverage of the aqueduct and sewerage services provision in Maicao.

The water is supplied from the Carraipía River and the catchment is made through a water outlet. It has four wells: 6A, 6B, Carraipía and Hospital San José. Operation of the first two is on an alternating basis, as they use the same source for water collection.

The El Jordán purification plant is of a conventional type and has a water tank of 120 m³, a diesel-powered generating plant, and a laboratory for operations. It has a design capacity of 400 liters per second, however in 2014 - the year in which the company billed 632,000 m³ - it struggled to produce even 229 liters per second. The 30 km conduction is carried out through 18" and 20" pipelines to the 700 m³ San José semi-buried storage tank, where disinfection with chlorine gas is carried out on a frequent basis.

In 2018, the coverage of Aguas de la Península throughout residences in the urban area of Maicao was 63.7% (see Table 45). The total number of users registered in April 2020, according to the company's website was 23,953.⁴⁴

⁴³ <https://www.aguasdela Peninsula.com.co>

⁴⁴ In 2013 and 2014, the amount of users was about 16.000 (Superintendency ..., 2015)

1.3 Sewerage and wastewater treatment

The wastewater flow of the Colombian household sector was calculated at 1,609.7 million m³ in 2016 (IDEAM, 2019: 171). Based on the data provided in Table 47, it can be concluded that there is an overall national deficit in wastewater collection, considering that even the households located in urban areas and populated centers have a deficit in the connection of toilets to sewerage systems of 8.1% and 58.1%, respectively. Given the population density in those areas, the deficit should be closer to zero.

Table 47.
Colombian Households,* by Area and Type of Sanitation Service (%), 2018

Type of service	Total	Urban areas	Populated centers	Rural scattered settlements
Toilets connected to the sewerage system*	75.6	91.9	41.9	6.0
Toilets connected to a septic tank	16.2	5.9	41.1	59.1
Toilets not connected to any system	1.5	0.4	2.2	7.0
Latrines	0.7	0.1	1.5	3.2
Toilets flushing directly to water sources (low tide)	1.8	1.0	3.9	4.8
No toilet available	4.2	0.7	9.4	19.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

*Inhabited households, with people present at the moment of the census and information available on their type of sanitation service

Source: DANE, National Population and Housing Census (CNPV), Departmental Chart 9V.⁴⁵

In relation to the sewerage infrastructure in rural scattered settlements, these areas do not have a regular system for wastewater evacuation through ducts or pipes, as required by Law 142 of 1994. Instead, septic tanks, latrines, and other individual solutions for the final disposal of wastewater are used, and these are not considered services within the current economic regulation (Superservicios - DNP, 2018). The data presented in Table 46 indicates these deficit conditions.

As evident in Table 48, aqueduct and sewerage services are provided by 1,112 entities, most of which combine the provision of both services, and just 34 are dedicated only to sewerage. Around a third of the providers are registered as utility companies and approximately another third correspond to municipalities that provide the service directly. The type of provider called “authorized organization” encompasses communal councils, cooperative public administrators, and user associations.

⁴⁵ <https://www.dane.gov.co/files/censo2018/informacion-tecnica/CNPV-2018-VIHOPE-v3.xls>

Table 48.
Colombian Aqueduct and/or Sewerage Providers Registered

Type	Large		Small	
	Aqueduct and sewerage	Sewerage	Aqueduct and sewerage	Sewerage
Authorized organizations			236	4
Utility companies	144	2	252	10
Municipalities (direct provision)			310	17
State-owned industrial and commercial company	96	1	66	
Marginal or independent producer, or private use			5	
Not available			3	
Total	240	3	872	31

Source: CRA, 2019

In the geographical areas included in this study, the sewerage service is provided by the aforementioned aqueduct companies; nonetheless, their levels of coverage are different. For example, in the four largest cities (Medellín, Barranquilla, Bogotá and Cúcuta), household sector coverage is higher (92.6%) than the national average in other urban areas. Likewise, coverage decreases further in the urban areas of the other municipalities that are part of their corresponding metropolitan areas, and in the smaller cities included in this study (Yopal, Arauca, and particularly Maicao). As expected, it is even lower in the populated centers (see Table 49).

Table 49.
Residential Coverage of Sewerage Service in Target Municipalities

Municipalities	Total	Urban areas	Populated centers	Rural scattered settlements
Medellín	97.2	98.3	39.8	25.8
Other municipalities of Medellín metropolitan area	86.4	97.9	61.0	46.8
Barranquilla	97.8	97.9	–	24.2

Other municipalities of Barranquilla's metropolitan area	84.3	88.8	11.3	11.6
Bogotá, D.C.	99.2	99.3	56.3	21.9
Maicao	44.6	68.0	18.9	0.5
Cúcuta	92.7	94.6	55.9	10.6
Other municipalities of Cúcuta's metropolitan area	83.5	96.2	46.1	8.1
Arauca	73.8	84.4	1,0	2.2
Yopal	84.0	92.2	85.7	7.0
Colombia	76.6	92.6	43.6	7.6

Observation: The percentages of the other municipalities in the corresponding metropolitan areas were calculated as averages of each municipality's coverage.

Source: DANE, National Population and Housing Census (CNPV), Municipal Chart 8V, 2018.⁴⁶

Although wastewater treatment has increased in the country, considering that it totaled only 8% in 2002 and reached 42.6% in 2017 (DNP, 2019), there is still much work to be done. According to the same DNP report, it will be necessary to review the following elements: 1) high cost of investments and lack of resources to finance them; 2) progressive increase of the remuneration rate, which has been applied based on the government-defined regional standards and the non-fulfillment of goals, resulting in providers' failure to pay; and 3) lack of acknowledgment by the national government about the effectiveness of wastewater treatment in the removal of organic load (Ibid: 630).

The expansion of sewerage networks, especially in medium and small urban centers, and the increase of wastewater treatment, such as solid waste disposal (something that was not addressed in this study), could be important paths of action for the application of official aid to development in Colombia.

COSTS FOR THE COLOMBIAN STATE - WATER AND SANITATION

The report of the Border Management Unit (2020) considers, among the monetary needs arising from Venezuelan migration, a required USD 260 million investment for water and sanitation and an additional USD 364 million for an income generation strategy for migrants and host communities. The time frame of these was not detailed in the document, but given the amounts, it could be between three and five years.

SUMMARY

In the table below, the summarized annual requirements (including those for which there is no clarity regarding the estimated time period) are presented for the year 2020.

Table 50.
Annual Recurring Needs of the Colombian State for the Assistance of the Population Coming from Venezuela, 2020, in USD Millions

Emergency health care	95.6
Vaccination	6.8
Sexual and reproductive health services	18.0
Other health needs	59.5
Education	160.0
Family Welfare System	45.0
Income generation strategy	121.0
Total	505.9
Urgent necessities*	
Hospital	40.0
Education	7.7
Water and sanitation	260.0
Total	307.7

* The estimate of the urgent necessities does not contain information that specifies the implementation time frame of investment in infrastructure and provision.

HUMANITARIAN CARE COSTS OFFERED BY THE INTERAGENCY PLATFORM

The Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan for Refugees - RMRP 2020 (R4V, 2020), updated to May 2020, has a demand similar to that of the Colombian State for the same year, as detailed in Table 51.

Table 51.
Colombia Financial Status of the RMRP 2020 Financing by Sectors in USD Millions

Sectors	Investment in USD
Water and sanitation	0.201
Education	0.861
Integration	0.233
Multisector	0.539
Protection	1.3
Health	0.492
Food and nutrition security	0.079
Monetary transfers	11.3
Supporting services	0.254
Mixed sectors	42.3 ²

Source: Financial Tracking System

OTHER NEEDS THAT MAY REQUIRE SPECIAL ATTENTION

COVID-19 AND THE VENEZUELAN MIGRATION TO COLOMBIA

On January 30, 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) outbreak a public health emergency of international importance, subsequently upgrading that designation to a pandemic on March 11. On March 6, the first case of COVID-19 was reported in Colombia. By March 10, isolation and quarantine were required for those arriving to the country from China, Italy, France, or Spain, and on March 12, the state declared a health emergency and implemented measures to mitigate the virus, including the suspension of gatherings of more than 500 people and the docking of foreign ships.

The closure of the borders and maritime, land, and river crossings with Panama, Ecuador, Peru, and Brazil continued (except for cargo transportation), and on March 17, President Marquez declared a State of Economic, Social, and Ecological Emergency throughout the national territory. Additional control measures were progressively increased, until the 22nd when mandatory preventative self-isolation was ordered for all the country's inhabitants, to last from March 25 to April 13. This preventative self-isolation was later extended to June the 30th. Few exceptions were permitted under the quarantine, including essential services and food supply chain employees, pharmacies, and food delivery. These restrictions have had a significant impact on the population, particularly for those who earn daily incomes working in informal sectors - many of whom are migrants, refugees, or Colombian returnees (VMR-CR).

MIGRANTS AND RETURNEES DURING COVID-19

According to Great Integrated Household Survey (GEIH) estimates, as of February 2020, 2,620,000 Venezuelan-born migrants were residing in Colombia, 80.5% of whom arrived in the last 5 years. An unspecified proportion held Colombian nationality, the majority, most likely, from having Colombian parents, whom they accompanied on their return, or who immigrated independently. In addition, GEIH identified 331,753 Colombian returnees from Venezuela as of February 2015 (Table 52); in many cases, this demographic group lives in dwellings with members from the migrant group, forming Colombian-Venezuelan homes. In both groups there is a slight predominance of men.

Table 52.
Colombia, Migrants Born in Venezuela and Returned from Venezuela in the Previous 5 Years By Sex, February 2020

	Total	Men		Women	
		People	%	People	%
Migrants	2,619,969	1,355,824	51.7	1,264,145	48.3
Returned	313,734	166,814	53.2	146,920	46.8
Total	2,933,703	1,522,638	51.9	1,411,065	48.1

Source: own elaboration from GEIH microdata February 2020, DANE

The demographic and social characteristics of the returnee and migrant populations, as outlined in Table 53, indicate that migrant flows of Venezuelan nationals to Colombia represent a broad age range, with an average age of 23 years old. In contrast, the average age of Colombian returnees is 41 years old, with a relatively small proportion of this average constituted by those under age 15 or over age 65.

Table 53.
Colombia, Migrants Born in Venezuela and Returned from Venezuela in the Previous 5 Years, by Sex, According to Age Groups, Average Age and Schooling, February 2020

	Migrants			Returnees		
	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women
Under 15 years (%)	32.1			5.8		
From 15 to 64 years old (%)	66.4			82.7		
65 and over (%)	0.5			11.5		
Average age (years)	22.7	22.5	23.0	41.4	41.2	41.7
Average schooling (years)	7.9	7.4	8.4	7.2	6.6	7.8

Source: own elaboration from GEIH microdata February 2020, DANE

The differences shown in Table 54 suggest family migration among this group, wherein migrants are young couples with children. In contrast, returnee statistics suggest consolidated households. The difference in average schooling period in favor of Venezuelans, though marginal, is likely biased by the majority characteristics of those who emigrated from Colombia and the lower levels of schooling at the time of emigration.

And although there are negligible differences in average age by sex in both populations, the difference is more evident in terms of schooling, where women exceed the average for men, by an average of one additional year of educational attainment.

Table 54.
Colombia, Percentage Distribution of Migrants Born in Venezuela and Returned From Venezuela in the Previous 5 Years, Department of Residence* February 2020

Department	Migrants	Returnees	Department	Migrants	Returnees
Bogotá DC	25.7	16.4	Chocó	0.6	2.6
Norte de Santander	12.7	15.5	Cundinamarca	3.9	2.6
Bolívar	3.3	10.4	La Guajira	3.9	2.3
Atlántico	5.8	7.9	Boyacá	0.7	1.8
Sucre	2.0	6.9	Quindío	0.3	1.5
Valle del Cauca	5.6	6.4	Santander	6.7	1.4
Magdalena	4.0	5.1	Meta	1.1	0.9
Antioquia	8.3	4.4	Tolima	0.4	0.4
Córdoba	1.3	3.9	Risaralda	1.9	0.3
Caldas	2.8	3.2	Huila	0.2	0.2
Cesar	6.1	3.2	Nariño	0.2	0.1
Cauca	2.2	2.7	Caquetá	0.1	-
			Total	100	100

* Does not include the “new departments”, among which is Arauca, bordering Venezuela and with a significant number, for its population, of migrants and returnees

Source: own elaboration from GEIH microdata February 2020, DANE

While the location in which migrants and returnees settle likely has a significant relationship with employment opportunities and access to services, among returnees, origin plays a very important role. According to GEIH data, one in three (33.5%) returnees was living in their municipality of birth, which contributes to the differences in distribution by departments of both groups.

This return to the municipality of birth suggests the permanence and strength of family networks, and probably of social capital in general. Moreover, and without considering

resources accumulated in Venezuela, which could be lost or abandoned due to recent circumstances, these networks represent an important source of support and may mean better livelihood conditions for returnees than for migrants. Table 55 provides a summary of vulnerability indicators of the population, according to their migratory category and across selected municipalities. The vulnerability of returnees is shown to be significantly higher than that of the total population, and the overall vulnerability of Venezuelan migrants to Colombia is greater than that of returnees.

Table 55.

Selected Municipalities, Vulnerability Indicators, by Immigration Status, 2018-2019

	Total population	Returned 5 years before the interview	Born in Venezuela
Bogotá DC (2019, GEIH)	11.5	23.4	48.9
Medellín AM (2019, GEIH)	16.3	25.0	54.8
Barranquilla AM (2019, GEIH)	13.3	33.1	48.2
Cúcuta AM (2019, GEIH)	24.5	41.3	68.0
Yopal (2018, CNPV)	32.1	38.1	61.2 *

* Includes all those born abroad

Source: see, in this same report, "Methodology for sizing and order the vulnerability of migrant, returnees, and non-migrant populations."

In addition to the conditions described above, the COVID-19 pandemic has created circumstances that put a large part of the Venezuelan population in Colombia into more vulnerable positions, such as: living in shared, often overcrowded housing; having an irregular migration status and limited migration permits (that, as of today, have been issued to 687,332 Venezuelans); facing difficulties in approving Venezuelan professional credentials (87% of requesting migrants have not obtained approval) (Equilibrium Centro, 2020); rising xenophobia exacerbated by COVID-19; and, particularly, that 44% of the total did not have a formal job (GEIH), reflecting the informality that dominates the labour market.

Regarding housing, in 2019, 20.6% of households had only one room, including a dining area, and 17.5% were expected to share sanitation services with people from other households (GEIH). This indicates a high proportion of collective occupation, either as agreements between households or in multi-family houses or motels which collect daily rent payments. Of the latter group, during the mandated quarantine period, there was an expulsion of an estimated 1,300 families in Bogotá, the majority of which were Venezuelan, and whose relocation to public buildings was hampered by opposition from residents within these neighborhoods.

Regarding the occupations of Venezuelans (by February 2020), a factor which has made them especially vulnerable during the crisis, the following was obtained through GEIH microdata:

- ◇ 13.6% worked in a site exposed on the street (mobile and stationary); 4.2% in a construction site; 4.2% door to door; 3.8% on a vehicle; and 0.4% in a booth or kiosk.
- ◇ 83.8% of the economic units in which they worked, including self-employed workers, were small, with fewer than 11 workers.
- ◇ 40.2% lacked any type of employment contract.
- ◇ 90.9% were not affiliated with pension funds.
- ◇ 78.2% felt unhappy with their work.
- ◇ 24.6% reported environmental problems (air, odors, cold, noise, temperature, etc.) in their work.
- ◇ The average labor income during the last month was \$862,935 COP, 15.7% lower than the legal minimum wage in Colombia, including transportation subsidy.

In the *Equilibrium Centro* survey (2020), Venezuelans interviewed in April were asked to select a response that best described their current situation. The most common responses were that they were either “out of a job” (45%); “at home without working, but I do have work regularly” (I do not receive income at the moment (31%); “a housewife, student, retired, I do not work regularly” (9%); or “working because I need to, although I am not formally authorized” (6%). In addition, 56% indicated that they did not have a supply of products to meet their basic needs nor the money required to purchase them.

In the midst of such conditions, and in view of the border closures, it would be expected that the immigration flow would stop, but this is not the case. Many still think that, as difficult as the situation is in Colombia, it is better than in Venezuela; there are also families awaiting reunification in Colombia. In addition, there are also those fleeing to protect their lives or freedom. In such circumstances, there are still people willing to migrate, risking dangerous routes. At the start of the month, Villa del Rosario reported that the border closure and

quarantine had not reduced the immigration flow into Colombia and that passage via area trails had in fact continued, at a magnitude that some estimated at 500 people per day.

Conversely, undetermined numbers of returns to Venezuela, from Colombia or passing through Colombia from Ecuador and Peru, have intensified. Transit from these southern countries has also been accompanied by obstacles, including authorities like the Mayor of Cali. On April 21, the Mayor blocked the southern area of the municipality in an effort to halt the passage of migrants from Ecuador, despite having previously facilitated transportation of around 800 migrants to the border with Venezuela, without offering them an alternative to continue their journey. Such a decision has forced migrants to take longer and higher risk routes. Between the beginning of 2020 and mid-March, around 36,000 migrants have returned to Venezuela, through Norte de Santander.

The migratory nightmare has not ceased for those who have managed to return to their country, with at least a few hundred forced to return to Colombia under various circumstances. For example, in Boca de Grita the population was forced to leave due to threats from “Los Rastrojos” of imminent combat with the National Guard.

It is worth considering the behavior of migratory flows once the borders reopen and passenger transport resumes, specifically whether pre-pandemic directions and intensity of flows will resume - and if so, how long this process will take. In addition, and given the state of destination economies, it must be further considered whether some flows will be extinguished and others will emerge in the direction of least affected areas. Likewise, it is worth considering the future of newly identified return flows.

The experience of the 2008 crisis in Latin America suggests that, for those whose economy of origin has little prospect of recovery, such as Venezuela, the end of the quarantine in countries of current residence allows the possibility of making a living, even if through informal markets. It is expected that such considerations might reduce the return of migrants to their countries of origin, which may occur predominantly among recent Venezuelan migrants. It is possible that families that are grouped, in Colombia or other countries in the region, will choose to return one family member (or multiple, and usually children or one of the members of the couple) to a relative's home back in Venezuela, in order to facilitate the support of those who remain in the foreign country while the crisis is being circumvented. Another scenario, as occurred in the previous crisis of 2008, is that instead of returning to Venezuela, migrants re-migrate to a new destination that they consider to be more promising as a temporary survival strategy.

The answers to the previous questions, and many others, will greatly depend on the final impacts of the pandemic and the adjustments that will be made to immigration policies and regulations. Partisan political calculations and global strategy are expected to strongly influence the reactivation plans that will be adopted following the pandemic.

THE RESPONSE OF THE COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

As of March 19, *Migración Colombia (Migration Colombia)* provisionally suspended the expiration dates of all migrant permits and documents until May 3 or until the term established for the health emergency has concluded, in order not to affect their stay in the country during the quarantine. For its part, the Ministry of Health and Social Security (2020) also issued “Guidelines for the prevention, detection and management of cases of COVID-19 for the migrant population in Colombia.”

Furthermore, a six-point plan, reported in the document “COVID-19 Epidemic”, has been prepared by Migration Colombia for the care of the migrant population. The plan focuses on the most vulnerable groups and follows the principles of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the WHO, and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. Colombia includes migrants in this response to COVID-19 but requires more international support (Presidency of the Republic, 2020), as detailed below:

1. *Responsible and humanitarian management of the border.* The priority is to protect the health system in the border departments (which was already saturated before the epidemic by migration dynamics), as well as protecting the health of the national and migrant population of the Colombian border departments. Based on the needs expressed by local authorities in the municipalities with border posts, work is already underway to enable humanitarian corridors to respond to the needs of each region.
2. *Guaranteed access to health.* The route of care for Venezuelan migrants with possible or infected COVID-19 is exactly the same as that of any Colombian citizen.
3. *Adaptation of cooperation programs for the care of migrants.* Migration Colombia has worked hand in hand with international donors and humanitarian and cooperation organizations gathered in GIFMM6 (more than 65 organizations), and with local authorities to adjust the existing measures in each region. This work has resulted in the prioritization of actions in the following areas:

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- ◇ Strengthening of multipurpose cash transfer (CASH) programs among vulnerable migrant populations for food and housing.
-
- ◇ Water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) prioritized for vulnerable migrant populations, including street dwellers and ‘caminantes’ (walking migrants, those travelling on foot), to include drinking water, toilet kits, access to toilets and showers, etc.
-

-
- ◇ Adaptation of health services giving priority to possible cases of contagion and establishment of isolation measures. All in accordance with the guidelines of the WHO, PAHO, and the Ministry of Health.
-
- ◇ Adaptation of food care logistics with social home contingency plans or cash transfer deliveries to exchange for food.
-
- ◇ Strengthening of measures taken in shelters and adaptation of spaces for 'caminantes' and the street population, mainly in border areas.
-
4. *Attention to vulnerable migrant populations.* The Government is managing mechanisms to safeguard vulnerable populations, in this case migrant and host communities, which are not part of the state's social programs that have been used to respond to the COVID-19 crisis. Early childhood care modalities were made more flexible, replacing face-to-face interaction with telephone and virtual support.
 5. *Targeting programs at high impact points.* With the support of international, humanitarian, and cooperation organizations, as well as with the local authorities in La Guajira, Norte de Santander, and Cundinamarca, the aim is to expand the capacities of actors directly involved in caring for vulnerable migrant populations in Villa del Rosario, Maicao, and Soacha.
 6. *Greater coordination and information.* All actions have been developed in coordination with the regional and local authorities for the design and implementation of care measures for vulnerable migrant populations. Coordination with local authorities, the GIFFM, and Venezuelan associations has been carried out to set up platforms that bring together the channels of care available so that migrants can inform themselves and seek care.

However, only 25% of migrants surveyed responded positively to the question of whether they considered that the decisions of the Colombian Government to prevent the expansion of COVID-19 had properly taken into account the Venezuelan population in the country (Equilibrium CenDE, 2020).

CHALLENGES

Within the plan to assist the Venezuelan migrant population during the pandemic, the Presidency of the Republic of Colombia (2020) posed three challenges to the national government, local authorities, and international and cooperation organizations: 1) monitor rising xenophobic sentiments, particularly in the most affected areas; 2) provide effective economic recovery plans focused on migrant populations and host communities, based

on the concept of integration and not just care; and 3) monitor the housing crisis faced by vulnerable migrant populations during the crisis (the government response is a core issue driving public opinion).

The Office of the General Comptroller of the Republic found evidence of over-invoicing and other forms of corruption by some mayors and governments during the pandemic. As such, it is essential to redouble efforts to ensure that public resources and cooperation are applied with care, efficiency and effectiveness.

It is an opportunity for healthcare to be fully universalized, and for migrants in irregular conditions not to be limited to emergency situations, the mechanism by which they are being assisted in the case of COVID-19, to access healthcare. Universalised healthcare outside of the pandemic would allow migrants' inclusion, without discrimination, in the prevention and general healthcare plans of the country's population. This would enable, in the current situation and in others that may come, easier identification of cases of contagion and their epidemiological surveillance - a key issue, given the migrants' own internal geographic mobility, such as those from Venezuela.

On the other hand, in preparation for the government's recovery plans to be implemented, there should be a general and definitive regularization of migrants, which will provide them and their eventual employers or partners with security of their stay in the country. This, together with a more agile and less complicated certification of qualifications and certification of competencies, would enhance migrants' integration and potential contribution to society.

GENDER AND VENEZUELAN MIGRATION TO COLOMBIA

As of June 30, 2019, the number of Venezuelan migrants residing in Colombia was 1,408,055, of which 48% were female and 52% were male.

Table 56.
Number of Venezuelan Migrants Residing in Colombia as of June 30, 2019,
by Gender and Age Range

Age in years	Female	Male	Total
< 18	97,440	99,988	197,428
18 to 29	270,608	292,796	563,404
30 to 39	159,192	193,740	352,932
40 to 49	84,710	91,369	176,079

50 to 59	43,932	35,864	79,796
60 to 69	17,629	11,455	29,084
> 70	5,693	3,639	9,332
Total	679,204	728,851	1,408,055

Source: Migration Colombia, 2019

It is observed in Table 56 that women only outnumber men in the age ranges above 50 years - that is, at an age where they start to show greater vulnerabilities related to the decrease in physical and cognitive capabilities, as well as the increase in dependence on others. This situation may be due to the arrival of Venezuelan mothers and grandmothers in Colombia to care for children and grandchildren, while the other members of the family are engaged in economic activities. This process, known as global care chains (Molano, Robert, and García; 2012), can generate and perpetuate situations of gender inequality and inequity. For Skorni and Cienfuegos, “care continues to be a responsibility of families and women, which expresses the continuity of intergenerational and gender patterns in transnational households. In this context, women, both migrant and non-migrant, are the ones who face the greatest difficulties when reconciling care work with other activities, including self-care” (p. 46).

According to national data, “gender and domestic violence is the third most frequent event of public health interest at the national level affecting people of Venezuelan nationality.” In fact, “registered cases of gender and domestic violence in the Venezuelan population have increased almost four times since 2017,” rising from 187 cases in 2017 to 463 in 2018, and increasing even further to 691 cases in 2019 (USAID, UN WOMEN, Universidad del Norte, and Ministry of Health and Social Protection; 2020).

Regarding people with diverse sexual orientations and gender identities, the Administrative Registry of Venezuelans Migrants in Colombia (ARVM) reported the presence of 333 transgender people, representing 0.075% of the total number of individuals included in this registry for the first six months of 2018. Likewise, a study on sexual health in Colombia, “Latin American Survey for Men who have Sex with Men (LAMIS),” maintains that “among the migrant population, the most representative group are Venezuelans, whose number rises to 343 participants, which represent 4.2% of the respondents” (Restrepo and Mejía, 2020, p. 28). These figures highlight the diversity of gender identities and sexual orientations present in migratory flows between Colombia and Venezuela, and the importance of considering these populations in the design and implementation of intervention projects.

In addition, some studies carried out by social organizations and researchers (Caribe Afirmativo, 2018; Red Somos Corporation and the LGBTI Platform for Peace, 2019; Fuquene and Barrera, 2019; Gómez, 2018) in Colombia on the situation of VMR-CR with different sexual

orientations and gender identities, reach the same conclusions, pointing out problems and barriers to access to social security and health for VMR-CR, especially those living with HIV/AIDS. The researchers also observed that the precariousness of working conditions and the difficulty in securing employment influences the decision of those particular VMR-CR to dedicate themselves to sex work, where they increase their vulnerability and exposure to risks of various kinds, and where they are often affected by different forms of violence motivated by bias or prejudice against their sexual orientations and gender identities, added to the discrimination and xenophobia that, in some cases, they may suffer in Colombia.

MOTIVATIONS OF THE MIGRATORY PROCESS OF FEMALE VMR-CR IN THE CITIES OF BOGOTÁ D.C., BARRANQUILLA, MEDELLÍN AND YOPAL

The motivations expressed by VMR-CR women to undertake the migratory process are related to the precariousness of the quality of life in Venezuela. Authors such as Restrepo, Castro, Bedoya and López (2019), explain that this instability and insecurity “becomes a complex and multidimensional process, which has affected migrant families who come not only to Medellín and Colombia, but to other countries in the world” (p. 66). The precariousness of the quality of life is manifested in the deprivation and scarcity of resources essential for having a decent life, such as food or medicine.

Consequently, the limited access to goods and services, hyperinflation and deterioration in the provision of basic services in Venezuela have caused a feeling of insecurity and vulnerability in its citizens, leading them to migrate in an attempt to escape these realities.

PERCEPTIONS OF HEALTH SERVICE QUALITY AMONG VMR-CR WOMEN IN THE CITIES OF BOGOTÁ, D.C., BARRANQUILLA, MEDELLÍN AND YOPAL

Overall Quality

Assessing the quality of health services available to VMR-CR is crucial. Two hundred forty-six 246 female VMR-CR interviewed during field work carried out for the present study, were asked to share an assessment of the health service, which includes both the physical infrastructure aspects of the health care centers, and the quality of the service provided by health personnel. 22% of VMR-CR women in the cities of Bogotá D.C., Barranquilla, Medellín and Yopal stated that the health service they received may qualify as “fair”. In some cases, this is because even when they pay a share of the cost for medical consultations, they do not feel well treated or consider the service they received to be inadequate. In the words of one migrant:

"They have attended me because I have accepted that I would pay 30% of the consultation price. After attending me, the doctor said I had nothing. I don't know if I made myself understood. The fact is that I have been to the hospital and the care is not that good, even when I'm paying."

Salome, 37 years old, Medellín

Meanwhile, 37% of the survey respondents valued the health service they received as "good", while 13% rated it as "very good". One of the interviewees expressed satisfaction with the health service she received:

"The two times I have been to the hospital for emergencies, they have treated me very well. The first time I went I was informed I was pregnant, and that the baby was already 3 and a half months old. I went because I was having contractions and I didn't know why as my period was normal. And the other time was in January, when I was also having contractions. They treated me really well, they gave me medication and advised me to rest accordingly."

Eva, 31 years old, Bogotá D.C.

On the other hand, 3% consider this service to be "bad". This perception may be due to the barriers to health service access that VMR-CR have to face, which are related to their immigration status, the cost of the service and its coverage. In the words of an interviewee:

"Health care is limited, very expensive, and migrants are unlikely to be cared for. Few migrants manage to receive medical attention, unless they have their documents in order."

María, 39 years old, Medellín

"I went to the emergency room when the baby was five months old, he became ill and there the care was regular so they had not explained me well how it was that I had to have an EPS, during my pregnancy nobody explained to me and they only attended to me because I had my permission, but they never explained to me that I had to have an EPS and a Sisbén score, when I went to the emergency room they were asking me for a quantity of silver and I told them that they never told me that I had to have EPS or Sisbén "

Interviewee 5, Bogotá, DC, 25 years old

In other cases, the health service is perceived as regular due to migrant's lack of awareness related to administrative procedures they must complete to access health services. This lack of awareness contributes to lack of access of care and poor quality of services received by migrant Venezuelan women.

Finally, 25% of interviewees did not answer this question, because they had not sought health services during their time residing in Colombia.

Quality of patient care

Regarding the expectations that the migrants had regarding the patient care in the health services in the four prioritized cities, 27% stated that it was more or less the same, that is, the service they received was in accordance with their expectations before using it. 31% of reported that the service received was better than they expected. And 12% considered that the attention was much better. In contrast, 3% perceived patient care in health facilities as worse than they expected and 1% much worse. For instance, one of the interviewees stated the reasons for the negative perception regarding health services:

“The infrastructure of the hospital is not bad, but they do not take care of us, they tell one that they do not take care of Venezuelans, in their face they tell us, I have a friend who went to the Red Cross with her serious husband, and they do not take care of them, and the husband left in this serious condition, as he was, which bothered me a lot. It cannot be, there in Venezuela they still attend, because health is no longer useful, but how many Colombians were not treated there, they did not even ask them what nationality they were”

Interviewee 4, Barranquilla, 51 years old

It is possible that the perception of a poorer health service does not originate from the infrastructure, equipment or services offered by health facilities, but from barriers to access to these services for migrants. Finally, the remaining 26% did not answer this question, since they had not made use of the health services in Colombia.

GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE

Prevention of gender-based violence is clearly needed as “in 2018 in Colombia, 666 femicides and 232 attempts were registered in the news over digital platforms for a total of 898 cases of feminicidal violence” (Román and Dávila, 2018, p. 4). Of those cases, 1.9% were related to women of Venezuelan nationality, as 16 femicides and 1 attempt were committed against Venezuelan migrants. Two of the femicides took place in the department of Antioquia, but

most of them are concentrated in border areas (Román and Dávila, 2018). The Colombian Ombudsman's Office, in its report "Analysis of gender and human mobility at the border" (2019), reports that "in relation to the violent deaths of Venezuelan women, there have been 10 violent deaths and 2 suicides in the last 4 years" (p.72) in the department of La Guajira. Moreover, in this same department in the year 2017, "the homicide of an LGBTI leader and individual threats to 3 female leaders were identified" (Ombudsman's Office of Colombia, 2019, p. 73).

Open Democracy reports that, of the cases of deaths of Venezuelan women in Colombia between the years 2018 and 2019, 57.3% were victims of femicide or gender violence, or were killed by a romantic partner, ex-partner or relative (Open Democracy, 2020).

Some of the interviewees stated that they have been victims of some sort of gender-based violence. However, on some occasions women do not openly communicate having been victims, because they are unaware that many of the events they face in their daily lives are expressions of psychological, verbal or economic violence, or because they are afraid of reprisals from their victimizers. This is evidenced in the following testimony:

"When I was living with a friend and her husband, she had to go on a trip and I stayed at home. That night her husband arrived drunk and drugged, and tried to abuse me. He did not push on and did nothing to me, but I had to leave my friend's house. I don't think of it as gender violence, but as mistreatment for being Venezuelan"

Verónica, 51 years old, Barranquilla

From the interviewee's narration, it can be concluded that she considers that the sexual harassment she was subject to does not constitute an act of gender violence but rather a situation that can be common to other VMR-CR women. This unawareness, as well as the distrust that the women have towards justice, influences the low number of complaints of this type of act. In the words of another migrant:

"I went to the police and accused my husband of mistreatment, but the police did nothing. I felt very bad because they sent me back home, since the complaint could not proceed without evidence. To be helped, I have to go to them with a black eye. He pulls my hair, he slaps me, and the authorities did not help me. Just now, I had to move to my mother's. He took my children away from me. I don't know what to do. I don't have a job and need to get my girl back with me."

Lucrecia, 26 years old, Barranquilla

This combination of unawareness and distrust - as well as inaction by police, leads to cases of gender-based violence not being reported to the competent authorities, hence is not reported in official statistics. “Despite the increase of events in the population of Venezuelan nationality, underreporting of cases of Violence Based on Gender are associated with situations such as lack of documentation, misinformation regarding access to services, fear and mistrust”(USAID et al, 2020, p.3).

GENDER AND ACCESS TO PRIORITY HEALTH SERVICES

Sexual and reproductive health services: Regarding sexual and reproductive health, the priority issues for VMR-CR include contraception, and it is necessary to ensure access to contraceptives to meet demand. Some of the interviewees stated that they have been able to access contraceptive medications or products for free. Other women commented that they buy their contraceptives, but expressed not knowing about institutions where they can acquire them regularly and at more accessible prices in order to use them continuously. In this respect, it would be necessary to further disseminate information on the offer of sexual and reproductive health services (both from public and private institutions) so that they reach, as a priority, VMR-CR women and all women in conditions of vulnerability.

Maternal and newborn care: Data collected through fieldwork show that 12% of the VMR-CR women surveyed are pregnant, therefore, they must receive access to obstetric and newborn services. However, in the interviews, some of the VMR-CR identified a series of barriers that can hinder the provision of these services, such restrictions ranging from institutional discrimination to high costs and lack of specific information about the services available. For example, pregnant women are often unaware that in Colombia, “health care for pregnant women and newborns [comes with] universal coverage, that is, that all women in the national territory are guaranteed services and care during childbirth and the first year of the newborn” (Profamilia, 2019, p.45).

Prevention and treatment of HIV/AIDS: A fourth area of focus is the prevention of HIV and other STDs, in terms of guaranteeing access to diagnosis and comprehensive monitoring and antiretroviral treatment (ARV) of VMR-CR who present with any pathologies of these diseases. In addition, it is necessary to take into account “the alarming ‘feminization’ of the pandemic (HIV), which manifests what can happen when women’s rights are completely ignored” (UNFPA, 2006, p. 38).

LGBTI+ Services: It is necessary to more closely examine some key populations, such as transgender women and men who have sex with men (MSM), which are populations that must be addressed as a priority due to the high incidence of HIV among them. Of the respondents in all four cities, 5% self-identified as belonging to the population with diverse sexual orientation or gender identity, and the percentage among women corresponds to 18%.

Finally, it is worth noting that people belonging to the LGBTI population face multiple conditions of vulnerability and are therefore more likely to suffer discrimination. Their sexual orientation or gender identities, immigration status and nationality create problems and barriers to accessing social security and health care, especially for those living with HIV/AIDS.

CONFLICT AND VENEZUELAN MIGRATION TO COLOMBIA

IMPACT OF ARMED GROUPS AND ORGANIZED CRIME ON VENEZUELAN MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES

The National Center for Historical Memory (NCHM) has identified five core areas for understanding the Colombian armed conflict and its differences across the country's regions:

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- ◇ Disputes over land property and agrarian conflicts, which have been based on multiple interests and ideologies.
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- ◇ Lack of guarantees and spaces for political participation, or cooptation when people have found them.
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- ◇ Drug trafficking, which has not just played a role as a means of funding different parties in the armed conflict but has also become a major protagonist in it. In addition, it has influenced cultural aspects and caused significant moral erosion in the society by validating some routes for rapid social rise.
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- ◇ Global context and international pressure to fight drug production, which have served as ideological references and provided economic resources for the war. Some examples of international events with an influence are the Cold War, the fight against drug trafficking, and the fight against terrorism.
-
- ◇ Government absence in some areas of the country, a situation that is represented by the expression that "in Colombia there is more territory than State", which is attributed to Luis Carlos Galán. The heterogenous way in which the State exercises its powers is evidenced in its institutional and territorial fragmentation, especially in the outlying areas.
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The national armed conflict has existed for over eight decades, beginning during the liberal-conservative partisan violence period, which is usually dated from around 1946. Since then, different armed actors have emerged and disappeared, and a number of demobilization or peace processes have been initiated but proven unable to end the confrontations between state forces and illegal groups.

Among the aforementioned processes, the following are worth mentioning: the “Guerrillas del Llano” surrender in 1953, which resulted in an amnesty for its members in Antioquia and Tolima (Gómez, 2016); the abandonment of arms through the April 19 Movement (M-19) in 1990 after 16 years of fighting (Grabe, 2010) and the signing of a political agreement that fostered the creation of the National Constituent Assembly in 1991 (Barco et al, 1990); the demobilizations, associated with the Constituent Assembly, of the Popular Liberation Army (EPL), the Revolutionary Workers Party (PRT), the Quintín Lame Indigenous Movement, the Socialist Renewal Movement (which was a predecessor of the National Liberation Army - ELN), and of some militia forces, between 1990 and 1994 (Grabe, 2013; Indepaz, 2013a; Peñaranda, 2015); and the Agreement with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia - People’s Army (FARC-EP), by which its members renounced their 50-year project to take power through arms and accepted a political role in compliance with the law, while the government agreed to judge their crimes based on an alternative justice system, which lead to short sentences and, generally, to the preservation of their political rights (Melo, 2016: 319).

The agreement with the FARC-EP spread the idea, among a big part of the Colombian population, that it would automatically bring an end to the national conflict and that peace would finally arrive. Even the use of the term “post-conflict” to refer to the period following the agreement’s enforcement became common. However, as expressed by the Delegate of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC): “The fundamental idea of the Peace Agreement was that peace does not depend on a signature by the FARC, especially when other actors have not taken a part of it; but it is rather something whose construction takes years and years” (Oquendo, 2019).

After the signing of the agreement, Indepaz (2018) expressed:

“[...] rather than demonstrating the appearance or disappearance of some elements, violence phenomena had a change in its logics [...]. The interpretation of targeted-armed conflicts [...] places confrontations in areas delimited by private interests, which are not interconnected under the logics of disputes for political power at the national level. Instead, dynamics are mainly grounded by the mafia penetration in the State, by foreign resources obtained from drug trafficking and the appropriation of income” (12).

The ICRC delegate quoted previously agrees that a complex setting of illegal groups and activities holds a key role in the national conflict:

“The new status in the Colombian conflict does not have a national dimension but dynamics in the micro regions that are not deeply linked to each other. The situation is more complex because the fundamental question is how to protect people and neutralize illegal economies. [...] Furthermore, the analysis about the armed conflict was easier in the past [...] but the border issues made it more complex. The analysis turned fragmented and much more difficult, as the illegal groups are not easily identified, and even civilians often tell us that they do not know who they are [...]” (Oquendo, 2019).

Indepaz (2018) classified the post-agreement armed structures into the following groups: narco-paramilitary groups, such as the Clan del Golfo and the Caparrapos or Caparros, former allies and current enemies; FARC-EP post-disarmament groups, subclassified into dissidents, drug trafficking security groups (some emerged to work for Mexican cartels and other foreign mafia groups with a presence in the national territory), and rearmed groups engaged in illegal businesses; the ELN; and the EPL, which is currently also known as Los Pelusos. On the other hand, the Organized Armed Groups (OAG) were defined by law as “[...] those which, under the command of a responsible figure, have enough control over a part of the territory to carry out sustained and concerted military operations [...]” (Colombian Congress, 2018: Art. 2). Likewise, the current National Government has classified ELN, dissident groups of the FARC-EP, Caparros, Clan del Golfo, and EPL as OAG structures (Gómez, 2020).

The illegal armed groups, whatever their names or origins are, continue to inflict violence in the country, within the framework of a conflict where vulnerable populations located within their areas of action or influence are the most affected. According to the ICRC (2020), the most serious human rights violations documented by their teams in 2019 consisted of almost one victim a

day, which included persons harmed by explosive devices and anti-personnel mines, cases of internal displacement and community confinement, homicides, threats, forced disappearances, attacks against the Medical Mission in areas with poor health coverage, the destruction of natural resources, sexual violence, and the enlistment of children by armed groups.

The already high vulnerability of Venezuelan migrants and some returnees, due to their irregular status and unemployment or precarious economic conditions, makes this population particularly prone to becoming victims or victimizers⁴⁷ within the Colombian conflict when illegal armed groups are present in their areas of residence, work, or transit. Additionally, according to Human Rights Watch (HRW), the limited knowledge about the Colombian conflict also plays a role in the complexity of migrants' situations (HRW 2019). Regarding migratory status-related vulnerability, InSight Crime found that, fearing potential deportations or prosecutions, many Venezuelans refrain from going to local authorities, which leads to their legal invisibility. The irregular status, added to the conditions of deprivation that originally prompted them to migrate, makes Venezuelan migrants (and especially newcomers) more vulnerable to exploitation by armed groups (InSight Crime, 2019).

Because the conflict is active across the Colombian-Venezuelan border, migrants are a significant group among the affected population, sometimes due to the extension of the conflict to Venezuelan territory or to the alliances made between Colombian and Venezuelan illegal groups. In fact, statistics from the 35 Colombian municipalities located on the border with Venezuela show the magnitude of the conflict in these areas: between 2012 and 2019, 4,911 people were murdered; 71 children and adolescents were recruited by illegal armed groups; 71,561 people were forcibly displaced; and 203 were kidnapped (Pares, 2020).

The Colombian-Venezuelan border spans 2,219 kilometers through the Colombian departments of La Guajira, Cesar, Norte de Santander, Boyacá, Arauca, Vichada, and Guainía, as well as the Venezuelan states of Zulia, Táchira, Apure, and Amazonas. In those areas, the operational criminal organizations are the ELN, EPL, Los Rastrojos, Clan del Golfo, and 10 Post-Farc Armed Groups (GAPF), in addition to other transnational criminal organizations, such as Los Pranes (coming from Venezuelan prisons and based in Maicao), the Sinaloa and Jalisco Nueva Generación cartels, Banda La Línea, Banda La Frontera, Los Evander, and Tren de Aragua (Pares, 2020a and 2020b), which are allies or enemies in the fight for territorial and market control. The illegal activities of these organizations include the charging of extortion fees for the transit of vehicles and people at uncontrolled crossings; drug trafficking; theft and the smuggling of fuel, livestock, weapons, spare car parts, and other goods; kidnapping; extortion; sexual exploitation; and human trafficking.

In the Catatumbo region, where migrants are especially exposed given the control of the armed groups and the existence of illicit crops, there is a significant concentration of people

⁴⁷ Source: Mentioned by a researcher participating in the workshop with academics held in the framework of this consultancy. **Data collection survey** on the Venezuelan Refugee and Migrant Situation in the Republic of Colombia

who “live in precarious conditions. Some of them sleep on the streets or in buildings in overcrowded conditions, sometimes without electricity or running water.” The number of people that fall into these groups is not clearly defined due to their irregular entry into Colombian territory and the scarce presence of the State, but the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimated that 25,000 people were in these situations in April 2019 (HRW, 2019).

In the border areas where the illegal armed groups are present, the conflict has affected the migrant, Colombian, and Venezuelan populations in recent years. Examples of these effects are presented in the following sections.

MURDERS

Between 2017 and 2019, 378 Venezuelan migrants were killed in the 35 Colombian municipalities located on the border (Pares, 2020). In Catatumbo alone, in April 2019, the Attorney General’s Office was investigating 47 cases of murders of Venezuelan citizens committed in the region since 2017, while 15 Venezuelans were killed by unidentified armed groups between January and July 2019, according to OCHA (cited by HRW, 2019).

RECRUITMENT BY ILLEGAL ARMED GROUPS, INCLUDING UNDERAGE MIGRANTS

To maintain their armed structures and obtain logistical and operational support to carry out their activities, the illegal groups require new members, with Venezuelan migrants, including children and adolescents, being especially vulnerable to recruitment. The issue of Venezuelans joining Colombian criminal gangs was reported in 2013 (Bargent, 2013), after the arrest of three Venezuelan members of the “Urabeños” (now known as the Clan del Golfo). In October 2018, InSight Crime reported⁴⁸, by citing an Army High Officer, that authorities had registered 27 cases of recruitment of Venezuelans by ELN and FARC dissident groups in the previous three months, and some other compatriots had been captured with charges of extortion, as well as drug, arms, and ammunition trafficking. It was also reported that some Venezuelan members of criminal groups died in combat against official forces (Venezuela Investigative Unit, 2018b). As the same article elaborated:

48 InSight Crime (<https://es.insightcrime.org/>) is a foundation dedicated to the study of organized crime in Latin America and the Caribbean.

“In some cases, recruitments are carried out under the use of threats or pressure methods, but the forced exodus of Venezuelans has created a kind of fishing whose main hook consists of taking advantage of their hunger and despair.

Inhabitants of the border towns located in the State of Táchira say that the young Venezuelans that are recruited usually come from remote regions of the country and lack basic resources like food. In consequence, guerrilla groups and criminal gangs operating in the area offer them income opportunities that they would never have in their country.

InSight Crime sources in the border area reported that young people received up to VES 50,000 per month (USD 300 in the parallel market), which is equivalent to more than 27 minimum wages in Venezuela (a monthly minimum wage is USD 12).”

As stated by a researcher in one of the workshops held in the framework of this consultancy, a subgroup of migrants with dual nationality (sometimes obtained fraudulently) would be of particular interest for criminal groups, given the difficulties for authorities to identify and crosscheck the information on criminal records. This would also represent a security risk for Colombia.⁴⁹

Regarding coca leaf collectors, known as “raspachines,” InSight Crime also stated that Venezuelans have replaced the Colombian workforce, as they charge a lower salary in the range of 100 to 300 dollars a month, “an income difficult to get across the border” (Venezuela Investigative Unit, 2019c).

In relation to the underage population recruited by criminal groups, the Ombudsman’s Office of Colombia reported that out of 105 early alarms issued during 2018 and up to May 14, 2019, 63 “risk scenarios of recruitment and human trafficking of children and adolescents” were identified in 94 municipalities of 23 departments, and “in all of them, Venezuelan migrants’ vulnerability has been detected.” The Ombudsman’s Office added that the conditions of many children become more serious when they have an irregular migratory status and are unaccompanied in the country, while criticizing the fact that when some of them leave the armed groups, the Colombian Government’s response is the rejection of their victim status and prosecutions for their crimes. Also, when they access protection systems, the conditions “do not meet the minimum standards to grant the real protection of their life and personal integrity” (Ombudsman’s Office of Colombia, 2019a).

⁴⁹ According to the same source, this flow would have led to a certain level of disqualification of some recent migrants as an effect of the perception about those who arrived in the first waves.

In addition, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR, 2020) warns that “in addition to the abuses and violations suffered by these girls and boys, they are in serious risks due to the attacks of the army and the police against the illegal groups they are involved with.” When the recruitment is not forced but involves money offering, “these dynamics pose strong contradictions within families due to their situation of poverty,” according to a researcher who participated in the workshop with academics.

Regarding La Guajira and Cesar departments, the Paz y Reconciliación Foundation has declared that “the ELN has been committing some acts against the civilian population, including the forced recruitment of young Venezuelan people” (Pares, 2020). Likewise, HRW has reported similar conditions in the Catatumbo area:

“The armed groups in Catatumbo recruit Colombian and Venezuelan children. The Colombian Victims Unit reports that between 2017 and 2018, 14 of them were recruited in the area. Similarly, the Office of the Attorney General of Colombia told Human Rights Watch that in April 2019, prosecutors had 17 open processes on the recruitment of minors that occurred in Catatumbo since 2017.

Members of the armed groups enlist children, as young as 12 years old. They often offer a payment in exchange, and sometimes threaten to kill them or their families if they refuse to do so, according to relatives of the victims, the Ombudsman’s Office and officers of humanitarian organizations working in the area. In March 2019, for example, ELN members visited a rural school in Catatumbo to try to convince the children to join their ranks. The groups use children to perform several tasks and assign them roles as informants or fighters. Also, according to credible sources, members of armed groups have subjected girls to sexual abuse” (HRW, 2019: 36).

In Catatumbo, the same source added that some children are working in coca cultivations and expressed the obstacle that this represents for school attendance, in addition to the fact that those who wish to study “face other difficulties, such as the lack of space in schools, the lack of money to buy school supplies and the enormous distances to reach school facilities in rural areas.” This situation is illustrated by an interview with a 14-year-old Venezuelan boy, who had to leave school when he arrived in Colombia to work from 5:00 AM until 12:00 PM and from 1:00 PM to 4:00 PM in coca plantations, where some of his compatriots worked “only for a plate of food.” There were other Colombian and Venezuelan children as young as eight years old working on the same coca plantation (HRW, 2019).

In October 2019, the forced recruitment of children and adolescents, mainly of Venezuelan nationality, was identified in the municipalities of Arauca and Arauquita, in the department of Arauca, where the ELN and other groups are present. The same source said:

“It has been identified that the main strategies used by all illegal armed groups to promote the involvement of children and adolescents in the dynamics of armed conflicts and crimes are: i) the offer of money, handguns and luxury items, ii) attraction or infatuation games performed by other young members of the groups, iii) persuasion through psychological pressure or constant invitations, and iv) threats to kill the children or their family. It is highlighted that the roles played by children within the armed structures range from having presence in surveillance points to collecting extortion fees or recruiting other children” (OAS, 2019).

In June 2019, four Venezuelans (including two women) were reportedly killed during a bombardment carried out by the Colombian Army on a camp of FARC dissidents in Arauca (Venezuela Investigative Unit, 2019a).

HUMAN TRAFFICKING AND SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND VIOLENCE

Venezuelan people, particularly children and women, are frequently victims of sexual assault and human trafficking, especially for sexual exploitation purposes. They are victimized by the criminal structures involved in the conflict, whether as migrants to Colombia or as Venezuelan residents, when they are captured in their country to be sent to Colombia, particularly to the border area.

According to InSight Crime, 75 percent of the victims registered by the Colombian authorities since 2016 have Venezuelan nationality “The criminals take advantage of them by making deceptive offers, which consist of non-existent jobs and working conditions, and once they are held as prisoners, they are prevented to go somewhere else, and their personal documents are withheld to create a dependency relationship.” The same document reports on two police operations carried out in Barranquilla, which resulted in the release of about 90 Venezuelans who were kept in overcrowded conditions and forced to participate in web pornography; it also mentions a network that was deceptively recruiting Venezuelans in Cúcuta with the promise of employing them in coffee farms but that instead forced them to sell drugs for criminal groups (Venezuela Investigative Unit, 2018a).

In the Department of La Guajira, the Colombian-Venezuelan human trafficking networks have been strengthened. In this regard, the Ombudsman’s Office noted:

"[...] In the municipality of Maicao, the existence of human trafficking networks for sexual exploitation has been identified. Taking advantage of the vulnerable conditions of the Venezuelan population, they enter some victims into national territory and mobilize them to other municipalities in La Guajira and neighboring departments [...]. In the Paraguachón village, indigenous and non-indigenous girls between 12 and 17 years old are being exploited by prostitution networks. These cases of child prostitution⁴ are more visible in the vans and trucks that cross the border" (Ombudsman's Office of Colombia, 2019b).

Also in La Guajira, according to the Early Warning 039-19 issued by the Ombudsman's Office and cited by the Paz y Reconciliación Foundation, in La 89 and La Cortica trails, "when women do not have money to pay the respective crossing fee, they are separated from the group, held against their will, taken to mountainous areas and sexually abused" (Pares 2020).

With reference to the border in Norte de Santander and the alliance between EPL and Los Rastrojos, the Paz y Reconciliación Foundation stated in a press release that the Venezuelan migrant population, and especially women and girls, were in "imminent risk of becoming victims of sexual exploitation in an aberrant way, many of them having been already forced to prostitute themselves, lived in slavery conditions and subjected to the most inhuman abuse" (Pares, 2020b).

In regard to Catatumbo, HRW (citing various sources) has reported the following events: allegations of violence and sexual abuse against Venezuelan women and girls; the sexual exploitation of Venezuelan girls, some of them between 12 and 15 years old and "exchanging sex for COP 5,000 (less than USD 2)"; and Venezuelan victims of sexual violence not reporting incidents to the Colombian authorities for fear of reprisals by the victimizers and deportations by the Colombian authorities (HRW, 2019).

According to HRW, "despite credible allegations of sexual abuse against Venezuelan women in Catatumbo, none of the 300 investigations of sexual crimes being processed by a prosecutor's office had been filed by Venezuelan victims" (HRW, 2019). The Tren de Aragua, which carries out its illegal activities especially in the Táchira-Norte de Santander area, is dedicated to human trafficking: "With offers of supposed formal job opportunities, they deceive women and retain their documents once they move from Venezuela to Colombia, where they are forced to work in sexual activities" (Pares, 2020b).

Male children and adolescents are also victims of trafficking for sexual exploitation purposes, according to the Semana magazine (cited by InSight Crime). In relation to a police operation that took place in La Guajira in October 2019, the source said:

“The band was called ‘La Mona’ and its victims, both Colombian and Venezuelan, were between 14 and 17 years old. The boys were drugged, disguised as girls and forced to prostitute themselves for COP 60,000 (approximately USD 18). Members of the criminal organization took advantage of the fact that Venezuelan children were in poverty, so they offered them money, lodging and food in exchange for sexual favors. The exploiters made them wear wigs and women’s clothing, and then a taxi driver transported them to different hotels. The children were prostituted in the Riohacha, Maicao, Fonseca and San Juan de Cesar areas” (Venezuela Investigative Unit, 2019a).

BORDER CROSSING FEES, PARTICULARLY THROUGH TRAILS

Given the number of people walking through the many irregular crossings along the border, and depending on the type and volume of the goods they carry, the collection of crossing fees has become a very lucrative business, specially in trails close to the main urban border centers. As a result, different armed groups fight or make alliances to obtain their control. In the case of La Guajira area, it has been identified that the trails are controlled by natives, who impose fees to allow vehicles transporting migrants to cross to the Colombian side. The following has also been identified:

“Natives control up to 10 checkpoints in each of the more than 200 trails [...] and have a fleet of vehicles registered in their structure. In order to cross these routes, payments have to be made at each checkpoint, and they vary permanently. When a migrant or an independent transporter tries to circumvent the established scheme, they are exposed to robberies, mistreatment, sexual abuse and life risk” (Unidad, 2019a).

In its Early Warning 039-19, cited by the Paz y Reconciliación Foundation (Pares, 2020a), the Ombudsman’s Office reported on the extortion fees charged to irregular transporters who were passing through La 89 and La Cortica trails in Maicao. Transporters had to pay between COP 1,000 and 2,000 per passenger.

The EPL built a strong alliance with Los Rastrojos (including El Evander group, which operates in Venezuela) in order to control the trails and checkpoints connected to Cúcuta, Villa del

Rosario, Puerto Santander, and Tibú, where Boca de Grita and La Marina are located. The authorities have associated such illegal control with the murder of Venezuelan migrants. In fact, it was reported that decapitated bodies were found on a trail of La Parada neighborhood, in the municipality of Villa del Rosario, presumably for not paying the established crossing fees (Pares, 2020a and 2020b).

It has been found that the ELN is responsible for collecting money from those who transit the trail routes from the upper area of Catatumbo to Convention, the vast majority of whom are Venezuelan migrants. Meanwhile, the local band La Línea charges the same type of population on the trails under its control, between the Venezuelan towns of San Antonio and Ureña, and Cúcuta, in Colombia. These trails are La Carbonera, El Águila, and El Escobal, which are a few meters away from the Francisco de Paula Santander International Bridge (Pares 2020a).

MIGRANT SMUGGLING

The existence of multiple irregular, free-of-state-control trails, as referred to in the previous section, suggests that, in general, the Colombian-Venezuelan border is not promising for crossing smugglers, who are also known as “coyotes.” However, InSight Crime reported on events that could be characterized as migrant smuggling:

“Mariana [...] did not need identity documents or a passport. Neither did she have to navigate fast-flowing rivers or deal with officers in the immigration checkpoints. She only paid over VES 20,000 and COP 10,000 (about USD 34 in May 2018), which was all the money she had saved, to occupy one of the five seats in the sedan-type vehicle that a friend of hers uses to transport Venezuelans to Colombia through Paraguachón, in the Zulia state. The amount paid, although it seems symbolic, boosts a rudimentary migrant smuggling structure that operates in La Guajira. The organization is controlled by indigenous Wayúu ethnic groups and is responsible for the illegal entry of thousands of Venezuelan migrants into Colombia. Mariana, a manicurist from Maracaibo, and at least 40 members of her family who currently live in Medellín, used the same network to leave Venezuela” (Venezuela Investigative Unit, 2018a).

InSight Crime reported on another practice that could be seen as related to migrant smuggling: the irregular fees that corrupt Venezuelan officers charge to provide the documentation required for the migration process, such as passports, criminal records, or university degree certificates.

Perceptions of the people or organizations that facilitate irregular migration differ among governments and migrants. While for the former they are considered as promoters of transnational crime, for the latter they are service providers. However, migrants seem to not take into account that by receiving such a type of service, they can become targets of different crimes, including murder and human trafficking. That was the case for 10 Venezuelans rescued by the police in the city of Armenia, where they were being held by a gang that demanded a payment of COP 600,000 and transportation fees (Venezuela Investigative Unit, 2018a).

OTHER MOBILITY RESTRICTIONS

There have been a number of reports regarding armed groups restricting the access of Venezuelans to some rural areas in the Catatumbo region. In order to enter, Venezuelans require the “recommendation” of a resident, who is subjected to retaliation in the event that the recommended person commits any fault in the opinion of the armed groups. In April 2017, the EPL released a pamphlet that stated: “People from other parts are not accepted without a recommendation from someone in the region. People who have no one to back them up must leave the area.” It was also reported that 100 Venezuelans were victims of “forced displacement” during 2017-2019 (HRW, 2019, 25).

DISAPPEARANCES

According to the Paz y Reconciliación Foundation, forced disappearance is one of the most frequently used practices of armed groups in the border area, with Venezuelan migrants and women the most vulnerable. The source added that most of these disappearances “are not reported, but in the streets of Cúcuta and the municipalities of Villa del Rosario, Puerto Santander and Catatumbo, it is common to hear citizens talking about them” (Pares 2020a). In April 2019, the Attorney General’s Office was investigating the alleged forced disappearance of 10 Venezuelans that had occurred in Catatumbo since 2017 (HRW, 2019).

A recognized national media outlet stated that people who transit the trails and do not pay the corresponding extortion fees or refuse to obey the orders of the armed groups in control may become victims of murder or forced disappearance. Citing the National Institute of Legal Medicine and Forensic Sciences, the media outlet commented: “In the last three years, the metropolitan area of Cúcuta recorded an average of 200 disappearances per year” (Semana TV, 2020).

CONCLUSION

It is clear that Venezuelan people have been, and continue to be, victims of different types of crimes in the framework of the Colombian armed conflict. With already-precarious

economic conditions that are also common to many Colombians, the special vulnerability of Venezuelans arises from 1) their irregular entry into the country as the access routes are controlled by armed groups, and 2) from their subsequent irregular migratory status, which contributes to their “invisibility” and impunity beyond the average rates in the cases in which they are victimized. Impunity increases due to the low level of denunciation, which is the result of a general fear of any possible retaliation by the victimizers, as well as of deportation given their irregular migratory status. Therefore, the need for the State to grant a broad and definitive regularization process is evident. Among other things, such a status change would enable their free mobility in the national territory, their participation in the labor market with conditions equal to that of the Colombian population, and their visibility before the State and society. It also seems clear, given the incidents that have been laid out, that the Venezuelan people who have been affected should be recognized as victims of the Colombian armed conflict.



Caracas/ Venezuela

PUBLIC FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN COLOMBIA



OVERVIEW OF PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS IN COLOMBIA FOR AN ODA LOAN

CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

The Colombian Constitution defines the country as a “social state under the rule of law, organized in the form of a unitary, decentralized republic, with autonomy from its territorial entities.”⁵⁰ This means that although the President of the Republic is the Chief of State, head of government and supreme administrative authority,⁵¹ there are territorial divisions (departments, districts, municipalities, and indigenous territories) endowed with the autonomy to take their management decisions according to their interests, within the limits of the Constitution and the Law.⁵²

50 Colombian Constitution , Article 1.

51 Idem Article 115.

52 Idem Article 287.

This clarification is important to understand the possible alternatives when designing a credit operation under the ODA Loan scheme, in order to be aligned with the powers of the national and territorial governments. Despite the autonomy granted to some territorial institutions, some authorization and enforcement functions remain reserved to the national authorities, as is the case with public credit operations. It is important to take into account the areas in which other national organizations, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores), the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit (Ministerio de Hacienda y Crédito Público), the National Planning Department (Departamento Nacional de Planeación) and the Colombian Presidential Agency for International Cooperation (Agencia Presidencial de Cooperación Internacional de Colombia, APC-Colombia)

GENERAL FRAMEWORK FOR AN ODA LOAN PROGRAM IN COLOMBIA

The purpose of this chapter is to describe the general framework established by Colombia for the design of an ODA Loan, considering its applicability to the operational modalities used by JICA: Project-Type Loans and Program Loans. It is important to specify that in Colombia, public credit operations are defined as “the accords or contracts that are intended to provide a State entity with resources, goods or services within a certain term for payment or those by which the entity acts as a joint debtor or guarantor of payment obligations.”⁵³ These operations include:⁵⁴

- Foreign and domestic credit operations
- Issuance, registration, and allocation of public debt securities
- Supplier credits
- Guarantees for payment obligations by State entities

Foreign credits can derive from different sources:

- International development organizations
- Governments or bilateral development banks
- Foreign public debt securities
- Private or commercial banks
- Providers
- International leasing companies

⁵³ Decree 2681 of 1993, “by which public credit, public debt management and related operations, as well as their contracting are partially regulated”. Santa Fe de Bogotá, D.C., December 29, 1993.

⁵⁴ Public Credit Operations Manual - National Planning Department, 2017.

Credit operations with governments or bilateral development banks, which are the core of this consultancy, are those “used by a foreign government to make reimbursable or contingent-recovery resources available for the Government of Colombia in order to finance certain projects, goods or services that are defined as strategic lines for both governments. For the execution of these resources, a previous framework agreement that determines the programs or projects to be developed can be signed by the two governments”.

As a general rule, the Government of Colombia requires the signing of a prior financial cooperation agreement with the corresponding cooperation agency or development bank in order to establish the bases, principles, strategic lines, and modalities to be covered under the cooperation. As these types of agreements are of international nature, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for leading the contracting process and the Congress of the Republic must submit its approval, as stated in Article 150, paragraph 16 of the Colombian Constitution.

Consequently, it is important to determine the powers of some national institutions to develop reimbursable and non-reimbursable cooperation programs and projects. This is necessary information to later design the roadmap for the identification of potential beneficiary institutions at the national, departmental, district or municipal levels.

CENTRALIZED INSTITUTIONS WITH FUNCTIONS IN OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT AID PROGRAMS WITH A CREDIT COMPONENT

According to the Colombian State structure, there are at least four institutions at the central government level with the power to structure an ODA Loan program. In some cases, these institutions have complementary roles in the stages of the ODA Loan structuring. This chapter will provide a general context of these institutions, and information regarding the structuring [will be explained in the section about the process for a public entity to request financing through an external credit operation.](#)

Colombia adopted the OECD’s definition of Official Development Assistance,⁵⁵ which is explained as the flows to countries and territories on the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) list of ODA Recipients and to multilateral development institutions that are provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies. Every ODA transaction must be:

a) administered with the main objective of promoting the development and economic welfare of developing countries;

55 <http://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/official-development-assistance.htm>, consulted on 04/13/2020

b) concessional in nature and have a donation component of at least 25% (calculated at a discount rate of 10%).

For the national government, financial cooperation is defined as reimbursable or non-reimbursable development measures allocated to the Republic of Colombia or any of its public entities⁵⁶, and carried out by governments or official agencies to implement official development assistance programs.

ENTITIES AND ROLES

- a) The **Ministry of Foreign Affairs** is the entity that, under the lead of the President of the Republic, formulates, plans, coordinates and executes Colombia's foreign policy. Hence, it is the entity leading the negotiations on Colombia's international cooperation instruments, including financial and technical cooperation programs and agreements with foreign governments and bilateral agencies.

Despite the international character of such instruments, they must be approved by the Congress, in accordance with the provisions of Article 150 of the Colombian Constitution.

Note: Currently, there is no financial cooperation agreement between the Government of Colombia and JICA. In this sense, JICA's first approach with the Colombian Government must be conducted through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in order to start or resume negotiations for an agreement of this type.

- b) The **Colombian Presidential Agency for International Cooperation (APC-Colombia)**, whose objective is to manage, guide and provide technical coordination for the non-reimbursable public, private, technical and financial cooperation resources of international nature received and granted by the Republic of Colombia. It is also in charge of executing, managing and supporting the channeling and execution of international cooperation resources, programs and projects. Credit operations that have a donation component of at least 25% of the total amount of the operation must be channeled through the Presidential Agency.
- c) The **National Planning Department (DNP)**, whose objectives are to: (i) improve institutional performance to achieve the objectives and goals defined by the National Development Plan; (ii) coordinate and align the design of plans, policies and programs to

⁵⁶ Public entities are defined by law. According to Article 20, Law 80 of 1993, state entities are: the Nation, the regions, the departments, the provinces, the Capital District and the special districts, the public establishments, the industrial and commercial companies of the state, the companies of mixed economy with a public participation of over 50%, among others. Some development banks such as Findeter are considered public although they are governed by private law.

effectively address sectoral and territorial needs; (iii) design and implement strategies that improve the quality of public investment, and (iv) strengthen the technical capacities of the sectors and territories to promote productivity, competitiveness, sustainability and equity. The DNP, through its Credit Sub Directorate and its sectoral technical areas, supports the entities in searching for financing sources, carrying out external credit operations and designing the CONPES (Economic and Social Policy Council) document that authorizes the contracting of credit operations with the nation. In addition, the DNP must verify that the indebtedness of State entities is appropriate, based on their financial situation.

- d) The **Ministry of Finance and Public Credit**, which is the entity in charge of defining, formulating and executing the country's economic policy, and its respective plans, programs and projects. It is also the State's entity in charge to prepare laws and decrees, and establish regulations on tax, customs, public credit, budget, treasury, cooperative, financial, exchange and monetary matters, without detriment to the powers conferred to the Board of Directors of the Bank of the Republic*.

The Ministry of Finance and Public Credit, together with the National Planning Department, is in charge of the negotiation, coordination and definition of the technical, fiscal and financial scope of the sovereign-guaranteed reimbursable financial cooperation (credits), as well as of the authorization and/or registry of the non-sovereign guaranteed reimbursable financial cooperation managed by other public entities.

For the management of the debt policies that are necessary to finance the expenditure plans established in the General Budget of the Nation, the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit has created a Debt Management Committee that determines the management of the Medium-Term Strategy for Public Debt.

Finally, it is important to clarify that even though national financial institutions such as Banagrario, Bancoldex, Financiera de Desarrollo Nacional and Findeter could act as borrowers with sovereign guarantee, their role is more as implementing partners

The Bank of the Republic is the highest authority in monetary, exchange and credit policy. Its functions as a credit authority include the general regulation of financial markets, the determination of reference interest rates and financial conditions for public entities to buy or sell securities in the market, the establishment of requirements for financial institutions that receive public deposits to maintain liquidity reserves, in addition to taking the necessary measures to intervene in financial markets when deemed necessary.⁵⁷

However, the Bank of the Republic does not have powers to authorize or coordinate credit operations by entities of the Colombian public sector.

and a second level financial providers in some cases than direct borrowers. Moreover, they do not have a substantial role providing services to migrants and refugees.

GENERAL INFORMATION ON POTENTIAL PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS IN COLOMBIA FOR A JICA ODA LOAN

After reviewing the wider picture regarding national entities with a role in the process of loan authorization, planning, coordination and monitoring of all the steps in the process for an Official Development Assistance operation with a loan component, it is necessary to also determine which public entities have powers to conduct foreign credit operations. These are defined as “the accords or contracts that are intended to provide a State entity with resources, goods or services within a certain term for payment or those by which the entity acts as a joint debtor or guarantor of payment obligations with individuals or entities not residing in the Colombian territory”⁵⁷.

In this regard, it must be considered that not all public entities are authorized to sign loan contracts on behalf of the nation, that is, to compel the Colombian State as the legal and political entity responsible for fulfilling certain credit obligations. Furthermore, according to the scope of this consultancy, the potential institutions eligible for an operation of this type are those that are part of the executive branch of the government, since they are the ones that formulate, coordinate and implement national policies to deal with the Venezuelan migration phenomenon.

In accordance with Article 2.2.1.2. of Decree 1068 of 2015, the public entities of the executive branch of the national government that can administer loans in the name of the nation are the ministries, administrative departments, superintendencies and special administrative units. They must fulfill the requirements indicated in the aforementioned Decree and in the Public Credit Operations Manual when credit operations are executed with specific targets for spending, as indicated in the following chapter.

In order to create a draft list of institutions likely to carry out an ODA Loan operation with JICA, broader context on the structure of the national government’s executive branch is required. A brief description of the nature of these entities is presented below.

57 Bank of the Republic. Available in: <https://www.banrep.gov.co/es/politica-crediticia>, consulted on 05/16/2020

58 Article 2.2.1.1.1, Decree 1068 of 2015.

MINISTRIES

These are entities of the executive branch of the national government, responsible for the formulation and implementation of the policies, general plans, programs and projects of the administrative sector under their direction⁵⁹. Their main functions include:

-
- ◇ Participation in formulating government policies on the issues of their competencies and advancing their implementation.

 - ◇ Creating the preliminary versions of the sectoral investment plans or programs, other public disbursements and their administrative development plans.

 - ◇ Coordinating the execution of their plans and programs with territorial entities and providing them with technical cooperation and assistance.

Currently, there are 18 ministries in Colombia, including the Ministry of Sports and the Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation, both recently created in 2019. The ministries that, together with the Presidency and Vice Presidency of the Republic and associated entities, form part of the executive branch are the following:

-
- ◇ Ministry of the Interior

 - ◇ Ministry of Foreign Affairs

 - ◇ Ministry of Finance and Public Credit

 - ◇ Ministry of Justice and Law

 - ◇ Ministry of National Defense

 - ◇ Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development

 - ◇ Ministry of Health and Social Protection

 - ◇ Ministry of Labor

-
- ◇ Ministry of Mines and Energy

 - ◇ Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism

 - ◇ Ministry of National Education

 - ◇ Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development

 - ◇ Ministry of Housing, City and Territory

 - ◇ Ministry of Information Technologies and Communications

 - ◇ Ministry of Transport

 - ◇ Ministry of Culture

 - ◇ Ministry of Sports

 - ◇ Ministry of Science, Technology and Research

As explained later, some of these ministries have been identified as potential beneficiaries of an ODA Loan program to be considered by JICA, based on the workshops and interviews carried out with the Key Stakeholders in the framework of this consultancy.

ADMINISTRATIVE DEPARTMENTS

Administrative Departments are independent entities with an exclusive technical approach and respond directly to the President. These are also national-level agencies, granted with the same level of oversight as the ministries. In practice, their directors have the same decision-making powers as the ministers, differing only in their eminently technical and non-political focus.

The administrative departments, like the ministries, have as primary objectives the formulation and adoption of the policies, general plans, programs and projects of the administrative sector under their direction. Among the Administrative Departments with the biggest technical focus are the National Planning Department (DNP) and the Administrative Department for Social Prosperity. For the purposes of the consultancy, the National Planning Department plays a strategic role, as indicated above.

SUPERINTENDENCIES

These are organizations under the executive branch that perform inspection and surveillance functions by delegation of the President of the Republic or by law. Generally, superintendencies have regulatory, authorization, advisory, coordination, surveillance, inspection, investigation and sanctionatory functions within their core sectors. Its duties differs from the Contraloría, as this has budget and fiscal surveillance capacities, meanwhile superintendencies have surveillance capacities regarding the provision of specific services o public interest.

As of 2020 there are the following superintendencies:

-
- ◇ Financial Superintendence of Colombia
Superintendencia Financiera de Colombia

 - ◇ Superintendency of the Solidary Economy
Superintendencia de Economía Solidaria

 - ◇ Superintendency of Family Subsidy
Superintendencia de Subsidio Familiar

 - ◇ National Superintendency of Health
Superintendencia Nacional de Salud

 - ◇ Superintendence of Industry and Commerce
Superintendencia de Industria y Comercio

 - ◇ Superintendency of Companies
Superintendencia de Sociedades

 - ◇ Superintendency of Surveillance and Private Security
Superintendencia de Vigilancia y Seguridad Privada

 - ◇ Superintendency of Notaries and Registration
Superintendencia de Notariado y Registro
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- ◇ Superintendence of Residential Public Services
Superintendencia de Servicios Públicos Residenciales
-
- ◇ Superintendency of Transportation
Superintendencia de Transporte
-

In some exceptional cases, and only by means of legal authorization, the superintendencies can receive jurisdictional powers to exercise functions of justice administration and to serve as judges. For example, the Superintendency of Industry and Commerce has been designated to settle disputes related to free competition law.

The surveillance and control roles of the superintendencies over certain activities like the ones in the financial, utilities, health and free market participation areas are of vital importance since, in many cases, they become the first instrument for citizens rights' defense and a guarantee for the fulfillment of the public function of the state.

When structuring foreign credit operations that require the implementation of control and surveillance mechanisms, as well as transparency and citizen oversight, the superintendencies are pivotal institutions to guarantee quality of implementation.

SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS

These are bodies without legal personality, with the administrative and financial autonomy conferred by law and responsibility for fulfilling administrative functions to develop or execute the programs of a ministry or administrative department.

There are different types of Special Administrative Units within the Colombian state structure. Some of them have functions aimed at promoting and guaranteeing the competence and quality among certain public services providers and are registered under a ministry. These are the Energy and Gas Regulation Commission (CREG), the Telecommunications Regulation Commission, and the Potable Water and Basic Sanitation Regulation Commission.

There are other Special Administrative Units with legal, administrative and financial autonomy and a coordinating or governing nature in matters of their competence, such as the Directorate of National Taxes and Customs (DIAN), Civil Aeronautics, the Colombian Presidential Agency for International Cooperation (APC-Colombia), and Migration Colombia.

POTENTIAL PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS IN COLOMBIA ELIGIBLE FOR A JICA ODA LOAN

According to a preliminary analysis and incorporating prior knowledge of the consulting team on the structure and operation of the Colombian public sector, the methodological proposal presents an initial list of the recommended strategic entities. Some of those listed have already been mentioned in the section on key entities that participate in the process of authorization, formulation, coordination and implementation of public credit operations. These entities are the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the National Planning Department, and the Colombian Presidential Agency for International Cooperation (APC-Colombia).

Based on the findings of the interviews and workshops carried out with the key stakeholder groups, it is necessary to add some ministries, national-level administrative departments and decentralized entities, given their missionary objectives and the impact of the Venezuelan migration on their programs and projects. These entities have been identified as potential beneficiaries of the operation proposed by JICA during the “pre-research” stage of this consultancy, during which many of the challenges, plans and projects to address migration from Venezuela have been specified.

Additionally, a brief description of the entities’ general objectives and responsibilities in the assistance of the migrant and returnee populations is included. It must be clarified that the analysis carried out so far will be complemented with the capabilities assessment, in accordance with the set of indicators designed for four key components (Strategic, Project-based, Financial and Economic) to be applied to each institution.

Consequently, the list below includes ten public centralized institutions in Colombia that may be eligible for an Official Development Assistance operation of the type that JICA is currently executing.

- 1. Ministry of Health and Social Protection:** Head entity in the health sector, in charge of understanding, directing, evaluating and guiding the General System for Social Security in Health through the formulation of policies, plans and programs, the intersectoral coordination and the association of health actors. Through these actions, it intends to improve the quality, opportunity, accessibility to health services, and sustainability of the public health system, increasing the levels of satisfaction of patients, families and communities.

In relation to the Venezuelan migration issue, the Ministry of Health and Social Protection has experienced severe financial pressure due to the increase of demands on healthcare by this group and the high costs of the emergency services. This, in turn,

has a negative impact on the sustainability of the public health system in receiving municipalities. Indicators that provide a better idea on the budget increase to meet the demand in years are displayed on the CONPES 3950, and can be consulted on the section “Estimation of Financing Needs for the Demand of Infrastructure Development”.

Regarding this situation, the Ministry has proposed strategies for the inclusion of the migrant population in the health system via insurance, either through contributions made by workers (regardless of their nationality) and employers to the system or by a subsidized regime whose costs are assumed by the national and regional governments. In this sense, the Ministry has made progress by implementing automatic registration of newborns to the subsidized health regime even when their parents are non-registered migrants, and by declaring the Venezuelan migrants with a Special Stay Permit eligible to be incorporated into the subsidized health regime (Decree 060 of 2020, Ministry of Health and Social Protection).

As of April 2020, the Ministry of Health and Social Protection reported a total of 216,285 Venezuelan migrants registered in the General System of Social Security in Health (SGSSS) of which 55.5% (approximately 119,000) are in the contributory regime and 45.5 % (approximately 97,285) are in the subsidized regime⁶⁰, both providing equal healthcare services.

2. **Ministry of National Education:** Its main functions are to formulate the national education policy and to establish and implement the technical qualitative criteria and parameters that contribute to improving the access, quality and equity of education. It is also responsible for administering comprehensive childcare in early development stages, covering all the educational levels and modalities.

As of 2015, the Ministry of National Education experienced a significant increase of Venezuelan students enrolling for the preschool, primary and secondary educational levels, with a population whose age ranges from 5 to 16 years old. As of 2020, the Ministry of National Education provides access to educational services to all students in these age ranges regardless of their migration status, which affects the overall capabilities of the educational system, including infrastructure. The access to education granted by the Colombian Government covers at least 330,000 Venezuelan migrants⁶¹.

3. **Ministry of Labor:** It has the objective to promote and create jobs, provide training and contribute to building a more skilled workforce at a national level and through offices at the department and municipality level. It is also responsible for the social protection of workers and the promotion of appropriate relationships between them and their employers.

60 Source: Ministry of Health and Social Protection, interview with the Sayara consulting team, May 2020.

61 Source: Ministry of Health and Social Protection, interview with the Sayara consulting team, May 2020.

Regarding the Venezuelan migration issue, the Ministry is focused on creating plans to offer formal jobs to this population, in order to leverage their capabilities in the productive sectors of each region. Similarly, it has been working on regional mobility programs with the aim of integrating the different regional employment services and strategies within different interoperational platforms that enable a quick and efficient validation of the university degrees of migrants, offering them better job placement opportunities.

- 4. Ministry of Housing, City and Territory:** The main purpose of this ministry is to create, adopt, direct, coordinate and execute public policies, plans and projects for territorial and urban development in Colombia. It also focuses on the consolidation of the city system, the establishment of patterns for efficient and sustainable land use taking into account the conditions of housing access and financing, and the provision of potable water and basic sanitation.

The massive influx of migrants to different cities in Colombia, including the territories targeted in this consultancy, has resulted in substantial increases of the provision of services such as water supply and basic sanitation. As such, the Vice Ministry of Water and Basic Sanitation has been considered as a possible beneficiary of an ODA Loan.

According to the World Bank (2018), the high demand for housing and the inability of the national government to supply it gave rise to the occupation of public spaces and the creation of informal settlements in risk areas. The occupation is the result of migrants' exposure to vulnerability conditions, particularly associated with their irregular status in the country and barriers to accessing a home.

The Ministry has formulated plans to improve the infrastructure of neighborhoods and the quality of housing. It has also designed financing instruments and focused on the provision of potable water and basic sanitation for the rural sector, where zones with the biggest impacts caused by the flow of migrants are located.

- 5. Ministry of Mines and Energy:** The entity in charge of formulating and executing policies for the sustainable use of mining and energy resources in order to contribute to the economic and social development of the country.

Considering that one of the most relevant historical problems in the border areas has been the prevalence of illicit economies, especially the smuggling of fuel from the neighboring country, the Ministry of Mines and Energy has the function of formulating strategies that prevent the increase of this issue, such as the allocation of quotas and maximum volumes of subsidized fuel to the border territories.

Regarding the provision of electricity services, despite the Ministry being aware of the increase in subsidies granted to utility companies due to the growth of the migrant population in some areas of the country, it has not yet conducted a study to measure

and understand the real impact of the migration issue on the financial and budgetary structure of the entity.⁶²

The electricity sector is quite complex. In Colombia there are several actors, from the companies that produce the energy, those in charge of transporting, and local companies that provides the services to population; including the Ministry is in charge of drafting national policies. To read more about the services providers, please refer to the section “Estimation of Financing Needs for the Demand of Infrastructure Development”.

- 6. Colombian Family Welfare Institute (ICBF):** The main function of the ICBF is to ensure the comprehensive protection of young people through early childhood, infancy and adolescence, as well as the welfare of families in Colombia, with a special focus on those whose rights have been threatened, neglected or violated.

Among the actions that the ICBF has been implementing to address the issue of migratory flow is the Migrant Childhood Strategy, which seeks to make the transition from an emergency phase to the development and inclusion stages. In this regard, the ICBF does not exclude children and young people from accessing its services based on criteria of any kind such as nationality. So far, the institute has supported around 100,000 migrant children.

The Colombian Family Welfare Institute has been making great efforts to include migrant and returnee children and adolescents in its protection programs, which has led to an increase in infrastructure needs for the Centers for Integral Development and the Substitute Homes. Notwithstanding, these types of needs have been covered under modalities that do not require the generation of income or the administration of resources by the institute.

- 7. Ministry of Foreign Affairs:** The entity that, under the direction of the President of the Republic, formulates, plans, coordinates and executes Colombia’s foreign policy. It also directs negotiations on Colombia’s international cooperation instruments, including financial cooperation programs.

As previously mentioned, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as the head institution of the foreign policy sector, is in charge of coordinating the negotiation and closure of framework agreements for financial and non-financial cooperation with governments, their agencies and multilateral organizations such as those that are part of the United Nations System.

- 8. Migration Colombia:** Part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Migration Colombia supports the formulation and implementation of Colombia’s migratory policy, exercises control and surveillance of migratory flows of both nationals and foreigners, and is in charge of the issuance of migration-related documents such as foreigner’s

identity cards, letters of safe-conduct, extensions of stay permits in the country, certificates of migratory movements, entry permits, registrations of foreigners, and more.

Migration Colombia has been in charge of the design and application of the Special Stay Permits (SSP) for Venezuelan migrants that grant them a regular immigration status for up to two years, the Entry and Permanence Permits (EPP) for those who enter with a passport for up to 90 days, and the Temporary Residence Permits that extend the initial stay period for up to 90 additional days.

- 9. Border Management Unit:** Called *Gerencia de Frontera* in Spanish, it is an agency included in the structure of the Administrative Department of the Presidency of the Republic (DAPRE). Although it is not constituted as an independent unit, it is tasked with coordinating actions to address the migratory phenomenon at both national and regional levels. Given its position as a dependency of the Presidency of the Republic, the Border Management Unit has been fundamental in the execution of national, departmental and municipal initiatives, especially in the departments of Norte de Santander, La Guajira and Arauca. Therefore, it is recommended that any migrant-focused project or program intended by JICA is approved by this agency.

Besides being essential to align the needs of the territories with the plans and programs formulated at the central, national level, the Border Management Unit has valuable information on the actions that have been implemented to face the immigration issue in different border areas under international cooperation agreements.

- 10. The Colombian Presidential Agency for International Cooperation (APC-Colombia):** Is an independent institution under de Administrative Department of the Presidency of the Republic (DAPRE). However, the Agency must work in coordination with MOFA and comply with the foreign policy guidelines. This agency has the objective to manage, guide and provide technical coordination for the non-reimbursable public, private, technical and financial cooperation resources of international nature received and granted by the Republic of Colombia. It is also in charge of managing and supporting the channeling and execution of international cooperation resources, programs and projects. In the framework of an ODA loan, besides including a donation component of at least 25% of the total amount of the operation, its implementation must be coordinated by the Presidential Agency.

Regarding the **Ministry of Finance and Public Credit** and the **National Planning Department**, it is necessary to clarify that, given their cross-sectoral and strategic role in authorizing, preparing, coordinating, implementing and monitoring public credit operations carried out by national or regional institutions, they will not be subject to technical and financial evaluation as they are ineligible for the execution of a Loan program with JICA. Although both institutions perform strategic functions, their role

is focused on verifying and validating the technical and financial needs and capacities of different sectors or territories to execute a loan program between a specific entity and a foreign government.

Nevertheless, taking into account their strategic nature, it is crucial for this consultancy to approach both entities - especially targeting the Subdirectorate of Financing with Multilateral Organizations and Governments of the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit, and the Credit Subdirectorate of the National Planning Department, since it is these agency divisions which authorize and make viable the development of any credit operation, based on the sectoral needs identified by the beneficiary/executing institution.

PROCESS IN WHICH A PUBLIC FINANCIAL INSTITUTION REQUESTS EXTERNAL ODA FINANCING IN COLOMBIA

This chapter mainly addresses the procedure that must be followed by a Colombian public entity to request financing through an external credit operation (ODA Loan). This chapter likewise provides an overall context of the Official Development Assistance (ODA) in the country, explaining the National Government's view on the matter, the instruments that have been developed, and the established priorities including assistance to the migratory phenomenon from Venezuela.

Following a brief overview of the context, the established procedures and steps for the formulation and structuring of an external credit operation with governments, development agencies, and multilateral banks will be detailed. The consultations and interviews conducted with different government entities entail that the proposed roadmap will be crucial to improve an operation of this nature. This chapter includes useful recommendations and suggestions for a JICA ODA operation with the Colombian Government.

COLOMBIA IN THE CONTEXT OF THE OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

Colombia has adopted the concept of Official Development Assistance (ODA) used by the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC), defined as the financial (donations or loans) and technical (knowledge) transfers, that meet the following criteria:

- It is provided by official agencies, including state and local governments and by public sector entities of the donor countries;
- It has the objective of promoting economic development and social welfare;
- It is provided to countries and territories included in the list of partner countries of the Development Assistance Committee or to multilateral development agencies (United Nations System, multilateral banking, etc.);
- It is concessional in character, which means that the aid is provided as a donation or, in the case of having the form of a credit operation (soft loans), it has a below-market rate of interest and it is composed of a grant element of at least 25%.⁶³

Even though financial institutions such as Banagrario, Bancoldex, Findeter, National Development Finance (Financiera de Desarrollo Nacional-FND) could act as borrowers with sovereign guarantee, their role is predominantly as implementing partner and, in some cases, a financial provider. Moreover, these institutions do not have a substantial role to support migrant populations.

Table 57.
Key Definitions ODA

KEY DEFINITIONS Related to Official Development Assistance

OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE: Transfer of resources from donor to developing countries, under favorable conditions, to promote social and economic development. The term also covers the official resources provided by the members of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

⁶³ This grant element is calculated based on a discount rate of 10% on the disbursement flows, depending on the characteristics of the credit operation. APC-Colombia, available at: <https://www.apccolombia.gov.co/ayuda-oficial-al-desarrollo>, consulted on 05/21/2020.

FINANCIAL COOPERATION: Any transfer of financial resources to support activities aimed at the development of the recipient country, that is, credits or grants, or funds resulting from the sale or donation of goods and services. The transfer is made on behalf of the donor to the beneficiary country.

NON-REFUNDABLE FINANCIAL COOPERATION: It consists of fund granting that does not have to be reimbursed by the recipient countries. The funds can be used to acquire equipment and carry out infrastructure works to address developmental challenges.

REFUNDABLE FINANCIAL COOPERATION: It seeks the human and economic development of partner countries through investments or transfers of economic resources of a reimbursable nature.

TECHNICAL COOPERATION: It is focused on the exchange of technical and managerial knowledge, in order to increase institutional and people's capacities to promote their own development.

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Colombia


In relation to international cooperation Colombia maintains a dual character, even though it is considered an upper middle income country, according to the World Bank's classification,⁶⁴ as a result of the differences and asymmetries in its economical development it continues to maintain its status as an ODA recipient, rejecting the option of becoming an emerging donor, a well-known position of the Colombian policy on cooperation. This means that Colombia, according to interviews with APC officials, despite recently formalizing its participation in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), will not assume a role as an ODA donor in the short term, and consequently, has not sought to be part of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC).

On different occasions Colombia expressed that its interest in joining the OECD was mostly focused on seeking benefits for the adoption, adaptation, and evaluation of public policies, instead of pursuing a "graduation"⁶⁵ that rules out the possibility of the country to be an ODA recipient. However, the National Government recognizes that its condition as an OECD member state may have a future impact on the flows of the Official Development Assistance. As such, Colombia maintains a character of a receiving country due to the great developmental challenges and gaps that keep large sectors of its population in poverty.

64 <https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-bank-country-and-lending-groups>

65 According to the DAC, when the Gross National Income Per Capita of a country exceeds USD 12,235 (in 2018) for three consecutive years, it will be considered a High-Income Economy and therefore it will not be longer considered as an ODA recipient. This process is known as the graduation.

Figure 17.
ODA Flows Received by Colombia in Recent Years



Source: Colombian Presidential Agency for International Cooperation (APC-Colombia) and ENCI 2019-2022.

Being a member state of the OECD is beneficial for Colombia. It enables the country to have access to the high standards and good practices developed within the said organization and adapt them to public administration processes, in a manner that results in improved governmental efficiency, transparency, and accountability. Even when the country is not part of the DAC, it may participate in different groups of this committee in order to influence the discussions on the global development agenda carried out by the main donor countries.

Colombia has always kept a position towards the demand of ODA management, for which the technical and financial flows entering the country must be aligned with the public policy priorities and the development pillars established by the country in the National Development Plans. ODA in Colombia in fact contributes to achieving these objectives without replacing the State's function in setting its own development roadmap.

Colombia similarly maintains its interest in positioning itself as one of the main providers of South-South and triangular cooperation in the Latin America and Caribbean region, and in increasing its participation in the most relevant discussions on the global development agenda, such as the Sustainable Development Goals and the fight against climate change.

Colombia's inclusion in the OECD in April 2020, along with its classification as an upper middle-income country by the World Bank, will have an impact on the ODA flows that it will receive. For this reason, Colombia has maintained an active agenda with the members of the DAC as an effort to sustain ODA flows to the country, considering the development challenges of its territory, where serious historical inequalities have existed and have been aggravating in recent years due to the largest migratory phenomenon in South America (originating from Venezuela).

COUNTRY PRIORITIES FOR ODA

In 2019, the Government of Colombia approved the new National Strategy for International Cooperation (ENCI) 2019-2022 led by both MOFA and APC along with the NPD, whose objectives are *'to address the constant changes that are occurring in the International Development Cooperation arena and provide the guidelines for collaboration between entities, capacity building and application of international cooperation regulations.'*⁶⁶ The new ENCI recognizes Colombia's dual role in international cooperation, but also adopts an approach for *inclusive and sustainable development in the framework of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which goes beyond the idea of economic growth and seeks to impact other social dimensions in order to achieve the equity related goals*⁶⁷.

The ENCI points out that Colombia's dual role as an ODA recipient and South-South cooperation (SSC) provider represents two simultaneous challenges:⁶⁸

Firstly, as an ODA recipient, Colombia seeks to align ODA operations with its national development actions and priorities. Secondly, as a SSC provider it looks for a global positioning through high technical rigor by identifying, exchanging, and making visible its experiences of success as a so-called Global South country.

To comply with this double task, the ENCI relies on a conceptual framework focused on (i) the 2030 Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), (ii) the bases and guidelines of the "Pact for Colombia, Pact for Equity" National Development Plan (PND) 2018-2022, and (iii) the Colombian foreign policy guidelines on International Cooperation.⁶⁹ In accordance with this conceptual framework, the ENCI defined five priority areas for receiving an ODA:

Territorial Stabilization: Part of the Peace Building Pact, included in the National Development Plan. In this aspect, the following actions have been established:⁷⁰

- Strengthening of the process for political, social, economic, and productive reintegration of ex-combatants.
- Substitution of illicit crops, which includes economic support, capacity building, and establishment of alliances with the private sector to support local productive projects.

66 National Strategy for International Cooperation (ENCI) 2019-2022 - Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Colombian Presidential Agency for International Cooperation (APC-Colombia), National Planning Department (DNP). PDF version.

67 Idem.

68 National Strategy for International Cooperation (ENCI) 2019-2022, PDF version, page 12.

69 Idem

70 Idem, page 39, PDF version.

- Territorially Focused Development Programs (PDET) and implementation of infrastructure works that promote rural development, productive inclusion, and the adequate provision of public goods and services.
- Multipurpose cadastre that includes, among others, the implementation of a national cadastral system.

RURAL DEVELOPMENT: EIGHT STRATEGIC POINTS WERE FORMULATED BY THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT:⁷¹

Rural and social planning that enables the inclusion of women in land formalization processes and the consolidation of the Rural Property Social Planning programs.

- Productive field planning, with the main purpose to encourage the efficient use of rural land and promote climate efficient agriculture models.
- Health diplomacy to develop a health admissibility plan and promote the adoption of good agricultural practices.
- Improve equipment of public goods in the agricultural sector that can increase the coverage and quality of connectivity and commercialization in rural areas and strengthen the land adaptation public service.
- Improvement of financing schemes and risk management of agricultural activities.
- Improvement of non-sectoral rural activities, that is, offering skilled labor and promoting industrial and commercial activities in rural areas.
- Institutional sectoral reform for the creation of a system of Projects of National Strategic Interest (PINE) in the agricultural area and the implementation of a national system for agricultural information.
- Improvement of financing and risk management schemes for agricultural activities.

71 Idem, pages 39 and 40.

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION AND SUSTAINABILITY

This is linked to the country's sustainability commitment and fight against climate change, in the framework of the Paris Agreement. It includes ten key elements:⁷²

- Actions for the restructuring and development of sustainable productive processes in the agricultural, transport, energy, industry, and housing sectors.
- Measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 2030, in compliance with the Paris Agreement.
- The National Circular Economy Strategy to increase waste recycling, water reuse, and energy efficiency.
- Creation of the National Council Against Environmental Crime and adoption of protocols for immediate and coordinated action between State entities.
- Implementation of the National Ecosystem Restoration Strategy, including Payment for Environmental Services and other conservation incentives.
- Conduction of studies on natural risks by technical-scientific entities for further considerations in municipal land use planning.
- Implementation of climate change adaptation initiatives to reduce the effects of droughts and floods in different sectors and territories.
- Provision of guidelines to improve the effectiveness of environmental licensing, the standardization of procedures, and other instruments for environmental control.
- Strengthening of the Regional Environmental Authorities to optimize environmental management, surveillance and control, as well as the provision of services to citizens.
- Formulate a pact for the preservation of the Amazon to promote the valuation of the forests and biodiversity found in this region, and more importantly to prevent deforestation and forest degradation.

72 Idem, pages 40 and 41.

ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND ORANGE ECONOMY

The current National Development Plan has a focus on promoting entrepreneurship and creativity with an emphasis on the so-called orange economy (under which the cultural and creative industries are considered sources of development and equity). In this context, the need to support the following activities is stated:

- Promote the generation of effective information for the benefit of the Orange Economic development.
- Strengthen the institutional environment for the development and consolidation of the orange economy and public-private coordination.
- Reinforce the importance of accessing the State's offer for the development of creative industries.
- Promote the "creativity" agendas in municipalities, cities and regions, as well as the development of Orange Development Areas.
- Promote the integration of the orange economy to international markets and other productive sectors.
- Create enabling conditions for the inclusion of human capital in the orange economy.
- Promote intellectual property in support of creative inspiration.

MIGRATORY PHENOMENON

Regarding the issue of the migration influx from its neighbor Venezuela, the ENCI focuses on five priority areas of intervention, which are aligned with the provisions of the document CONPES 3950 "Strategy for the Assistance to Migration from Venezuela." These have also been analyzed in other parts of this study. The defined intervention areas are as follows:⁷³

73 Idem, pages 42 and 43.

1. Health care

- Procurement of services for the migrant population included in the public health network.
- Access to health care services, child development centers, vaccination programs, care for complex diseases, and high-cost treatments for diseases, such as cancer, kidney conditions and diabetes.
- Expansion and improvement of hospitals and public health infrastructure.
- Provision of technological equipment and first-level health personnel to assess health status and carry out screenings.

2. Education

- Coverage management: provision of temporary classrooms in educational institutions, improvements and expansion of infrastructure, construction of new classrooms and toilet units.
- Permanence management: provision of transportation service, registration of students in the School Food Program, supply of clothing/uniforms and cleaning kits, in order to reduce the risk of school drop out.
- Welfare management: provision of psychosocial care by specialized teams for receiving communities, migrants and returnees, in addition to the educational professionals.
- School leveling: establishment of Comprehensive Assistance Routes, with complementary school hours and supporting teams for academic reinforcement.

3. Protection of vulnerable groups

3.1. Aid to children and adolescents

- Identification of migrant children and adolescents and their families through channels of the Colombian Family Welfare Institute (ICBF) and formulation of information systems for monitoring the services provided.
- Mobile units and protection teams, with flexible modalities to assess childrens' conditions and expectant mothers (unaccompanied, malnourished, unborn).
- Provision of care and shelter services for mothers and children.

3.2. Women

- Prevention and care for women who are victims of gender violence.
- Access to social programs and family reunification.
- Job opportunities including women's role as caregivers.

3.3. People in irregular settlements, homeless or rough sleepers

- Housing, drinking water and basic sanitation solutions

3.4. Itinerant people

- Transportation, food assistance and transit shelters

3.5. Indigenous population

- Classification and ethnic migratory emergency care plan in border departments.

4. Economic integration

- Expansion of regularization mechanisms.
- Strengthening of the classification mechanisms.
- Preparation of job offers.
- Strengthening of labor intermediation.
- Support for entrepreneurship.
- Facilitation of financial inclusion.

5. Information and Communications Technology

- Strengthening of ICT systems to register and classify the migrant population and cross check their conditions of entry and permanence in the country.

- Technologies and applications to improve migration governance and inter-institutional coordination at the local and regional levels.
- Tools to coordinate the provision of humanitarian care by governmental and non-governmental actors at both the national and international levels.

The migratory phenomenon is definitely one of the main priorities for Colombia's governmental cooperation agenda. This is evident by its entities expressing this on several international occasions and when requesting its partners to increase aid flows to face the challenges that this migratory situation poses on its public finances. For example, in 2019 the country managed to mobilize USD 272,857,575 from international cooperation resources for this migration issue (see Table 58). However, this amount is insufficient considering the current challenges and the previous calculations made by the Border Management Unit of the Presidency of the Republic, according to which the cost assumed by the State in this matter exceeds USD 1 billion.

Table 58.
Cooperation Resources Mobilized for Migrations in 2019 (USD)

CONTRIBUTION SOURCE	Total
United States	\$195,319,054
Canada	\$25,670,967
European Union	15,697,101
United Kingdom	\$10,520,000
Germany	\$7,992,740
Sweden	\$3,550,016
Norway	\$ 3,480,000
Netherlands	5 3,354,875
Spain	\$1,881,639
Japan	\$1,800,000
New Zealand	\$1,195,887
United Nations	\$1,172,143
Switzerland	\$599,327
South Korea	\$500,000
European Investment Bank	\$71,384
France	\$42,442
Total	\$272,857,575

Source: APC-Colombia's elaboration based on management plans for 2019

MODALITIES FOR THE STRUCTURING OF OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT AID PROGRAMS (ODA)

Regarding ODA, Colombia has elaborated a mixed strategy when agreeing on cooperation programs with donors, which has resulted in negotiations that largely depend on the policies of the donor country or the specific cooperation agency. Thus, there are cooperation programs that have required complex negotiations, involving working groups to align country strategies with the modalities, lines, and general objectives of the cooperation. These country strategies, in turn, respond to the general commitments agreed and the guidelines provided in the framework cooperation agreements that have been signed with the relevant countries or organizations.

Cooperation programs with countries are generally agreed for periods of four years and the negotiation processes are led by the Colombian Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the support of the Colombian Presidential Agency for International Cooperation (APC-Colombia). Examples of this type of negotiations include those carried out with Germany, Spain, the United States of America as well as with the United Nations System.⁷⁴

There is another group of countries with whom political consultation agreements (including cooperation topics) are currently in place. Under these agreements, Colombia's priorities and needs are presented according to the interests and strengths of the donors or, in some occasions, the donors are the ones who present their cooperation lines and priorities to be commented by Colombian institutions. There is no specific guideline or procedure by which Colombia adopts international cooperation programs with its main donors. The country, nonetheless, resorts to the signing of these cooperation agreements as a way of formalizing and structuring relations on this matter.

Overall, there are different modalities for the cooperation agreements. Some of them are limited to technical or financial cooperation, while others combine both modalities. There are additional cooperation agreements for specific sectors, such as for science and technology, culture and sports, among others.

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AGREEMENTS OR CONVENTIONS

There are different types of international cooperation agreements (or conventions). Therefore, it is worth distinguishing between those that are signed on behalf of the Republic of Colombia and have the character of international treaties, and those that have a specific or simplified nature, which are usually execution agreements regulated by the international law traditionally accepted by Colombia and whose scope is based on a treaty already in place.⁷⁵

74 In 2019, Colombia signed the United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (UNSDDCF) for the next four years, replacing the United Nations Development Framework (UNDAF).

75 Judicial Decree 288/10 of the Constitutional Court. Available at <https://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/autos/2010/A288-10.htm>, consulted on 06/02/2020

With regards to the former, that is, those that have the character of international treaties, there is an entire constitutional regulation for their negotiation and approval, consisting of the following stages:

1. Negotiation by the President of the Republic as the highest authority for international relations. The President of the Republic may authorize the Minister of Foreign Affairs or a plenipotentiary delegate to carry out the negotiation (Article 189 No. 2 C.P.).
2. Approval by the Congress of the Republic (Article 150 No. 16 C.P.).
3. Review by the Constitutional Court prior to the ratification or expression of consent by the President of the Republic.
4. Ratification or expression of consent as established in the treaty Ministry of Foreign Affairs (whether by using a deposit of the international instrument or an exchange of diplomatic notes).
5. Enactment of the treaty as a Law of the Republic of Colombia in the Official Gazette.

While the latter, the simplified agreements, do not require the procedures and requirements applicable to international treaties as the Constitutional Court has stated in different pronouncements⁷⁶ that these agreements do not enforce new obligations, but rather seek to develop or comply with the substantive clauses of an already existing treaty.⁷⁷

In Colombia, cooperation relationships with states or organizations created under international law are governed by framework agreements that *establish the general criteria according to which specific cooperation projects or programs must be proposed, agreed and executed*.⁷⁸ These framework agreements are adopted as international treaties and therefore must follow the five stages described above. In summary, they must be approved by the Law of the Republic of Colombia and be subject to constitutional surveillance prior to their entry into force under international law.

The above means that in the absence of a framework agreement⁷⁹ for technical and/or financial cooperation, approval becomes a *sine qua non* for progress in structuring any cooperation program. A different case occurs when there is a framework cooperation agreement or convention from which specific cooperation agreements can be derived to develop specific projects and activities. In this case, obligations that are not stated in the framework document cannot be enforced in the specific agreements. The above has been

⁷⁶ Sentence 363 de 2000, Residing Judge Álvaro Tafur Galvis; Sentence C-1439 de 2000, Residing Judge María Victoria Sáchica; Sentence C-239 de 2006, Residing Judge Jaime Córdoba Triviño; and Sentence C-378 of 2009, Residing Judge Humberto Antonio Sierra Porto, among others.

⁷⁷ Sentence C-363 del 2000, Residing Judge Álvaro Tafur Galvis, available at <https://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2000/C-363-00.htm>, consulted on 06/02/2020.

⁷⁸ Sentence C- 378 de 2009, Residing Judge Humberto Sierra Porto, available at <https://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2009/C-378-09.htm>, consulted on 06/02/2020.

⁷⁹ The framework has undetermined end date and provide general conditions to determine the scope of the cooperation agreement

pointed out by the Constitutional Court when states that “[these] do not represent the acquisition of new obligations for the party States other than those contracted as a result of the ratification of the international cooperation treaty, and therefore they do not require approval or automatic control by the Congress of the Republic⁸⁰.

FINANCIAL COOPERATION WITH JAPAN

The governments of Colombia and Japan have traditionally structured their cooperation relationships through simplified agreements, that is by means of agreements that according to the Constitution of Colombia do not have the solemn character of international treaties, but are subject to international law. As such, these agreements are binding for all the parties and are generally approved through mechanisms admitted by the Vienna Convention. This mechanism has been used on several occasions to implement different programs both under technical cooperation and non-reimbursable resources (grants) schemes, whereby the Government of Japan was the donor and the Government of Colombia was the recipient country.

The interviews and consultations with different entities of the Colombian Government, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the National Planning Department (DNP), and the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit, showed that for the purposes of carrying out a loan agreement between the Colombia Government and JICA, the establishment of a financial cooperation agreement will be necessary as a first step (under the conditions and steps mentioned in the section International Cooperation Agreements or Conventions).

Recommendation

According to the information collected with different government institutions for the preparation of this report, the first step for structuring a credit operation (ODA Loan) between JICA and the Government of Colombia is to define a roadmap that enables the adoption of a financial cooperation agreement. It should be borne in mind that an agreement of this type requires a solemn procedure that includes the approval of a law by the Congress of the Republic and a prior review by the Colombian Constitutional Court. Both procedures would require a period of at least one year.

PROCEDURE TO REQUEST AN EXTERNAL CREDIT OPERATION WITH A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT

As indicated in the “General Framework for and ODA Loan in Colombia” chapter, there are certain institutions of the central government that play a key role in the structuring of an

80 Idem.

ODA, such as the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit, the National Planning Department, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Colombian Presidential Agency for International Cooperation (APC-Colombia). Regarding the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, its role is limited to only leading and coordinating the negotiation of financial cooperation agreements and presenting the bills to the Congress of the Republic on behalf of the National Government for their approval.

The Colombian Presidential Agency for International Cooperation, acts as the prime coordinating agent, thus technically guiding the cooperation lines and projects, and monitoring their execution. In some cases, it has the function to receive and administer international cooperation resources or facilitate its incorporation into the budgets of other public entities. Nonetheless, the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit and the National Planning Department are the entities that have the greatest relevance in the procedure for the authorization of an external credit operation.

According to the DNP's Public Credit Operations Manual, external credit operations can be classified into:⁸¹

- **Specific-destination or investment credits:** Credit resources received by centralized public entities in order to partially or totally finance a specific investment project or program. All centralized state entities can access external specific-destination credits without requiring a government guarantee.
- **Free-destination or program credits:** Credits from the National Treasury that allow a free and autonomous allocation of the resources and are not associated with a particular project but with a global financing program. "This type of financing provides rapid disbursement assistance to countries that require external financing. The resources are disbursed against the development of structural reforms in a particular sector or throughout the economy." (CONPES 3334 of 2005).
- **External credit with a government guarantee:** It can be accessed by decentralized national entities and their associates (such as ICBF), as well as regional entities (e.g. Municipal or Departmental Health or Education Secretariats) and their corresponding decentralized bodies. It has the objective to finance specific investment projects based on the development priorities of the requestor entity, and the bilateral and multilateral grantors are the ones deciding whether requestors require the guarantee.

81 National Planning Department. (2017). Public Credit Operations Manual. Consulted on June 3, 2020, from <https://colaboracion.dnp.gov.co/CDT/DNP/CE-M02%20Manual%20de%20Operaciones%20de%20Cr%C3%A9dito%20P%C3%BAblico.Pu.pdf?>

The main stages of the procedure to request an ODA Loan with the Colombian Government are referenced below, noting that they are addressed to specific-destination operations as well as free investment credits.

ODA LOAN FOR SPECIFIC DESTINATION OR INVESTMENT

The formal procedure for structuring a specific-destination credit operation with a foreign government or agency begins via an official request from the national entity to the Directorate of Investments and Public Finance (DIFP) of the DNP. The actual request is in fact the result of a comprehensive relationship process carried out previously between the entity and the source of cooperation - which can be the National Government, a development agency or a multilateral bank.

This means that when an entity formally issues the request to the DIFP, it must have previously approached the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit, the DNP and the corresponding agency, government or international institution. Within the cooperation framework, there must also be a program for institutional strengthening with those previously identified as implementors of projects that will be financed through external resources. Every program must be articulated with both, the NDP and the ENCI.

National Public Investment Systems (SNIP) In Colombia

In Colombia there is a system for planning and approving investment projects, although it is properly called the National Public Investment System SNIP as in other countries. In Colombia, this system is based on the incorporation of projects in the investment project bank BPIN, administered by the DNP. Every project that is financed by national budget resources must be registered with the said bank, respond to the strategic planning and budget schemes of national entities and meet the project approval requirements (MGA formulation-with approval from the sector). This applies to all projects for financing PGN resources, which also covers projects financed with credits or ODA resources.

The planning exercise in Colombia is defined in the political constitution, under:

- Articles 151 and 342 Territorial Organic Law of the Development Plan and Budget
- Article 339 National Development Plan and Development Plans of Territorial Entities
- Article 340 Planning Councils
- Article 343 and 344 Management and results evaluation systems

The institutional relationships for planning are as follows:

Governing Bodies

- Ministry of Finance and Public Credit
- National Planning Department

Executing agencies

- Ministries and Public Establishments
- Judicial Branch, Control Bodies
- Mixed economy companies and companies

Approval Bodies

- CONPES
- Superior council of fiscal policy
- Congress of the Republic

The donor and the public institution tend to carry out technical cooperation work in the lines or projects that will be covered by the external credit operation, so that when requesting the inclusion of the operation in the programming of the external source, there is sufficient clarity on the basic aspects of the intended ODA Loan.

1. Formal request from the public entity interested in contracting an ODA Loan and feasibility concept by DNP:

This request not only has a formal purpose, but it must contain enough information to facilitate the evaluation of the technical and budgetary relevance of the operation. For this reason, the request must contain at least:

- The background and justification of the project or program to be financed.
- The objectives, scope and impacts of the project.
- The reason why an external operation is intended, indicating that it is a source substitution operation and not an increase in the debt ceiling of the public entity.
- The project financing plan indicating the counterpart.
- The evaluation of alternative sources of financing.

It is useful to clarify that for the Colombian authorities, namely the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit and the National Planning Department (DNP), to consider a specific-destination credit operation feasible, the public institution must have the available budget.⁸² A credit operation at no time represents an increase in the budget previously assigned to the public entity, but implies the substitution of an internal financial source by an external one. This is a fixed requirement for the issuance of the feasibility concept of the operation by the DNP's Credit Subdirectorate.

Recommendation

Prior strengthening of technical cooperation processes through initiatives, projects or activities aimed at assisting vulnerable populations, including migrants, is an important step for JICA, since it will gradually consolidate a relationship that would lead to the future structuring of an ODA Loan credit operation.

Colombian public institutions recognize the challenges and pressures that the assistance to the migrant population exerts in their budgets, and many of them even have limitations to propose actions and projects exclusively aimed at this population. Therefore, the implementation of actions that target vulnerable populations in areas with high concentrations of migrants is suggested.

2. Inclusion in the external source programming

Although this step is mostly applied to operations with multilateral banks, it is important to note that the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit and the DNP must agree with the sources of the credit resources on the operations to be carried out every fiscal period. In this sense, if the operation has received a feasibility concept, the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit and the DNP inform the source that the operation has been included in the loan portfolio of the corresponding period.

3. Technical preparation of the operation

The preparation of any operation requires the consideration of multiple technical and financial factors, as well as the evaluation of risks, and the definition of impacts, goals and indicators, among other cross-cutting aspects. Each donor establishes

⁸² The room is designated in accordance with the projections of the Medium-Term Fiscal Framework and the entity's Medium-Term Expenditure Framework.

the requirements that must be met for the operations to take place in addition to the means that must be available for the elaboration of the project document.

According to Colombia's experience in the preparation of this type of operations with multilateral entities such as the World Bank (WB), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the Development Bank of Latin America (CAF), as well as with banks or state development agencies such as the French Development Agency (AFD) and the Credit Institute for Reconstruction (KFW), it takes between six months to a year to structure all the details for such an operation.

In the case of JICA, the situation should follow a similar line, it is necessary to support and agree with the Colombian Government authorities on aspects such as:

- The objective
- The program components
- The expected products and results
- The duration
- The implementation structure
- The necessary collaboration schemes
- Social and environmental considerations
- Cross-cutting aspects such as climate change and gender
- Risk factors
- Monitoring and evaluation schemes

Thereby, the process to carry out an external credit operation requires the use of different types of tools such as identification, preparation and analysis-focused technical missions to collect the necessary information for the elaboration of the document of the National Council for Economic and Social Policy (CONPES).

4. CONPES on Public Credit

The CONPES is *the highest national planning authority and acts as an advisory body to the Government in all aspects related to the economic and social development of the country*⁸³.

CONPES acts under the direction of the President of the Republic and has permanent

83 National Council for Economic and Social Policy, consulted on 06/06/2020. Available at <https://www.dnp.gov.co/conpes/paginas/conpes.aspx>

members with the right to voice and vote, the Vice President of the Republic, all Ministries, the Director of the Administrative Department of the Presidency of the Republic, the Director of the DNP. Based on the project documents, the CONPES analyzes the program background, justification, and description, in addition to issuing a favorable concept for contracting the external loan and formulates the relevant recommendations. The CONPES document is prepared by the public institution that will execute the external credit program together with the DNP. It must contain the following information:

- Background of the operation
- Technical, economic and social justification
- Evaluation of financing alternatives
- Description of the program or project (general and specific objectives, components, costs, disbursement schedule, execution scheme and monitoring indicators)
- Recommendations
- Monitoring

5. Inter-Parliamentary Public Credit Commission⁸⁴

The Public Procurement Law of Colombia states that *the operations of external public credit carried out and guaranteed by the National Government with a term of more than one year, will require the prior approval of the Inter-Parliamentary Public Credit Commission* (Law 80 of 1993 on Public Contracting, Paragraph 2, Article 41). The public entity executing the program that has been financed with external credit must present the document (CONPES) to this dependency of the Congress of the Republic in order to receive its prior concept.

It should be noted that during the procedure for the operation approval, two submissions must be made before this Commission: the first once the CONPES document is authorized, and the second only when the credit negotiation process finishes. In summary, the Inter-Parliamentary Public Credit Commission intervenes to provide its concept prior to the negotiation of the operation and then to formalize the final concept.

In theory the approval time frame is a legislative period (from six month to one year).

⁸⁴ This commission is made up of three (3) members of the Third Constitutional Commission of the Senate and three (3) members of the Third Constitutional Commission of House of Representatives.

6. Negotiation and signing of the credit agreement

Once all the procedures have been completed, the contract is negotiated by the executing public entity, the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit, the DNP and the credit granting agency or country. When the negotiation is completed, the contract is signed by the Minister of Finance, the minister or director of the Colombian Government's executing entity, and the representative of the agency, bank or borrowing entity.

LOANS THAT ARE NOT DESTINED TO A SPECIFIC PROJECT OR OPERATION

The procedure established for the approval of budget-support-type loans/policy-based loans shares some common elements with the specific investment/project loans. However, the former are operations with faster approval and disbursement processes, as they are not associated with a particular project but with the financing of a global government program.

Budget-support-type loans/policy-based loans are the bulk of the external debt of the Central National Government. For 2019, about 82% of the debt portfolio with multilateral organizations and governments corresponded to this type of operations.⁸⁵

The main sources of these loans have traditionally been the multilateral banks, the World Bank⁸⁶, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the Development Bank of Latin America (CAF). However, in the last 15 years there has been an increase in financing by banks and government development agencies such as the French Development Agency (AFD), the Credit Institute for Reconstruction (KfW) and to a lesser extent by the Agency for Spanish Cooperation (AECID) and others that together add up to 8% of the Colombian external debt.⁸⁷ A policy of sources diversification, established by the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit, has resulted in a greater participation of different sources in the Colombian public debt. The main stages of the procedure for the application and approval of free destination credit operations are detailed below:

DEFINITION OF THE GLOBAL FINANCING QUOTA

The Ministry of Finance and Public Credit, in accordance with the general expenditure policy, uses tools such as the National Government's Financial Plan and the Medium Term Expenditure Framework. The former is defined as:

The Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MGMP) is the public instrument of financial programming that enables the coordination of policy design, medium term

⁸⁵ Report on Contracted External Credits 2015-2019, Ministry of Finance and Public Credit, General Directorate of Public Credit and Treasury, March 2020, consulted on 06/04/2020 available at: http://www.irc.gov.co/webcenter/ShowProperty?nodeId=%2FConexionContent%2FWCC_CLUSTER-125591%2F%2FidcPrimaryFile&revision=latestreleased.

⁸⁶ World Bank loans are contracted through the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD).

⁸⁷ Source: Interview with the Subdirector for Financing with Multilateral Organizations and Governments, and the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit, May 2020.

*macroeconomic and fiscal planning, and annual budget programming.*⁸⁸

This instrument contains the budget ceilings for the operation and investment items in every sector of the National Government. This reference framework is one of the essential conditions for the approval of a credit operation aligned with the budgetary limits and the so-called Fiscal Rule imposed by the Colombian public policy.

APPROVAL OF THE GLOBAL CONPES DOCUMENT

The specific destination operations require a comprehensive, financial and technical structuring process before preparing the CONPES document. However, the free destination operations, due to their nature, only demand the elaboration of a document that includes the global debt programming, according to the decision of the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit, which is sustained in the general expenditure framework and instruments.

INTER-PARLIAMENTARY PUBLIC CREDIT COMMISSION

On a similar note, the involvement of the Congress of the Republic through the Inter-Parliamentary Public Credit Commission is required for this type of credit operations as this entity is responsible for issuing the favorable concept for the management of these rapid disbursement credits. After the approval of the Global CONPES document and the issuance of the favorable concept by the Inter-Parliamentary Public Credit Commission, the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit proceeds to issue a resolution to authorize the operations' negotiation process.⁸⁹

PREPARATION

The preparation stage includes the joint development of the policy actions (policy matrix) that are aimed at being supported or impacted with the credit operations. As with the specific destination operations, the preparation stage generally requires the borrowing institutions to carry out technical and financial missions in order for them to meet all requirements regarding program evaluation, goals and expected results setting, as well as an operational risk assessment.

It is important to take into account that despite their free destination nature, these operations entail actions aimed at strengthening and reforming public policies. This is to achieve better development results in areas such as poverty reduction, infrastructure, improvement of health indicators, and social inclusion.

88 Medium Term Expenditure Framework 2020-2023, Document CONPES 3965, National Planning Department (DNP), Ministry of Finance and Public Credit, 2019.

89 A resolution is a legal mechanism by which a public institution informs a decision. It has a lower hierarchy than an executive decree, but it is binding for the particular matter on which it decides.

NEGOTIATION AND SECOND SUBMISSION TO THE INTER-PARLIAMENTARY PUBLIC CREDIT COMMISSION

Once the preparation stage has been verified and the policy matrix and the objectives and indicators of the operation are clear, the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit and the DNP prepare the document containing the policy actions that will contribute to reach the objectives of the sectoral or multi-sectoral reform, in addition to all the project components. From this document, the credit operation is negotiated and the same is re-submitted to the Inter-Parliamentary Public Credit Commission of the Congress of the Republic for its acceptance prior to the credit contracting.

SIGNING

Once the favorable concept of the Inter-Parliamentary Public Credit Commission is issued, the external credit contract is signed by the representative of the borrowing entity and the government representatives (the Minister of Finance and the Director of the DNP).

EXTERNAL CREDIT WITH A GOVERNMENT GUARANTEE

In accordance with Decree 1068 of 2015, which regulates all matters related to the treasury and public credit sector, decentralized entities at the national level and their associates, and regional entities and their corresponding decentralized bodies can access credit operations with a government guarantee by meeting the following requirements:

- Favorable concept (approval) issued by the National Council for Economic and Social Policy (CONPES) regarding the granting of the government guarantee and the loan or payment obligation, as appropriate;
- Concept (approval) by the Inter-Parliamentary Public Credit Commission regarding the granting of the government guarantee, in case it exceeds a period of one year.

The following sections will indicate brief descriptions of the main stages for the approval of an operation that requires a government guarantee:

DEBT REQUEST AND FEASIBILITY CONCEPT

The decentralized and regional entities interested in contracting an external credit operation must submit a request to the DNP so that the proposed operation is included in the loan portfolio of the National Government and the chosen borrower.

As in the previous cases, the DNP must analyze the technical, fiscal and debt

capacity of the respective decentralized or regional entity, in accordance with the public debt policies set out by the National Government and the priorities established in the current National Development Plan. Provided that the DNP analyzes the relevance of the project against sectoral or regional priorities, the initiative requires the alignment with public policies and the goals established in national and regional plans so that it can receive a favorable feasibility concept. After meeting all requirements, the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit and the DNP include the operation in the portfolio of the borrowing source.

For credits granted to regional decentralized entities with a term longer than one (1) year, an assessment of their payment capacity is required, including a legal, financial and administrative risk analysis of the respective entity. The assessment must be performed by a credit rating agency duly authorized by the Financial Superintendence of Colombia.⁹⁰

The process for the payment capacity rating before a debt operation, which must be carried out by an independent third party, is composed by an analysis of institutional capacity. Important aspects in order to submit a concept, include the following:

PREPARATION

In accordance with the procedures established by the source (whether it is a multilateral bank or a government development agency), the result of this stage is a project document that contains all relevant elements for the implementation of the operation. This project document presents the objectives, policy indicators and expected results, and analyzes the cross-cutting factors that may affect the operation, such as social and environmental risks, along with their respective mitigation plans. The project document essentially serves as the basis for the approval of the CONPES document.

APPROVAL AND PUBLICATION OF THE CONPES DOCUMENT

The CONPES document must include an analysis of the financial situation of the executing entity when the credit operations are requested by decentralized or regional entities that require a government guarantee.

APPROVAL OF THE INTER-PARLIAMENTARY PUBLIC CREDIT COMMISSION

Once the CONPES document is approved and published, the operation is presented to the Inter-Parliamentary Public Credit Commission. With its favorable concept, the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit issues the resolution authorizing the negotiation of the loan.

90 Organic Decree of the Finance Sector 1068 of 2015, Article 2.2.2.2.3. Consulted on 06/04/2020, available at: <https://www.funcionpublica.gov.co/eva/gestornormativo/norma.php?i=72893>

NEGOTIATION AND SIGNING

A draft of the contract is prepared and submitted for the review of the National Government and the borrowing entity. Continuing with the process, a negotiation act is formulated and the contract is signed by the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit, the DNP, and the borrowing entity.

OVERVIEW OF COLOMBIAN EXTERNAL CREDIT

The Colombian Government has two main instruments to ensure the fiscal sustainability of its finances, including the adequate management of its levels of external indebtedness. These instruments are the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MGMP) and the Fiscal Rule.

The MGMP is the expenditure projection and re-prioritization that enables that annual budget decisions are driven by policy priorities and regulated by medium-term resource limits⁹¹. In short, the MGMP, based on macroeconomic and sectoral assumptions, facilitates budgetary planning for the government and its institutions for a period of three years.

On a similar note, the Fiscal Rule, a policy instrument created in 2011 (by Law 1473), seeks to maintain the balance between the budget income and expenses, keeping them both within a minimum margin as a percentage of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). It is the rule that defines the acceptable fiscal deficit of the National Government, ensuring an adequate macroeconomic and public financial management according to the different economic cycles. The National Government adopts its Fiscal Rule following the recommendations of an Advisory Committee made up of renowned professionals from the academic sector, researchers and members of the Congress of the Republic.

However, Law 1473 of 2011 established that the National Government will follow an annual decreasing path of the deficit in its structural fiscal balance that allows it to reach a GDP's structural deficit of 2.3% or less in 2014, 1.9% or less in 2018, and 1.0% or less in 2022⁹².

Overall, the Fiscal Rule and the MGMP are similar in the sense that both tend towards an adequate level of the fiscal deficit and the efficient management of public finances. Despite the conservative management of Colombian main macroeconomic indicators and the ongoing goal of reducing the fiscal deficit to 1.0% of the GDP by 2022, the economic authorities have recognized the existence of external variables that significantly affect compliance with the commitments established regarding public expenditure.

Therefore, in 2019, after receiving the recommendations of the OECD and the Fiscal Rule Advisory Committee, the National Government decided to modify the Fiscal Rule limits due to the pressures caused by the migration from Venezuela.⁹³ Consequently, an increase in the

91 Ministry of Finance and Public Credit, Medium Term Expenditure Frameworks, consulted on 06/06/2020, available at: http://www.urf.gov.co/webcenter/portal/EntOrdenNacional/pages_presupuestogralnacion/marcosdegastodemedianoplazo

92 Law 1473 of 2011 by "which establishes the Fiscal Rule and other provisions" Transitory Paragraph, Article.

93 Relajan regla fiscal para atender necesidades de la migración venezolana. 03/29/2019. El Espectador.

percentage of fiscal deficit was allowed, rising from 2.2% to 2.7% of the GDP in 2019 and from 1.9% to 2.3% in 2020⁹⁴. The justification for this modification was based on the calculations of the costs that the assistance to the migrant and returnee population would represent for the State, which at the time was established at around 5 trillion pesos per year, equivalent to 0.5% of the GDP. This measure was taken despite the country continuing to insist that, in the long term, migration will have a positive effect on Colombia's economic growth.

In addition, the current situation derived from the pandemic COVID-19 (SARS-Cov-2), made it necessary to modify the Fiscal Rule, initially to 6.1% of the GDP in 2020⁹⁵. However, in June 2020, at the request of the National Government, the Advisory Committee recommended the suspension of the Fiscal Rule during 2020 and 2021.⁹⁶ This authorizes the National Government to unlimitedly increase public expenditure and debt as an emergency measure to face the negative effects that the pandemic currently has, and will continue to have, on the economy.

It is possible to expect the increase of the external indebtedness levels of the National Government in the short and medium terms, a situation that has been evidenced with the authorization of credit disbursements by the World Bank worth USD 250 million⁹⁷ and by the IDB worth USD 1.15 billion⁹⁸ to invest in development policies to face the negative effects of the pandemic.

INDEBTEDNESS TO FACE THE VENEZUELAN MIGRATION PHENOMENON

Despite the "favorable" panorama for the contracting of loans with multilateral banks and foreign governments that is foreseen in the short and medium terms as a result of the flexibilization of the percentages allowed for fiscal deficit, the consulting team, based on the interviews conducted with key government actors (including the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit), has concluded that *currently, the National Government is not interested in financing the response to the migration phenomenon through the contracting of external credit operations with governments.*

This means that although the impact of migrants assistance in key sectors such as health, education, water and basic sanitation is recognized (with costs that amount to around USD 1.1 billion⁹⁹), priority has been given to obtaining non-reimbursable international cooperation

Consulted on 06/06/2020, available at: <https://www.elespectador.com/economia/relajan-regla-fiscal-para-atender-necesidades-de-la-migracion-venezolana-articulo-847586>

94 Idem.

95 Colombia podrá tener un déficit fiscal de 6,1 % en 2020 por coronavirus. 05/04/2020. Forbes. Consulted on 06/07/2020, available at: <https://forbes.co/2020/05/04/economia-y-finanzas/colombia-podra-tener-un-deficit-fiscal-de-61-en-2020-por-coronavirus/>

96 Sin regla fiscal, Gobierno tiene vía libre para gastar por coronavirus. 06/16/2020. Revista Dinero. Consulted on 06/06/2020, available at: <https://www.dinero.com/economia/articulo/gasto-del-gobierno-colombia-por-coronavirus/289724>

97 Colombia receives disbursement from the World Bank to support COVID-19 response. 04/04/2020. World Bank. Consulted on 06/07/2020. Available at: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2020/04/04/colombia-recibe-desembolso-del-banco-mundial-para-apoyar-su-lucha-contra-el-covid-19>

98 El BID otorga millonario préstamo a Colombia para enfrentar el coronavirus. El Nuevo Herald. 04/30/2020. Consulted on 06/07/2020. Available at: <https://www.elnuevoherald.com/noticias/mundo/america-latina/colombia-es/article242396071.html>

99 Situation and response to migratory flows from Venezuela. Presidency of the Republic, Border Management Unit. May 2020.

resources from different countries¹⁰⁰ through donations and technical cooperation projects, as well as using a forceful strategy to request resources from funds and facilities from different multilateral donors (including Japan).

In relation to resources granted from these funds, Colombia and Ecuador were recognized in 2019 as eligible countries to obtain non-reimbursable funds from the Global Concessional Financing Facility (GCFF) of the World Bank¹⁰¹ and the IDB's Grant Facility to support the integration of migrants in their host countries and communities.¹⁰²

The GCFF is an instrument created by the World Bank, the United Nations and the Islamic Development Bank to face humanitarian crises caused by large migrations and refugee situations. Its initial purpose was to help face the migratory crises in the Middle East (namely, those in Jordan and Lebanon) caused by the Syrian crisis, but in 2019 Colombia and Ecuador were included as they are the countries most affected by the migratory flows after the collapse of the Venezuelan economy. Currently, Colombia is applying to non-reimbursable resources worth USD 37.5 million from this fund to support various health sector strategies aimed at assisting migrants.

The IDB's Grant Facility has allocated around USD 100 million to help the countries most affected by the migratory crises generate policies in sectors such as health, education, housing, security and social services that improve the dynamics of integration of migrant populations in their host countries. Colombia has also obtained non-reimbursable funds from the IDB to finance health care and urban integration activities for migrants.

Recommendation

Although the consulting team, based on information provided by direct sources from the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit, was able to establish that the Colombian Government is not interested in contracting credit operations (ODA Loans) to specifically and directly finance the assistance to the migrant population in the short and medium term, it was possible to conclude that there are public institutions that have established programs for the assistance to vulnerable populations (including Venezuelans) in the areas most affected by the migratory phenomenon.

100 See Table 29 Cooperation resources mobilized for migrations in 2019..

101 Global Concessional Financing Facility. World Bank. Consulted on 06/076/2020. Available at: <https://globalcff.org/>

102 IDB approves grant funds for countries receiving migrants in Latin America and Caribbean. IDB. May 2019. Consulted on 06/076/2020. Available at: <https://www.iadb.org/en/news/idb-approves-grant-funds-countries-receiving-migrants-latin-america-and-caribbean>

Thus, the National Government has no limitations to receiving resources from external credit operations that finance programs or projects aimed at addressing historical needs in various areas such as health (including infrastructure), education (including infrastructure), child care, water and basic sanitation and employment that transversely benefit the migrant population.

See in Annex 3 the Manual of Public Credit Operations of the National Planning Department.

EXPERIENCE OF COLOMBIAN PUBLIC FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN ACCESSING EXTERNAL ODA FINANCING, INCLUDING THOSE BY MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS SUCH AS WORLD BANK AND IDB.

In this chapter, a brief reference to the experience of the Colombian Government and its institutions in the procurement of external credit operations (external ODA financing) with multilateral development banking will be made. They are mainly represented by the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and some government development banks.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the types of procurement of external credit operations by the Colombian Government includes:

- Free investment or destination
- Specific destination
- Government's guarantee

In this regard, we will refer to external credits contracted by the government and decentralized entities at the national and regional levels from the year 2015 up to and including 2020¹⁰³.


¹⁰³ There is not yet an official report of contracted credits during 2020. However, according to interviews with various institutions and by reference to secondary sources, some operations already in place can be mentioned.

Furthermore, some ongoing external credit operations with specific destination will be mentioned, mainly in the health, education, water and sanitation and child care sectors, pointing out some of their characteristics, as well as, the experiences and lessons learned from these processes, which provide a valuable input for JICA to learn about aspects that must be considered in the process of preparation of an ODA Loan with the Colombian Government. As in the previous chapters, some recommendations from the consulting team will be included along the chapter.

COMPOSITION OF COLOMBIAN PUBLIC DEBT WITH MULTILATERAL AGENCIES AND GOVERNMENTS

As of March 2020, the profile of the public debt of the central National Government was split between 62% of internal debt¹⁰⁴ and 38% of external debt¹⁰⁵.

Figure 18.
Type of Debt



Source: Investors Relations Colombia (IRC). Ministry of Finance and Public Credit

On the other hand, the profile of the country's public external public debt has been represented partly in bonds and debt to multilateral agencies and governments. According


104 Most public debt is represented in Government Debt Securities with terms of 5, 10 or 15 years. They are sovereign bonds backed by the Colombian Government.

105 Investors Relations Colombia (IRC). Historical profile of public debt of the Government of Colombia. March 2020. Consulted on 06/06/2020. Available at: http://www.irc.gov.co/webcenter/portal/IRCEs/pages_Deuda/perfildeudapublicagnc/perfildeudapublicagnc/historico

to data from the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit (MFPC), from April 2019 to March 2020 debt to multilaterals and governments has increased slightly, from 41%¹⁰⁶ to 43%, with external debt represented in bonds still being the main source of external financing.

According to the Subdirectorate for Financing with Multilateral Organizations and Governments of the General Directorate of Public Credit and National Treasury of the MFPC, over the past 15 years the country has been promoting a policy of diversification of external sources of financing, which has led to a gradual increase in the share of participation of other sources such as the French Development Agency (AFD) and the Credit Institute for Reconstruction (KFW), mainly through free investment credit operations.

Figure 19.
External Debt by Financing Sources



Source: Investors Relations Colombia (IRC). Ministry of Finance and Public Credit

Among multilaterals, the World Bank, through the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), leads the sourcing of this type of financing by a small margin above the IDB. There has also been a gradual increase of the resources granted by the Development Bank of Latin America (CAF).

106 Investors Relations Colombia (IRC). Historical profile of public debt of the Government of Colombia. April 2020. Consulted on: 6/06/2020. Available at: http://www.irc.gov.co/webcenter/portal/IRCEs/pages_Deuda/perfildeudapublicagnc/perfildeudapublicagnc/historico

CONTRACTED EXTERNAL CREDITS FROM 2015 TO 2019

Below there is a reference to the external credit operations contracted by the Colombian Government for the period between 2015 and 2019, indicating whether they are free investment or specific destination credits. This information will provide a comprehensive overview of the recent credits and the policy objectives they were intended to reach.

CREDIT OPERATIONS IN 2015

During 2015, the Colombian Government carried out six (6) external debt operations of which five (5) were “free investments” and only one was “specific destination” (see Table 57). During that year, the public investment banks from France and Germany participated, consistent with the policy of source diversification.


AFD (USD 308 million) and KFW (USD 160 million) contracted credits with the Colombian Government that, despite being classified as a free investments, were linked to clear policy objectives that will continue to occur in the various operations of these two cooperating agencies. As such, it is visible that AFD focuses on policies related to environmental development and climate change, while KFW focuses on policies aimed at peace-building.

CREDIT OPERATIONS IN 2016

From 2016 on, a growing trend in the contracting of credits for specific destination was observed, although the amounts between both credit modalities still differed substantially. For 2016, for example, total free investment loans totaled USD 2,229.93 million, while free destination operations reached USD 321.43 million.

During this period, one specific credit contracting mechanisms deserved special mention: Public Company of Medellín (which is one of the main regional decentralized enterprises in Colombia) and the National Bank for Economic and Social Development, part of the Brazilian Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade of Brazil. This project, for USD 111.43 million, was aimed at financing the acquisition of equipment necessary for the construction of the Ituango hydropower plant, one of the most important energy infrastructure projects in the country. This project is particularly relevant because it was requested by a state-owned industrial and commercial company of the Municipality of Medellín (capital of the Department of Antioquia, that is, a decentralized entity of the regional order) to a non-traditional borrower, which although is one of the most important and largest emerging economies in the world, it is considered as part of the developed world.

Figure 20.
Free Destination Credits vs Specific Destination, 2016



Source: Authors' elaboration based on information provided by the MFPC

CREDIT OPERATIONS IN 2017

For the year 2017, as shown by Figure 20 the values disbursed to the country in the form of free investment and specific destination were significantly closer. This is due to the IDB's entry as a founder of the Ituango Hydropower Project through a specific destination credit of USD 1 billion. For that year, specific destination operations accounted for 45% of the total government debt.

CREDIT OPERATIONS IN 2018

In 2018, government development banks (AFD and KFW) focused their loan resources on peace-building and environmental related issues. This trend shows how funding sources, other than traditional multilateral banking (IDB and WB), were aligned with the strategic areas of the global development agenda in which governments are focusing their efforts. For example, in the case of the French Development Agency, its overall mandate focused on supporting green growth based on a basis of solidarity with recipient governments. For this reason its strategy with *Colombia was organized around three thematic objectives: i) to promote the convergence and sustainable development of territories, ii) to promote climate change mitigation and adaptation policies, and iii) to accompany social cohesion and gap reduction policies*¹⁰⁷.

107 Draft Law "Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Colombia and the Government of the French Republic on Financial Cooperation", signed in Bogotá on December 19, 2016. Consulted on 08/06/2020, available at: <http://leyes.senado.gov.co/proyectos/images/documentos/Textos%20Radicados/proyectos%20de%20ley/2018%20-%202019/PL%20080-18%20Aquate%20Cooperation%20Financiera.pdf>

The same is the case of KFW, as the lines of credit contracted correspond to the thematic areas defined in the respective financial cooperation agreement between the German Government and the Colombian Government¹⁰⁸.

Until 2018, the loans granted by banks and public government agencies focused on operations of free destination, which were being prepared solely by the MFPC and DNP, processing is more expeditious than specific destination credits involving other institutions, whether at a national or regional level.

Credit Operations in 2019

Of the twelve (12) credit operations approved in 2019, seven (7) were specific destination credits, which is the first time this has occurred relative to previous years. The reason was that as lending institutions have gained greater experience and maturity in the preparation of this type of credits, the MFPC and DNP have been developing more operations feasible, noting that one of the added values of these loans is the simultaneous institutional strengthening of sectoral or regional entities through the associated technical cooperation.







During 2019, the credit granted by KFW is worth mentioning, as it was the first specific destination operation by this German development bank. It amounted to USD 43 million and it had the objective to implement the SAVER wastewater treatment project, executed by the Ministry of Housing, City and Territory in the country. Under this operation, feasibility studies and designs were financed for the sanitation of the Chinchiná, Otún-Consota and Río Oro basins.

During the same year, a loan with CAF was also signed. The recipient project was the Drinking Water and Sanitation Program for the Urban and Rural Areas of the Buenaventura District, which received resources of USD 76 million.

See below tables 59, 60, 61, 62 and 63 for detailed information about credit operation 2015-2019

108 The agreement can be consulted at: http://apw.cancilleria.gov.co/Tratados/adjuntosTratados/8C8D8_ALEMANIA_B-CONVCOOPERACIONFINANCIERA2012-TEXTO.Pdf

Table 59. External Credits Contracted with Multilateral Agencies and Governments, 2015

YEAR	AVAILABILITY	SOURCE	BORROWER	LENDER	PROJECT OR PROGRAM	LOAN CURRENCY	LOAN AMOUNT (MILLION)	DOLLAR AMOUNT (USD MILLION)			
2015	FREE	MULTILATERAL BANK			FINANCIAL SYSTEM REFORM SUPPORT PROGRAM	USD	500.00	500.00			
					PROGRAM OF FISCAL REFORM DEEPENING IN COLOMBIA		400.00	400.00			
					PROGRAMMATIC LOAN TO SUPPORT SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND GREEN GROWTH	EUR	637.70	700.83			
					PROGRAM TO SUPPORT PUBLIC INVESTMENT STRENGTHENING THROUGH PROJECT STRUCTURING	USD	500.00	500.00			
				PROGRAM TO SUPPORT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF NATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE POLICIES	EUR	275.00	308.08				
				LOAN FOR DEVELOPMENT POLICIES - SUPPORT FOR PEACE BUILDING. PHASE II		75.00	79.94				
				LOAN FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT POLICIES	USD	80.03	80.03				
		TOTAL FREE INVESTMENT CREDITS								2,568.88	
		SPECIFIC		MULTILATERAL BANK	FINDETER		FISCAL AND PUBLIC INVESTMENT EXPENDITURE STRENGTHENING IN BARRANQUILLA	USD	100.00	100.00	
		TOTAL SPECIFIC INVESTMENT CREDITS								100.00	
TOTAL CREDIT OPERATIONS 2015								2,668.88			

Source: Ministry of Finance and Public Credit / General Directorate of Public Credit and National Treasury / Subdirectorate for Financing with Multilateral Organizations and Governments










Updated on: February 2020

* December 2020 cut-off data.

** Information provided by the Programming and Negotiation Group.

*** Equivalent amounts expressed with change rate of the contract signing date

Table 60. External Credits Contracted with Multilateral Agencies and Governments, 2016

YEAR	AVAILABILITY	SOURCE	BORROWER	LENDER	PROJECT OR PROGRAM	LOAN CURRENCY	LOAN AMOUNT (MILLION)	DOLLAR AMOUNT (USDMILLION)		
2016	FREE	MULTILATERAL BANK	EMPRESAS PÚBLICAS DE MEDELLÍN (EPM)		EPM-CAF INVESTMENT PLAN 2014-2022 OF EMPRESAS PÚBLICAS DE MEDELLÍN E.S.P.-EPM.	USD	200.00	200.00		
					SUPPORT FOR COLOMBIA'S PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP (PPS)REFORM PROGRAM		400.00	400.00		
					SUPPORT FOR THE SUBSIDY REFORM PROGRAM		400.00	400.00		
				DPL - STRENGTHENING TERRITORIAL PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT OF SUBNATIONAL FINANCES	EUR	716.50	746.88			
				DPL II - INCOME GROWTH AND CONVERGENCE		624.20	704.28			
			BILATERAL ORGANIZATION		PBL - MODERN CITIES AND INFRASTRUCTURE FOR SUSTAINABLE TERRITORIAL INTEGRATION	USD	450.00	450.00		
							PBL - CLIMATE II	EUR	182.00	189.08
							DPL - MODERN CITIES AND SUSTAINABLE INFRASTRUCTURE FOR TERRITORIAL INTEGRATION		50.00	55.28
					PBL - SUPPORT FOR PEACE BUILDING - PHASE III		75.00	84.41		
			TOTAL FREE INVESTMENT CREDITS							
	SPECIFIC	MULTILATERAL BANK	EMPRESAS PÚBLICAS DE MEDELLÍN (EPM)		FINANCING OF THE COMMERCIAL CONTRACT SIGNED BETWEEN ALSTOM AND EMPRESAS PÚBLICAS DE MEDELLÍN E.S.P. FOR THE ACQUISITION OF ELECTROMECHANICAL EQUIPMENT- TURBINES AND GENERATORS NECESSARY FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE ITUANGO HYDROPOWER PLANT.	USD	111.43	111.43		
			FINDERET		PROGRAM FOR FISCAL STRENGTHENING AND PUBLIC INVESTMENT EXPENDITURE FOR MUNICIPALITIES, THEIR DECENTRALIZED ENTITIES AND METROPOLITAN AREAS		150.00	150.00		
					INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTHENING PROGRAM FOR THE OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE REPUBLIC		30.00	30.00		
INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTHENING PROGRAM FOR THE ENERGY MINING SECTOR					30.00		30.00			
TOTAL SPECIFIC INVESTMENT CREDITS								321.43		
TOTAL CREDIT OPERATIONS 2016								3,551.37		

Source: Ministry of Finance and Public Credit / General Directorate of Public Credit and National Treasury / Subdirectorate for Financing with Multilateral Organizations and Governments










Updated on: February 2020

* December 2020 cut-off data.

** Information provided by the Programming and Negotiation Group.

*** Equivalent amounts expressed with change rate of the contract signing date.

Table 61. External Credits Contracted with Multilateral Agencies and Governments, 2017

YEAR	AVAILABILITY	SOURCE	BORROWER	LENDER	PROJECT OR PROGRAM	LOAN CURRENCY	LOAN AMOUNT (MILLION)	DOLLAR AMOUNT (USDMILLION)	
2017	FREE	MULTILATERAL BANK			PBL - NATIONAL PROGRAM TO ENSURE A SUSTAINABLE AND EFFICIENT ENERGY SUPPLY	USD	300.00	300.00	
					FINANCIAL SYSTEM REFORM SUPPORT PROGRAM II		50.00	50.00	
							400.00	400.00	
		BILATERAL ORGANIZATION			FIRST FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY LOAN AND COMPETITIVENESS-DPL	EUR	568.30	676.11	
							PBL - RURAL DEVELOPMENT	200.00	237.24
							SUPPORT FOR PEACE BUILDING - PHASE IV	100.00	118.39
			SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT II	75.00	79.98				
	TOTAL FREE INVESTMENT CREDITS								1,861.72
	2017	SPECIFIC	MULTILATERAL BANK	BANCOLDEX		BANCOLDEX-IDB	USD	9.27	9.27
				MEDELLIN PUBLIC ENTERPRISES (EPM)		RENEWABLE ENERGY FINANCING PROGRAM IN NON-INTERCONNECTED AREAS		1,000.00	1,000.00
FUND FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PLAN WE ARE ALL PAZCIFICO REPRESENTED BY FIDUPREVISORA S.A.				IDB/CII-EPM		231.40		231.40	
				PARTIAL FINANCING OF THE ITUANGO HYDROPOWER PROJECT		126.70		126.70	
ICETEX						PAZCIFICO PLAN: WATER, BASIC SANITATION PROGRAM		160.00	160.00
						ICETEX-IBRD		10.00	10.00
			EFFICIENT ENERGY DEMAND MANAGEMENT PROGRAM IN ZNI - SAN ANDRES PILOT						
TOTAL SPECIFIC INVESTMENT CREDITS								1,537.37	
TOTAL CREDIT OPERATIONS 2017								3,399.08	














Source: Ministry of Finance and Public Credit / General Directorate of Public Credit and National Treasury / Subdirectorate for Financing with Multilateral Organizations and Governments
Updated on: February 2020

* December 2020 cut-off data.

** Information provided by the Programming and Negotiation Group.

*** Equivalent amounts expressed with change rate of the contract signing date.

Table 62. External Credits Contracted with Multilateral Agencies and Governments, 2018





YEAR	AVAILABILITY	SOURCE	BORROWER	LENDER	PROJECT OR PROGRAM	LOAN CURRENCY	LOAN AMOUNT (MILLION)	DOLLAR AMOUNT (USDMILLION)	
2018	FREE	MULTILATERAL BANK			PROGRAM OF FISCAL REFORM DEEPENING IN COLOMBIA II	USD	600.00	600.00	
					DPL - SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT II		500.00	500.00	
					SUPPORT PROGRAM FOR COMPREHENSIVE RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE POST-CONFLICT CONTEXT		300.00	300.00	
		BILATERAL ORGANIZATION			SUPPORT PROGRAM OF CLIMATE CHANGE POLICIES -PHASE III		230.00	230.00	
					SUPPORT FOR PEACE BUILDING - PHASE V		100.00	115.54	
					DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN CITY POLICIES AND SUSTAINABLE INFRASTRUCTURE FOR TERRITORIAL INTEGRATION - PHASE II		80.00	92.43	
		SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT - PHASE III		100.00	115.54				
	TOTAL FREE INVESTMENT CREDITS								1,953.51
	SPECIFIC	MULTILATERAL BANK	BANCOLDEX		BANCOLDEX-BID FOURTH INDIVIDUAL LOAN FOR INVESTMENT PROJECTS FINANCING, PRODUCTIVE RECONVERSION AND EXPORT DEVELOPMENT, WITH CONDITIONAL CREDIT LINE RESOURCES FOR INVESTMENT PROJECTS (CCLIP)	USD	90.74	90.74	
			EMPRESA METRO DE BOGOTÁ S.A		FIRST LINE OF THE BOGOTA METRO		56.00	56.00	
							70.00	70.00	
							70.00	70.00	
			ICETEX		ICETEX -BIRF- PHASE IV - HIGHER EDUCATION ACCESS AND QUALITY PROGRAM (PACES)		160.00	160.00	
				IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MOCOJA MUNICIPALITY SEWER MASTER PLAN (PHASE I)	30.00		30.00		
			COLOMBIA SUSTAINABLE PROGRAM	100.00	100.00				
			PROGRAM TO STRENGTHEN THE OMBUDSMAN'S INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY	18.00	18.00				
			PROGRAM TO STRENGTHEN THE INSTITUTIONAL MANAGEMENT OF THE OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF COLOMBIA	40.00	40.00				
TOTAL SPECIFIC INVESTMENT CREDIT								634.74	
TOTAL CREDIT OPERATIONS 2018								2,588.25	

Source: Ministry of Finance and Public Credit / General Directorate of Public Credit and National Treasury / Subdirectorate for Financing with Multilateral Organizations and Governments

Updated on: February 2020
* December 2020 cut-off data.

** Information provided by the Programming and Negotiation Group. *** Equivalent amounts expressed with change rate of the contract signing date

Table 63. External Credits Contracted with Multilateral Agencies and Governments, 2019

YEAR	AVAILABILITY	SOURCE	BORROWER	LENDER	PROJECT OR PROGRAM	LOAN CURRENCY	LOAN AMOUNT (MILLION)	DOLLAR AMOUNT (USDMILLION)	
2019	FREE	MULTILATERAL BANK			SECOND DPF OF FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY, COMPETITIVENESS AND MIGRATION	USD	718.50	718.50	
					PBL- PROGRAM OF EMERGENCY CARE FOR VULNERABLE PEOPLE IN COLOMBIA		500.00	500.00	
					PROGRAM TO IMPROVE THE CONNECTIVITY AND DIGITALIZATION OF THE ECONOMY		300.00	300.00	
					PROGRAM TO IMPROVE THE CONNECTIVITY AND DIGITALIZATION OF THE ECONOMY		50.00	50.00	
					PBL - PROGRAM TO ENSURE A SUSTAINABLE AND EFFICIENT ENERGY SUPPLY - PHASE II		600.00	600.00	
	TOTAL FREE INVESTMENT CREDITS								2,168.50
	SPECIFIC	BILATERAL ORGANIZATION			PROGRAM FOR WASTEWATER TREATMENT IN THE BASINS OF CHINCHINÁ AND OTÚN-CONSOTA (SAVER)	USD	43.93	43.93	
					PUBLIC SECTOR STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT CAPACITY BUILDING PROGRAM		15.00	15.00	
		PROGRAM FOR THE ADOPTION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF AN URBAN-RURAL MULTIPURPOSE CADASTRE	50.00		50.00				
		FINDETER	FISCAL STRENGTHENING AND PUBLIC INVESTMENT EXPENDITURE PROGRAM		150.00		150.00		
		MULTILATERAL BANK	PAZCIFICO FUND		PROJECT FOR WATER AND SEWERAGE CONNECTIVITY AND PROVISION IMPROVEMENT IN THE PAZCIFICO- ACUAPISTA REGION		41.90	41.90	
					PROGRAM FOR THE ADOPTION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF AN URBAN-RURAL MULTIPURPOSE CADASTRE		100.00	100.00	
					IMPLEMENTATION OF PHASE I OF BUENAVENTURA'S SEWER MASTER PLAN		76.00	76.00	
	TOTAL SPECIFIC INVESTMENT CREDITS								476.83
TOTAL CREDIT OPERATIONS 2019								2,645.33	

Source: Ministry of Finance and Public Credit / General Directorate of Public Credit and National Treasury / Sub-Directorate of Financing with Multilateral Organizations and Governments Date of update: february 2020

* Data as of December 2020.

** Information provided by the Programming and Negotiation Group.

*** Equivalent amounts expressed with the exchange rate of the date of signing the contract.

SOME CREDIT OPERATIONS CURRENTLY IN PREPARATION

Credit operations with some of the entities that participated in the interviews previously conducted and are currently in the design or negotiation stage are presented below. It must be clarified that the following is unofficial information, since the Colombian government only provides information once the credits are approved and signed, in accordance with the relevant procedure for each type of credit approved and following the procedure described in the following chapter.

MINISTRY OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL PROTECTION

Operation name: “Program to Improve the Sustainability of the Health System in Colombia with an Inclusive Approach”.

Lender entity or entities: World Bank and IDB.

Amount: USD 300,000,000 - IDB: USD 150,000,000, WB: USD 150,000,000 (joint operation of multilateral banking). Non-refundable - WB: USD 37,500,000, IDB: USD 12,500,000.

Objective: To improve the fiscal efficiency of the General System of Social Security in Health (GSSSH) through the use of indicators of disbursement for a result-based credit to improve quality patient care in a financially sustainable system.

Specific objectives:

- SO1. To improve the quality in the provision of health services to the population by increasing the satisfaction levels of the system users.
- SO2. To improve the efficiency of health expenditure to ensure the financial sustainability of the GSSSH while preserving the achievements in coverage, equity and financial protection.

Allocation of resources: Financing the maximum budget amount authorized to the Ministry of Health and Social Protection, in recognition of the results achieved in expenditure efficiency and improvement of health care. It is important to note that the resources of the credit are not additional to the budget previously allocated, as the feasibility concept issued by the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit clarified that the fiscal ceiling of the entity could not be extended. In this sense, the operation substituted one source of budget funding by another, in this case of an external nature.

Execution time: 3 years.

Characteristics: This is a result-based credit operation or Program for Results (PforR) according to the terminology of multilateral banking. This was one of the first operations with a specific destination to be authorized, therefore it has, to a certain extent, become a pilot for the use of such programs with banking.

Result-based operations have the particularity that disbursements are carried out once a series of indicators, previously agreed on with the bank during the structuring process, include a series of preparation, identification, evaluation and analysis technical missions¹⁰⁹.

During the preparation phase of this project and given its novelty as a types of instruments barely used with banking, expected difficulties arose when adapting the banking processes and requirements to the context of the Colombian health system, which is characterized by having a large number of public and private actors (insurers, service providers and entities at the departmental and municipal levels). For example, it was necessary to look for formulas that were aligned with the role of the Ministry of Health and Social Protection, which is the governing body of the system but is not responsible over some aspects related to the provision of services, as these are in charge of the insurance entities (Enterprises for Health Promotion, EPSs) or the service providers (Health Services Provider Institutions, IPSs).

Non-refundable resources: A special characteristic of this operation is that it has a component of granting or donation of non-refundable resources by both the World Bank and the IDB.

Indeed, given that the health sector is one of the most affected by the phenomenon of migration from Venezuela, the Colombian Government and multilateral banking managed to include donation resources which will be used to alleviate the costs of the care of migrants in the health system. To date, resources of this type that are linked to the said credit transaction amount to around USD 50,000,000, of which approximately USD 37.5 million come from the Global Concessional Financing Facility (GCFF) administered by the WB, and approximately USD 12.5 million from the IDB fund to support the migration crisis.

On this particular point, it is worth mentioning that one of the great challenges of the public entities in the country is to find the most appropriate way to incorporate the resources from donations into their budgets. Donation resources are managed differently in the national budget, since they are not part of the budget ceiling allocated to the public entity. The reason is that having a non-reimbursable condition, they are added to the resources

¹⁰⁹ The naming of missions depends on the terminology and processes of each bank. For example, for the IDB, the mission prior to the preparation of the project document is called "analysis mission" and for the WB is an "appraisal mission".

of the entity and do not substitute the source of financing, as in the case of the credits. Otherwise, receiving a donation would be a kind of punishment for the institutions in fiscal and financial terms.

In any case, the rigid regulations for public budgets demand adequate instruments to achieve the incorporation of resources from donations because, even if they are non-refundable, they must be properly incorporated into the budget of the respective entity before being executed.

Generally, entities choose to incorporate these resources via public investment projects¹¹⁰. In the case of the Ministry of Health and Social Protection, and taking into account that the institutions do not have investment projects exclusively formulated to address the migration problem¹¹¹, the formulation of an investment project has been considered for this purpose, being thus far the only entity to consider such a measure.

Recommendation

The importance of the structuring missions of the operation is mainly that the entity granting the loan manages to understand the organization and operation of the public entity, so that the operational processes are adapted to the way in which the institution carries out its mission. It should be borne in mind that the Colombian public sector has special and preferential legal rules, thus the entities can only carry out the activities that have been allowed by law. In other words, the legal regime of public entities is different from that of private entities in financial, budgetary, contractual, supervision and control aspects.

Understanding the specific competences of an institution to conduct a credit operation depends on the prior analysis of its financial capacity by the National Planning Department and the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit, which is the basis for them to issue the feasibility concept of the operation and, consequently, for its inclusion in the portfolio of the respective source. During the structuring missions, different phases will be developed, including the preparation of indicators, the formulation of social and environmental studies (where appropriate) and the risk analysis of the specific operation.

110 In general, an entity's budget is made up of operational and investment resources. The latter contain different projects that must be approved by the DNP and incorporated into the Bank of National Investment Programs and Projects (BPIN), which is manage the same entity. Every investment project has a missionary objective and properly formulated, verifiable and measurable activities, goals and indicators.

111 This was the conclusion of the consulting after conducting the interviews with the DNP and other institutions.

MINISTRY OF NATIONAL EDUCATION (MEN)

Operation name: “Support Program for the Improvement of Educational Pathways in Targeted Rural Areas”.

Lender entity or entities: Inter-American Development Bank (IDB).

Amount: Up to USD 60,000,000 or its equivalent in other currencies.

Objective: To improve educational pathways in initial, preschool, primary and secondary educational levels in rural targeted areas.

Specific objectives:

- SO1. To strengthen rural educational management.
- SO2. To improve rural teaching practice by making it more relevant and contextualized.
- SO3. To improve learning environments through the provision of furniture and reading material.

Allocation of resources: Financing the support program for improving educational trajectories in rural areas. As in the previous case, this credit operation was also authorized because it had the fiscal room and was in line with the budget ceilings allocated to the Ministry of Education in the Medium Term Expenditure Framework.

Execution time: 4 years.

Characteristics: The programme is aimed at closing the gap between urban and rural education. Analysis of the problem showed that in rural areas students have a lower school attendance rate, low coverage, limited educational offerings and poor infrastructure. In the analysis of this operation, the successful experiences of the MEN in the execution of its budget and the implementation of credit-financed programmes with resources from multilateral agencies was taken into account¹¹². In fact, the MEN is one of the public entities of the central government with the best budget execution and also one with the most significant budget increases in recent years.

112 With credit resources, the MEN has successfully implemented projects such as “Rural Education” with the International Bank for Reconstruction (WB), and “New School System” with the IDB.

MINISTRY OF LABOR

Operation name: “Program to Strengthen Employment Policies”.

Lender entity or entities: Inter-American Development Bank (IDB).

Amount: USD 20,000,000 - Non-refundable: USD 5,000,000

Objective: To increase the employability of the national and migrant workforce.

Specific objectives:

- To increase coverage and effectiveness of employment policies.
- To strengthen the system that ensures the relevance and quality of training for employment programs.
- Expand the scope of the competence-based certification.

Resource allocation: Resources seek to strengthen the Public Employment System through information systems that are interoperable between those looking for and those offering employment, as well as, to expand competence certification schemes for nationals and migrants through the National Learning Service (SENA). Cutting through, actions aimed at mitigating pressure in labor markets affected by migration flows and leveraging the opportunity that migration represents for the Colombian economy are being sought.

Execution time: 5 years.

Characteristics: An important aspect of this project is an element focused on assisting the migrant population. In that sense, even if it is not structured directly for migrant populations, it represents a good example of how a credit operation can address the challenges that the migration issue poses on the sector through the strengthening of already established sectoral policies.

The project includes non-reimbursable resources of USD 5 million from the IDB Migration Initiative and it is mainly focused on the relevance and quality components of training for employment, as well as, on the expansion and strengthening of competency certification. This way the skills of the migrant population can be used for their inclusion into the Colombian formal labor market, which undoubtedly generates positive impacts not only on the national economic and social environment, but also alleviates the pressures that the problem presents for other sectors such as health care and education.

As in the case of the other operations described above, this project does not entail an expansion of the fiscal ceiling of the Ministry of Labor as the resources are considered in its budget allocation, according to the Medium Term Expenditure Framework approved by the MFPC.

MINISTRY OF HOUSING, CITY AND TERRITORY (MHCT)

Operation name: "Project for Inclusive and Resilient Housing".

Lender entity or entities: World Bank.

Amount: USD 100,000,000 - Non-refundable: USD 15,000,000

Objective: To improve social inclusion strategies through the development of the *Casa Digna, Vida Digna* (Decent House, Decent Life) resilient housing program.

Specific objectives:

- SO1. To improve houses in targeted areas.
- SO2 To improve housing conditions of the poorest 20%, including migrant population.

Resource allocation: Resources seek to scale the actions of the *Casa Digna, Vida Digna* program, which grants subsidies to household owners and tenants that do not have access to urban housing.

The program of *Casa Digna, Vida Digna* is structured with the participation of several actors with different roles. In addition to MHCT, it also includes Fonvivienda, a Ministry-affiliated entity that aims to implement government policies on housing and manage national budget resources for housing projects of social interest; Findeter, which is the financial entity for territorial development that acts as the program operator; and the territorial entities where the projects are targeted.

Execution time: N/A

Characteristics: The program is aimed at granting subsidies for conditioning and structural improvements (household connections, floors, finishes, bathrooms, kitchens, overcrowding mitigation) or structural reinforcement in homes of vulnerable populations.

Operation name: “Drinking Water and Sanitation Program for the Guajira Department”.

Lender entity or entities: Inter-American Development Bank (IDB).

Amount: USD 50,000,000 - Non-refundable: USD 5,000,000

Objective: To increase access and quality of drinking water services, and increase access to safely managed sanitation in urban populations of the Department of La Guajira, thus contributing to the fulfillment of the objectives of the National Government’s Guajira Azul Program, which consists of providing a larger part of the population with water suitable for human consumption and with adequate sanitation.

Allocation of resources: Resources are aimed at the coverage expansion and quality improvement of urban and rural drinking water as well as of urban sanitation systems in the Department of Guajira.

Execution time: N/A

Characteristics: The region of the Colombian Guajira peninsula has been characterized by being an extremely dry area, where the availability of water has been decreasing over the years. Additionally, the area is primarily populated with indigenous people of the Wayú ethnic group and has a high flow of migrants, both pendular and returnees. The settlements are scattered, which makes it difficult to provide any public service.

The program is based on three components: infrastructure, health education and water culture, and community support. The infrastructure component includes deep well drilling and the installation of a water treatment plant.

According to the project profile, the program consists of:

The installation of a number of public reservoirs, each one serving various communities within a maximum radius of 5 km; and a tank truck to transport water from the plant to the reservoirs. Given the dispersion of the population, the project does not provide for home connections, but people can come from their communities to the reservoir to collect the amount of water allocated to each family, and carry it on their own to their houses. Traditionally, this water collection and transport work has fallen on women and children (studies conducted by MHCT show that women and children in rural areas spend seven hours a day collecting water)¹¹³.

113 Drinking water and sanitation program for La Guajira department. IDB 2019. Retrieved 11/06/2020. Available at: <http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=EZSHARE-2103967455-23>

COLOMBIAN FAMILY WELFARE INSTITUTE (ICBF)

Operation name: "*Sacúdete* (Shake Yourself Up): Program to Develop 21st Century Skills in Youth People".

Lender entity or entities: Inter-American Development Bank (IDB).
Amount: USD 50,000,000.

Objective: To build the necessary skills for young Colombians to achieve productive and happy lives, which can make them agents of social and economic change.

Specific objectives:

- SO1. To promote institutional strengthening for updating and consolidation of youth policies;
- SO2. Expand access to 21st century skills training services for young people in flexible modalities.

Allocation of resources: Resources will be allocated to the implementation of four strategies:

- Development and implementation of disruptive training methodologies (USD 5 million).
- Training for trainers, to transfer pedagogical methodologies in the territories through the SENA (USD 8 million).
- Construction or adaptation of infrastructure and physical equipment of the *Sacúdete* centers (USD 32 million)
- Strengthening of management, evaluation and monitoring capacities at the central level (USD 5 million).

Execution time: N/A.

Characteristics: The bulk resource allocation is for the infrastructure component, which includes the construction or adaptation of the *Sacúdete* centers (physical spaces where the training model will be applied) and the acquisition of physical equipment (USD 32 million). *Sacúdete* is a cross-sectoral strategy of the National

Government, through the Colombian Family Welfare Institute (ICBF), to promote youth innovation and talent in the country. With the program, “37,300 children and adolescents located in 299 municipalities in 16 departments benefit, strengthening their abilities and skills, and implementing activities to continue building their life project, with a component of prevention against all kinds of violations, through a remote accompaniment carried out by psychosocial support teams”.

This credit operation is novel for the ICBF, as its traditional project implementation scheme has been through alliances with strategic partners in which the institute does not act as the executing entity of the resources. For example, in accordance with the information provided in the interview rounds, for the infrastructure projects the ICBF signs cooperation agreements designating a strategic partner to be responsible for the execution of the works, in order for the institute to assume technical oversight work while the collaborator provides the resources that are managed and executed by the third strategic partner.

See Annex 4 Financial Conditions Credit Operations with Multilateral Banking



SUGGESTED LOAN FRAMEWORK FOR COLOMBIA



LOAN FRAMEWORK FOR COLOMBIA IN SUPPORT FOR INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT IN AREAS AFFECTED BY VENEZUELAN REFUGEES AND MIGRANTS

The objective of this chapter is to outline the framework for a credit operation (ODA Loan) with the Colombian Government, gathering some of the characteristics that have been detailed throughout this report to a large extent, but synthesizing and grouping them so that JICA can have a concrete view of the main elements that must be considered during the preparation of a project of this type.

There is a description of the programs that were identified as interested in carrying out international cooperation programs during the cycle of interviews with public institutions. Also, those that present opportunities to implement infrastructure projects with positive impacts on the migration issue are indicated. Additionally, some recommendations on aspects considered to be key for JICA in the preparation of an ODA Loan are provided.

The following are some considerations for an ODA Loan program framework with the Colombian Government:

DEBT POLICY OF THE COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT

One of the key considerations to develop a collaboration approach with the Colombian Government for a credit operation is the national debt policy, which is basically reflected in two elements: The Fiscal Rule, and the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MGMP).

Starting in 2019, the Fiscal Rule Advisory Committee recommended that the National Government modify the Fiscal Rule in such a way that it allowed more indebtedness as a result of the pressures on public finances caused by the phenomenon of migration from Venezuela.

With the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic, a relaxation of the Fiscal Rule was recommended again, initially allowing a level of indebtedness of up to 6.1% of the GDP¹¹⁴ in 2020. Later on, in June 2020, the Fiscal Rule Advisory Committee authorized the suspension of this instrument for the years 2020 and 2021, granting the National Government the unlimited freedom to increase public expenditure and public debt during said periods. This decision will be reflected in the corresponding Medium-Term Expenditure Framework for those years.

Therefore, in the short and medium term, the country will certainly face an increase in public indebtedness, driven by external credit operations, derived from sources such as multilateral banking and government development banks and agencies.

NEED FOR A FINANCIAL COOPERATION AGREEMENT

One of the key aspects in the structuring process of a possible ODA Loan operation between JICA and the Colombian Government is the initial need for the country to formalize a financial cooperation agreement with the Government of Japan, which requires an approach that enables resuming previous conversations in regards to ODA loans and other forms of cooperation.

As a result of the interviews conducted with the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit, it was evident that the policy on external credit is aimed at diversifying the sources of external financing. Hence, for the Colombian Government to consider JICA among the eligible financing sources, the first step is to achieve an understanding about the conditions of the ODA instrument¹¹⁵.

114 Colombia podrá tener un déficit fiscal de 6,1 % en 2020 por coronavirus. 05/04/2020. Forbes. Consulted on 06/07/2020. Available at <https://forbes.co/2020/05/04/economia-y-finanzas/colombia-podra-tener-un-deficit-fiscal-de-61-en-2020-por-coronavirus/>

115 In this regard, the chapter Process to request an ODA Loan can be consulted.

According to the above mentioned interview, the MHCP considers that, except for this *sine qua non* requirement, the other general conditions for making a loan with JICA feasible are eventually acceptable, considering the previous experience when trying to agree on a loan program that unfortunately could not materialize at that time.

DEBT TO ADDRESS THE EFFECTS OF VENEZUELAN MIGRATION

As mentioned in the chapter on the procedure to request an ODA Loan, different authorities told the consulting team that currently, the Colombian Government is not interested in financing the assistance to the migrant phenomenon through the contracting of external credit operations with governments.

However, the impact of the assistance to migrants in key sectors such as health, education, water and basic sanitation, child, adolescence and youth care, and employability is recognized, with costs amounting to around USD 1.1 billion¹¹⁶ annually, according to estimates of the Border Management Unit of the Presidency of the Republic.

The document CONPES 3950¹¹⁷, which determines the Government's strategies for the assistance to the migrant population, made an estimate of the necessary investments in the main sectors affected by the migration problem. According to mentioned public policy document, the investments of these sectors, until December 2021 (date of the monitoring phase finalization), would amount to approximately COP 422,799,000,000 (around USD 114,270,000¹¹⁸) between 2018 and 2021.

It is important to note that these budget calculations were made two years apart by different units, and that the recent budget estimate was done at a time when the migrant population had increased considerably.

The Colombian Government has recognized international cooperation as an important catalyst to support the efforts to address the migratory phenomenon. However, it is aware that the greater proportion of the economic costs of the crisis should be assumed by the Colombians themselves via current resources of the national budget. In this sense, cooperation will have a complementary role that demands a strategic management to leverage its benefits.

In this context, strategies with different collaborators have been designed to develop projects that contribute with the attention of the emergency initially. However, given the magnitude of the situation and its continuity over time, it is necessary that the projects have a greater impact on the development and integration of this population into Colombian society.

116 Situación y respuesta a flujos migratorios provenientes de Venezuela. Presidency of the Republic, Border Management Unit. May 2020.

117 Estrategia para la atención de la migración desde Venezuela. Economic and Social Policy Council (CONPES). 2018. Consulted on 06/16/2020. Available at: <https://colaboracion.dnp.gov.co/CDT/Conpes/Econ%C3%B3micos/3950.pdf>

118 At an exchange rate of COP 3,700 per USD 1.

The migration crisis has raised the interest of the donor community towards Colombia, despite its status as an upper middle-income country and its condition as a full member of the OECD since April 2020.

Recommendation

Colombia expects that, despite its status as an upper middle-income country and a member of the OECD, ODA flows to the country will continue in three main areas: Peace Building and Legality, Sustainability and Environment, and Migration. In this sense, it has welcomed the decision of the Government of Japan to maintain ODA flows to Chile although the country graduated from the DAC because its per capita income has already passed the threshold of an upper middle-income country, becoming a high-income economy.

Concerning this scenario, some cooperation agencies such as the German GIZ have been implementing strategies to diversify their traditional lines of cooperation. In this case, the GIZ, in addition to its technical cooperation work in the key areas of peace building, environment, climate change, and economy and employment, designed the SI Frontera Program, which promotes actions *to facilitate migration governance, access to services, employability and peaceful coexistence, in favor of mixed migratory flows*¹¹⁹.

The tendency to include migratory-related issues has also been observed in external credits. As previously mentioned, there are no known operations with a specific focus on assisting migrant groups, but some that have been operating since 2019 have a component aimed at meeting the needs of this population in a transversal way.

An example of the above is the “Program to Improve the Sustainability of the Health System in Colombia with an Inclusive Approach”, which is implemented by the Ministry of Health and Social Protection with the IDB and the World Bank. In this operation, an indicator related to the increase of the migrant population directly registered in the health system was included, with increasing goals until 2022. The reason for this indicator is that it is much less expensive for the country to assume the costs of health care for migrants if they are duly registered in the system. Also, a component of this type attracts more non-reimbursable resources from the multi-donor funds to the country in order to promote actions that mitigate the effects of migration in the country.

Another case is the “Program to strengthen employment policies”, which will be implemented by the Ministry of Labor with IDB support. It has the objective to mitigate the pressure in

119 SI Frontera Program. GIZ. Consulted on 06/18/2020. Available at <https://estoyenlafrontera.com/organizaciones/giz-programa-si-frontera>

the labor markets affected by migratory flows in a transversal way and to leverage the opportunity brought by migration to the Colombian economy.

The previous experiences show that the migratory issue has definitely been a value-adding element to any cooperation initiative with the Colombian Government, whether in technical or financial cooperation projects, including ODA Loan-type credit operations.

Later in this document, some of the programs designed by the Colombian public institutions identified in this study will be presented, as they may be of interest for JICA when proposing a cooperation work, given the inclusion of the component of assistance to the migrant or returnee population, either directly or transversely.

PRIOR TECHNICAL COOPERATION

Definitely, one of the most efficient strategies to strengthening and deepening relations with Colombian institutions is the use of the technical cooperation mechanism. JICA has been working with Colombia on this type of cooperation through technical assistance modalities that include the support by Japanese experts, capacity building through training courses, the provision of equipment and the implementation of volunteer programs.

Unlike other issues, the immigration phenomenon in Colombia is recent, and therefore its attention requires flexibility and adaptation. Beyond the humanitarian crisis it leads to, it has become a developmental challenge that worsens the country's historic shortcoming in key sectors such as health, education, public utilities and employment. For this reason, the cooperation with Colombia must diversify its lines and approaches, so that adaptation to the new challenges and priorities of the country is achieved.

Moreover, the opportunities to design technical cooperation projects to offer migrant assistance are very wide, and the Government, its institutions and territories have, generally, identified the areas of interest when proposing initiatives in this matter. The National Strategy for International Cooperation of Colombia (ENCI), for example, prioritized some topics that resulted from consultations and technical panels with the different sectoral and regional institutions. The outcome was the proposal of five (5) lines of cooperation in this area, as a complement to the strategies defined in the CONPES document on migrations¹²⁰. Some of the actions associated to these lines that were considered by the consulting team as interesting for JICA are the following¹²¹:

120 It should be borne in mind that the strategies for the assistance to migrants contained in the CONPES document were formulated as sectoral public policies, while the areas prioritized in the ENCI were conceived as lines in which the institutions are interested in obtaining international technical and financial cooperation.

121 National Cooperation Strategy 2019-2022. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, APC-Colombia, DNP. 2019. PDF version.

Recommendation

In order to materialize an ODA Loan program with a focus on the migration phenomenon, it is important to diversify the currently available technical cooperation programs, lines of action and sectors. This way, projects address the greatest challenges and pressures in the provision of services that can be developed with the institutions, even if they are not initially prioritized by international cooperation agencies. In this sense, it is important to keep active the aid effectiveness agenda defined in the Paris Declaration of 2005, which aims to deepen, among others, the principles of adoption, alignment and harmonization by international cooperation, in accordance with the needs of the recipient countries.

1. Health care

- Procurement of services for the migrant population included in the public health network.
- Access to health care services, child development centers, vaccination programs, care for complex diseases, and high-cost treatments for diseases such as cancer, kidney conditions and diabetes.
- Expansion and improvement of hospitals and public health infrastructure.
- Provision of technological equipment and first-level health personnel to assess health status and carry out screenings.

2. Education

- Coverage management: Provision of temporary classrooms in educational institutions, improvements and expansion of infrastructure, construction of new classrooms and toilet units.
- Permanence management: Provision of transportation service, registration of students in the School Food Program, supply of clothing/uniforms and cleaning kits, in order to reduce the risk of school drop out.

3. Protection of vulnerable groups

3.1. Aid to children and adolescents

- Mobile units and protection teams, with flexible modalities to assess children's conditions (unaccompanied, malnourished, expectant mothers).
- Provision of care and shelter services for mothers and children.

3.2. People in irregular settlements or living the streets

- Housing, drinking water and basic sanitation solutions.

4. Economic integration

- Strengthening of labor intermediation.
- Support for entrepreneurship.
- Facilitation of financial inclusion.

5. Information and Communications Technology

- Strengthening of ICT systems to register and classify the migrant population and cross check their conditions of entry and permanence in the country.

For its part, the Border Management Unit of the Presidency of the Republic also carried out a consolidation process of the needs and strategies that, at a sectoral level, require international cooperation support. According to the analysis, the main strategies to be addressed in the assistance to the migrant population were classified in three central lines¹²²:

[Economic inclusion of migrants through an income generation strategy:](#)

Roadmap for the economic integration of migrants, either through access to the labor market or the creation of their own ventures. Ten (10) actions have been prioritized in the short and medium term:

¹²² Situación y respuesta a flujos migratorios provenientes de Venezuela. Border Management Unit, Presidency of the Republic of Colombia. May 2020. PDF version.

- Enable mechanisms to continue regularizing the migratory status of the population, such as the different types of Special Permanence Permits (PEP 5, PEP-FF, Educational PEP, TPS).
- Carry out a characterization of the socioeconomic profile of migrants and monitor their economic integration processes.
- Reduce time and costs of degree validation procedures and create alternatives to the apostille requirement (Hague Convention for document validation).
- Expand the options of access to the skills certification and vocational training programs by the migrant population.
- Implement a specific route for the migrant population within the Public Employment System (SPE) and improve the alignment of labor information systems.
- Raise awareness among employers of the importance of combating forced labor and labor discrimination, and strengthening overall labor surveillance capacities.
- Adjust the regulations and procedures in force so that foreigners can access the financial support funds for entrepreneurship.
- Work with financial institutions to promote access to financial products and services by the Venezuelan population and invest in financial education.
- Promote equitable access of women to different socio-economic integration programs and expand the care capacity.
- Mobilize financial resources to promote local economic development: investment in public works, creation of special economic zones, stimulation of tourism development, strengthening of the orange economy, etc.

Addressing the effects on coexistence and citizen security:

- Strengthen knowledge and research on the linkage between migration and citizen security in the Colombian context.
- Identify and implement evidence-based strategies.

Expand the use of information and communication technologies to strengthen and coordinate responses to the migration phenomenon:

- Strengthen migration governance by using big data and digital communication interfaces between migrants, local communities and institutions.
- Coordinate humanitarian assistance in a more precise way in order to highlight its complementary role and make its follow-up, monitoring and evaluation possible.
- Facilitate the social and economic integration of migrants through an effective alignment of job demand and supply, and the provision of better training opportunities, more entrepreneurship options linked to the formal economy, and more solutions for positive interaction with host communities.

It can be concluded that the opportunities for technical cooperation on the migration issue are diverse. Many actions in the most affected territories are currently being covered by United Nations agencies such as UNHCR and IOM, as well as by aid workers and NGOs, as inferred from the mapping of aid workers developed in the framework of this consultancy. Similarly, some of the strategies proposed both by the ENCI and the Border Management Unit have been implemented by the Ministry of Health and Social Protection, the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Labor, as well as by the Colombian Family Welfare Institute (ICBF).

In the next section, some of the programs and projects aimed at assisting the migrant population developed by the institutions targeted in this study are presented. These projects represent an initial framework of opportunities for JICA in both technical cooperation and ODA Loan modalities.

SECTOR PROGRAMS AND OPPORTUNITIES

MINISTRY OF NATIONAL EDUCATION (MEN)

To start, it is worth mentioning that education is one of the core axes of the “Pact for Colombia, Pact for Equity” National Development Plan (PND) 2019-2023. In fact, the educational sector has received the highest budget in its history for the current four-year period.

At least four (4) of the 20 main goals established by the Government in the PND are directly related to the education sector. These goals are focused on: (i) expanding primary education coverage by 67%; (ii) increasing the number of beneficiaries of the School Food Program (PAE),

from 5.3 million to 7 million in 2023; (iii) increasing the number of students attending full-day schools; and (iv) strengthening the 61 public Higher Education Institutions, and gradual advance in free-of-charge access for 320,000 young people and recognition of excellence (this coverage is expected to increase from 53% to 60%)¹²³.

To achieve these goals, the Ministry of National Education (MEN) established a comprehensive group of strategies that includes a vigorous infrastructure program through the Educational Infrastructure Financing Fund (FFIE), which has the objective to finance projects for the construction, improvement, adaptation, extension and provision of public educational and digital infrastructure in initial, preschool, primary and secondary educational levels, in urban and rural areas.

The funds for the educational infrastructure projects implemented by the FFIE come from different sources, mainly from the allocated national budget. Financing from credit operations can be considered, provided they are included in the Medium-Term Fiscal Framework (MFMP) and in the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MGMP) established by the National Government, which means (as it has been previously noted) that credit replaces a source of financing.

The FFIE is also authorized by law to receive funds from international and private cooperation sources. When it comes to non-reimbursable resources, that is, a donation, national regulations allow their management through the figure of a commercial trust contract, which is governed by the private legal regime instead of the public. The autonomous patrimony resulting from the trust contract is directed by a Fiduciary Committee, which is in charge of advising the administration and the construction of educational infrastructure projects.

Currently, the FFIE has a portfolio of 541 projects in different regions of Colombia, of which 159 have already been completed, 221 are under construction, 148 are in the design phase and 13 are under structuring¹²⁴. Therefore, it can be said that the FFIE has extensive experience in the development of infrastructure projects.

With international cooperation resources, the Ministry of Education develops projects such as Education Cannot Wait, which has a component of construction and rehabilitation of classrooms or educational spaces to improve coverage education services, including Venezuelan children and adolescents, migrants and refugees. Another example of a program is *Juntos Aprendemos* (Together We Learn), which is financed with USAID resources and is aimed at strengthening educational spaces in host communities.

123 20 metas del Plan Nacional de Desarrollo que transformarán a Colombia (20 goals of the National Development Plan that will transform Colombia). Presidency of the Republic. 2019. Consulted on 06/22/2020. Available at: <https://id.presidencia.gov.co/especiales/190523-PlanNacionalDesarrollo/documentos/20MetasPND.pdf>

124 Educational Infrastructure Financing Fund. 2020. Consulted on: 05/26/2020. Disponible en: <https://ffie.com.co/proyectos/metad/>

Additionally, this Ministry has extensive experience in the implementation of external credit operations, including one with the IDB for USD 60 million that is currently in preparation and whose objective is to improve educational pathways in the initial, preschool, primary and secondary educational levels in rural areas.

Recommendation

It is important to take into account that the Ministry of National Education has no limitations or distinctions regarding the nationality and migration status of the population that is beneficiary of its services. Migration Colombia has also provided guidelines to facilitate the enrollment process of foreign minors in educational institutions, without imposing sanctions that could present a barrier to the enrollment of the migrant population².

The Ministry of National Education has provided educational services to around 330,000 Venezuelan students, which would be equivalent to the entire educational offer for a medium-sized city in Colombia. Statistics of the seats granted to this population are tracked through the Integrated Registration System (SIMAT)³, which is a valuable source for structuring any sectorial project that aims at impacting the migrant population. [See more information on Venezuelan migrant's education enrollment on Annex 6.](#)

Although the MEN does not have a project addressed exclusively to assist the migrant population, any type of program can benefit it transversally, including the infrastructure expansion ones. In fact, this is one of the goals of the National Development Plan.

MINISTRY OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL PROTECTION

As pointed out throughout this report, the health sector has undoubtedly been one of the most impacted sectors by the migratory phenomenon. It is known that the Venezuelan health system collapsed, and consequently, the health of its population, including those who have moved to Colombia, is quite precarious. Both communicable and non-communicable diseases, as well as events related to maternal and perinatal health pose a great challenge. According to data from the Ministry of Health and Social Protection and PAHO-WHO, until March 2020, 6,515,655 health services had been provided in the country, which corresponds to a total of 901,954 people attended¹²⁵.

125 Situation and Response of the Migratory Phenomenon In Health, Cutoff date: March 31, 2020. Ministry of Health and Social Protection, Health Cluster and PAHO-WHO.

Both the National Development Plan (PND) and the Health Sector Response Plan to the Migratory Phenomenon (Response Plan), consider different actions in the field of public health management to mitigate the impacts of migration in the different host territories. Among others, the Ministry has included activities of surveillance, capacity development, insurance management, collective and individual interventions (prevention of disease and promotion of health), as well as the provision of health supplies and access to water and basic sanitation.

Among these actions, it is the insurance of the migrant population where the Ministry focused its greatest efforts. As explained in the CONPES document on Migrations, “the costs of health care are lower when accessed via insurance, which is the scheme that distributes the health risk among a group of affiliates, reducing per capita spending. Conversely, the provision of event-based health services to the uninsured population implies higher spending as the costs are individually assumed without the solidarity of insurance”¹²⁶.

As of April 2020, the Ministry of Health and Social Protection reported a total of 216,285 Venezuelan migrants registered in the General System of Social Security in Health (SGSSS), of which 55.5% (approximately 119,000) are in the contributory regime and 45.5% (approximately 97,285) are in the subsidized regime.¹²⁷

According to data from Migration Colombia, as of March 31, 2020 there were 1,809,872 people from Venezuela residing in Colombia, of whom 1,025,038 have an irregular status¹²⁸ and therefore have no possibilities of accessing the General System of Social Security in Health (SGSSS) through insurance, either in the contributory or subsidized regime, in the short and medium term.

This situation means that in the near future, the system will continue to absorb most of the pressure of migrants via event-based care, which represents an impact in the long-term financial sustainability of the system, generating accumulated debts for health providers that ultimately become a barrier for the migrant population to access health services.

The Ministry of Health and Social Protection has been structuring strategies to solve this situation by designing basic care packages for the migrant population aimed at covering the most common health events such as maternal-perinatal care. Likewise, it has worked in the coordination with entities such as the Health Cluster and the Inter-Agency Group for Mixed Migration Flows (GIFMM), which is led by IOM and UNHCR, in the design of response plans, including actions like the provision of equipment and supplies for health centers in the areas most affected by migration.

126 Strategy for the Assistance to Migration from Venezuela. CONPES 3950. 2018. Available at: <https://colaboracion.dnp.gov.co/CDT/Conpes/Economicos/3950.pdf>

127 Source: Ministry of Health and Social Protection, interview with the Sayara Consulting Team, May 2020.

128 *Venezolanos en Colombia* (Venezuelans in Colombia). Migration Colombia. March 2020. Consulted on 09/28/2020. Available at: <https://www.migracioncolombia.gov.co/infografias/venezolanos-en-colombia-corte-a-31-de-marzo-de-2020>

Regarding infrastructure construction projects, the Ministry of Health and Social Protection works with the regional entities in the implementation of the Biennial Plans for Public Investments in Health. Each infrastructure project developed in the national territories must have the endorsement of the Directorate for the Provision of Services and Primary Care and comply with the guidelines issued for each type of service and level of care expected to be provided.

Public hospitals, that is, those where the health services are provided directly by the central government or the regional entities, represent the greatest opportunity for the development of health infrastructure projects. The Ministry has been implementing the Comprehensive Action Program in Public Hospitals (Ai Hospital), which is based on the sectoral objectives of the National Development Plan to reach higher levels of infrastructure and health provision, as a way of support for effective access and quality.

Through the Ai Hospital program, the Ministry aims at supporting the improvement of infrastructure and providing resources to public hospitals according to the needs of every territory. It also has the goal to improve the general management of public hospitals by establishing indicators and goals regarding the quality of services, the administrative and financial procedures and the hospital management in the territories.

In this context, the Ministry of Health and Social Protection has the experience and capabilities to receive an ODA Loan. It has adequate technical and financial tools, and it has been working with multilateral banks on credit operations containing components related to improving health care for the migrant population. Likewise, the Ministry also has gained experience in projects to strengthen public hospitals through donations from the Japanese Government. Some beneficiaries of such interventions are the hospitals of Tauramena, Casanare; San José de Belalcázar, Caldas; and San Blas, Boyacá.

MINISTRY OF HOUSING, CITY AND TERRITORY (VICE MINISTRY OF WATER)

The Consulting Team has focused on the water and basic sanitation programs over the housing projects when analyzing the scope of this Ministry. The reason is the recognition of the limitations of JICA to participate in housing projects, even when multilateral banks have been supporting the *Casa Digna, Vida Digna* project through credit operations, which is aimed at improving the quality of life by enhancing the conditions of houses and their surroundings. Regarding the water and sanitation projects that are implemented through the Vice Ministry of Water, the *Agua al Barrio* program has been prioritized for this study. This program is aimed at providing water and sanitation services under a differential approach, as it has targeted informal settlements, municipalities with difficult access, and municipalities with high poverty rates, which are areas that generally have a large presence of the Venezuelan migrant population.

Taking into account that this program was designed to reach highly vulnerable areas, the Ministry designed unconventional and flexible schemes for the provision and charge for the service (for example, prepayment or community billing schemes), solving the difficulties faced by the service providers when using conventional models.

The program expects to reach 15 pilot cities: Bogotá, Cali, Pasto, Soledad, Cartagena, Medellín, Itagüí, Bello, Pereira, Neiva, Riohacha, Cúcuta, Bucaramanga, Girón and Yopal. Its objective is to serve 72 informal settlements in highly vulnerable areas, some of them being located in the territories targeted by this consultancy.

For the structuring phase of this program, resources from regional entities, service providers and the Ministry have been used. Given that an estimated investment budget (five-hundred ninety-one thousand million COP, of which the Ministry is providing fifty-thousand-million COP) is available until 2022, there is an opportunity to design an ODA Loan-type operation.

MINISTRY OF LABOR

A robust job creation program was included in the National Development Plan, aimed at reducing unemployment to the lowest levels experienced since the 1990s. In relation to the migratory phenomenon, the National Government was aware of the need to integrate the population born in and returned from Venezuela into the labor market, not only because it guarantees the positive impacts expected from migratory processes, but it is key for this population to have access to state-provided services beyond humanitarian assistance.

A migrant who manages to access the labor market guarantees his/her registration in the Social Security System in Health, allows the schooling of his/her children and contributes to a more equitable distribution of the burdens of the State.

Therefore, the National Government has given predominance to the economic inclusion of migrants through an income-generation strategy that contains several actions, several of them being financed through non-reimbursable resources from a credit operation with the IDB (details of the operation are provided in the chapter on public institutions experiences included in this report).

The certification of migrant competencies, including degree validation, is necessary in this sector as it enables the use of the professional background of this population for their insertion in the labor market. Hence, this is an opportunity for JICA to provide support through technical and financial cooperation. Although this sector does not develop infrastructure projects as part of its mission, the Consulting Team considers that they must be considered, since labor inclusion is the most valuable indicator for the Colombian Government to leverage the benefits and added value that the migratory situation represents for the country in the long term.

Among the actions carried out by the Ministry of Labor, the following were identified as relevant to receive support via technical or financial cooperation from JICA:

- Granting access to the skills certification and vocational training programs to the migrant population.
- Implementing a specific route for the migrant population within the Public Employment System (SPE).
- Improving the alignment of regional labor information systems.
- Implementing regional mobility programs.

The Ministry of Labor has gained experience in the implementation of credit programs. At the same time, it has identified actions that involve the migrant population but currently lack funding, so an operation with this Ministry is certainly a good opportunity for JICA.

COLOMBIAN FAMILY WELFARE INSTITUTE (ICBF)

According to the CONPES document on Migrations, the migratory phenomenon from Venezuela has generated a growing demand for early childhood care and has impacted the prevention and protection models for children, adolescents and young people.

Through the Migrant Childhood Strategy, the ICBF set out the goal to *improve the integration of the response to migrant children and adolescents and host communities through services with a migratory focus that facilitate their transit from emergency care to family and community stabilization* ¹²⁹.

To cover the needs of the children and youth migrant population through the Prevention and Protection systems, the strategy includes activities in all the programmatic focus areas of the Institute: Early Childhood, Childhood and Adolescence, Families and Communities, and Nutrition. In addition, there is a focus area called Management of Alliances, Cooperation and Civil Society, in which the management of resources for infrastructure and seats has been set as a goal, taking into account the current need to expand the care offered by around 15 thousand seats for migrants, in addition, to the nearly 100,000 that have already been granted.

Through this strategy, the ICBF is promoting complementary work with territorial entities, joining efforts with municipal mayors and international cooperation to face the growing demand for services to migrant children, which is even expected to double by the end of

129 Migrant Childhood Strategy (*Estrategia Niñez Migrante*). ICBF. 2020.

2020. The ICBF, like the majority of Colombian institutions, has a rights-based approach in the provision of services, which means that there is no differentiation between the national or immigrant population in the access to its institutional offer.

Although the ICBF does not have a specific investment project for the care of the migrants, the services provided to this population, including the commitments made in the document CONPES 3950, are embedded in the budgets of existing projects. The resources of these investment projects are financed by the national budget and therefore a source substitution through an ODA Loan credit operation may be agreed with the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit.

In relation to ICBF-owned infrastructure projects, the scheme used by the Institute is the framework agreement with cooperators (agencies or governments), in which a third partner is appointed to manage and implement the project. This third partner can be a public or private entity and will be responsible for the execution of the adaptations and constructions, in accordance with the guidelines and under the supervision of the ICBF.

OUTLINE FOR STRUCTURING


This chapter explains the necessary steps and the institutions that participate in the structuring of a credit operation with the Colombian government, whether it is a free investment, specific destination or Government's guaranteed type of credit. These operations need to be endorsed by the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit and be included in the debt planning of the corresponding external sources, which can be multilateral banks or development agencies or banks of the different cooperating countries.

The structuring of a credit operation with the Colombian Government requires an implementation period of between six months and a year, depending on whether it is a free investment or has a specific destination, the former being the simplest as the credit resources go to the national treasury and do not need to be transferred to an institution, which demands additional procedures and time to complete.

When the operation has a specific destination, the process is more complex, since several missions for the analysis, evaluation and design of objectives, goals, results and products need to be conducted, in order to properly align the operation with the problem that is intended to be addressed. However, this type of credit is attractive because it contributes to building capacities among public entities, is aimed at a specific strategy or program (as is the case of the migrant population), and facilitates future close collaboration with borrowing agencies or countries.

The following scheme summarizes the process of structuring an operation, from the negotiation phase until the signing of the credit agreement:

Figure 21.
Route for Structuring an External Credit Operation



Source: Authors' elaboration

MILESTONES AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN STRUCTURING

Based on the scheme above, some observations on specific aspects of interest to JICA are presented.

Negotiation to establish the relevant technical objective

It is important to have worked with the institution, preferably through cooperation and technical assistance projects, in this case, in the field of migration, as it facilitates exchange of mutual knowledge of both the assistance programs that have been developed (with their strengths, weaknesses and opportunities) and the work and coordination schemes with the territories. Even knowledge of the technical teams that would be involved in a possible operation would be possible.

Associated with this prior technical work, it is important to establish dialogue with the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit and the DNP, in such a way that both entities present their considerations regarding a possible operation before agreeing on the credit instrument and financial conditions that best suit the parties, in accordance with the modalities previously defined. It is relevant to mention that having had prior experience with institutions also facilitates the identification of possible budget spaces that could be affected through a source substitution by external credit.

The above aspects must be discussed before the institution submits the formal request to the Ministry of Finance and DNP for the inclusion of the operation in the credit planning of the corresponding source. It is also worth recalling that an operation of this type cannot represent a modification of the budget allocated for the entity, and that it must be in line with the fiscal projections defined by the National Government.

Technical negotiations with the interested institution

The technical and financial preparation work of the transaction must be adapted to the characteristics of the financial instrument chosen between the Government (mainly Ministry of Finance and Public Credit) and the external source. JICA operates under two broad categories of ODA Loans: Project Type Loans and Program Loans.

Thus, it is important to define, together with the Colombian Government, which type of instrument is the most appropriate to meet the objectives of the operation, even when both are feasible to implement an ODA Loan. The instrument selected will depend on the type of program to be supported. In some cases, governmental institutions require support for the implementation of clearly defined public policies, where perhaps it would be interesting to propose a Program Loan. In other cases, when it comes to specific infrastructure or endowment works, the appropriate financial instrument would surely be a Project Type Loan in one of its forms.

In either case, the negotiations and technical preparation of the operation should take into account the particularities of procurement systems (if applicable), the control and audit measures and the verification systems that are proposed.

On this matter, Colombian public entities prefer auditing systems that rely on national systems. This implies, for example, avoiding the hiring of external auditing firms when possible, since the Colombian public procurement systems are complex, not just because of the selection rules and procedures required by law, but because the Colombian Constitution already provides the fiscal control and monitoring of the public sector through the Comptroller General of the Nation.

The same is applicable for some other requirements set out in the lenders' policies. Cases such as the adoption of anti-corruption guidelines usually have implications beyond the legal powers of the institutions, because they cannot assume powers that legally belong to other authorities (e.g. the Prosecutor's Office).

In credit operations, unlike donations, bound purchases are not generally accepted, as they are refundable resources, so it is necessary to use open and competitive acquisition plans in line with the country's public procurement systems.

Finally, during this stage of technical preparation, social and environmental assessments and some cross-cutting aspects such as risk analysis and mitigation methods are simultaneously conducted.

[Preparation of the CONPES document](#)

CONPES is the highest instance for public policy formulation in Colombia. The fact that external credit operations must be authorized by the Economic and Social Policy Council guarantees that the operation is fully supported by the State, as in addition to the President of the Republic all the ministers and entities that participate in the implementation of the program are involved. It also proves that its alignment with the objectives and requirements that ensure its correct execution and monitoring.

In fact, the same CONPES document establishes the mechanisms for monitoring and evaluating targets, and lists the verification authorities in the National Planning Department.

[Approval by the Inter-Parliamentary Public Credit Commission](#)

In Colombia, the expenditure and investment budget is approved by Congress of the Republic. Fiscal and credit policy, while directed by the Executive Branch, must be in accordance with the approved components of the budget law.

The approval of credit operations by the Congress through the Inter-Parliamentary Public Credit Commission proves the institutional support to the debt policy and is a guarantee for the lender of the State's commitment with the obligations assumed by a particular government.

POSSIBLE RISKS, UNKNOWN VARIABLES REQUIRING FURTHER STUDY IN THE SUGGESTED FRAMEWORK

This document provides a brief description of the main risks inherent to a possible credit operation with the Colombian Government aimed at financing assistance programs and infrastructure projects directed at mitigating and resolving the poverty situation of the Venezuelan migrant population in Colombia.

The analysis focuses on the identification and characterization of the main elements that, in the opinion of the Consulting Team, represent the main threats and vulnerabilities to the success of the credit operation in terms of the repayment of the debt by the Colombian Government and the effective execution and implementation in the territory in social, economic and environmental terms.

Following is a brief description of the general risk components identified, as well as the different elements that must be analyzed, quantified and valued by JICA prior to signing the credit contract with the Colombian Government.


CHARACTERIZATION OF THE MAIN RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH THE SIGNING, EXECUTION AND REPAYMENT OF A POTENTIAL CREDIT WITH THE COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT

When entering into a loan contract, economic and financial aspects that determine the capacity of the National Government to repay the financial obligation in the long and short-term should be taken into account.

In the same way, it is equally important that the credit taker has regulatory, operational, administrative and logistical elements in its planning and implementation mechanisms that provide confidence in the speed and procedures of formalization of the programs and projects, the management of resources and their efficient use, as well as the appropriate monitoring and continuity.

In view of the foregoing, the Consulting Team considers that the risks of the operation are presented in three main categories, namely: (a) economic risks, b) fiscal risks, and c) institutional risks. The first two elements relate to the nation's credit vulnerabilities, while the third is associated with the threats arising from the disbursement and execution of resources, as well as with the implementation of derivative programs and projects.

Figure 22.
Main Risk Groups Identified



Source: Authors' elaboration

The following is a brief description of each of the associated risks:

Economic Risks: Defined as the potential risk in case of downturns or crashes in the national economy, which could affect the payment of debt incurred by the State. This analysis assumes that a rich, diversified, resilient, market-oriented and adaptable economy, along with a track record of sustained economic growth, provides a solid basis of income, improves flexibility in fiscal and monetary policy, and ultimately increases its debt capacity. For this reason, it is essential to analyze the macroeconomic fundamentals of the country, its historical stability, the level of income of the population, the growth perspective of the economy, the economic diversity and its potential vulnerabilities, as well as the culture of repayment of its external credits.

Fiscal Risks: Understood as the unexpected events that adversely affect the fiscal framework established by the National Government, as well as factors that have the potential to alter the accrued (actual) data of the nation's financial variables relative to their projected values. These risks can have significant impacts on the fiscal result and the financing needs, i.e. the surplus or deficit of the public sector, through higher expenditures or public revenues lower than expected.

Institutional Risk: Defined as the risk when the credit taker does not have clear mechanisms that allow the implementation and monitoring of the resources derived from the operation, which prevents it from meeting its organizational and political objectives. This category includes not only political and regulatory changes, but also the operational and administrative capacity of the State for the implementation of programs and projects in the determined time.

Each of the above-mentioned risk groups represents a degree of threat and vulnerability that may affect the effectiveness of the credit operation. However, there are different elements associated to each group that must be analyzed and quantified prior to the disbursement of resources and on which it is recommended to perform evaluation and mitigation exercises. These may be part of the requirements to be included by JICA in the loan contract concluded between the parties.

The elements that will be explained and defined in this document are summarized in the following table:

Table 64.
Risk Groups and Derived Elements

Institutional Risks	Effectiveness and stability of public policy
	Institutional transparency and responsibility
	Fiduciary capacity of the State to execute the credit
	Security threats that may affect the projects to be implemented
	Environmental and social threats of infrastructure projects
Economic Risks	Debt repayment cultura
	Country income levels
	Economic growth expectations
	Economic diversity and potential volatility
Fiscal Risks	Debt level and fiscal flexibility
	Medium and long-term fiscal vulnerabilities
	Potential risks of contingent liabilities
	External liquidity level
	Ratings history with Risk Agencies

Source: Authors' elaboration

DEFINITION OF DERIVED RISKS AND PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS

INSTITUTIONAL RISKS:

In order to assess the risk exposure and level of uncertainty associated with the State's capacity for the implementation and execution of the ODA loan program, the following elements are to be analyzed:

[Effectiveness and stability of public policy aimed at the care and assistance of Venezuela's migrant population](#)

This element focuses on determining the level of stability of the public policies of the recipient country related to funding resources. It is a measure used to determine the probability that potential regulatory, administrative and budgetary changes may have over the life of the credit affecting the implementation of derivative projects and programs.

In Colombia, planning processes are part of the political and budgetary structure of the national and local governments. So, the first step in mobilizing resources for the financing of programs and projects is to be included in the thematic strategies (i.e. health, education, gender) of the respective development plans. In fact, the legislation is clear in mentioning that it will only be possible to process funding resources from public sources, and therefore from international funding sources for those projects that are duly included in these planning instruments.

In the face of this, and as detailed in the documents developed for this consultancy, the Government of Colombia currently has a clear support strategy for the migrant population. However, migration has not been explicitly incorporated in the thematic strategies of sectoral development plans, which may create limitations for the management of international resources to projects oriented exclusively to the assistance to the Venezuelan migrant population. This is mainly because of the difficulty in achieving the separation of implementation goals and objectives, which makes it difficult to measure the impact of programs. However, these are aspects that can be addressed in the credit formalization documents prior to the disbursement and implementation stages.

[Fiduciary capacity of the State for the implementation of the credit](#)

The fiduciary risk is understood as the potential vulnerability of operational, administrative and legal problems arising from the management of funds from the ODA loan. This may include cases to where an agent does not act properly, or not in the best interest of the client, without necessarily including a fault or fraud.

In Colombia, the capacity of public entities to manage international financing resources and the implementation of derivative programs and projects varies. Most sectoral entities have experience, standardized processes and specific teams in place for the management of international resources. However, the capacity to develop projects related to migration differs across the ministries included in the interviews, as shown in the Maturity Framework analysis carried out in the previous chapter of the consultancy.

To mitigate the derived risks, JICA is recommended to implement a potential ODA Loan with those entities that have been prioritized by the Maturity Framework analysis.

[Mechanisms of transparency and institutional responsibility \(clear information and processes of subscription and payments\) for credit](#)

This element analyzes the existence of checks and balances between the institutions implementing the credit and the perceived level of corruption in the country, which correlates strongly with the responsibility of its institutions. The impartial enforcement of contracts and respect for the rule of law (especially property rights), which closely correlate with the respect for the interests of creditors and investors; and the independence of statistical offices and the media, and the history of reviews or data breaches, qualify as measures of transparency and reliability of information.

Colombia is characterized by being a participatory democracy with clear rules and processes for government procurement, and surveillance schemes for the control of programs and projects implemented by the National Government. Although this situation is clear from a regulatory point of view, the perceived efficiency may vary at the sectoral level, so it is recommended to analyze this situation prior to the contracting of the credit and define the requirements that JICA considers relevant for the implementation of the ODA Loan.

[Threats in terms of security, as well as social and environmental aspects in the implementation of the credit](#)

This element involves identifying the potential challenges of political institutions to address internal conflicts in the implementation of the projects, or by significant challenges to the legitimacy of institutions on ethnic, religious or political grounds.

In this regard, Colombia faces major security challenges, especially in the regions that have been affected by the armed conflict. However, it is important to mention that the security threat has been decreasing substantially in recent years, as progress has been made through peace and reconciliation agreements between the different armed actors in the country, and is unlikely to suddenly increase. Nonetheless, it is important to assess the security risk in the territories where resources will be allocated for the financing of development programs,

since it may be a variable that can affect the implementation and limit the fulfillment of the proposed objectives.

[Environmental and social threats associated with infrastructure projects](#)

This element refers to the social and environmental impacts caused by the implementation of the programs and projects, which may be a requirement for the prior execution of the project, such as prior consultations, licensing procedures or environmental permits.

Prior consultation, which is a mechanism to guarantee the rights of indigenous peoples or ethnic groups when projects, public works or activities are developed within their territories, is definitely a risk to consider for any intervention in areas such as Alta Guajira, where indigenous populations consider themselves binational.

These risks can lead to extra charges and overdue terms for credit-derived programs, affecting their impact and sustainability. The level of impact and probability of occurrence may vary depending on the complexity and execution scheme of the project, among other aspects.

This document contains the main elements to be taken into account for the analysis of social and environmental risks of this type of projects. However, it is important to mention that Colombia currently has clear guidelines and quality standards defined for several productive sectors such as transport, health, education, housing, water and sanitation. Likewise, the recent implementation of a regulatory framework for the structuring and implementation of Public-Private Partnership projects has brought the modernization of public policies aimed at controlling the risks assumed by the State. As such, the CONPES documents 3714, 3107, 3169, 3760, among others, provide clear guidelines for the identification, risk management and calculation of contingent liabilities for infrastructure development in Colombia.

ECONOMIC RISKS

In order to assess the risk exposure and level of uncertainty associated with the State's debt capacity, it is proposed to analyze the following elements:

[Macroeconomic stability and debt payment culture \(history of defaults\)](#)

This element identifies the country's level of economic stability, understanding that the effort of the institutions and of the applied economic policy creates an attractive environment for investment and income generation, which in turn will be represented in a greater capacity for the citizens and the government.

In this aspect, Colombia stands out positively, since the country has been characterized by its strict compliance with international financial obligations. No default events that affect the credibility of the country's monetary and financial policy have been registered, which is positive for a potential credit operation.

Likewise, the ratings given to Colombia by international risk agencies reflect a history of moderate macroeconomic management and monetary and exchange rate flexibility, which "mitigates external shocks. They also reflect a moderate debt burden and a weak external profile, which includes vulnerability to sudden changes in terms of trade. However, Colombia has a flexible line of credit for USD 11 billion from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which supports its external liquidity" (Standard & Poor's, 2020).

[Country's income levels and expectations of economic growth](#)

This aspect analyzes the recent evolution of the national economy and the expected variation of the income and the aggregate product. It is understood that with higher levels of GDP and GDP per capita, a country has broader potential fiscal and financing bases, which generally supports creditworthiness.

Colombia has had a positive evolution in the levels of both the GDP per capita and the aggregate GDP in the past decade due to the greater demand and increase in the prices of mining and oil commodities between 2010 and 2015, which has had a positive effect on the development of economic sectors and the generation of employment and income for society. However, the fall in commodity prices in the second half of the last decade has affected the GDP growth, a factor that, together with the emergency caused by COVID-19, led to an economic contraction and could result in an economic recession for the period 2020-2021.

According to the latest report issued by S&P in March 2020, "before the start of the pandemic, GDP growth was expected to be around 0.7% in 2020, with a drop in per capita income of 0.4% (Annex 5), with a possible average recovery of around 3.4% during the 2021-2023 period", which would be higher than in most Latin American economies.

In line with the above and according to the latest Medium-Term Fiscal Framework report published by the National Government in June 2020, the expected downturn of the country's economy in 2020 may be -7.8%, which would be higher than the world average (-4.9%) but lower than the Latin American average (-9.4%). This situation reflects vulnerabilities on the income of Colombians and the nation's tax revenues. Both must be evaluated by JICA prior to signing the loan contract.

[Economic diversity and potential volatility](#)

This aspect assesses the potential of added value generation in the main sectors of economic activity, as well as the volatility factors that can affect their positive evolution.

In this aspect, Colombia has had positive outcomes in terms of consolidation of economic activities with high added value in the construction, financial, public services, and energy sectors, among others. Colombia has benefited from the notorious improvement of internal security conditions over the last decade, increasing its investment levels. However, there are infrastructure deficiencies that restrict connectivity and hinder the dynamism of the economy, factors that are necessary for the nation's economic evolution.

Mining and energy are the main economic sectors generating foreign exchange and determining economic growth, but given their dependency on the global conditions, they have been increasingly affected by the COVID-19 crisis. In this regard, according to the latest report published by S&P in March 2020, it is known that "the recent drop in oil prices, together with the global negative impact of COVID-19, has weakened the external profile of Colombia, as a result of lower export income and a broader current account deficit, which raise concerns about expectations of economic growth."

In this sense, it is important that JICA reviews the effects of COVID-19 on the generation of income in the mining and energy sector as the country's economic stability and the Government's credit capacity will continue to depend on this sector in the short and medium terms.

FISCAL RISKS

To assess the risk exposure and level of uncertainty associated with the Medium-Term Fiscal Framework compliance, analysis may include the following elements:

Debt level and fiscal flexibility

To analyze this element, JICA may evaluate the levels of indebtedness of the National Government, as well as the existing mechanisms to control it. It is understood that the higher a government's level of internal and external debt is, the lower its capacity to contract new financial obligations will come as a result.

In this aspect, Colombia has increased the levels of external and internal debt, derived from the lower generation of tax revenues after the fall in the prices of oil and mining commodities. In turn, this has had an effect on the current account balance, registering a current account deficit of 3.5% at the end of 2019 (Annex 5), which has been financed through debt.

According to S&P 2020, lower exports will worsen the net external debt to 140% of current account income in 2020 (from 113% in 2019) and will likely remain above 120% during the 2021-2023 period. In conclusion, this aspect creates pressures on debt levels that could affect the Government's borrowing capacity and should be analyzed in the short and medium term.

[Country's medium and long-term fiscal vulnerabilities](#)

Vulnerabilities that have a direct impact on the country's fiscal framework in the medium and long-term must be analyzed. Some of these vulnerabilities include the permitted fiscal deficit, the balance and/or surplus of the current account, the levels of Foreign Direct Investment, and the policies associated with these fiscal indicators. These elements are important for understanding the vulnerabilities that the Colombian State may assume in the short, medium and long term related to its financial obligations with international entities.

Given the emergency caused by the COVID-19 outbreak, the National Government decided to increase the allowed deficit of the fiscal rule to 8.9% of the GDP. Due to the 2020 current account levels, which are close to -4.8% of the GDP, the deficit will have to be financed mainly through debt, reaching 58.5% of GDP for 2020 according to Government plans, which is 12.5% higher than in 2019. Although it is expected that a sustained economic recovery in 2021 and 2023 will reduce 35% of debt levels in the next decade, the present situation reflects a greater vulnerability for Colombia's public finances, which should be analyzed prior to contracting the credit.

[Potential risks of contingent liabilities limiting the country's fiscal capacity](#)

It refers to those guarantees and contingent commitments assumed by the Colombian state for financing of its productive activities and the development of its infrastructure projects, which may affect the stability of public finances in the event that the risks associated with the development of the programs materialize.

In the Colombian case, there are no significant contingent liabilities that could represent a greater fiscal deficit. However, it is important to monitor the projects of the fourth and fifth generation of concessions, as well as the First Line of the Bogotá Metro project, where the national government has assumed risks associated with demand that, if materialized, would represent an important expense for the nation. It is equally important to review the contingencies of the financial sector and of all non-financial public companies, including Ecopetrol's debt, which according to Government reports represents close to 7% of the GDP.

[External liquidity level](#)

This element is related to the country's capacity to generate international currencies for the fulfillment of financial obligations contracted with non-residents. This is regularly measured

by analyzing the level of external debt in relation to the evolution of current account balances, taking into account the evolution of exchange rate levels, plus international reserves.

In Colombia, the combination of lower oil prices and the slowdown in world economic growth derived from the current pandemic may erode Colombia's external profile, albeit with a lower concentration of the energy and mining sector the recovery of the current account deficit can be supported by an increase of non-oil exports. According to S&P 2020, external liquidity will depend less on oil due to the fall in oil prices and exports, which during 2019 represented 23% of current account income, compared to 42% in 2014, before the last oil price shock. In fact, oil export revenue is expected to decline in 2020, contributing to a rise in the current account deficit to 5.6% of the GDP (from 4.4% last year). However, the weak growth in non-oil exports is expected to gradually recover current account income. This, along with lower repatriation of profits and a weaker exchange rate, could reduce current account deficits to an average of 4% of the GDP during the 2021-2023 period.

On the other hand, in relation to the level of international reserves, no constant increases or decreases are expected, according to information provided in the new Medium-Term Fiscal Framework 2020-2030 by the National Government, and with the figures projected by S&P (Annex 5). However, it is important to assess the implications of this situation on the country's fiscal risk prior to a potential disbursement operation.

[Rating history of risk agencies](#)

The last element that is relevant in the analysis of the country's fiscal risk and debt capacity is the history and evolution of the country's long and short-term debt ratings issued by the world's main agencies, such as: Fitch Ratings, Moody's Investor Services and S&P. It is understood that an entity that has historically maintained a good credit rating and remains at investment levels, has characteristics of an economic, fiscal, monetary and institutional nature that guarantee external credit operations.

In this sense, Colombia's ratings reflect stability, as shown in Annex 5. According to S&P, "its track record of sound fiscal and monetary policies that, together with a significant improvement in the conditions of internal security for the last 10 years, have supported greater investment, growth and less vulnerability of the economy in terms of trade and other external factors. The Government leveraged the favorable prices of international commodities in recent years to make structural changes in its fiscal policy, improve its debt profile and develop its local capital market."

Notwithstanding, it is important that JICA, prior to the formalization of the operation, follow up on the notes and perspective adjustments that the long and medium term ratings may define, since the ratings will be revised as a result of the COVID 19 crisis.

SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS CONSIDERATIONS

The social and environmental risks listed have been designed based on JICA’s Guidelines for Environmental and Social Considerations (ESC Guidelines). The “ESC Guidelines are set forth JICA’s responsibilities and required procedures, together with obligations of partner countries and project proponents, in order to put ESC into practice” (JICA 2016).

ESC guideline lays out aspects that must be taken into account when “a project aiming for economic and social development may nevertheless entail a risk of having negative impacts on the environment or society, such as pollution, loss of natural habitat, involuntary resettlement, and infringement of people’s rights”.

At the time of this study, no cooperation agreements or loans have been allocated for specific infrastructure development. Nevertheless, because of the findings of this report, it can be predicted that a potential program coordinated between JICA and the government could fall under Category C and FI according to Environmental Categories below:

Enviromental Categories	
Category	Description
A	Project that is likely to have significant adverse impacts on enviroment and society. For example, a large-scale project in a sector that requieres special attention such as energy development and infrastructure development, or a project in a sensitive area such as a nature reserve or a living sphere o indigenous people.
B	Project whose impacts on the environment and society are less adverse than of category A.
C	Project that has a minimal or virtually no impact on the enviroment and society.
FI	Project in which JICA funds rhe financial intermediary or executing agency that selects its sub-projects after JICA’s approval of the funding, and therefore JICA cannot assess the ESC of each sub-project prior to its approval. Such projects are classified as FI the sub-projects are likely to have a consederable impact on the environment and society.

Guidelines for Environmental and Social Considerations¹³⁰

130 JICA Annual Report, Guidelines for Environmental and Social Considerations, 2016 https://www.jica.go.jp/english/publications/reports/annual/2016/c8h0vm0000aj21oz-att/2016_54.pdf

In the scenario where JICA successfully signs a cooperation agreement for an ODA loan with the Colombian government aimed at developing infrastructure to address the needs of the VMR-CR and the host communities, a more comprehensive and specific study will be run as directed by the ESC Guidelines. At this stage, the present study has pre-identify some social and environmental potential risk factors.

Table 65.
Social and Environmental Risk Considerations

ESC Guidelines Considerations

Risk	Impacts in the Context of Colombia	Probability	Severity
Involuntary resettlement, migration, and urbanization.	In the context of Venezuelan migration, which is mainly based in urban areas, the construction of hospitals, schools, and other physical works, generally entails the resettlement of homes or the affectation of public and private goods.	High	Medium (large infrastructure projects, such as power plants, could entail massive resettlement or major damages major damages).
Unfair distribution of benefits, local conflicts of interest, and impacts on local economy.	<p>Targeted investments vary the risk of being considered as “unfair”. Posing them as investments for settlements of vulnerable communities, which in few cases are exclusive to migrants, can counteract that risk.</p> <p>Labeling or limiting services benefits to one particular group, in this case Venezuelan migrants, refugees and Colombian returnees, can negatively impact distribution of benefits as well as create animosities among migrants and host communities.</p>	Low (Depending on the type of infrastructure and its location, the risk may vary, but the prior consideration of it in each case, may lead to being generally low)	Low
Impacts on vulnerable populations such as indigenous peoples and the poor, gender equality, and children’s rights.	In several of the target areas of potential investments, there are ancestral habitats of indigenous communities, in particular in the border areas of La Guajira, where the Wayuu (a binational people), compose the majority of the population. However, the type of works to be carried out would, in general, be of benefit to indigenous communities and other vulnerable populations. In order to avoid risks of cultural, social, and environmental damages, it would be necessary to carry out previous community engagement activities and consultancy as required by the Colombian law.	Low	Low
Impacts on community health and safety (including accidents and epidemics such as HIV/AIDS).	<p>Infrastructure developments that could be carried out should not lead to health risks for beneficiary communities, except in the construction period, which would be easily avoidable if the appropriate assessment of materials and construction methods are approved by international and local health authorities, as well as social distancing and protection gear is provided in order to avoid COVID19 contagion.</p> <p>In the case of large infrastructure such as water plants, these might entail a negative impact if built in unstable land and fragile geo-environmental settings. The effect can range from water natural resources contamination or drought, to the transmission of viruses propagated by animals such as mosquitos like dengue (a widely spread virus in Barranquilla, Cartagena and more recently Medellín) if waste is inappropriately managed.</p>	Low	Low
Impacts on, or caused by, the labor environment (including occupational health and safety).	<p>Colombian construction workers lack strong legal guarantees that protect them from accidents and health issues that occur as a result of their job. The majority of the labor force is hired through temporary contracts, absolving employers from any liability for long term negative effects on workers health.</p> <p>In areas of influence of criminal groups, contractors could be victims of extortions in order to carry out construction works.</p>	Medium	Medium

ESC Guidelines Considerations

Risk	Impacts in the Context of Colombia	Probability	Severity
Impacts on social structures, social infrastructures, and social services.	Such risks would be minimal or nonexistent since JICA is looking to strengthen social services through better infrastructure.	Very Low	Very Low
Impacts on cultural heritage.	May occur in architectural, landscaping, traditional educational and medical facilities, as well as recreational areas. The above require consultation and planning with local communities, and appropriate alignment with local development plans.	High	High
Other Social Considerations			
Climate change	Climate change can lead to forced displacement of vulnerable communities due to floods or droughts, which may expand needs for service provision in other areas of the country. For example, a possible drought in La Guajira (a desertic region of Colombia) can force mobility to neighboring cities like Valledupar, shifting the population make up, specific needs and new social dynamics.	Low	High
Exacerbation of social conflicts.	Tensions between host communities and migrant/refugee populations caused by feelings of competition over resources, misinformation, and xenophobic sentiments. The above can negatively impact the perceptions of beneficiary communities around projects or activities carried out under a cooperation agreement between JICA and the Colombian government.	Medium	High
	Violent encounters between illegal armed groups and the Colombian military forces is more likely in regions currently hosting a large number of migrants and refugees, such as the northern border of La Guajira, and Norte de Santander and Arauca. This can prevent JICA, other cooperation agencies, and the Colombian government from developing any infrastructure activity with a defined timeframe. Moreover, conflict can lead to forced displacement and revictimization of migrants, refugees, and host communities.	High	High
	Violent attacks on infrastructure by illegal armed groups. These can target infrastructure developed with the cooperation of JICA, or constrain any plans in relation to physical infrastructure.	Low	High
	Increase in (forced) recruitment by illegal armed groups, mainly of minors. A common practice by illegal armed groups has now negatively impacted migrants and refugees. The above can shift priorities in terms of infrastructure needs, and pose a threat on the safety of local communities and institutional officials carrying out social development activities.	High	High
COVID19, social distancing policies and socio-economic impacts.	Rise in the number of cases might lead to more strict social distancing policies and prevent national and international organizations from carrying out activities such as assessments, research, community engagement, and building infrastructure. As an end result, operations can be delayed and/or postponed.	Medium	High
	The increase of cases will lead to a higher demand for healthcare facilities, shifting the Colombian Government priorities to assist this sector and reject any cooperation aimed at supporting the movement of populations such as Venezuelan migrants and refugees.	Medium	High

CONCLUSIONS

In the previous chapter, the potential risks that may arise from the credit operation with the Colombian Government have been listed. It is relevant to evaluate every aspect mentioned in this document prior to developing the contract for the loan, and identify the elements that may be subject to monitoring and control as they should be incorporated in the documents that formalize the respective operation.

It is also important to monitor the country's economic activity and fiscal vulnerability, which will be affected by the COVID 19 at the national and international level, noting that, according to the Medium-Term Fiscal Framework 2020-2030, the economic outlook has the following macroeconomic risks that are associated with the pandemic:

- A. Extension of the period of preventive isolation that would generate a greater impact on consumers, companies, investors, workers and supply chains, slowing down the rebound of the economy.
- B. Slower-than-expected global economic recovery, associated with a new outbreak of the virus that would negatively impact the economic growth of commercial partners and the price of commodities.
- C. Impact on the solvency and balance of the financial system, which would amplify the adverse effects of the economic shock, taking into account its role in macroeconomic stability.
- D. Greater deterioration of the labor market caused by the continuation of the shock, which could generate hysteresis or inertia in unemployment, preventing a rapid recovery.

If any of these risks materialize, both economic growth and the medium-term payment balance scenario could be affected, which may have a direct impact on the risks of the credit operation.

See Annex 5 for Main economic indicators of Colombia (S&P March 2020) and Colombia's long- and short-term debt ratings - Risk rating agencies in Colombia



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APPENDIX 1: COVID-19 AND POSSIBLE IMPACTS ON THE REGIONAL VENEZUELAN MIGRATORY FLOWS



The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the possible impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on Venezuelan migratory flows in Latin America and the Caribbean, specifically in Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, and Trinidad and Tobago. Hence, the progress of the pandemic and the main measures aimed at controlling it are presented, including actions to restrict human mobility and counteract its first effects, keeping the focus on the Venezuelan population and their needs prior to the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in the analyzed countries. Subsequently, the macroeconomic impacts are evaluated, considering the effects on the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and the employment conditions, as key information that leads to assumptions on the capacity to integrate the migrant population after the emergency response. Later, the groups within the Venezuelan populations with greater propensity to return to their native country are identified, based on studies carried out in different geographic locations. Finally, the information analyzed is presented to provide an overview of the possible trends of Venezuelan migrant flows after the first phase of the pandemic.

EVOLUTION OF THE PANDEMIC

On January 30, 2020, the Director-General of the World Health Organization (WHO) declared that the COVID-19 outbreak was a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC), in accordance with the International Health Regulations (WHO, 2006) that are applicable to all States Parties.¹³¹ Over a month later, on March 11, WHO declared this outbreak a pandemic.

By May 31, the infection had significantly advanced in the countries that are part of this study, on which some indicators are presented in Table 1. Perhaps the most accurate indicator is the mortality rate vs. population density, which is highly dependent on the time elapsed since the start of the pandemic, the type of contagion prevention measures taken by the authorities, and the population's compliance with their implementation. According to the reference date, the panorama in the countries of the sample widely differs, as mortality ranges from 5.7 deaths per million people in Trinidad and Tobago to 190.3 in Ecuador.

Table 1 also presents the fatality rate, which is the ratio between confirmed deaths and confirmed cases, and ranges from 1.1 in Chile to 8.6 in Ecuador. Given that the number of confirmed cases depends on the testing volume, this indicator tends to be lower in the countries that actively apply tests within their population, since they increase the denominator of the ratio.

Table 1.
Selected Countries. Indicators of COVID-19 Confirmed Cases and Confirmed Deaths, as of May 31, 2020

Indicators	Countries ¹						
	ARG	CHL	COL	ECU	PAN	PER	TTO
Cases per million people	385.3	5,501	577.5	2,216.1	3,206.7	5,157.1	83.6
Deaths per million people	12.3	58.2	18.9	190.3	79.7	140.5	5.7
Percentage of fatality rate	3.2	1.1	3.3	8.6	2.5	2.7	6.8

Source: Authors' calculations based on data provided by the Coronavirus Resource Center (2020) and UNDESA (2019).

GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO CONTROL SPREAD

The first government responses were directed at slowing down the spread of the virus. Initially, actions were focused on controlling the entry of travelers, with border closures and restrictions on mobility, first banning crowds and then forcing people to remain in their

131 https://www.who.int/ihr/legal_issues/states_parties/en/

houses. Both measures had a far reach but were limited by the need to provide essential services and basic supplies and to maintain international trade operations.

Measures to Limit Human Mobility

Table 2 summarizes the first measures implemented to prevent the entry of the virus into each country. Initially, they focused on the epidemiological surveillance of travelers arriving from territories where the virus had already developed significantly. In general, they were established within the first week after WHO declared the pandemic, with the exception of Trinidad and Tobago, where measures were taken as soon as the International Emergency was decreed, which could explain the reason why the country's rates of cases and deaths are lower.

The initial measures were followed by the prohibition of all means of transportation (marine, air, river, or land) for people's entry to the countries, which entailed the closure of ports, airports, and land and river crossing points for passengers' mobility, although cargo operations continued. Humanitarian flights were also exempted, and some border crossings were enabled to allow the return of nationals and residents immobilized outside their countries due to the epidemiological surveillance measures they were subjected to upon arrival. The closings were extended beyond the dates initially scheduled, at least until the end of June. Colombia and Argentina do not plan to restart the operations of international flights before September 1.

Table 2.
Selected Countries. Initial International Mobility Measures,
Established Between January 31 and March 22

Countries and respective regulations	Measures	
	Traveler surveillance	Border and entrance control
Argentina, National Executive Power, Decrees 260 and 274, March 12 and 16	14-day isolation for suspected and confirmed cases with restrictions in their contact with other people; isolation of people who arrived in the country after passing through "affected areas," including those who arrived in the 14 days prior to the effective date of the regulation.	From March 13, suspension of international commercial flights from the "affected areas" for 30 days. As of March 16, prohibition of entry of foreign people not residing in the country for a period of 15 days, through ports, airports, international crossings, border centers, and any other access points.
Chile, Ministry of Health, Resolutions 183 and 194, March 17 and 20	14-day isolation for people coming from Iran, China, Germany, France, Spain, Italy, South Korea, Japan, Argentina, Bolivia, and Peru. Quarantine for 14 days in the Easter Island territory.	Ban on cruise ships docking at all ports until September 30. Installation of sanitary control points at the country's entry locations, including ports and airports. Delivery and control of health passports.

<p>Colombia, Ministry of Health and Social Protection, Resolutions 380 and 385, March 10 and 12. Ministry of the Interior, Decree 412, March 16. Ministry of Transport, Decree 439, March 20</p>	<p>Isolation of people coming from China, Italy, France, and Spain for 14 days.</p>	<p>Ban on docking, disembarking, loading, and unloading of passengers and merchandise from international maritime commercial ships. Closing of maritime, land, and river border crossings until May 30. Suspension for 30 days (as of March 23) of the landing of passengers coming from abroad by air with entry or connection purposes.</p> <p>Total suspension, from March 17 to April 5, of all commercial flights from international destinations.</p>
<p>Ecuador, Inter-Ministerial Agreements 002 and 003, March 12 and 14. Minutes of the meeting of the National Emergency Operations Committee, March 14</p>	<p>14-day mandatory preventive isolation for people coming from China, Spain, France, Iran, Germany, South Korea, Italy, Denmark, United States (Massachusetts, California, New York, and Washington), Norway, Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland. As of March 15, people coming from any country by air, sea, river or land are subject to the mandatory preventive isolation period.</p>	<p>From March 17 to April 5, total suspension of all commercial flights transporting passengers from international destinations to Ecuador. From March 15, ban on cruise ship passengers disembarking in Ecuadorian ports. From March 15, suspension of air, sea or land entry of people with foreign nationality. Closure of land border crossing points.</p>
<p>Panama, Ministry of Public Security, Executive Decree 2017, March 16</p>	<p>From March 13, observation and surveillance to people coming from risk areas for a period of 14 days. 14-day quarantine for those who entered on or after March 17.</p>	<p>From March 13, suspension of embarkation and disembarkation of cruise ships, mini cruises, deep draft vessels, or any other type of maritime transport coming from risk areas in ports, piers, and marine and anchorage areas. As of March 17, permission to enter the country was granted only to Panamanian nationals and foreigners with temporary or permanent residence or with an ongoing immigration process. Exception was conferred to travelers making international transfers at Tocumen airport.</p>
<p>Peru, Presidency of the Council of Ministers, Supreme Decrees 44 and 45, March 15 and 17</p>	<p>Peruvian nationals who returned to the country due to the exceptional opening of borders should comply with the mandatory social isolation, in accordance with the provisions of the Ministry of Health.</p>	<p>Total closure of the borders from March 16. Hence, international transport of passengers by land, air, sea, and river was suspended.</p>
<p>Trinidad y Tobago, Chief Medical Officer,</p> <p>The Quarantine [2019 Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV) Disease] Order, 31 de enero.</p> <p>Public Health [2019 Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV)] (No. 3) Regulations, March 22</p>	<p>From February 1, surveillance of the crew and passengers of ships suspected to have COVID-19 cases during the six weeks prior to arrival in a port in Trinidad and Tobago. The measure was applied for a period of 14 days from the last day of possible exposure to the infection. The same measure was taken for the crew of airplane passengers, when the presence of the infection was presumed at any time prior to arrival in Trinidad and Tobago.</p>	<p>Between March 23 and April 30, closing of all air terminals and sea ports for the arrival or departure of aircraft, ships, or other vessels carrying passengers, from or out of the country.</p>

Source: Authors' elaboration, based on the regulations detailed in the first column

Simultaneously, or soon after, controls on human mobility within the territory were established (Table 3). The most lenient measures prohibited attendance in events or crowds that exceeded a certain number of people, as well as the introduction of night curfews. From then on, the restrictions escalated to the total or almost total immobilization of some population groups and in some particular geographic areas, until reaching all the national territories.

Table 3.
Selected countries. Initial domestic mobility measures,
established between January 15 and March 27

Countries and respective regulations	Measures
Argentina, Decree 297, March 19	Social, preventive, and mandatory isolation for the entire population from March 20 to March 31, by which people had to stay in their houses and refrain from going to their workplaces, moving around roads, and visiting public spaces.
Chile, Ministry of Health, Exempt Resolution 202, March 22	Quarantine in the city of Puerto Williams, since March 23, for an indefinite period. Isolation of the entire country's population in their residences, between 10:00 p.m. and 05:00 a.m. from March 22, 2020, for an indefinite period.
Colombia, Ministry of the Interior, Decree 457, March 22	Mandatory preventive isolation of all inhabitants, from March 25 to April 13.
Ecuador, Resolutions by the Emergency Operations Center (COE), March 17	Curfew by which circulation on roads and public spaces was banned nationwide, from 9:00 p.m. to 5:00 a.m., starting on March 17.
Panama, Ministry of Health, Statement 16, March 18	Curfew throughout the national territory from March 17, between 9:00 p.m. and 5:00 a.m.
Peru, Presidency of the Council of Ministers, Supreme Decrees 044 and 046, March 15 and March 18, respectively	Mandatory social isolation (quarantine). Compulsory stay of the country's population in their homes from 8:00 p.m. to 05:00 a.m.
Trinidad and Tobago Public Health [2019 Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV)] (No. 4) Regulations, March 27	Between March 30 and April 15, people were prohibited from attending their workplaces (when they were located outside of their home), except for the cases specified in the sub-regulation. Prohibition of gatherings in public places.

Source: Authors' elaboration, based on the regulations detailed in the first column

Study and work places were also closed, with the exception of those related to the provision of basic services and the food production, distribution, and commercialization chain. As a result, the paralysis of economic activities was considerable in all countries.

The World Bank released two maps that provide an idea of the magnitude of the paralysis during the application of the measures in Latin American countries. They compare people's mobility between January 3 and February 6 and at the end of March, based on the information

of users who had the Google location history activated in their phones. The results show that visits to shopping malls and entertainment venues decreased between 80 and 90% in Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, and Peru; and between 70 and 80% in Chile. On the other hand, visits to work sites were reduced between 60 and 70% in Ecuador; between 50 and 60% in Argentina, Colombia, Panama, and Peru; and between 40 and 50% in Chile (2020, 25).

From the end of May, the de-escalation of the measures began in some countries, with the continued application of precautions to avoid contagion (use of face masks, limitations on the number of people received in service centers, establishment of minimum distances in lines, etc.). However, in several countries and in different specific areas within them, de-escalation has been retracted due to the increase in the rates of contagion.

Measures to Alleviate the First Impacts

The paralysis caused in most economic sectors by the measures to contain the contagion had immediate implications for the economy of households, companies, and states. The governments of the different countries tried to counteract them through various instruments of economic policy. Table 4 consolidates the different actions taken in this regard, according to a publication by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) (Nuguer and Powel 2020), classified by type of policy and including data for the month of April. They were complemented by the inclusion of two actions carried out by the Colombian government, which were not mentioned in the said publication.

Table 4.
Selected Countries. Public Policy Actions Taken During the Pandemic to Alleviate Its First Impacts, by Country and Type

	ARG	CHL	COL	ECU	PAN	PER	TTO
Monetary policy actions taken by central banks							
Reduction in policy interest rate		X	X			X	X
Intervention in the foreign exchange market	X	X	X			X	
Liquidity provision in USD through swap lines		X	X			X	
Purchase of private or public securities		X	X				
Policy actions taken by countries to improve credit and liquidity							
Temporary loan extensions	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Increase in liquidity/credit to SMEs	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Liquidity and reserve requirements	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Fiscal policy measures taken by countries							
Transfers to families	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

Reduction/postponement of labor taxes and contributions to social security	X	X		X			
Reduction/postponement of other taxes		X	X	X	X	X	
Credit lines granted to companies	X		X			X	X
Postponement of debt services	X		X	X		X	X
Employee compensation	X	X	X				X
Total measures	9	11	12	7	5	10	8

Source: Nuguer & Powel 2020, tables 2.1, 3.1, and 4.1

It was determined that the only measures common to all the selected countries were those aimed at improving credit and business liquidity, along with transfers to families. Table 5 details the type of transfers to families. Argentina and Colombia stand out for the greatest number of alternatives used, and Panama for the lowest.

Table 5.

. Selected Countries. Social Protection Measures for Poor and Vulnerable People to Face the Effects of the COVID-19 Pandemic, by Type of Measure, as of April 24, 2020

	ARG	CHL	COL	ECU	PAN	PER	TTO	VEN
Cash transfers	X	X	X	X		X	X	X
Advance payment for existing transfer programs			X					
Increase in population coverage of existing transfer programs	X						X	
Increase in the amount of current cash transfers	X	X	X			X	X	
New money transfer	X	X	X	X		X	X	X
Delivery of food and medicine	X	X	X	X	X	X		X
Basic services	X	X	X	X	X			
Total	6	5	6	4	2	4	4	3

Source: ECLAC, 2020b

VENEZUELAN MIGRANTS IN SOCIAL ISOLATION

Venezuelans, who are also experiencing the adverse conditions caused by COVID-19, represent groups of different sizes and relative relevance in the selected countries, as observed in Table 6. The volume range of this population estimated in March 2020 by the Inter-Agency Platform (R4V 2020c) was wide: between 24,000 people in Trinidad and Tobago and 1.8 million in Colombia; and the percentage of representation within the total population

of the countries was generally significant, with a range of 0.3% in Argentina and 3.5% in Colombia. It is worth noting the high visibility of Venezuelans in Trinidad and Tobago, given the size of the country, which barely exceeds 5,000 square kilometers, in addition to the significant concentration of the group on the island of Trinidad.

Table 6.
Selected countries. Venezuelan Population and Representation in the
Total Population by Country, First Six Months of 2020

	ARG	CHL	COL	ECU	PAN	PER	TTO
Total population, in thousands (first six months)	45,196	19,116	50,883	17,643	4,315	32,972	1,399
Venezuelan population, in thousands (March)	145	371	1,800	367	95	861	24
Weight of the Venezuelan population in the total population (%)	0.3	1.9	3.5	2.1	2.2	2.6	1.7

Sources: R4V 2020c; UNDESA 2020

The sudden increase of the Venezuelan population was common to all countries, with critical lapses of one to two years. In the Colombian case, a massive and concentrated return of nationals living in Venezuela was added. The consequence was, among others, considerable difficulties of the economies and the states to adapt to the new situation. Evidence of that are the percentages of basic unmet needs, which are listed in Table 7 and correspond to estimates made by intergovernmental and international cooperation agencies. In general, non-random samples were taken, but in the case of Argentina, the small size and obvious biases in the selection gave the sample little representativeness, but it was used as the best available resource. In general, data suggests higher proportions of unmet needs in countries with higher volumes or proportions of Venezuelans, which seems reasonable. Therefore, the most complicated scenarios are present in Peru, Ecuador, and Colombia; Chile and Argentina are at the opposite side of the spectrum, the latter with some reservation due to the characteristics of its sample; and Panama and Trinidad and Tobago fall somewhere in the middle.

Table 7.
Selected Countries. Venezuelan Migrant Population with Basic Unmet Needs,
by Country, by Type of Need (%), 2019-2020

	ARG	CHL	COL*	ECU	PAN	PER	TTO
Food security/nutrition	1.2	7	43	70	15	39	1
Health	3.2	10	49	46	16	63	38
Education	8	12	15	18	8	45	5
Protection	1.2	38	37	68	33	44	20
Housing	2	1	-	19	9	44	-
Water and basic sanitation	-	0	28	19	-	43	-
Other needs	-	7	31	11	38	62	20
Average	3	11	34	36	20	49	17

*Including Colombians returnees from Venezuela.

Source: R4V 2020a and 2020b, IOM-UNHCR-UNICEF-OAS 2019, IOM 2019d

The conditions for Venezuelan migrants worsened with the progress and extension of the isolation measures, which forced the closure of many businesses and resulted in the impossibility of carrying out informal commercial activities in public spaces, from which a large proportion of Venezuelans obtain their livelihood sources. On the other hand, their condition of non-nationals with high levels of migratory irregularity posed considerable restrictions to access the aid provided by the governments, and entities that had been offering assistance for the Venezuelan population faced difficulties to continue their work. These effects are exemplified in the following excerpts from a report by the United States Official Cooperation Agency (USAID, 2020), which focuses on the three countries with the highest volumes of Venezuelans:

The vulnerabilities faced by Venezuelan migrants and refugees in Colombia have increased after the closure of international borders [...] and by the imposition [...] of a national quarantine, which has hindered the provision of some humanitarian services. According to the Norwegian Refugee Council, aid organizations are estimated to have reduced their activities along the Colombian-Venezuelan border to less than a third of their normal operations in early April. Likewise, Venezuelans in Colombia are highly dependent on informal markets for income generation, which have been largely disrupted by COVID-19.

The Inter-Agency Group for Mixed Migration Flows (GIFMM) [identified] [...], from March 31 to April 8, [...] widespread needs for food, shelter and employment, as well

as increased negative coping mechanisms. Also, a quarter of the population reported consuming only one meal a day during the quarantine. The RMRP [Refugee and Migrant Response Plan] also reports on the intensified concern among Venezuelan families regarding their security in Colombia in the context of the COVID-19 crisis, specifically as a consequence of the increase in gender-based violence and xenophobia. [...] Vulnerable Venezuelans have had increasing difficulties in meeting their basic needs, including rent payments, which have led to evictions and lack of access to shelters during the national quarantine.

[In Ecuador], some shelters that used to receive migrants and refugees were closed or suspended the entry of new people for fear of infection and increased levels of xenophobia, while many Venezuelans were evicted from their homes for not being able to pay their rents, according to the RMRP [...]. Meanwhile, almost 50 percent of aid activities addressed to Venezuelans and host communities implemented by R4V partners were suspended during the quarantine [...].


As part of the COVID-19 mitigation measures, the Government of Peru has suspended the granting of national asylum and the registration of migrants. However, on March 7, immigration officials authorized the issuance of temporary residence permits and national identity cards for foreign citizens who had initiated procedures to obtain their documentation prior to the COVID-19 crisis. These documents will alleviate the current mobility restrictions over undocumented Venezuelan refugees and migrants, according to R4V. [...] Save the Children Federation (SCF) published in mid-April a statement indicating that the nutritional conditions of many Venezuelan families had worsened as a consequence of the measures of social isolation.

PANDEMIC AND NATIONAL ECONOMIES

In recent years, the economy of the selected countries and of Latin America in general had slowed down, and in the Argentinian case, it had become depressed; this is even without the situation in Venezuela being accounted for. However, the year 2020 was expected to show some improvement, with a better performance of the GDP, as observed in Figure 1. It should be noted that the growth projections in Chile, Colombia, and Ecuador had decreased, partly as a result of the social protests that created uncertainty (Nuguer and Pawell 2020). However, even before the declaration of the pandemic, the slowdown in major world economies, such as those of the United States, China, and Europe became visible, with impacts on raw material prices, which are sensitive in Latin American and Caribbean countries, although to different degrees.

Figure 1.

. Selected Countries. Growth Rate of Total Annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at Constant Prices, 2010-2018 and Pre-Pandemic Projections (Nov 2019) for 2019 and 2020, (%)



Source: Authors' elaboration based on data by CEPALSTAT¹³² and ECLAC, 2020c

In a document published by the IDB, Manzano and Saboin mention the coincidence of the international economic crisis and the pandemic, both causing temporary paralysis of the economies of the Andean subregion. Three of the selected countries together with Venezuela have said that the external shock alone would push them to economic recession, but “the effects of quarantine can generate a deeper crisis” (2020, p.3).

In this regard, the IDB (Nuguer and Pawell 2020) draws attention to the repercussions of the pandemic on fiscal balance, currencies, and other monetary and financial indicators for Latin American countries. It also highlights the fact that most of the countries in the region currently have open commercial and financial systems, which means that they will be affected by events occurring in China, Europe, and the United States, and “...just considering the external demand shock, the fall in raw materials prices and the shock of the financial markets, the region [Latin America and the Caribbean] will suffer a major recession this year, likely to exceed the one registered in 2009 (around 2% of the GDP). The most extreme scenario [...] would be a recession of more than 5% of the GDP” (p.54).

Table 8 gathers different forecasts on the percentage variation of the GDP in the selected countries and Venezuela in a pandemic scenario. All of them concur on the negative nature of the figures for 2020, as well as on positive changes for 2021 and 2022, with lower rates in 2022 (except for Argentina and Colombia which are projected at point one and point four

132 http://interwp.cepal.org/cepalstat/WEB_cepalstat/estadisticasIndicadores.asp?idioma=i

percentage higher, respectively). It should be noted that the increases in 2021 would not be enough to recover the losses, indicating that a return to the levels of economic activity prior to the pandemic would not occur during the said year. The figures would confirm the following statement by the *Semana Magazine*:

Never in history have economic forecasts changed so much, so quickly, and so badly. When the pandemic hit, multilaterals and analysts anticipated a large and transitory downturn in the world economy, but with the prospect of a relatively rapid recovery by 2021, what economists call a V-shaped recovery. Today, almost everyone talks about the worst depression since the great world crisis of 1929, but with a slower, U-shaped recovery. The social consequences of these changes are unpredictable.¹³³

Table 8.

. Selected Countries and Venezuela. Projections on the Percentage of Change in Total Annual GDP, Made During the Pandemic for 2020, 2021, and 2022

Countries	2020				2021		2022	
	ECLAC (April)	World Bank* (April)	IMF (April)	OECD (June)	Manzano & Saboin (junio)	World Bank* (April)	OECD (June)	World Bank* (April)
ARG	-6.5	-5.2	-5.7	-8.3		2.2	4.1	2.3
CHL	-4.0	-3.0	-4.5	-5.6		4.8	3.4	2.8
COL	-2.6	-2.0	-2.4	-6.1	-13.2	3.4	4.3	3.9
ECU	-6.5	-6.0	-6.3		-11.4	3.2		1.5
PAN	-2.0	-2.0	-2.0			4.2		4.0
PER	-4.0	-4.7	-4.5		-14.1	6.6		3.5
TTO	-5.0	-6.5**	-4.5			2.6**		
VEN	-18.0	-20.4**	-15.0		-37.0	0.8**		

*The projections correspond to the “single-hit scenario,” in which a second epidemic crisis is ruled out. The World Bank also made projections for a “double-hit scenario,” to which it gave the same probability of occurring, with a second wave of cases and population confinement. **These data are not from the World Bank. Data on Venezuela has been provided by the Circle of Latin American Studies (cesla.com), and data on Trinidad and Tobago has been provided by Bladex. Sources: ECLAC 2020c; World Bank 2020; OECD (2020); IMF 2020; IMF, <https://www.imf.org/en/Countries>; CESLA, <https://www.cesla.com/prediccion-economica-venezuela.php>; Bladex, <https://bladex.com/es/latam-info/trinidad-y-tobago-0>

Box 1 shows the economic prospects for the selected countries, except for Trinidad and Tobago, which is presented by the World Bank in its report for the first half of 2010. Regarding the economic predictions of the countries of interest, with a high level of pessimism, the following can be concluded (as Mejía does):

¹³³ <https://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/coronavirus-en-colombia-los-graves-problemas-que-enfrenta-la-economia/673566>

[...] the great economic crisis that we seem to be facing is not really the result of the specific quarantine that one's country has implemented. It is the result of a world shock of a gigantic scale on the productive system and the confidence of all economic agents. [...] Expecting the economic situation to dramatically improve would be naive, to say the least. A naivety associated with the comfort generated by oversizing our autonomy from the world economy and our ability to control society.

Box 1.

Selected Countries.

World Bank Economic Outlook, by Country

Argentina

The severe impacts of COVID-19 and the containment measures taken will exacerbate the economic recession and delay recovery. Limited fiscal space is restraining the grant of incentives, which include cash transfers, salary subsidies for companies to avoid layoffs, additional transfers to provinces, and capital expenditure. GDP growth is projected to decrease further, at -5.2%, in 2020; meanwhile unemployment, informality, and poverty will continue to increase. Depending on a successful debt renegotiation and a short-term COVID-19 collapse, the economy is expected to recover slightly in the fourth quarter of 2020 and continue to improve in 2021 and 2022.

Chile

After a solid performance in 2018, economic growth slowed abruptly in 2019 due to extended social mobilizations. Growth will become negative in 2020 due to the impact of COVID-19, low copper prices, and uncertainties about constitutional changes. Despite Chile's massive countercyclical response that will help dampen the crisis in 2020, economic activity is expected to rebound in the medium term, as the health crisis fades and political consensus restores the confidence of the private sector and contributes to a more equitable society.

Colombia

After a robust growth in 2019, the GDP is expected to decline in 2020 due to COVID-19, a fall in oil prices, and internal containment measures. Countercyclical fiscal policies are expected to partially contribute to reducing the adverse impact on consumption, but the slight poverty reduction in 2019 is likely to reverse in 2020. The depth and duration of the COVID-19 pandemic and the economic recession are still uncertain.

Ecuador

Economic growth, affected by fiscal consolidation and social unrest, was almost zero in 2019. Growth will be negative in 2020, after the COVID-19 outbreak and the fall in oil prices. Although the government responded quickly to the first signs of the crisis, large fiscal imbalances and limited access to financing have conditioned the size and scope of economic measures. As the crisis alleviates, growth acceleration and a moderate but growing trend are expected, helped by investment encouragement reforms.

Panama

The economy is likely to have a negative growth in 2020 due to the impact of COVID-19, given the important connections of Panama with the global economy. The main employment sectors, such as services and construction, will be the most affected. Some positive contributions from the public expenditure are expected, although this will increase the fiscal deficit above the relatively high levels of 2019. Poverty has only marginally decreased in 2019 and is expected to increase in 2020 due to the COVID-19 outbreak, reverting the progress made since 2017.

Peru

After a modest performance in 2019, the economy is expected to fall into recession in 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The drop in economic activity, which mostly affects the less skilled and vulnerable urban population, is expected to exacerbate poverty and inequality. Given the likely temporary nature of the shock, growth is expected to recover strongly in 2021. Peru's prudent macroeconomic management provides the country with extensive fiscal, monetary, and external buffers to mitigate the impact of the shock.

Source: World Bank, 2020

In February 2020, before the declaration of the pandemic, the Venezuelan-American Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Venamcham) held the 2020 Economic Outlook Forum.¹³⁴ Citing excerpts from some of the speeches, the following scenario was built:

Currently, we are experiencing an improvement in the mechanisms for goods distribution, and while inflation has slowed down, it is clear that we continue having hyperinflation. A notorious aspect is the strengthening of transactional dollarization amid a slight rebound in the trade and services sectors, although it cannot be said that

134 Economic outlook amid opportunities and challenges. http://www.venamcham.org/?page_id=8572

there is economic growth. [...] Importation of goods has been allowed to compensate for low local production, and control policies have eased [...]. National economy is having its sixth year of decline, being 70 percent smaller compared to 2014, with oil production at only 500 thousand barrels per day and committed to Russia and China [...]. In 2020, we must be prepared for a multi-currency environment, now including the Petro (PTR), amid the prolongation of the political conflict and a stagnation of consumption in some sectors [...] (Asdrúbal Oliveros, Economist and Managing Partner of Ecoanalítica).

In 2019, compared to 2014, banking has decreased by 58%, credit by 97%, and liabilities by 64%. We have a limited credit capacity due to the complexity of the banking operation and additionally, we have had high rates of staff turnover and human capital flight. Unfortunately, we rank last in Latin America in terms of bank loans. [...] Currently, 73% of banking income comes from non-financial services as intermediation (the natural business) has been impacted by a limiting regulatory framework. It is evident that an effective legal reserve of 97% does not help stimulate financing. In fact, 86% of banking availability is in the Central Bank of Venezuela, which hinders financing activity for the country's productive sectors. [...] However, the good news is that banks remain adequately capitalized, with a solvency ratio of 78% and a capital adequacy ratio of 146%. Banking is strong in terms of assets (Carlos Ramírez, Partner at the Deloitte firm).

Four years ago, 43% of the population declared to be mainly affected by shortages; and the same year the CLAP government program was launched. Currently, the main concern for 47% of respondents [in January 2020] is the high cost of living. What changed? The CLAP program reached 57% of the population, so the discussions moved from the public sector (shortages) to the private sector (high costs). There is no government's improvisation in this regard. [...] According to investigations by Datos, 51% of people who carry out some work activity are receiving foreign currency and, in practice, one out of four Venezuelans receives dollars in cash. [...] [There are] three faces of Venezuela currently coexisting: one for Caracas, one for the inland region and one for Maracaibo and Los Andes, which are very different in socio-economic and infrastructure quality terms. It is worth noting that 22% of the people surveyed claimed to have migrated from the inland to the capital city with the main objective to have access to services (Luis Maturén, General Director of the Datos company).

The financial commitment of a manufacturing company is considerable given its need for working capital. We have the options to enter the stock market, export the products and also serve as an outsourcing for third parties, and leverage the installed capacity that is currently available. I am concerned about the continuity of the policy against the manufacturing sector. (Héctor Rodríguez, President of Industrias Unicon)

The Venezuelan situation is always complex, because talking about politics leads to thinking about uncertainty, but when we refer to the economy, the term flexibility arises. Between one term and another there are people with their reasonable doubts. While 91% of people say that things are negative in the country, 34% of respondents express having a good personal situation, [...] and [there is hope that] remittances will grow to reach USD 5 billion in 2020. [The Venezuelan situation] is a matter of economic dynamics, which goes beyond “bodegones”¹³⁵. Actually, there have been major changes, but they are not complete yet. Some subsectors are beginning to rebound, especially the commerce and services ones. This permeates the economy, where all inhabitants have access to currency without being wealthy. That will not change; on the contrary, it is increasing. [...] Based on the fact that there will be no model change in the short term, the recommendation is to build with the resources at hand. We must take advantage of the existence of underserved markets, little competition and the need for technological improvements to seek to maintain and even strengthen the activities, projecting a change in the medium term (Luis Vicente León, President of Datanálisis).

Shortly after, already amidst the pandemic scenario, Venezuela’s economic future changed, as was the case for the other Latin American countries. Table 71 shows three forecasts for 2020 made during the month of April, all of them with negative results, the most optimistic being a 15% drop in GDP. Just two months later, the only forecast available for June, which was published by the IDB, indicates a much higher drop (37%). Under these conditions, the forecast for a 0.8% positive growth in 2021 made in April seems highly unlikely.

The World Bank reference document does not present a narrative on the prospects for the Venezuelan economy carried out during the pandemic. Therefore, Box 2 includes sections of those made by the National Academy of Economic Sciences of Venezuela (ANCE), which were delivered in the first two weeks of June 2020, approximately on the same date of the Bank’s publication.

¹³⁵ “Bodegones” are local warehouses for groceries and other imported products for daily use that emerged in the midst of the Venezuelan crisis, as an alternative to internal shortages of goods and to the high prices of national products. Normally the prices are set in USD.

Box 2.**Venezuela Economic Outlook**

The continuous drop in oil production, the collapse of oil prices, the arrival of COVID-19, the persistence of hyperinflation (which reached 80% in April), the recurring power outages and gasoline shortage throughout the country, and the political crisis, suggest that 2020 will become the seventh consecutive year of a decline in economic activity. [...]

At the end of the first quarter of 2020, the contraction of the Venezuelan economy continued, accumulating 25 consecutive quarters of decline in the Gross Domestic Product. Although there are no official data on the magnitude of the decline during this year, there are no analysis elements that indicate that the objective conditions of supply and demand determining the immense fall in production in 2019 have changed in a substantive way, beyond the specific recovery of the country's electricity supply after the great blackout in March 2019. [...]

The ravages generated by the electricity crisis, the 47.2% estimated drop in oil production (according to secondary OPEC sources) and the extreme decrease in demand due to the fall of the purchasing power of wages are among the most significant factors that explain the gigantic contraction. [...]

[...] Many of the factors that explain the fall in production last year are still present, aggravated by public policy sanitary measures against COVID-19, which in the case of Venezuela, as in other countries of the region, have generated an internal shock to production, income and demand for goods and services. [...]

Oil production (according to OPEC), although registering a drop of 7.5% in the first quarter of the year, going from 714 thousand barrels in December to 622 thousand in April, is now seriously threatened by the unplanned withdrawal of the giant Rosneft from all its projects, associations and businesses with the state-owned company PDVSA and by a much more restricted operating license granted by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States to the Chevron company to maintain its assets in Venezuela. Both companies had so far been strategic partners in maintaining oil production in the face of the drop in PDVSA's production. [...]

The sustained decline in oil production has become a critical variable that threatens to further destabilize the Venezuelan economy. In addition, there has been a decrease in active drilling rigs, an important indicator of future production rate. The company Baker Hughes reports in its May "International Rig Count" that drilling activity in Venezuela was located in 14 drilling rigs, against an average of 25 reported for the last 9 months, until March.

EXPECTED DEVELOPMENTS IN VENEZUELAN MIGRANT FLOWS

Given the expected magnitude of the pandemic impacts and their linkage to a global crisis (according to different sources, it may reach the levels of the 1929 crisis), it is possible to expect changes in migratory flows of Venezuelans. Several components of these flows should be affected by, and their magnitude and direction should be related to, although not determined by, the policies, regulations, and actions for economic recovery and international human mobility to be taken by the Latin American governments, including that of Venezuela.

In the first place, there are flows of return to Venezuela, which have been very visible in the media due to the dramatic return conditions imposed by social isolation, paralysis in transportation, and borders closing. Except for unique circumstances, the idea of return is inherent to migration, being often postponed and sometimes never achieved given the particularities regarding times, conditions, and rhythms. In fact, despite the aggravation of the situation of migrants, it is inevitable that many think about returning to their land and that they ultimately do so regardless of the difficulties. An increase in the pace, or at least in the intention of Venezuelans to return to their country is expected, although the matter has not been studied, and there are no reliable related statistics; therefore, the magnitude of the change cannot be known. However, there are some antecedents and rough figures that provide guidance to some extent.

In August 2018, the Venezuelan government established the *Vuelta a la Patria* (Return to Homeland) plan, which is “essentially aimed at nationals who have precarious economic conditions that prevent them to pay for their return and who can transparently certify their situation.”¹³⁶ As of February 10, 2020, 100,426 people were registered in this program, and 17,522 had returned. Figures for other returns are not available.

During the pandemic, 46,986 cases of return to Venezuela were registered between April 6 and May 21, 2020, according to Venezuelan official figures collected by OCHA (2020). Most of the returnees used land transportation means, and 991 traveled back by air. There were two flights from Mexico and one from the Dominican Republic, Cuba, Chile, Peru, and Ecuador. Migration Colombia reported on June 16¹³⁷ that “to date more than 76 thousand Venezuelan citizens have voluntarily returned to Venezuela,” a figure that could include migrants located in other countries seeking entry to Venezuela through Colombia. The same report stated that Venezuelans in Colombia who are part of a return plan would number more than 24,000 and that, due to the restrictions imposed by Venezuela, their departure could take more than six months.

136 http://mppre.gob.ve/temas/vuelta-a-la-patria/?lcp_page0=4#lcp_instance_0


137 <https://www.migracioncolombia.gov.co/noticias/retorno-de-venezolanos-a-su-pais-tomaria-hasta-6-meses-debido-a-las-restricciones-de-venezuela-director-de-migracion-colombia>

The little data presented, which was adjusted with assumptions on unaccounted returnees (who use unauthorized border crossing points), provides a rough estimate of a monthly average return of between 25,000 to 30,000 Venezuelans by 2020. The number corresponds to returns from the selected countries and is based on a scenario in which current general conditions are maintained. This being the case, the annual figure of returnees would be between 300,000 and 360,000, which would be equivalent to an annual return rate of 7.5 to 10% of the total volume of Venezuelan emigrants.

It is difficult to predict whether such intensity of return will be maintained. On the one hand, the removal of mobility restrictions will allow the majority of migrants to go back to their informal subsistence activities in a new scenario of economic crisis, reducing the urgency of returning to their country; and on the other hand, many of those who had formal jobs will have lost them. In both cases, with the resumption of transport services, returning will be easier. However, the authors of this report are inclined to think that the return rate will not be sustained for a long time, and it will slow down in a few months, recovering to its “normal” level.

As a benchmark, during the financial crisis that began in 2008, the rate of return of Latin Americans from Spain had visible changes, as shown in Figure 2. Consistent with an onset of not very sudden and immediate effects, the rate of return grew gradually throughout the recession until 2013, from approximately 3.5%, never doubling, and returning to its original value in 2014. In comparison, the current crisis started with an extreme situation that did not represent an economic slowdown but a sudden stop, which practically deprived the majority of the population, including migrants, of the possibility of obtaining an income to reach their subsistence levels, with many people having to pay their rent on a daily basis. In such extreme conditions, despite the fact that the situation in Venezuela that motivated the mass exodus has not undergone significant changes, a group of Venezuelans found that the return to their country allowed them, at least, to receive help from their family and social networks, not to mention also removing the growing discrimination and xenophobia they had been subjected to in their countries of residence.

Figure 2.
Spain, Percentage of Residents Born in South America Who Returned to Their Countries of Birth, by Year, 2008-2014



Source: Authors' elaboration based on data provided by Mejía, 2016b

Once these extreme situations have been overcome and the restrictive mobility measures are lifted, offering migrants the possibility to perform their informal activities in the streets (which will surely increase), the pressure of return will possibly decrease. The current reality and the perspectives of the Venezuelan economy in the short and medium term, which are much lower than those of the other countries in the region (also negative), will make many opt for non-return, as a less adverse solution.

It must be taken into account that returning is, to some extent, a family strategy to consolidate the group's position abroad. The return of one or more members of the family and the permanence of others, who are responsible for the economic support of the returnees through remittances, has been observed in other processes, such as the 2000 crisis. Thereby, stepping back in the advances of family grouping and retaking them later is a valid option. This phenomena would keep the flow rate in its current levels or could eventually make them increase.

A clear fact is that the rates of return will not be the same from all countries, since the conditions of the Venezuelans differ per location. One of the factors that can determine the disparities is the selectivity of the moving groups, including the returning ones, noting that the composition of migratory flows does not correspond to a representative sample of the populations where they originate. On the contrary, groups with certain characteristics move more than others, depending on different conditions, such as their places of origin and of destination.

Empirical studies in this regard are ample worldwide, frequently showing common characteristics that supposedly determine a greater propensity to return. Table 9 lists some of those characteristics that could be used as a reference for other migration cases, in countries different to those when the studies were conducted.

Table 9.
Selected Return Variables Identified in Empirical Studies, by Category
With the Highest Propensity to Return, by Authors, 1979-2006

Groups with a higher propensity to return	Authors
Age: senior citizens	Zeiceva & Zimmermann 2012; Fuchs-Schündeln & Schündeln 2009; Dumont & Spielvogel 2008; Jensen & Petersen 2007; Klinthäll 2006; Duleep 1994
Sex: men	Mejía 2016a; Mejía & Castro 2012; Eurofound 2012; Zeiceva & Zimmermann 2012; Dumont & Spielvogel 2008
Educational level: less educated	Mejía 2016a; Medina & Posso 2009; Dumont & Spielvogel 2008; Nekby 2006
Marital status: single	Fuchs-Schündeln & Schündeln 2009
Time at destination: recent migrants	Dumont & Spielvogel 2008; Jensen & Petersen 2007; Nekby 2006; Duleep 1994; Da Vanzo 1983; Fields 1979
Employment status: unemployed	Schneider; Kubis & Wiest 2011; Fuchs-Schündeln & Schündeln 2009; Constant & Massey 2003 y 2002; Lam 1994
Immigration status: irregular	Mejía 2016 ^a

Sources: Mejía, 2016a & 2016b

Hypothetically assuming such criteria for the Venezuelan migrant population in the selected countries is valid, and taking the approximate percentage of representation of the above-listed groups between the general Venezuelan migrant population, Table 10 is presented. It indicates that exclusively based on the characteristics of the population, the highest propensity to return would be in Trinidad and Tobago, while the lowest would be in Argentina.

Table 10.
Categories with Higher Propensity to Return, 2018 - 2020

	ARG	CHL	COL	ECU	PAN	PER	TTO
Senior citizens (wide ranges)	4	6	8	8*	4	3	11
Men	51	50	52	60	53	45	58
Less educated (less than tertiary educational level obtained)	23	38	78	61	53	39	61
Single people or without financial dependents	42	32	63	28		45	68
Recent migrants (less than a year)	29	80	32	19	15		77
Unemployed	16	11	22	20	3	19	33
With irregular immigration status (excluding those registered as refuge/asylum applicants)	6	29	57	58	30	20	21
Average	24	35	45	41	26	29	47

Sources: Pacecca & Liguori 2019; IOM-UNHCR-UNICEF-OAS 2020; IOM 2020, 2019b, 2019e, and 2018; IOM-ILO-MPTE 2019; Mendoza and Miranda 2019; INE 2020; IOM 2019; CARICOM-CDEMA-WFP-FAO 2020; Government of Colombia 2018

If other circumstances that have been previously observed and may induce return are added to the described propensity, it is possible to create a countries ranking (Table 11). Based on the indicators presented, it is expected for the intention of return to grow with the increase in the number of COVID-19-associated deaths among the population of Venezuelans with basic unmet needs and the groups most likely to return, as well as a result of the the continuous drop of the GDP. To this end, seven points (as the sample is composed of seven countries) are assigned to the country with the highest value per category, decreasing until reaching the lowest value (1 point). On the contrary, as it is expected that the number of measures to mitigate the first COVID-19 impacts and aimed at granting social protection negatively correlates with the propensity to return, the highest number of points corresponds to the countries that implemented the fewest measures.

Table 11.
Selected Countries. Relative Position in Relation to Indicators Based on Factors Potentially Inducing the Return of Venezuelans, 2020

Table	Indicators	ECU	PAN	PER	TTO	CHL	COL	ARG
1	Deaths per million inhabitants	7	5	6	1	4	3	2
4	Measures to alleviate the first impacts	6	7	3	5	2	1	4
5	Social protection measures	4	7	4	4	3	1	1
7	Proportion of Venezuelans with basic unmet needs	6	4	7	3	2	5	1
8	GDP's fall in 2020 (IMF, April)	7	1	3	3	3	2	6
10	Population with propensity to return	5	2	3	7	4	6	1
	Averaged position	5.8	4.3	4.3	3.8	3.0	3.0	2.5

Note: Positions range from 1 to 7, where 1 is the value assigned to the least inducing conditions in the corresponding variable.

Source: Author's elaboration based on the tables mentioned in the first column.

It is understood that most of the indicators are related to each other and that, if a model were to be formulated, several would not pass the collinearity test. However, the purpose here is to have elements that allow for the differentiation of conditions in the analyzed countries and to establish a credible hypothesis about their relative position in a rank from the highest to the lowest intensity of the return of Venezuelan emigrants. In this regard, it should be said that the highest intensities with respect to the volume of the groups would occur from Ecuador and Panama, while the lowest would be from Argentina and Colombia. Of course, other factors that have not been evaluated, such as immigration policies and regulations, still play an important role.

In order to rank the power of attraction of the analyzed countries for Venezuelans, a mechanism similar to the one used to determine the propensity of return is implemented, that is, by taking some of the same variables (which in this case would go in the opposite direction) and adding new ones. The lower proportions of pandemic-related deaths and of Venezuelans with basic unmet needs (which are reported by social networks), as well as shorter distances or easier conditions for emigrating from Venezuela, are expected to translate into comparative advantages that will weigh on the evaluation of potential migrants to decide their destination. In the same way, it is foreseeable that greater responses to counteract the effects of the pandemic, as well as better expectations of economic growth for the year 2021 and the presence of larger Venezuelan groups (which represents more support networks, regrouping movements, and important "call effects"), have the same results.

Consequently, Table 12 indicates that in the short and medium term, Colombia would continue to be the country with the greatest power of attraction for migrants, and Chile and Argentina would become more relevant as chosen destinations. This shows a different scenario for the remaining four countries, in particular for Ecuador, which would no longer be one of the most chosen destinations, as it has been in recent years. Certainly, these projections may vary as long as changes in the assumptions on which they were built occur.

Table 12.
Selected Countries. Relative Position in Relation to Indicators Based on Factors Potentially Associated with their Attractiveness as Destinations, 2020

Table	Indicators	COL	CHL	ARG	PER	TTO	PAN	ECU
1	Deaths per million inhabitants	5	4	6	2	7	3	1
4	Measures to alleviate the first impacts	7	6	4	5	3	1	2
5	Social protection measures	6	5	6	2	2	1	2
6	Venezuelan population volume	7	5	3	6	1	2	4
7	Proportion of Venezuelans with basic unmet needs	3	6	7	1	5	4	2
8	GDP growth in 2021 (World Bank, April)	4	6	1	7	2	5	3
-	Distance/ease of access	7	2	1	3	6	4	5
	Averaged position	5.6	4.9	4.0	3.7	3.7	2.9	2.7

Note: Positions range from 1 to 7, where 1 is the value assigned to the least attractive destination for a potential migrant in regard to the corresponding variable.

Sources: Author's elaboration based on the tables mentioned in the first column.

Given the economic and social projections for Venezuela, it is not foreseeable that the outflows from the country will be significantly reduced. Once the restrictions on international mobility are normalized, the intensity of the flows will go back to the pre-pandemic levels, in which a certain deceleration of the growth rate is observed, with a tendency to acquire some stability in the monthly volumes.

To conclude, it must be taken into account that migratory flows are not limited to emigration and return processes. Another important aspect is the remigration from previous destinations where settlements have occurred (i.e. these are not referred to as transit places). In this regard, no figures have been identified, but as a simple reference, the 2008 crisis had a proportion of Venezuelans who emigrated from Spain to reside in a third country, as presented in Table 13. As an example, of every 100 Venezuelans (by birth) who left their residence in Spain in 2014, 65 went back to Venezuela and 35 moved to a third country.

Table 13.
**Percentage of the Venezuelan-born Population Emigrated from Spain who Declared
 their Intention to Reside in a Country other Than Venezuela, 2008 – 2014**

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Percentage of non-returnees	19.7	20.1	24.3	24.2	19.0	27.3	34.5

Source: Mejía 2016b

It can be assumed that the new movements also occur depending on the relative attractiveness of the countries of destination (Table 75), thus small flows of Venezuelans from their current residences to neighboring countries with a better relative situation are expected. Perhaps the most frequent movements would be from Ecuador to Colombia, Chile, and Argentina; from Peru to Colombia, Chile, and Argentina; and from Argentina to Chile. There are other kinds of movements, such as those aimed at performing work on the border or those of a seasonal nature (especially for agricultural activities), on which it is even more difficult to make predictions at the moment, as they are associated with very specific economic sectors.

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APPENDIX 2: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS CURRENT MIGRATION CRISES



A review of migration crises in other regions, including key dynamics and socioeconomic consequences, as well as, lessons learned from donor responses in those regions, can provide important comparative value, illuminating potential challenges and best practices applicable to the Venezuelan migration situation in Latin America and the Caribbean. This review of existing literature and lessons that can be drawn from them are divided into two sections: 1) The key migratory dynamics and its socioeconomic consequences, 2) the lessons learned from donor responses to refugee, displaced and migrant populations. The migratory phenomena examined include migration flows from Central Asia and the Middle East towards Europe (East-West), African migration along various flows (South-North, South-South, and intra-country), and the Northern Triangle of Central America (NTCA) towards the United States (South-North). These case studies represent similar presentations of highly diverse drivers of migration, as well as highly different responses from the international community.

KEY DYNAMICS AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF CURRENT MIGRATION PHENOMENA

MIGRATION DYNAMICS IN CENTRAL ASIA AND MIDDLE EAST, HORN OF AFRICA AND NORTHERN TRIANGLE COUNTRIES

CENTRAL ASIA & THE MIDDLE EAST

Most migrants traveling from Central Asia and the Middle East to Europe originate from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, of which the latter constitutes the most significant human displacement situation in the world and is the focus of this section. According to the International Agency for Migration (IOM), 90% of migrant arrivals to Greece come from Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq, of which 88% decided to leave due to “conflict, persecution, and human rights abuses”.¹³⁸ Migrants from these countries report fear of both general and targeted violence as a factor in their decision-making.

And while many—the majority Syrian—reported leaving “because the violence had become intolerable”, lack of economic opportunity is an increasing driver in countries like Iraq and Afghanistan, where conflict continues but no longer constitutes destruction on the scale of Syria. For these migrants, primarily young men, the prospect of economic opportunity abroad is often fostered by familial and social networks settled in Europe, both through regular and irregular migration pathways. Moreover, these migration flows reflect the natural extension of intra-country migration outwards; people first move from rural to ‘safe’ urban areas in order to find basic security, goods, or economic opportunity, but as a conflict worsens (Syria) or stagnates (Afghanistan), people may be physically forced to extend their migration across international borders or, facing an ongoing lack of economic prospects, choose to risk irregular migration.

For the 5.6 million registered Syrian refugees, the majority reside in predominantly urban areas in one of three neighboring countries: Turkey (3.5 million), Lebanon (1.5 million), or Jordan (655,000).¹³⁹ These figures demonstrate two key contextual factors. First, that while the forced displacement of millions of Syrians was often highlighted in terms of the ‘European refugee crisis’, the overwhelming majority of Syrian refugees are actually living in neighboring states. This is in line with global trends that highlight that the majority of forcibly

138 Crawley, H. “Beyond ‘mass movement’: understanding the dynamics of migration into Greece, ODI: Humanitarian Practice Network.” Humanitarian Exchange No 67, September 2016, p. 10-13, <https://odihpn.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/HE-67-FINAL.pdf>

139 UNHCR USA, Syria Emergency, <https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/syria-emergency.html>, Accessed 11 May 2020

displaced persons reside in neighboring countries, many of which are developing economies; a full third of refugees currently reside in a 'least developed country' (LDC).¹⁴⁰ Second, that displacement generally occurs laterally, from one developing context to another, where the receiving country is vulnerable to significant shocks across its infrastructure. In the case of Lebanon, for example, Syrian refugees constitute nearly a quarter of the country's current population—the largest number of Syrian refugees per capita¹⁴¹, presenting enormous logistic, economic, and infrastructure barriers to service provision.

In the Syrian context, repatriation is not a realistic durable solution and the “sheer number of refugees has presented a significant strain on the resources of their host countries.”¹⁴² While receiving states do not have the economic ability to provide adequate support, external responses vary based on the individual domestic and foreign policy interests of each state¹⁴³, creating both gaps and duplications of efforts. Meanwhile, “legal discrepancies between [receiving] states regarding the protections granted to refugees means that refugees’ rights are uncertain, resulting in tenuous access to work, education, healthcare, food, and water. The strain on domestic resources accompanying a continuing flow of refugees has exacerbated tensions with local populations, contribut[ing] to restiveness and instability.”¹⁴⁴

Data indicate that just 15% of Syrian refugees residing in neighboring countries were food secure in 2015, lacking both the economic and physical access to key nutrients such as meat and fruit. Refugees also face barriers in terms of healthcare, due to lack of capacity and awareness¹⁴⁵, and education, due to lack of documentation, communication, capacity shortfalls, social integration, and education gaps as many children have been out of school for years, among others.¹⁴⁶

According to a 2017 comparative analysis of the role of sub-national governance and politics in Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan in determining local responses to the refugee situation in their respective country, two broad sets of factors were identified that shape variation in sub-national policies: identity and interests. Using an analytic approach based in political economy and political sociology, the authors defined *identity* in the case analysis as political, tribal, or religious affiliation, while *interests* related largely to the concept of “policy entrepreneurship” wherein response depends upon whether and what a politician or political entity can gain from representing refugees as either a threat or opportunity.¹⁴⁷

140 UNHCR. “Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018.” Geneva, 2019, <https://www.unhcr.org/5d08d7ee7.pdf>, pp. 2, 14-17

141 UNHCR. “Operations Worldwide, Lebanon.” <http://reporting.unhcr.org/node/2520>

142 Bolme, D., et al. “A Comprehensive Response to the Syrian Refugee Crisis: Highlighting the United States’ Role in the International Effort.” University of Washington, Winter 2016, https://jsis.washington.edu/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Task-Force-D-Report-2016-Friedman_.pdf, p. 12

143 Ibid, p. 11

144 Ibid, p. 13

145 Ibid, p. 48

146 Ibid, pp. 69-71

147 Betts, A. “Local Politics and the Syrian Refugee Crisis: Exploring Responses in Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan.” University of Oxford Refugee Studies Centre, https://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/files/files-1/local-politics-and-syrian-refugee-crisis_report-web.pdf, p. 4

In terms of identity, the analysis concluded that shared identity can ameliorate tensions that might naturally arise between migrant and host communities. The local infrastructure in Mafraq, Jordan, was highly strained by the refugee presence, including pressure on “schools, water resources, and the creation of unmanageable levels of waste... [leading to] increased resentment.”¹⁴⁸ However, because of the shared kinship links between Syrian refugees and local residents, violence was rare and “a passive acceptance has endured partly because of longstanding kinship ties that predate the conflict”.¹⁴⁹

In terms of interest, local mayors and chambers of commerce in both Jordan and Turkey work to frame the situation in terms of “Syrians hav[ing] improved the situation for Jordanians as well... We explain to people that it isn’t just competition for jobs and services. We try to bring projects that benefit all.”¹⁵⁰ These sentiments are further backed by initiatives to improve or expand local infrastructure, by requesting more funding from national and international pots to assist in meeting the needs of a larger population. In Sahab, Jordan, for example, Syrian businesses have been allowed to relocate to Jordan, bringing additional jobs and industry to the benefit of Syrians and Jordanians alike. In Turkey, some municipalities have partnered with national and international NGOs to create livelihood projects to the benefit of both Syrian and Turkish residents, Chambers of Commerce work to integrate Syrian refugees into the socioeconomic landscape, and Governorates have established communications mechanisms between local actors to identify and fill gaps while minimizing duplication.¹⁵¹

In contrast, the authors used Zarqa, Jordan, as an example of a receiving community employing neither identity- nor interest-based measures to mitigate potential unrest. Zarqa’s Governor is reportedly outspoken about the burden of refugees on the economy, healthcare, education, and public services. Coupled with high rates of youth unemployment in the governorate, this has become a narrative used by the government to demonstrate the drain of Syrian refugees on the country. Local leaders further described how a lack of “historical or familial familiarity” in Zarqa contributes to social tensions, and that currently, most Jordanians would ‘blame the Syrians’ for their economic problems.¹⁵²

In short, this analysis concluded that “even in countries with relatively centralized authority over refugee policy, local actors [municipalities] matter for integration outcomes.”¹⁵³

THE AFRICAN CONTINENT

Migration flows within and out of the African continent include labor or economic migrants, refugees, asylum-seekers, and internally displaced persons (IDPs). Overall, while 31 million people live outside the country of their birth, the majority remain within the African continent;

148 Ibid, p. 12

149 Ibid.

150 Ibid, pp. 13-14

151 Ibid, pp. 25-26

152 Ibid, p. 14

153 Ibid, p. 28

in fact, just 25% of African migrants reside in Europe.¹⁵⁴ Sub-Saharan Africa also hosts 26% (18 million) of the world's refugees, with refugee and IDP flows impacted by ongoing crises in the Central African Republic, Nigeria, and South Sudan, among others. In addition, recent displacement has been spurred on by extremism and insurgency, with the most notable impacts in Mali, Nigeria, Kenya, and Somalia.

Compared to the other contexts described in this report, African migration, particularly forced displacement, is characterized by South-South movement, in that IDPs and refugees “originate from and relocate to poor localities... taxing the meager resources in healthcare, education, housing and transport services at the relocation destinations”.¹⁵⁵

However, and despite a historical narrative of African migration being overwhelmingly driven by poverty and violence, an estimated 86% of migration within Africa is not related to conflict, and instead follows normal, regular migration trends, with migrants seeking out education, employment, and other opportunities.¹⁵⁶ In this perspective, migration is often the result of extensive planning and saving, with irregular migration frequently following failed attempts at accessing legitimate migration channels, as was found in an OECD study of West African migration factors.¹⁵⁷ This finding holds true across migration contexts generally, particularly among economic migrants.

Looking at specific contexts within the continent, migration is generally characterized by intra- and inter-regional population movements through both regular and irregular channels. In the Horn of Africa, most migration occurs along three routes: the North-Western Route (Sudan-Egypt-Libya-Europe), mostly used by Somalis; the Eastern Route (Yemen-Saudi-Gulf/Middle East), mostly used by Ethiopians and Somalis and; the Southern Route (eastern corridor of Africa to South Africa or Asia), used mostly by Ethiopians and Somalis. While a number of these migrants are forcibly displaced, with the region hosting 6.5 million IDPs and 2.2 million refugees,¹⁵⁸ migrants also move due to lack of employment—largely due to mismatched skills and opportunities—poverty, and environmental factors including climate change impacts.

The extent of mixed-migration throughout the region has also caused related illicit markets to flourish, including human smuggling, human trafficking, and organ trafficking, among others. According to research conducted in 2017, 41% of migrants used a broker or smuggler to facilitate their original departure from their country of origin, while 73% indicated they

154 Adepoju A. “Migration Dynamics, Refugees, and Internally Displaced Persons in Africa.” Academic Impact, UN, 20 September 2016, <https://academicimpact.un.org/content/migration-dynamics-refugees-and-internally-displaced-persons-africa>

155 Ibid

156 Flahaux, M., and De Haas, H., African Migration: trends, patterns, drivers, CMS 4, 1 (2016), <https://comparativemigrationstudies.springeropen.com/articles/10.1186/s40878-015-0015-6#citeas>

157 Kirwin, M. and J Anderson, Identifying the factors driving West African migration, West African Papers, N. 17, OECD Publishing 2018, <https://www.oecd.org/swac/publications/2018-wap-17-identifying-the-factors-driving-west-african-migration.pdf>, p. 11

158 UNHCR & World Bank Group, Eastern Africa HOA Displacement Study: Forced Displacement and Mixed Migration in the Horn of Africa, 2015.

had used a smuggler for subsequent legs of their migration journey. More than a third of migrants reported they had been controlled or prevented from leaving by a smuggler or a broker and more than a quarter reported that government officials were involved, paid, or rewarded in the smuggling process.¹⁵⁹

These multi-million dollar industries pose significant risks not only to people on the move in search of better livelihood opportunities like education and employment, but also lead to the exploitation of forcibly displaced populations, of which the majority are women and children, led by female-headed households. These factors make these populations particularly vulnerable to exploitation, as traditional social ordering may limit, if not exclude, displaced women from legitimate economies.

In the region, victims of trafficking are exploited in a range of industries including domestic work, agriculture, construction, entertainment, forestry, fishing, mining, and textiles. Exploitation also includes forced prostitution, forced marriage, engagement of children in armed conflicts, forced begging, forced labour, and organ trafficking.¹⁶⁰

National governments in the HoA region are currently developing or implementing mechanisms to interrupt trafficking networks, provide vulnerable migrants or victims of trafficking with easily accessible information on trafficking and other vulnerabilities (both before, during, and after migration journeys), improve community understanding of irregular migration risks, and provide critical referral information to state and civil actors to ensure a greater ability to identify and intercept potential trafficking victims and provide them with medical, legal, and other support.

The Northern Triangle of Central America

Similar to African migration, there is no “single, dominant factor—such as a war or a natural catastrophe—driving recent migration patterns in the Americas”.¹⁶¹ On the contrary, countries with the highest rate of outward migration share an “interlocking set of political, economic, and social challenges that have given rise to pervasive insecurity and desperation”, broadly categorized as: crime and violence; extreme poverty and economic collapse; environmental degradation and loss of traditional lifestyles; and impunity and elite indifference.”¹⁶²

Various studies of NTCA migrants suggest that direct violence against themselves or their family is often a key reason to undertake a migration journey, with 40% of NTCA asylum-

159 Danish Refugee Council, Unpacking the Myths: Human smuggling from and within the Horn of Africa, RMMS Briefing Paper No. 6, 2017.

160 IOM Regional Strategy East and Horn of Africa, 2016 – 2019

161 Restrepo, D., et al, Getting Migration in the Americas Right: A National Interest-Driven Approach, Center for American Progress, 24 June 2019, <https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2019/06/24/471322/getting-migration-americas-right/>

162 Ibid

seekers indicating such experiences.¹⁶³ The region also accounts for roughly 40% of global homicides despite containing just 8% of the world population, a statistic largely driven by increasing gang and narcotraffic activity and which further demonstrates the potential reach of violence.¹⁶⁴ Similarly, a recent study found that the “probability that an individual intends to migrate is 10-15 percentage points higher for Salvadorans and Hondurans who have been victims of multiple crimes than for those who have not.”¹⁶⁵

In addition to violence and criminality, poverty is further exacerbated by a combination of factors. The agricultural sector, for example, accounts for roughly 25% of NTCA employment¹⁶⁶; meanwhile, changing weather patterns, such as drought, have led to food insecurity and devastated livelihoods in the region.¹⁶⁷ Such environmental degradation can lead to displacement to main cities causing rapid and unplanned urbanization, where local infrastructure and employment often fails to meet the new demands, in turn leading to unemployment, and greater susceptibility to recruitment to gangs, involvement in illicit economies. Armed groups are also known to enlist children as young as 12 years old, both by ‘choice’, enticing Venezuelan migrants with steady income, and by force, including threatening to kill recruits or their families if they refuse. InSight Crime reported that recruits received up to VES 50,000 per month (USD 300 in the parallel market), the equivalent of 27 minimum wages in Venezuela (a monthly minimum wage is USD 12)¹⁶⁸, offering an attractive and unique income source in areas with higher rates of unemployment and informal work.

Against a backdrop of government institutions that are incapable of meeting the basic needs of the population, non-state actors perpetuate insecurity and forcibly recruit individuals into their ranks and use sexual violence as a tool of intimidation and control.¹⁶⁹ In particular, Venezuelan children and women are frequently victims of sexual assault and human trafficking, especially for purposes of sexual exploitation. They are victimized by the criminal structures involved in the conflict, whether as Colombian immigrants or as Venezuelan residents, when they are captured in their country to be sent to Colombia, particularly to the border area.

Given these interlocking factors, past migration trends from the region, which were largely driven by economic opportunity, are now likely to be “driven by fear and extreme privation” and “pose unique administrative and logistical challenges for recipient countries and are unlikely to be deterred by threats of aggressive enforcement of immigration laws.”¹⁷⁰

163 Forced to Flee Central America’s Northern Triangle: A neglected humanitarian crisis, Medecins Sans Frontieres, May 2017, https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/sites/default/files/2018-06/msf_forced-to-flee-central-americas-northern-triangle.pdf, p. 5

164 Ibid

165 Hiskey, J., et al., Leaving the Devil You Know: Crime Victimization, US Deterrence Policy, and the Emigration Decision in Central America, Latin American Research Review, vol. 53, no. 3 (2018)

166 Wilson, J., Recent Migration to the United States from Central America: Frequently Asked Questions, Congressional Research Service, 29 January 2019, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R45489.pdf>, p. 5

167 Restrepo, et al

168 Venezuela Investigative Unit. “GameChangers 2018: Venezuelan Migration, A New Gold Mine for Organized Crime.” InSight Crime, 8 January 2019, <https://es.insightcrime.org/noticias/analisis/gamechangers-2018-migracion-venezolana-crimen-organizado/>

169 MSF, p. 8

170 Ibid

APPLICABILITY OF MIGRATION LITERATURE TO THE VENEZUELAN MIGRANT CRISIS IN COLOMBIA

While the movement of Venezuelan migrants to Colombia represents the risks associated with South-South migration, the context is also benefited by a number of mitigating factors.

Existence of identity and interest factors

The Venezuela-Colombia context is significantly benefited by the countries' shared history, language, and sociocultural characteristics. Their shared histories of decolonization, government systems, recent political instability, and migration flows further mitigate unrest in the face of the current migration crisis. However, these factors do not preclude xenophobia, particularly should local economies deteriorate due either to the strain of the migration crisis or other external factors, such as the COVID-19 pandemic.

To this end, it is vital that programming identify the 'identity and interest' factors that shape sub-national policymaking or the application thereof. This may include the following:

Assess host community openness or resistance to Venezuelan migrants. Assessments may be conducted in various receiving communities to ascertain the openness or resistance towards Venezuelan migrants in a given locality and the specific factors that contribute to the identified reception. This could include identification of existing local ties in order to identify, for example, how localities that had high rates of pendular migration prior to the crisis respond to Venezuelans migrants compared to those who did not have the prior history of pendular movement.

Assess attitudes toward migrants and perceptions of host community and infrastructure capacity among host government authorities and local leaders. Identification of attitudes or perceptions from local authorities, such as mayors, may be necessary to address divergent perceptions of local priorities to ensure assistance meets an existing need, that it is both compatible with and does not duplicate existing efforts.¹⁷¹

Thoroughly map private sector stakeholders in host communities. Local business actors and Chambers of Commerce have also proved to be key intermediaries for influencing local politics, whether through investment in or lobbying on behalf of incorporating migrants into local economies. Tapping into these networks is a key, on-the-ground means of linking existing skills to needs and opportunities.

Spillover and existing instability

While the shared history and characteristics of both countries may help to mitigate severe negative outcomes for both Venezuelans and Colombians, Colombia's current stability is in its infancy. Studies have demonstrated that the risk of falling back into civil war—or the conflict

171 Betts, A., p. 28

trap—is highest in the first decade following the cessation of violence.¹⁷² Colombia, having experienced over six decades of protracted violence, large-scale violence against civilians, and a highly unstable neighbor, is particularly at risk of this trap given the resurgence of multiple non-state actors that have transformed the violence dynamics.

The already high vulnerability of Venezuelan immigrants and some returnees (due to their irregular status and unemployment or precarious economic condition), makes this population particularly prone to becoming victims or victimizers within the Colombian conflict when illegal armed groups are present in their areas of residence, work, or transit.

These factors, combined with the ongoing political instability of Venezuela and long-time conflict dynamics of Colombia, have allowed transnational criminal structures to consolidate their power in the border region, exploiting the vulnerability of Venezuelan migrants and returnees and heightening the risk factors for conflict escalation across the region.

To mitigate these vulnerabilities, we can draw lessons from experience in the Horn of Africa:

The Better Migration Management seeks to strengthen the capacity of all institutions and agencies responsible for migration and border management, while simultaneously improving identification, assistance, and protection for victims of trafficking and vulnerable migrants, particularly women and children in the Horn of Africa.¹⁷³ Adopting a similar strategy among key destination countries--Colombia, Brazil, Ecuador, and Peru--would help national government institutions create cohesive and complementary migration strategies, including improved communication and information sharing. It could also provide vulnerable migrants and victims of trafficking with urgently needed access to information and support systems along their journey or within destination countries. Smarter, collective, and more targeted support to migrants can further help to ameliorate strains on local host communities and potentially reduce intergroup tensions.

Lessons learned from donor responses to refugee, displace and migrant populations

International actors and host country governments employ different approaches in response to increased migration flows stemming from conflict and instability in the Middle East, the Horn of Africa and countries in the Northern Triangle (NTC's). The breadth of actors and approaches employed to attend displaced and migrant populations in these regions make it necessary to synthesize existing literature and lessons learned on responses to human migration. The following section includes a review of literature of completed and evaluated, as well as, ongoing programs and projects in response to the Syrian refugees in the Middle East (Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey), and migration in the Horn of Africa (Somalia, Kenya, and Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, Somalia).¹⁷⁴

172 Hegre, H., et al. "The Conflict Trap." PRIO, 11 October 2011, <https://folk.uio.no/haavarmn/ConflictTrapPaper.pdf>, p.

173 "EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa." European Commission. https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/region/horn-africa/regional/better-migration-management-programme_en

174 The analysis provided in this section only includes donor responses from the Horn of Africa and the Middle East, because of the dearth of published studies and evaluations of intra-regional migration among northern triangle countries.

REVIEW OF DONOR RESPONSES TO MIGRATION

International actors and host country governments employ different approaches in response to increased migration flows stemming from conflict and instability in the Middle East, the Horn of Africa and countries in the Northern Triangle (NTC's). The breadth of actors and approaches employed to attend displaced and migrant populations in these regions make it necessary to synthesize existing literature and lessons learned on responses to human migration. The following section includes a review of literature of completed and evaluated, as well as, ongoing programs and projects in response to the Syrian refugees in the Middle East (Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey), and migration in the Horn of Africa (Somalia, Kenya, and Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, Somalia).¹⁷⁵

The migration response space consists of many actors, including international non-governmental organizations, international multilateral organizations and bilateral donors, private sector actors and host country governments, both national and local. In this section, studies and evaluation reports on responses implemented by the following actors were reviewed: IOM, UNHCR, ILO, UNDP, EU, the World Bank, IDB, USAID, DoS. The findings summarized here include donor responses focused on emergency humanitarian aid, as well as, prolonged engagement of development activities with refugee, displaced and migrant populations in host countries. Particular attention is given to donor responses with an infrastructure and service delivery focus in host countries.

General Characteristics of Donor Responses to Migration

The responses by donors to human displacement and migration vary on the level of involvement with host country governments and by types of support provided to foreign nationals and host countries. The responses, generally speaking include: a) direct support of host country governments to attend migrant population needs, b) provision of technical support and the implementation of temporary (less than one year) or prolonged (more than one year) service delivery and infrastructure support in coordination with or parallel to host country government activities. The types of responses include technical support with research, policy development, and coordination between government agencies and international actors, as well as, implementation of service delivery and infrastructure activities for displaced persons and migrants.

Among service delivery responses, donors implemented activities that addressed basic needs of migrants, refugee and displaced persons, as well as, comprehensive coverage of services, which included: health care, basic and vocational educational, employment programs, community awareness raising campaigns on migration issues, and gender empowerment. Among infrastructure, donors' investments related to migrant and host community included:

¹⁷⁵ The analysis provided in this section only includes donor responses from the Horn of Africa and the Middle East, because of the dearth of published studies and evaluations of intra-regional migration among northern triangle countries.

housing, water and sanitation, sewage waste management, roads, lighting, municipal government infrastructure, and energy. Many of these responses included the participation or employment of refugee, displaced and migrant populations.

Finally, donors implement responses through bilateral investments with host country governments and in some cases, through regional response and funding mechanisms, such as the Jordan Compact¹⁷⁶, the World Bank Global Concessional Funding Facility (GCFF)¹⁷⁷, and the Regional Migration Program in the Horn of Africa.

LESSONS LEARNED FROM DONOR RESPONSES

Benefits to host government and communities

Across service delivery and infrastructure projects in the Middle East and the Horn of Africa, studies found that providing benefits to host governments, such as capacity building, and addressing host communities' needs, such as service delivery and infrastructure, impacted project achievements.

When countries hosted large numbers of refugees, it was necessary to mitigate the protracted negative fiscal, economic and social development effects of the refugees on host governments and communities. Studies found that both host community government officials and residents recognized the issues with host community infrastructure and service capacity such as, lack of and cost of housing, over saturation of public services (i.e. schools and health services), municipal services and delinquency.¹⁷⁸ The balanced approach to addressing forced displacement and migration created co-benefits that mitigate the harmful its impacts, and create political goodwill through win-win propositions. In contrast, failing to target host community needs, such as community service delivery and infrastructure, reduced the effectiveness of the institutions' intended development approaches.¹⁷⁹

Similarly, when projects successfully addressed host government capacity building needs, studies found that the quality of service delivered to migrants improved as result of change in awareness and attitudes of government staff¹⁸⁰. In contrast, quality of service delivery to migrants suffered, where trainings did not address government staff management and technical skills, such as program planning and financial management¹⁸¹ and technical skills

176 Veronique Barbelet, Jessica Hagen-Zanker and Dina Mansour-Ille. "Jordan Compact: Lessons learnt and implications for future refugee compacts." ODI. February, 2018.

177 The Bank Group helped establish two new refugee-specific financing instruments: The GCCF for middle-income countries and the IDA18 Regional Sub-Window for Refugees and Host Communities for eligible IDA countries. These new financing instruments build on lessons from prior instruments, including multi-donor trust funds, that push for more targeted, refugee-specific, support to ensure both refugees and vulnerable host communities benefit fully from concessional financing.

178 The World Bank, "Turkey's Response to the Syrian Refugee Crisis and the Road Ahead" December 2015.

179 The World Bank Group, IFC, MIGA "World Bank Group Support in Situations Involving Conflict-Induced Displacement," June 20, 2019.

180 Social Impact "Regional Summary Report: Horn of Africa: Evaluating the Effectiveness of Regional Migration Program Models on Providing Assistance to Vulnerable Migrants" April, 2017.

181 REACH, "Jordan emergency services and social resilience project (JESSRP) monitoring study 1" January 2016

(e.g. assessing migrant vulnerability, providing psycho-social support, or building referral networks)¹⁸² limited their ability implement interventions in border areas, as well as, scale up interventions in neighboring municipalities.¹⁸³

This illustrated in the specific project examples across the regions:

- In the Lebanon Health Resilience project, funded by the World Bank and UNHCR, an external evaluation concluded that refugees would not sufficiently benefit from expanded access to health facilities without also expanding services too poor Lebanese, to ensure coverage of health services targeted areas.¹⁸⁴
- Jordan Emergency Services and Social Resilience Project (JESSRP) aimed to strengthen the capacity of municipalities by investing in social infrastructure and supporting visible and tangible improvements at the municipal level.
- Jordan Compact, signed in 2016, brought together the World Bank, the EU, UNHCR DFID and IMF, to develop a long-term strategy to provide education and labor market opportunities to Syrian refugees and Jordanian host communities. Of key interest is its use of economic zones, providing work permits to Syrians in specific geographic areas, and developing infrastructure projects in Jordan host communities through “Employment through labor intensive Infrastructure” projects.

Targeting Migrant Needs and Vulnerabilities

In addition to targeting host communities, benefits to migrants had to be well targeted to their needs and vulnerabilities within the host community context. In projects that successfully identified vulnerabilities and needs, donors responses used geographic information system based technology to map migrant population groups, which helped ensure coverage of services to marginalized groups.¹⁸⁵ Similarly, donor responses that implemented gender-sensitive approaches mitigated barriers of participation and access of mothers and women to employment programs and service delivery.¹⁸⁶ Finally, research on donor responses showed that actively involving refugee and host community in decision-making improves targeting of services.¹⁸⁷

In contrast, when displaced and migrant population vulnerabilities go unaddressed, donor responses can contribute to conflict in host communities and limit the reach of service delivery projects. Even in ambitious donor responses that aimed to influence policies

182 Ibid 5.

183 Regional Durable Solutions Secretariat, Danish Refugee Council “Local Integration Focus: Refugees In Ethiopia” February, 2018.

184 Ibid 5.

185 Ibid 7.

186 Ibid 5.

187 International Rescue Committee “New Responses to the Refugee Crisis: Promises and Challenges in Ethiopia” November, 2018.

related refugee permanence and labor rights, when failing to so can limit the success of service delivery projects¹⁸⁸. Similarly, in country contexts where similar refugee and host communities share a strong cultural networks (like those of Syria and Turkey), failing to address vulnerabilities such as stigma and discrimination due to misinformation can create tension, misunderstandings and conflict in donor response.¹⁸⁹

This illustrated in the specific project examples across the regions:

- The Jordan Emergency Services and Social Resilience Project (JESSRP), aimed at improving municipal service capacity through infrastructure investment in street lighting, road rehabilitation and solid waste management (SWM). The project ensured even geographical targeting of road and SWM interventions, based on clear criteria, to contribute to a gradual improvement of service coverage at large, eventually reaching rural areas and the entire community evenly.¹⁹⁰
- In Lebanon, the Creating Opportunities in Support of the Lebanon National Jobs Program promoted participation of female migrants' in public service and public works activities through advocacy campaigns that support women's empowerment and through provision of quality childcare.¹⁹¹
- The Development Response to Displacement impact project in the Horn of Africa, implemented by World Bank and UNHCR, created a formal process for directly engaging refugees and host communities in the decision-making process through community consultations demonstrated to improve access to basic-social services among refugees and enhance environmental management of programs for host communities.¹⁹²

Monitoring and Evaluation

A recurrent theme across almost all studies and evaluations was the negative impact that poor monitoring and evaluation practices had on donor response efforts in the Horn of Africa and the Middle East. Weaknesses in monitoring and evaluation practices were related to: documentation of service delivery responses, tracking receipt of services to refugee, displaced and migrant populations and vulnerable sub-groups within the population (e.g. women and LGBTQ), and use of indicators that only tracked outputs.

188 Ibid 13.

189 The World Bank, "Turkey's Response to the Syrian Refugee Crisis and the Road Ahead", December 2015.

190 Jordan Emergency Services and Social Resilience Project

191 World bank eval

192 DDRP World Bank and UNHCR

Poor monitoring and evaluation systems contribute to accountability deficits within project activities. In some cases, government and regional donor officials did not prioritize tracking tracing technical assistance services provided to government staff and entry and movement of vulnerable migrant groups in host communities.¹⁹³ This made it challenging to develop country management capacity across the Horn of Africa¹⁹⁴ and to monitor hard to reach migrant populations in Lebanon¹⁹⁵ and Jordan¹⁹⁶. Poor documentation practices further compounded this issue, as government stakeholders in some projects did not prioritize standardized documentation of activities. Inconsistent or poor quality documentation made it difficult to monitor the implementation of activities overall and presented challenges in ensuring community priorities were included into the project planning process.¹⁹⁷

Successful implementation of donor responses in the Horn of Africa and the Middle East went under-reported because of poor design of monitoring and evaluation systems. Donors and host country governments counted the number of beneficiaries receiving project support, using mostly output indicators rather than outcome indicators¹⁹⁸, which are typically used to measure access to services and access to rights. Moreover, a dearth of outcome indicators on changes in well-being and security of migrant populations, limited their ability to inform the development of policies that respond to migrant needs.

Finally, studies and evaluation of donor responses recommended numerous ways to improve monitoring and evaluation of projects and programs. First, to design robust monitoring and evaluation metrics that track outcomes and contextual indicators that assesses population groups' vulnerabilities during implementation. Second, provide technical assistance throughout design and roll-out phases to regional staff and government stakeholders to instill capacity to implement these measurement systems. Third, utilize mixed-methods approaches to measure and monitor harder to measure phenomena impacting migrant populations, such as stigma and discrimination, gender based violence, child labor, and migrant and host population knowledge attitudes and practices related access and utilization of services delivered.

193 Ibid 5.

194 Ibid 6.

195 Ibid 5.

196 Ibid 7.

197 Ibid 7, 8 and 9

198 Unprepared for (re)integration Lessons learned from Afghanistan, Somalia and Syria on Refugee Returns to Urban Areas. Ibid 5, 6 and 13.

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