

**Ex-Post Project Evaluation 2014
(Mozambique, Bhutan, Palestine)**

November 2015

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Republic of Mozambique

Ex-Post Evaluation of Japanese Grant Aid Project

“Construction of Secondary Schools”

External Evaluator: Juichi Inada, Senshu University

0. Summary

The project’s objective was to improve access to lower secondary education, by constructing 4 schools and extending the capacity of existing schools and their facilities in the target areas of Maputo Province and Gaza Province, thereby contributing to improvement of the quality of education. The project’s objective coincides with the development policy of Mozambique, which emphasizes the expansion of access to secondary education at the time of planning and also ex-post evaluation. It also coincides with the development needs of Mozambique, because there are very strong needs for the construction of secondary schools in order to respond to the rapid increase in the number of students who wish to receive secondary education. It was also relevant to Japan’s ODA policy at the time of planning. Thus, its relevance is high.


The project cost and the project period are the same as planned, thus its efficiency is high.

As to the effects of the project, 4 schools and 58 classrooms were constructed as planned, the number of students enrolled at those schools exceeded the original target, and other positive effects were revealed in terms of the access to secondary education such as improvement of educational environment and reduction in commuting time to schools. Thus, its effectiveness is high. There were some negative impacts of the project; for example, the IT classrooms of some schools were not utilized as planned, and the promotion rate declined in some grades of 2 schools in Maputo Province partly because the number of students per classroom far exceeded the capacity of the classroom. On the other hand, there were some positive indirect impacts as planned; the promotion rate improved in 2 schools in Gaza Province, and the learning attitudes of students and teaching attitudes of teachers also improved. Thus, the project’s effectiveness and impact are high.

As to the aspects of operation and maintenance (O&M), there were no serious problems in the technical aspect, but there were some problems in the institutional and financial aspects, as well as the O&M situations. Thus, sustainability of the project is fair.

In the light of the above, this project is evaluated to be highly satisfactory.

1. Project Description



Project Locations



Athletic field of Kongolote school, Gaza Province

1.1 Background

The Mozambique government prioritized education of the people and human capital development in its national development plan. It formulated the “Plano Estrategico da Educacão e Cultura 2006-2010/2011 (PEEC),” implemented the strategic plan which prioritized the spread of primary education¹, and achieved 100% gross enrollment ratio for lower primary education². Furthermore, for the implementation of PEEC, the government formulated the “Estrategico da Ensino Secundario (EES) 2008-2015” and has been putting in place measures to expand access to secondary education, improve the quality of education, and strengthen the systems.

However, the shortage of secondary educational facilities created an immediate bottleneck for improving access to education, and classes conducted in three sessions while exceeding capacity, as well as poor environment, were negative factors for improving the quality of education. Therefore, improving secondary educational facilities was a pressing issue. In the EES, the Mozambique government set out the aim of expanding and improving secondary educational facilities by constructing 930 classrooms per year until 2015.

1.2 Project Outline

The project’s objective was to improve access to secondary education and the quality of education, by constructing 4 secondary schools and related facilities in Maputo Province and Gaza Province.

¹ Primary education in Mozambique is divided into 5 years of lower primary education (EP1: 1-5 grades) and 2 years of higher primary education (EP2: 6-7 grades), and 3 years of lower secondary education (ESG: 8-10 grades) and 2 years of higher secondary education (ESG2: 11-12 grades).

² “Gross Enrollment Rate” refers to the percentage of the official school age population that corresponds to the same level of education in a given school year.

Grant Limit/ Actual Grant Amount		1,015 million yen /1,015 million yen
Exchange of Notes Date/ Grant Agreement Date		October 2009/ October 2009
Implementing Agency		Ministry of Education and Culture (Ministry of Education at the time of completion) ³
Project Completion Date		January 2012
Project Implementation	Contractors	Construction: Ceta Construção E Servicosm S.A. Procurement: L. Duarte Dos Santos Lda
	Consultants	Matsuda Consultant, Inc.
Basic Design		March 2009
Detailed Design		October 2009
Related Projects		<p>Technical Cooperation: Strengthening of In-Service Training for Primary Teachers in Gaza Province (2006-2009), Advisor for Teacher Training Development (2010-2012), Advisor for Strengthening In-service Teacher Training System for Secondary Education (2014-2015)</p> <p>Grant Aid: Project for the Construction of Primary and Secondary Schools in Maputo City (2001-2003, 984 million yen), Project for the Construction of the Chimoio Primary Teacher Training Center (2005-2007, 945 million yen), Project for Construction of the Cuamba Teacher Training Center (2007-2009, 997 million yen), Project for the Construction of Secondary Schools in Nampula Province (2012-2013, 1,063 million yen), Project for the Construction of Monapo Primary Teacher Training Institute in Nampula Province (2013-2015, 1,024 million yen)</p> <p>Other Organizations: The Fund for Education Sector (FASE), (The World Bank, EU, other 9 countries, Phase I: 2003-2008, Phase II: 2008-2012, Phase III: 2012-2016), Education Project IV (African Development Bank, 2008-2010)</p>

2. Outline of the Evaluation Study

2.1 External Evaluator

Juichi Inada, Senshu University

2.2 Duration of Evaluation Study

This evaluation study was performed according to the following schedule.

Duration of the Study: November, 2014–December, 2015

³ Because the name of the Ministry of Education and Culture was changed to the Ministry of Education at the time of project completion, this evaluation report uses the name of the Ministry of Education.

Duration of the Field Study : February 16, 2015–February 26, 2015, May 3, 2015– May 9, 2015

3. Results of the Evaluation (Overall Rating: A⁴)

3.1. Relevance (Rating: ③⁵)

3.1.1 Relevance to the Development Plan of Mozambique

Education was a prioritized agenda in human capital development, which was one of the three pillars of the Mozambique National Development Plan (Plano de Acção para a Redução da Pobreza Absoluta II 2006-2009: PARPA II). Of these, expansion of secondary education with better quality to respond to the needs of the society was established as the primary objective, while pursuing improvement of facilities for responding to the rapidly increasing needs for secondary education, increasing the number of qualified teachers, reform of the curriculum, and alleviating the gap between urban and rural areas were the aims set out to achieve this primary objective. The government also adopted the “Plano de Acção para a Redução da Pobreza (PARP 2011-2014),” which continues to prioritize the spread of education with the aim of achieving comprehensive economic development and escape from poverty.

Under PEEC 2006-2010/2011, the government implemented a strategic plan which prioritized primary education, and achieved 100% gross enrollment rate for lower primary education in 2008. The government then formulated EES 2008-2015, and has been putting effort into expanding access to secondary education, improving the quality of education, and strengthening institutions, in order to realize the objectives of PEEC. Even in the Plano Estrategico do Sector da Educacão (PEE) 2012-2016, which follows PEEC 2006-2010/11, the necessity of increasing the number of schools for secondary education to respond to the increasing need for secondary education is mentioned.

Therefore, this project is relevant to “EES 2008-2015,” which mentions the expansion of access to secondary education and the improvement of the quality of education, at the time of appraisal. The project is also relevant to “PARP 2011-2014” and “PEE 2012-2016,” which mention the spread of education and response to the rapidly increasing needs of secondary education, at the time of ex-post evaluation.

3.1.2 Relevance to the Development Needs of Mozambique

100% gross enrollment rate for lower primary education was achieved in 2008 in Mozambique, and the number of secondary students has also been increasing. For instance, the number of students at the lower secondary levels (ESG 1: 8-10 grades) doubled, and that of the higher secondary levels (ESG 2: 11-12 grades) became 2.6 times from 2004 to 2008. The gross

⁴ A: Highly satisfactory, B: Satisfactory, C: Partially satisfactory, D: Unsatisfactory

⁵ ③: High, ②: Fair, ①: Low

enrollment rate for ESG 1 in 2008 was 39.4% (net enrollment rate was 8.9%)⁶, and the gross enrollment rate for ESG 2 in 2008 was 12.5% (net enrollment rate was 1.3%). Although the rates were still low, the number of students enrolled in secondary education was expected to increase at the time of appraisal. In fact, the total number of students in ESG 1 was tripled (to about 500,000), and that in ESG 2 was quadrupled (to about 100,000), from 2004 to 2011. The gross enrollment rate for ESG 1 in 2010 was 46%, and that for ESG 2 was 19%, marking a further increase since 2008⁷. The need for constructing secondary schools is very high; therefore, this project takes on great significance in responding to these needs⁸.

Matola City in Maputo Province is a suburban city near Maputo, the capital city of Mozambique, where the population has been increasing and the number of students who want to enroll in secondary school has also increased rapidly. The construction of 2 schools in Maputo Province (Nkobe school and Kongolote school) is helping to meet the growing demand for secondary schools, and the selection of the locations of the two schools is regarded as appropriate. The population of Gaza Province, which neighbors Maputo Province, has been also increasing, and the number of students who want to go to secondary school is also expanding. There are a small number of secondary schools, and the students must walk a long distance to schools in the area where Chissano school and Manjakaze school are located. The project aims to improve the educational environment, including cutting down on the amount of time it takes students to commute to school, through the construction of secondary schools in small cities in the rural areas, as well as the selection of locations that is regarded as appropriate.

On the other hand, advancements have been made in aid coordination in the educational sector in Mozambique, and the FASE (Fundo de Apoio ao Sector da Educaç o) is a typical example of the use of common funds for assisting the educational sector, which began in 1995. The World Bank has been initiating the FASE since 2008. The FASE has been the largest financial resource in the educational sector, and the largest share of it has been used for construction of schools. FASE assisted in the construction of 20 new secondary schools and rehabilitated one secondary school from 2008 to 2011, the World Bank itself assisted in the construction of 6 new secondary schools and rehabilitated 6 schools from 2003 to 2008, and the

⁶ "Net Enrollment Rate" refers to the number of children enrolled in school who belong to the age group that officially corresponds to schooling, divided by the total population of the same age group. "Gross enrollment rate" is higher than the "net enrollment rate," because the former includes the number of students who are outside the official school age of population (repeaters, readmitted, etc.)

⁷ PEE (2012-2016), p.130.

⁸ "Project for the Construction of Primary and Secondary Schools in Maputo City," started in 2001 (984 Million yen), was offered as a scheme of General Grant Aid. On the other hand, "The Project for the Construction of Secondary Schools in Nampula Province," started in 2012 (1,063 Million yen), which provided assistance to construct 4 schools (49 classrooms) in Nampula Province, was offered as a scheme of Grant Aid for Community Empowerment. One of the differences between the General Grant Aid and the Grant Aid for Community Empowerment is that local contractors (with a share of local capital of more than 50%) are selected as contractors for the construction of facilities and procurement of equipment in the latter scheme, which is highly estimated by the Mozambique side because it corresponds to the expectation and needs for using local companies.

African Development Bank assisted in the construction of 5 new secondary schools and rehabilitated 4 schools from 2004 to 2009. At the time of 2009, the African Development Bank had a plan to assist in the construction of 2 schools in the North, and the Kuwaiti Government had a plan to construct 2 schools in the middle area of Mozambique; therefore, the Japanese government focused on the South of Mozambique as its target. The decision for the selection of location is regarded as appropriate.

Therefore, the project is responding to development needs, both at the time of appraisal and at the time of ex-post evaluation.

3.1.3 Relevance to Japan's ODA Policy

The Japanese government has been providing ODA in the areas of economic infrastructure building, rural and agricultural development, and human resource development, among others. Human resource development was raised as one of the prioritized areas at the "Policy Dialogue with Mozambique" held in 2007. Therefore, assisting in the improvement of educational facilities is consistent with the priorities of Japanese ODA policies for Mozambique⁹. The Japanese government announced its plans to assist in the improvement of access to education in Africa by constructing 1,000 primary and secondary schools and 5,500 classrooms at the Fourth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD-IV). Therefore, the project is consistent with this initiative and Japanese ODA policy at the time of planning.

This project has been highly relevant to the country's development plan and development needs, as well as Japan's ODA policy. Therefore, its relevance is high.

3.2 Efficiency (Rating③)

3.2.1 Project Outputs

58 classrooms (19 classroom buildings¹⁰ and other 16 buildings) in 4 schools (Chissano school and Manjakaze school in Gaza Province, Nkobe school and Kongolote school in Maputo Province) were constructed as planned¹¹.

There were no major changes from the original plan in terms of major facilities. Athletic field, field locker room, teachers' locker room and store house in Chissano school were excluded at the time of bid because of budget limitations, but those were finally constructed in batch 4 by using the remaining balance of the budget. Actual total floor space of the 4 schools was

⁹ "Country assistance Policy for Mozambique" had not yet been formulated in 2009.

¹⁰ This number of classrooms includes the number of multipurpose classrooms.

¹¹ At the time of ex-post evaluation, the name of Kongolote school was changed to Bonifacio school, and the name of Manjakaze school was changed to Samora Machel school. However, this report uses the names of schools at the time of planning, to maintain consistency with the names at the time of planning.

12,672.70 m², in contrast with the 13,746.70 m² as planned. The decrease in total floor space was due to the decrease in the space of facilities attached to the athletic field of Chissano school, without any major changes to the facilities of the 4 schools¹².

Table 1: Details of Constructed Facilities

Batch Number	Province/District/School	Facilities (number of blocks)
1	Gaza/ Chissano, Bilenemasia/ Chissano	4 Classroom Block×2 Block(8 Classrooms in total), Multipurpose Classroom Block, Administration Block, Toilet Block, Warden’s Block, Athletic Field with Roof
	Gaza/ Manjakaze, Manjakaze/ Manjakaze	3 Classroom Block×1, 4 Classroom Block×3 Block (15 Classrooms in total), Multipurpose Classroom Block, Administration Block, Toilet Block, Warden’s Block
2	Maputo/ Matola, Mashaba/ Nkobe	3 Classroom Block×1, 4 Classroom Block×3 Block (15 Classrooms in total), Multipurpose Classroom Block, Administration Block, Toilet Block, Wardens Block, Athletic Field with Roof
	Maputo/ Matola, Inflene/ Kongolote	4 Classroom Block×5 Block (20 Classrooms in total), Multipurpose Classroom Block, Administration Block, Toilet Block, Wardens Block, Athletic Field with Roof ‘
4	Athletic field with roof of Manjakaze School (Batch 1)	Athletic Field with Roof

(Source) JICA Reports. Batch 3 involved the procurement of furniture for 4 schools, which is not listed in Table 1.



Photo1: Nkobe/Maputo



Photo2: Kongolote/Maputo



Photo3: Chissano/Gaza



Photo4: Manjakaze/Gaza

¹² Based on JICA Reports.

There were no major changes from the original plan in terms of major facilities. Athletic field, field locker room, teachers' locker room and store house in Chissano school were excluded at the time of bid because of budget limitations, but those were finally constructed in batch 4 by using the remaining balance of the budget. Actual total floor space of the 4 schools was 12,672.70 m², in contrast with the 13,746.70 m² as planned. The decrease in total floor space was due to the decrease in the space of facilities attached to the athletic field of Chissano school, without any major changes to the facilities of the 4 schools¹³.

As to the major furniture and equipment, there were minor changes in the number of sanitary equipments (washstands and sinks etc.) for both male and female shower rooms at the 4 schools. Cisterns were also added to the toilet blocks of the 4 schools. These changes were made to respond to the requests of the counterparts of the project. There were no other major changes to the furniture and equipment.

Although the students' hostels and teachers' houses are normally constructed according to the MoE's standard design, this project excluded those facilities to construct as many schools as possible within its budget of about 1 billion yen, because the cost of construction of 1 school would become doubled if those facilities were included. Choosing the location of schools with relatively better access reduced the need for students' hostels, but the MoE constructed teachers' houses using their own budget for the Chissano school and Manjakaze school in Gaza Province, where there was a strong need for teachers' houses. Also, in the case of athletic fields, the seats (stands) were constructed based on the MoE's normal design. However, the seats were excluded from the design of the 4 schools in this project in order to reduce the cost of construction per school.

3.2.2 Projects Inputs

3.2.2.1 Project Cost

Project cost on the Japanese side was 1,015 million yen, provided as Grant Aid for Community Empowerment. The remaining amount of the budget at the time of completion of disbursement to contractors in March 2013 was 27.60 million yen, which was reimbursed to the implementing agency (Ministry of Education) in September 2013 in accordance with the request of the Ministry, to cover the cost of constructing other secondary schools. Therefore, the final project cost was 1,015 million yen, which was the same as planned (100%).

The project component borne by the Mozambique side included the surrounding facilities, land, and water equipment for the 4 schools, which were provided as planned. (The amount of the cost borne by the Mozambique side was 54 million yen at the time of planning.) The Mozambique side paid for additional components such as extension of roads to neighboring

¹³ Based on JICA Reports.

cities and construction of teachers' houses, which were not included in the original plan. (Their actual cost is unknown.) On the other hand, although IT and science class equipment were expected to be provided by the Mozambique side, science class equipment has not yet been provided in all 4 schools, while IT equipment (computers, monitors, etc.) has been provided in 3 schools but not yet been provided in Chissano school of Gaza Province.

Thus, project cost on the Japanese side remained as planned. As we have not been able to identify the details of the project cost for the Mozambique side, project cost was evaluated based on that for the Japanese side only.

3.2.2.2 Project Period

Project period was 28 months from October 2009 (E/N of G/A) to January 2012 at the time of appraisal, and the actual project period was also 28 months from October 2009 (E/N of G/A) to January 2012 (completion of construction and handover of facilities and equipment), which was 100% according to plan. Thus, the project period was the same as planned.

Both the project cost and the project period were as planned. Therefore, efficiency of the project is high.

3.3 Effectiveness¹⁴(Rating: ③)

3.3.1 Quantitative Effects (Operational and Effect Indicators)

The number of classrooms as an operational indicator, and the number of students who are able to go to schools and the number of teachers and staff as effect indicators, were examined at the time of ex-post evaluation¹⁵. Since there is no exact data on the enrollment rate of each division, we compared the number of students in the 4 target schools of the project at the time of both planning and ex-post evaluation, with the increase in the number of students in Matola city in Maputo Province and Gaza Province as a whole.

(1) The number of classrooms

As already mentioned in the section on project outputs, 4 schools and 58 classrooms were constructed, and the target was achieved.

(2) The number of students who are able to go to schools

¹⁴ The rating of effectiveness includes the evaluation of the impact of the project.

¹⁵ As the Preparatory Survey of JICA mentioned in its report that the construction of 58 classrooms, and 184 teachers and 102 staff (administrative and other staff), are necessary for the management of the 4 secondary schools to be constructed under the project, these figures were verified as operational indicators.

The target number of students who can enroll in the schools was 9,570, which was calculated based on the formula “55 persons per classroom¹⁶ × 3 sessions × number of classrooms (58)”, which was the same as the output figures. The actual number of students in the 4 schools is the most important indicator for assessing the effective utilization of the facilities.

At the time of planning, the expected number of students who can enroll in the schools was estimated to expand to 9,570 in 2014 (2 years after the project completion), and the actual number of students in February 2014 was 10,356 (and 12,723 in 2015), which was more than the expected number at the time of planning¹⁷. (See Table 2)

Table 2: Comparison of Operational Indicators between the Target and the Actual

	Baseline	Target	Actual			
	2008	2014	2012	2013	2014	2015
	Assessment Year	2 years After Completion	Year of Completion	1 Year After Completion	2 years After Completion	3 Years After Completion
Number of classrooms	2	60	60	60	60	60
Number of students	678	9,570	n.a.	5,993	10,356	12,723
Nkobe school	0	2,475	431	1,351	2,805	3,780
Knongolote school	0	3,300	n.a.	2,022	4,205	4,519
Chissano school	678	1,320	1,292	1,455	1,518	1,954
Manjakaze school	0	2,475	761	1,165	1,828	2,470
Number of teachers (number of staff)	n.a.	184(102)	n.a.	124(48)	195(56)	213(67)
Nkobe school	0	46	13(6)	31(11)	51(14)	54(14)
Kongolote school	0	61	n.a.	42(17)	62(20)	67(29)
Chissano school	n.a.	31	22(7)	27(8)	37(8)	44(9)
Manjakaze school	0	46	18(8)	24(12)	45(14)	48(15)

Source: Baseline and target figures are based on JICA Report. Actual data is based on the documents offered by MoE and the 4 schools.

Notes: (1) 15 new classrooms were constructed in Nkobe school, 20 new classrooms in Kongolote, and 15 new classrooms in Manjakaze. In Chissano school, 2 classrooms were already existing, and 8 new classrooms were constructed. (2) The targeted number of students in 2014 refers to the capacity of the schools, while other student figures are all actual figures.

Table 3 shows the number of students for Matola city of Maputo Province and Gaza Province as a whole in 2009, 2012 and 2014, as well as the number of students for the 4 schools¹⁸. There were 39 secondary schools in Matola city in Maputo Province, and the increase in the number of

¹⁶ The number of students per classroom was based on the figure mentioned in “Estrategico da Ensino Secundario (EES) 2008-2015”.

¹⁷ The ex-ante evaluation report of JICA mentioned that ex-post evaluation would be conducted 2 years after the completion of the project, and a comparison made between the figures at the time of planning and the figures for February 2014.

¹⁸ Total number of students enrolled in two days and one night sessions together, based on the statistics offered by DPEC (Direccoes Provincial de Educacão e Cultura) of Maputo Province.

secondary school students from 2009 to 2014 was 19,794. The number of students for Nkobe school and Kongolote school was 7,010 (2,805 and 4,205 respectively), which was 35.4% of the total increase of 19,794. The number of new schools constructed during the period from 2009 to 2014 was 4, of which 2 were constructed with assistance from JICA while the other 2 were constructed with assistance by FASE. There were 50 secondary schools in Gaza Province, and the increase in the number of secondary students from 2009 to 2014 was 17,481. The increase in the number of students of 2 schools in Chissano and Manjakaze schools was 2,668 (840 and 1,823 respectively), which was 15.3% of the total increase of 17,481¹⁹.

The increase in the number of students under the project was 9,678, making 26.0% of 37,275, which was the total increase in Matola city in Maputo Province and Gaza city as a whole. Hence, the 4 schools assisted under the Project made a large contribution in accepting the increase in the number of students who want to go to secondary schools in those areas.

Table 3: The Total Number of Students in the Target Areas and the Share of the Number of Targeted Schools

		Total number of enrolled students			Increase between 2009-2014 (A)	Number of enrolled students in targeted 2 schools (B)	Share of the targeted 2 schools in total increase (B/A)
		2009	2012	2014			
Matola city/ Maputo Province	ESG1	40,274	50,354	53,192	19,794	7,010	35.4%
	ESG2	5,309	10,783	12,185			
Gaza Province*	ESG1	44,390	55,815	58,009	17,481	3,346 (2,668)	19.1% (15.3%)
	ESG2	9,975	11,483	13,837			

Notes: Based on the documents offered by MoE and the 4 schools.

* The data for Maputo Province in this table shows the data for Matola city only, but the data for Gaza Province shows the data for Gaza Province as a whole, because 2 schools supported by the project were located in different districts and no district specific data was available. In Chissano school, there were 678 students in 2008, and the figures shown in brackets () are the net increase obtained by subtracting the existing number of students from the current number of students in 2014.

(3) The number of teachers/staff

At the time of February 2014, the number of teachers in the 4 schools was 195 in total. This number exceeded 184, which was the target number of teachers at the time of appraisal. Therefore, the necessary number of teachers was stationed. On the other hand, the number of administrative staff (secretary and management staff) was 56 in 2014. This number was less

¹⁹ Based on the data offered by DPEC of 2 Provinces and interviews. The expected number of students in Manjakaze school in 2014 at the time of appraisal was 2,475 (15 classrooms × 3 sessions × 55 students per classroom), but the actual number of students in 2014 was 1,828, which was less than expected. This is because the Manjakaze school accepted students from the 8th grade and 11th grade only. (Students of other grades were students who had advanced from the previous grades and included no newcomers.) The actual number of students in 2015 is almost the same as the targeted number of students.

than 102, the number of target staff at the time of appraisal. Therefore, the necessary number of staff was not stationed.

3.3.2 Qualitative Effects (Other Effects)

The expected qualitative effects produced by the project are as follows.

(1) Improvement in Educational Environment

At the time of planning, it was expected that it would become possible to conduct school lessons in accordance with the regular curriculum, and that the quality of education would improve through the provision of multipurpose classrooms, IT classrooms, libraries, athletic fields with roofs, which are necessary to conduct lessons in accordance with the regular curriculum of secondary schools.

However, science classrooms were used as normal classrooms because science equipment in the multipurpose classrooms had not yet provided to all 4 schools. Besides, IT equipment such as computers were provided only to the 2 schools of Kongolote school (in 2012) and Manjakaze (in 2015) by the Ministry of Education, but had not yet been provided to Chissano school²⁰ (at the time of ex-post evaluation). Furthermore, the IT equipment of Nkobe school was stolen in 2014. (See Photo 5.) Therefore, science and IT classrooms were often used as normal classrooms, and were not used in the ways they were expected to be used.

Based on the beneficiary survey seeking the opinions of students about the facilities of the constructed schools, the level of satisfaction of the students was relatively high in general²¹. Satisfaction level on “desks and chairs” was relatively low. (It is believed that the reason was because the number of desks and chairs was far less than the number of students in Nkobe school and Kongolote school.) Satisfaction level on “IT classrooms” was low in Chissano school and Nkobe school. (It is believed that the reason was that there were no computer equipment in those schools.) Satisfaction level on “libraries” was also low in Chissano school and Manjakaze school. (It is believed that the reason was that the number of books in libraries was very limited in those schools.) Satisfaction level on athletic fields and administration offices was relatively high²²; on the other hand, satisfaction level on toilet facilities was relatively low in general.

²⁰ One Japanese physics teacher was dispatched to Chissano school in February 2015, as a member of JOCV (Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers).

²¹ Beneficiary Survey was conducted, and interviews were conducted on 50 students per school (20 students in the morning session, 20 students in the afternoon session, 10 students in the night session, with 25 boys and 25 girls among them, 200 in total) and 15 teachers per school (60 in total), during the period from February to March 2015.

²² The athletic fields with roofs are open after school and during weekends, and are used by the adults and children in the neighboring communities. They are also used as the meeting places for school committees.

Based on the beneficiary survey seeking opinions on the necessity for teachers' houses, as well as students' hostel and canteens, many respondents answered that all of these facilities were necessary in the Chissano school and Manjakaze school, which are located in rural areas. On the other hand, there were less positive answers for the Kongolote school and Nkobe school. (See Table 4.)

Table 4: The Perception about the Necessity of Teachers' Houses, and Students' Hostel and Canteens

(Proportion of "Yes" answers: %)

School	Teachers' Houses	Students' hostel		Canteen	
	teacher	teacher	student	teacher	student
Chissano/Gaza Province	80	80	72	87	82
Manjakaza/Gaza Province	93	80	88	93	92
Kongolote/Maputo Province	47	60	46	80	74
Nkobe/Maputo Province	80	60	56	100	72

Notes: Based on the questionnaires conducted on teachers in the case of teachers' houses, and conducted on both teachers and students in the case of students' hostel and canteens.



Photo 5: IT classroom of Manjakaze school



Photo 6: Teachers' house of Manjakaze school (under construction)

(2) Reduction in commuting time to schools

The reduction in commuting time to schools is shown in Table 5, which shows that commuting time has decreased for all 4 schools.

Overall, the expected effects produced by the project, including the number of classrooms, the number of enrolled students in the 4 schools, and the number of teachers, were achieved. Educational environment was improved because it became regular to conduct lessons in accordance with the regular curriculum although the IT classrooms were not used as planned, and commuting time to schools was also reduced. Therefore, this project has largely achieved its objectives.

Table 5: Reduction in Commuting Time to 4 Schools

School	Improvement of access to schools	Time taken to commute to schools based on beneficiary survey (average)
Nkobe/Maputo	In comparison with the situations before the construction of the new school, commuting time was reduced from 30 minutes to 15 minutes by bus, and from 1 hour to 30 minutes on foot.	Decreased from 66 to 52
Kongolote/Maaputo	After the construction of the new school, students no longer have to commute to schools far from their community. (Zonaverde, Matola: 5-7km distance)	Decreased from 52 to 41
Chissano/Gaza	Before the expansion of the school, many students commuted to the next nearest school located 10km away.	Decreased from 29 to 21
Manjakaze/Gaza	Before the construction of the new school, many students commuted to another secondary school located 7km away, which took them almost 2 hours to reach. Now, students who live in the nearby community take between 5 to 30 minutes to commute, while students in other communities take about 1.5 hours (2 hours previously).	Decreased from 29 to 20

(Notes) The sentences in the middle column are based on interviews with the principals. The right column shows the average commuting time based on the beneficiary survey (questions addressed to 50 students in each school, 200 in total, about the commuting time to schools before and after the construction of new schools).

3.4 Impacts

3.4.1 Intended Impacts

The following impact has been identified in this project.

(1) Improvement in promotion rate (Aproveitamento Escolar)

One of the indicators used to assess the results of school lessons on learning is “promotion rate (Aproveitamento Escolar),” which means the rate of the number of students who are able to move to the next grade, based on the results of lessons or scores in examination for entering 10th grade and 12th grade.

Table 6 shows that promotion rates have improved since 2013 in Chissano school and Manjakaze school where the number of students were within the official capacity. On the other hand, the promotion rates had not improved, or had declined, in some grades in Nkobe school and Kongolote school in Maputo Province.

The promotion rates in Chissano school and Manjakaze school had improved and the quality of education was achieved, it was believed, partly by keeping the number of students within the official classroom capacity. On the other hand, the promotion rates in Nkobe school and Kongolote school had not improved, it was believed, partly because the number of enrolled students had rapidly expanded and lessons were conducted under conditions of overcapacity. In comparison with the average promotion rate in Matola city in Maputo Province and Gaza

Province as a whole, the promotion rates for Nkobe school and Manjakaze school were not as high as the average.

Table 6: The shift in Promotion Rate for Each Grade in the 4 Schools

School	Shift in promotion rate (%)					
Nkobe/ Maputo		8th	9th	10th		
	2013	76	82	na		
	2014	62	56	57		
	(8th-10th grades only. 11th grade starts in 2016.)					
Kongolote/Maputo		8th	9th	10th	11th	12th
	2013	77	97	na	85	na
	2014	79	78	39	85	60
Chissano/Gaza		8th	9th	10th		
	2010	65	68	na		
	2011	62	68	60		
	2012	64	77	55		
	2013	80	80	80		
	2014	89	82	86		
(8th-10th grades only. 11th grade started in 2015.)						
Manjakaze/Gaza		8th	9th	10th	11th	12th
	2012	65	na	na	na	na
	2013	75	69	na	72	na
	2014	79	72	72	73	84
	(8th grade started in 2012, and 11th grade started in 2013.)					

Source: Based on interviews with, and documents from, the 4 schools.

(2) Improvement in learning attitudes of students and teaching attitudes of teachers

In the interviews conducted with the 4 schools, all schools provided answers such as the following: “Getting desks and chairs has made it easier for us to study;” “There are less students who are leaving the classroom halfway through the lessons;” “There are many students who want to come to this school because the facilities are very good;” “The quality of education has improved because teachers can walk around the classrooms.” These were achieved as a result of the improvement of facilities under the project.

Table 7: Beneficiary Survey Results on the Quality of Education

School	Question1: Have the new school facilities made an impact on your performance at school? (question to students)	Question2: Was there any positive impact on the learning attitudes of students? (question to teachers)	Question 3: Was there any positive impact on the teaching attitudes of teachers? (question to teachers)
Nkobe/Maputo	56	93	80
Kongolote/Maputo	82	93	93
Chissano/Gaza	82	53	80
Manjakaze/Gaza	86	60	93

Notes: The number of responses was: 50 students in each school making a total of 200 in 4 schools, and 15 teachers in each school making a total of 60 in 4 schools.

In addition, Table 7 shows the positive answers pertaining to the impact of the project. Both students and teachers answered that the learning attitudes of students and teaching attitudes of teachers have been improved through the construction of new school facilities.

(3) Number of students per classroom

The number of students per classroom differs according to the policy for accepting local students in the 4 schools. (See Table 8.)

In the 2 schools in Maputo Province, schools accepted all students who wanted to enroll. As a result, the number of students per classroom exceeded the capacity, reaching about 80 students per classroom, and leaving many students to study without desks and chairs. Nkobe school accepted students from 8th to 10th grades, where its classrooms were crowded. Hence, the number of students exceeded the classroom capacity, resulting in the students studying their lessons while sitting on the floor. The situation was the same in Kongolote school.

Table 8: Shift in the Number of Students per Classroom of 4 Schools

	Capacity of classroom	2012	2013	2014	2015
Nkobe/Maputo	55	50-55	60-65	65-70	70-80
Kongolote/Maputo	55	n.a.	65	70-75	75-80
Chissano/Gaza	55	56	56	56	n.a.
Manjakaze/Gaza	55	50	52	55	56

(Notes) Based on the interviews with principals of 4 schools

In the 2 schools in Gaza Province, schools set their quota for accepting students at a maximum of 56 students per classroom. In Chissano school, lessons were sometimes held outside without classroom facilities before the project, and the situation improved after the construction of 8 classrooms under the project. Chissano school accepted the students for ESG 1 (8-10 grades) before 2014, but began to accept students for ESG 2 (11th grade) as well, so the number of students was on the rise²³. As such, the school was still using the existing classrooms by buying plastic chairs using their own budget (without desks) (See Photo 9). Manjakaze school began to accept students of 8th grade in 2012, and continued to accept new 8th grade students every year to keep the number of students per classroom under the maximum capacity of 55 until 2014. However, it became difficult for the school to accept an increasing number of students who wanted to enter the school after 2015. Hence, it has

²³ Chissano school has set its quota on the number of students to accept based on the capacity of its classrooms. Since the number of students has increased and more classrooms are necessary to accept them, members of the local community have tried to construct a new building of 4 classrooms by themselves. However, they were only able to construct its walls without a roof.

requested the Government to construct new classrooms, and is reviewing the limit on the number of students as a temporary measure in the meantime.



Photo 7: Classroom of Kongolote school



Photo 8: Classroom of Manjakaze school



Photo 9: Existing Classroom of Chissano school

3.4.2 Other Impacts

(1) Impact on the Natural Environment

None.

(2) Land Acquisition and Resettlement

No land acquisition was necessary for the project because the land for the 4 schools was all state-owned land. Resettlement happened only in the case of Nkobe school, where 6 households agreed to resettle with compensation, but one household near the school rejected resettlement and is still located just outside the wall of school. (See Photo 10.) In the case of the construction of the Manjakaze school, 4 tombs were relocated with the understanding of local residents.

As the Mozambique government has been accepting financial assistance for the educational sector from FASE coordinated by the World Bank, the Ministry of Education is maintaining the standards requested by the World Bank in its operational procedures of construction for all schools. For instance, the government is compliant with “OP4.12: Operational Guidelines of Involuntary Resettlement” drawn up by the World Bank in December 2001²⁴.

(3) Other Impact: Impact on Gender Issues

This project gave consideration to female students in improving the school facilities, by constructing toilet facilities and shower rooms in athletic fields for girls so as not to discriminate girls’ access to schools.

The proportion of female students in Mozambique was 47.2% in ESG 1 (8th -10th grades) and 44.5% in ESG 2 (11th -12th grades) in 2008²⁵. The proportion of female students was higher

²⁴ The government enacted a law on involuntary resettlement in 2012, and is compliant with the procedures stipulated under the law. Furthermore, “Social and environmental safeguards” drawn up by the World Bank in 2012 has been applied not only to the projects of FASE, but also to the projects assisted by Japan.

²⁵ Based on JICA reports.

than the national average in the southern part of Mozambique. For instance, the proportion of female students in Matola city in Maputo Province was 54.8% for ESG 1 and 50.5% for ESG 2 in 2008, and 55.9% for ESG 1 and 58.6% for ESG 2 in 2014, which signified a gradual increase in ESG 1 and rapid increase in ESG 2 from 2008 to 2014.

In fact, the number of female students exceeds the number of male students in all 4 schools. In the case of day sessions (morning and afternoon sessions) for ESG 1 in 2014, the proportion of female students was 52.1% in Nkobe school, 57.0% in Kongolote school, 60.0% in Chissano school, 58.3% in Manjakaze school, and 57.2% on average for the 4 schools. Some of the underlying factors for this situation are that the number of girls is higher than that of boys demographically, and many boys of secondary school age are working in South Africa. Furthermore, one of the responses indicated that female students tend not to become pregnant as compared with girls who do not attend schools. This is considered to be an indirect impact of education for girls²⁶.

(4) Other Impact: Expansion of Business in the Neighboring Areas of Schools

Population has increased, and the number of shops has also increased, in the areas surrounding Kongolote school in Maputo Province. It is clear that residents have moved to locations near to the school for better access to the school, and school bus services managed by private companies are popular.

In the areas surrounding Manjakaze school in Gaza Province, the number of houses has increased, more people have come to settle in these areas, and more shops and small business have opened. (See Photo 11.) Electricity service was extended to the areas surrounding the school in tandem with the construction and electrification of the Manjakaze school²⁷.



Photo 10: The resident who denied resettlement outside Nkobe school (left side: school wall, right side: residence house)



Photo 11: Shops near Manjakaze school

²⁶ Based on interviews with the Principal of Kongolote school in Maputo Province.

²⁷ The water system is provided only inside the school area, and the people of the neighboring community have to fetch water from other natural water sources.

In short, the number of students has increased for all 4 schools as a result of the construction of schools, and the number of residents and shops in the surrounding areas has also increased. These represent the indirect positive impacts of the project.

As mentioned above, the number of classrooms, the number of students who can enroll in 4 schools, and the number of teachers exceeded the target figures at the time of planning, and the project has contributed to the increase in the number of students in secondary students in Matola city in Maputo Province and Gaza Province as a whole. It has become possible to conduct lessons in accordance with the regular curriculum, although IT classrooms are not used as planned in some schools, and commuting time to schools has decreased. Therefore, effectiveness of this project is high.

As to the impact of the project, the improvement in promotion rate in 2 schools in Gaza Province, as well as the improvement in learning attitudes of students and teaching attitudes of teachers, have been identified as indirect impacts. These are mostly on par with expectations. There has been no negative impact in terms of natural environment and resettlement.

Thus, this project has largely achieved its objectives as planned, and effectiveness and impact of the project are high.

3.5 Sustainability (Rating: ②)

3.5.1 Institutional Aspects of Operation and Maintenance

(1) O&M by the Ministry of Education

Technical maintenance and procurement management of the facilities constructed by the Ministry of Education are under the charge of the Department of Construction, which handles the drawing up of standard designs for facilities, implementation of the entire process from bidding and signing of contracts to the management of the construction of facilities and procurement of equipment. The administration of education services, such as operation and maintenance and implementation, at the provincial level is under the charge of DPEC (Provincial Department of Education and Culture), which has departments for education, planning, human resources, construction, finance, and other departments corresponding to the central organizations. The DPEC requests for the necessary budget, allocates teachers for school management, and secures budget for operation and maintenance, under the supervision of the Department of Planning and Cooperation (DIPLAC) of the Ministry of Education. There were no major changes to the organizational structure in 2009, 2012 and 2015. In 2015, restructuring of the Ministry of Education had begun, but the basic framework of secondary education has remained almost the same as the structure mentioned above.

The number of staff in the Construction Department (CEE) was 33 including 19 technical staff in 2009. 3 more staff members were added and one staff member died later; consequently,

the number of staff was 35 including 22 technical staff in March 2015. The staff members added were an expert on the social impact of projects, and an expert on the environmental impact of projects. They are in charge of providing compensation to residents in the implementation of projects. Thus, the allocation of human resources in the Ministry of Education is considered appropriate.

(2) O&M by the Provincial Department of Education and Culture: The relationship among DPEC, Provincial Education Service and Schools

As to the maintenance of school facilities, schools report to DPEC in case there is any major damage to the facilities, and schools themselves undertake the daily maintenance of facilities and equipment. The District Educational Services Office is in charge of coordinating between the schools and the provincial governments²⁸. When a school reports a major damage to DPEC, DPEC will check the damage. However, there are many cases where DPEC is unable to fix the damage due to budgetary constraints.

(3) O&M by Schools

Table 9 shows the systems and the number of staff responsible for maintenance in the 4 schools. The number of staff responsible for maintenance varies depending on the schools, and only Kongolote school has specific staff for the maintenance of electricity and equipment.

Table 9: O&M Systems of the 4 Schools

School	Number of Maintenance Staff and O&M System	Total Number
Nkobe/Maputo	5 security guards, 4 cleaning staff.	9
Kongolote/Maputo	5 security guards, 4 cleaning staff, 1 gardener, 1 electricity maintenance staff, 1 equipment maintenance staff. New security system was introduced by the chief of the School Committee.	12
Chissano/Gaza	2 security guards, 2 cleaning staff, excluding the management staff such as secretaries. No changes from 2012 to 2015.	4
Manjakaze/Gaza	The number of maintenance staff has increased from 4 in 2012 to 7 in 2015. 4 security guards, 3 cleaning staff. Security guards are hired using contributions from the local community.	7

Source: Based on interviews with the Principals of the 4 schools.

²⁸ Advancements have been made in decentralization in Mozambique, and there are no personnel and budgetary transfers and relations between the Ministry of Education of the central government and DPEC of the provincial governments. District Education Services Offices are offices placed in each district to connect schools and DPEC, and they are small in terms of the facilities and the number of personnel, and have no technical staff.

Teachers and staff are allocated by the Ministry of Education and the provincial government based on the plan provided to them, and their salaries are covered by the general budget from the government. Hence, the number of teachers and staff is usually sufficient. On the other hand, the number of the maintenance staff tends to be insufficient because maintenance staff is hired by schools, and their salaries must be covered by the school's budget. The maintenance staff for facilities, plumbing and electricity should be stationed at secondary schools in accordance with the official guidelines set forth by the Ministry of Education, but it often happens that they are not stationed because of the budgetary constraints faced by the schools.

"School committees," which consist of the school principal, teachers and parents of students, are normally established in all schools, and their meetings are held based on need. The school committees serve the roles of connecting schools with local communities, and participating in the management of the school (such as making decision on school uniforms, providing assistance to poor households, dealing with problematic students, and undertaking voluntary work such as cleaning school facilities). The school committee of Manjakaze school has been paying a part of the salaries of maintenance staff, such as the security guards.

Thus, there are some problems with regard to sustainability in terms of the institutional aspect, such as the shortage of maintenance staff in some schools.

3.5.2 Technical Aspects of Operation and Maintenance

(1) Technical situations at the Ministry of Education

The CEE of the Ministry of Education is in charge of constructing schools, and has technical staff for architecture, civil engineering, calculation, survey, construction management, and other areas. The CEE has been engaged in all construction projects under the Ministry of Education, including projects supported by international donors, and has implemented the series of work ranging from planning, design of schools, selection of contractors, to construction management. It therefore has sufficient knowledge and experience of each process of school construction. The CEE uses manuals that summarize all procedures of planning, construction and management of schools, which were formulated with financial and technical support from FASE, and it has organized seminars to help familiarize school staff with these manuals.

(2) Technical situations in provincial governments

The DPEC has some technical staff who work not only for the schools constructed by FASE, but also provide technical support for the maintenance of all schools under the Ministry of Education, and who have adequate technical knowledge and experience. The manuals drawn up with support from FASE are also distributed to DPEC, and are used at DPEC.

There are 145 staff members in total in DPEC in Maputo Province, and 4 technical staff have

been allocated to the School Construction Unit, of whom 2 have been hired by FASE. There are 3 technical staff in the Schools Construction Unit of DPEC in Gaza Province, but there is no other technical staff hired by FASE.

(3) Technical Situations at Schools

Teachers and staff are engaged in daily maintenance works, which do not require a high level of technical knowledge. These include minor repairs and checking the damage of facilities and equipment. Minor damages are sometimes repaired by these school staff, but the repair works for damage to electricity facilities, water systems, plumbing, windows, desks and chairs, and door knobs cannot be managed by these school staff. External companies are normally requested to undertake these repairs. Decisions on the need for repairs are made by schools, while major damages such as damage to buildings are reported to the DPEC, which is also requested to provide support to repair these damages.

Thus, there are no specific problems because the central and provincial governments have enough experience and knowhow, although there are limitations in terms of the technical aspects at the school level.

3.5.3 Financial Aspects of Operation and Maintenance

(1) Budget of the central and provincial governments in the education sector

The governmental expenditures (including provincial governments) in the education sector was 20,908 million MT²⁹ (21% as a proportion of total governmental expenditures) in 2010, of which 16,584 million MT was the amount from domestic resources and 4,324 million MT was the amount from foreign resources (20.7% as a proportion of the total)³⁰. The budget in the education sector is expected to increase in tandem with the increase in GDP, which has been estimated to increase by 7.8% annually during the period of 2012-2016 (“PEE 2012-2016”, p.128). Actual governmental expenditures in the education sector have increased from 16,673 million MT in 2009 to 31,290 million MT in 2013. (See Table 10.) Looking at the details of the financial resources, foreign resources decreased slightly from 4,773 million MT in 2009 to 4,476 million MT in 2013 (decrease of 6%), domestic resources increased from 11,828 million MT in 2009 to 26,814 million MT in 2013 (increase by 2.27 times), and the proportion of domestic resources has been increasing alongside with the continuing economic development of

²⁹ MT is the currency unit of Mozambique. 1MT is approximately 4.5 Japanese yen at the time of ex-post evaluation in 2015.

³⁰ “Domestic resources” refers to the budget allocated from the revenue of the government. “Foreign resources” refers to the budget obtained from aid and loans from international organizations, foreign governments and organizations, including the FASE (Fund for Assisting Education Sector).

Mozambique³¹. Based on this trend, the domestic resources for the education sector are expected to increase even in the future. Most of the foreign resources have been dependent on FASE.

On the other hand, among the governmental expenditures for the education sector, the proportion of expenditures for secondary education was 17.8% in 2010, and expected to reach about 21% in 2016. Among the expenditures for the education sector, the share of expenditures for human resources was 71.1% in 2010, the share of expenditures for school facilities and equipment was 7.8%, and the expenditures for the maintenance of facilities and equipment formed only a part of this³².

Table 10: Expenditures of the Central Government in the Education Sector
(Million MT)

	2009	2013
Domestic resources	11,828	26,814
External resources	4,773	4,476
Total	16,673	31,290

Notes: Based on MoE, “Evolução do Sistema Educativo:2010-2014”, p.75.
The total amount for 2009 does not tally, but has been shown as it is.

(2) External Financial Resources in the Education Sector (Aid and Loan from International Donors)

The greatest amount of foreign resources has come through the FASE, which makes up the largest share of foreign resources³³. The FASE has been offered continuously since 2003, in Phase I (2003-2008), Phase II (2008-2012), and Phase III (2012-2016). At present, Phase III (2012-2016) is in progress, and a similar level of assistance is expected at least up to 2016³⁴.

The resources from FASE have been used for the construction of schools and the provision of equipment, and 1,454 million MT was used for the construction of primary schools and 916 million MT was used for the construction of secondary schools in 2014. Of the 916 million MT used in the construction of secondary schools, 66 million MT was disbursed in Maputo Province and 72 million MT was disbursed in Gaza Province. The FASE has been used for “Apoio Directo as Escolas (ADE),” which is the direct budgetary support provided to schools via provincial governments.

³¹ MoE, Evolução do Sistema Educativo:2010-2014, p.75.

³² PEE 2012-2016, p.133.

³³ The shares of major donors to FASE in 2014 are as follows: The World Bank 58.7%, KfW 12.9%, CIDA 10.5%, Finland 6.0%, Ireland 5.4%, DfID 4.8%, etc.

³⁴ Some donors have committed to FASE by multi-year basis, and other donors have committed to FASE by one-year basis. Major donor such as the World Bank have committed their assistance to FASE until 2016 fiscal year at the time of March 2015.

(3) Operation and Maintenance Budget of Schools

There are 3 different categories of budgets for schools.

① The ADE (Direct Budgetary Support from FASE): This budget cannot be used for the maintenance of schools, so the budget for maintenance must be covered by the following ② and ③.

② General budget provided annually (twice a year) by the Ministry of Finance via provincial governments

③ Income from the tuition fees collected from students: Secondary education is not free and students must pay tuition fees at the start of each school year, normally 400-500 MT per person.

Table 11 shows the annual budget and expenditures for maintenance in the 4 schools in 2014. Most of the operational budget was used for personnel costs as well as lighting and heating expenses. Only a part of the budget was used for maintenance, and was insufficient in all 4 schools.

Table 11: Annual Budget for Operation and Maintenance of 4 Schools

School	Operational Budget			Expenditures for Maintenance
	ADE	General Budget	Income from Tuition Fees	
Nkobe/Maputo	181	940	863	20 (1.8%)
Kongolote/Maputo	250	940	1,700	100 (3.5%)
Chissano/Gaza	128	485	238	20 (2.4%)
Manjakaze/Gaza	127	435	422	67 (6.8%)

Notes: Based on interviews with principals of the 4 schools. Figures on the right show the proportion of expenditures for maintenance in the total operation budget (%).

Thus, although the budget for the education sector and the budget for schools were expected to be adhered to some extent through the use of financial resources such as FASE, the budgetary situation after 2016 remains unclear. Besides, there is also a problem such as constant issues of insufficient maintenance budget.

3.5.4 Current Status of Operation and Maintenance

(1) O&M Issues at the Provincial Government Level

In general, there has been no severe damage to the school facilities. However, the following 2 issues could not be managed at the school level, and DPEC was requested to provide assistance for the damages.

① In Nkobe school in Maputo Province, there were many subsided blocks near the bottom of pillars. (See Photo 12) This damage was believed to have occurred as a result of poor rainwater drainage and ground subsidence.

② In Manjakaze school in Gaza Province, some cracks appeared on the grounds of the athletic field after the completion and handover of the facility in 2012.

Both the damages in ① and ② were repaired by the construction contractor within a year of completion, which fell within the period of liability of the contractor. However, the problems still remained even after the period, and the schools requested DPEC to carry out repairs. However, the damages were still there at the time of ex-post evaluation.

(2) Situations of Daily Maintenance

Desks and chairs, as well as windows of the classrooms, have been damaged through daily use in all 4 schools, but these damages have been repaired using the respective school budgets and requests to specific companies. These repair works have been carried out periodically, but the equipment to be supplemented has often not been covered by the schools' budget, and has therefore not yet been supplemented.

Most of the doorknobs of the classrooms are damaged and have not yet been repaired. In Manjakaze school, the doorknobs for many classrooms were replaced 3 times using the school budget³⁵.

There is much trouble with toilet facilities, most of which have not been fixed due to the shortage of budget for maintenance, and lower priority for these facilities in comparison with the desks and chairs in classrooms.

Table 12: Major Issues in the Maintenance of Facilities and Equipments for the 4 Schools

School	Situation of maintenance of facilities and equipments
Nkobe/Maputo	The subsided blocks have not been fixed, although the damage was reported to DPEC. This damage was once repaired in 2012, within a year after the completion. The current problem of subsided blocks in floors and near pillars seems to have occurred after 2013.
Kongolote/Maputo	No major damage, although there is some damage in the toilet blocks.
Chissano/Gaza	No major damage, although there is some damage in the toilet blocks. Some toilet damage was reported as having been fixed in 2012, but there have been similar problems that were not fixed after 2013.
Manjakaze/Gaza	There are some cracks on the floor of athletic fields, and they have not been fixed, although the problem was reported to DPEC. The cracks were once repaired in 2012, but the current problems seem to have occurred again after 2013.

Notes: Based on the site-visits at the time of the first and second field surveys, and JICA project documents.

³⁵ There was a problem with the specifications of the doorknobs, and the MoE now uses another type of doorknobs when constructing new schools. (Interviews with the MoE.)



Photo 11: Broken doorknob (Chissano school)



Photo 12: Subsided blocks (Nkobe school)

As mentioned above, as to the institutional aspect of operation and maintenance, there are problems such as shortage in the number of maintenance staff in some schools. There are no major problems in the technical aspect of operation and maintenance, because the Ministry of Education and DPEC have enough knowledge and experience, although there are limitations to the maintenance level carried out by schools. Regarding the financial aspect, there are constant issues of insufficient maintenance budget, although the budget for the education sector and schools is expected to be adhered to some extent through the use of FASE and other sources. Some problems were observed with regard to the current status of maintenance, because some damaged facilities remain unrepaired.

Thus, some minor problems have been observed in terms of institutions, finances and situations of operation and maintenance. Therefore, sustainability of the effects of the project is fair.

4. Conclusion, Lessons Learned, and Recommendations

4.1 Conclusion

The project's objective was to improve access to lower secondary education, by constructing 4 schools and extending the capacity of existing schools and their facilities in the target areas of Maputo Province and Gaza Province, thereby, contributing to improvement of the quality of education. The project's objective coincides with the development policy of Mozambique, which emphasizes the expansion of access to secondary education at the time of planning and also ex-post evaluation. It also coincides with the development needs of Mozambique, because there are very strong needs for the construction of secondary schools in order to respond to the rapid increase in the number of students who wish to receive secondary education. It was also relevant to Japan's ODA policy at the time of planning. Thus, its relevance is high.

The project cost and the project period are the same as planned, thus its efficiency is high.

As to the effects of the project, 4 schools and 58 classrooms were constructed as planned, the number of students enrolled at those schools exceeded the original target, and other positive effects were revealed in terms of the Access to secondary education such as improvement of educational environment and reduction in commuting time to schools. Thus, its effectiveness is high. There were some negative impacts of the project; for example, the IT classrooms of some schools were not utilized as planned, and the promotion rate declined in some grades of 2 schools in Maputo Province partly because the number of students per classroom far exceeded the capacity of the classroom. On the other hand, there were some positive indirect impacts as planned; the promotion rate improved in 2 schools in Gaza Province, and the learning attitudes of students and teaching attitudes of teachers also improved. Thus, the project's effectiveness and impact are high.

As to the aspects of operation and maintenance (O&M), there were no serious problems in the technical aspect, but there were some problems in the institutional and financial aspects, as well as the O&M situations. Thus, sustainability of the project is fair.

In the light of the above, this project is evaluated to be highly satisfactory.

4.2 Recommendations

4.2.1 Recommendations to the Implementing Agency

(1) Recommendations to the Ministry of Education: The urgent need for providing IT and experimental equipment to schools

Although 3 years have passed since the completion of the schools, experiment equipment has not been provided to all 4 schools, and IT equipment has not been provided to Chissano school. The MoE has the responsibility to prepare the budget and provide this equipment as soon as possible, because it is necessary in order to maintain and improve the quality of education.

(2) Recommendations to the schools: Allocation of an adequate number of maintenance staff

Maintenance staff for facilities, equipment and electricity should be stationed at schools based on the MoE guidelines, but the number of such staff is less than sufficient, except in Kongolote school. Even under the budgetary constraints, all schools should try to secure enough staff for maintenance. Each school should put effort into keeping the necessary staffs for maintenance, by sharing its experiences with other schools. For instance, Manjakaze school has made efforts to obtain financial contribution from the local community to provide for the cost of hiring security guards.

4.2.2 Recommendations to JICA

None.

4.3 Lessons Learned

(1) The possibility of incorporating the component to be borne by the recipient government into the component of the Japanese side at the time of planning of the project

Although 3 years have passed since the completion of schools, experiment equipment has not been provided to all 4 schools, and IT equipment has not been provided to Chissano school. This poses a barrier to maintaining and improving the quality of education. The MoE has the responsibility to provide this equipment, but there are some factors that prevent it from doing so, such as the budgetary constraints and/or lower priority for the provision of educational equipment in the MoE. To encourage the effective use of IT and science classrooms in the schools constructed through Japanese assistance, JICA should consider the possibility of including the budget for IT and experimental equipment in the package for constructing school facilities through assistance from the Japanese side, at the time of planning of the project.

In short, JICA should consider the possibility of incorporating the component that is to be borne by the recipient government into the component of the Japanese side, after a detailed examination of the feasibility of the component of the counterpart, for effective implementation of the whole.

(2) The possibility of including additional facilities such as teachers' houses and canteens in the design for constructing school facilities located in rural areas

This project excluded the construction of students' hostels and teachers' houses, which are standard facilities of the schools in remote areas in MOE's standard design. The reason for the exclusion was to construct more schools within the budget. However, the MoE constructed teachers' houses in 2 schools in Gaza Province, because those schools are located in rural areas and there are fewer places for teachers to stay in. There is a significant need to construct these additional facilities in the rural areas, and the beneficiary survey also showed the same results. Therefore, JICA should consider the possibility of including additional facilities such as teachers' houses and canteens in the design for constructing school facilities located in rural area far from cities, at the time of planning of the project.

Kingdom of Bhutan

Ex-Post Evaluation of Japanese Grant Aid Project
“Construction of Educational Facilities”

External Evaluator: Takeko Inuma, Senshu University


0. Summary

In Bhutan, basic education was extended to the middle secondary school (the tenth grade) in 2000. In addition to the pre-existing need to provide educational opportunities to children in remote areas, the expansion of access to secondary education was becoming an urgent need. This project aimed to improve the basic education facilities and to expand access to basic education through the construction of educational and hostel facilities and through the provision of furniture in five schools in four districts.

This project has been in accordance with the Bhutanese development plans / policies and development needs, and also with the Japanese aid policies, and, thus, the project is highly relevant. The project cost was less than the originally planned budget, and the project period was slightly longer than the plan because of the unsuccessful bidder, thereby causing the efficiency to be rated fair. Regarding its effectiveness, the targets of the operation indicators (the number of schools and classrooms) were achieved. The achievement of the effect indicator (the number of students) was lower than the target while the other effect indicator (the number of students per classroom) showed an improvement, which rates the project’s total effectiveness fair. With regard to sustainability, the maintenance budget has been perpetually insufficient, resulting in a lack of maintenance, which leads to the evaluation of the overall sustainability as fair.

In light of the above, this project is evaluated to be partially satisfactory.

1. Project Description



Project locations



Four-classroom building
Chukha School, Chukha District

1.1 Background

In Bhutan, although the gross enrolment ratio in primary education was improving in the 2000s, the demand for primary schooling remained high. In addition, since basic education was extended up to Middle Secondary School (MSS) (10th grade) from Lower Secondary School (LSS) (8th grade) in 2000, the demand for secondary education was rapidly increasing. In the “Ninth Five-Year Plan (2003-2008),” the improvement of primary and secondary educational facilities was considered as one of the important undertakings, indicating the need to establish 135 new Primary Schools (PS) and 173 new secondary schools. However, unlike primary educational facilities, many of which had been constructed through community-based efforts, it was difficult for the Government of Bhutan to secure all the necessary budgetary sources and technical expertise for constructing secondary educational facilities with a variety of facility components such as student hostels. Taking this situation into account, the Government of Bhutan requested that the Government of Japan assist the construction of secondary education facilities, which requires larger-scale operations.

In response to this request, the Government of Japan, through the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), conducted multiple studies to examine the validity of the project as the Grant Aid cooperation within the area of primary and secondary education, following which this project was formulated.¹

1.2 Project Outline

The objective of the project is to improve basic education facilities and to expand access to education, by constructing the secondary schools’ educational and hostel facilities and by providing relevant furniture in 5 areas of 4 Districts, thereby contributing to the improvement of the basic education in Bhutan.

This project started as regular Grant Aid assistance. After the construction of Kanglung and Chukha Schools in the 1/4 period, however, the tender for the 2/4 period fell through as there was no participant.² Due to the tender cancellation, instead of the general Grant Aid, which anticipates the Japanese companies to be contractors, the project was shifted to be a Grant Aid for Community Empowerment³, which allows local contractors, under which Pakshikha, Phobjikha and Kabjisa⁴ Schools were constructed.

¹ Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), “Basic Design Study Report on the Project for Construction of Educational Facilities in the Kingdom of Bhutan,” March 2005. Hereafter, the “Basic Design” (2005).

² The potential contractors refrained from tender participation because of the fact that the site conditions were difficult and that the 1/4 period construction experienced a number of difficulties (based on inquiries with relevant parties).

³ Grant Aid provides funding for materials, equipment, services that would contribute to development of social and economic infrastructure of developing countries. Grant Aid for Community Empowerment is another type of grant cooperation, which aims to assist overall capacity building of communities.

⁴ The actual name of the school is Kabesa School, yet, this report employs Kabjisa School, which was used in the project documents.

Grant Limit (based on E/N) / Actual Grant Amount	Grant Aid: 1,810 Million Yen / 490 Million Yen ⁵ Grant Aid for Community Empowerment: 1,064 Million Yen / 1,064 Million Yen
Exchange of Notes Dates	Grant Aid: June 2005 Grant Aid for Community Empowerment: May 2008
Implementing Agency	Ministry of Education
Project Completion Date	June 2011
Project Implementation	Contractors Grant Aid: Dai Nippon Construction, Co., Ltd. Grant Aid for Community Empowerment: Kencho Dorji Construction (Kabjisa School educational facilities, Pakshikha School hostel facilities), Nima Construction (Phobjikha School educational and hostel facilities), Kelcon Construction (Pakshikha School educational facilities)
	Consultants Grant Aid: Mohri, Architect & Associates, Inc. Grant Aid for Community Empowerment: Tashi Dawa Associates Private Limited
Basic Design / Overall Design	Grant Aid: November 2004 / Grant Aid for Community Empowerment: March 2008
Detailed Design	Grant Aid: August 2005 Grant Aid for Community Empowerment: October 2008
Related Projects	N/A

2. Outline of the Evaluation Study

2.1 External Evaluator

Takeko IINUMA, Senshu University

2.2 Duration of Evaluation Study

Duration of the Study: October, 2014 – September, 2015

Duration of the Field Study: January 3-11, 2015, March 16-25, 2015, June 11-20, 2015

2.3 Constraints during the Evaluation Study

Although this project underwent a change in the form of the cooperation, namely from the Grant Aid to the Grant Aid for Community Empowerment, this evaluation employed single indicators for these two forms of project in order to ensure its coherence as a single project. The indicators set for the evaluation purpose at the time of project planning were listed in the Grant

⁵ Indicates the overall project budget, both planned and disbursed according to “Basic Design” (2005). Regarding the E/N, only two terms out of the four terms reached the E/N, and the first term was agreed on 474 million Yen, the second term 307 million Yen, totaling 781 million Yen.

Aid project document⁶ and were used as the basic indicators for this evaluation.

3. Results of the Evaluation (Overall Rating: C⁷)

3.1 Relevance (Rating: ③⁸)

3.1.1 Relevance to the Development Plan of Bhutan

Bhutan's long-term national plan, "Bhutan 2020: A Vision for Peace, Prosperity and Happiness" (Government of Bhutan, 1999) addresses its objectives to maximize Gross National Happiness (hereafter GNH), to stress the importance of education in enhancing people's capability, and to expand access to education as well as to improve the quality of education. In response to this plan, the "Ninth Five-Year Plan (2003-2008)" indicated concrete programs and objectives for the education sector and aimed at the expansion of access to basic education and the improvement of educational quality. The major objectives of primary and secondary education were: 1) to raise gross enrollment ratio of primary education (ages of 6-12) from 90% to 95% by 2007, 2) to improve the quality of education, 3) to expand the basic education from Lower Secondary School (hereafter LSS) (7-8th grades) to Middle Secondary School (hereafter MSS) (9-10th grades), 4) to raise Higher Secondary School (hereafter HSS) (11-12th grades) entrance rate from 38% to 56% by 2007⁹. This project was in accordance with the Bhutanese development policy in the sense that it responded directly to the requirements of the most important tasks to expand basic education opportunities and to improve educational quality in the long-term development policy and of the Five-Year Plan during the planning stages of the project.

The "Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2013-2018)" at the time of the ex-post evaluation restated the necessity to expand the opportunity for secondary education for the purpose of poverty alleviation and for graduation from the least developed country (LDC) status, and thus the project remains relevant to these new development policies.

Furthermore, as seen in the *Bhutan Education Blueprint, 2014-2024*¹⁰, the most recent policy direction has shifted towards the amelioration of educational quality, enrolling more students in well-equipped larger-scale schools, from the expansion of educational opportunities by increasing the number of schools, including small-scale schools.

Along this line, attempts through Central School (hereafter CS) started in 2015 in 24

⁶ The project design document was the "Basic Design" (2005).

⁷ A: Highly satisfactory, B: Satisfactory, C: Partially satisfactory, D: Unsatisfactory

⁸ ③: High, ②: Fair, ①: Low

⁹ "Basic Design" (2005).

¹⁰ This is a long-term education policy, whose central theme lies in assurance of quality education that can meet the current needs, and it is also a plan of education reform for 10 years. It indicates comprehensive educational reforms and strategies in the areas such as educational system, curriculum and school management (Ministry of Education. *Bhutan Education Blueprint, 2014-2024*. 2014).

designated schools in the country in the first phase.¹¹ In this new measure, all of the five schools under this project were considered to be CSs.¹²

This project was planned and implemented under Bhutan's educational policy, which focused on the expansion of access to education, namely more of the quantitative side of education. Although the more recent policy focus shifted towards the quality side of education, this project gained renewed importance and is expected for further use, which indicates continuously high relevance regardless of the shift in Bhutan's education policy.

In conclusion, the expansion of basic education opportunities has been of great importance before and after the project implementation in all the development policies, such as GNH as the national premise, Five-Year Plans, and poverty alleviation, and this project is of relevance to Bhutan's development policies.

3.1.2 Relevance to the Development Needs of Bhutan

In the 2000s, there were changes in the needs of primary and secondary education in Bhutan. In contrast to the rapid amelioration of primary education enrolment rate, secondary education enrolment rate did not see sufficient improvements. As the main needs were shifting to secondary education, the project has responded well to the development needs by focusing on schools with secondary education levels. Due to the budget constraint, the project assistance was limited to five schools, but its focus on the facilities of the schools with secondary education levels was an appropriate choice.

The selection of five schools in four districts as the project sites was appropriate with regard to needs of middle secondary school facilities and priorities, as well as geographical considerations, demographic status, and local requests. All five schools under the project are located in rural areas, and, although they have many feeder schools¹³, or lower level schools, in their respective areas, there was a lack of middle secondary schools. Moreover, in the selection process of the project sites, screening was done systematically and comprehensively in terms of conditions such as the highest priority¹⁴ under the standards of

¹¹ CS serves as the base for secondary education in relatively poor rural areas with many hamlets and villages in the proximity, and the government provides free education as in the system before and, in addition, all the fees that were paid by the students, such as school uniforms and hostel fees. CS has greater budgetary discretion. Among the similar schemes, there is a designation of Autonomous School, which also has greater budgetary discretion in the same way as CS.

¹² Pakshikha School was designated as the first-phase CS in 2015, and its name was changed from Pakshika MSS to Pakshikha CS. Kanglung School was designated as CS for the second-phase in 2016. Phobjikha School, which has good study environment and geographical location, is considered for the third-phase CS. Other two schools of the project shall be designated as CSs if they meet all the conditions. But only Kabjisa School has no prospect of such designation due to the constraint of the limited school land (Ministry of Education).

¹³ Feeder schools are the schools that catch the students from the neighboring areas, for instance, primary schools (PS), extended classrooms, lower secondary schools (LSSs).

¹⁴ Priority standard of education in Bhutan had been judged comprehensively depending on the urgency of enrolment demand and the lack of middle secondary school facilities, and it is divided into three levels of priority. Furthermore, all the project schools were rated to be of the first priority.

the Ministry of Education, the access possibility of construction vehicles, the prospect in foreseeable and sufficient demand based on the lower school enrolment, and fully functional school management and maintenance securing a sufficient number of teachers, budget, related party's collaboration¹⁵, thereby the selection of the target areas and the target schools was done appropriately.

The Government of Bhutan has been attempting to enhance its self-reliance regarding efforts for the expansion of access to education, and many donors in the education sector have been fading out by the end of the "Tenth Five-Year Plan (2008-2013)." At the time of this ex-post evaluation, although it is not funding for construction, the World Food Programme (WFP), who had been assisting the school meals in school hostels, has a definite plan to phase out, which means that the Government of Bhutan has increasingly greater financial responsibilities. The "Eleventh Five-Year Plan" also claims to enhance its self-reliance. Upon such a move towards self-reliance in the education sector, which can be called a transition period, there is a need to minimize the shock of the withdrawal of the external resources, and this project played a role in relieving this shock as well (Ministry of Education).

Thus, this project has relevance to the development needs of Bhutan both before and after the project implementation.

3.1.3 Relevance to Japan's ODA Policy

The "Outline of Japan's ODA to Bhutan" had been emphasizing assistance in the areas such as agriculture, rural development and economic infrastructure projects. In addition, it launched basic principles to assist Bhutan's GNH in 2002, made social development the third pillar of the Japanese assistance to Bhutan after agriculture and economic infrastructure, and raised the expansion of educational opportunities as one of the main tasks.¹⁶ This project reflects these new dimensions of the aid policies. Furthermore, this project is in accordance with Japanese ODA as it contributes to poverty alleviation, which has gained greater importance throughout Japanese ODA policies, from the perspective of education. Assistance to education also matches Japan's policy from the perspective of "Human Security." Thus, this project is consistent with the Japanese aid policies at the time of the project appraisal and formulation.

¹⁵ "Basic Design" (2005).

¹⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Economic Cooperation Bureau. *ODA Country Data Book*. 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004.

3.1.4 Appropriateness of the project planning and approach

As stated above, this project started as a Grant Aid project, but the tendering fell through after the construction of the two schools in the first period. The project planning and approach was highly appropriate, in the sense that the project was changed its form of financial cooperation to a project under the Grant Aid for Community Empowerment, that it avoided the risk of project cancellation, and that it managed to catch up with the time delayed due to the construction of the three schools over almost the same period. The measures taken in face of the unsuccessful tender were suitable as the originally targeted number of schools were built in the end. Thus, the change that was made in the form of the financial cooperation after the project started was appropriate and justifiable.

Hence, the expansion of access to basic education has been one of the most important objectives in the national plans and development plans of Bhutan, and this project matches with its development policies. The project focused on secondary education, whose needs were increasing in basic education, and thus has been in accordance with priority and needs in Bhutan's education policy. Moreover, the project has been in accordance with the Japanese aid policy, in particular poverty alleviation. This project has been highly relevant to the country's development plan, development needs, as well as Japan's ODA policy. Therefore, its relevance is high.

3.2 Efficiency (Rating: ②)

3.2.1 Project Outputs

The project achieved as its output the construction of 76 classrooms in five schools in four districts, in accordance with the plan in the "Basic Design" (2005) of 76 classrooms in five schools in four districts. The details of the output were: 2 schools (2 schools achieved as opposed to 5 schools in the plan) or 20 classrooms in total for Kanglung School (Trashigang District) and Chukha School (Chukha District) under the Grant Aid; 3 schools (its plan was to build 4 schools, but these 3 schools built were the same as the three that had been cancelled under Grant Aid) or 56 classrooms in total for Pakshikha School (Chukha District), Phobjikha School (Wangdue Phodrang District), and Kabjisa School (Punakha District) under the Grant Aid for Community Empowerment.¹⁷ They are either two-story or one-story buildings, built with reinforced concrete, equipped with water supply and sanitary facilities, electric facilities, and furniture. The details of the facilities in each school are the following.

¹⁷ The construction of Darla School, which was included in the "Outline Design Study Report on the Project for Construction of Educational Facilities in the Kingdom of Bhutan" (hereafter "Outline Design") (2008), the project plan document for the Grant Aid for Community Empowerment, was cancelled in July 2009 due to the lack of budget.

Table 1: Facilities in the Five Project Schools (Output)

Form of financial cooperation	District	School	Facility (number of blocks) *
Grant Aid	Trashigang	Kanglung	4CR BLK (1), 8 CR BLK (1), Male Toilet BLK (1), Female Toilet BLK (1), Principal's Quarters (1)
	Chukha	Chukha	4 CR BLK (2), Administration & Library BLK (2), Male Toilet BLK (1), Female Toilet BLK (1), Girls' Hostel (64 beds) (4), Kitchen & Store (1), Principal's Quarters (1), Matron's Quarters (1)
Grant Aid for Community Empowerment	Chukha	Pakshikha	4CR BLK (2), 8CR BLK (1), Administration & Library BLK (1), Laboratory BLK (1), Male Toilet BLK (1), Female Toilet BLK (1), Boys' Hostel (96 beds) (2), Girls' Hostel (96 beds) (2), Kitchen & Store (1), Principal's Quarters (1), Staff Quarters (1), Warden's & Matron's Quarters (2), Multipurpose Hall (1)
	Wangdue Phodrang	Phobjikha	4 CR BLK (1), 8 CR BLK (2), Administration & Library BLK (1), Laboratory BLK (1), Male Toilet BLK (1), Female Toilet BLK (1), Boys' Hostel (64 beds), Girls' Hostel (64 beds) (4), Kitchen & Store (1), Principal's Quarters (1), Warden's & Matron's Quarters (2), Multipurpose Hall (1)
	Punakha	Kabjisa	4 CR BLK (1), 8 CR BLK(2), Administration & Library BLK (1), Laboratory BLK (1), Male Toilet BLK (1), Female Toilet BLK (1), Principal's Quarters (1), Staff Quarters (1)

Source: JICA.


* CR stands for classroom. BLK stands for block.



Picture 1: Kanglung School



Picture 2: Chukha School



Picture 3: Pakshikha School



Picture 4: Phobjikha School



Picture 5: Kabjisa School

The changes from the original plan were the omission of the teachers' hostel in Kanglung School and the multi-purpose hall in Chukha School. They were cancelled because it became obvious that the budget would fall short as a result of the skyrocketing prices of construction materials.¹⁸ Against the "Basic Design" (2005), the teachers' hostel was cancelled in Phobjikha School under the Grant Aid for Community Empowerment.¹⁹ The reason is that Kabjisa School and Pakshikha School were given priority and went ahead with the tender, and as a result, the budget fell short.²⁰

These changes were made by eliminating the lower priority components according to the component priority of the Ministry of Education, and the Ministry also tried to seek financial resources for the eliminated components from other sources, thereby keeping the effect on the project minimal.

The construction standard of all the target schools meets the school construction standard of the Ministry of Education. Moreover, the Ministry also recognizes that the project demonstrated the desirable standard as Japan's Grant Aid effected quality construction. At the same time, the Ministry also recognizes the positive point of having been able to minimize the cost of the project by utilizing the local contractors for construction, procurement and the management under the Grant Aid for Community Empowerment.

An issue during the warranty period was the odor arising from the girls' hostel in the Grant Aid's Chukha School, and it was found that the soil around the permeating pipes was not pervious and did not allow water to permeate sufficiently. By changing the pipe layout and conducting improvement work, the problem was solved.

Chukha and Kanglung Schools had damages such as outer wall mortar cracks, peeling paint, cracks / bending of the wooden furniture due to its drying and shrinking, rusted iron parts, damaged faucets and water pipes. Pakshikha and Kabjisa Schools under the Community Empowerment had peeling paint; Pakshikha School had damaged toilets; Phobjikha School had a burst water pipe and damaged concrete, all of which were repaired during the warranty period.

Therefore, although the three components were eliminated from the original plan, all other components were installed, and thus there is no problem in the program's output.

3.2.2 Project Inputs

3.2.2.1 Project Cost

This project was divided into two forms of cooperation, namely the Grant Aid and the

¹⁸ In the end, the Government of Bhutan appropriated financial resources provided by the Government of India to build these facilities.

¹⁹ This is also a change against the "Outline Design" (2008) of the Grant Aid for Community Empowerment.

²⁰ The changes in the "Outline Design" (2008) in comparison to the "Basic Design" (2005) were: the number of 64-bed hostel buildings for boys and girls was reduced from 2 to 1, and the plan of two 10-classroom buildings was changed to one 4-classroom building and two 8-classroom buildings in Phobjikha School.

Grant Aid for Community Empowerment. The following is the total inputs.

The Grant Aid was composed of 4 terms, and the project cost of the first term was 469 Million Yen, which was 90.5% of the planned 518 Million Yen.

The 2/4 term of the Grant Aid was cancelled due to no tenderer participation, and there was a cost of 21 Million Yen as the design cost at the time of the bill settlement.

The project costs under the Grant Aid for Community Empowerment (1,064 Million Yen) was 100% of the plan.

The total project costs for the both forms of financial cooperation show that the actual costs (469+21+1,064=1,554 Million Yen) were 85.9% of the plan (1,810 Million Yen). If we compare this with the plan in the “Basic Design” (2005), the actual costs were 1,554 Million Yen (85.9%) of the plan, 1,810 Million Yen, and the project costs remained within the budget.

3.2.2.2 Project Period

The Grant Aid’s “Basic Design” (2005) indicated that the project period would be from May 2005 to March 2010, totaling 59 months. But the term 2/4 fell through, and changing to the Grant Aid for Community Empowerment²¹ took time. Therefore, the actual project period was from June 2005 to May 2011, totaling 72 months. This was 122.0% of the planned period (May 2005 – March 2010, 59 months), which was longer than planned.

Therefore, the project cost was lower than planned, but the project period was longer than planned, and its efficiency is fair.

3.3 Effectiveness²² (Rating: ②)

3.3.1 Quantitative Effects (Operation and Effect Indicators)

This project encompassed two forms of financial cooperation, the Grant Aid and the Grant Aid for Community Empowerment, but in order to examine the integral effectiveness of these two, this evaluation employed the outcome indicators of the “Basic Design” (2005) (its actual figures are from 2004) as the baseline and examined the actual outcome (construction of 5 schools) under the Grant Aid and the Grant Aid for Community Empowerment. The outcome indicators are: (1) the number of middle and higher secondary education facilities in 4 districts, (2) the number of usable classrooms in the 5 MSSs, (3) the total enrolment in the 5 MSSs, (4) the number of students per classroom. This evaluation considers (1) and (2) as the operation indicators and (3) and (4) as the effect indicators, and its comparison is shown on Table 2.

²¹ The project period of the Community Development Support Grant was March 2008 (E/N) - December 2010 (2 years and 10 months, 34 months) on the plan, and the actual period was May 2008 (E/N) – May 2011 (completion and hand-over) (3 years and one month, or 37 months). Therefore, the actual period (37 months) was 108.8% of the plan (34 months), and the period of the Community Development Support Grant alone was over its original plan.

²² The "Impact" evaluation in the next section is an integral part of the "Effectiveness" evaluation.

Table 2: Outcome Indicators

Outcome Indicators		Baseline	Target	Actual	
		2004	2009	2011	2015
		Assessment year	Project completion year (Construction completion)	Project completion year	4 years after Project completion year
Operation indicators	Number of middle and higher secondary education facilities in 4 districts	13	18*	18*	18*
	Number of usable classrooms in the 5 MSSs	18	94	92	92
Effect indicators	Total enrolment in the 5 MSSs	N/A	8,790 persons	2,621 persons	3,330 persons
	Number of students per classroom	101 persons**	93.5 persons / room	28.5 persons	36.2 persons

Sources: “Basic Design” (2005) and interviews with schools, March 2015.

N.B.: Enrolment in 2011 is based on *Annual Education Statistics*.

Figures for 2015 are based on the interviews.

* Excludes other schools than the project schools in the 4 districts.

** This figure is based on the enrolment of 5 schools as 1,819 persons and the number of usable classrooms as 18. In reality, schools were obliged to use other classrooms in dilapidated states.

(1) The number of middle and higher secondary education facilities in 4 districts

The baseline in 2004 was 13 schools, and the target in 2008 was 18²³. Five schools were constructed against the 5 schools as the target, and the operation indicator of the facilities construction was as planned.²⁴

(2) The number of usable classrooms in the 5 MSSs

The baseline in 2004 was 18 classrooms, and the target in 2008 was 94 classrooms. In 2015, 92 classrooms were usable in the 5 schools. The reason why there were 2 less classrooms than planned was because, although the number of usable classrooms in Kanglung LSS in 2004 was 8²⁵, the government of Bhutan constructed new Kanglung MSS with 6 classrooms in a new site. This project assisted the construction of the new Kanglung MSS, and the actual overall usable classrooms of the project schools have been 92. In terms of the project target, as the target of 76 classrooms were achieved, there are no issues regarding the operation indicators.

²³ According to “Basic Design” (2005), Chukha School already had MSS and HSS at the time of the project planning, hence, there were 4 newly established school compounds and one rebuilt / expansion.

²⁴ Besides the 5 school buildings built by this project, 11 schools were newly built by the Government of Bhutan with the funding of the Government of India by 2014. Therefore, the total number of MSSs and LSSs in the 4 districts was 29 (only public schools). (Ministry of Education, Royal Government of Bhutan, *Annual Education Statistics 2014*, 2014.)

²⁵ “Basic Design” (2005) and interviews with the Ministry of Education.

(3) The total enrolment in the 5 MSSs

As shown in Table 3, the baseline in 2004 was 1,819 persons, and the target in 2009 was 8,790 persons. The actual number of students in March 2015 was 3,330, which accounts for merely 37.9%²⁶ of the total. This shows that the effectiveness indicator rates low.

Table 3: Enrolment in the Five Project Schools

School	Baseline	Target	Reference figures	Actual
	2004	2009*	2009	2015
	Project Assessment Year	Project Completion Year (Construction Completion)	Bhutan Government's Estimation	4 years after the Project Completion
Kanglung	146	728	720	552
Chukha	555	2,113	720	749
Pakshikha	N/A	2,859	576	903
Phobjikha	550	2,253	720	573
Kabjisa	568	837	828	553
Total	1,819	8,790	3,564	3,330

Sources: "Basic Design" (2005) and interviews with schools, March 2015.

* In "Basic Design" (2005), the estimated number of enrolled students in 2009 was calculated as (the estimated number of enrolled students in the pre-existing schools + the estimated number of out-of-school children in each district) × the average increase rate of enrollment.

The reasons for the discrepancy between the target and the achievement in the enrolment can be ascribed to the fact that the estimation included all the out-of-school children in the districts, and that the estimation presupposed that the enrolment rate in PS, LSS and MSS in 2009 would have reached 100%, thereby the presupposing figures for the estimation were too high²⁷. On the other hand, the estimation done by the Government of Bhutan at that time roughly coincides with the actual achievement figure, although no grounds are shown. Taking this into consideration, the target enrolment at the time of the "Basic Design" (2005) seems to have been too high, and as a result the project outcome in this regard did not reach its target.

This project aimed at improving the access for the out-of-school children and at raising the enrolment rate by increasing the number of classrooms. Regarding contributions to the numbers of out-of-school children, sufficient demographic data is not available for calculating

²⁶ As mentioned above, 11 schools were newly constructed other than these project schools, and in these 4 districts the rest of all other 24 schools except the project schools had 14,975 students, and there is a possibility that students were partly taken by these other schools.

²⁷ "Basic Design" (2005) indicates 8,790 persons as "estimated number of students in the project schools (2009) and that figure is used as the "outcome indicator of the overall project purpose achievement" in the proposal for the overall project plan in relation to ex-post evaluation. It considered the estimation and the objective as the same, and the actual facilities' capacity was 2,736 persons, as opposed to the target of 8,790 persons. Seemingly, this led to the discrepancy between the target and the real achievement in enrolment. Considering that the actual enrolment exceeds the actual capacity of the facilities, it can be said that the facilities are in use to the maximum extent.

the exact gross or net enrolment rates at the time of ex-post evaluation²⁸, and it was not possible to verify the actual contribution of the project to out-of-school children. Thus, one of the objectives of this project, the expansion of access to education, had limited effectiveness.

(4) The number of students per classroom

The baseline in 2004 was 101 persons, and the target in 2009 was 93.5 persons. As the number of classrooms at the time of ex-post evaluation was 92 in total, including the pre-existing 18, the number of students per classroom was actually 36.2 persons as opposed to 93.5 as the target (Table 4).²⁹ From the viewpoint of the improvement of study environment, this achievement can be considered sufficient. Considering the fact that the Ministry of Education sets the limit of the number of students per classroom as 40 persons, the average for the 5 schools as 36.2 persons³⁰ is within this range, and it has seen a great improvement from the dilapidated state, wherein the number of students per classroom used to be 101 persons before this Project was implemented.

Table 4 : Effect Indicators of the Five Project Schools: Educational Facilities
Year* (plan / completion time / ex-post evaluation time); Usable classrooms; number of students; number of students per classroom (at the time of ex-post evaluation)

School	Years available at the time of project planning (2004)	Years available at the time of the project completion (2010)**	Years available at the time of evaluation (2015)	Number of usable classrooms (Number of the Project-funded classrooms) (rooms) (2015)	Number of students (persons) (2015)	Number of students per classroom (persons) (2015)
Kanglung	pp-8	7-10	7-12	18 (12)	552	30.7
Chukha	9-12	9-12	9-12	18 (8)	749	41.6
Pakshikha	N/A	pp-10	pp-10	16 (16)	903	56.4
Phobjikha	pp-6	pp-10	pp-10	20 (20)	573	28.7
Kabjisa	pp-8	pp-10	pp-10	20 (20)	553	27.7
Total	---	---	---	92 (76)	3,330	36.2

Sources: Interviews with schools, March 2015.

* pp stands for pre-primary and is part of basic education. After pp, students continue to the 1st year.

** The figures on Kanglung and Chukha Schools are from 2007, and those on other 3 schools are from 2011.

²⁸ Although each district's number of students are disclosed, a national census has not been conducted since 2005, and it is difficult to precisely estimate the district population by age in 2015.

²⁹ Depending on schools, one or more classrooms are used as computer room or a counseling room, which are included in this average, and hence the regular classrooms would have more number of students than this average.

³⁰ Meanwhile, the number of students per classroom varies greatly among these schools, as seen in the maximum, 56.4 persons in Pakshikha School, more than twice the minimum, 27.7 persons in Kabjisa School. The rapid increase of the number of students in Pakshikha School between 2014 and 2015 is due to the expansion of school years, and there is already a plan to construct additional facilities.

Although it was not included in the “Basic Design” (2005), it is important to take into account the situations of the hostels as a sign of effectiveness, the table below shows the hostel capacity, the number of the boarders, and occupancy rate.³¹

Under this project, hostels in three schools of Chukha, Pakshikha and Phobjikha were constructed. The occupancy was very high in all except Chukha, and were overcrowded. According to the Ministry of Education standards, commuting time shall not exceed 5km or one hour of walking, and admittance to schools and hostels are coordinated according to this standard (Ministry of Education). The hostel congestion reflects the school situation of Bhutan, where students come to school from a geographically wide areas, but in order to prevent negative influence on students’ health and educational environment, it is necessary to improve the congested hostels.

Table 5 : Effect Indicators of the Five Project Schools: Hostel Facilities

School	Hostel capacity (persons)	Number of boarders (persons)	Occupancy rate (%)
Kanglung	128*	209	163.2
Chukha	606**	457	75.4
Pakshikha	384	791	158.2
Phobjikha	128	253	194.6
Kabjisa	N/A	N/A	N/A
Total	1,358	1,710	---

Sources: School data. Interviews with schools, March 2015.

* Kanglung School hostels were built by the Government of Bhutan.

** Among all the hostel facilities at Chukha School, the capacity of the facilities built by this Project is 256 persons.

3.3.2 Qualitative Effects

According to the beneficiary survey, the following situations of the user satisfaction have been observed.³² As the Figure 1 shows, the satisfaction rate among students at the education facilities accounted for more than 70% responding “good” or “very good.” However, the satisfaction level is relatively low regarding the toilet facility (toilets, hand-washing stands), and 34.3% of valid answers chose “bad” or “very bad.” Similarly, regarding the hostel facilities, the

³¹ As mentioned above, Kanglung School was started in 2005 as a new MSS (built by the Government of Bhutan with the funding from the Government of India), and after this Project’s construction was completed in 2007, it became equipped with hostel facilities built by the Government of Bhutan in 2008. As for Kabjisa School, due to limited land, there is no hostel facility.

³² With the aim of understanding this project’s satisfaction and usefulness levels, a beneficiary survey was conducted in February-March, 2015, targeting students and teachers. The survey employed exhaustive sampling for students in the Year 10, which is the final year of basic education (and of middle secondary education), totaling a 303-person sample. Their response sheets were filled out by the survey team. In the survey for teachers, all teachers in the 5 schools were asked to fill out the questionnaire, and 70 of them have returned them (response rate of 43.5%). The details of the respondents are: 149 males and 154 females for students (total 303 respondents), and 44 males and 26 females for teachers (total 70 respondents).

satisfaction level is low regarding the toilet facility (toilets, hand-washing stands), and other components have higher satisfaction.³³ In interviews with each school and each District Education Office, they pointed that the students had become motivated owing to the new school buildings by this project.




Figure 1: Evaluation of Educational Facilities by Students (Valid responses: 303)

Source: Beneficiary Survey, February-March 2015.




Figure 2: Evaluation of Hostel Facilities by Students (Valid responses: 303)

Source: Beneficiary Survey, February-March 2015.

³³ N/A (not applicable) means that the respondents are not using that facility. N/A Figure 2 indicates that they are not boarders. But they have answered the question about hostel toilets, which shows that the non-boarders are also using the hostel toilets, reflecting the shortage of the toilet facilities.

According to the beneficiary survey, regarding changes following enrollment in school (multiple-choice answers), 286 persons (94.4%) responded that they “have more time to study,” and 256 persons (84.5%) responded that they “have time to read books,” thus the most of them pointed the benefits in their studies. Also, 72 persons (23.8%) responded that “I have been liberated from work at home.”

Consequently, regarding the effectiveness of the project, one of the project purposes “the expansion of access to education” (or an increase of enrolment) was partially effective, yet, the “improvement of secondary education facilities” has been achieved as the number of students per classroom meets the standard set by the Government of Bhutan, and the users’ satisfaction was high in general. Therefore, it can be concluded that the project objective regarding the improvement of study environment was achieved.

3.4 Impact

3.4.1 Intended Impacts

1. Impact on Commuting Distance and Time

School access was improved by the construction of the 5 schools under the Project. Before the implementation of this Project, many students had to walk long distances across mountainous terrain to reach an MSS in another valley, and some, as in the case of the former Phobjikha School, had access difficulties during the rainy season. By constructing the 5 schools, the students’ access in terms of both distance and time has been greatly shortened.

Out of 303 valid student responses in the beneficiary survey of this project evaluation, 108 persons responded that their commuting time was within 1 hour, for whom effectiveness of building schools in a commutable distance was high. Among 195 students who spend more than 1 hour commuting, 74 students spend less than 2 hours, and 121 students more than 2 hours, which means that most of these students could not have attended school unless there had been any hostel facilities, and that the effectiveness of schools with hostel facilities is of further significance. As the number of the hostel users considerably surpasses the capacity of the facilities, the need for hostel facilities remains high.

Kabjisa School, the only school without hostel facility among the project schools, was able to introduce school bus services in 2013 through the request by the District Education Office, and serves the students whose home is more than 5 km away from this school.

2. Impact on Teachers

From the viewpoint of education quality, the student-to-teacher ratio is also important. The nationwide average student-to-teacher ratio at the time of this evaluation is 20 persons (*Annual Education Statistics 2014*). As shown in Table 6, the average student-to-teacher ratio in

the 5 project schools is similarly 20.7 persons, which is appropriate. Pakshikha has a rather higher ratio, with 25.1 students per teacher.

Table 6: Number of Students (persons) / Number of Teachers (persons) / Ratio of Students (persons) per Teacher in the Project's 5 Schools

School	Number of students (persons)	Number of teachers (persons)	Number of students (persons) per teacher
Kanglung	552	31	17.8
Chukha	749	33	22.7
Pakshikha	903	36	25.1
Phobjikha	573	30	19.1
Kabjisa	553	31	17.8
Total	3,330	161	20.7

Sources: Interviews with schools, March 2015.

According to the beneficiary survey, almost 80 percent of teachers responded “very good” or “good” with regard to the impact on their classes of the educational facilities of this Project. This implies that these educational facilities had a positive influence on teachers’ class management in general.³⁴

3. Impact on Gender Issues

The gender parity index for gross enrollment ratio in secondary education in Bhutan shows a higher ratio of girls: 1.02 (2010), 1.04 (2011), 1.06 (2012) (World Development Indicators). Although it is not possible to calculate the gender parity index at the school level, as Table 7 shows, the 4 project schools, excluding Chukha School, have a high female ratio, with Kabjisa and Phobjikha Schools being the highest. There is a possibility that the shortening of the commuting distance and the provision of hostel facilities both gave a positive impact on girls’ enrollment.³⁵ The number of girls in hostel facilities exceeds that of the boys in all but Chukha School, and the female boarders account for 117.7 at Kanglung School and 127.9 at Phobjikha School to male 100, which attests the great needs in girls’ hostels (Table 7).

³⁴ Those who obtain high marks on the examination for the Bhutan Certificate for Secondary Education (BCSE) at the end of the 10th grade can receive scholarships and proceed to the 11th grade, which is in higher secondary education (others may proceed to private schools on their own funds if desired). Kabjisa School’s score was at the very bottom nationwide in 2010, but 27 (77.1%) out of 35 students passed this examination in 2014, and it became one of the top schools in the nation.

³⁵ It is considered that the reason for the low ratio of female students at Chukha School derives from the fact that it has a greater ratio of the 11th and 12th years as the only school specializing in middle and higher secondary education among the project schools (interviews at Chukha School). As a general trend, the higher in the year, the smaller the ratio of female students.

Table 7: Male-female Ratio of Students and Boarders in the 5 Project Schools
(Number of females to male 100)

	Number of female students to male 100	Number of female boarders to male 100
Kanglung	109.1	117.7
Chukha	92.1	82.1
Pakshikha	106.2	104.4
Phobjikha	114.6	127.9
Kabjisa	123.9	N/A
Total	107.3	102.4

Sources: Interviews with schools, March 2015.

According to the Beneficiary Survey (303 valid responses), in response to a question about “the preference of school with hostels or school without hostels,” 68% of girls answered that they preferred “school with hostels” while 58% of the boys answered in this manner. More girls than boys tend to prefer being lodging in a hostel for school attendance to commuting to a distant school. The major reasons are because “one can avoid dangers of a long commute” and “one has to do cooking and cleaning and to take care of the siblings and animals at home, but one can concentrate on studying at a hostel” (Beneficiary Survey). It is highly important for girl students to be able to avoid risks along the commuting route and to be able to focus on studies freed from the domestic burden based on the sexual division of labor, and including girls’ hostels in the construction of schools is greatly beneficial.

3.4.2 Other Impacts

(i) Impacts on the Natural Environment

The former Phobjikha School was located in a wetland in the middle of Phobjikha Valley, where black-necked cranes, one of the engendered species, seasonally migrate to, and it was a problem with respect to nature conservation. Under this project, the school was relocated to the hill top as the newly built Phobjikha School, which enabled the wetland to be maintained as a nature conservation area, and thus the project was able to avoid causing negative impact on the natural environment.

For other schools, also, sites that would not have any negative impact on the nature were selected for school construction.

(ii) Land Acquisition and Resettlement

In acquiring land for schools, the construction was done in state-owned land for 4 out of the 5 school sites, and hence there was no problem in land acquisition. In the case of construction of Kanglung, Chukha, and Kabjisa Schools, former school sites were allocated, and

Phobjikha School was constructed on the land of the Ministry of Agriculture, which was secured for this Project without any problem. Only for Pakshikha School, the project acquired the land that was used as a pastor land, but the acquisition process was conducted according to the domestic law and induced no resettlement (Interviews).

With regard to quantitative effects, the achievement of the operation indicators (number of schools and classrooms) met the planned target, yet the achievement of the effect indicator (number of enrolled students) fell short, accounting for 37.9% of the target, and hence its achievement was limited. On the other hand, there was a great improvement in terms of the number of students per classroom, and the qualitative effects (satisfaction rate with facilities) was at a desirable level. With regard to impact, the expected level of indirect outcomes was achieved in general, namely, effectiveness in access to education improvements as seen in shortened commuting time, and effectiveness in improving educational quality as seen in smoother class management. There has not been any negative impact such as worsened natural environment or resettlement.

Therefore, this project has somewhat achieved its objectives, and its effectiveness and impact are fair.

Column: Education Opportunities and Education Quality based on the Beneficiary Survey

(1) Expansion of education opportunities: characteristics of the project school students

With regard to the education level of the students' parents, 65.6% of the fathers and 79.3% of the mothers are illiterate; 18.1% of the fathers and 13.7% of mothers have finished primary education; and a very small number of them, less than 6% of the parents, received secondary education, which illustrates that an outstanding expansion of education opportunities has occurred for the generation of the project school students.

The ethnic group composition of the surveyed students reflects the three main ethnicities of Bhutan. In Kanglung School, 85.9% of the surveyed students were the Tshangla (or Sharchokpa); Chukha and Pakshikha Schools have both of the Ngalop and the Lhotsampa: most surveyed students at Phobjikha and Kabjisa Schools (74.6%, 72.1%). There are also minority groups such as the Kurtoepa and the Khengpha, and education opportunities are provided with a good balance without any distortion towards particular groups.

On the other hand, the 10th grade is, in principle, of 16 years of age. Yet, the ages of the surveyed students range from 14 to 21 years old, and the 16-year old students account for merely 25.7%. The highest percentage of students are of 17 years of age (32.7%), and 18-years old students account for 20.8%. This implies that there is still much to be done for the

improvements of the net enrollment ratio.

(2) Influence on education quality: effect of educational facilities on students’ studies

Regarding the influence of each component on studies according to the students’ evaluation, as seen in Figure 3, the most appreciated component was the library, indicated by 35% of the respondents, and it was followed by classroom blocks. “Very good” and “good” together, 64% of the respondents answered that most facility components had positive effects. The exception was the toilet blocks, as 33.7% of the respondents claimed that they influenced the studies in a negative manner. With regard to teachers’ evaluation about the educational facilities’ influence on students’ studies, more than 80% of the respondents chose “very good” or “good” for all components (Figure 4).




Figure 3: Facilities’ Influence on Students’ Studies (Evaluated by students; Valid responses: 303)




Figure 4: Facilities’ Influence on Students’ Studies (Evaluated by teachers; Valid responses: 70)

Consequently, the expansion of education opportunities reflects the particular characteristics of Bhutan, and, with regard to the improvements of education quality, both students and teachers in the survey pointed out positive influence on the students’ studies.

3.5 Sustainability (Rating: ②)

3.5.1 Institutional Aspects of Operation and Maintenance

Institutions for operation and maintenance are Policy and Planning Division, as well as School Planning and Building Division, Ministry of Education, and also the District Education

Office are in charge, as in the same manner as the time of the project planning. As of the beginning of 2015, the Policy and Planning Division has 34 personnel, 9 assistants, 25 architects / engineers, and additionally 6 temporary engineers during the period of the fund provision from the Government of India. In recent years, the number of staff is decreasing. The Ministry of Education and the District Education Offices in the 4 districts have been attempting to strengthen operation and maintenance of the project schools. First, each school has a school management committee, composed of school-related personnel and the parents, headed by the District President. Depending on the school the frequency of the meetings differs, but the members meet 2-6 times annually and discuss school operation and maintenance issues. Boarder students' parents live in distant areas, which make organizing difficult, but there is sufficient collaboration among the parents who live in the school areas.

Regarding the situations of school management by the school management committee, teachers and staff, if teachers belong to the school management committee, they attend the committee directly, but if not, they participate in management through the staff meeting. Also, there is a constant network wherein staff inform the principal and the committee about operation and maintenance issues.

Each District Education Office has been promoting the participation of parents, students and teachers in the process of school operation and maintenance. Kabjisa School records especially strong involvement of parents, residents, students, teachers, and the request for establishing an MSS was strong at the local level (Interview with Punakha District Education Office).

Thus, institutional sustainability is well organized and relatively fair.

3.5.2 Technical Aspects of Operation and Maintenance

Teachers and staff understand basic operation and maintenance, but actual activities are different in different schools. Some schools' maintenance staff are graduates of vocational training schools, and others are not, therefore the technical level and certificates of the maintenance personnel vary. In any case, the person in charge can take technical training courses at the Ministry of Education.

Among maintenance works, cleaning and small repairs are done at the school level. Usually, such maintenance is carried out by a multi-skilled personnel, and there are 1 to 2 such persons per school.³⁶

For damages that would require large repairs, the schools request the District Education Office, and if the budgetary measure is taken, a contractor would be commissioned to do the

³⁶ In Pakshikha School, there was one such personnel, who moved in December 2014. Although the school requested a replacement, there has not been one yet.

repair.

Cleaning practices by students are integrated as part of the daily and weekly activities at both the primary and secondary levels. Moreover, students in the secondary schools and older students in the hostels work on the terrain of school sites for betterment, planting, and beautification. Certain schools have a school maintenance club, whose member teachers and students carry out maintenance activities such as small repairs and betterment of the school environment (Interview with Kabjisa School). The technical level of teachers and students is sufficient in conducting daily maintenance.

Thus, there is no serious problem in terms of the technical aspects of operation and maintenance.

3.5.3 Financial Aspects of Operation and Maintenance

3.5.3.1 Financial situation of operation and maintenance in the education sector

The “Ninth Five-Year Plan (2003-2008)” allocated to the Ministry of Education (the then Department of Education) 2,597 Million Ngultrum, which accounted for 3.7% of the total budget (Current Budget of 1,598 Million Ngultrum, Capital Budget of 998.476 Million Ngultrum) (“Tenth Five-Year Plan,” p. 53). The “Tenth Five-Year Plan” (2008-2013) saw an improved allocation rate, and allocated 10,364 Million Ngultrum, which accounted for 7.09% of the total budget (Current Budget of 875 Million Ngultrum, Capital Budget of 9,489 Million Ngultrum) (“Tenth Five-Year Plan,” Volume 1, p. 66). For school construction, 2,500 Million Ngultrum was allocated (Interview with the Ministry of Education).

The allocation rate of “Eleventh Five-Year Plan” (2013-2018) to the Ministry of Education was reduced to 3.9%, allocating 8,372 Million Ngultrum (Current Budget of 934 Million Ngultrum, Capital Budget of 7,439 Million Ngultrum) (“Eleventh Five-Year Plan,” Volume 1, p. 105). For school construction, 4,000 Million Ngultrum was allocated (Interview with the Ministry of Education).

3.5.3.2 Financial situation of operation and maintenance in school management

The Policy and Planning Division of the Ministry of Education secures the budget for school management, and the District Education Office guides its practice. Small-scale operation and maintenance comes from the current budget which is allocated to each school. Usually, 20,000 Ngultrum per year is allocated to each school in primary education, and 50,000 Ngultrum per year to each school in secondary education, therefore the budget standards depend on the educational level.

However, these amounts are far from sufficient for any school, and especially for schools with a large number of students, such as Chukha and Pakshikha Schools, which claim that they

need at least 150,000 Ngultrum (Interviews with schools). Also, depending on the years since the construction and the types of the facilities, some additional operation and maintenance budgets can be supplemented, but in the case of a newly built school, there is no budget at all for the first 2 years. In reality, however, an operation and maintenance budget is necessary even for newly built schools, which can be problematic (Interviews with the Ministry of Education).

The table below indicates the allocation of the current budget for operation and maintenance by schools.

Table 8: Operation and Maintenance Budget (building / equipment)
(Unit: Thousand Ngultrum)

School	2011-20 12	2012-20 13	2013-20 14	2014-20 15
Kanglung	100 / 20	-- / --	-- / --	30 / 30
Chukha	100 / 20	20 / 15	50 / 49	50 / 49
Pakshikha	-- / 20	20 / 60	50 / 40	50 / 50
Phobjikha	-- / --	50 / --	50 / 30	50 / 40
Kabjisa	-- / --	10 / 10	10 / 10	10 / 10

Sources: Interviews with schools, March 2015; school information (1 Ngultrum = 1.9 Yen)

For greater repairs, each school submits a request for the disbursement of the capital budget through the District Education Office. Nevertheless, there is a tendency that no budgetary measures are taken due to the budgetary constraints and that problems are left for a long time (Interviews with schools).

Meanwhile, under the new education policy of *Bhutan Education Blueprint* (2014), the project schools became the candidate schools for CS, and one of them has started to function as a CS in 2015. Becoming a CS would be entitled to receive more direct assistance to students and a larger school facility budget. This is one of the most important policies in education administration, and CS designation is expected to contribute to sustainability in both operation and maintenance.

In fact, for Pakshikha School, which became a CS in 2015, has a facility expansion plan with a budget of 59 Million Ngultrum at the point of June 2015, and measures are being taken with the aim to resolve problems of congestion in the educational and hostel facilities.

Thus, although the CS designation could ameliorate financial situations, at the time of ex-post evaluation, there are constant issues of insufficient operation and maintenance budget, and therefore sustainability is fair.

3.5.4 Current Status of Operation and Maintenance

There is an issue regarding school management as certain facilities are deficient in considering the imbalance with the number of enrolled students (Table 9). Specifically, the

shortage in facilities in Pakshikha School, the largest among the project schools, is grievous. Furthermore, the number of toilets is not sufficient in all project schools, and their intensive use can easily lead to maintenance problems.

Table 9: Lack of School Facilities

Facility	School	Details or Measures
Lack of Classrooms	Kanglung	Using the staff room as the computer room and the counseling room. There is no geography classroom or conference room.
	Chukha	Using the science laboratory as a regular classroom.
	Pakshikha	Lack of desks and chairs.
	Kabjisa	Obligated to make 2 classes share one classroom, depending on the Year.
Lack of hostels	Kanglung	There are 209 boarders in a 128 capacity hostel. Still, half of the day students commute for more than 1 hour on foot one way to school, and the construction of hostels is urgently needed. Have requested hostels for boys and girls with 100 person capacity each.
	Pakshikha	There is not enough space, tables, or chairs for boarders to take meals.
Lack of Staff Quarters	Pakshikha	There is hardly any rental housing in the nearby villages, and the school's staff quarters for 4 households are not sufficient.
	Phobjikha	Government-built staff quarters for 4 households are not sufficient.
	Kabjisa	As an emergency measure, modified the entrance hall on the first floor to set an additional and temporary quarters.
Lack of Toilets	Kanglung	There is only one toilet block (with 7 units) for boys and girls each whereas there are 552 persons.
	Chukha	There is only one toilet block (with 7 units) for boys and girls each and one block each for the hostels whereas there are 749 persons.
	Pakshikha	There is only one toilet block (with 7 units) for boys and girls each whereas there are 903 persons.
	Phobjikha	There is only one toilet block (with 7 units) for boys and girls each and one block each for the hostels whereas there are 573 persons. There is a lack of toilets in both educational blocks and hostels.
	Kabjisa	There is only one toilet block (with 7 units) for boys and girls each, whereas there are 553 persons.

Sources: Interviews with schools, March 2015.

Aside from the main school buildings, there are other important school components that are not yet constructed (Table 10). The completion of the access road is necessary for ensuring the safety of students on their commute even though it is not under the supervision of the Ministry of Education. Furthermore, schools do not have any fences, which allows outsiders and animals to trespass freely and enables students to escape easily. In this respect, fences are needed by schools in Bhutan.

Table 10: Lack of Other Components and Facilities

Component / Facility	School	Details or Measures
Incomplete access road	Kanglung	Access road of 800m to reach school has been requested for many years, but no action has been taken.
	Phobjikha	Large amount of gravel is exposed on the route, and it is difficult to walk on or drive on.
	Kabjisa	Road is narrow with many slopes, which makes difficult for a school bus to operate.
Lack of fence	Pakshikha	There are problems with outsiders entering the school.
	Kabjisa	Outsiders enter the school.
Lack of outdoor water faucets	Kabjisa	Essential for students' outdoor activities.
Lack of heating system	Phobjikha	There is no electricity in both hostels and classrooms. Especially, there will be great trouble unless heating is repaired for the period between September and March in hostels. Although electric heating has been requested, the electric cable outside was damaged by heavy rain and remain unrepaired.
Lack of sport facilities	Pakshikha	There is no outdoor sport facility, and the boarders' activities on weekends are confined.
	Phobjikha	There is no basketball court, and students are using the parking lot for the time being.

Sources: Interviews with schools, March 2015.

With regard to the status of operation and maintenance, each school faces multiple problems of operation and maintenance as shown in the table below. Most of them derive from insufficient budget and, as a result, of the lack of operation and maintenance. At the same time, some schools have the same type of problems. Pakshikha and Kabjisa Schools were constructed by the same local contractors under the Grant Aid for Community Empowerment and suffer from the same damages of eaves ceilings falling apart, which seemingly occurred due to inappropriate installation. Furthermore, all 3 schools built under the Grant Aid for Community Empowerment have many cracks on the concrete floors and walls and already require maintenance measures. As mentioned above, the project cost was minimized by implementing the project term after 2/4 under the Grant Aid for Community Empowerment. On the other hand, whereas the construction under the Grant Aid for Community Empowerment is more recent, its schools have more damages on the main part of the buildings than the schools built under the Grant Aid, and it requires careful operation and maintenance for the former.

Table 11: Main Issues of Operation and Maintenance

Component / Facility	School	Details or Measures
Damages to eave's ceiling	Pakshikha	Due to its geographical location, the area is often windy. One section of a hostel's roof and eave's ceiling fell in February 2015. Other parts are also loosened, and it needs to be urgently repaired to avoid accidents.
	Kabjisa	A part of eave's ceiling is loosened. Same as above.
Cracks of concrete floors and walls	Pakshikha	Floors and walls. Cracks all over in multi-purpose hall.
	Phobjikha	Floors and walls.
	Kabjisa	Floors and walls.
Building doors	Chukha	The sun and strong winds cause damages on the main wooden doors of the buildings.
Wall painting	Kanglung	Need to purchase white cement instead of the regular paint, but impossible due to the lack of budget.
Water supply	Pakshikha	Because the water source is not sufficient, and because the water pipe network was problematic, there is a serious shortage of water. Another source has plenty of water, but it is 16 km away.
	Phobjikha	Water supply becomes frozen at the end of the school year in October and November for 2 months.
	Kabjisa	Water source is far away and becomes affected by rain and landslides. Water supply often stops in summer. To minimize the use of water from the source, people have been using rain water for hand washing.
Toilets	Kanglung	Wooden doors are damaged due to water.
	Chukha	Due to the firm ground structure, the sewage tank becomes full very quickly, especially in the rainy season, because the ground does not absorb enough water. By using vacuum trucks, people have started trying to regularly empty it. ³⁷
	Pakshikha	There is no water to flush in the toilet because of the lack of water.
	Phobjikha	The toilet stops functioning because of excessive use beyond its capacity. Have to remove waste water from the sewage tank twice a month.

Sources: Interviews with schools, March 2015.

In all schools, the wooden doors are damaged or deteriorated by water, but Kabjisa School attached an aluminum panel inside the wooden door from early on and prevented them from becoming eroded from water. Inventive ideas at the school level made maintenance possible. In all schools, the lack of the operation and maintenance budget is the major concern, but by introducing resourceful ideas and preventive measures early on, facilities can be used in the long term.

³⁷ In Chukha School, toilet sewage odor became a problem in November 2007. A Japanese contractor changed the waste water path and enlarged the sewage tank. Students at that time kept water running, and as a result, the sewage tank was filled all the time. A note of caution was issued to the Ministry of Education. At the time of the ex-post evaluation, the same problem existed. While there was no vacuum truck at the time of the project's implementation, it was possible to use one by the time of the ex-post evaluation, and its use helped to improve the situation.

Apart from the above problems, multiple schools shared the same issues of the lack of equipment maintenance fees such as copying machines, printing machines, computers, and printers, and also a perpetual lack of teaching materials and office supplies (such as in Kabjisa School)³⁸. PCs in the IT room broke down in 2 years (such as in Kabjisa School). Electric spare parts that are used in the school buildings are not available on the regular market and are difficult to purchase (such as in Phobjikha School). One particular issue was that Phobjikha School tried to plant plants in the school compound in response to the Ministry's green promotion, however, with no success. Its land was originally covered by shrubs with a large amount of gravel, which made planting impossible, and also there might be a risk of soil erosion (Interview at Wangdue Phodrang District Education Office).

Thus, the status of operation and maintenance has challenges and has some problems.

From the above points of this project, the institutional aspect of operation and maintenance is well organized based on the networks of the Ministry of Education, District Education Office, and schools; technical aspects of operation and maintenance have no problems; regarding the financial aspect, there are constant issues of insufficient operation and maintenance budgets; the current status of operation and maintenance showed that all schools have issues such as repair needs.

Some problems have been observed in terms of finances as well as the operation and maintenance status, and, therefore, sustainability of the project effect is fair.

4. Conclusion, Lessons Learned, and Recommendations

4.1 Conclusion

In Bhutan, basic education was extended to the middle secondary school (the tenth grade) in 2000. In addition to the pre-existing need to provide educational opportunities to children in remote areas, the expansion of access to secondary education was becoming an urgent need. This project aimed to improve the basic education facilities and to expand access to basic education through the construction of educational and hostel facilities and through the provision of furniture in five schools in four districts.

This project has been in accordance with the Bhutanese development plans / policies and development needs, and also with the Japanese aid policies, and, thus, the project is highly relevant. The project cost was less than the originally planned budget, and the project period was slightly longer than the plan because no tenderer participated, thereby causing the efficiency to be rated fair. Regarding its effectiveness, the targets and the actual achievements of

³⁸ This project provided the facilities and furniture, and the Ministry of Education provided copying machines, Printing machines, PCs, and printers.

the operation indicators (the number of schools and classrooms), did coincide. The achievement of the effect indicator (the number of students) was lower than the target while the other effect indicator (the number of students per classroom) showed an improvement, which rates the project's total effectiveness fair. With regard to sustainability, the maintenance budget has been perpetually insufficient, resulting in a lack of maintenance, which leads to the evaluation of the overall sustainability as fair.

In light of the above, this project is evaluated to be partially satisfactory.

4.2 Recommendations

4.2.1 Recommendations to the Implementing Agency

(1) Measures for the repairs that schools are unable to conduct

Because of financial constraints in Bhutan, multiple schools often have common problems in school operation and maintenance. Certain large-scale repairs, which cannot be borne by the schools, need to be done urgently as explained as follows.

(i) In Pakshikha School, an expansion of the facilities is the most important imperative in order to meet the increase of the enrolled students, and the expansion plans that are already underway shall be assured for implementation.

(ii) The problem of the water supply in Pakshikha School is an essential matter for the use of school facilities, and needs to be improved urgently, and further cooperation should be sought in relation to the Chukha District in implementing the solution plan.

(iii) Repairing the damages of the roof and the eave's ceiling in Pakshikha School is difficult for the school to cope with, therefore, and a request shall be made to the district to conduct repairs. The same urgency would apply to the loosened eave's ceiling in Kabjisa School.

(iv) It is desirable to improve access roads to Kanglung, Phobjikha and Kabjisa Schools. Although the supervision of access road is not under the purview of the Ministry of Education, insufficient access roads prevent the utility of the schools. It is recommended that schools and the DEO continue requesting the District Office for their intervention.

(2) Promotion of the common lessons and experiences for school operation and maintenance.

Multiple schools often have common school maintenance problems. It would be beneficial to share information on prevention and measures regarding school operation and maintenance. Some schools have innovative approaches to these problems, and exchanges of lessons learned and of successful examples can be promoted between schools.

4.2.2 Recommendations to the Schools

(1) Efforts to obtain the CS status

The Ministry of Education launched systems of CSs and autonomous schools with the aim of expanding education opportunities and of upgrading education quality in rural areas. Obtaining this status is important in order to maintain or enhance the effectiveness and sustainability of the project-supported schools in the new education policies. It also enables greater flexibility in school budgeting, which would contribute to better operation and maintenance. The schools that are already designated as CSs need to prepare all the institutional and logistical aspects for the full implementation of such schools, and those that are not yet fully designated could attempt to obtain this status. (However, the case of Kabjisa School does not apply due to the limited school land.)

(2) Operation and maintenance efforts at an early stage

The operation and maintenance budget is perpetually insufficient, and in consideration for Bhutan's situations with difficulties to increase this budget, school-level measures and self-help would be highly important. Since most of the possible problems of operation and maintenance in the future can be extrapolated, it is necessary to aim for preventive measures against damages at an early stage.

4.2.3 Recommendations to JICA

(1) Advice to the District Offices for access road improvements

With regard to the problem of access roads for Kanglug, Phobjikha and Kabjisa Schools, it is desirable for JICA to advise the Ministry of Education in an appropriate manner in their request to the Districts for the improvements of these access roads.

4.3 Lessons Learned

(1) The need to set a realistic target as the output indicators of the project

As described in the effectiveness section, this project had set a target much higher than the actual capacity of the facilities. In the project cycle, this affects all of planning, implementation, and evaluation, and it is necessary to seek improvements at the time of planning by making a realistic estimation, clarifying the maximum and minimum figures, and strictly separating the estimated figure and the target figure.

(2) Examination of forming a package of all the necessary components to assure effective use.

Building the school fences was the responsibility of the Bhutan side, but this has not been done due to financial constraints and to the fact that it was given a lower priority among the school components. However, building of fences around the school is desirable in order to ensure student safety. Even if it is the responsibility of the other Government, it is advisable to

discuss the possibility of integrating into the aid package the components that are less likely to be secured by them but which are nevertheless indispensable in assuring the effective use of the facilities.

(3) Advantages and disadvantages of the Grant Aid and of the Grant Aid for Community Empowerment

This project was implemented through two forms of financial cooperation. Under the Grant Aid, the quality of the facilities is ensured by engaging Japanese contractors, which was appreciated highly by the Bhutan side. Under the Grant Aid for Community Empowerment, the cost was lowered by contracting local contractors, which was also very much welcomed by the Bhutan side as it allowed more number of buildings. Nevertheless, there are issues under the Grant Aid for Community Empowerment, such as all the early damages and deterioration of all three schools, which require more rigorous supervision and operation management especially for the Grant Aid for Community Empowerment, in order to ensure the highest possible quality.

Palestinian Authority

Ex-Post Evaluation of Technical Cooperation Project
“Improvement in Local Governance System”

External Evaluator: Juichi Inada, Senshu University

0. Summary

The Project’s objective was to improve the foundation of local governance system by clarifying the major issues of local finance and joint councils, formulating their policy and strategy for improvement, and strengthening the capacity of stakeholders in local governments.

The Palestine Authority regards the strengthening of institutional foundation as its most important policy, among which local finance and joint councils are prioritized. The Community Empowerment Component (CEC) was added and started one and a half years after the beginning of the project, targeted at the Jordan River Rift Valley (JRRV) that was the least developed area in the West Bank region. Therefore, this project coincides with government policies and development needs. The project also coincides with the Japanese government policy of strengthening its assistance to Palestine. However, at the time of the start of the project, a quite broad area of local governance had become the target of assistance, the logical relationship between outputs / project purposes and the overall goal was unclear, and thus there was a problem in a part of its approach. Thus, the project coincides with the development plan and development needs of Palestine and Japan’s ODA policy, but there was a problem in its approach. Therefore, its relevance is fair.

As to the effectiveness of the project, the Local Finance Policy (LFP) and Joint Council (JC) Strategy¹ were approved by the Ministry of Local Government (MoLG), and JCs were strengthened to some extent through the CEC. However, the training system initiated by the MoLG was not established; therefore, its effects have been limited. Although the improvement of the lives of local people in the JRRV area was the positive impact of this project, improvements in the services provided by LGUs (Local Government Units) and the financial decentralization to LGUs are still on the way. Thus, the project’s effectiveness and impact are fair.


Both the project cost and the project period far exceeded the planned cost and period. Thus, its efficiency is low.

As to the sustainability of the project, necessary policies for sustaining the effects of the project continue, but there are some problems in terms of organizational and technical aspects, and a serious problem in the financial aspect. Thus, sustainability of the project is low.

In light of the above, this project is evaluated to be unsatisfactory.

¹ The LFP is a policy paper which summarized the measures for improving the financial situations of LGUs. JC Strategy is a policy paper which summarized the measures for making local governance more effective by gathering small scale LGUs and formulating JCs.

1. Project Description



Project Locations²



Mid-west JC Service Center

1.1 Background

The Palestine government has promoted the improvement of local governance systems and decentralization to LGUs for state independence in the future as well as independent management of administration and finance, through legislation of the Local Government Law (in 1997), gradual implementation of local election (in 2004), and other means, after the establishment of the transitional authority in 1994. However, as a result of the blockade of the Palestinian autonomous area and restrictions to travel in the area imposed by Israel after the Intifada broke out in September 2000, Palestinian economic and financial situations deteriorated significantly, and the administrative and financial independence of LGUs also suffered. In addition, existing legislations and laws of local finance at that time were not matched with the conditions in LGUs, which could not have enough autonomy under poor financial conditions, and there were no their own local finance law and ordinances. At the same time, there was a lack of staff who had expertise in local finance and opportunities for systematic human resource development.


Under such circumstances, this project was started as a technical cooperation project, and the MoLG became its counterpart that was facing many problems, in response to the assistance for local governance reform made in 2004, and based on the project design formulated by the core staff of the MoLG and heads of LGUs at the time of the training seminar for project formation held in Japan in 2005.

During the project period, the CEC was added as a related component of JC in February 2007, for the purpose of strengthening the functions of JCs by planning and implementing pilot projects in the JRRV area and encouraging autonomous activities in the communities³.

² The red (darkened) area is "Area A" where the Palestinian Authority has administrative and security jurisdiction.

³ The Palestinian side requested the Japanese side to enhance JICA project not only from drafting policy and strategy of local governance, but also to concrete projects that can contribute to the improvement of services provided by local

Figure 1: Target Area of the Project and Locations of 4 JCs



Notes: Based on JICA Document. Right side columns show the names of LGUs of 4 JCs.

1.2 Project Outline

Overall Goal	Municipal services are improved through promotion of LGU amalgamation and formation of JCs. LGUs' revenue is improved through implementation of local finance policy.
Project Purposes	The foundation for implementing policies in the area of local finance and joint councils is established.
Outputs	Output1 Major issues of local finance are clarified and a basic policy for improvement of local finance is recognized and promoted in MoLG.
	Output2 Major issues for joint councils are clarified and a strategy for improvement of service delivery is recognized and promoted by MoLG.
	Output3 Needs of LGUs are identified and MoLG is able to implement training for capacity development of LGUs.
Total cost (Japanese Side)	1,052million yen
Period of Cooperation	September 2005 – August 2008 (extension period: September 2008-December 2010)

governments in the entire area of JRRV. (Based on interviews with MoLG officials.)

Implementing Agency	Ministry of Local Government
Supporting Agency	4 Joint Councils (JCs) in JRRV area
Organization in Japan	Koei Research Institute Inc. (CEC)
Related Projects	<p>1) Technical Cooperation: Adviser for Local Administration in Palestine (2011.3-2012.3) Improvement of Local Governance System (Phase 2), (2012.6-2014.3) Project for Improvement of Local Finance System in Palestine (2012.10-2016.9) The Project for Capacity Development on Solid Waste Management in Jericho and Jordan River Rift Valley in Palestine (2005,9-2010.2), Phase II (2014.10-2017.9)</p> <p>2) Grant Aid: The Project for Establishment of New Schools in the West Bank (FY2008) The Project for Support for the Public Activities of the Communities in Jordan Valley (FY2009)</p> <p>3) Other Organizations: The World Bank, Municipal Development Program Phase 1 (2009.9-2013.4)</p>

1.3 Outline of Terminal Evaluation

1.3.1 Achievement Status of Project Purpose at the time of the Terminal Evaluation

Through the achievement of Output 1, 2 and 3, major issues for local finance and Joint Council were clarified, and training for capacity development for the staff of LGUs was implemented. The foundation for implementing policies in the area of local finance and Joint Councils was expected to be established soon⁴.

1.3.2 Achievement Status of Overall Goal at the time of the Terminal Evaluation

The Terminal Evaluation Report mentioned that the JC strategy should be disseminated through the initiatives of MoLG, ensuring a linkage between the JC strategy and other strategies of MoLG (amalgamation strategy, etc.), while the LFP should be implemented for increasing revenues of LGUs under the initiative of MoLG. Those efforts need to be continued, and these efforts should be continued to achieve the Overall Goal⁵.

1.3.3 Recommendations at the time of the Terminal Evaluation

The following recommendation was made at the time of the Terminal Evaluation.

(1) Local finance: MoLG should set priorities to implement tasks recommended by the action plan of LFP, and take preparatory steps for implementation, before the end of project

⁴ Summary of Terminal Evaluation, p.3.

⁵ Terminal Evaluation Report, p.4, 80.

completion.

(2) Joint councils: MoLG should put more effort into aligning JC strategy with other several ongoing strategic planning processes on local government framework. Although all 15 pilot projects have not yet been completed by the time of the completion of the project, experiences and lessons drawn from the pilot projects should be included in the JC Strategy Annex document. Therefore, the period of the Project needs to be extended until the end of December 2010, and continuing efforts should be put into completing pilot projects and drafting the JC Strategy Annex, which includes the lessons drawn through pilot projects.

(3) Training: MoLG should consider whether the MoLG should continue its training for LGU staff, or if the training should be conducted by other organizations. Also, the MoLG should be encouraged to formulate a solid plan on the future status of the Jericho Training Center^{6,7}

2. Outline of the Evaluation Study

2.1 External Evaluator

Juichi Inada, Senshu University

2.2 Duration of Evaluation Study

This evaluation study was performed according to the following schedule.

Duration of the Study: November, 2014 – December, 2015

Duration of the Field Study: January 5, 2015 – January 15, 2015, and March 28, 2015 – April 3, 2015

2.3 Constraints during the Evaluation Study

The Terminal Evaluation Report mentioned that we need to have another perspective on the impacts of the project process and communication among stakeholders, in addition to the standard method of DAC 5 evaluation criteria, in order to evaluate the projects implemented under the situations of occupation or conflict, which have a different nature from normal projects. It also proposed the need to evaluate the timing for commencing the project, contents of the project, selection of target areas and beneficiaries, relevance of the implementation system, impact of such projects, and how it has responded to the change in situation, based on the perspective of peace-building⁸. The evaluation team made additional analyses on those points under the section of relevance. However, the evaluation rating is based on the standard DAC 5 evaluation method.

⁶ Jericho municipality offered its facility for training, and it was used as a training center during the project period.

⁷ Summary of Terminal Evaluation, p.6.

⁸ Terminal Evaluation Report, pp. 33-34.

3. Results of the Evaluation (Overall Rating: D⁹)

3.1 Relevance (Rating: ②¹⁰)

3.1.1 Relevance of the Development Plan of Palestine

In the “Local Governance Reform Action Plan” approved by Palestine government in 2004, the capacity development of LGU staff in the areas of financial management, budget formulation and accounting, improvement of decentralization laws including local finance, and improving the effectiveness and coverage of public services were mentioned. This project coincided with these reform agenda items at the time of planning.

The “Palestine Reform and Development Plan 2008-2010” set forth the establishment of the foundation of Palestine government, and the formation of local governance system was an important part of it. The next “Palestine National Development Plan 2011-2013” focused on the strengthening of the institutional foundation of the Palestinian government, and prioritized the formulation of framework of local government. In the “Palestine Development Plan 2014-2016”, an even greater focus was placed on public service delivery, while substantial delivery of public services was prioritized in the plan.

The “Palestine 13th Program”, which was one of the development plans formulated by the Palestinian government in August 2009, set out the strengthening of LGUs as one of its five priority agenda items, and established the goals of capacity development of LGUs, participation of residents in the development process, and autonomy of finance and administration of LGUs. To achieve those goals, the Program mentioned that the MoLG should put effort into the securing of financial resources of LGUs, amalgamation of LGUs to improve public services to residents, and establishment of training center for staff of LGUs.

In addition, this project coincides with the “Strategic Framework of Cross Sector Plan 2011-2013,” which was a sector strategy for local governance, as well as the “Strategic Framework of the MoLG 2010-2014,” because these strategic frameworks included the restructuring of LGUs, such as financial decentralization for autonomy of LGUs and the amalgamation of LGUs.

Thus, the project coincides with the Palestinian development policy, both at the time of planning and at the time of project completion.

3.1.2 Relevance of the Development Needs of Palestine

Palestinian participants in the training program in Japan discussed the outline of the project before the start of the project in 2005. In addition, a needs assessment survey was conducted just after the start of the project. The contents of the project tried to coincide with the needs of

⁹ A: Highly satisfactory, B: Satisfactory, C: Partially satisfactory, D: Unsatisfactory

¹⁰ ③: High, ②: Fair, ①: Low

Palestine through the implementation of these processes¹¹.

The Municipal Development Lending Fund (MDLF), which was established in 2005, the same year as the start of the JICA project, has been supporting the local governance system in Palestine, with the support of many international donors such as the World Bank and Danida (Danish International Development Agency)¹². Major components of the assistance include local finance, strengthening of local governance framework, capacity building, and improvement of infrastructure, which are the same as the agenda for the JICA project. All of these issues can be regarded as important ones that coincided with the needs of local governance in Palestine.

The pilot projects of CEC, which were launched in February 2007, have focused on the JRRV area as their target, because the area was the most marginalized area in West Bank, and the CEC was appreciated by the stakeholders of Palestinian Authority and local residents as it responded to the needs for improving people's lives¹³. The pilot projects were followed by the Grant Aid for Community Empowerment, which had extended assistance to that area¹⁴. Hence, the project coincided with development needs even at the time of project completion.

JICA's approach of JC strategy emphasized the strengthening of JCs; on the other hand, other major donors have focused on the amalgamation strategy of LGUs instead of the strengthening of JCs. The difference in approach had existed both at the time of planning and at the time of project completion. As an example, the World Bank has made effort to strengthen the financial foundation and service delivery of municipalities in its approach to strengthen local finance¹⁵. In that sense, JICA's approach was different from that of the World Bank, yet shared a common long-term goal. Hence, the project coincided with the development needs of Palestine at the time of project completion¹⁶.

Therefore, the project is responding to development needs, both at the time of appraisal and at the time of ex-post evaluation.

¹¹ "Training Needs Assessment" (February 2006), and "Needs assessment of JSC" (April 2006) were conducted by JICA, with the survey outsourced to ID Management Consulting. The survey checked what was necessary to strengthen JCs, and the kind of training that was needed, and the details of the contents of the project were decided based on the results of the survey.

¹² The MDLF began providing assistance in 2007, and the total amount of its projects was US\$321 million during the period from 2007 to 2014.

¹³ Based on JICA documents. Voices of residents at the time of project completion. As to the assessment of pilot projects at the time of ex-post evaluation, see Column "Impact of CEC".

¹⁴ The Project for Support for the Public Activities of the Communities in Jordan Valley (2009 FY). This Grant Aid for Community Empowerment was in fact implemented between 2010 and 2012. (The project period overlapped with the JICA project in 2010.)

¹⁵ The World Bank has supported the strengthening of finance and service delivery of municipalities in its "Municipal Development Program Phase 1" (September 2009~April 2013).

¹⁶ In the successive project of JICA on Joint Councils, the strengthening of JCs is regarded as a transitional approach toward the goal of amalgamation. On the other hand, other donors have begun to think the approach of strengthening JCs as a meaningful transitional approach. (Based on interviews with The World Bank, MoLG, etc.)

3.1.3 Relevance to Japan's ODA Policy

“Outline of Japan's ODA Policy to Palestine in 2004” mentioned the provision of assistance for administrative reform as well as democratization as the areas of priority for Japan's assistance, at the time of planning. It also emphasized the improvement of governance systems of the central government and capacity strengthening of local governance to improve the stability of local communities. Furthermore, the “Basic Policy of Assistance to Palestine,” which was announced when Foreign Minister Machimura visited Palestine in January 2005, mentioned the provision of assistance for strengthening the foundation of the Palestinian government for the future establishment of the State of Palestine¹⁷.

Therefore, the project is consistent with this initiative and Japanese ODA policy at the time of planning.

3.1.4 Appropriateness of Plan and Approach of the Project

In this project, the project design was expected to be modified flexibly according to unexpected external factors such as security situations in Palestine, and the flexibility was included in the contents of the agreement of project implementation. In fact, the project period was extended for two years and the total cost of the project increased significantly. After that, the PDM (PDM Ver.0) at the time of starting the project in September 2005 was revised at the time of the mid-term evaluation in March 2007 (PDM Ver.1), and it was revised again at the time of the Second Management Advisory Survey conducted in October 2009 (PDM Ver.2)¹⁸.

Looking at the process of the changes to project design, broad areas of the local governance agenda were picked up as the target areas for assistance, and the priorities and focus were not clear at the time of starting the project in 2005¹⁹. Therefore, the approach of linking outcome, project purposes and overall goals was not clear, and the problem remained even after several revisions of the PDM. Specifically, one of the overall goals was to “improve LGUs' revenue through the implementation of local finance policy, and the Ministry of Finance was essential to bring about the realization of this goal. However, the MoF could not be sufficiently involved throughout the project period. In addition to the external factor of severe financial conditions of the Palestine government as a whole, there was a problem in the approach of project at the time of planning.

Furthermore, the JICA's approach of aiming to strengthen JCs at the time of the start of the project in 2005 was different from the approach of assisting in amalgamation of the World Bank,

¹⁷ The Japanese government announced the initiative of “Corridor of Peace and Prosperity” in July 2006, as a long-term effort for the future co-existence of Israel and Palestine, and pledged its intention to strengthen the socio-economic foundation of JRRV.

¹⁸ In this ex-post evaluation, evaluation was conducted based on PDM Ver.2 in principle, instead of PDM Ver.0 formulated at the time of planning.

¹⁹ Based on the comments of local stakeholders of MoLG officials and JICA local staff.

and the CEC added to the project later focused on the JCs in the most difficult area in the West Bank of Palestine (JRRV) as the target of its pilot projects. This choice coincided with the developmental needs of improving the lives of residents in JRRV, but resulted in difficulties in achieving the effects of the project purposes.




Figure 2: Different Tracks for LGU Amalgamation and the Location of JC expected in the Project

Source: JICA Document. Other major donors aimed to improve public services through the amalgamation of LGUs to municipalities, but JICA’s JC Strategy aimed to achieve improvement of public services by strengthening JCs through the path of Track A shown in the Figure.

This project was highly relevant to the country’s development plan and development needs, as well as Japan’s ODA policy. However, there was a problem in its approach because the relationship between outcomes/project purposes and overall goals was unclear. Therefore, its relevance is fair.

3.2 Effectiveness and Impact²⁰ (Rating: ②)

3.2.1 Effectiveness

3.2.1.1 Achievement of Project Purpose

The project purpose was to “establish a foundation for implementing policies in the area of local finance and joint councils.” The following Table 1 shows a summary of project purpose,

²⁰ Sub-rating for Effectiveness is to be put with consideration of Impact.

indicators, and actual situation.

Table 1: Achievement of Project Purpose

Project Purpose	Indicator (PDF Ver.2)	Actual
The foundation for implementing policies in the area of local finance and joint councils is established.	①Local finance policy (LFP) is approved by MoLG.	LFP was approved by the Minister of MoLG in May 2010.
	②JC strategy is approved by MoLG.	JC strategy was approved by the Minister of MoLG in May 2010.
	③JC function is strengthened. (additional indicator)*	South JC and North JC were strengthened, but North-east JC was not functioning.
	④Training system is established. (additional indicator)**	Training system was not constructed including training plan.

Notes: *The purpose of CEC as an additional component is considered to be the strengthening of the function of JCs through the implementation of pilot projects for improving the basis of local finance and Joint Councils. Therefore, ③ has been included as an additional indicator.

**Establishment of training system for capacity building of LGUs is an essential factor for achieving the project purpose. Therefore, ④ has been included as an additional indicator.

In the following section, the concrete situations of output are summarized and divided into separate components.

Table 2: Output Indicators of the Project

	Component	Indicators 【PDM Ver.2】
Output1	Local finance	Major issues of local finance are clarified and a basic policy for improvement of local finance is recognized and promoted in MoLG.
Output2	Joint councils, CEC	Major issues for joint councils are clarified and a strategy for improvement of service delivery is recognized and promoted by MoLG.
Output3	Training system	Needs of LGUs are identified and MoLG is able to implement training for capacity development of LGUs.

(1) Local Finance

In the area of local finance, the first version of LFP was completed in March 2008, and reviewed by major LGUs in the West Bank area, and the final version of LFP was completed in June 2009. Brief leaflets of the final version of LFP were formulated and distributed to stakeholders of the government and members of LGUs. In the process of drafting the LFP, stakeholders were involved in the discussion of its contents, and the MoLG officials regarded the LFP as a useful document for promoting the understanding of the stakeholders of LGUs on its basic framework. The existence of the LFP was also well known among the staff of relevant international donors²¹.

²¹ LFP was not regarded as an important document because the MoF was not involved in the drafting process. (Based on interviews with the MoF and related donors such as MDLF and Danida.)

Hence, Output 1: “Major issues of local finance are clarified and a basic policy for the improvement of local finance is recognized and promoted in MoLG,” was mainly achieved.

(2) Joint Councils

In the area of joint councils, the JC Strategy was formulated by the JCspd of MoLG and JICA Project Team, and the final version was completed in March 2010. The JC Strategy was not the same as the amalgamation strategy of LGUs to municipalities, which was the mainstream for other donors, instead, it coincided with the transitional approach in the process of amalgamation of LGUs. Hence, the formation of the JC Strategy is regarded as meaningful in clarifying the strategy of LGUs toward amalgamation. Besides, JCspd took a central role in drafting the strategy, and held about 10 workshops for LGU staff who were in charge of local administration during the process of formulating the strategy, and the outline of the strategy was assumed to be recognized by stakeholders of MoLG. The leaflets of the JC Strategy were produced and distributed to the stakeholders of local governance through seminars on the JC Strategy.

Therefore, Output 2: “Major issues for joint councils are clarified and a strategy for improvement of service delivery is recognized and promoted by MoLG.” was mostly achieved.

“JC Strategy: Annex” had not yet been completed at the time of terminal evaluation, because 3 pilot projects were delayed and the lessons learnt from the pilot projects could not be included in the document. However, the experiences of pilot projects in JRRV area were summarized in the Project Completion Report, and the key points of the experiences were summarized in the leaflet for the JC Strategy that was formulated later.

(3) Community Empowerment Component (CEC)

A part of Output 2 (joint councils), the Community Empowerment Component (CEC), was added. The purpose of CEC was to encourage autonomous activities by communities of JC and LGUs through the planning and implementation of pilot projects in JRRV area, to summarize the problems and lessons in drafting the JC Strategy, and to disseminate the framework of JCs. JCs have been implementing the pilot projects.

On the other hand, in terms of the effects of improvement of people’s lives, most pilot projects have contributed to the improvement of the lives of the residents. Therefore, these efforts were appreciated by the local leaders of LGUs and residents²². Besides, CEC has contributed to strengthening the function of JCs at least in South JC and Mid-West JC, among the four JCs of the South, Mid-East, Mid-West and North JCs, in respect to the dissemination of

²² As pilot projects of CEC, 92 project proposals were proposed, and 15 pilot projects were implemented (9 pilot projects in the first phase, 6 pilot projects in the second phase). Other proposals were examined as proposals for Grant Aid for Community Empowerment (“The Project for Support for the Public Activities of the Communities in Jordan Valley”), and 26 projects were implemented from 2010 to 2012. The project established “the improvement of lives of local residents” as its project purpose.

larger administrative institutions in the JRRV area. This was appreciated by the residents as a good project with concrete benefits.

(4) Training System

10 core staff of MoLG (Dept. of Budget, Finance, and JCspd, etc.) were trained, and conducted training for MoLG staff and leaders of LGUs as trainers. Training materials based on the needs of LGUs were also produced in this project and distributed to the participants at the seminars.

More than 2,600 members of LGUs and JCs participated in the training seminars, and the number exceeded the number of the original plan of 1,000. Based on the interview survey conducted on the participants after the training seminars, the average score was more than 4 (maximum of 5) for 18 courses among the total 20 courses held between March 2009 and April 2010²³. Therefore, Output 3: “Needs of LGUs are identified and MoLG is able to implement training for capacity development of LGUs.” was mostly achieved, because the training was implemented as planned.

On the other hand, a training plan based on the results of financial analyses was not formulated by the end of project completion, and training was not conducted after 2011²⁴, therefore, a training system was not constructed.

As mentioned above, the LFP and the JC Strategy were approved for Output 1 and Output 2, and the JCs were partly strengthened by the implementation of pilot projects. That means the project was effective in strengthening the function of JCs. On the other hand, the effectiveness of Output 3 was limited, because the training system was not established by the MoLG, although training seminars were conducted as planned during the project period.

Thus, the project purposes were partially not achieved.

3.2.2 Impact

3.2.2.1 Achievement of Overall Goal

Achievement of overall goal was that “Municipal services are improved through promotion of LGU amalgamation and formation of JCs.” and “LGUs’ revenue is improved through implementation of local finance policy.”²⁵ Table 3 shows the achievement of the overall goal. The JICA report indicated that the overall goal would be realized in 2015, which is 5 years after

²³ Terminal Evaluation Report, 2010, p.12.

²⁴ The main reason was considered to be the lack of will to implement training among the top leaders of MoLG. (Based on interviews with some core staff who worked in the training center of MoLG.)

²⁵ Overall goal in 【PDM Ver.0】was to “Develop capacity in the area of local finance and JCspd to attain sustainable local governance system”, and verifiable indicators of overall goal in 【PDM Ver.1】 were “①Basis policy for local finance is approved by MoLG, and ②Basic strategic plan for JCspd is approved by MoLG.

the project completion, and continuous efforts should be made”²⁶.

Table 3: Achievement of Overall Goal

Overall Goal	Indicator	Actual															
Municipal services are improved through promotion of LGU amalgamation and formation of JCs.	①The number of amalgamated LGUs and active JCs is increased.	<p>The number of active JCs increased during the project period, but has been decreasing after that. (See the following table.)²⁷</p> <p>The change of the number of LGUs and JCs in West Bank of Palestine</p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th></th> <th>2005</th> <th>2008</th> <th>2010</th> <th>2014</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>LGUs</td> <td>484</td> <td>484</td> <td>484</td> <td>352</td> </tr> <tr> <td>JCs</td> <td>60</td> <td>84</td> <td>84</td> <td>72</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p>(source: interview with the MoLG staff)</p>		2005	2008	2010	2014	LGUs	484	484	484	352	JCs	60	84	84	72
		2005	2008	2010	2014												
LGUs	484	484	484	352													
JCs	60	84	84	72													
LGUs’ revenue is improved through implementation of local finance policy.	②Types of services and budget by amalgamated LGUs and JCs are increased.	The types of services and budget of JC expanded temporarily during the project period, but they have not increased especially after 2013.															
	③LGUs’ revenue is increased.	Revenues of LGUs have been fluctuating every year and stable increase of revenue has not yet realized.															

(1) Local Finance

Some seminars were held for MoLG and LGU staff to revise the LFP, during 2011-2012 after the project completion. Thus, MoLG was putting effort into revising and disseminating the LFP until 2012. However, the efforts were discontinued due to political reasons after 2013, and efforts to revise and bring about the realization of the LFP came to a standstill in the MoLG²⁸.

Although this project supported MoLG as a counterpart in the formulation of the basic policy for local finance, Ministry of Finance (MoF) played a significant role in realizing LFP and financial transfer from the central government to local government, while the influence of the MoLG in financial policy was limited. It was essential to involve the MoF to bring about the realization of the LFP, but the MoF could not be fully involved as a related organization into the project. Hence, there was a problem with a part of the approach in the original plan²⁹.

At the time of ex-post evaluation, JCs were not the main actors in service delivery, but served

²⁶ Terminal Evaluation Report, 2010, p.80.

²⁷ The fact that there is no increase of the number of JCs and LGUs between 2008 and 2010 means that amalgamation of LGU was not achieved even after the establishment of JCs. And, the decrease of the number of LGUs and JCs between 2010 and 2014 means that amalgamation of small scale LGUs into existing municipalities were progressed and some small and micro JCs for Solid Waste Management (SWM) were stopped to operate based on the MoLG strategy for SWM, although governorate level JCs for SWM remained.

²⁸ Reportedly, the policy direction was changed by the change of minister of MoLG. (Based on the interviews with MoLG)

²⁹ In the successive project of JICA on local finance (Project for Improvement of Local Finance, October 2012-September 2016), MoF is the counterpart agency for providing assistance on the fixed assets tax system, instead of MoLG.

as the windows for coordinating common issues of LGUs; LGUs continued to be the core actors in providing public services because the LGUs had strong political resistance to losing their power and budget.

JCs were the implementing agencies in both CEC (implemented during 2007-2010) and Grant Aid for Community Empowerment (implemented during 2010-2012), but there were no changes to the structure in which JCs did not have a permanent budget for their own use as independent actors. The lack of progress in financial transfer to local governments was considered as the most important reason as to why the number of services and the amount of budget of JCs or amalgamated LGUs have not increased.

The situation of local finance in Palestine indicated that the population of each LGU had been increasing during the project period and even after the project completion, but the budget of each LGU was not increasing but fluctuated significantly each year. The revenue of LGUs comprised mainly of the financial transfer from the central government for the public services of electricity and water supply, and there were no major changes to the basic structure of the budget of LGUs. Transportation fees for the maintenance of roads came from the central government in 2009, but were suspended later. A decision was made to resume the provision of these fees, but they had not yet been distributed at the time of ex-post evaluation. The main reason was because the budget of the Palestinian government was severely restricted and there were few financial resources that could be transferred to local governments. (This can be regarded as an external factor.) The revenue from the fixed assets tax did not make up a large portion yet, because it was still in the process of reform in 2014. The new JICA project on local finance, formulated after this project, set the MoF as a counterpart of the project, and the approach is considered to be appropriate in terms of its effectiveness of policy and organizational capacity.

There were no cases where the revenue of LGUs increased as a result of the project. For example, Aljiftlik, which is a LGU in Mid-East JC, began to operate public bus service as a pilot project. This showed a surplus but not enough revenue sources at the time of ex-post evaluation. The salaries of operational staff for the facilities built through the pilot projects, such as libraries, are covered by the budget of the LGUs in which the facilities locate.

Thus, indicators of overall goal, which are “② Types of services and budget by amalgamated LGUs and JCs are increased.” and “③ LGUs’ revenue is increased.” were not realized.

(2) Joint Councils

After the JC Strategy was drafted in 2010, the revised version of “JC strategy 2014-2018” was formulated in 2013, although the work assisted under the new JICA project followed after this project. The revised version had been drafted by the MoLG itself, with support from the

following project. The new features of the revised version of JC Strategy were to separate the functions of JCs into single service and multiple services, and to provide concrete action plans, among others. Based on the fact that the revised version of JC Strategy had been drafted, and the experiences from the pilot projects of CEC had been shared among the staff of MoLG and LGUs in the target areas of the following project, the activities of the MoLG on Joint Council are regarded as continuing after the project completion³⁰.

On the other hand, there were different approaches to the amalgamation strategy of LGUs among related donors (giving much consideration to amalgamation, continuation of the function of LGUs, or JCs between the two), and the MoLG itself was fluctuating between the two different strategies of the amalgamation of LGUs to municipality and strengthening of JCs. The reasons behind the differences in the approaches are that: (1) the World Bank, MDLF, etc. have been providing assistance in the amalgamation of LGUs to municipalities, (2) there are political resistances among LGUs against losing their power to municipality as a result of the amalgamation, and (3) JICA has been providing assistance to strengthen JCs.

Although major donors such as the World Bank and MDLF have emphasized the amalgamation strategy of LGUs to municipalities, their stance have been changing from amalgamation to the realistic approach of strengthening JCs and municipalities as a transitional strategy³¹. In the JRRV area, which JICA has focused on as a major target, the establishment of JCs was regarded as a transitional strategy toward amalgamation in the long term. Hence, the two approaches of amalgamation to municipalities and strengthening of JCs are now not contradictory to each other. In reality, some JCs are not functional, and some LGUs have been amalgamated into the Jericho Municipality.

During the project period from 2005 to 2010, the number of JCs had been on the rise, but the number of LGUs and JCs had decreased after 2010 because of progress in the amalgamation of LGUs to municipalities. The decrease in the number of JCs was mainly caused by the integration of LGUs in the surrounding area into municipalities. In the JRRV area, which the JICA project focused on as a target of CEC, some JCs were established during the project period, but the LGUs continued to exist after the establishment of JCs.

Thus, the indicator of overall goal in the area of Joint Council, which is that “①The number of amalgamated LGUs and active JCs is increased.” was not achieved.

³⁰ The successive project on joint councils by JICA is considered to be a factor for the continuation of activities of MoLG.

³¹ Based on the interviews with major donors such as MDLF, The World Bank, Belgian Technical Cooperation (BTC), and Danida. In the World Bank project “Municipal Development Program-Phase 1” conducted during 2009-2013, it was implemented with the aim of improving public services and functions of municipalities, instead of increasing the number of municipalities. The number of municipalities targeted by the Program increased from 132 in 2009 to 135 in 2013. (The World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report, 2014.)

(3) Community Empower Component (CEC)

The activities for strengthening JCs were conducted through the implementation of CEC during the project period, but many JCs were not functional in reality after the project completion. After the project completion, there were some cases where the JCs still existed officially and LGUs held meetings on their common issues (in South JC and Mid-West JC), but there was a case where there were no meetings among LGUs of the same JC (Mid-East JC). The situation for the JCs depended on the relationship between LGU leaders, geographical locations of LGUs, and other factors.³²

Table 4 (Current Status of Pilot Projects of CEC) shows the status of 15 pilot projects at the time of ex-post evaluation. Although there were no major damages in general as to the facilities and equipment of those pilot projects such as JC buildings, some facilities were utilized very well but some to a lesser extent at the time of ex-post evaluation. Specifically, many projects for improving lives, as proposed by the residents (the projects of CIPP in Table 4), had stopped their activities. As the Grant Aid for Community Empowerment was implemented in the JRRV area in the West Bank after 2010 and the JCs were the beneficiaries of the sub-project, the JCs were functional when the grant aid was implemented, but some JCs became nominal and not functional as a core of LGUs after the completion of the grant aid.

Table 5 below shows the summary of questionnaires to residents, conducted in our beneficiary survey in 12 pilot projects³³. The questions were: ①Was the project useful in improving your life? ②Has the project contributed to strengthening JC? ③Do you know that the project is funded by Japanese aid? The results of ① and ② were converted to scores. 10 is the highest score; the score is higher, the higher the level of contribution of the project.

Scores for “①improvement in lives of residents” were high in general, and especially high in Mid-West JC. Scores for “②strengthening of JC” were relatively high, although not as high as scores for ③. Based on the detailed interviews with residents, respondents sometimes mistook their VC (Village Council) as JC (Joint Council). Therefore, the effects on the strengthening of JC were not clear. Scores of “③Perception of Japanese aid” were not high. The main reason is considered to be that the pilot projects were implemented under the initiatives of MoLG and LGUs (JCs were recipients), and Japanese contributions were not visible.

Thus, in terms of indicators of overall goal, “②types of services and budget by JCs” had increased temporarily, but the indicators of “①The number of amalgamated LGUs and active JCs is increased.” and “③LGUs’ revenue is increased” were not achieved.

³² The four JCs are North cluster (Tubas Governorate), Mid-West cluster (Nablus Governorate), Mid-East cluster (Jericho Governorate), and South cluster (Jericho Governorate).

³³ In our ex-post evaluation, our team conducted our beneficiary survey in all pilot projects which were still active at the time of ex-post evaluation, extracting 355 samples in total, distributing and collecting questionnaires/answers.

Table 4: Current Status of Pilot Projects of CEC

Code	Pilot Project (location)	Current Status	Status of Utilization, Outcomes, Problems etc.
LGPP-1	Women's Center (Al'auja & Fassayel)	③	Facilities are in good condition, and used for seminars. (Seminars are supported by other donors as well.)
LGPP-2	School Buses (Mid-WestJC)	②	Only one bus out of two is used. Maintenance cost is high because they are used cars. Drivers are hired by LGU.
LGPP-3	Construction of VC Building(Aljiftlik)	②	Facilities are in good condition, but not used frequently. There are almost no JC meetings.
CSPP-1	Pre-school Education (Bardalah)	②	Equipment is still used by (about 15) children.
CSPP-2	Public Library (Alnwei'meh & Aldyouk Alfoqa)	③	Facilities are in good condition, and used as venues for seminars. A librarian is hired by LGU.
CSPP-3	Literacy Education (Mid-WestJC)	①	Seminars were held only in the first year of the project. The participants (illiterate women) appreciated the project.
CIPP-1	Livestock (Marj Alghazal, Marj Na'jeh, Alzbeidat)	①	Activities were stopped after the livestock was sold out.
CIPP-2	Handicrafts (Aljiftlik)	①	Women's group started activities but stopped in 2012 because of severe market competition.
CIPP-3	Apiculture (Ein Elbeidah & Kardalah)	①	All the bees died because of insecticide spray from nearby Israeli fruit farms. Now, farmers are trying to restart.
JC-N1	North JC Service Center (Ein Elbeidah)	③	Facilities are in good condition, and used for seminars etc.
JC-W1	Middle JC Service Center (Alnassariyah)	②	The completion of construction was delayed till 2011. Facilities are in good condition, but not used frequently. No management cost has been prepared and there is no staff.
JC-E1	Public Bus (Aljiftlik)	③	Two buses are operated in two routes. Financial surplus is gained. (Drivers are hired by LGU.) The Bus route to Jericho is beneficial to the lives of residents.
JC-S1	VC Building Renovation (Fassayel)	③	The completion of construction was delayed by December 2010. Facilities are in good condition, and used for seminars.
JC-S2	Kindergarten (Aldyouk Alfoqa)	②	The completion of construction was delayed by December 2010. Facilities are in good condition. The number of children is 14, same as that in 2010. Director was former core staff LGU.
JC-S3	Multipurpose Hall (Al'auja)	③	Facilities are in good condition, and used for seminars etc.

Notes: Based on the interviews with LGUs/JCs staff in charge of pilot projects, and site visits. The top 9 projects are "existing pilot projects" and lower 6 projects are "new pilot projects".

Figures for "Current status" show the rating as follows: ③ fully utilized or effective, ② effective but with problems, ① ineffective or suspended. (Rating was accorded by the author, based on interviews and site visits.)

Table 5: The Results of Beneficiary Survey on 12 Pilot Projects of CEC

Code	Project Name (location)		No. of respondents	1. Was the project useful in improving your life? (*)	2. Has the project contributed to strengthening JC? (*)	3. Do you know that the project is funded by Japanese aid? (Share of "Yes":%)
CIPP-3	Apiculture (Ein Elbeidah & Kardalah)		20	8.5	7.3	100
CSPP-1	Pre-school education (Bardalah)		15	8.7	7.7	53
JC-N1	North JC Service Center (Ein Elbeidah)		40	8.6	6.8	68
CSPP-3	Literacy education (Mid-West JC)		20	9.5	6.5	40
LGPP-2	School Buses (Mid-West JC)		40	9.8	8.8	63
JC-W1	Middle JC Service Center (Alnassariyah)		40	9.2	8.8	75
JC-E1	Public Bus (Aljiftlik-Mid-East JC)	Residents	20	9.8	6.8	35
		Children	25	9.4	7.7	56
CSPP-2	Public Library (Alnwei'meh & Aldyouk Alfoqa)		40	8.7	8.6	55
LGPP-1	Women's Center (South JC)	Al'auja	20	10.0	8.8	55
		Fassayel	20	8.9	8.9	85
JC-S1	VC Building Renovation (Fassayel)		20	9.0	7.8	55
JC-S3	Multipurpose Hall (Al'auja)		20	7.8	7.9	60
JC-S2	Kindergarten (Aldyouk Alfoqa)		15	9.7	9.7	87

Notes: Scores of (*) were calculated using the following method. "Very much" scored 10, "More or less" scored 5, "Not at all" scored 0, and each score was aggregated for the figure/ number of answers (excluding the number of respondents giving no answers). The higher the score, the higher the degree of appreciation from residents.

Column 1: School bus project in Mid-West JC and public bus project in Mid-East JC

Among the list of CEC pilot projects, examples of appreciated pilot projects were the school bus project in Mid-West JC (LGPP-2) and the public bus project in Aljiftlik VC of Mid-East JC (JC-E1).

A school bus in Mid-West JC has been used for commuting to primary and secondary schools in six LGUs of Mid-West JC. It was highly appreciated and positive answers to the effects on strengthening JC were given. Two used cars were provided through the project (in consideration of budgetary limitations), but only one car is now utilized as maintenance costs have been high.

On the other hand, public buses in Mid-East JC have been operated by Aljiftlik VC instead of JC, and its effect on strengthening JC is low. However, the project had been greatly appreciated in terms of its benefits. There are two routes served by the public buses. One is a route to connect Mid-East JC and Jericho, and another is a commuting bus for kindergarten children inside Aljiftlik. Two new buses were provided, and maintenance costs are currently relatively low. Drivers' fees and fuel costs are covered through users' fees and budget of LGU for now.



Photo1: School bus in Mid-West JC (LGPP-2)



Photo2: Public bus in Mid-East JC Aljiftlik (JC-E1)

(4) Training

There has been no systematic training conducted by the MoLG, after the project completion. The Jericho Training Center utilized for training during the project period was not used as the training center after the completion of the project, and there was no systematic training plan at the time of ex-post evaluation³⁴.

The 10 staff who were trained as trainers between 2006 and 2010 were engaging in their own work in their departments and were not working as trainers at the time of ex-post evaluation. Besides, training was not conducted at the time. Therefore, training materials formulated by the project were not used for training.

The aim of training was to achieve the overall goal: “Municipal services have improved.” However, the lack of training system after the completion of the project led to the failure in the achievement of the indicators of the overall goal, which are “The number of active JCs has been increased” and “Types of services by JCs have been increased.”

As mentioned above, although there has been progress in the amalgamation of LGUs to municipalities, the number of active JCs has not increased. In addition, the types of services and budget of JCs have not improved since 2013 after the CEC and Grant Aid were completed, although the service and budget of JC did increase temporarily during the time when these projects were implemented. Reform of fixed assets tax, which can be a new financial resource for LGUs, is still underway. Therefore, the impact expected through the implementation of the project is limited, and this project has not achieved its overall goal.

³⁴ It was because of the lack of political will of leaders of MoLG. (Based on interviews with staff of MoLG)

3.2.2.2 Other Impacts

(1) Impact on the Natural Environment

None.

(2) Land Acquisition and Resettlement

Land acquisition and resettlement could occur only in the CEC, because JC buildings, community centers, and libraries were constructed as pilot projects requested by LGUs. However the land where these facilities were built had originally been government-owned land, and no land acquisition and resettlement issues arose³⁵.

(3) Impact on the Improvement in People's Lives in the JRRV Area

At the time of planning, the following consideration was brought up. "In light of human security, peace building, poverty, and gender, JICA will give consideration to adopting a participatory method and process in the formation of projects targeting a wide area, to offer benefits for socially vulnerable people, and not widen the gap of social structure, gender and area." The CEC was a component introduced with the aim of realizing this approach in the JRRV area.

Many pilot projects were implemented in Area-C³⁶, which was under the strong influence of Israel, relatively poor, where economic activities were restricted, and which received little assistance from donors. The assistance for improving the lives of "marginalized people" was appreciated by local residents and officials of Palestinian authority.

The following comments were made in terms of concrete impacts of the project. (1) Other donors began to come and offer aid after JICA showed that aid in Area-C was feasible. (Interview at Mid-West JC) (2) Communication and exchanges among communities have expanded because of the construction of JC buildings, community centers, libraries, etc. (Interviews at Mid-West JC and South JC) (3) The Women Center has contributed to the empowerment of women by providing a space for seminars and activities organized by Women's Organizations. (Interview at South JC) (4) Living environment has been improved through assistance from some projects of CEC and Grant aid, and has contributed to halting the decrease of the youth population. (Interview at Mid-West JC)³⁷

³⁵ The project of construction of VC Building (LGPP-3) in Jiflik was delayed, because it was located in Area-C and took a long time to receive permission for construction from Israel. This is regarded not as an impact but external factor that restricted the implementation of the project.

³⁶ "Area-C" is the area where Israel has jurisdiction of both administrative and security authority.

³⁷ Terminal Evaluation Report of the project mentioned that "Implementation of the project in JRRV has contributed to growth in the confidence of local residents and leaders of LGUs to sustain the communities in this area. This project also had the impact: Provision of better preschool education has led to the enhancement of the conscience of parents toward preschool education. School buses became available for local residents after several discussions with the Ministry of Transportation. It could enhance the capacity of operation and management of Women's Center. It also encouraged joint activities among different communities.

As mentioned above, there were some effects achieved through the implementation of this project, and effectiveness and impact of the project are fair. As to the project purpose, the LFP and the JC Strategy were approved by the ministry, and the JCs were partly strengthened by the implementation of pilot projects of CEC. That means the project was mostly effective in strengthening the function of JCs. On the other hand, the training system was not established by the MoLG. Therefore, the project was achieved at a limited level.

This project achieved its overall goal at a limited level, because the number of active JCs had not increased, although the amalgamation of LGUs to municipalities had progressed. Moreover, the types of services and budget of JCs had not increased especially since 2013, although the services and budget of JCs improved temporarily during the implementation of the CEC. Reform of fixed assets tax, which can be a new financial resource for LGUs, is still underway.

3.3 Efficiency (Rating: ①)

3.3.1 Inputs

Table 6: Planned and Actual Inputs

Inputs	Plan	Actual (at the time of completion)
(1) Experts	Short-Term (13 MM)—local governance in general, local finance, Joint Council/planning, system engineering/database	Long-Term: 1 person, Short-Term: 14 persons in total number (42.5MM)—capacity building of JC, CDC, etc.
(2) Trainees received	Training in Japan (about 8 persons), Third Country Training (about 10 persons per year)	58persons (Training in Japan: 39 persons, Third Country (Jordan) Training: 20 persons)
(3) Equipment	Remodeling, equipment and furniture required for a training center, a vehicle	Remodeling, equipment and furniture required for a training center, a vehicle
(4) Others	Field activities (workshops, in-country training, diagnostic survey, training needs assessment, questionnaire)	Field activities (workshops, in-country training, diagnostic survey, training needs assessment, questionnaire)
Japanese side Total Project Cost	149 million yen in total	1,052 million yen in total
Palestinian side	1. Cost of counterpart staff (3 persons) 2. Facilities and Land for Project Management Office and Training Center	1. Cost of counterpart staff (8 persons in total number) 2. Local staff (7 persons) 3. Facilities and Land for Project Management Office and Training Center (Underground floor of library of Jericho municipality was offered.)

Note: The amount of inputs from Palestinian side was unclear because of the lack of data, so the contents of inputs are provided instead.

3.3.1.1 Elements of Inputs

(1) Dispatch of Experts

After the start of the project, appropriate inputs were injected under the difficult conditions in Palestine, such as the dispatch of short-term experts to draft the LFP and JC Strategy. The first long-term expert was dispatched in January 2007, and a group of JICA experts was delegated to engage in CEC in February 2007³⁸. In the latter period of the project, inputs increased according to the expansion of the project, especially for CEC.

(2) Training in Japan/Jordan

Thirty-nine (39) Palestinian staff members, mainly the staff of MoLG, participated in the training in Japan, and fifty-eight (58) staff members participated in the third-country training held twice in Jordan. The actual number of participants exceeded the number expected at the time of planning (54 persons in 3 years). Average number of trainees each year was calculated at the time of planning, and the increase of the number of participants was mainly brought about by the extension of the project period³⁹.

(3) Machinery and Equipment

At the beginning of the project, the activities of the project stagnated and inputs of equipment were delayed because of the political turmoil in Palestine. The equipment provided to the training center by the Japanese side was maintained under the responsibility of the director, project managers, and other staff assigned by the MoLG, and was fully utilized. The equipment provided to the Jericho Training Center is now used as the equipment for JICA's Jericho Sanitation Project⁴⁰, as well as the facility, after the project completion.

(4) Inputs from Palestinian Side

After the birth of the Hamas regime in March 2006, there was a period when the Palestinian side could not be involved in the project because of the strike by public servants, which served as an example of the obstacles to project implementation. After the situations improved, the directors and managers of the Palestinian side were highly motivated and committed to the project, and the project manager played a central role.

The Jericho Training Center was located at the underground floor of the library of Jericho Municipality, which offered the facility to the MoLG for free. The Jericho Training Center was closed after the project completion, and the office is now used as a project management office

³⁸ JICA expert group was contracted to implement CEC, but they also supported for other components of local finance and Joint Councils.

³⁹ Terminal Evaluation Report, p.20.

⁴⁰ Technical Assistance and Capacity Building Project for the Jericho Sanitation Project (December, 2012-July 2016).

of JICA's Jericho Sanitation Project.

3.3.1.2 Project Cost

The planned project cost was 149 million yen, and the actual project cost was 1,052 million yen, which was significantly higher than planned (706% of the plan amount).

The significant difference between the planned and actual amounts was mainly caused by the expansion of inputs, the identification of concrete focus and priorities after the beginning of the project, response to the recommendations that the project needed in order to strengthen its implementation system, and introduction of a new component to existing components, at the time of mid-term evaluation in 2007. Significant expansion in actual cost was mainly derived from the cost of CEC (pilot projects provided to JCs), which was newly added in 2007. At the time of the first management advisory survey conducted in May 2008, the project period was extended for two years up till 2010, and the project costs increased in August 2008 as well. Furthermore, the budget of CEC (pilot projects) was expanded, exceeding the limit of the amount of sub-projects in their implementation; this was another major reason for the increase in the project costs. (Originally, 5 million yen had been the maximum budget allocated for each sub-project requested by LGUs, and 500,000 yen had been the maximum budget allocated for each project requested by civil organizations, at the time of planning of CEC)⁴¹.

3.3.1.3 Period of Cooperation

The planned period of cooperation was from September 2005 to August 2008 (36 months), and the actual period of cooperation was from September 2005 to December 2010 (64 months), which was significantly longer than planned (178% of the plan).

The factors affecting the extension of the period of cooperation were as follows.

One factor was the turmoil in Palestinian politics. After the establishment of the Hamas Cabinet in 2006, Japanese aid including JICA assistance was suspended for a while. Another factor was the difficulty in finding appropriate long-term experts who could be dispatched to Palestine because of special security conditions in Palestine as an unstable area, so JICA was unable to dispatch any long-term expert until January 2007. Hence, it was difficult to implement the project smoothly. At the time of the first management advisory survey conducted in May 2008, the progress of the project was reviewed and the delay of the project was indicated. As CEC was added as a new component in 2007, one and a half years after the project beginning, the period of cooperation had to be extended for two years, and the project completion date was extended from August 2008 to August 2010. Besides, some pilot projects such as the building of

⁴¹ Necessary costs of pilot projects sometimes expanded in the process of implementing them, and the increase of expenditure was allowed in case there were inevitable reasons for it such as cost increase of materials and construction. (Interviews with JICA local staff)

Aljiftlik village council needed to obtain a license from Israeli side, which was not necessarily granted in a timely manner and thus caused delays.

At the time of the terminal evaluation survey conducted in May 2010, three pilot projects had not yet been completed. Then, the period of cooperation was extended again up to December 2010. Most of the 15 pilot projects (9 existing and 6 new pilot projects) were completed by August 2010 by responding flexibly to obstacles that arose in their implementation process. However, three pilot projects (namely, the construction of service center in Mid-West JC, construction of kindergarten in South JC, and construction of VC building in South JC) could not be completed before August 2010 and were therefore extended again until December 2010. This was because of the unexpected amount of time taken for the procurement and arrangement of implementation, the difficulty of coordination with local contractors in implementing the project, and the delay of obtaining permits for land use for the construction of the building from Israeli authority, etc. Two projects among the three uncompleted pilot projects at the time of August were completed in December 2010, and the remaining project was completed in mid-2011⁴².

Judging from the process of the project mentioned above, the stagnation of the project until the beginning of 2007 was caused by external factors such as unstable Palestinian political situations. The two-years extension of the project period decided at the first management advisory survey in March 2008, and the further four-month extension of the project period decided at the terminal evaluation survey, were based on appropriate reasons that took into consideration the progress of the CEC, which was delayed because of obstacles derived from socio-political situations such as delays in obtaining permission from Israel. Then, the decisions of extension were regarded as appropriate.

Thus, the significant expansion of project costs were mainly caused by the CEC added to the project in 2007, and the significant extension of the period of cooperation was mainly caused by uncontrollable factors in the project.

Therefore, both the project cost and the period of cooperation significantly exceeded the plan, although there were reasonable factors behind the increase. Therefore, efficiency of the project is low.

⁴² The completion date of the project was considered to be December 2010, because that was the date for finalizing the project completion report and all works of experts were terminated at that moment, although one pilot project had not yet been completed by the end of December 2010.

Column 2: Project implementation under unstable security conditions

This project faced unstable political conditions (external factor) during the period from the start of the project in September 2005 to the beginning of 2007. The course of events was as follows.

After Hamas became the ruling party in the election held in January 2006 and the establishment of the Hamas regime in March 2006, the relationship of Palestine with the international community deteriorated, and armed conflicts occurred frequently between Hamas and Fataha. The situation was relatively stable around the period of March 2007, when the Haniya integrated regime was established, but a large scale armed conflict occurred in June 2007. After the conflict, the regimes of West Bank and Gaza split. After that, the situation in West Bank became more stable.

The period of the suspension of new Japanese ODA projects was from April 2006 to August 2007, but existing projects were continued even during the period. In the case of this project, the Management Advisory Mission was sent in August 2006, and the JCspd workshop was held in the same month of 2006. The first long-term expert was dispatched in January 2007, and the mid-term evaluation survey was implemented in February 2007.

Because of the special situation in Palestine, it was difficult to find and dispatch an appropriate person as a long-term expert during the period from the beginning of the project in 2005 and 2006. Hence, JICA focused on dispatching short-term experts and utilized local human resources in its operations in the fields. After the start of the project, short-term experts were dispatched for drafting the LFP and JC Strategy in response to the needs of the counterpart, and efforts were made to keep to the schedule of activities for the project. The efforts of JICA to implement this project under such difficult conditions should be evaluated positively.

In the pilot projects of CEC starting 2007, 92 project proposals were proposed. Assistance was provided for 15 pilot projects in this JICA project, while assistance was provided for 22 projects among the remaining project proposals using the Grant Aid for Community Empowerment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Since so many project proposals were proposed in 2008, efforts were made to find other aid frameworks to assist in more projects that could not be covered by the CEC. JCs became the recipients of the following Grant Aid as counterparts of the individual projects, and the Grant Aid project has contributed to the improvement of living of local people in the same way as CEC. These efforts were much appreciated by the local residents. Thus, the CEC contributed to the formulation of a larger scale project under the Grant Aid (1.176 billion yen).

3.4 Sustainability (Rating: ①)

In the following section, sustainability in terms of the policy background, organizational, technical, and financial aspects is summarized, focusing on the services and financial resources of JCs and LGUs.

3.4.1 Related Policy and Institutional Aspects for the Sustainability of Project Effects

In terms of the policy aspects, strengthening of institutional basis of local governments of Palestine and the establishment of the framework of local governance were prioritized in “Palestine National Development Plan 2011-2013”, and the focus was transformed to public service delivery and improvement of concrete services of local government in the new “Palestine Development Plan 2014-2016”. Furthermore, the “Strategic Framework of

Cross-sector Plan 2011-2013” and “Strategic Framework of MoLG 2010-2014” coincided with these national development plans.

On the other hand, in terms of the institutional foundation after the project completion, the amalgamation of LGUs to municipalities progressed in the West Bank as a whole, such as Hebron, but the number of active JCs did not increase. The types and budget of JCs did not increase and the reform of fixed assets tax as a new financial resource is still underway. Financial transfer from the central government to local government has not yet progressed under the situation of chronic financial deficit of Palestine Authority. In terms of JC Strategy, the MoLG could not take a definite stance between the two different approaches of focusing on the amalgamation of LGUs (which was the mainstream among other donors such as the World Bank and MDLF) and strengthening JCs. However, the long-term goal and direction (which is “Municipal services are improved through promotion of LGU amalgamation and formation of JCs.”) are shared between JICA and other major donors, and other major donors have begun to take a more pragmatic approach, while the two approaches are converging with each other.

Thus, stakeholders have begun to share the basic policies and direction of local governance, although the foundation of local finance and joint councils has not yet been established. Therefore, sustainability of the project effects is assured to some extent in terms of policy and institutional aspects.

3.4.2 Organizational Aspects of the Implementing Agency for the Sustainability of Project Effects

In terms of organizational aspects, the Budget Department is responsible for local finance, and JCspd is responsible for joint councils, at the time of ex-post evaluation. That was the same during the project period. The Ministry of Finance has jurisdiction over the establishment of fixed assets tax system, which is the focus of the succeeding JICA project, and the Budget Department of the MoLG was involved in the issue but could not exert a substantial influence on it⁴³. The number of staff of JCspd was strengthened to nine (including Director) during the project period, but was reduced to four after the project completion. At the time of ex-post evaluation, the number of staff increased to six (seven including a staff member of MoLG in Jenin), after two staff members were added by the support of BTC. At the end of 2014, the Policy Unit was established with the support of the Danish government. It is responsible for policy coordination and it serves as an example of reforms for a more effective organizational structure. In 2014, a part of the Administration Department was divided, and the Human Resource Department was established as a section to deal with the issue of human resource

⁴³ Based on interviews with the MoF.

development⁴⁴.

Among the four JCs (LGUs clusters), the South JC is still functional as a framework for LGUs to tackle their common issues and hold several meetings among them in the same way as during the period of the project. However, the Mid-West JC and North JC are now less active and hold joint meetings only where necessary. The Mid-East JC is only nominal with no meetings of JC, and each LGU is active autonomously. At the time of project completion, the necessity of monitoring the effectiveness of JCs was mentioned in JICA report, and frequent communication between the MoLG and JCs was carried out to monitor the activities of JCs. However, there were almost no concrete actions to strengthen the function of JCs, because the training system had not been established and there is no new budget which can be provided to JCs.

The Jericho Training Center was dissolved after the project completion. Jericho Municipality had the intention of continuing to provide the facility for free, but the top leaders of MoLG did not have the intention of establishing their own training center at the time⁴⁵. The lack of training center shows the lack of will to continue training activities of MoLG by themselves.

Thus, although there are some positive factors, such as the trend of institutional reform of MoLG, and the increase in the number of staff of JCspd, there were some negative factors. For example, some JCs are not active in the JRRV area, and the training center was dissolved after the project completion. Therefore, there are some problems in terms of organizational aspects of the sustainability.

3.4.3 Technical Aspects of the Implementing Agency for the Sustainability of Project Effects

After the project completion, the training center was dissolved and no systematic training programs existed. A report titled “MoLG: Human Resource Capacity Development Strategy” was proposed by a consultant hired by BTC in December 2014, which mentioned the necessity of capacity development, but a concrete plan for strengthening technical capacity for the future has not yet been identified.

As systematic training was discontinued, manuals formulated under the project are not used in a systematic way and have not been revised. Ten trainers trained under the project are working in their respective departments as core staff, but not as trainers.

In a part of the programs in which assistance was provided by donors, seminars and training have been conducted on the techniques of financial management, project management, etc.⁴⁶ In other words, the staff of counterpart departments receiving assistance in the area of local

⁴⁴ Human Resource Department consists of only two personnel including director, and is responsible for human development programs with assistance from BTC.

⁴⁵ Based on interviews with MoLG.

⁴⁶ Examples of donors are international donors such as GIZ, BTC, and international NGOs such as World Vision, Global Communication.

governance from major donors have many chances of training and have relatively high expertise, although the chances of training depend on the assistance from donors. Moreover, they have opportunities for OJT (On the Job Training) to enhance their capacity, because there are many foreign advisers such as JICA expert dispatched as an adviser for the next project (“Improving Local Governance System: Phase II”), and Danida advisers who are providing assistance on policy issues as long-term experts to MoLG. As to the individual and institutional capacity of the four JCs that were established during the project period, an assessment of capacity development was conducted in June 2010. The assessment report showed that there were differences in the levels of management capacities among the four JCs⁴⁷.

Thus, the capacity of the staff who was involved in local governance issues, including the counterparts of the projects with assistance provided by donors, has improved. However, a training system for improvement of capacity of the MoLG has not been established, and opportunities for continuous training and capacity development have not been provided. Therefore, there are some problems in terms of technical aspects of the sustainability.

3.4.4 Financial Aspects of the Implementing Agency for the Sustainability of Project Effects

(1) Financial Situation of JCs and LGUs

Financial transfer from central government to local governments has not progressed as a result of the chronic financial deficit of the Palestine Authority as a whole, and there have no major changes in terms of the budgetary and revenue structure of LGUs.

The revenue of LGUs comprises mainly of the financial transfer from the central government for the public services of electricity and water supply, and LGUs are trying to provide their public services within the limitation of their current budget. Transportation fees for maintenance of roads came from the central government in 2009, but were suspended later. It was decided that this would be resumed, but had not yet been distributed at the time of ex-post evaluation.

Based on the statistics⁴⁸ of the budget of each LGU between 2008 and 2014, the budget of LGUs of the four JCs is not stable and has been fluctuating significantly each year.

The MoF demonstrates a positive stance in establishing the fixed assets tax system as a stable financial source in the future, and JICA has been assisting in their activities in its successive project. Once the fixed assets tax system has been established, the share of the tax would become a large portion of the revenues of LGUs. However, it is still in the process of reform

⁴⁷ The assessment report summarized the capacities of JCs as follows: “Technique” of individuals were relatively high in South JC and Mid-West JC, low but improving in North JC, low in Mid-East JC. “Intellectual resource” “operation & management system” “Monitoring and evaluation” of organizations were relatively high in North JC and South JC, low in Mid-West JC and Mid-East JC, “Financial management” “collaboration with ministries” were relatively high in Mid-West JC and South JC, low but improving in North JC, and low in Mid-East JC. Items were categories assessed in the report. (Based on the report provided by JICA.)

⁴⁸ Statistics provided by Budget Department of MoLG.

and there are no significant changes at this moment⁴⁹.

In terms of the operation and management (O & M) of four JCs (LGU Clusters) and 15 pilot projects after the project completion, JCs do not have their own budget in general. JCs were the recipients of the CEC pilot projects and Grant Aid for Community Empowerment, but there is no other continuous budget for JCs and the basic structure is unchanged. The O & M budget of pilot projects has been paid for by LGUs, including the personnel costs of staff (such as librarians, bus drivers). The continuation of pilot projects faces budgetary constraints. As an example, the public bus of Aljiftlik (JC-E1, see Column 1) shows a surplus at the time of ex-post evaluation, but the O & M cost of the bus is expected to increase in the future. In the case of the school bus project in Mid-West JC (LGPP-2, see Column 1), two used buses were provided but only one bus is now in operation to reduce the O& M cost of buses and driver's fees. At women's center (LGPP-1), women's union has been continuing their activities by receiving financial support from NGOs such as Global Communication⁵⁰.

(2) Situation of Governmental Budget for Local Governance

The budgetary situation of Palestine Authority has been very serious, and its budget for local governance has depended on aid from international donors. This situation had remained the same up till now⁵¹.

The MDLF has been the largest financial resource for local governance, and approximately US\$250 million was provided in total during the four years of Phase 1 from 2009 to 2012. The financial assistance has been used for the improvement of infrastructure of LGUs, to supplement the budget of LGUs, for the emergency rehabilitation of the Gaza area, and for policy reforms and program management, among other activities. The MDLF has continued after 2013, and Phase 2 is now ongoing from 2013 to 2016. Major donors of the MDLF, which are the World Bank, GIZ, and Danida, have made commitment to continuing the assistance during the period of Phase 2.

Looking at the shares of financial resources for local governance in 2014, bilateral direct assistance from international donors including JICA made up 59% of the total, and that from MDLF made 23%, while the budget of MoLG made up only 18% of the total⁵².

⁴⁹ In some municipalities which have the service of Solid Waste Management (SWM), the revenue from SWM shows a large share in total revenue.

⁵⁰ Global Communications is a civil organization assisted by USAID.

⁵¹ The revenue of Palestinian Authority increased from 1.64 billion dollars in 2008 to 2.05 billion dollar in 2011, but revenues collected by the Palestinian Authority was only 370 million dollars of 2.05 billion dollars in 2011, because Israel controlled the export and import of Palestine and collected tariffs, and sent back to Palestinian Authority regularly. In November 2012, Israel stopped the transfer of clearance revenue of 100 million dollar to Palestine, as a countermeasure against the attainment of observer state at the United Nations by the Palestinian Authority, and the freeze of transfer has deteriorated the financial situations of Palestinian Authority furthermore.

⁵² MoLG (Policy & Planning Unit), Donor Mapping, January 2015.

Thus, in terms of financial aspects, there is still a serious problem in the financial situation of Palestinian Authority as a whole, and this has been a major factor behind the unstable financial situation of LGUs and insufficient service delivery by JCs. Concrete activities, seminars and training have also depended on assistance provided by international donors.

The budget for local governance as a whole remains dependent on external resources. As international assistance in this area has been continued, the Palestinian government is expected to continue its efforts to improve the foundation of local governance using such external resources.

Therefore, major problems have been observed in terms of financial aspects, because the situation of shortage in budget of Palestine Authority have not been improved and are expected to continue. They are dependent upon assistance from international donors such as MDLF, although the establishment of a fixed assets tax system may improve the situation of local finance to some extent in the future.

Thus, minor problems have been observed in terms of the policy background, organizational, and technical aspects of the implementing agency, and major problems have been observed in terms of financial aspects. Therefore, sustainability of the project effects is low.

4. Conclusion, Lessons Learned, and Recommendations

4.1 Conclusion

The Project's objective was to improve the foundation of local governance system by clarifying the major issues of local finance and joint councils, formulating their policy and strategy for improvement, and strengthening the capacity of stakeholders in local governments.

The Palestine Authority regards the strengthening of institutional foundation as its most important policy, among which local finance and joint councils are prioritized. The CEC was added and started one and a half years after the beginning of the project, targeted at the JRRV that was the least developed area in the West Bank region. Therefore, this project coincides with government policies and development needs. The project also coincides with the Japanese government policy of strengthening its assistance to Palestine. However, at the time of the start of the project, a quite broad area of local governance had become the target of assistance, the logical relationship between outputs / project purposes and the overall goal was unclear, and thus there was a problem in a part of its approach. Thus, the project coincides with the development plan and development needs of Palestine and Japan's ODA policy, but there was a problem in its approach. Therefore, its relevance is fair.

As to the effectiveness of the project, the LFP and JC Strategy were approved by the MoLG, and JCs were strengthened to some extent through the CEC. However, the training system

initiated by the MoLG was not established; therefore, its effects have been limited. Although the improvement of the lives of local people in the JRRV area was the positive impact of this project, improvements in the services provided by LGUs and the financial decentralization to LGUs are still on the way. Thus, the project's effectiveness and impact are fair.

Both the project cost and the project period far exceeded the planned cost and period. Thus, its efficiency is low.

As to the sustainability of the project, necessary policies for sustaining the effects of the project continue, but there are some problems in terms of organizational and technical aspects, and a serious problem in the financial aspect. Thus, sustainability of the project is low.

In light of the above, this project is evaluated to be unsatisfactory.

4.2 Recommendations

4.2.1 Recommendations to the Implementing Agency

(1) The necessity of establishing a training system for the MoLG (Recommendation to the MoLG)

The MoLG should improve its training system, formulate its training plan, and take concrete actions for human resource development of the MoLG and JCs as soon as possible. As examples, the MoLG is expected to formulate and implement its training program, by utilizing the former Jericho training center, to enhance the capacity of MoLG staff for formulating development plans and budget, capacity of LGU staff for carrying out accounting work, and the IT expertise of MoLG and LGU staff, etc.

(2) The necessity of closer cooperation between MoF and MoLG on the issue of local finance (recommendation to JCspd and Budget Department)

In the area of formation of local finance policy and financial resources of joint councils, the MoF has major authority in realizing those policies, therefore, the MoLG should formulate its action plan for improving financial policy and financial resources of JCs in close cooperation with the MoF. As an example, a concrete action plan is expected to be formulated in a revised version of LFP, in collaboration with the MoF. Also, close collaboration should be maintained between JCspd, Budget Department, and the MoF to formulate concrete measures for resolving the financial problems raised in the JC Strategy.

4.2.2 Recommendations to JICA

(1) To encourage the MoLG and the MoF to collaborate

As local finance and joint councils have close relationships with each other, JICA has been assisting the MoF in the area of local finance, and the MoLG in the area of Joint Councils, in its

successive projects in those areas. As the close collaboration between the two ministries is essential for securing financial resources and improving public services in local governments, and JICA has been assisting both ministries in its programs, JICA is expected to put effort into encouraging the collaboration between the two ministries, and to help make policies and plans more effective.

4.3 Lessons Learned

(1) Effective implementation of projects that include multiple components and different ministries

This project included three different components of local finance, joint councils, and training. In light of assisting the improvement of local governance, the MoLG became the counterpart agency in all components. However, involvement of the MoF was essential to bringing about the realization of financial reforms in local governance such as LFP, and the transfer of financial resources to LGUs. Therefore, the approach of this project, which focused on MoLG the a counterpart, had its limitations in making reform plans and policies effective. In that sense, JICA's approach of focusing on the MoF in the successive JICA project on local finance was appropriate, and it is important for JICA to encourage the two ministries to collaborate with each other in implementing plans and policies of local governance.

In the case of a project to assist with governance reforms, including the formulation of strategies and plans of local governance as well as budgetary and finance reforms, it is necessary to gain the positive support of all related ministries for the project, and to maintain close collaboration among them, in order to achieve the purposes of the project (The Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Local Government are almost always important in any country). The counterpart(s) of the project must be selected carefully and appropriately at the time of planning. Multiple ministries could be the counterparts of one project, or multiple projects in one ministry as a counterpart could also be considered as far as related ministries could collaborate with each other. In any case, it is essential to keep the involvement of related ministries in the project at the time of planning, and to make clear the roles and concrete activities of those related ministries and organizations.

(2) Implementation of a project of comprehensive governance assistance, in the case of adding a large scale component to the project

In this project, the total cost of the project increased significantly and the period of cooperation was extended significantly as well, mainly because a large scale component (CEC) was added in the middle of the project period (one and a half years after the start of the project), which was not included in the original plan. Although the CEC was regarded to contribute to

“the strengthening of joint councils” in its PDM, in reality, the CEC was quite in line with the project purpose of the Grant Aid for community empowerment, namely “the improvement of access to public services at the community level (in JRRV),” as inferred from the fact that many sub-projects proposals of CEC were implemented under the Grant Aid project.

This project was a comprehensive governance assistance to promote administrative and financial reforms. It sometimes happens to add new activities and/or modify original PDM flexibly, responding to the real situations and/or needs of counterparts, after the start of the project to assist in the administrative and financial reforms of the counterpart countries. In the event that the additional component, though along with its project purpose, has a different factor in substance, and is a large component in terms of the cost, it would be advisable to separate the additional component from the original project and to implement it separately, in light of effectiveness of the project.

(3) Evaluation standards of the projects implemented under difficult conditions such as projects in fragile states and projects for peace building, which are vulnerable to external factors

This project tackled the difficult issues of strengthening the foundation of local governance in Palestine, under extremely unstable political and socio-economic circumstances. In the case of evaluation based on standard DAC 5 items, the evaluation ratings of effectiveness and efficiency of such projects tend to be worse, because the projects are vulnerable to negative political and economic external factors.

The low ratings of such projects may discourage the motivation to undertake projects under difficult conditions in the future. While it is necessary to apply common evaluation standards to all projects in the light of objectivity, it is also necessary to take all methods into considerations from political and diplomatic perspectives or in light of the long-term impacts of the projects, so as not to reduce the likelihood of initiating these projects, As an example, supplementing the evaluation is an option that can be explored, by setting other standards for projects implemented under difficult conditions, such as in cases where governmental agencies are still fragile or where external factors (especially security situations) strongly affect the project implementation. Besides, the lessons learned and experiences of from those projects conducted under difficult conditions, such as projects in fragile states and projects for peace-building, should be accumulated and utilized for future project planning and implementation.

Annex: Situations of Achievement by Outcomes

Output	Indicators	Status	Points of Evaluation
Output1: Major issues of local finance are clarified and a basic policy for improvement of local finance is recognized and promoted in MoLG.	① Local finance policy is drafted.	Achieved	The first version of LFP was completed in March 2008, and reviewed by major LGUs in West Bank, and the final version of it was completed in June 2009.
	② Concerned people understand local finance policy sufficiently.	Achieved	Leaflets were also produced based on the final version, and distributed to the stakeholders in the government and members of LGUs, and its existence was recognized among donors' community.
Output2: Major issues for joint councils are clarified and a strategy for improvement of service delivery is recognized and promoted by MoLG.	① JC strategy is drafted.	Achieved	The final version of the JC Strategy was completed in March 2010.
	② DJCspd and Regional Directorates of MoLG understand JC strategy sufficiently.	Achieved	Workshops were held about 10 times, and stakeholders of MoLG were invited during the process of drafting the JC Strategy. Leaflets on the JC Strategy were also made and distributed to the stakeholders of local governance at the seminars etc.
	③ Experiences and lessons learned from pilot projects are included in the JC strategy annex document.	Partly achieved	The lessons were not summarized at the time of terminal evaluation, because of the delay in the pilot projects. The experiences of pilot projects were summarized in the Project Completion Report in December 2010, and the key points were summarized in the JC Strategy: Annex.
	④ Number of dissemination activities for JC strategy organized by DJCspd.	Achieved	Leaflets on the JC Strategy were produced and distributed to the stakeholders in local governance at the seminars etc.
Output3: Needs of LGUs are identified and MoLG is able to implement training for capacity development of LGUs.	① 10 trainers are trained.	Achieved	Staff from each department of MoLG were trained and 10 staff became trainers.
	② Training materials which reflect needs of LGUs are developed.	Achieved	Training materials were drafted with the assistance of JICA experts.
	③ 1,000 LGU and JC members are trained.	Achieved	More than 2,600 LGUs and stakeholders of the Joint Councils participated in seminars.
	④ 10 trained trainers are able to conduct trainings with the developed training materials.	Partly achieved	10 trainers trained under the project taught the core staff of MoLG and LGUs. (Training was not conducted after 2011.)
	⑤ 70% of participants evaluate the training above 4 out of 5 levels.	Achieved	Based on the survey conducted by external consultants, 18 courses were evaluated by participants above 4 out of 5 levels on average, among 20 courses conducted since March 2009 to April 2010.
	⑥ Training plan of the training center based on financial analysis is prepared.	Not achieved	Training Plan with financial projection had not been drawn up at the time of project completion.