

## 【知識創造ケーススタディ】～「遠野スタイル」のまちづくり～

### 1. Overall backgrounds

日本のこれから長期にわたる最大の政策課題は、人口減少・高齢社会への対応である。国立社会保障・人口問題研究所の公表データ（出生・死亡中位推計）では、このままの傾向で推移すれば、2010年に1億2,800万人だった日本の総人口は、2030年には1億1,700万人、2040年には1億700万人、2050年には9,700万人になるものと推計されている。「まちづくりを通じて地域の活性化を図り、人口の減少を少しでも食い止め、地域社会の機能を将来にわたり維持していくこと」が全国自治体の共通する課題となっている。そして、この状況は全国一律の傾向で進行するのではなく、過疎化の進む地方の自治体において大都市自治体に先行して進んでいる。いわば、学ぶべき課題先進地が地方にある。

本ケーススタディでは、岩手県遠野市を取り上げることとする。遠野市においても、人口減少・高齢化の進行といった課題は存在するが、本田敏秋市長のもとで、地域を見つめ直し、様々な新しい政策を積極的に実行し、観光、グリーン・ツーリズム、教育研修等による外からの交流人口の増大<sup>1</sup>、Uターン・Iターンによる移住や起業の促進、暮らしやすい子育て環境づくり<sup>2</sup>、安全・安心のまちづくりを推進し、地域活性化の先進モデルとなっている。そして、何よりも強調したいのは、数としての人口ではなく、質としての市民力の向上をめざしていることである。これは、遠野市のまちづくりを最も特徴づけている市民協働、コミュニティの力とも関係する。

遠野市の取り組みは、一言でいえば、基本に忠実な、現場に即した粘り強い取り組みといえる。本田の行う地域経営は、地域の資源を活かし、身の丈に合った取り組みに特徴がある。

本ケーススタディでは、まず、2つの政策事例を取り上げる。ひとつは、地域の素材を生かした地域振興の政策事例、もうひとつは、災害・危機管理に関わる政策事例である。そして、これら2つの事例は、このまちに脈々と流れるまちづくりビジョンの系譜を抜きに語ることはできないことを紹介していく。

遠野の取り組みは、特殊なものではなく、行政がリーダーシップを持ち行動することで、どこの自治体においても応用できるものである。手の届かない特別な政策ではなく、発想を転換することで、有益な、政策を考えるうえでの重要なヒント、気づきを与えてくれる。

本ケースを通じて、自治体による地域経営にこれから何が必要か、いっしょに学ぶこととしたい。

なお、本ケースをよりよく理解するためには、日本の地方自治制度について基本的な知識があることが望ましいことから、以下に簡単な概要を示す。

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本ケースは、自治大学校客員教授、第50代自治大学校長の武居丈二氏が執筆し、政策研究大学院大学の高田がNAPAのMPPコース教材用に修正したものである。

<sup>1</sup> 観光入込客数（2010年～13年の平均、各市内施設に年間約60万人のほか、道の駅「風の丘」に約130万人）  
「遠野市調べ」

<sup>2</sup> 女性の合計特殊出生率（2008年～2012年）：遠野市1.69（岩手県1.45、全国1.38）「総務省統計局」

日本では、地方自治は憲法で保障されており、地方公共団体は国とは別の法人格を有する。地方公共団体は2層制であり、広域的団体として都道府県が、また基礎的団体として市町村が置かれている。これらの関係は、地域的に都道府県が市町村を包含しているが、上下関係ではなく、対等・協力の関係にあるものとされる。

地方公共団体の長（都道府県知事、市町村長）は住民の直接選挙で選ばれ（任期4年）、行政を執行する。地方公共団体には、同じく直接公選の議員で構成される議会があり、法律の範囲内で立法権を有する。長と議会はいずれも住民の代表であり、チェック・アンド・バランスの関係にある。

地方公共団体は幅広い事務・事業を担っており、このうち市町村は基礎的団体として、義務教育、社会福祉、ゴミ収集・処理・上下水道、消防などの住民生活に密接な主なサービスを提供している。警察は都道府県の事務である。また、災害対策については、国・都道府県・市町村が役割分担し、かつ連携協力して行うものとされている。なお、地方公共団体が行う事務には、国が様々な義務付けを課している場合が多いが、地方分権によって地方公共団体が自主的・自立的に決定できる範囲が拡大しており、地域活性化や産業振興、安全・安心なまちづくりなどの面において、市民参加や住民との協働によって特色ある施策を展開する地方公共団体が増えてきている。

## 遠野市について

### (1) 位置

遠野市は、日本の東北地方の北部にあり、北海道に次いで日本で2番目に大きな岩手県に属する。岩手県内中央にある北上山系の中南部にあり、内陸部と沿岸部の中間に位置する。四方を山に囲まれた盆地の中に市街地が形成されている。市役所から県都盛岡市（29.8万人（2010年））までは約70km、東北地方の中心都市である仙台市（104.6万人（2010年））までは約180km、首都東京（1,316万人（2010年））までは約530kmの距離に位置する。東京からは、新幹線と在来線の鉄道を乗り継いで約4.5時間の距離にある。

主要交通網は、沿岸部と海岸部を結ぶ幹線国道があるほか、JR釜石線がある。また、現在、内陸部と沿岸部を結ぶ高速道路が整備されつつあり、内陸部から遠野市の手前までは延伸されている（遠野市の位置付けは図表1を参照）。

### (2) 沿革等

遠野市の中心市街地部は、今から200年、300年前の江戸時代には遠野南部家の城下町として、また内陸部と沿岸部を結ぶ宿場町として繁栄した。往時の面影は市街地のそこかしこに慎ましく偲ばれるが、賑やかな栄華は過去の歴史の世界に留まっている。また、気候風土が概して厳しく、過去の歴史をたどると冷害に苦しむ時代もたびたびあった。今となっては、全国を見渡しても、地理的にも、経済的にもむしろハンディを持った地域に属する自治体といえる。

### (3) 遠野のイメージ

遠野には、『遠野物語』（119の民話を集録）のイメージから民話のふるさとや田園風景を

連想する人が多い。『遠野物語』は、今から約 100 年前の 1910 年、遠野出身の佐々木喜善（きぜん）が地元で伝えられる民話を語り、日本の民俗学の創始者である柳田國男が記した冊子（初版本：350 部余）である。遠野は、アイヌ語で TO（湖）NUP（丘原）の意味で太古には湖水であったとも言い伝えられる。真偽はともかく、遠野のイメージは、時間をかけて育まれてきた。

かつては、遠野と言っても、東京をはじめ県外の人にはどこかわかってもらえない時代が長かった。第 3 代遠野市長の工藤千蔵（1966 年～82 年、市長に在任）は、遠野を少しでも覚えてもらうために昔話や民話を来訪者等に自ら披露し、東京などに出かける際には、名刺代わりに『遠野物語』を配って歩いたという。

#### （4）人口及び世帯数

1950 年代に 4 万数千いた人口（2005 年に合併した旧遠野市と旧宮守村の合計人口）も、1970 年代には 4 万人を割り込み、その後も漸減が続いている。2013 年 10 月 1 日現在の人口は 28,377 人、世帯数は 10,854 世帯、65 歳以上の高齢者の人口は年々増加し、人口の 35% を占めている。なお、遠野市の人口規模を全国で比較すると、1700 を超える市町村の中で大きいほうから 790 位前後である。

#### （5）地勢等

遠野市は面積 825 平方キロメートル（1700 を超える全国市町村の中で 60 位）である。東西、南北ともに約 38 km、隆起準平原と言われる北上高地の中央に位置する。標高 1,917 m の霊峰早池峰山を最高峰に標高 300～700 メートルの山々が取り囲み、中央に遠野盆地を形成している。市内の 81% は山林であり、大小多くの河川が市内を流れ、盆地内の河川沿いを中心に田園風景が広がっている。

遠野市を地図で眺めると、真ん中に遠野駅、市役所、図書館・博物館、とおの物語の館をはじめとする公共的な施設が立地する中心市街地があり、「町場（まちば）」の区域を形成する。その町場を取り囲むように「在郷（ざいごう）」と呼ばれる農村集落が点在し、遠野全体で完結的なひとつのまとまりをもった地理空間を形成している。

#### （6）気候

遠野市は寒冷地に属し、また寒暖の差が大きく、四季の移り変わりもはっきりしている。夏は昼間は摂氏 30 度を超えるが夜は過ごしやすく、冬は零下 10 度を下回ることもたびたびあり寒い。年間降水量は 1,100 ミリ程度であり、冬は降雪してもそれほど積もらない。

#### （7）市制の歩み

1954 年に 1 町 7 村が合併して「遠野市」が誕生した。合併後、1950 年代後半にピークを迎えた人口も、日本の高度成長期（1960 年代）以降、隣接沿岸部の釜石市のような大規模な企業立地は行われず、過疎化が少しずつ進行していった。

2005 年 10 月 1 日に人口 2 万 7 千人余の遠野市と人口 5 千人余の宮守村が合併して新しい遠野市が誕生した。この合併は、遠野市が宮守村を編入するかたちの合併ではなく、遠野市と宮守村をいったん閉じ、両者が対等なかたちで新たな市を創設したものである。新市の名称については、合併前の協議を重ねるなかで、「民話のふるさと」としての知名度があり、歴史的にも地理的にもこの地方を代表する名称が「遠野」であることから、あらためて新「遠

野市」とした。全国の合併市町村のなかには、全く新たな名称を採用するところも多くあるが、「遠野」という名前へのこだわりは、合併以後の政策展開に有形無形の貢献をしている。

#### (8) 市の財政規模、産業構造等

遠野市の財政規模は、2014年度の当初予算で見ると179億円である。行政改革を実行し、職員数も徐々に減らしてきており、市長以下376人の職員（2014年4月現在）が行政運営に携わっている。

産業別の就業者数（2010年10月1日現在）は、1次産業が20%、2次産業が30%、3次産業が50%であり、市内純生産額は1次産業が4%、2次産業が28%、3次産業が68%となっている。農産物については、米、野菜、畜産（肉牛・乳牛）のほか、特色あるものとして、ビールの原料のホップについて、全国4割の生産量を誇りトップの岩手県の中でも最大の産地となっているほか、全国有数の葉たばこ生産県の岩手県の中の主要生産地のひとつである。

2011年度の一人当たり市民所得は209万円で、岩手県平均の88%、全国平均の72%である（遠野市の人口推移、財政規模、産業等は図表2を参照）。

## 2. Case 1 本田市政、最初の挑戦（2002年～）～「どぶろく特区」の実現へ～

### 2.1 Backgrounds

2003年12月の遠野市の公式ホームページには、二人の男が握手する写真が載った。一人は遠野市長本田敏秋。もう一人は内閣総理大臣小泉純一郎であった。真ん中には遠野市の構造改革特区認定書が写っていた。その写真は、2003年11月28日に遠野市が「日本のふるさと再生特区」（通称「どぶろく特区」<sup>3</sup>）の認定を受けた瞬間を写したものだ。

小泉は、2001年4月、国民の熱烈な歓迎を受けて第87代内閣総理大臣に就任した。小泉内閣の誕生から1年後の2002年4月に、本田は第6代遠野市長に就任する。小泉総理就任当初の支持率は驚異の水準であり、「改革なくして成長なし」のスローガンのもとでの構造改革に対する国民の期待が大きかった。一方の本田は、「公正」「公平」「公開」のもとでの意識改革を訴え、それが遠野市民に支持されていた。国と小さな地方の自治体の違いはあるが、小泉と本田は改革の旗振り役であるという点で共通するものがあった。この写真は、遠野市民、市役所職員に大きな誇りと自信を与えた。

2002年以降の遠野のまちづくりは、本田のリーダーシップと政策構想力を抜きに語るこ

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<sup>3</sup> 「どぶろく」は、かつて（約100年以上前）農家で米を発酵させて造っていた白く濁った酒であるが、1899年以降は自家製造酒は禁止され、現在は財務省国税庁の酒造免許を受けた酒造会社しか造ることはできない。酒には酒税がかけられ、貴重な税収（2013年度1.35兆円）になっている。かつて70年、80年前は国税の20%以上を占める時代もあったが、現在は国税収入の3%弱。

はできない。本田の経歴を以下に紹介する。

遠野市で生まれ、高校まで過ごす。学業のため首都圏の大学に進学。卒業後、岩手県に戻り県庁に入る。県知事秘書や消防防災課長、工業振興課長等を務め、1999年企画調整課長に就任。1999年は、2010年目標の新しい岩手県総合計画が完成した年だった。この総合計画を市町村や県民に周知し、円滑に実行に移すために陣頭指揮した。この総合計画は3年の期間を要して県職員の手づくりで策定された計画であり、「県民総参加型計画づくり」の手法を取り入れ、当時、全国的にも画期的な計画だった。

2000年、久慈地方振興局（岩手県北部沿岸地域の地理的・経済的にハンディのある広域圏）の局長に就任。県総合計画に盛り込まれた久慈地方圏域の地域振興施策を圏域内の市町村役場とともに積極的に推進した。本田は、その時期に、県全体が元気になるためには、個々の市町村がもっと元気にならなくてはいけないとの思いを強くした。その頃、遠野の多くの友人・知人から遠野に帰ってきてふるさとのために尽くしてほしいとの声が上がった。遠野市は4年毎の市長選挙を翌2002年4月に控えていた。本田は、県庁に残って幹部への道を歩みたいとの思いも頭をよぎったが、2001年12月に県庁を退職（当時55歳）する。遠野市長選は、有力な対抗候補者もおり、けっして楽ではない選挙戦だった。

本田は、第5代菊池正（しょう）市長（1994年～2002年）の後を継ぎ、2002年4月に第6代遠野市長に就任した。その後遠野市と宮守村との合併（2005年10月）に伴い実施された新遠野市の市長選は無投票当選。2009年、2013年と3期連続で無投票再選し、通算4期目の遠野市長として市政を運営している。

2002年4月に市長に就任した本田は、就任後の挨拶で職員たちを前に次のように語った。

『予算不足であれば、英知を結集する。マンパワーが不足であれば、市民との協働により行政課題の解決に取り組む。人口増加が無理であれば、交流人口を拡大し遠野型交流システムの確立をめざす。面積が広大で近代化が進まないのであれば、田舎の田園風景そのままをグリーン・ツーリズムで体系化する。そうした発想で遠野市のまちづくりに取り組んでいきたい。』<sup>4</sup>

また、本田は、

『大多数の自治体が似たような状況にあるわけだが、これからのまちづくりは、それぞれの自治体が均衡横並びの発想を転換して、自治体の持つ個性を体系化し、魅力ある自治体像を市民とともに共有することから始まると考えている。』<sup>4</sup>

とも語っている。

本田は、市民や地域住民<sup>5</sup>、各種団体等を対象とした座談会である「市長と語ろう会」を精力的に開催した。この「市長と語ろう会」は、市民や地域住民、各種団体等が抱える日常的な課題をフリートーキング形式で議論し意見を集約するものだった。最初の2年半で、述べ1000件以上の行政課題が特定され、ここで出された課題の進捗状況等については全て、彼らに回答した。

<sup>4</sup> 遠野市政策研究会、「遠野スタイル」（ぎょうせい、2004年10月）p171,p172

<sup>5</sup> ここでは、「市民」は市全体に視点においた表現で、「地域住民」はそれぞれの地域を起点においた表現で使っている。なお、「市民」と「住民」はそこまでの厳密な使い分けはなく、文脈の流れで使用しているが、本ケースでは「住民」は「市民」よりも地域を意識していることが多い。

こうした手法は、地味と取られるかもしれないが、市民や地域住民、団体等の当事者意識を高める効果があった。例えば、市内のある地域を例にすれば、地域住民自身がその地域の課題を見つけ、自らの問題として向き合い協議に参加した。地域課題を地域住民と行政が共有することで、全体としての「市民と行政の有効な協働体系」の構築につながるものとなった。本田は、就任2年目に、1年目の取り組みを振り返り、こうも語っている。

『私が考える遠野市の「都市・新世紀の風景」の実行は、執行機関や財政などの行政基盤を見据えた上で、市民に開かれた「公平」「公正」「公開」の原則に立った行政機能を確認する足固めから始めることとなった。しかし今後は、かつて北上高地の宿場町として交流人口の絶えなかった遠野市を、もう一度「日本のふるさと遠野」としての切り口から、交流人口の拡大を望む第2ステージに移行するものとした。先人が残した遠野らしさを生かし育てることが、21世紀の日本の財産となると考えるからである。』<sup>4</sup>

本田は、市長就任2年目の2003年度に市役所の組織機構を改正して、庁議（市の幹部メンバーで重要事項を協議）や市の総合計画を所管する政策企画室を設置した<sup>6</sup>（遠野市の機構図（2003年度）は図表3を参照）。

この政策企画室の中堅・若手メンバーを中心に政策研究会をつくり、1年かけて2004年10月に『遠野スタイル』というタイトルの180ページの本を出版した。この研究会は、市長や幹部職員ではなく中堅・若手職員が参加し、これまで遠野で行われてきたまちづくり政策を評価・検証し、今後を展望していることに大きな意義がある。これは、後ほど述べるように、遠野市が国から「日本のふるさと再生特区」の認定を受け、いわゆる「どぶろく特区」として各種メディアに盛んに取り上げられ、世間に注目されている時期と重なっていた。この本の結びに、本田は次のように寄稿した。

『遠野市で今なにが行われ、真に目指すものはなにかについて、一人でも多くの方がたに知っていただきたいとの思いから生まれたのが本書である。

「どぶろく特区」が広く世間の耳目を集めるようになったのは、本書の出版企画がスタートした昨秋よりわずかながら後のことであった。逆にこうした動きが同時進行したことは、本書の執筆に当たった遠野市政策研究会のメンバーのみならず、市職員たちを大いに刺激し、また鼓舞したであろうことは想像に難くない。

遠野市は今年（2004年）12月、市制施行50周年を迎える。先人・先輩たちの足跡を振り返り、まちづくりを総括し、なにを継承・発展させ、どんな地域を形づくっていくべきか、機会あるごとに考え、議論すべき節目の年でもある。

幸い遠野市には、連綿と受け継がれ築き上げられてきた地域資源としての歴史や文化がある。「どぶろく特区」といっても、この背景抜きには語れない。遠野市には元来、明治時代まで自家製濁酒（どぶろく）を盛んに製造してきた歴史があり、盆地ではあるが、古くから内陸と沿岸を結ぶ交易の要衝として発展してきたがゆえの外来者に対する旺盛な「おもてなしの精神」という文化があった。あえていえば、それらを背景に実現した「必然」が「どぶろく特区」である。

<sup>6</sup> 政策企画室はその後順次拡充され、現在は経営企画部として、秘書広報、総合計画やまちづくり、財政、情報政策等を所管する重要な組織となっている。

こうした、ものごとの「背景にあるもの」について、みんなでいっしょになって思いめぐらす場、語り合える環境を大切にしていきたいと考えている。 』

## 2.2 Policy contents and policy process

### 2.2.1 Policy contents

2002年6月、本田は、市長就任から2か月が経ち、「市長と語ろう会」の開催や様々な団体との会合に日々精力的に参加していた。本田は、岩手県庁の職員として、30数年間のキャリアを積み、市町村行政のこと、ふるさと遠野のこともそれなりにわかっているつもりだった。しかし、こうして市内の現場に出向き、市民と直接ひざを交えて語らうと、まだまだ知らないことだらけだと痛感していた。また、遠野には先人、先輩から引き継がれてきた地域資源の宝がたくさんあることも再認識していた。

そのような時期に、小泉内閣が注目すべき政策を実行に移そうとしていた。「構造改革特区」制度である。マスコミ等メディアの関心も高く、たびたび新聞等の報道にもその動きが取り上げられていた。この政策の仕組みは、全国一律に設けられている国の規制について、自治体や民間からの提案を募り、地域を限定した規制の特例を「特区」として認めるものだった。これにより、地域の活性化や民間活動の活発化の促進をめざすとともに、特区認定を受け実施された全国各地の成功事例を全国に波及させることにより、国全体の構造改革につなげることをめざしていた（構造改革特区の申請・認定の手続きの流れは図表4を参照）。

この政策は、制度設計の段階から地方行政の関係者も大いに注目していた。当然本田も、この政策に高い関心を持っていたが、当初は遠野市には活用できない、縁のない制度だろうと考えていた。「特区」について、最初に本田の頭に浮かんだのは、経済振興とか産業振興であったり、地方であれば工業団地の開発にこれを活用するようなイメージだったからだ。本田は、岩手県庁在職中に工業振興課長も務めた経験からそう思ったのかもしれない。

その後、本田の人脈を活用して関連する情報を集めるうちに、徐々に詳しい内容がわかってきた。どんな分野でもいいし、制度も従来のもよりもっと柔軟らしいことが判明した。それならば挑戦すべきだ、地方の小さなまちでも身の丈で取り組める規制緩和策があるはずだ、と本田のエンジンがかかった。

職員との会話の中でいろんなアイデアが浮かんだ。そのなかに「どべっこ祭り」の話題もあった。その祭りは、本田がよく知らない祭りだった。どべっこ祭りは、何十年も昔に行われていたものを2年前に復活したものだ。寒い真冬の観光閑散期に市民や訪れる人たちの楽しみやおもてなしにしようと、農村集落を再現した「遠野ふるさと村」（前任菊池市長の時代に整備）を会場に復活したのだ。4月に就任した本田は、まだこの祭りを体験していなかった。そして、この祭りには、濁り酒が不可欠だった。かつて農家では、自分の家で採れたお米で自家製の濁酒（どぶろく）がつくられ、これは彼らの冬の楽しみであり、来訪者や仲間たちの交流の「おもてなし」のひとつ品でもあった。いまは酒造免許を受けた事業者しか酒の製造ができなかった。どべっこ祭りでは、酒造会社の造った濁り酒を購入して、それを皆で酌み交わしながらいろいろを囲んで民話や昔話を聞き、神楽を楽しんでいた。

このちょっとした話が本田の頭には引っかかっていた。そして、遠野市の特区づくりの取

り組みが回転し始める。

### 2.2.2 Policy process

2002年6月26日、小泉内閣は「経済財政運営と構造改革に関する基本方針」を閣議決定し、構造改革特区の政策も正式にスタートした。本田は、これまで出された国からのプレスリリースや新聞報道等の情報、さらに自らの県庁時代からの人脈なども使って得た情報を総合して思案していた。市長に着任して2カ月、市長職にも慣れてきた頃で、次のステップに上がる政策推進力を組織に与えるきっかけがほしい時期だった。本田は、構造改革特区の制度自体はこれからも続く、しかし、ぜひ早い段階で遠野ならではの特区提案をして遠野のまちづくりを推進したいものだ、このように考えた。

7月4日、本田は企画調整課長の小原とその部下の永田を市長室に呼んだ。小原らは、てっきりその時抱えていた別の懸案事項で呼ばれたものと思った。本田の指示は「関係者にコンタクトを取って国や県の最新の動きをさぐり、我々も遠野らしい特区を実現できないか検討しよう」というものだった。本田の頭には、「どぶろく」や「どべっこ祭り」も当然浮かんでいた。小原たちはさっそく動いた。本田は、その報告を聞き、特区の今後の手続き、進め方、特に国と地方のやり取りの流れを頭に入れた。<sup>7</sup>岩手県庁も、県自らの特区提案や県内市町村からの特区提案に極めて積極的・協力的で、これからいろいろと協力してもらえるであろうことも確認した。

本田は、さっそく「どべっこ祭り」からイメージをくらませて構造改革特区の提案を行うように小原たちに指示した。本田は、「どぶろく」はかつて東北地方の貧しい農山村のささやかな楽しみであり、食文化そのもの、遠野においてこそ取り組む意義が大きいと考えていた。ここから、遠野市の特区への取り組みが本格的にスタートする。小原らは職場に戻り、関係方面からの情報収集と並行して、本格的な作業に着手した。7月26日には市役所のプロジェクトチームも発足した。

小原たちは、ストーリーを持った遠野らしい提案内容にしなければならぬと考えた。夏休み返上で議論を重ね、内容を詰めていった。「かつて遠野で親しまれていた本物の「どぶろく（濁酒）」を祭りで飲ませよう。」「遠野市を代表する伝統的な農家の建物「南部曲がり屋」の家屋に泊って、いろり端で炭火に暖を取りながら、昔話・民話の語り部の話を聞いてもらおう。」「その傍らには「どぶろく」がある。」「遠野の冬場はどうしようもなく寒い。観光客もほとんど来ない。」「そんな冬を乗り越えるためにはどべっこ祭りをもっと魅力的なものにすべきだ。」そんなイメージがどンドン膨らんでいった。ただ単に、国に対して「どぶろく」を造らせろではなく、農家のお米や野菜も使いながら農家民宿を使って都会との交流を進めようではないか。そうすると、農家が市外から不特定多数の宿泊や食事の訪問者を受け入れることになるので、宿泊や調理に関連する法律の規制も緩和してもらわなければならない。そういったことが点として浮かび線となってつながって、提案イメージも徐々に担当者間で共通のものとなっていった。小原らは、本田や市の幹部を交えた会議を何度も開催し、提案

<sup>7</sup> 特区制度の大きな特徴のひとつに、都道府県を経由するのではなく、国と提案する市町村が直接連絡し合い、相互にやり取りすることができるがあった。



内容を固めていった。

担当者たちが夏の休日も犠牲にしてまとめ上げた提案書は、8月29日に「日本のふるさと再生特区」として国に提出された。国に提案した内容は、特定事業者のどぶろく製造、農家民宿要件の緩和、民間企業等による農業容認など8項目からなるものだった。

遠野市の中山間地域では市の中心部に比べ過疎化や高齢化はますます進んでおり、農村地域では将来に対する不安が消えなかった。このような状況を克服し、地域が元気になるための方法として、「おもしろさ」と「やる気」を感じるような新しい取り組みにチャレンジしようという機運をもっと盛り上げたい、それが遠野市が特区に挑戦した背景にあった。

構造改革特区への挑戦がはじまった当時、遠野市には、いくつものまちづくり団体が活動していた。遠野市は、これらの団体や農家、地域住民と連携して、農村での滞在型余暇活動であるグリーン・ツーリズムの取り組みを進めていた。グリーン・ツーリズムの活用により、自然環境、伝統芸能、食文化とのふれあいや生産活動を通じて、都市住民と遠野の住民との交流の輪がもっと広がり、地域の活性化が図られることが期待されていた。周囲を囲む山々の四季の景色の移ろい、それを背景に溶け込む農村集落と田園風景、そして『遠野物語』から連想される「ふるさと」感が「遠野らしさ」という個性そのものである。これを生かした「遠野ツーリズム」の推進を大きな柱に据え、構造改革特区の規制緩和を提案したのだった。

遠野市提案の特区は、国の認定までスムーズに進んだわけではない。むしろ多くの困難が待ち構えていた。どぶろくは、かつて遠野をはじめ日本の地方の農家では農村の食文化の中に組み込まれ造られていた。しかし、酒の製造は、貴重な国税である酒税徴収と表裏一体であり、酒造りには税務署（財務省国税庁の出先機関）免許が必要だった。現状では、一定量（6,000 リットル）以上の酒類を生産する酒造会社のみが国の免許を受けて酒造りをしており、国の規制の中で最も緩和することが難しい分野と世間からみられていた。<sup>8</sup>

遠野市は、2002年10月11日に国から最初の回答を受け取った。結果は「C判定」、すなわち対応不可。本田をはじめ市の担当職員は、あらためて越えるべきハードルが高いことを認識した。しかし、一方で希望もあった。マスコミや世の中の反応が遠野市の提案に好意的だったからだ。どうしたら提案が実現するか。担当職員たちは、国が認めざるを得なくなるような提案にするにはどうしたらいいか、喧々諤々の議論を重ねた。それまで、提案書づくりに時間を取られ十分でなかった農業、観光、グリーン・ツーリズム等に一言を持つ人たちの現場の声や専門家の意見も聞いて回るなど、職員たちは意欲的に作業を進めた。そして提案内容を重点化するとともに提案理由も補強した。本田は、提案は小粒であっても相手は国の官庁の中でも最強の財務省(国税庁)、認められるまで何度でも知恵を絞って挑戦しよう、何か拓けるはずだという気になっていた。

2003年1月、国に再度特区提案を行った。この段階では規制緩和項目を極力絞り、4項目にした。4月には特区実現と特区認定後の取り組みを検討するため特区推進会議を設置、5月には岩手県庁遠野地方振興局に支援チームも発足した。この間に、遠野市が国と接触する中で、国の構造改革特区所管組織の中に、非公式ではあったが遠野市の取り組みに理解を示

<sup>8</sup> 国税庁の属する財務省は、税や予算を所管し、世の中には最も権限の強い国の官庁と認識されている。

し応援する幹部がいたことも本田や職員たちには心強かった。(遠野市の特区認定までの道のりは図表5を参照)。

遠野市の「日本のふるさと再生特区」は、二つの目標を掲げていた。

目標のひとつは、「ぬくもり」と「もてなし」の心でつくる遠野ツーリズムの推進。これは地域資源を活用し、都市との交流の拡大を図る趣旨で目標に掲げられていた。遠野市は、「民話のふるさとのイメージ」や「日本の原風景といわれる景観」といった恵まれた自然、昔ながらの伝統・文化を大切に守ってきた。それをふるさとの持つ温かみとして都市住民との交流を広げていきたいという趣旨であった。都市との交流は、遠野の活性化に必ずつながっていくと考えた。

目標のもうひとつは、「おもしろさ」と「やる気」を感じる新たな起業の促進であった。その当時、起業の促進、雇用の場づくりが課題だった。特区への対応と歩調を合わせるように、2003年には、遠野市民の有志約50人を中心に「遠野の産業が元気になる幹事会」が結成された。350を超える起業の提案が出され、それぞれの提案をお互いにぶつけ合いながら、議論を重ねていた。これは行政支援が前提ではなく、民間ベースで進めることが基本だった。安易に民間の取り組みに補助金が入ると、行政への依存体質が生まれる可能性があった。「遠野の産業が元気になる幹事会」は、行政に頼らない発想力と行動力を発揮した。このような活動が、遠野の特区への取り組みと共振した。

再提案した規制緩和の内容は、以下の4項目だった。

第1は「農家民宿における簡易な消防設備等の容認事業」である。遠野の農家が農家民宿を行うためのハードルを低くして遠野ツーリズムへの住民の参加を容易にしようとするもの。

第2は「特定農業者による<sup>どぶろく</sup>濁酒製造事業」である。農家民宿や農園レストランを営む農業者が濁酒製造を可能にするためのもの。なお、再提案では、酒税法に定める最低製造数量(年間6,000リットル)の規定を適用しない、農家の少量の酒類製造が許されるというところに絞ったところにポイントがあった。<sup>9</sup>

第3は「地方公共団体又は農地保有合理化法人による農地又は採草放牧の特定法人への貸付事業」である。株式会社等法人による農業への参入を可能にし、農業の担い手不足や遊休農地の解消に努めようとするもの。

第4は「農地の権利取得後の下限面積要件の特例設定基準の弾力化による農地の利用増進事業」である。農地の権利を取得して農業に従事しようとする場合の下限面積を、50アールから10アールに引き下げて、新規参入者などによる農業参入の可能性を拡大しようとするもの。

2003年11月28日、本田は小泉総理から「日本のふるさと再生特区」の認定書を受け取った。本田は、これまで1年半に及ぶ職員たちの労をねぎらい、農業関係者、市民とともにこの喜びを分かち合いたいと思ったが、一方でこれはまだスタートラインに立ったただけだとも思っていた。それは、ひとつには、実際に意欲的な農家が現れ、どぶろくづくりが始められ

<sup>9</sup> 納税が免除されるわけではなく、酒税の納税義務は負う。

るかであったし、もうひとつは、ここで芽生えた職員の自信や遠野への全国の注目を、市民を巻き込んで次につなげていけるかであった。

遠野市の「日本のふるさと再生特区」は、特区に挑戦するときから「どぶろく特区」として紹介されることが多かった。確かに「どぶろく特区」は語呂がよく、国民にはわかりやすかった。しかし、遠野市が考えた「どぶろく特区」は、正確にはどぶろく製造自体が目的ではなかった。都市との交流のひとつの味つけであった。手づくりのどぶろくは、旅行者を受け入れる際の「ぬくもり」と「もてなし」の象徴であった。農家が「おもしろさ」と「やる気」を感じなければ、どぶろく製造は実現しない。特区認定に位置付けられた「特定農業者」である意欲的な農家が実際に現れて、どぶろくが造られ、都市との新たな交流が生まれてはじめて、第1ステージのゴールといえた。そして、この道のりも決して楽ではなかった。

遠野市では、国の特区認定後速やかに、農家によるどぶろくづくりを始めるべくその手続きに入った。どぶろくづくりに意欲を持つ農家を募集した。どぶろく製造には、農家自らが当事者として国の税務署（財務省国税庁の地方出先機関）から製造免許を受ける必要があった。市の広報とともに、本田もやれそうな心当たりの農家に声をかけて回った。

そして、7軒の農家が挙がってきた。税務署が行う免許の審査基準はこの時点ではまだ詳細はわからなかった。所管する国税庁も、これまで経験したことのない初めての規制緩和であり、慎重に内部検討を進めていたともいえる。そして判明した審査の基準には、まず、①自ら米を栽培する農業者であること、かつ②自ら民宿又は食堂の営業を行っていること<sup>10</sup>、という特区条件に沿った項目が挙げられていた。その上で、さらに関門となる基準条件として、農家が酒税法（税務署）所管の酒造りの技術要件を満たすこととあった。これらが具体的に示され、遠野市で7軒の農家をひとつひとつチェックしていくと、可能性のある農家はひとり欠け、ふたり欠けと減っていった。最終的に可能性を残すのはただ一軒、江川<sup>さちお</sup>幸男だけになってしまった。

江川の家は、遠野市中心部から車で40分、かなりの距離を山あいの道を走り、早池峰山麓の山間丘陵地に入った小さな集落にあった。ここで、酪農経営（現在乳牛約60頭、肉用牛3頭）を中心に、規模は大きくないが米や野菜をつくり、山菜取り、溪流釣り、熊やキジの狩猟など自前で食料を確保できる農業を営んでいた。奇しくも、教員であった本田の父は、かつてその地域の初代の中学校長をしていたこともあり、本田は何かの巡り合わせを感じた。

農業以外の事業をやったことのない農家にとって、「どぶろく特区」の審査基準にある、米作り農業者が宿泊事業や食堂の責任者でもあり、酒の製造に関わる技術要件も満たさなければならぬハードルはとても高かった。これは食品衛生法、消防法、建築基準法等いくつもの法令をクリアすべきことを意味し、一般的な普通の農家にとって、これに一から取り掛かることは金銭的にも負担が大きく、専門知識を習得するにも時間を要する困難さを伴っていた。江川の家は、先代が50年以上前に開拓者として、遠野でも辺鄙で気候の厳しい山麓の地

<sup>10</sup> 営業とは、経営が成り立っていることであり、赤字経営では条件を満たさないため、この条件も辺鄙な地方の事業者にはハンディがあった。

に入植して切り開いたものだった。江川の先代は、牛を一頭からはじめて長年かかって地道に増やし、これを江川が引き継いだ。また江川は、1999年には、高校生や県立農業大学校等の学生たちの農業体験・酪農体験を積極的に受け入れるために自宅を自己資金で改修し、農家民宿の営業許可も既に取得していた。当時、岩手県内には前例がない初めての農家民宿で、関係法令をクリアするための建物や設備の改修は、知識的にも資金的にも時間的にも並大抵の苦労ではなかったが、このときの経験と施設の財産がここで生きることとなった。

2003年12月、江川は特定農業者としての認定を沿岸の釜石市にある釜石税務署から受けるべく、申請書類の作成に着手した。江川は、今でも当時を振り返り、「途中でやめたくなかったが、自分でもよくふんばったものだ。」「私も10年前はまだ50歳代半ば。今ならたぶん無理だったと思う。」と回想している。江川は、「日本中に前例がない」なかで第1号で100年ぶりに農家によるどぶろくの復活を周囲や本田たちから期待されていた。慣れない申請書類を書き、何度も何度も峠を越えて税務署に足を運んだ。遠野市が行政として特区認定は受けたが、農家の酒造りの税務署審査は容赦なく厳格だった。江川の言葉を借りれば、マスコミも含め世の中の好感とは別で、税務署は審査基準が満たされなければ当然認められないという雰囲気だったという。申請書は修正がきかないので一字一句間違えられない。間違えたらそのページははじめから書き直し。最終の申請書類は約80ページになっていた。このような書類の書き方に門外漢の江川は、農作業を終え、疲れた体にむち打って遠野市役所に何度も通い、アドバイスをもらった。市役所では、2002年7月4日に小原とともに市長室に呼び出された若手職員の永田が専従として対応し、後半はさらに1名が加わり相談に乗った。これは本田の指示によるものだった。

酒造りの技術要件のクリアも大きな課題だった。これには岩手県庁が全面サポートした。県庁では関係部署が4部にもまたがるため、増田知事（当時）の指示でこれを調整し、協力した。江川のための技術講習会が12月から1月にかけて醸造部門を有する県立工業技術センターで開催され、知事名の証明書が特別に発行された。この期間、マスコミ等メディアの関心も高く、いつ第1号のどぶろくづくりの許可が出るか、注目していた。

2004年2月26日、全国的にも注目された、釜石税務署長からのどぶろく製造免許が交付された。<sup>11</sup>そして、農家民宿「MILK-INN江川」は、その春以降、マスコミ取材や著名人の来訪・宿泊でてんでこ舞いの忙しさとなった。江川はどぶろくに「開拓」という名をつけた。江川の先代が開拓者としてこの地を入植したこと、そして、このどぶろくが法律による規制の壁を切り開いて実現にこぎつけたことの2つの意味が込められていた。酪農などの本業以上に忙しくなってしまったが、江川は誇らしげに自ら宿泊客に自家製のどぶろく「開拓」を振舞った。

2004年2月28日、東京にある総理大臣官邸と岩手県遠野市が中継で結ばれた。政府主催の国民対話集会である「タウンミーティング・イン 官邸アンド遠野」の開催であった。遠野での開催は、タウンミーティング100回突破を記念して開催されたものだった。構造改革

<sup>11</sup> 全国では、同日付けで江川とともに他県で3名に酒税法に基づく「自家製濁酒（にがりざけ）製造」の免許交付がされた。

特区や地域再生に向けた取り組みが高く評価されたことが、遠野での開催の背景にあった。遠野会場には、遠野の特区の内容や地域再生に関係の深い国の省庁から亀井善之農林水産大臣と金子一義構造改革特区担当大臣が出席した。後半 15 分間は、東京の首相官邸にいる小泉純一郎総理と参加者との対話も行われた。小泉総理は、農業や食生活、都市と農村の交流の大切さと構造改革の必要性を強調した。

遠野会場の「遠野ふれあい交流センター（あえりあ遠野）」には、溢れんばかりの 400 人近くの市民が参加した。タウンミーティングの様子は、3 年前に市が整備し、開局した遠野テレビ（ケーブルテレビ）を通じて、市内全域に生中継された。市内に 7 つある地区センターをはじめ、道の駅「遠野風の丘」、遠野ふるさと村、たかむろ水光園、遠野ショッピングセンター「とぴあ」などの大型テレビの前に大勢の市民が集まった。市民総参加ともいえるタウンミーティングとなった。タウンミーティングの会場では、遠慮して意見があまり出ないのではないかと市の担当者の心配をよそに、さまざまな意見や提言が活発に出された。この催事は、国にとっては多くの行事のひとつかもしれなかったが、小さな地方都市の価値や魅力を全国に発信するまたとない機会となり、市民にも市職員にも大きな自信となった。

2004 年 4 月 28 日、構造改革特区一周年記念展示会が総理官邸で開催された。江川も官邸から招待を受けた。官邸では、この 1 年間で構造改革特区の認定を受けた 324 の地域から 18 の特区の展示が行われた。江川は、自分の造った第 1 号のどぶろくをぜひ小泉総理に味わってもらいたいと思っていた。江川は、免許取得で苦勞させられた釜石税務署も、一躍新聞報道等で有名になり「時の人」となった江川にやさしくなったことを肌身で感じていた。しかし、相談を持ちかけた税務署は、自家で提供することが前提であり、法令上、自家以外での提供では認められないという。江川は一計を案じ、どぶろくの「見本品」を小泉総理に見てもらうのだと説明し、持参した。マスコミからのリクエストに促された小泉総理は、江川の見本品を「うん。うまい。うまい。」と味わった。江川の顔には、これまでの苦勞がなかったように笑顔が広がった。本田の市長就任直後に話題に上ったどぶろくが総理官邸で江川の傍らでスポットライトを浴びるまでに、2 年間に要したのだった。

江川のサポート役を無事に果たした市職員の永田は、2004 年 10 月に発刊された前述の『遠野スタイル』のなかで、「遠野市には、「日本のふるさと」として地域づくりを進めてきたという、明確なコンセプトがあったからこそ、特区もまちづくりのツールとして活用できた。「日本のふるさと再生特区」への取り組みは、地域の特性を意識したからこそ遠野市が挑戦できたともいえる。」と回想している。遠野のどぶろくが脚光を浴びたが、永田たちは、観光客等のニーズに応えるためには、遠野市内の観光施設等でどぶろくを提供できなくてはどぶろく特区に掲げた目標を達成したことにはならないのではないかと、どうしたらいいかと模索した。そして、遠野市が認められた特区の 4 項目の中にある「企業の農業参入」と「農地取得の面積要件緩和」を適用し、これにさらに「どぶろく製造」の特例を掛け算で重ね合わせればこの課題を解決できるのではないかと気づく。遠野市が出資し運営している第 3 セクター会社が米をつくり、どぶろくを製造する道が開かれた。

特区認定の前後で入込宿泊客数を比べると、2002 年 5.7 万人、2003 年 6.2 万人、2004 年 6.8 万人と増加している。産業連関表によるこの時期の経済波及効果は、2.2 億円（2005 年

2 月時点)と推計された。これを契機として、遠野ツーリズム大学の開校やさまざまな市内のグループ、団体の地域活動も活発になっていった。その後の農家民泊の広がりや農家レストランの展開、ふるさとの景観保存活動などにも続いていく。

全国に目を向けると、その後各地の自治体に「どぶろく」を内容に取り込んだ特区が着実に広がりをみせていった。<sup>12</sup>遠野市は、そのような動きをとらえて、2006 年 2 月に第 1 回全国どぶろく研究大会を開催した。この大会は、その後全国各地を持ち回りで開催されている。遠野市におけるどぶろく製造量も、2004 年の 352 リットルから年々着実に増え、2013 年には市内の 5 団体で 20,000 リットルを生産するまでに成長し、地域活性化に大いに貢献している。このうち、遠野市と合併した旧宮守村の「宮守川上流生産組合」は、集落の話し合いと長年の取り組みにより、一集落一農場方式の集落営農と地域づくりを見事に調和させた経営で、2011 年度に全国最高賞の天皇杯の表彰を受けている農業組合法人であるが、ここで製造される「遠野どぶろく」は遠野市を代表する主力製品のひとつになっている。江川もまた、その後酒類販売業の免許を取得し、今では「開拓」を全国からネットで注文することができるまでになった。<sup>13</sup>

### 3. Case 2 東日本大震災における被災地支援

#### ～被災地後方支援「遠野モデル」の誕生～

##### 3.1 Backgrounds

岩手県民であれば、岩手県の三陸沿岸地域を過去に幾度も大地震・津波が襲ったことを知らないものはいない。この 100 年余りをみても明治 29 年（1896 年）6 月 15 日の明治三陸地震・大津波（死者・行方不明者、岩手を含む全体で約 2 万 2000 人）、昭和 8 年（1933 年）3 月 3 日の昭和三陸地震・津波（死者・行方不明者、岩手を含む全体で約 3000 人）と 2 度の大きな地震・津波が三陸沿岸部で発生している。そして昭和 35 年（1960 年）5 月 23 日には、チリで発生した大地震による津波が 1 万 7500 キロメートルを 22 時間から 24 時間かかって日本に到達し、死者・行方不明者こそ 142 人と少なかったが、15 万人の罹災者が岩手県を含む各地の沿岸部で発生した。

本田が岩手県消防防災課長に着任した 1995 年当時、消防防災課は二つの大きな任務を負っていた。ひとつは、地震の原因となる岩手県内の活断層をすべて調べてそれを県地域防災計画を改正し反映させること。もうひとつは、岩手県では初めてとなる、災害救助や防災訓練に活用する県有防災ヘリコプターを導入し、防災航空隊を立ち上げることだった。本田が 1995 年 4 月に消防防災課長に着任する 2 ヶ月前に西日本の神戸市を中心に阪神・淡路大震災（死者・行方不明者約 6400 人）が発生していた。本田は着任後、神戸市の被災現場に足を運び、神戸市消防局職員から多くのことを学んだ。彼らが語った「我々は 100 万神戸市民を

<sup>12</sup> 2013 年 3 月末現在、129 自治体がどぶろくに関する「特区」認定を受けている。

<sup>13</sup> 現在はどぶろくは、酒類販売業の免許取得により、自家消費以外の販売も可能になった。

守るため自負も気概も設備も持っていた。しかしあの惨状の中では何も役に立たず、役に立ったのはシャベルと軍手とつるはしだった。」は本田の胸に強く刻まれた。

本田は、岩手県の沿岸部を北端の種市町から南端の陸前高田市まで、役場や現場を訪ね歩く。明治時代、昭和時代の津波がこんな高いところ、こんな内陸まで到達したんだなということ体を覚えていった。また、防災ヘリコプター導入後はヘリに乗って鳥の目で岩手県を上空から眺め、広大な岩手県域の防災対策の重要性を実感した。内陸部と沿岸部の中間に北上山系が連なり、ふるさとの遠野盆地が見えた。

本田は、市長に就任した時に実行すべく、温めていた政策があった。それは遠野市を中心に広域的に経済圏を考える「遠野広域経済圏構想」であった。岩手県の地図に、コンパスで遠野を中心に50キロ圏の円を描いてみると、みごとに内陸部や沿岸部の主要都市が円の上に乗った。車で1時間から1時間半の距離だった。また、江戸時代には内陸部と沿岸部を結ぶ中間地点に位置し、交易が盛んに行われていたことも歴史をひもとき確認した（内陸部と沿岸部の結節点、広域圏の中の遠野市は図表6を参照）。

本田は、「遠野広域経済圏構想」を進めるためには、遠野市を通るルートで東の沿岸部の釜石市まで計画されている高速道路の整備促進や北東沿岸部の宮古市とをつなぐ最短ルートの立丸峠のトンネル化がぜひとも必要だと考えていた。しかしながら、時代は国・地方を通じて緊縮財政の時代に入り、道路等の公共インフラ事業への投資は逆風の時代だった。本田は、この構想にある道路の整備主体は国等であるため、全国枠の中で優先順位を上げ国の予算を確保してもらうのは容易でないなとも思いながらも、毎年の国や県への予算要望時には、広域経済圏の確立のためには道路ネットワークが必要だと訴えていた。

一方で、本田はあることに気づいた。それは、遠野市内の建設業者の数が、遠野市の人口規模、予算規模に比べて多いことだった。彼らから気づかされたのは、「遠野は、沿岸部の作業現場も内陸部の作業現場も、いずれにも1時間から1時間半で通うことができる。朝に遠野を出れば、仕事を夕方までしても夜遅くならない時間に遠野に戻って来れる」ということだった。言い換えれば「建設業者は遠野市内だけで仕事をしているのではない」という事実だった。本田は、遠野市という枠の中だけで考えていてもダメだと気づかされた。

これは、その後本田が行った政策の中にも、当てはまるものがあった。本田の市長就任後、2004年4月に遠野市内から産婦人科医が全くなくなるという深刻な事態が発生した。この緊急事態になんとかならないかと職員と知恵を絞って、健康福祉の里に2007年12月に開設したのが遠野市営助産院「ねっと・ゆりかご」だった。妊婦の不安解消と通院負担の軽減のため助産師を充実し、関係者の協力を得て市外の9つの医療機関と連携協力ネットワークをつないだ。遠野市外にある施設機能とのつながりに着目したのだった。これにより、ふだんは助産師が対応するとともに、モバイル遠隔健診システムを活用して、市外病院での出産までの間、助産師と連携した妊婦健診が可能になった。ただし、万一の時には妊婦のお母さんや赤ちゃんを迅速に市外の病院に輸送するための、「命をつなぐ道づくり」は必要だった。

### 3.2 Policy contents and policy process

### 3.2.1 Policy contents

2004年、2005年頃には、「宮城県沖を震源とする大地震と巨大津波が30年以内に99%の確率で発生するリスクがある」とする国や宮城県等の調査結果が新聞等メディアで盛んに報じられていた。関係地域の行政関係者や県民の関心も高まっていた。

そんな時期に本田たちが昔の遠野町史を調べていると、1896年の明治三陸地震・津波（死者・行方不明者2万2000人のうち岩手県内1万8000人）の発生の翌日には臨時遠野町議会を開き、義捐金の予算を組み、遠野町民がありがたけの医薬品や毛布などの救援物資を馬の背に乗せて、峠を越えて8時間も10時間もかかって沿岸部の町や村に届けた事実を知った。このとき本田は考えた。「遠野は内陸のまちだから津波は来ない。だから安心だ。関係ない。」ではなく「遠野には沿岸部と内陸部を結ぶ役割がある。歴史がそれを証明している。」と考えるべきだ。

本田は、「今は消防や警察、自衛隊のヘリコプターが全国に数多く配備されている。これらのヘリコプターは、遠野を起点にすれば、沿岸部に15分程度のフライトで行くことができるのではないか。」などと考えた。「道路アクセスの改善もこの視点が重要ではないか。」「自分たちの遠野市のためだけの政策ではなく、他の地域とつなぎ、これを支援するという考え方に置き換えたらどうだろうか。」このことが、その後、遠野市が提唱する「地震・津波災害における後方支援拠点整備構想」（以下「被災地後方支援「遠野モデル」」という）につながっていく。

本田は、三陸沿岸部に地震・津波が発生した場合に、遠野市が、沿岸部と内陸部の中間点に位置する立地条件から、救援活動のための拠点として大きな役割を果たすことを確信した。幸い遠野市の郊外には十分な広さの総合運動公園がすでに整備されていた。この公園は、バイパス道路のアクセスも良く、高圧電線がなく、多数のヘリコプターの離発着も十分に可能だった。「このグラウンドなら自衛隊の野営地や全国からの消防、警察の集結場所としても十分な広さがある。」「将来、老朽化した市の消防庁舎を移転し総合防災センターにすれば機能連携できる。」そんなことを考えながら、遠野市独自に被災地後方支援「遠野モデル」をまとめていった。この時期には、岩手県知事と一緒に県の防災ヘリコプターに乗り、上空から総合運動公園や沿岸部を視察し、本田自ら説明した。また、知人の岩手大学教授に依頼し、地盤の調査も行い、花崗岩のきわめて安定的な地盤であることも確認した。

2007年9月には、県内各地区が毎年持ち回りで開催する岩手県総合防災訓練が、遠野市を会場に予定されていた。本田たちは、例年の訓練内容（開催自治体が被災したとの想定）に加えて、沿岸部が被災したとの想定を加え、沿岸部への医療救護支援や救援物資の輸送訓練を行うよう県に提案し訓練を実施した。この訓練には、県内87機関、8,746人が参加し、この訓練によって、本田や遠野市の防災関係幹部は、後方支援の有効性と遠野市の優位性が実証されたものと自信を深めた。

### 3.2.2 Policy process

岩手県総合防災訓練の検証データは、さっそく被災地後方支援「遠野モデル」の提案書に



盛り込むこととした。また、本田たちは、これは遠野市のことだけの要望でない。もっと広域的な視点から、遠野市ができること、国や県にお願いすべきことを整理し、被災地後方支援体制の整備を広く関係者に訴えていく必要があると考えた。このため、2007年11月、沿岸部を含む関係9市町村で構成する被災地後方支援拠点整備のための推進協議会「三陸地域地震災害後方支援拠点施設整備推進協議会」を立ち上げ、国等関係機関に要望活動を行うこととした。本田は、自ら国や国の出先機関、県庁等防災に関わる関係機関に構想の有用性を説いて回った。本田の要望・提案活動は80か所近くに及んだ。しかし、その必要性については各所で一定の理解はされても、具体的な政策や行動につながるような期待した反応はどこでも得られなかった。

このような要望活動を続けるなかで、本田は、東北地方全体の陸上自衛隊を統括するトップである宗像久男東北方面隊総監にこの構想を説明する機会を得た。宗像総監の最初の反応は、「自分も長い自衛隊生活を送ってきたが、市長が来て自衛隊に自分たちのグラウンド施設を自由に使えなんというのは初めてだ。市長は本気なのか。」というものだった。それから本田は、宗像から「市長はそんなことをいうが、もし、その時に市民が野球大会とかサッカー大会をやっていたらどうするんだ？」と問われた。本田は、一瞬想定外の質問でたじろいだが、「直ちに中止させます。」と答えた。その後話し合いを重ねるなかで宗像は本田の本気度を知った。実は宗像も、宮城県沖地震で想定される大惨事を考えた時に従来型の防災訓練ではだめではないか、もっと大々的な実働訓練をやる必要があるのではないかと考えていた。宗像たちは、遠野市を視察するとともに関係機関を駆けずり回り、なんとか1億円の訓練費用を捻出したのだった。2008年秋、自衛隊の大規模震災対処訓練が遠野市をメイン会場に岩手・宮城両県で行われることとなった。

陸上自衛隊東北方面隊震災対処訓練「みちのくALERT2008」は、2008年10月31日と11月1日の2日間、前例のない大きな規模で実施された。宮城県沖を震源とする地震が発生し、三陸沿岸に津波が襲来したことを想定。東北6県所在の自衛隊全部隊、岩手・宮城両県の自治体、消防、警察、医療隊などの関係機関、地域住民など人員約18,000人、車両2,300台、航空機43機が参加した。この訓練で、遠野市の位置付けや遠野市総合運動公園の広さは災害支援に必要ということが実証された。被災地後方支援「遠野モデル」は、防災に関わる関係者や市民の心の中に「実現すべき確かな計画」として捉えられていった。本田たちは確信を持ち、この訓練の成果も盛り込んで、機会をとらえ関係先に要望して回った。

2011年3月10日、2011年度予算を審議する長かった遠野市議会も無事閉会し、本田は新年度に向けていろいろとやるべきことに思いを巡らせていた。被災地後方支援「遠野モデル」の一翼を担う遠野市総合防災センターの総合運動公園隣接地への整備事業費も、この議会で承認されていた。

3月11日、本田はこの日、市内用務のため朝から外出し、昼過ぎまでかかった用務を終え、自宅に戻って遅い昼食を済ませたところだった。市役所に戻ろうと身づくろいをしている14時46分、経験したことのない大きな揺れが襲い、その後しばらく続いた。

東日本大震災（日本周辺の観測史上最大のM9）が発生。  
岩手県・宮城県の沿岸部の早いところで20数分後には大津波が到達。  
安定岩盤の遠野市でも震度5強の大きな揺れを観測。

本田の頭は、瞬間的に「津波！」と反応した。急いで防災服に着替え直し、自宅にあった自転車に乗り、携帯ラジオでいま起こったばかりの大地震の速報を聞きながら市役所へと急いだ。到着まで10分足らずの時間が長く感じられた。市役所中央館の柱が座屈して余震のよる庁舎の倒壊が危険なため、市役所中庭駐車場に続々避難してきた心配顔の職員たちの前に、防災服に身を固めた本田が携帯ラジオを聞きながら現われた。予期せぬかたちで現れた本田の姿に、職員たちは内心驚きながらも頼もしく感じた。

本田は直ちに遠野市災害対策本部を設置するとともに、遠野市内に大きな被害や火事が発生していないか、市内全域をパトロールさせた。15時20分には市民のための避難所開設を指示するとともに、その後の余震も想定し、住民への避難勧告を出した。これらと並行して市内に大きな被害が出ていないことを確認した。<sup>14</sup>

一方で、消防防災担当の職員には、総合運動公園をこれから続々参集するだろう自衛隊、消防、警察の広域応援部隊の拠点として開放するように指示した。担当職員は、「市民のグラウンドが荒れて使えなくなってしまった時にはかなりの額の補修費が必要になりそうだ」「お金はどこから出してもらえるのか」と一瞬心配した。本田はこれを見透かしたように「お金のことは心配するな。いま優先すべきことをやれ。俺が責任を持つ。」と言った。本田のこの姿勢は、その後も一貫して続く。本田をトップとする第1回の遠野市災害対策本部は、市役所が損壊したため、駐車場にテントを張って開かれた。市災害対策本部は、この夜、安全な屋内に移動するが、7月20日に廃止されるまで68回開かれている。

発災日の深夜午前1時40分、沿岸部の大槌町から峠を越えてひとりの被災住民が助けを求めてきた。彼から聞いた現地の状況はテレビ・ラジオの報道を超えた凄惨なものだった（その後判明した死者・行方不明者は約1万9,000人。うち岩手県約6,000人）<sup>15</sup>。本田は何をおいても遠野市としてできる支援活動を行うことを決意。早朝4時50分、職員たちの第一陣が救援物資を持って大槌町に向かった。これはどの自治体や国の機関よりも早い被災地支援の第一歩だった。ここから何カ月にも及ぶ被災地後方支援活動がスタートした。3月13日には市独自に後方支援活動本部を設置した。当時の災害救助関係の法律では、被災した自治体からの支援要請が県や国に縦の系統で行われ、それに基づいて支援活動が行われるスキームだった。しかし、被災した自治体の被害があまりにも甚大であるとき、要請行為自体ができないことも想定される。まさに大槌町役場がそうだった。このような状況下で、本田は、国や県の要請を待つことなく、独自の判断で支援活動に着手した。

2007年から重ねられていた防災訓練の経験が市職員に浸透しており、災害対策本部と後方

<sup>14</sup> 遠野市の被害額32億円。沿岸部に3月11日に滞在していた遠野市民8名が死亡。

<sup>15</sup> 大槌町の死者・行方不明者は約1,300人（町人口の8%）であり、この中には、大槌町役場約130名の職員のうち、町長、町幹部職員を含め犠牲になった30名を超える職員も含まれている。

支援活動本部の一体となった活動が行われた。市職員や市民は、被災地救援のための食事の炊き出し、救援物資の仕分け、支援部隊のサポート、沿岸からの避難者の受け入れなど、大人から子供まで被災地支援のためのさまざまな活動に従事した。遠野市のお母さんたちは握力がなくなるまで懸命におにぎりを握り続け、延べ2,050人で3月11日から29日間で4万2,400個のおにぎりを作り被災地へ届けた。

そして、総合運動公園をはじめ市内の施設には、全国から続々と自衛隊、消防、警察が集結し、遠野をベースキャンプとして被災地の救援活動を開始した(3月20日時点で3,500人)。また、遠野市の友好自治体をはじめ40を超える自治体から被災地への救援物資が遠野市に届けられた。全国からは延べ10万人を超えるボランティアや全国各地から集まった自治体、企業、団体などの人たちが後方支援活動に参加した。

このような遠野市の取り組みにより、被災地後方支援活動「遠野モデル」は現実のものとなり、多くの人々の記憶に残ることとなった。遠野市ほどの大規模で機動的なものではなかったが、東日本大震災においては各地で被災地への後方支援活動が行われた。そして、それまで災害対策や災害救助の法制が国・県・市町村の垂直・縦割りの要請や指揮命令系統になっていたものを見直すきっかけとなった。いわゆる被災自治体と支援自治体の水平連携による活動の重要性が注目されることとなった。特に、大規模な災害であったり、被災地が自衛隊・消防・警察が駆けつけるのに時間を要する僻地のような場合には、国の指示による本格的な救援部隊が到着するまでの間、近隣の自治体が大きな役割を果たすケースも多いものと想定される。それを可能とする法制度の改正が、遠野市の具体事例なども理解促進の材料に使われ、その後速やかに実施された。

遠野市においては、2012年3月26日に総合運動公園隣接地に遠野市総合防災センターが完成した。免震構造2階建て、通常時は市の消防業務、救急業務の拠点として、災害時は市の災害対策本部の本拠地として機能する。また、災害時には広域的なネットワークの拠点として、総合運動公園に集結する自衛隊、消防、警察等の補完機能を担う。防災センターは、東日本大震災の教訓を風化させることなく後世に伝えるため、遠野市の行った被災地後方支援の活動記録を展示しており、センター開設後2年間で1万3千人の視察者を受け入れた。

かつて本田がコンパスで円を描いた「遠野広域経済圏構想」のなかでぜひとも整備したいと願っていた沿岸宮古市とを結ぶ最短ルートにある立丸峠のトンネル化は事業が加速され、2018年度に完成することとなった。また、沿岸の釜石市と結ぶ高速道路及びそのインターチェンジについても、2015年度内に完成することとなった。

遠野市は、震災から1年3か月後の2012年6月、市職員29名、市民等9名による後方支援活動検証委員会を独自に設置した。遠野市が官民一体となって取り組んだ沿岸被災地後方支援活動の記録とその成果や課題を1冊の記録誌としてまとめ、後世につなぐとともに広く全国の関係者にも伝えるためのものだった。この全国に例のない現場からの支援活動記録誌は、2013年9月、画像700枚を含む343ページの大冊として完成した。

2014年4月1日、遠野市は、行政の役割とともに市民による「自助・共助による災害に強いまちづくり」を推進するため、遠野市防災基本条例を施行した。この条例は、東日本大震

災・津波から3年が経過し、この災害で経験したことをあらためて見つめ直し、教訓を風化させることなく後世に伝えるとともに、将来にわたり災害に強い地域社会を築くために制定された。この条例の施行に合わせて、自助・共助による地域防災力の取り組みを推進するため、土砂災害危険箇所、浸水区域、避難所、防災学習を記載した防災マップを遠野市の全世帯に配布した。

日本では、東海地震、東南海地震、南海地震などやそれに伴う津波災害が今後数十年のうちに発生することが大いに懸念されている。住民の安全・安心を確保するためのハード・ソフトの防災対策もこれまで以上に急ピッチで進められている。近年、自治体どおしの相互応援協定の締結も一段と進んでいるが、被災地後方支援「遠野モデル」は生きた教材であり、全国自治体の共有財産ともいえる。本田も、全国各地に講演で出かける機会が増えた。「現在」から振り返ると「過去」の対応は、記憶が薄れていくとともに必然の出来事のように感じられる。しかし、当事者が強い意志を持って「過去」のある時点で起こした行動によって、その後の結果は確実に変わることを遠野は伝えてくれる。

## 4. 遠野市のまちづくり補論

### 4.1 「どぶろく特区」以降の地域資源を活かしたまちづくり

#### (1) 遠野遺産

遠野遺産の誕生は、世界遺産からのアイデアではじまった。2006年当時、岩手県では、中尊寺、毛越寺等の建築・庭園群で構成する「平泉」（岩手県南内陸部の平泉町等に所在）の世界遺産登録をめざしていた。遠野遺産は、本田たちがこれに着想を得てはじめた住民主導の身の丈サイズの取り組みだった。

「平泉」の世界遺産登録は、2001年の世界遺産の暫定リスト入りから登録まで10年の歳月を要した。2006年12月に「平泉」を世界遺産にすることを国の文化審議会で推薦決定した。この最初の推薦ではいくつかの課題を指摘され、2008年のユネスコの会議では登録が延期された。岩手県は、課題の指摘について対応策を練り、満を持して次の機会に臨んだ。その矢先の2011年3月11日に東日本大震災・津波が発生した。岩手県、宮城県、福島県の沿岸部で死者・行方不明者1万9千人弱、被害額約17兆円の想像を絶する大災害となった。そして、この年6月に「平泉」は世界遺産に登録された。まだ災害から3カ月しかたっておらず、復旧もこれからで災害の傷跡が生々しく残るときに、岩手県民にとって久々の明るいニュースだった。達増拓也岩手県知事は、ユネスコ世界委員会でのスピーチの中で、「いま」という時の意義と感謝の言葉を述べた。

再び2006年当時に時計の針を戻す。「平泉」の世界遺産登録をめざす運動が岩手県全体で盛り上がりを見せていた頃、「世界遺産があるならば『遠野遺産』があってもいいのではないか。」と世界遺産の話題の中から本田たちのアイデアが生まれた。本田は職員に指示し、念のため、県（教育委員会）や国（文化庁）の関係部署に市独自の遺産指定は支障ないかと問い合わせたりもしてみた。国等からは、あくまで市の責任で独自におやりになるなら私た

ちがとやかく言うことではないとの反応だった。ここからはじまった取り組みが、全国初の「遠野遺産認定条例」（2007年4月施行）である。

『遠野物語』序文に「路傍に石塔多きこと諸国その比を知らず」とあるように、遠野市のそこかしこに昔話、民話に出てくる物語の世界が存在していた。また、先人から受け継がれた地域の宝（伝統や伝承、歴史、文化）がたくさん残っていた。遠野にある地域の宝は、学術的な資料や文献のないものもたくさんあった。全国的に有名でなくても、例えば、しし踊り、神楽、南部ばやし、手踊りなど、何百年の歴史の中で培われてきた郷土芸能をはじめ多くの地域の宝が、先人から受け継がれ、地域の方々が大切に守っていた。

遠野遺産認定条例の第1条（目的）には、「この条例は、市民が慣れ親しみ、郷土の誇りとして育んできた地域資源を、将来にわたって継承していくべき遠野遺産として認定し、市民協働によりその保護及び活用を図ることにより、魅力ある郷土の創造及び発展に寄与することを目的とする。」と記されている。

遠野遺産の特徴は、地域に暮らし活動する住民たちが地域資源を発見し、市に推薦を出して認定を受けること。認定受けた地域資源である「遠野遺産」は地域住民たちの手で保護・活用を図っていくこと。その際には市からも支援を行うこと。こういった住民主体の取り組みが前面に出ていることにあった。地域住民は、認定された遠野遺産を保護・活用するため、みんなが持っている経験や技、労働力を提供して地域の宝を守り磨いていく。地域づくりそのものであった。

この遠野遺産認定制度ができたことで、地域住民は、「そういえば、昔あそこにこんなものがあつた。」「あその場所をきれいにして切り開けば素晴らしい宝になるなあ。」などと自分たちの地域を見つめ直すきっかけになった。

例えば、「遠野遺産」までの遊歩道や階段、柵を整備したり、案内板を整備したり、茅葺のあずま屋を田園風景の中に整備したり、定期的に草刈や無駄な樹木の間伐等で周辺をきれいにしたり、そんなことを地域住民たちの手で行った。2014年度現在で、141件が認定されている。カップ伝説で有名なカップ淵は遠野遺産第22号である。遠野遺産は、権威者が決めるわけでもなく、学者が選ぶわけでもない。文献や資料がなくても、地域住民が「これは私たちの集落にとってとても大事なものだ」と共通の思いを持ち、自分たちの力で次の世代につなげていこうとする取り組みであった。これは「遠野スタイル」そのものとも言えるものだった。

## (2) 語り部 1000人プロジェクト

「遠野物語」に代表される豊かな地域文化は、多様なジャンルの地域の住民によって受け継がれてきた。以前から昔話の名人のおばあちゃんたちが「語り部」として観光客等に語りを披露していた。本田たちは、多様なジャンルの「語り部」を遠野の大切な人的資源として活用することを考えた。2010年に「遠野物語」発刊100周年で様々な記念事業が予定されていた。その前年の2009年から多様な「語り部」を市民から発掘・育成し、市内の各所にある文化施設、公共施設等で活躍させ、交流人口の拡大に寄与することをめざした。ジャンルは「昔話」「食」「郷土芸能」「歴史」「生業」の5つとして、遠野テレビで語り部の養成プログラム番組を放送したり、実技講習会を実施して語り部の育成に努めた。また、観光ツアーや

子どもたちの教育旅行ともタイアップし、語り部の宿、語り部タクシーなどの取り組みも新たに加わえ、遠野の魅力情報を発信した。「昔話」分野については小中学校とも連携し、子ども語り部も育成した。2014年度までに652人が語り部として認定された。

### (3) さまざまな住民サイドの取り組みの活発化

遠野市では、この間、住民サイドにおけるまちづくりへの取り組みも活発に行われていった。この中には、本田以前から取り組まれてきた住民の活動がさらに活発化していくものや本田たちの行政の取り組みに触発されて新たな活動が生まれるケースなど多様であった。ここでは、それぞれの代表的な取り組みを紹介する。

#### ①あやおり夢を咲かせる女性の会

後述する「カントリーパーク構想」の一環として、市内綾織地区に地区センターができたのは1979年だった。地区センター開設後、綾織地区の地域づくり協議会は、地区内のさまざまな団体の活動の情報共有の場として、地域課題解決のための活動を展開していった。その中のひとつに1994年に発足した「あやおり夢を咲かせる女性の会」の活動があった。1990年代に、この地区に岩手県営で水田の大区画圃場を整備する計画が持ち上がった。これをきっかけに、農業の働き手の半分を占める女性の声も反映してほしいとの思いから女性グループの会が結成された。この女性グループは、1997年には女性の視点を見事に発揮し、全国初の「田んぼの中の公衆トイレ&休憩所」を実現し、全国の反響を呼び、多くの視察者が訪れた。その後バイパス道路沿いに1998年に道の駅「遠野風の丘」がオープンすると16㎡程度の小さなお店「夢咲き茶屋」をオープンし、手づくりの団子、おにぎり、そばを出し、大繁盛のお店とした。本田が市長になって以降も、全国的な表彰を受け、沿道等の花壇づくりや人気の農家レストランのさらなる展開など活発な活動を行い、その後続く多くの女性団体の活動の先導役、目標として活躍している。

#### ②遠野 山・里・暮らしネットワーク

「日本のふるさと再生特区」への挑戦と歩調を合わせるように、グリーン・ツーリズムへの取り組みも活発になっていった。そして、クラスター型の全く新しい活動団体も登場した。2003年6月9日に発足した「NPO法人 遠野 山・里・暮らしネットワーク」である。遠野市内の自発的で草の根的なグループやそのメンバーたちを支援し、グループやメンバーのネットワーク化や協働でのプロジェクト実施、関係者の情報共有などを目的に活動している。

#### ①の女性の会とも密接に交流している。

この団体は、遠野市を主たる活動フィールドとして、地域資源を活かした都市住民との交流の深化と遠野への移住促進（ツーリズム）、伝統文化・芸能・技術・技芸の伝承と深化・応用（アート）、里地・里山における循環的な生活スタイルの再建と実践（ライフ）等に関する事業を行い、今日まで実績をあげてきている。特徴ある活動として、遠野市内で着実に定着してきた農家民泊との連携や農村型ワーキングホリデー、3. Case 2 で述べる被災沿岸地域との連携事業、東北のグリーン・ツーリズムを学ぶ場の提供などがある。このうち、全国的に注目されたユニークな取り組みとしては、市内で閉鎖された民間ドライビングスクールを市外の企業に働きかけ、2004年に営業再開し、都会等の学生たちの合宿型自動車免許取得と農家滞在・農業体験、そば打ち体験、乗馬体験等のグリーン・ツーリズムを組み合わせ

た魅力的なプログラムを開発し、地域の活性化に大きく貢献している。

## 4.2 まちづくりの継承・発展

### (1) 遠野市総合計画（2006年度～2015年度）

遠野市の行政、市民が、将来めざすまちづくりの方向性のよりどころとなるおおもとは、遠野市総合計画である。現在の総合計画は、2006年6月に議会の議決<sup>16</sup>を得て策定された2006年度を初年度とする10カ年計画である。前期の5年間の計画期間が終了する時期に合わせ、2010年11月、総合計画・後期基本計画（2011年度～2015年度）を策定している。<sup>17</sup>

そして、遠野のまちづくりを語るには、この総合計画を紐とく必要がある。計画に盛り込まれたキーワードは2つ。計画において、将来像として掲げる「永遠の日本のふるさと遠野」、基本理念として掲げる「遠野スタイルの創造」である（遠野市総合計画の将来像、基本理念等の体系は図表7を参照）。

「日本のふるさと再生特区」の取組にも、「被災地後方支援「遠野モデル」」の取組にも共通するのは、人と人、地域と地域を結ぶ「縁」と「絆」といえる。遠野のまちづくりの水面下を流れる「縁」や「絆」が遠野の田園風景や『遠野物語』に代表される民話・昔話と結びつき、「ふるさと」のイメージを膨らませている。

遠野市総合計画・後期基本計画の表紙に、「百年の縁を100年続く絆に」というメッセージが掲げられている。これまでの100年の縁を大切にしながら、これから100年続く絆を創っていこうという意味が込められている。

総合計画の基本理念である『遠野スタイルの創造』は、「地域の特性や資源を活かすこと」「市民が主体性を持つこと」「自分たちのまちをよりよくしようと行動すること」が相互に連環・好循環するまちづくりである。また、同時に、持続可能な新たなまちづくりの仕組みを創造しようとする市民と行政の協働活動そのものである。

そのうえで、計画書は計画理念を以下のように説明する。

『本市は、先人が守り育ててきた自然、歴史、文化、伝統を大切にされた地域づくりに取り組んでいます。特に、昭和46年（1971年）からスタートした市民センター構想によって、生涯学習や地域づくりに一体的に取り組む活動拠点として市民センターや地区センターを整備し、他自治体に先駆けたまちづくりを行ってきました。これを契機に、市民が主役となり、自ら人づくりや地域づくりを行政と一体となって進める基本的な協働スタイルが創造されました。』

<sup>16</sup> 日本の市町村において、総合計画の基本部分である「基本構想」については、2011年以前は地方自治法において議会の議決を経て定めることが義務付けられていた。しかし、国の地方分権推進の流れの中で、2011年5月の地方自治法改正により、基本構想自体の法的な策定義務がなくなり、基本構想の策定を行うか否か及び策定しても議会の議決を経るかどうかは市町村が自ら判断することとなった。しかし、ほとんどの市町村はその後も条例を定め、従前と同じ議会の議決を経ることとしている。遠野市においても同様の取り扱いである。

<sup>17</sup> 後期計画においても、基本理念、将来像、計画の大綱をはじめ計画の骨格は変わらない。

このような地域資源を活かした市民活動と行政の協働スタイルは、古くて新しい、本市が誇るべき不変的財産といえるものです。

遠野スタイルは、地方分権社会の今日、益々重要性が高まっており、地域づくりのみならず、産業の活性化や少子高齢化対策、環境問題など、あらゆる分野において、時代に対応した新たな協働の創造が求められております。』

本田は、新しい総合計画が策定される頃（2006年）から今日まで、「古くて新しいものは光り輝く」という言い方を、市民や職員の前で機会あるごとに好んでしてきた。本田へのインタビュー（2014.7.17）でも、

『諸先輩の歴代市長の成果・功績を継承し、新しいかたちで発展させるために苦心してきました。私は「古くて新しいものは光り輝く」ということばを、職員からはくどいといわれるほど使いますが、これは、「古いものは滅び、新しいものもそのままではいつかは滅びてしまう。何が生き残るかと言えば、古くて新しいもの。先人から引き継いだ古いものと今享受できる新しいもの、そのどちらも光り輝く可能性を含むのが地域資源なのだ。』と話しています。』

『行政・民間の枠組みを超えて、地域が一丸となって、地域資源を古いままにせず、新たに磨きをかけていくような地域経営の姿勢こそが「遠野スタイル」としてのまちづくりだと考えるのです。』

と述べている。

このことは、第3代市長工藤千蔵による総合計画「トオノピアプラン」の策定（1968年）とその中核的な施策である「市民センター構想」及び「カントリーパーク構想」から、若干の表現の違いはあっても、第4代市長小原正巳、第5代市長菊池正（しょう）、そして第6代本田へと受け継がれてきたまちづくりの理念そのものの継承ともいえる。

#### （2）トオノピアプラン（1968年策定）

遠野市の基本構想（総合計画）「トオノピアプラン」は、1960年代後半、人口の過疎化現象が一段と進行し始めた頃、第3代遠野市長工藤千蔵（1966年就任）のもとで1968年に策定された。まちの活気も乏しく、若者が次々に都会に出て行き、帰ってこようとしなない時代だった。市長になった工藤が直面したのは、このような沈んだ状況をどうしたら抜け出せるかということだった。工藤は若手職員にその手立てを研究させた。そこから生まれたのがトオノピアプランだった。トオノピアプランは本来、遠野市総合計画の基本構想部分にあたるもので、このネーミングも職員たちが考案したものだった。「トオノピアプラン」はトオノ（遠野）とユートピア（理想郷）を合わせた造語だった。この計画がめざしたまちは、市民が等しく幸せで物心共に豊かに暮らすことのできる郷土「大自然に息吹く永遠の田園都市」を創り上げることだった。将来像（トオノピア）として、次のようなまちを標榜した。

- ・大地と光と水と緑がたっぷりの生産加工都市～インダストリアル・サイクルを基調に～
- ・明るく人間性豊かな健康文化都市～ヒューマン・サイクルを基調に～
- ・自然と歴史と民俗の博物公園都市～ナチュラル・サイクルを基調に～

遠野に根差しながら、明るい未来志向の雰囲気を感じられるものだった。工藤は「遠野がよくなるうとして、世間並みに進もうとしても、市民一人ひとりがその気にならなければいけない。要は市民の生涯学習を喚起し、行政と一体となった施策の推進が不可欠である」と



して、ひとづくり（生涯学習）、地域づくりに心血を注いだ。当時、遠野市の財政は乏しく、国などから知恵を絞って財源を引き出し、現場でも創意工夫を凝らして事業を行わなくては、市民の要望に応えることができなかった。

### (3) 市民センター構想、カントリーパーク構想

トオノピアプランを推進するための具体的な施策体系として打ち出されたのが、「市民センター構想」、「カントリーパーク構想」だった。この構想は、トオノピアプランの策定過程で職員たちのアイデアから生まれ、1970年代後半以降1980年代にかけて市民センター、カントリーパークの施設整備が進められた。当時全国に例のないこの構想は、全国から多くの視察者を迎え入れた。コミュニティや市民協働の意義が1970年代に職員や市民の間で日常的に話題にされていたことは、今から振り返っても相当に先進的だった。

「市民センター構想」は、市民会館、中央公民館、勤労青少年ホーム、市民体育館、市民プール、図書館、博物館等の各施設を市内中心部に集中して配置した施設群であった。この構想は、ハードの施設面だけでなく、ソフトの機能面のことも併せ含んでいた。このため、市役所の組織も、市長部局の生活行政と教育委員会部局の教育文化行政が連携・一体化して機能を発揮できるよう、人事面でも関係職員は2つの組織の併任の身分とした。このことにより、地域コミュニティに関する施策も総合的に実施できた。当時の国の法律（教育行政）においては、このような身分を兼ねる組織は想定していなかった。当時の市の担当者たちは法律に抵触しないことの国の理解を得るのに大変な努力と苦勞をしてクリアした。この仕組みは、全国の先駆的取組として注目を集め、遠野の手法をモデルに導入する他の自治体が後に続いた。これにより、一般行政と教育行政の壁が取り払われ、ひとづくりとまちづくりが一体的にサービスを展開できることとなった（市民センター構想概念図は図表8を参照）。

市民センターは、将来に希望の持てる田園都市を創るための課題として、

- ① 遠野が世間並みによくなるため市民一人ひとりがその気にならなくてはいけない
- ② 地域開発をするには市民の連帯感を一層強めなければならない
- ③ 市民が健康でなければならない

という3つの要素を基盤として取り組まれた。

市民センターの主な事業としては、市民生活の分野では、地区行政、市民協働、交通安全及び地域安全並びに施設管理があった。また、社会教育の分野では、生涯学習、青少年健全育成、国際交流、高齢者教育及び芸術文化の推進があり、社会体育の分野では、健康づくりとスポーツ振興があった。市民センターの取組のうち市民協働の代表例は、市内一斉河川清掃や市内一斉町民運動会、市民の創作舞台「遠野物語ファンタジー」<sup>18</sup>などであり、いずれも今日まで続く遠野市が誇るべき市民活動である。

また、「カントリーパーク構想」は、市民センターが市全体の中核施設であるのに対して、地域住民の日常生活圏の中核施設として、日常生活圏である2～4ヘクタール程度の広さに、

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<sup>18</sup> 2015年2月に40回の節目を迎えた遠野物語ファンタジーは、全国表彰もされた市民による総合創作舞台づくりである。地域の民話等を題材に脚本から出演者まで全て市民の手づくりで行い、観光のオフシーズンの遠野の冬の風物詩として市外、県外からもファンを惹きつける。毎年の舞台づくりは、市民生活の一部となり、親から子、孫へと受け継がれ、市民の連帯意識の向上や住みよいまちづくりにつながっている。

小学校・中学校、保育園、診療所、警察駐在所等の施設を集中配置し、地域の人たちが日常的にふれあうことのできる地域の中核施設（地区センター）を各地区（1954年の合併前の町や村単位）毎に整備するものだった。この地区センターには、地区センター所長、保健師<sup>19</sup>、社会教育委員が常駐し、地域活動支援、地域保健活動、社会教育の提供を行いながら、カントリーパークの効果的な運営を担った。

また、地区センターは、画一的な施設整備とせず、地域毎に有する特色ある地域文化を継承する意図をもって、農耕文化、森林文化、畜産文化、考古文化、民俗文化、芸能文化等の文化的テーマをもって整備されていった。地区センターは、市民センターのサブ的な機能を果たしながら、地域毎の特色あるコミュニティ活動を支援した。ここの職員も、市長部局と教育委員会の身分の併任発令をかけて、現場で機動的に対応できるようにした。

#### （4）遠野市民憲章と市民協議会

このような市民センター構想、カントリーパーク構想に基づく具体的な活動を展開するため、1971年に「遠野市民憲章」が制定された。

遠野市民憲章は次のように記されていた。

『わたしたちは、清らかな山河、澄みきった空気のもと、語りつがれてきた民話とゆかしい文化をもつ心のふるさと遠野の市民であることを誇り、このまちをさらに豊かな田園都市にするため、ここにこの憲章をさだめます。

わたくしたちは

- 1 恵まれた自然を愛し、清潔なまちをつくります
- 1 郷土の文化をたいせつにし、その発展につとめます
- 1 からだをきたえ、教養を高め、明るい家庭をつくります
- 1 たがいに信じ、助けあい、平和なまちをつくります
- 1 仕事に励み、郷土の開発につとめます

市民憲章は、新しい市民社会づくりの指標理念となるものであったが、この理念は行政の取り組みだけで達成されるものではなく、市民自らの参画と活動が伴うことにより達成されるべきものだった。こうした考えのもとに、市民憲章を具体的に推進する協働機関として、「遠野市民憲章推進協議会」と「地域づくり連絡協議会」が、それぞれ市民センターと各地区センターに設置された。このことにより、遠野市の児童・生徒の学力向上、健全育成を目的とした教育振興運動や生活の合理化運動、環境美化運動、交通安全運動、社会教育、社会体育などのさまざまな市民運動や活動の窓口が一本化され、市民と行政が共通の目標に向かって取り組む体制が整った（市民センター・カントリーパーク・市民憲章の体系は図表9を参照）。この体制は、時代が変わり、市長が変わっても途絶えることなく、行政や市民、地域で引き継がれ、今日まで続いている。

#### （5）第5代市長菊池<sup>しょう</sup>正から本田への財産の継承

第3代市長工藤が実践した遠野市の地域経営は、第4代市長小原、第5代市長菊池へと継承

<sup>19</sup> 現在は、市の「健康福祉の里」に保健師は集約して配置され、各地区センター等とは、ICT環境も活用しながら、ネットワーク化されて限られた人員の有効活用が図られている。

されていった。1994年に市長に就任した菊池は「21世紀に一番遠いまちづくり」を提唱した。それは、遠野市がこれまで育ててきた伝統・文化、自然環境、里山・田園風景といったものを大切にすまちづくりを進めようとするものであり、遠野市が将来受け継ぐべき不変の事項と位置付けた。これは、国際化、情報化が進む21世紀において、遠野市が保有する自然環境等の地域資源を保持し続けることが、時代の変遷の中で価値を増し続けていくことに直結するとの考え方であった。菊池にとって、「このような考え方」と「必要な社会資本を整備し市民の生活基盤を向上させる考え方」とは矛盾するものではなかった。

実際に、菊池が在任期間中に実施した事業や政策をたどると、数多くの施設整備が行われた。後継の本田が、大きな施設整備をほとんどしていないのとは対照的だった。菊池は、農村集落を再現した「遠野ふるさと村」、日本や世界各地の民話を紹介する「遠野昔話資料館」、農耕馬、乗用馬、競走馬の繁殖・調育成と馬にまつわる文化の伝承施設として「遠野馬の里」、遠野の農産品・加工品の販売、レストランや観光案内所となる道の駅「遠野風の丘」、「遠野地域木材総合供給モデル基地」、市内全域に光ケーブルを敷設した「遠野テレビ（ケーブルテレビ）」、中心市街地の区画整理事業、市民や市外からの訪問者が交流・研修をし、宿泊することもできる「遠野ふれあい交流センター（あえりあ遠野）」などの整備を行った。

本田は、これら菊池が整備した施設のストックを活用し、時代に合わせて機能面のリデザインをし、ソフトの中身を育てていった。菊池の時代に大きな投資を行ってきたため、本田はあまりハード面でお金を使うことができなかつた一面はあるが、そのことが知恵やアイデアを磨く姿勢を一層促進していったのは確かである。遠野遺産に見られるような地域資源の再評価や遠野ふるさと村などの施設運営への市民団体や市民の積極的な参画は、時代にマッチしたものといえた。

#### (6) 2010年進化まちづくり検証委員会

遠野市では、第三セクターをはじめとする関係機関・団体等の見直しを外部からの視点で検証するため、2010年2月に大学教授等外部有識者で構成する進化まちづくり検証委員会をスタートし、現在まで様々なテーマで検討を続けている。2010年2月の第1回委員会における本田の冒頭挨拶を紹介する。

『遠野の里に春を告げる「遠野物語ファンタジー」が、1月30日（土）から31日（日）にかけて行われました。約350名もの市民の手作りによる遠野物語を題材にした舞台「オシラサマ昇天」が3回公演され、述べ2,400人近い方が鑑賞し、涙あり、笑いありの舞台を楽しまれました。出演者の中には、この春に進学・就職を控える高校3年生の姿もありました。（略）

遠野の里も、氷点下10度を下回る日が続いておりますが、確実に春が近づいています。この時期に、山田委員長をはじめ各委員には、大変お忙しい中、遠野の進化し続けるまちづくりに、それぞれのお立場から意見・ご提言をいただくことをお快諾いただきましたこと、心より感謝・お礼申し上げます。

まちづくりにおいて「進化」は、大切にしたいキーワードです。改革、改善、見直し、再編という時代の流れは、避けて通れない大きな問題であり、これに挑戦していくという気概を持って、立ち向かっていかなければなりません。「進化」というキーワードで、地域経営のあり方を考えてみてもいいのではないかと常日頃、市民の皆様や市職員とも議論しているところです。（略）

市（行政）とパートナーを組んでいる第三セクター、機関・団体、市の委員会、審議会等、様々な組織が 400 以上あります。それぞれの役目、機能がどう発揮されているか、本当に必要な組織なのか、きちんとメスを入れながら、それらの組織を進化させていながら、遠野の底力が示せるまちづくりにしたいと思っています。委員の皆さんには、そのような切り口から、しがらみの無い中で率直なご意見・ご提言をいただき、市民協働で総合力が発揮されるまちづくりへと進化させていきたいと思っておりますので、よろしくお願い申し上げます。

なお、会議の様子は、遠野テレビでのライブ中継を通じて、市民の皆さんとも情報を共有しながら、共に悩み、考えるしくみとさせていただいております。』

#### (7) 2014 年総合計画審議会

遠野市役所は、3 年前の東日本大震災の影響で本庁舎中央館が取り壊された。このため、市役所機能は市内のいくつかの既存施設に分散した。市議会庁舎は遠く離れた旧宮守村役場を活用した。市長ほかが入る主要部門は、2002 年に民間ショッピングセンターが撤退後、共同店舗が入居していた駅前商業施設「とぴあ」の 2 階の空きスペースを間借りした。遠野市クラスの財政規模の全国の市庁舎の中では、極めて質素な市庁舎ともいえた。市職員にとっては多少の不便が生じて、多くの財源を割けない中でやむを得ない選択だった。しかし、市民にとっては駅前のアクセスの良い立地に加え店舗との複合化で、予想外に好評な市役所となっている。2015 年から数年間かけて、現在の入居スペースをそのまま活用しつつ、隣接地権者の理解と協力を得ながら、建物を拡張する予定である。

2014 年 5 月 15 日、この市役所「とぴあ庁舎」大会議室で総合計画審議会が開催された。総合計画審議会は、市内の各界各層の代表者等の委員により構成されており、毎年度、総合計画に盛り込まれた政策・事業の進捗状況を説明し、彼らから意見をうかがっている。現在の総合計画は 2006 年度から 2015 年度までの 10 年計画であり、後期基本計画も残り 2 年となっていた。この日に開催された会議における本田の冒頭の発言を議事録概要から紹介する。

『 おはようございます。今日は 5 月 15 日で、市内各地では田植えが真っ盛りという状況であり、今年も豊年であってほしい、そして、災害の無い 2014 年度であってほしいと思っていますところ。』

昨日、宮古市田老の摂待地区で防潮林の植樹イベントが開催され、私は、県の緑化推進委員会の理事長の立場として参加しました。鳥取県や山口県で育てたコナラやクロマツの苗が、300 本、600 本と届いており、鳥取県からは森林愛護少年団の子供達、そして、平井知事も参加されました。地元岩手県からも、知事以下、宮古市長さん、関係者の皆さんも出席されていました。津波により根こそぎ被害を受けた素晴らしいクロマツの防潮林が、果たして植樹の中でどのような形で蘇っていくのかと、非常に複雑な気持ちでした。その際、国道 340 号立丸峠を通りました。川井村側の方では、トンネル工事の槌音が、現場で力強く響き渡っていました。これにより、遠野市と宮古市がトンネルという安心安全な形で繋がり、1 時間という時間の中で遠野市が位置付けられることとなります。さらには、釜石自動車道も予定より 2 年間前倒しで、2018 年までに全通することとなりました。釜石自動車道の全通の時期と国道 340 号の立丸峠のトンネル化が、ほぼ同時期に完成するということが目に見えてきました。このような状況の中で、遠野のまちづくり、地域づくりをどのような形で進めていくかということは、これは大変なことだなということ

を改めて、車の中で思いながら戻って来たところでは。

私は、踊り場状態の中で、これまで取り組んできた遠野のまちづくり・地域づくり、また、官民一体という、「遠野モデル」とまで言わせしめたこの仕組みを確実なものとしながら、将来を見据えたまちづくりに取り組んでいかなければならない、と職員には言っています。そのためのこれからの2年間と位置付けて良いだろうと思っています。現在の総合計画の後期5ヵ年計画は、2015年度が最終年度です。そのため、現在の総合計画をどのように総括し、その中で課題を浮き彫りにしながら、それを2016年度からの次期総合計画（前期5ヵ年・後期5ヵ年）ということになれば、次の計画の前期5ヵ年の2017年度、18年度の2年間で市内外を高速でつなぐインフラといったものが、釜石自動車道と立丸峠のトンネル化ということで、相次いで形になるわけでありまして、3年後を見据えた一つの課題に、それこそ3万市民が心を一つにして取り組むというシナリオを作っていかなければなりません。それを皆さまに、いろいろな形での立場の中からお願ひすることになるかと思ひますので、よろしくお願ひします。』

#### (8) 日本建築学会文化賞

2014年5月30日、本田は、遠野市を代表して日本建築学会文化賞を受賞した。その授賞理由は、次のようなものだった。

『遠野市は、1968年に総合計画の基本構想として「トオノピアプラン」を策定以来、歴史的町並みの修景や地域固有の建築文化の振興を図りながら、民俗学の振興に取り組んでいる。

・・・(略)・・・

本田敏秋氏は、2002年の市長就任以来、現在に至るまで、このような文化事業を積極的に継承・推進し、次のような成果を上げてきた。」として、4点の成果を掲げている。

- ① 市中心部にある大工町通り沿道の住宅を中心とした町並景観の形成
- ② 「とおの昔話村」(1986年整備)をリニューアルし、文化拠点として「とおの物語の館」を整備し、周辺に文化的施設を集約(2013年全体完成)
- ③ 市中心部や市内各地の文化資産をネットワーク化するとともに、語り部によるソフト面からの文化の継承
- ④ 市全域に散在する祠(ほこら)、川、橋、神社などの景観要素を活用して、市域全体を「遠野物語」の世界を表現する舞台として仕立て上げたこと。これらにより、地域の文化資源を生かした地域振興の経済効果も得られ、この分野の事業のモデルとされる成果を上げたこと。』

また、2011年の東日本大震災時には、以上に述べた文化活動の蓄積に基づき、「三陸文化復興プロジェクト」を立ち上げ、「遠野文化研究センター」を設置するなど、文化面での沿岸の復興を支援する中心的な役割を果たしたことも本田の業績とされた。

#### (9) 遠野みらい創りカレッジ

東日本大震災で甚大な被害を受けた沿岸部に対する支援の拠点となった遠野市には、国や全国自治体、企業、ボランティア等多くの団体や人々が長期にわたり集結した。そして、お互いに連携・交流しながら、復旧・復興に貢献した。その中のひとつに東京に本社を置く大企業、富士ゼロックス株式会社があった。同社は、遠野市にベースを置きながら、津波で汚れた文書の洗浄やコピー機の貸し出しなどの独自の震災からの復旧活動に取り組んだ。それらの活動を通じて、遠野市と様々な接点が生まれた。そうした機運の中から、2013年3月で

市内の中学校統合のために廃校になった旧土淵中学校を活用するアイデアが生まれた。この校舎を活用して、2014年4月から遠野市と富士ゼロックスが協働して地域振興を行うための拠点施設として「遠野みらい創りカレッジ」が開校した。中学校のある土淵地区は遠野市中心部から離れた田園地帯にあり、『遠野物語』の民話を柳田國男に語った佐々木喜善のふるさとであった。このカレッジでは、民俗学研究・発信の拠点化や企業の社員研修、大学のゼミ合宿・留学生研修、農家と連携したグリーン・ツーリズム、特産品開発等を行うこととしており、簡易宿泊機能やレストラン、農産物直売所も今後整備していく予定である。

#### (10) 職員たちの思い

本田のもとでまちづくり政策に長年携わってきた現経営企画部長の菊池をはじめ職員たちに共通の思いは、自分たちが行っているいろいろな政策も、どこかで自分たちが先輩たちから教えられ学んできたこととつながっているということだった。そして、自分たちも、先輩たちから継承したことを、後輩たちにつなげていかななくてはいけないという思いであった。

2015年1月に発表された2015年度の政府予算案には、さまざまな地域振興や地方創生に関する国の新たな政策が数多くを打ち出されていた。菊池たちは、それらの政策を現場で有効に生かせるかどうかは自分たち職員の手腕にかかっているのだと気を引き締めていた。そして、本田が常々口にする「古くて新しいものは光り輝く」ことへの挑戦は、行政、市民一丸となってこれからも続くのだと噛みしめていた。

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## 「遠野スタイルのまちづくり」

### Discussion questions

- ① How was the idea of introducing a new policy formed?
- ② Which actors were involved in the policy process?
- ③ Analyze the roles and importance of those actors. 特に、市職員中間層の役割はどのように位置づけられるか。
- ④ Relate the policy process with the theories that you have learned.
- ⑤ 遠野市の持つ地理的・歴史的・社会的特徴が、2つの事例における政策の発想・立案・実現にどのように影響したか（あるいはしていないか）。

## ○遠野市まちづくりの歩み（1954年～2014年）

- ・1954年 遠野市誕生（1町7カ村合併）  
人口 36,486 人、面積 667 km<sup>2</sup>（当時本州 2 番目の大きさ）  
（注）人口、面積ともに 2005 年合併の宮守村は含まず
- ・1956年 市役所新庁舎建設
- ・1963年 遠野ホップ生産組合を組織化、ホップ生産開始（現在生産量日本一）
- ・1966年 [工藤千蔵市長誕生（～1982年）](#)
- ・1968年 遠野市総合計画「トオノピアプラン」策定
- ・1970年 第 25 回国民体育大会が岩手県で開催（遠野市はサッカー会場）
- ・1971年 市民サービスや市民協働の拠点として「市民センター」が完成  
市民憲章の制定
- ・1973年 市民憲章推進協議会結成（市内一斉河川清掃、市内一斉運動会等）
- ・1975年 茅葺屋根の「南部曲がり家」国の重要文化財指定
- ・1976年 遠野の民話等を題材に多数の市民ボランティアが制作・出演する第 1 回「遠野物語ファンタジー」はじまる（今年で 39 回目）
- ・1979年 地区ごとに特色のあるカントリーパーク（地区センター）を時間をかけながら各地区に順次整備
- ・1980年 市民センター構想の柱のひとつである全国先駆的な合築様式の図書館・博物館完成、県立遠野病院完成
- ・1981年「たかむろ水光園」が完成（当時、浄水施設、宿泊研修施設、民俗資料館、日本庭園等とミニ水力発電、ソーラーシステム等のローカルエネルギーを活用した総合的な市民憩いの施設で全国的にも珍しいものだった。）  
「田園都市を考える遠野会議」を全国から多くの国・自治体・大学関係者を集め開催（「トオノピアプラン」と市民協働が注目される）
- ・1982年 [小原正巳市長誕生（～1994年）](#)  
全国の小都市では初めての日本民俗学会開催  
早池峰山が国定公園に指定
- ・1983年 遠野物語ファンタジーが民間の全国的な文化賞で最優秀章受賞
- ・1984年 遠野昔話祭りスタート。地域文化を体験できる伝承園オープン  
イタリア・サレルノ市と国際姉妹都市を締結。
- ・1985年 総合福祉センターが完成
- ・1986年 柳田國男の「遠野物語」の世界を紹介する「とおの昔話村」オープン  
農村アメニティコンクールで国土庁から表彰
- ・1987年 柳田國男サミットを開催
- ・1988年 地場産品の特産化、宣伝、販売等を目的に遠野ふるさと公社設立
- ・1991年 「全国昔ばなしフェスティバルとおの」開催
- ・1994年 [菊池<sup>しょう</sup>正市長誕生（～2002年）](#)




国内外の多くの関係者や市民参加で「世界民話博覧会」開催。

- ・ 1995 年 遠野物語研究所設立、遠野グリーン・ツーリズム研究会発足
- ・ 1996 年 遠野ふるさと村オープン
- ・ 1997 年 遠野昔話資料館開設
- ・ 1998 年 遠野馬の里オープン、観光物産館「遠野風の丘」オープン
- ・ 1999 年 木材総合供給モデル団地完成
- ・ 2001 年 市内全域をカバーする遠野テレビ (CATV) 開局
- 公民館・宿泊機能を有するふれあい交流センター「あえりあ遠野」オープン
- ・ 2002 年 [本田敏秋市長誕生 \(～現在\)](#)
- 民間ショッピングセンター撤退後の共同店舗「とぴあ」オープン
- ・ 2003 年 遠野市が日本を代表する観光文化賞を受賞
- 農村女性グループが農業・村づくり分野の全国表彰
- グリーン・ツーリズムの横断的な支援組織 (NPO 法人) 設立
- 国から「日本のふるさと再生特区」 (通称「どぶろく特区」) の認定
- ・ 2004 年 全国第 1 号で農家民宿 (江川) によるどぶろく製造。遠野ツーリズム大学開校
- 総理官邸とネットで結びタウンミーティング開催
- 『遠野スタイル』出版 (職員有志で遠野のまちづくりを体系的に整理)
- ・ 2005 年 遠野健康福祉の里条例制定
- 遠野市と宮守村が合併し、新「遠野市」が誕生
- ・ 2006 年 第 1 回全国どぶろく研究大会開催
- 遠野市新総合計画策定：将来像「永遠の日本のふるさと遠野」、基本理念「遠野スタイルの創造」
- 官民一体の定住支援組織「で・くらす遠野」スタート
- ・ 2007 年 遠野遺産認定条例制定
- 遠隔健診ネットワークを活用した市営助産院「ねっと・ゆりかご」開設
- 岩手県総合防災訓練を実施
- ・ 2008 年 自衛隊の大規模震災対処訓練「みちのく A L E R T 2 0 0 8」を実施
- ・ 2009 年 「語り部 1000 人プロジェクト」はじまる
- ・ 2010 年 「遠野物語」発刊 100 周年記念事業の開催
- ・ 2011 年 東日本大震災 (3.11) 発生。市庁舎大損壊、とぴあ仮庁舎へ移転
- 被災地後方支援活動を市をあげて精力的に実施
- 遠野文化研究センター設立
- ・ 2012 年 遠野市総合防災センター完成
- ・ 2013 年 東日本大震災の後方支援活動検証記録誌をまとめる
- ・ 2014 年 遠野市防災基本条例制定・施行
- ・ 2014 年 廃校(旧土淵中学校)を活用した「遠野みらい創りカレッジ」開校


図表1 遠野市の地理的位置付け




図表2 遠野市の人口推移、財政規模、産業等



図表3 遠野市機構図 (2003年度)



図表4 構造改革特区の申請・認定の手続きの流れ




図表5 遠野市・特区認定までの道のり

- 2002年6月26日 小泉内閣が「経済財政運営と構造改革に関する基本方針」を閣議決定。本田、構造改革特区に対する国の動きや県の対応を素早く情報収集。
- 7月4日 本田は小原、永田を市長室に呼び、「どぶろく祭り」からイメージを膨らませて遠野らしい特区提案を作るよう指示。「どぶろく」はかつて遠野では農村の食文化そのものであり、「どぶろく」にちなんだ冬の祭りが行われていた。さっそく、職員サイドで各方面の情報を収集し、検討を開始。
- 7月26日 庁内に特区プロジェクトチームが正式発足。
- 8月1日 庁内課長等連絡会議で、全庁的な提案項目の洗い出し
- 8月26日 市長等幹部の庁議にて特区提案項目の決定
- 8月29日 「日本のふるさと再生特区」(通称「どぶろく特区」)を国へ提案 (特定農業者のどぶろく製造、農家民宿要件緩和、民間企業等による農業容認等8項目)
- 10月11日 国から遠野の特区提案は「対応不可」(C判定)との回答。
- 11月～ 国のハードルは極めて高かったが再チャレンジすることに。どうしたら提案が実現するか議論を重ねる。現場の声や専門家の意見も聴取。提案理由を補強。
- 2003年1月15日 「日本のふるさと再生特区」を国へ再提案(どぶろく製造等4項目に絞る)
- 4月 市に特区推進会議設置
- 5月 岩手県庁遠野地方振興局に支援チーム発足
- 5月～9月 国の関係省庁で調整
- 8月 市農業委員会で農業関係者たちの特区の研修会を開催
- 9月4日 岩手県知事に特区推進の要望
- 9月29日 国との調整が整い、市で特区計画を正式決定
- 10月1日 国への特区計画の認定申請
- 11月28日 国において特区計画を認定(全国初の通称「どぶろく特区」の誕生)。


図表6 内陸部と沿岸部の結節点 広域圏の中の遠野市




図表7 遠野市総合計画(期間:2006年度~2015年度)



図表8 市民センター構想概念図(1971年)



図表9 市民センター・カントリーパーク・市民憲章(1971年)



## 職階制（JCS）と人事評価（PES）

### 職務、能力・実績を基礎にした人事管理への転換の系譜

2014年10月23日夕方、A省のB課長は、部下であるC係長に対して、約45分間の人事評価の期末面談を行った。過去1年間の能力評価と過去半年間の業績評価の評価結果を伝達するとともに、自己申告と照らしながら、評価すべき点、改善すべき点について指導を行った。C係長は、初任の係長で経験が少ないこともあり、前年に引き続き能力評価の結果はB（標準）であり、近々の課長補佐への昇任対象とはならないが、本年9月末に招集の臨時国会に内閣が提出した、A省所管のD法改正法案の立案に尽力したことから、業績評価の結果はA（優秀）であり、本年12月のボーナス（勤勉手当）や来年1月の基本給の査定昇給は、標準者（平均値）の5割増しとなろう。B課長にとって、正直、課員25人に対する面談は、大きな負担であるが、部下とのコミュニケーション・ツールとして有意義であり、組織の管理者として当然のことと考えている。

#### 1 Overall backgrounds

2014年10月、日本の国家公務員の人事評価制度（Personnel Evaluation System）（以下、PESという。）は、実施5周年を迎えた。

PESは、一般職国家公務員（約30万人）<sup>1</sup>の能力・実績に基づく人事管理の基礎とすべく、2007年4月の国家公務員法（National Public Service Act）（以下、NPSAという。）の改正により導入され、2年を超える準備期間を経て、本格実施に至ったものであり、実際に任用（昇任、降任、免職）や人材育成、給与決定（昇給、ボーナス）に活用されている。

PESが導入される前においても、職員の勤務成績の評定制度（Personnel Appraisal System）（以下、PASという。）が設けられており、実際に定期的に評定は行われていたものの、その評定結果は人事管理には活用されず、必ずしもシステム化がなされていない管理者ないし人事当局による中長期的な観察結果などに、任用や給与決定等の人事管理は依拠する運用が長年続いてきた。

勿論、1947年のNPSA制定の際に導入が定められたPASは、人事管理に活用することを前提としていたことはいままでのことであり、このことは、洋の東西を問わず、公務部門、民間部門を問わず、しばしば人事管理に見受けられる制度の建前と実際の運用との乖離の一つの例であるといえよう。

このような乖離が生じる背景としては、当初の制度設計は高い理念に燃えて行われる（場合によれば外部からの強い要請に基づいて行われる）ものの、従前の制度・運用に関する現状分析、問題点の検討、制度設計に当たって実効可能性の検証、実施に向けた関係者の理解・協力などが不十分な場合に往々にして生じるものといえよう。

日本の公務員制度の基本に係わるシステムにおいては、このほか、職階制（Job Classification System）（以下、JCSという。）が、長年にわたって本来制度が予定した形では実施することができなかつたなど制度と運用の乖離が生じていた。

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This case is based on the draft written by Mr. Norio FUKUTA / NPA, with some revisions made by TAKADA / GRIPS for the material to be used in the MPP at NAPA.

<sup>1</sup> See Table1&2 attached. Number of National Public Employees in regular services has been reduced to almost less than a half through the administrative reform for the last decade, and Government of Japan has one of the most efficient structures among OECD countries.<OECD : Government at a Glance 2013>

このケースでは、JCS と PES を例に制度と運用の乖離を解消する形で、どう人事管理の変革につなげることができたのかについて、示していきたい。

ここで、日本の公務員制度の基本理念について、概略を提示しておく。

第 2 次世界大戦前の日本の公務員制度（官吏制度）は、19 世紀後半のドイツ帝国（第二帝政）ないしプロイセン王国の官吏制度を範として 1890 年頃、確立されたものであり、当時の憲法（大日本帝国憲法）第 10 条が定める官制及び任免大権の下、公務員（官吏）は「天皇陛下の官吏」として、天皇との間の忠実義務・恩恵付与関係を基礎とした前近代的な要素を残す身分的、特権的な官僚制度であった。

第 2 次世界大戦後、新憲法の下、公務員の基本的な性格が「国民全体の奉仕者」<sup>2</sup>と改められた中、統治機構改革の一環として、科学的人事管理制度の確立を旗印に、公務員制度を民主的かつ能率的なものに抜本的に改革するべく、1947 年に国家公務員法（NPSA）が制定された<sup>3</sup>。なお、同法は、米国・カナダ人事委員会連合会の会長であった Blaine Huber 氏が団長をつとめた対日アメリカ合衆国人事行政顧問団の意見によるところが大きかった。

NPSA はその条文において、人事管理の基本原則として、平等取扱いの原則（§ 27）、情勢適応の原則（§ 28）<sup>4</sup>をはじめ、任免に関して能力実証主義（§ 33）、給与に関して職務給の原則（§ 62）、分限（降任、免職等）や懲戒に関して公正の原則（§ 74）などを定めており、これら基本原則に基づき具体的な人事管理制度が、NPSA やその委任を受けた人事院規則等で定められている。なお、以上のような各基本原則は、近代的公務員制度の基本理念であるメリット・システム（成績主義の原則）<sup>5</sup>を具現化したものであるといえよう。

このようなメリット・システムに基づく人事管理が実現されるよう、NPSA は、第 2 次世界大戦前の「身分」や「人の属性」に着目した人事管理を抜本的に改め、職階制（JCS）を導入することによって、官職・ポストを客観的に評価・分類し、それら官職・ポストに相応しい人材を公正に選抜し、従事する職務に応じて給与を支給する官職中心の人事管理<sup>6</sup>とすることを目指すとともに、PAS を導入し、個々の職員の勤務成績を測定し、人事管理に反映させることを規定していた。

また、このような人事管理が公正に企画され、実施されることを担保するため、NPSA の制定により、内閣からの高い独立性を有する、専門的な中立・第三者機関である中央人事行政機関として、1948 年に人事院（National Personnel Authority）（以下、NPA という。）が創設された<sup>7・8</sup>。

<sup>2</sup> Constitution of Japan ; **Article 15**② “All public officials are servants of the whole community and not of any group thereof.”

<sup>3</sup> Mr. Kiyoshi ASAI, first President of NPA & former Professor of administrative law of Keio University, stressed NPSA as the Reform Act in his “Commentary of NPSA” <revised version, published in 1970>.

<sup>4</sup> “Principle of Meeting Changing Conditions” means that working conditions of civil service ought to be legislated in accordance with general conditions of society, esp. to meet public sector pay, through NPA recommendations.

<sup>5</sup> The antithesis of “Merit System” is “Nepotism” or “Spoils System” .

<sup>6</sup> “Rank-in-position” , whereas former system could be called “Rank-in-person” .

<sup>7</sup> NPA is constituted by 3 Commissioners with the secretariat of 630 staffs, and responsible for 1) ensuring neutrality & fairness in the Personnel Administration and 2) protecting the benefits of public employees.

<sup>8</sup> This case doesn't handle the matters of administrative institutions or number of employees, but see Table 1 & 2 for reference.

現在国において国家公務員の人事行政、人事管理に関わる機関としては、人事院の他に内閣人事局や各府省庁があるが、その役割分担は概略次のとおりである。

人事院：人事行政の公正の確保及び労働基本権制約の代償機能の確保の観点から基準の設定等

内閣人事局：幹部職員人事の一元管理等に関する事務を担うとともに、政府としての人材戦略を推進していくため、人事管理に関連する制度について、企画立案、方針決定、運用を一体的に担当

各府省庁：法令に基づき、個別の人事権を行使

なお、内閣人事局は 2014 年 5 月に設置された組織であり、それまで総務省人事恩給局が所管していた人事行政と、人事院が有していた機能の一部が移管されている。内閣人事局は、内閣総理大臣が行う人事行政の事務を担当する機関であることから、一定の場合については人事行政の公正性の確保の観点から、人事院の意見を聴くこととされている。

## 2 Case 1 職階制（JCS）の機能不全とその克服

### 2.1 Backgrounds

JCS とは、公務員全体の官職・ポストを職務記述書の作成等を通じて、分類・整理し、その分類結果ごとに試験要件等を明らかにすることによって、職務を基本に、客観性をもった公務員制度全体のいわば OS（オペレーション・システム）として、公務員制度の各制度、すなわち人事配置や昇任等の任用や、給与決定などに活用しようとするものであり<sup>9</sup>、先に述べたとおり、第 2 次世界大戦前の官吏制度が「天皇陛下の官吏」として身分や人の属性を基本に行われていたものを抜本的に改める上での基礎となるものであった。

このような JCS は、米国において、具体的には、戦間期（第一次世界大戦及び第二次世界大戦の間）にシカゴ市で事務員の職務（Clerical Jobs）の管理を念頭に考案され、連邦政府公務員制度には 1923 年に初期のものが導入され、その後、第二次世界大戦直後の 1949 年に本格的に適用されたものであった。

すなわち、当時、比較法的にみても先端的な米国起源の JCS を、組織や職場の風土や伝統が基本的に異なる日本の国の行政機関に、大きな変更を加えることなく、科学的人事行政の基本的ツールとして、我が国公務員制度に移植しようとするものであった。

### 2.2 Process as an initial approach and its outcome

NPA は、NPSA に基づき 1948 年に創立され、JCS が適切に実施に移されるよう、制度面、実施面の両面から最大限の努力を行った<sup>10</sup>。

まず、法制面では、1950 年 5 月には、JCS の基本を定める法律（職階法）（以下、JCSA という。）が人事院の案に基づき国会で制定されたほか、1952 年 7 月までには任用・給与への活用方法を含め、職階法・職階制度の実施に必要な各種人事院規則が制定・整備がされていった。

また、職階制の対象となる約 50 万（当時）にも上る官職のうち、実際に多くの官職について、官職の分析や職務記述書の作成等を通じて官職の分類整理も行われ、1955 年頃までには、制度的にはいつでも本格実施できるようになっていた。

加えて、各方面からの分類の簡素化等の要望を受け、職種（Job Series）の数の大括

<sup>9</sup> See Table 3 attached.

<sup>10</sup> Special Division in charge of JCS had been established in the NPA Secretariat.

り化（449 職種から 129 職種へ）など必要な見直しについても適宜行っていた<sup>11</sup>。

しかしながら、JCS は、結果として、NPSA や JCSA が当初予定していた形では、実施・実現されることはできなかった。要は、米国直輸入の制度であり、その前提となる仕事のやり方や人材登用等人事管理の在り方が、日本の職場風土や人事風土になじむことができなかつたからだといえよう。

具体的に、不実施となった理由・背景を挙げると、次の 5 点である。

- ① JCS が前提とした人事管理は、個々の官職に空きが生じた場合に、公務内外を通じて公募等を行い、適任者を選抜して任用するという開放型人事システムを前提としていたが、日本の人事風土は、公務員、民間企業を通じて、閉鎖型人事システム、すなわち、新規学卒者を中心に一括して、エントリー・レベルで採用し、多様な職務経験や研修機会の付与等を通じて人材育成しながら選抜し、登用していくという人事管理（長期継続雇用、部内育成の原則、年功的人事管理）が基本であり、開放型の人事管理を前提とした JCS はなじみがたかつた<sup>12</sup>。
- ② JCS により、個々の公務員の職務や責任の範囲については、その就いている官職・ポストごとの職務記述書により限定され、かつ明確化されるという建前であったが、日本においては、公務、民間の職場を通じて「大部屋主義」<sup>13</sup>が基本であって、個々人の職務の範囲を必ずしも明確化されず、上司・部下、同僚の間で協力し、サポートし合う集団的な業務遂行体制をとっている場合が多く、このような状況に JCS はなじみ難かつた。
- ③ JCS の制度設計が理念的かつ技術的になり過ぎた面もあり<sup>14</sup>、実際の人事を行う各省庁から専門性によって職種を細分化すると異動・昇進の範囲が狭くなり、円滑な人事配置に支障を生ずるなど人事権の制約と受取られ、十分な支持が得られなかつた<sup>15</sup>。
- ④ 職員団体（労働組合）側は、JCS によって、職務給原則が徹底されると、給与の配分が「上厚下薄」、幹部職員や管理者の給与水準が高くなり、係員をはじめとする組合員層の給与水準を抑制されることになるのではないかとの懸念から、JCS に対して、否定的ないし懐疑的であつた。
- ⑤ 加えて、約 50 万（当時）にも上る個々の官職の職務分析の積み上げによる官職分

<sup>11</sup> At first job-series were estimated over 500 for 800,000 positions. As of 1/1952 NPA officially announced the number was 449, but after the broad banding the number was reduced to 126 for 500,000 positions in 6/1954 – 300,000 Postal Workers were excluded from JCS.

<sup>12</sup> Under the “Life Time Employment” system or practices, after recruited, staffs change their positions almost every 2 or 3 years by employers’ initiatives to get various experiences – a kind of OJT. If a staff shows excellent performance, he/she is promoted or transferred to a better position. There aren’t such practices as applications to Inner-office / outer vacancy - announcements.

<sup>13</sup> Under the Large-Room Principle, sometimes more than 30 staffs including a division director share the same large office space, which enables each member to recognize his / her colleagues’ jobs or tasks and to support or even substitute them during their absence.

<sup>14</sup> JCS was planned both for appointment & pay, which made the system complicated. But even in the US federal public service system, Job Classification System is planned & used mainly for pay.

<sup>15</sup> Japanese Central Government has decentralized personnel management structures; Although personnel systems are common among ministries regulated by laws & NPA regulations, the state minister of each ministry is the appointive officer, and the final officer in charge of each ministry’s personnel management.

類を行い、かつ、職務内容の変化に機動的に対応してこれを適正に維持するためには、事務的に煩雑かつ膨大なコストがかかるものと懸念がもたれた。

- ⑥ さらに、①と関連するが、日本の雇用分野においては、そもそも民間部門においても、雇用の流動性が限定であり、かつ、労働条件に関する労使交渉も（企業横断的な企業連合と職種・職能別の労働組合との交渉ではなく）個別企業と企業内組合の間で行われるのが専らであることもあって、企業横断的な職種の概念が必ずしも確立しておらず、職務分類の風土・土壌が乏しかったことも挙げられよう。

勿論、人事院は、これら問題点に対して、先に述べたとおり、例えば、事務簡素化や運用の弾力性の確保の観点から、職務分離の簡素化や大括り化を図るなど、円滑な実施のために様々な改善努力を行った<sup>16</sup>。その後、1982年には政府の第二次臨時行政調査会から「JCSAを廃止する方向で、現実的な立場から検討を行うこと」が適当である旨の提言がなされ、NPAにおいてJCSに代わる分類制度の構築を含めて必要な検討がNPAにおいて行われた。

しかしながら、次に述べる人事管理・運用の下、結果として、JCSはNPSAの制定当初に予定されていた形では実施されることはなく、また、長期にわたってJCSAが改廃されることなく、2007年にNPSAからJCS関連規定が削除され、かつJCSAが廃止されるまでその状況は継続した。

JCSは当初予定していた形では長期にわたって実施されることはなかったが、NPSAの理念に基づき、JCSが目指していた職務と責任（職責）に応じた公正な給与（職務給原則）や能力実証主義に基づく昇任・配置といった任用は、可成の程度実現されていた。

給与面においては、基本給である俸給表について、役職段階を基礎とした簡便な職務分類による職務等級制を導入し、職責に応じた格付けを実現するとともに、任用面においても、この給与上の職務等級制を暫定的にJCSによる官職分類とみなして活用することなどによって、NPSAが求める諸原則を人事管理の実情と調和した形で実現していた。

具体的には、次のとおりである。

第一に、任用のうち採用については、NPAは、1950年前後には、係員級（エントリー・レベル）に関する採用試験制度を整備し、大規模に自ら企画・実施にすることにより、広く有為の人材の確保を行うとともに、メリット・システム、能力実証主義の徹底を図った<sup>17 18</sup>。なお、NPAは、採用試験制度について、人材の需給の状況等を踏まえつつ、国の行政を支える多様な有為の人材確保を目指して、試験の種類や区分、試験内容等に関して適時に見直しを行ってきている<sup>19</sup>。

第二に、給与については、NPSA制定当初の公務員給与の給与決定の要素としては、年齢給要素、生活給要素が大きく、高校卒業の初任給から一般職国家公務員の最上位の事務次官の給与を一本の指数曲線で結ぶことによって、基本給（俸給）の額を決定し、基本給（俸給）の表を作る、いわゆる「通し号俸制」をとっており、このため、勤務年数に応じ

<sup>16</sup> “First Provisional Commission for Administrative Reform” also recommended to simplify the JCS<1964>.

<sup>17</sup> First NPA examinations were inaugurated in 1949. In the fiscal year 2007, NPA organized 16 kinds of recruitment examinations – in total 126,453 applied, 13,544 passed, 6,285 recruited. <NPA Annual Report>

<sup>18</sup> Under JCS, it was ideally recognized that competitive examinations ought to be executed for each vacant position, or for each so-called “Class”; basic classified job group. But NPA has implemented examinations by large banded job categories.

<sup>19</sup> For examples, NPA made thorough recruitment-examination system reforms in 1985 & 2012.



て右肩上がりに給与額が増加する年功的な給与カーブ（Profile）を描く一方、職務の違いによる給与額の差は少なかった<sup>20</sup>。しかしながら、1957年に給与法の改正を行い、基本給である俸給表の構造を改め、係員、係長、課長補佐、課長などの役職段階に応じた8等級制からなる職務等級制を導入し、職務と責任に応じて給与差が図れるようにし、NPSAが定める職務給原則の実現を図った。その際、官職が求める客観的な職務・責任だけではなく、経験年数や勤務成績など職員個人の要素をも考慮できる簡便な格付けとした（【補足】参照）。

第三に、採用以外の昇任や人事配置等の任用面についても、この役職段階を基礎とした、給与上の分類（職務等級制）を活用して、昇任、降任、転任等を定義するとともに、給与上の職務の級への格付け基準（①官職がNPA規則の級別標準職務表に定める標準的な職務に該当すること、②級別定数の範囲内であること、③当該職員の勤務成績が優秀であること及び④NPA規則が定める必要な経験年数を満たしていることなど）を任用においても昇任等における必要基準として活用して、公正かつ能力主義に基づいた任用の実現を図った。

以上のとおり、本来のJCSと実際の運用との間には乖離はあったものの、このような仕組みをとることにより、日本的な人事管理の特色である、長期継続雇用、部内育成・登用などと調和を図った形で、NPSAやJCSの趣旨や理念は、実現がなされたとも評価できよう。

このような暫定的な状況は、NPSA制定後、半世紀超にわたって継続したが、次の2.3で述べるとおり、2007年のNPSAの改正（2009年実施）により、人事評価制度の導入と併せて（3で詳説）、従前のJCSを廃止し、役職段階・職位を基本とした現実的な仕組みに正面から改めることにより、制度と運用の乖離の解消を図ることができた。

#### 【補足】俸給表の職務等級制<sup>21</sup>

俸給表の職務等級は、役職段階を基本とするが、同一の役職段階に応じた等級は複数設けることとし、同一の役職段階の官職であっても、求められる職務と責任の程度に応じて異なる職務の級に官職を格付けすることができるとするものである。ただ、同一の官職を占めながらも、職員の経験や能力向上等と相まって、官職の職務と責任の評価を変更することが可能であり、このことを通じて、職務給原則の下で、職務給と「人」の能力向上との調和が図られ、職務と人を融合させた実際の人事管理に対応し得る仕組みといえよう。

例えば、一般の事務職種の俸給表である行政職俸給表（一）の場合、係長に対応する等級は、3級、4級であり、職務給の観点からは、職務と責任の比較的軽い係長を3等級、職務と責任の困難な係長を4等級に位置づけた上で、初任の係長は3級に格付けられた後、一定年数勤務し、成績が優秀であれば、能力が向上したと認め、4級にあらかじめ格付けられた他の係長の官職に異動することなく、当該係長の官職に就いたまま、その官職を4級と評価替えして、4等級に昇格させることができる運用である。

なお、俸給表の職務等級の構成について、NPAは、業務の複雑化等に伴う職務・職責の変化や組織の人員構成の変化等に応じて、必要な見直しを行ってきている。具体的には、行政職俸給表（一）の場合、1957年時点では8等級制であったが、1964年には事

<sup>20</sup> Although Basic Salary Schedules had grades parallel to job-ladders, even before 1957, there were little differences among grades on amounts of salary if length of services as civil service were equal, because of structures of scales, so-called “consecutive step system” .

<sup>21</sup> See Tables 4 & 5 attached.

務次官、局長等の等級を別俸給表として削除し、課長補佐級に 1 等級増設したほか（結果として±0 の 8 等級制）、1985 年には課長級、課長補佐級、係長級にそれぞれ 1 級増設することにより 11 級制とし、さらに 2006 年には課長級の増設、係長級及び係員級の各 1 級削減により 10 級制とした。

### 2.3 Revised policy contents

1990 年前後のいわゆるバブル経済が終焉した後、多くの日本の民間企業においては、効率的な組織運営に向けて、組織・人事制度の減量化・改革に取り組んだ。このような民間の状況に加え、社会の少子高齢化・情報化の進展、行政諸課題のグローバル化などに適切に対応できるよう、1990 年代後半以降、公務組織においても、行政改革や公務員の人事管理の見直しが重要な課題となってきた<sup>22</sup>。

特に、2001 年の中央省庁の再編（23 省庁から 13 府省に削減<sup>23</sup>）以降、公務員制度についても、公務員の労働基本権の在り方や中央人事行政機関である NPA の役割など基本事項を含め、人事管理全般にわたる様々な議論が行われた。

その結果、公務員の退職管理の在り方と併せて、能力・実績主義人事の一層の推進を行うこととなり、2007 年の NPSA の改正により、PES の導入と併せて、従来からの懸案でもあった、JCS の在り方についても見直しを行うことができた。

具体的には、

- ① NPSA から JCS に関する規定を削除し、JCSA を廃止するとともに、
- ② 給与上の職務等級制は、引き続き従前通りとし、
- ③ 任用については、
  - 1) 任用上必要な職務分類は、課長、課長補佐等の役職段階、すなわち職制上の段階とすることを法律上明記し、
  - 2) 任用に当たって必要な資格要件として、当該職制上の段階ごとに、標準職務遂行能力を新たに定めることとした（なお、標準職務遂行能力は、後で述べる新たな PES の能力評価の基準と共通化を図られた。）<sup>24</sup>。

すなわち、JCS が目指した職務調査を基礎に実証的に精緻な職務分類を行い、その分類を唯一の分類として任用制度、給与制度の共通の基礎とするという考え方は修正され、任用制度、給与制度それぞれの制度で必要な職務分類を設けるものとなったが、いずれも簡便な役職段階を基本としており、2007 年前の運用を制度化したものといえ、それ故、職務を中心に合理的な人事管理を行っていくという NPSA の基本理念の下、制度と運用の乖離の解消を図られるとともに、円滑に制度移行がなされたところである。

## 3 Case 2: 従前の勤務評定制度（PAS）の機能不全と新たな人事評価制度（PES）の導入

### 3.1 Backgrounds

<sup>22</sup> The experts meeting chaired by Mr. Kyogoku, Professor Emeritus of Uni. Tokyo presented to NPA the report for “Personnel Management in the new era” in March 1998, and also “Investigation Committee for Public Employee System” made the basic report in March 1999.

<sup>23</sup> The 2001 central government reform aimed to reinforce cabinet functions and improve efficiency of administration, based on the 1998 report of the Administrative Reform Council headed by P.M. Hashimoto.

<sup>24</sup> See Table 7 attached, which shows PES criteria ( = ability to perform standard duties ) for division directors level

NPSA の制定当初より、個々人の勤務成績を定期的に評定し、その評定の結果に応じた措置を講ずる仕組みとして、PAS が予定され、1950 年頃には実際に導入されていた。

2 の JCS も PAS もいずれも科学的な人事行政の基礎となるものであったが、JCS が官職（ポスト）の職務と責任の度を評価し分類するものであったのに対して、PAS は、個々の官職（ポスト）に実際に就いている（任用されている）職員の勤務実績の評価という点で、異なる仕組みであった。

そもそも、個々の職員の勤務成績の評価をどのような形で行い、その客観性や納得性をどのように確保していくのか、ということは、2014 年の現時点においても、公務部門・民間部門あるいは国の内外を問わず、非常に重要かつ容易ではない課題である。

日本の国家公務員に PAS が導入された 1950 年頃は、民間部門でも、未だ十分な人事考課制度は導入されておらず、国家公務員の制度が日本におけるリーディング・ケース、先進的な取り組みであった。

NPA は、PAS の検討及び導入に当たって、参考となる仕組みについて国内外を対象に調査研究を行ったが、国内には参考となる仕組みが見当たらず、結果として、JCS と同様、米国連邦政府の評定制度<sup>25</sup>を参考として制度設計を行うこととなった。

具体的制度設計に当たって、NPA は、1948 年から翌年にかけて、NPA の全職員（当時約千人）を対象に実験評定を 2 回行うとともに、NPA と関係省庁の担当官なる会議を設けて、郵便局や造幣局、刑務所、気象台などの官署においても実験評定を行いながら、検討し、1950 年 10 月、PAS の制度要綱をとりまとめた。その後、NPA は、PAS の合理的な実施と結果の適正な実施を目的に関係省庁会議を設け、60 回にわたって開催するとともに、同年 12 月には、各省庁の監督者約 2 万 5 千人を対象に評定要素について調査を行い、評定要素及び評定要素間の軽重を決定した。その上で、1951 年 1 月、全省庁で試験評定を実施するとともに、翌 2 月には NPA は、PAS の実施に必要な関係 NPA 規則を制定・公布し、PAS の実施のための準備は整った。各府省においては、同 5 月以降、部内規程を整備し、順次、実施することとなった<sup>26</sup>。この PAS は、人事院方式と呼ばれ、その後の民間企業や地方公共団体における人事考課制度導入の推進力ともなった<sup>27</sup>。

この PAS は JCS とは異なり、国家公務員については毎年、曲がりなりにも実施はされていたものの、残念ながら、多くの職場で形式的に行われるなど形骸化し、実際の人事管理への活用ができず、十分に機能することができなかった<sup>28</sup>。

その理由として、次のような点が挙げられよう。

- ① 日本においては、1950 年代から 70 年代にかけて、公務部門も含めて、労働運動が激しく、国家公務員の職員団体をはじめ、同様の仕組みを導入しようとしていた地方公務員、なかんずく公立学校の教員の職員団体などが、PAS の実施に対して、違法な争議行為を含めて激しい反対闘争を行い、円滑な実施の大きな障害となった<sup>29</sup>。

<sup>25</sup> “Standard Form No.57” of US Civil Service Commission was mainly referred.

<sup>26</sup> The forms of Appraisal Reports were not common among ministries, and were regulated through consultations with NPA.

<sup>27</sup> “20 Years of Personnel Administration” <P.294 NPA 12/1968>

<sup>28</sup> Results of PAS were to some extent applied to pay increase/step increase, but not systematically.

<sup>29</sup> In Japanese legal structure, NPSA is not applied to local governments' employees, as shown in Table 1, but the relevant act, called “Local Public Service Act”, is enacted. Teachers unions had severely been against PAS insisting impossibility of evaluating teachings, and in consequence, PAS were not implemented for them

- ② 勤務評価制度自体の内容は、制度的には、当時としては先進的なものであり、現在の視点でも必ずしも大きな問題を有するわけではなかったが、1) 評価の基準が必ずしも明確ではなかったこと、2) 評価項目の中に「性格」といった主観的な事項も含まれていたこと、3) 評価結果は相対評価とされ、上位は概ね3割以内とされていたこと、4) 評価はあくまで管理者が一方的に行うものとされ、その結果は職員本人に対しても非公開とされていたこと、5) 任用・給与など人事管理への活用方法が具体化されていなかったこと、などの問題点や状況等があり、納得性、公正性等の観点からは不十分な面は否めないところであった。
- ③ 加えて、PAS の立案過程は、上で述べたとおり、各府省担当者の意見交換、実験評価などを行うなど手順を踏んだものといえようが、第二次世界大戦直後の社会経済の混乱状態が続いている中で、そもそも人事考課制度の土壌がないところに、新たには設計し、導入するには極めて拙速であったといわざるを得ない。形としては作ったものの、有機的に機能するための手順を十分に踏んだとはいいがたく、そのことが後々まで影響を与えたものといえよう<sup>30</sup>。

PAS が有機的に機能しない結果、昇進や人事配置などの任用については、主として人事当局による長期間にわたる職員の働きぶりの観察などを通じて行われるとともに、給与面（昇給、ボーナス）での勤務成績の反映については、給与制度内での必ずしも様式化されていない簡便な判定を通じて行われてきた。

このため、任用面では、採用試験の種類や採用年次などの年功序列を重視した人事管理がなされ、給与面でも、いわゆる持ち回りの運用など職員の間で大きな差がつかないような運用がなされてきたが、日本全体が右肩上がりの経済成長の下、2.2①でのべたような官民を通じた雇用風土の中においては、むしろ職員が高いモラルをもって職務を遂行する上で、プラスの要素として理解されてきた。これが、1990年代はじめのいわゆるバブル経済が終焉するまでの状況である。

その後は、3.2.2 で述べるとおり、このような人事管理は、過度の平等的な取扱いではないか、また、成績主義、能力実証主義が十分には徹底されてこなかったのではないのか、職員に対する説明責任が不十分ではないのか、といった批判が惹き起こされることとなり、PES 導入の議論につながっていく。

## 3.2 Policy contents and Policymaking process

### 3.2.1 Policy contents

2009 年から本格実施された新たな PES の主な内容と特色は、次のとおりである。

#### (1) 能力評価と業績評価による評価

人事評価は、客観性、納得性の確保を念頭に、民間でも広く導入されている現実にと

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unlike national public employees.

#### <sup>30</sup> “Column”

Mr. Andoh, the Director of PAS section at the time of its planning & introduction, recollected in “20 Years of Personnel Administration” <P.312 NPA 12/1968> as follows; “Unlike compensation or appointment matters, the officer in charge of GHQ/SCAP, Mr. Tyndel, was less interested in PAS, or reluctant to introduce PAS because he was very much skeptical of its fair implementations. By the support of Commissioner Yamashita, one of the 3 members of NPA, I succeeded in introducing PAS regulations after getting approval of GHQ, while the officer of GHQ and my boss, Mr. Kaneko, Director-General of Bureau, were on official trip to US for three months – Study Mission to the US headed by Prof. Masamichi ROHYAMA, Uni. Tokyo & funded by GARIOA.”

った行動に対する現代的な評価の手法、すなわち行動特性（コンピタンス）を用いた能力評価と目標管理（MBO）的な手法を用いた業績評価からなるものとした。

このうち、能力評価は、その評価項目等の策定に当たって、職員に対して優秀者の行動特性に関するアンケート調査を行い、その結果等も参考とした。ただ、前述の試行を経る中、任用における職制段階ごとの共通基準である標準職務遂行能力の内容と共通化を図ったため、コンピタンス（成果を生み出す優秀者の行動特性）という性格が薄れ、結果として概括化、抽象化された面は否定できない<sup>31</sup>。また、評価項目が職務と関連した客観的なものとなるよう、従前の PAS にあったような、主観的な要素である被評価者の性格に関する事項は、評価項目とはしなかった。

また、業績評価は、MBO の手法を取り入れるものの、民間企業のように売上高といった数値で業務を評価することが困難であるという、公務の特性を踏まえ、必ずしも数値目標など定量的目標を設定する必要はなく、いつまでに何をやり遂げたかといったプロセスを重視したものとするこゝも可能な弾力的な仕組みとした。

なお、人事評価の期間をどのような時期に設定するのか、各府省共通の時期とするのかどうかは、実務上、各府省協議における大きな議論となり、業務上のサイクルや繁忙、評価結果の活用する上での長短の観点から、種々の選択肢の検討がなされた結果、各府省共通の時期として、能力評価は年 1 階（評価期間 10 月 1 日から翌年 9 月 30 日まで）、業績評価は年 2 回（評価期間 4 月 1 日から 9 月 30 日まで、10 月 1 日から翌年 3 月 31 日まで）、それぞれ行われることとなった<sup>32</sup>。

## (2) 評価項目の明示

評価の透明性や職員に対する納得性を確保するためには、能力評価における評価項目や評価に当たっての着眼点等をあらかじめ定め、被評価者に明示することは重要であり、NPA 等の HP や各府省の電子掲示板等を通じて行っている。

## (3) 絶対評価

人事評価は、人材育成にも活用するものであり、あくまで個々の職員の能力、業績を評価基準に照らして絶対的に評価するものであって、職員の納得性の観点からも、（分布率をあらかじめ定めるような）相対評価にはよらないこととした。

また、評価結果の評語は、個別の評価項目ごとの評価は a, b, c の 3 段階、総合評価は S, A, B, C, D の 5 段階とし、それぞれ評価に当たっての具体的な基準・目安を、納得性の観点からも被評価者に対して（2）と同様、明示している。

その上で、査定昇給やボーナス（勤勉手当）など給与に評価結果を反映させる際には、予算等の制約もあることから、(7) a) のとおり、絶対評価による評価結果を相対化して活用している。

## (4) 評価結果の本人開示・面談等の実施

人事評価の透明性や納得性を高めるため、上司とのコミュニケーションや本人関与等を重視することとし、具体的には、被評価者による自己申告、評価期間の期首及び期末における上司との面談、評価結果の被評価者への開示・フィードバック等を組み込んだ。この点については、【補足】のとおり、関係者間での主要論点としての議論を経てのものである。

<sup>31</sup> See Table 7 attached.

<sup>32</sup> A Number of staffs are transferred among ministries in the course of a year, so in order to avoid complex coordination, the terms of evaluations are unified among them.

なお、評価は、公正の確保の観点から、評価者として原則、課長が第一次の評価を行うとともに、絶対評価であることに伴う評価者間（すなわち所属課の間）での有利不利が生じないとするなどの観点から、評価者の上司である局長等が、第2次の評価を行う調整者とするなど、2段階の評価を行っている。

#### 【補足】

評価の制度設計に当たって、関係者間の協議中で大きな論点となったのが、この評価結果の開示についてであった。

評価結果の開示は、人材育成への活用という点からも、また、職員に対する納得性の確保や説明責任という観点からも、重要であることはいうまでもない。しかしながら、日本の雇用関係における風土、特色として、官民を通じて、個々の職員の能力や実績について、白黒を明確につけ、差別化を図ることを避けることが一般的であり、（任用や給与への反映の結果から遡ってある程度は推測されるものの）評価結果それ自体を開示することは、伝統的に人事上の秘密として否定的であった。

その背景としては、①日本の業務遂行方式として、いわゆる大部屋主義、すなわち組織として業務遂行をしており、特定の個人の能力・成果を高く評価したり、低く評価したりすることは必ずしも説得的ではなかったこと（2.2②で言及）、②（長期継続雇用の慣行の中で、幹部職員への選抜時期は、比較的遅く<sup>33)</sup>（明らかに劣った者はともかく、相当の期間、明確な黒白をつけないことにより）多くの者が将来におけるより高い処遇を期待しつつ、全体として高いモラルをもって職務に貢献することが期待でき、使用者としても好都合であったことが挙げられよう。

協議に当たって、制度担当である NPA 等は、客観的で公正性や透明性が高く、実効性のある人事評価制度としていくためには、人材育成に活用していく上でも、少なくとも評価結果（評語）の開示は必要であるとの立場であった。一方、職員団体は、透明性、納得性の観点から、評価シート全体を開示すべきとの考え方があったが、他方、直接、人事管理を行う各府省の人事担当者からは、人事当局の専管事項として慎重な意見が強かった。

協議の結果、一定の弾力的な取扱いの容認を前提に、個々の評価項目については任意とし、各評価項目全体を総括的に表す全体評語について開示ないしフィードバックを行うことで関係者間での合意に至った。

#### (5) 評価研修

NPA は、評価者間の評価結果のぶれをできるだけ少なくし、評価結果の客観性や公平性を確保するため、評価能力や部下に対する指導力の向上等を目的にしたロールプレイを含めた評価者研修を3種類開発し、実施しており、本府省、地方機関を通じて多数の管理者・評価者が参加している<sup>34)</sup>。

#### (6) 苦情への対応

評価結果の任用、給与等への活用が徹底されると、任用、給与等の決定に対する不服のほか、評価結果その他評価の実施自体に関する苦情も増加することが予想されたこと

<sup>33</sup> Professor Hiroaki INATSUGU, University of Waseda, described the situation positively as “late screening” in his book, “Personnel System of Japanese Bureaucrats” published in 1996.

<sup>34</sup> NPA has developed and conducted following courses; 1) Training to improve personnel evaluation abilities, a) Advanced Course for directors at HQs & b) Role-playing Course for directors at regional bureaus & 2) Personnel Management Seminar. For details please contact & ask relevant officers of NPA.

から、これらに適切に対応し、公正性・納得性が確保されるよう、各府省において必要な体制整備が行われたほか、NPA には、従前からある（評価結果を活用した）昇進、降任や給与決定等に関する不服申立制度<sup>35</sup>に加えて、評価結果自体に対する苦情処理のため専門の部署（「人事評価苦情調整室」）が設けられるなど苦情対応の仕組みが整備された<sup>36</sup>。

(7) 評価結果の昇給・ボーナス、昇任・降任・免職等への活用

評価結果の任用、給与への活用基準をあらかじめ明確に定め、実際に活用し、かつ活用を行っているというのは、従前の PAS と異なる大きな特色である。

具体的な活用の仕組みは、次のとおりである<sup>37</sup>。

a) 給与

評価結果は、毎年の基本給（俸給）の昇給や半年ごとの特別給（ボーナス）に直結して、反映させている。その際、予算上の制約もあるため、絶対評価の結果を相対化し、昇給では上位 25%、ボーナスでは上位 30%の成績優秀者に限って、平均を上回る給与上の効果を与えている。

i) 昇給

基本給（俸給）は、過去 1 年間の 1 回の能力評価と 2 回の業績評価の結果に基づいて、上位 25%を決定し、それら成績優秀者に対して、直後の昇給期（1 月）において、標準者（4 号俸）を上回る昇給（6 号俸または 8 号俸）が行われる。また、下位の評価を受けた者については、そのまま 2 号俸昇給が昇給なしとなる。

ii) ボーナス（勤勉手当）

ボーナス（勤勉手当）は、年 2 回、6 月、12 月に支給される。それぞれ直前の業績評価の上位の者から順に、上位 30%の成績優秀者に対して、標準者の最大 2 倍のボーナス（勤勉手当）の支給が行われる<sup>38</sup>。また、下位の評価を受けた者については、標準を下回る支給となる。

b) 昇任・降任・免職

任用についても、例えば、昇任の場合、職制段階に応じて過去 2 年間又は 3 年間の能力評価及び業績評価において、上位の評価結果が必要とするなど、過去の評価結果を用いた基準をあらかじめ定め、任命権者の裁量によって、具体的な昇任者を選抜することとしている。

なお、a) の給与への活用との違いは、給与については評価結果のみで反映が決定されるのに対して、昇任については、評価結果はあくまで昇任候補者の選定、いわば足きりにとどまり、実際に誰を昇任させるのかは各府省の任命権者の総合勘案に委ねられているなど、評価結果だけでは一義的に昇任者を決定する仕組みにはなっていない

<sup>35</sup> Besides judicial procedures, national public employees can appeal to NPA against disadvantageous actions. NPA has had the quasi-judicial system, a sort of ARD – Alternate Disputes Resolution, since its establishment by NPSA. In the Physical Year 2012, the section received new 67 cases.

<sup>36</sup> “The section for complaints on PES” was established in Equity & Investigation Bureau, NPA. In the Physical Year 2013, the section received new 23 cases which were unable to be solved in each ministry.

<sup>37</sup> See Table 8 attached.

<sup>38</sup> Bonus has a relatively large share in annual compensation in Japan, both in private sector & public sector pay. As of 12/2014, annual amount of average bonus is equivalent 4.1 months of basic salary. Bonus is consisted of 2 parts, end-term allowance & diligent allowance. Performance is affected to the latter; In the case of June, average performer 0.795month, whereas the best performer 1.65months.

い。これは、人事評価制度のもつ限界であると同時に、弾力性ともいえよう。

### 3.2.2 Policymaking process

1990年頃のいわゆるバブル経済の終焉の後、民間部門では、企業経営の合理化の一環として、従前の年功、年齢を重視した処遇を見直しし、従業員の能力や業績を重視した処遇体系への変革 – 職務給や役割給の導入、成果主義賃金への転換、がトレンドとなった。また、その基礎として、職務分析・評価の導入などとともに<sup>39</sup>、目標管理(MBO<sup>40</sup>)や自己評価などの手法を含む人事評価・人事考課制度の導入・改善も多くの企業で検討された。

こういった中、公務においても、職員のモラルを高め、公務能率の向上を図っていくためには、民間における動向を踏まえながら、成績主義の原則のより一層の徹底を図ることが重要であると考えられるようになった。このため、職員の能力や勤務実績を的確かつ公正に把握し、任用や給与、人材育成等に活用していくための基盤となる評価の仕組みが必要となったが、従前のPASは内容面で不十分であり、かつ、過去の職員団体の反対闘争もあり、労使双方から忌避感が強かったことから、NPAが中心となって、任用、給与制度の見直しと併せて、新たな人事評価制度の見直しに着手した。

新たな評価制度は、公務を取り巻く環境変化の下で、公務員のモラルを高め、行政運営の効率化を図っていくため、公務の特性を踏まえながら、能力・実績に基づく人事管理の基盤となるよう、職員の能力や実績を的確に把握し、人材育成、任用・人事配置、給与等に活用していくためのものであり、具体的反映方法を併せて整備したものである。

政治情勢等との関係もあり、紆余曲折を経ながらも、関係者間での協議を重ねながら、フィージビリティがあり、かつ実際に任用、給与等に活用できる仕組みとして、制度化され、2009年に本格実施に至った。

成功裏に導入することができた背景としては、次の3点が挙げられよう。

- ① 客観的で公正性・透明性が高く、実効性のある人事評価制度を確立することを基本理念とし、民間企業等における先進的な仕組みを取り入れつつも、いたずらに精緻になり過ぎず、公務職場の実情や特性に応じた運用を可能とする弾力的な仕組みにしたこと<sup>41</sup>。
- ② 制度の検討に当たって、NPAは、総務省人事恩給局とともに、実際の人事管理を行う各府省当局や、職員団体との間で十分な意見交換・意思疎通を行ったこと。
- ③ 制度導入に当たって、習熟に向けて本格実施までに4度に渡る試行を重ねたり、全職員を対象とした研修を行うなど、十分な準備を行ったこと。

NPAは、3.2.2の冒頭で述べた民間における取組み状況や公務員人事管理を取り巻く状況を踏まえ、1999年9月、大学教授等の学識経験者、民間企業実務家、労働組合関係者等からなる研究会(「能力、実績等の評価、活用に関する研究会」)を設け<sup>42</sup>、

<sup>39</sup> “Hay Methodology - Profile Guide Chart” is one of popular job evaluation systems from US, which many Japanese big firms tried to introduce. But the methodology has a lot of common points with the old JCS, so for which it might be still difficult to be applied directly to the Government Systems.

<sup>40</sup> Management by Objectives

<sup>41</sup> Main reasons of failure of JCS & PAS were direct introductions of unfamiliar foreign systems. NPA Studied foreign evaluation system at the introduction of PES, but no more than a reference.

<sup>42</sup> NPA declared establishing the study group in the Report at the annual pay recommendation to the Cabinet & the Diet on 11/Aug/1999. Chairman of the study committee was Professor Sasajima, Meiji Gakuin Uni.



PAS に代わる新たな人事評価の在り方及びその活用法に関する制度設計の検討に着手した。約 1 年半にわたって、19 回の会合等を通じた検討の後、2000 年 6 月の中間報告を経て、2001 年 3 月に同研究会は最終報告（以下「報告書」という。）をとりまとめた<sup>43</sup>。検討に当たっては、公務における現状と問題点を整理しつつ、民間企業、諸外国における人事評価制度及びその活用状況を把握しながら、公務に相応しい仕組みを目指した。

この報告書においては、新たな人事評価について、評価手法（コンピテンシーすなわち行動特性による能力の評価、MBO すなわち目標管理的手法を用いた業績の評価）、評価項目のイメージ、面談の在り方など評価の具体的な実施方法、評価システム研修、さらには、苦情相談の在り方、任用、給与への活用の在り方などを提示し、民間企業における取組状況を積極的に取り入れた、先進的、かつ、フィージビリティの高い仕組みであった。

なお、報告書のとりまとめに当たっては、研究会の各メンバーはもとより、事務局となった NPA 職員の貢献度は高かった。

一方、政府は、2001 年 12 月に「公務員制度改革大綱」を閣議決定した。この大綱においては、新たに能力等級制度を導入し、これを基礎とした新任用制度と新給与制度を確立するとともに、PAS にかわる「能力評価」と「業績評価」からなる新評価制度を導入することを柱とする新人事制度の構築がうたわれていた。さらにそのスケジュールとして、2003 年中を目標に NPSA の改正案を国会に提出し、関係法令の整備を 2005 年末までに行い、他の項目も含めて全体として 2006 年度を目途に新たな公務員制度に移行することを目指す、とされていた。

NPA は、報告書を受け、直ちに新たな評価制度の導入に向けた検討に入ることを予定していたが、結果として、実現までには、紆余曲折を経ざるを得なかった。同報告書の策定に前後して、2.3 で言及したとおり、2001 年 1 月の中央省庁の再編が行政改革として実施され、それに併せて、政府において橋本行政改革担当大臣（元内閣総理大臣）を中心に「白地からの公務員制度の改革」の検討を行うことが政治的イシューとなり、人事評価制度をはじめとする能力・実績主義人事の推進についてもそのパーツとして位置づけられることとなり、一体的な議論を行うことが求められた。

しかしながら、この「白地からの公務員制度の改革」は、労働基本権の在り方を含め様々な議論が各方面から噴出し<sup>44</sup>、結果として成案を得られない状況が続いた。このため、人事評価制度の導入は重要かつ必要な課題であることは広く認識はされ、NPA を中心に必要な部内検討は継続されつつも、早期の制度化の動きにつながることはなかった。

NPSA の改正案についても、2004 年の通常国会にも提出がされず、当時の小泉内閣総理大臣からは大綱自体の再検討が必要ではないかという発言がされる状況となった。

報告書の策定後、約 4 年近くが経過した 2004 年 12 月となり、政府の行政改革に関する閣議決定<sup>45</sup>の中で、公務員制度全体の改革に先んじて、能力実績に基づく人事管

<sup>43</sup> Out of 19 meetings, 6 of them were branch-meetings consisting of business persons.

<sup>44</sup> Labor Organizations/Labor Unions put the high priority to lift the restrictions of basic labor rights, which made difficult to reach the consensus of the total reforms, whereas ILO/International Labor Organizations made some recommendations to the Government of JAPAN.

<sup>45</sup> “Policy of the future administrative reform” <Cabinet Decision 24/12/2004>

理の推進など現行制度の枠内で実現可能なものについては早期に実現することとし、その一環として人事評価制度の導入に取り組むこと及びそのための試行の実施を 2005 年度中に行うこととなった。

NPA は、この閣議決定を受け、人事評価の試行に向けて、制度の内容と実施手続きについて検討を急ぐこととし、総務省人事局と共同でたたき台を策定するとともに、実際に人事評価を実施する各府省の人事担当者からなる意見交換の場を 2005 年の春に立ち上げ、仕組みの具体化を進めていった。

また、並行して、2005 年 4 月以降、職員団体（労働組合）<sup>46</sup>の代表者との間においても、総務省人事局を交えたいわゆる三者会議として、意見交換の場を設け、同様のテーマで議論を重ねた。かつての PAS 反対闘争の時代とは異なり、職員団体側も、新たな人事評価制度の導入について、それが公正かつ納得性の高いものとなる限りにおいて、反対するものではなく、試行の実施に向けて議論は積み重ねられていった。なお、人事管理への活用を前提とした人事評価の設計・導入をテーマとしつつも、人事管理への具体的な活用方法については、人事評価制度の具体化の後に、次の段階として、改めて別途、議論するということとし、この会議のテーマとは位置づけられなかった。

このような中、NPA は、2005 年 8 月 15 日の国会・内閣に対する給与勧告の際の報告で、PES の整備について、基本的考え方、留意点などについて言及した。ちなみに、当該給与勧告では、給与構造改革として給与制度の全般的な見直しを勧告しており、その一環として、勤務成績に基づく査定昇給制度の導入やボーナス（勤勉手当）への勤務成績反映の拡大を措置した<sup>47</sup>。

一方、政府は 2005 年 12 月に閣議決定した「行政改革の重要方針」において、能力・実績主義の人事管理の徹底等の観点に立った公務員人事制度のできるだけ早期の具体化を図ることと併せて、当面、改革を着実に推進するため、新たな人事評価の第 1 次試行を 2006 年 1 月から開始し、さらに対象範囲を拡大して 2006 年度中に第 2 次試行を行うこととした。

以上のような議論、準備を経て、2006 年 1 月から 6 月まで、第 1 回の人事評価の試行が開始された。対象は、本府省の課長補佐及び課長の中から抽出された約 2500 人であり、評価手法は、コンピテンシーを用いた能力評価及び目標管理的な手法による業績評価とし、評価手続としても、期首・期末の面談を行うものであった。

その後、徐々に対象職員の職位や対象機関を拡大していき、本格実施の 2009 年までに 4 階の試行を重ね、最後の第 4 回目は全員参加の試行であった<sup>48</sup>。

各試行の後には、各府省を通じて実施状況等を実証的に把握するとともに、試行の対象となった職員（被評価者及び評価者の双方）に対してアンケート調査を実施し、得

<sup>46</sup> There are 2 big labor federations for national public employees, JTUC/Komu-Rokyo & NCTU/Kokko-Roren. Before the start of 1<sup>st</sup> trial in 1/2006, 7 intensive meetings were held with Komu-Rokyo, and 6 with Kokko-Roren. In total, till the end of 12/2007, 17 meetings with the former and 11 meetings with latter were held.

<sup>47</sup> These pay reforms were implemented in 4/2007, ie. prior to the introduction of PES.

<sup>48</sup> The 1<sup>st</sup> trial was implemented between 1/2006 & 6/2006, participants – evaluatees 2,000, evaluators 500. The 2<sup>nd</sup> trial was btw. 1/2007 & 6/2007 for all ladders of HQs, evaluatees 9,000, evaluators 2,000. The 3<sup>rd</sup> trial was btw. 10/2007 & 3/2008 for staffs of local offices+ and special job categories of HQs, evaluatees 70,000, evaluators 19,000. Final/4<sup>th</sup> trial was btw. 9/2008 & 12/2008 for all regular service staffs, evaluatees 265,000, evaluators 44,000.

られた情報等を、逐次、その後の具体的な制度設計に反映させていくなど、PDCA サイクルにのっとった対応を行っていった。

このような中、2006 年末になって、人事評価制度の本格実施に向けた法律化の動きが急遽、政治的な課題として遡上に上った。実際問題として、その時点で試行は未だ 1 回のみ、しかも前述のとおり極限られた職員を対象に実施したに過ぎず、加えて、人事評価結果の任用、給与など人事管理への活用方法についても議論する段階には至っておらず、拙速の感はぬぐえなかった。

しかしながら、政治の側としても能力実績に基づく人事管理の推進を積極的に示したいということもあり、2007 年 1 月の第 166 通常国会における安倍内閣総理大臣の施政方針演説では、公務員制度改革について「新たな人事評価を導入して能力本位の任用を行う」ことが表明された。さらに同年 4 月には新たな人事評価制度の構築等を内容とする「公務員制度改革に関する政府・与党合意」がまとめられ、NPSA の改正法案を速やかに国会に提出することとなった。これを受けて政府は同月中に「公務員制度改革について」を閣議決定し、改正法案を国会に提出した。同法案は会期末近くの同年 6 月に国会で成立し<sup>49</sup>、2 年間の準備期間後の 2009 年 4 月からの本格実施が法律上、正式決定となった<sup>50</sup>。

#### 【補足 1】

人事評価の試行の対象及び回数が未だ限られ、内容面でも未だ流動的な状況の中にあつて、関係者の一定の理解の下、本格実施の決定を意味する法律化が実現できた背景には、①法律ではあくまで人事評価の骨格のみを示すに過ぎず、具体的内容は施行時期（2009 年 4 月）までに下位法令で定めればよかったこと、②任用等人事管理への活用方法については本格実施以降も一定の経過的な取扱いを認めるなど、十分な準備を経ながら円滑な導入ができるよう、時間的な余裕があつたこと、③能力実績に基づく給与制度の改革は、前述のとおり、すでに 2005 年の NPA の勧告に基づき 2006 年 4 月から実施に移されているなど関係諸制度の改革の推進による環境整備が図られてきたことが挙げられよう。

#### 【補足 2】

この NPSA 改正法案には、新たな人事評価制度の導入等による能力・実績主義による人事管理のほかに、国家公務員の離職後の再就職に関する規制を導入する等の退職管理に関する事項が含まれていた。野党である民主党からは、主にこの再就職規制を強化するための対案が提出されたが、能力・実績主義に関しては、同法案の本文ではなく附則において、政府が将来策定する「公務員制度改革実施計画」の項目の 1 つとして定めるものとされているのみであつた（野党案は結果として否決された）。

前述の改正 NPSA の施行までの準備期間中においては、NPA を中心に任用や給与へ

<sup>49</sup> 2007 NPSA amendment act stipulated 2 main reforms; 1<sup>st</sup> introduction of PES for the basis of improvement of merit system, 2<sup>nd</sup> reform of retirement management. As the latter was less popular for civil servants, the former was expected the role of “Locomotive”. At first the unpopular bill of the amendment act was skeptical to be enacted at the Diet, but the ruling party steamrolled the bill omitting the deliberation at the related committee at the end of the Diet session.

<sup>50</sup> The term of the competency evaluation is from October to September every year, so the new PES was inaugurated or applied from 10/2009.

の具体的な活用方法において各府省や職員団体の意見を聴取しながら検討を進め、2008年の給与勧告時の報告で、評価期間、評価結果の開示、苦情への対応、評価結果の任用・給与への活用の仕組みとその時期など残された検討課題についての方向性を示した。その上で、2009年3月までにNPA規則など関係法令が制定された後、検討の開始から数えて約10年となる同年4月に本格実施に至った。3.2.1(1)で述べたとおり、能力評価の評価期間が毎年10月からであるため、大多数の負傷で部内規定の整備等を経て、実際の開始は同年10月からとなった。

なお、2009年12月には、NPA 総裁は、PES 制度の導入に向けた一連の貢献について、NPA 内の関連部局・職員に対する功績表彰を行った。

#### 4 Evaluation and Challenges

人事評価の導入後、既に約5年が経過した。基本的には大きな問題が生ずることなく、円滑に実施され、任用、給与など人事管理への活用も順調に行われている。能力・実績に基づき、個人間で任用や給与で差別化が図る上で、説明責任を果たすという、初期の目的も果たしていると認められる。さらに、期首面談や期末面談を通じ、上司と部下の間のコミュニケーション・ツールとしても意義深いものとなっている。

ただ、人事評価の評価結果の評語の分布状況をみると、府省による差はありうるものの、全府省で見ると、上位の評語にシフトし、下位の評語を受けた者が少ないといった傾向は否定できない。

最近の調査結果では、全府省の総計で、次のとおり、標準のBを上回る者が5割超となっている。

##### 【評価結果（各評価における全体評価の評語の分布）の調査結果<sup>51</sup>】

###### <一般職員>

能力評価 S 5.8%、A 53.8%、B 39.8%、C 0.5%、D 0.1%

業績評価 S 6.0%、A 51.9%、B 41.5%、C 0.5%、D 0.1%

※ S：特に優秀、A：優秀、B：通常、C：不十分、D：劣っている

※ 評価期間 能力評価：2011年10月～2012年9月

業績評価：2012年4月～2012年9月

もっともこの状況が直ちに大きな問題というわけではない。人事評価の評価方法を相対評価ではなく、絶対評価する以上、予想されたことであり、人材育成への活用という面からは何ら障害にはならないところである。また、そもそも公務にはNPAの採用試験を経て、一定レベル以上の人材を確保していることの反映でもあると考えられる。加えて、給与上の査定昇給や成績反映のボーナスなど処遇への反映では、相対化を行っており、予算増加の要因にはなるものでもない。ちなみに、米国連邦政府職員など他国においてはより明確なインフレ傾向が認められるところでもある<sup>52</sup>。もちろん、できるだけ本来の趣旨に沿った運用となることが望ましいことはいうまでもなく、今後、実施状況について、さらに分析を加えながら、評語の趣旨の徹底などより一層の運用の改善に取り組むことが課題といえよう。

.....  
2014年10月23日夕方、A省B課のC係長は、B課長との約45分間の期末面談を終え

<sup>51</sup> <http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/gaiyou/jimu/jinjiyoku/files/000277655.pdf> P.11

<sup>52</sup> See Table 9 attached, which shows the distribution of appraisal results of US Federal SES.

た。C 係長の上司である B 課長は、日頃、国会議員や関係団体などとの調整で席を温める暇もないほど極めて繁忙であり、C 係長はなかなか話をする機会がなく、C 係長は、本日の面談は、評価結果に限らず、仕事に対する B 課長の理念をお聴きし、また自分の考えを伝える機会としても非常に有益に感じた。

B 課長より指摘された改善点、優れた点としてより一層伸ばすことを推められた点を踏まえながら、本年度下半期の業務に取り組むつもりだ。C 係長は、一両日中に改めて下半期の業績評価にかかる業績目標を B 課長に提出する必要があるが、B 課長が示した下半期の B 課の業務計画に則り、D 法案が国会で成立した場合に備えた D 法案の実施計画の策定を中心に、少しチャレンジングな業績目標を立てようと思っている。

#### Discussion questions

- ① How was the idea of introducing a new policy formed?
- ② Which actors were involved in the policy process?
- ③ Analyze the roles and importance of those actors.
- ④ Relate the policy process with the theories that you have learned.
- ⑤ JCS や PAS が本来の予定された形で実施されず、その状態が長期にわたったのはどういう理由や背景によるものなのか。
- ⑥ 従前の PAS と比較して、新たな PES が成功裏に導入できた理由・背景（PAS との違い）はどこにあるのか。また、円滑な実施を可能にしたのはどのようなことであると考えられるか。

Table 1

### Types of Civil Service in Japan

- Public Service Employees in Japan comprise
  - 1) **641,000** National Public Employees and 2) **2.76 million** local public employees.
- National Public Employees are divided into 2 categories; Regular Service & Special Service. Nation Public Service Act (NPSA) is applied to the Regular Service Staffs.




Table 2

### Number of the Civil Service - last 45 years

- Total staff numbers are strictly administered by the Law, and there has been no net growth in last half century.
- In addition, Central Government Structures have been down-sized dramatically recent years.




Table 3

Image of JCS




Table 4

Salary - Grading System - Substitute of JCS

Each position is ranked & classified into a certain Grade of a Salary Schedule, based on the hierarchy within the office. Under the Principle of "Pay by Duties" ; one kind of "Simple JCS"

Salary Grade	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Ministry's HQs		Officer	Unit Chief		Assistant Director			Head of Office	Division Director	
Regional Bureaus		Officer	Unit Chief		Assistant Director		Division Director	Department Director	Head of Bureau	

Recruitment, Promotion, Transfer, etc.

↓

Determining the grade

↓

Determining the salary step

↓

Monthly salary

➡ One's Salary-Grade is determined by requirements of the position, his performance, length of his service, within the range of the fixed number of Staff in each grade. And such conditions are also utilized to appointments.

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Table 5

Salary Schedule for Administration Jobs (1)

Grade	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1	135,000	185,000	222,900	261,800	298,700	335,600	372,500	409,400	446,300	483,200
2	136,700	187,600	225,500	264,400	301,300	338,200	375,100	412,000	448,900	485,800
3	138,400	189,300	227,200	266,100	303,000	340,000	376,900	413,800	450,700	487,600
4	140,100	191,000	228,900	267,800	304,700	341,700	378,600	415,500	452,400	489,300
5	141,800	192,700	230,600	269,500	306,400	343,400	380,300	417,200	454,100	491,000
6	143,500	194,400	232,300	271,200	308,100	345,100	382,000	418,900	455,800	492,700
7	145,200	196,100	234,000	272,900	309,800	346,800	383,700	420,600	457,500	494,400
8	146,900	197,800	235,700	274,600	311,500	348,500	385,400	422,300	459,200	496,100
9	148,600	199,500	237,400	276,300	313,200	350,200	387,100	424,000	460,900	497,800
10	150,300	201,200	239,100	278,000	314,900	351,900	388,800	425,700	462,600	499,500
11	152,000	202,900	240,800	279,700	316,600	353,600	390,500	427,400	464,300	501,200
12	153,700	204,600	242,500	281,400	318,300	355,300	392,200	429,100	466,000	502,900
13	155,400	206,300	244,200	283,100	320,000	357,000	393,900	430,800	467,700	504,600
14	157,100	208,000	245,900	284,800	321,700	358,700	395,600	432,500	469,400	506,300
15	158,800	209,700	247,600	286,500	323,400	360,400	397,300	434,200	471,100	508,000
16	160,500	211,400	249,300	288,200	325,100	362,100	399,000	435,900	472,800	509,700
17	162,200	213,100	251,000	289,900	326,800	363,800	400,700	437,600	474,500	511,400
18	163,900	214,800	252,700	291,600	328,500	365,500	402,400	439,300	476,200	513,100
19	165,600	216,500	254,400	293,300	330,200	367,200	404,100	441,000	477,900	514,800
20	167,300	218,200	256,100	295,000	331,900	368,900	405,800	442,700	479,600	516,500
21	169,000	219,900	257,800	296,700	333,600	370,600	407,500	444,400	481,300	518,200
22	170,700	221,600	259,500	298,400	335,300	372,300	409,200	446,100	483,000	519,900
23	172,400	223,300	261,200	300,100	337,000	374,000	410,900	447,800	484,700	521,600
24	174,100	225,000	262,900	301,800	338,700	375,700	412,600	449,500	486,400	523,300
25	175,800	226,700	264,600	303,500	340,400	377,400	414,300	451,200	488,100	525,000
26	177,500	228,400	266,300	305,200	342,100	379,100	416,000	452,900	489,800	526,700
27	179,200	230,100	268,000	306,900	343,800	380,800	417,700	454,600	491,500	528,400
28	180,900	231,800	269,700	308,600	345,500	382,500	419,400	456,300	493,200	530,100
29	182,600	233,500	271,400	310,300	347,200	384,200	421,100	458,000	494,900	531,800
30	184,300	235,200	273,100	312,000	348,900	385,900	422,800	459,700	496,600	533,500
31	186,000	236,900	274,800	313,700	350,600	387,600	424,500	461,400	498,300	535,200
32	187,700	238,600	276,500	315,400	352,300	389,300	426,200	463,100	500,000	536,900
33	189,400	240,300	278,200	317,100	354,000	391,000	427,900	464,800	501,700	538,600
34	191,100	242,000	279,900	318,800	355,700	392,700	429,600	466,500	503,400	540,300
35	192,800	243,700	281,600	320,500	357,400	394,400	431,300	468,200	505,100	542,000
36	194,500	245,400	283,300	322,200	359,100	396,100	433,000	469,900	506,800	543,700
37	196,200	247,100	285,000	323,900	360,800	397,800	434,700	471,600	508,500	545,400
38	197,900	248,800	286,700	325,600	362,500	399,500	436,400	473,300	510,200	547,100
39	199,600	250,500	288,400	327,300	364,200	401,200	438,100	475,000	511,900	548,800
40	201,300	252,200	290,100	329,000	365,900	402,900	439,800	476,700	513,600	550,500
41	203,000	253,900	291,800	330,700	367,600	404,600	441,500	478,400	515,300	552,200
42	204,700	255,600	293,500	332,400	369,300	406,300	443,200	480,100	517,000	553,900
43	206,400	257,300	295,200	334,100	371,000	408,000	444,900	481,800	518,700	555,600
44	208,100	259,000	296,900	335,800	372,700	409,700	446,600	483,500	520,400	557,300
45	209,800	260,700	298,600	337,500	374,400	411,400	448,300	485,200	522,100	559,000
46	211,500	262,400	300,300	339,200	376,100	413,100	450,000	486,900	523,800	560,700
47	213,200	264,100	302,000	340,900	377,800	414,800	451,700	488,600	525,500	562,400
48	214,900	265,800	303,700	342,600	379,500	416,500	453,400	490,300	527,200	564,100
49	216,600	267,500	305,400	344,300	381,200	418,200	455,100	492,000	528,900	565,800
50	218,300	269,200	307,100	346,000	382,900	419,900	456,800	493,700	530,600	567,500
51	220,000	270,900	308,800	347,700	384,600	421,600	458,500	495,400	532,300	569,200
52	221,700	272,600	310,500	349,400	386,300	423,300	460,200	497,100	534,000	570,900
53	223,400	274,300	312,200	351,100	388,000	425,000	461,900	498,800	535,700	572,600
54	225,100	276,000	313,900	352,800	389,700	426,700	463,600	500,500	537,400	574,300
55	226,800	277,700	315,600	354,500	391,400	428,400	465,300	502,200	539,100	576,000
56	228,500	279,400	317,300	356,200	393,100	430,100	467,000	503,900	540,800	577,700
57	230,200	281,100	319,000	357,900	394,800	431,800	468,700	505,600	542,500	579,400
58	231,900	282,800	320,700	359,600	396,500	433,500	470,400	507,300	544,200	581,100

59	233,600	284,500	322,400	361,300	398,200	435,200	472,100	509,000	545,900	582,800
60	235,300	286,200	324,100	363,000	400,000	436,900	473,800	510,700	547,600	584,500
61	237,000	287,900	325,800	364,700	401,700	438,600	475,500	512,400	549,300	586,200
62	238,700	289,600	327,500	366,400	403,400	440,300	477,200	514,100	551,000	587,900
63	240,400	291,300	329,200	368,100	405,100	442,000	478,900	515,800	552,700	589,600
64	242,100	293,000	330,900	369,800	406,800	443,700	480,600	517,500	554,400	591,300
65	243,800	294,700	332,600	371,500	408,500	445,400	482,300	519,200	556,100	593,000
66	245,500	296,400	334,300	373,200	410,200	447,100	484,000	520,900	557,800	594,700
67	247,200	298,100	336,000	374,900	411,900	448,800	485,700	522,600	559,500	596,400
68	248,900	299,800	337,700	376,600	413,600	450,500	487,400	524,300	561,200	598,100
69	250,600	301,500	339,400	378,300	415,300	452,200	489,100	526,000	562,900	599,800
70	252,300	303,200	341,100	380,000	417,000	453,900	490,800	527,700	564,600	601,500
71	254,000	304,900	342,800	381,700	418,700	455,600	492,500	529,400	566,300	603,200
72	255,700	306,600	344,500	383,400	420,400	457,300	494,200	531,100	568,000	604,900
73	257,400	308,300	346,200	385,100	422,100	459,000	495,900	532,800	569,700	606,600
74	259,100	310,000	347,900	386,800	423,800	460,700	497,600	534,500	571,400	608,300
75	260,800	311,700	349,600	388,500	425,500	462,400	499,300	536,200	573,100	610,000
76	262,500	313,400	351,300	390,200	427,200	464,100	501,000	537,900	574,800	611,700
77	264,200	315,100	353,000	391,900	428,900	465,800	502,700	539,600	576,500	613,400
78	265,900	316,800	354,700	393,600	430,600	467,500	504,400	541,300	578,200	615,100
79	267,600	318,500	356,400	395,300	432,300	469,200	506,100	543,000	579,900	616,800
80	269,300	320,200	358,100	397,000	434,000	470,900	507,800	544,700	581,600	618,500
81	271,000	321,900	359,800	398,700	435,700	472,600	509,500	546,400	583,300	620,200
82	272,700	323,600	361,500	400,400	437,400	474,300	511,200	548,100	585,000	621,900
83	274,400	325,300	363,200	402,100	439,100	476,000	512,900	549,800	586,700	



Table7

PES Record

Term	2013/10/1 ~ 2014/9/30	Evaluatee	Division	Title	Name
Interview Date	2014/10/23	Evaluator	Title	Name	Date
		Coordinator	Title	Name	Date
		Executive Officer	Title	Name	Date

( I Competency Evaluation Administration H.Q.of Ministry Director)

Evaluation Item & Behaviors / Point of Views	Self-Evaluation	Evaluator		Coordinator
	Comments	Remarks	S to D	
<b>&lt;Ethics&gt;</b> 1 As a servant of the whole community, evaluatee has high ethical mind, addresses his/her division's tasks with responsibilities, abides duties, and implements jobs fairly.				
① responsibilities An a servant of the whole community, evaluatee has high ethical mind, and implements his/her division's tasks fairly.				
② fairness Evaluatee abides duties, and implements jobs fairly.				
<b>&lt;Planning&gt;</b> 2 Grasping the environments of the administration his/her jurisdiction, evaluatee shows the directions for the issues standing the people's view-points				
① structural grasp of environments Evaluatee accurately grasps the total situation of his/her business and its environments, such as complicated causalities, complex concerns.				
② manifestation of basic directions Evaluatee shows the basic directions of his/her division putting the priority to the benefits of the State and the people & reading the changes at home and abroad.				
<b>&lt;Decision Making&gt;</b> 3 As a person in charge of his/her division, evaluatee makes proper decisions.				
① optimum choices Evaluatee selects optimum choices from possible strategies/alternates, considering directions & present situations.				
② timely decision Evaluatee makes timely decisions, considering priorities of issues and effects to the whole situations.				
③ risk management Evaluatee manage risks promptly, when environment changes & problems are occurred.				
<b>&lt;Accountability / Coordination&gt;</b> 4 Evaluatee explains the administration of his/her jurisdiction, and makes coordination among stock-holders aiming for the fulfilment of organizational goals, and forms agreements.				
① building trust relationship Evaluatee builds trust relationship with external parties on every occasion, for supporting efficient agreement.				
② negotiation/coordination Evaluatee makes negotiation and coordination among stock-holders aiming for the fulfilment of organizational goals.				
③ proper explanation Evaluatee explains the administration of his/her jurisdiction properly.				
<b>&lt;Conduct of Business&gt;</b> 5 Evaluatee carries out business effectively with cost-conscious mind.				
① foresight Evaluatee carries out business with foresight, such as preparing measures forseeing the future situations and effects of his/her maneuvers.				
② effective operation Having mind of the goals of the business and the expected level of results, evaluatee performs his/her operations effectively on the points of both time & amount of labor.				
<b>&lt;Leadership / Development of Human Resources&gt;</b> 6 With proper job-distribution, evaluatee makes progress management and accurate directions, and accomplishes tasks. He/She performs instructions & upbrings subordinates.				
① job distribution Paying attention to the importance of issues and subordinates' tasks and abilities, evaluatee distributes jobs properly in his/her division.				
② progress management Observing the situations of information sharing and progress of subordinates' jobs, let the tasks be fulfilled with evaluatee's proper directions.				
③ human resource development Paying attention to subordinates' conditions, evaluatee instructs them to develop their potentials, and draws their abilities.				
<b>(General Evaluation)</b>				
	Evaluator		Coordinator	
Remarks	S to D	Remarks	S to D	

日本の国家経営に関する事例研究

Term	2014/4/1	~	2014/9/30	Evaluatee	Division	Titel	Name
Interview Term Start	2014/4/1			Evaluator	Title	Name	Date
Interview End Term	2014/10/23			Coordinator	Title	Name	Date
				Executive Officer	Title	Name	Date

( II Performance Evaluation)

[1 Goals]

No	Duties	Goals (What should be done till when & to what levels?)	Difficulties	Importance	Self-Evaluation (Achievements, Situation Change, etc.)	Evaluator		Coordinator Comments
						Comments	S to D	
1								
~5								


[2 Jobs other than Goals]

No	Duties	Self-Evaluation (Jobs done other than Goal, Reaction to un-anticipated emergent matters etc.)	Evaluator Comments
1			

[3 General Evaluation]

Evaluator		Coordinator	
Comments	S to D	Comments	S to D

Table 8



**Table 9** Distribution of Appraisal Results  
**US Federal / Senior Executive Services (SES)**

FY2010	Appraisal by 5 Levels	Appraisal by 4 Levels
	N=6,097	N=761
Outstanding	47.9%	-----
Exceeds Expectations	42.8%	54.3%
Fully Successful	9.0%	45.1%
Minimally Successful	0.3%	0.4%
Unacceptable	0.03%	0.3%

※ 74.7% Staffs received Awards.

<http://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/senior-executive-service/facts-figures/annual-data-reports/fy2010.pdf>

Annex

## Chronology

### <<Founder Epoch>>

- 1945 Aug. End of WWII  
 1946 Nov. US Mission to JAPAN on Personnel Management headed by Blaine Huber  
 1947 Oct. NPSA enacted  
 1948 Dec. NPA established  
 1949 First NPA recruitment examinations  
 1950 May. JCSA enacted in accordance of NPA plan  
 Oct. Outline of PAS drafted  
 1951 Jan. related NPA regulations on NPAS enacted  
 May. PAS was ready to start  
 1952 Jul. related NPA regulations on JCS enacted, but not enforced  
 1954 Jun. Job-series of JCS were thoroughly reduced through broad-banding  
 1955 legally almost ready for starting JCS  
 1957 Pay Act was revised, and 1<sup>st</sup> Salary-Grading-System, “8 Grades-System”, was introduced. Such Grading-System was also used as tentative substitute of JCS  
 1950s ~ 1970s Labor Unions’ severely opposed against PAS

### <<Doldrums but Typical Japanese HM under rapid economic growth>>

- 1964 Reform of Salary-Grading-System  
 1982 Jul. 2nd Administrative Investigation Committee recommended abolishment of JCS  
 1985 Reform of Recruitment-examinations  
 Reform of Salary-Grading-System / “11 Grades-System”

### <<Reformer Epoch>>

- Early 1990s Collapse of Japanese “Bubble Economy”  
 1999 Aug. NPA declared Study Committee on new PAS  
 2001 Jan. Central Government Reform - Number of ministries & agencies reduced from 23 to 13  
 Mar. Report of above Study Committee  
 2004 Dec. Cabinet Decision on Introduction of PES of trial basis  
 2005 Apr. ~ “Tree-Party-Discussions” on PES  
 Aug. NPA presented outline of PES to the Diet & the Cabinet, & recommended reform of Pay System to them  
 2006 Jan. 1<sup>st</sup> trial of PES (~June/2006)  
 Apr. Reform of Salary-Grading-System / “10 Grades-System”  
 2007 Apr. 2<sup>nd</sup> trial of PES (~June/2007)  
 Apr. NPSA amended - JCS abolished, new PES introduced etc.  
 Oct. 3<sup>rd</sup> trial of PES (~March/2008)  
 2008 Sep. 4<sup>th</sup> & Final trial of PES (~December/2008)  
 2009 Mar. related Cabinet Orders and NPA Regulations for PES enacted  
 Apr. amended NPSA enforced  
 <Sep. Regime Change – From LDP & Komeito to DPJ>  
 Oct. new PES started in most ministries  
 Dec. President of NPA recognized related staffs on introduction of PES  
 2012 Reform of Recruitment-examinations  
 <Dec. Regime Change – From DPJ to LDP & Komeito>

## WORKSHOP AGENDA

### *Base line study on the public policy process in Vietnam*

### *and integration of the research findings*

### *to the Master of Public policy program (Hanoi, 13 March 2015)*

**Time:** 09:00 – 11:45, 14:00- 16:45 13 March, 2015

**Venue:** Conference Hall B, Building A, National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA)

09:00 - 09:10	<b>Introduction of workshop participation and agenda</b> MA. Pham Thi Quynh Hoa, Director, Department of International Cooperation, NAPA, Coordinator of the international cooperation of the 2 <sup>nd</sup> Output of JICA - HCMA Project
09:10 - 09:30	- <b>Opening Speech:</b> NAPA leader - <b>Remark by JICA - HCMA Project Management:</b> Mr. Hanazato Nobuhiko, Chief Advisor of JICA - HCMA Project
09:30-10:30	<b>Presentation 1:</b> <i>Base line study on the public policy process in Vietnam:</i> - <i>Key findings:</i> Presenter: Dr. Nguyen Van Thang, Director of APIM, Team leader of the base line study - <i>Some case studies:</i> Presenter: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Nguyen Huu Hai, Dean of the Faculty of Public Administration Sciences, Technical Coordinator of Output 2 of JICA - HCMA Project Presenter: Asso. Prof. Dr. Nguyen Van Thang, Director of APIM, Team leader of the base line study
10:30 - 10:45	<b>Comments on the baseline study findings and case studies</b> - <i>Comments by Japanese professors</i> - <i>Q&amp;A</i>
10:45-11:00	<b>Tea Break</b>
11:00-11:40	<b>Presentation 2:</b> <i>How to integrate the case study findings to the Public Policy Program (1)</i> Presenter: Visit. Prof. Takeji TAKEI, Former President of Local Autonomy College, Japan
11:40 - 11:45	<b>Wrap up of the morning session</b> NAPA leader
<b>12:00– 13:30</b>	<b>Lunch</b>
14:00 - 14:30	<b>Presentation 3:</b> <i>How to integrate the case study findings to the Public Policy Program (2)</i> Presenter: Prof. Kiyotaka YOKOMICHI, Vice President, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS)
14:30 - 15:00	<b>Discussion:</b> <i>Integration of the baseline study findings to the Master of Public policy program in NAPA: What and How?</i> NAPA Lecturers participating of MPP design teams in NAPA (At the end of the discussion, all the teams send their reports of discussion to Assoc. Prof. Nguyen Huu Hai, Dean of the Faculty of Public Administration Sciences, Technical Coordinator of Output 2 of JICA - HCMA Project to synthesize)
15:00 - 15:15	<b>Presentation 4:</b> <i>Integration of research finding of the baseline study to the course of Public policy process management of the Master of Public Policy Program in NAPA</i> Presenter: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Nguyen Thi Hong Hai, Dean, Faculty of Organization and Personnel Management, Team leader of the Design Team of the course of Public Policy Process management
15:15 - 15:30	Comments and suggestions by Japanese professors

15:30 - 15:40	<b>Tea Break</b>
15:40 - 16:10	<p><b>Presentation 5:</b> <i>Integration of research finding of the baseline study to the Master of Public Policy Program in NAPA: synthesis of discussion results and next steps</i></p> <p>Presenters:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Assoc. Prof. Dr. Nguyen Huu Hai, Dean of the Faculty of Public Administration Sciences technical coordinator of NAPA- JICA Project</li> <li>- MA. Le Van Hoa, Deputy head of Public Policy Division, NAPA</li> </ul>
16:10 -16:30	<p><b>Comments and suggestions:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- By Japanese professors</li> <li>- By national consultants</li> <li>- By workshop participants</li> </ul>
16:30 - 16:45	<p><b>Closing ceremony</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Dr. Le Nhu Thanh, NAPA's Permanent Vice President</li> <li>- Mr. Hanazato Nobuhiko, Chief Advisor of JICA - HCMA Project</li> </ul>

【知識経営ケーススタディ～岩手県遠野市～】

「遠野スタイル」のまちづくりと被災地後援「遠野モデル」の誕生



2015.3.13 自治大学校客員教授・元(第50代)自治大学校長 武居文二

なぜ岩手県遠野市を取り上げたのか

- 遠野市がこれまで実践してきた地域経営やまちづくり政策は、多くの注目する要素を含んでおり、国内外問わず自治体経営に共通する重要な視点を気づかせてくれること。
- 時代時代の環境変化に対応した蓄積があり、底流には、その場限り、その時だけではない、ふれぬ経営理念を有すること。
- 地理的条件・経済的条件に恵まれているわけではなく、むしろかつては冷害に苦しんだ歴史もあるなど、けっして特別な地域ではないこと。
- 特に、地域にある資源に磨きをかけ、地域内外の交流を促進することをめざしており、これからのまちづくりに有効な政策手法を提供するものと考えられること。
- 今回紹介する具体的な取組は、その成果が全国の他の自治体に波及したり、国の制度改正に影響を与えており、意義深いこと。
- 行政のリーダーシップは地域経営にとって大きなカギを握るが、その理解を助ける好例であること。
- 最後に、遠野市自ら「永遠の日本のふるさと遠野」を標榜するように、訪れる人たちにどこか懐かしさを感じさせるまちであること。

【目次】

- 第1章 遠野市の概要と「遠野スタイル」のまちづくり
- 第2章 被災地後援「遠野モデル」の誕生
- 第3章 東日本大震災への対応  
～災害時の広域応援の仕組みと震災当日の国(政府)の行動～
- 第4章 「遠野モデル」のその後の展開とまちづくりの継承・発展

・編集はすべて武居の責任で行っております。  
・本資料の写真、データ、内容等は、遠野市役所に全面的にご協力をいただくともに、国関係の資料の一部については総務省自治行政局国際室等のご協力をいただいております。


第1章

遠野市の概要と「遠野スタイル」のまちづくり



遠野市の地理的位置付け



遠野市の概要







### 遠野の祭り・暮らし

春  
夏  
秋  
冬

(市民協働のまちづくりの代表例) 遠野の民謡等を題材に何百人もの市民が制作・出演する総合舞台芸術「遠野物語ファンタジー」は1976年にはじまり、毎年40回を越える。

遠野の夜空を彩る花火。空地に響き渡る花火の音は迫力があります。

秋の爽やかに参拝し、帯飾はやしやしし踊りなどの郷土芸能が一堂に乱舞。遠野市最大のお祭りです。

昔懐かしいどぶっこを再現。芋煮き屋根の踊り歌で、心も体も温まります。

### 貧しい時代も暮らしの中で語り継がれてきた昔話、民話

100年前に「遠野物語」は刊行された(日本民俗学発祥の地)

柳田國男 1875~1962  
日本民俗学の創始者。1909年、1920年、1926年と高遠野を訪れている。

佐々木喜善 1886~1933  
遠野出身の民俗学者。日本のグリムと呼ばれ、多くの昔話を述べている。

遠野物語 1910年6月刊行  
遠野に伝わる伝説や昔話を中心に全119話収録

遠野ゆかりの出版物  
遠野遺産第22号カッパ瀧  
郷土芸能 鹿(し)踊り

### 総合計画の基本理念「遠野スタイルの創造」とは何か


遠野市総合計画(期間:2006年度~2015年度)

●少ない予算 → 知恵と工夫を結集  
●人員不足 → 新たな公と市民協働  
●社会資本整備の遅れ → 豊かな自然と環境先進地  
●人口減少 → 交流人口の拡大

●遠野市の基本理念  
●遠野スタイル 5つの大綱  
●自然を愛し共生するまちづくり  
●健やかに人が輝くまちづくり  
●活力を創意で築くまちづくり  
●ふるさとの文化を育むまちづくり  
●みんなで考え支えあうまちづくり

### 「遠野スタイル」のまちづくりを推進する本田敏秋市長

現在進められている遠野のまちづくりは、本田市長のリーダーシップと政策構想力を抜きに語ることはできない。市長就任までの経歴は以下の通り。



■遠野市出身。高校まで遠野市で過ごし、学業のため首都圏の大学に進学。卒業後、岩手県に戻り、県庁に入る。県知事秘書や消防防災課長、工業振興課長等の要職を歴任後、1989年企画調整課長に就任。ちょうど2010年目標の新しい県総合計画が完成した年で、計画を市町村・地域と連携し円滑に実行に移すために陣頭指揮。

■2000年久慈地方振興局(岩手県沿岸北部のハンディのある広域圏)の局長に就任。県総合計画に盛り込まれた管内の地域振興に関わる様々な施策を市町村行政や住民とともに積極的に取り組む。


■その過程で、県全体が元気になるためには、個々の市町村が元気にならなくては行けないと考える。

■その頃、遠野の多くの友人・知人から遠野に帰ってきてふるさとのために尽くしてほしいとの声が上ががる。ふるさとに戻ることを決断し、2001年12月県庁を退職(当時55歳)。

■選挙を経て2002年4月第8代遠野市長に就任。

(本田敏秋市長(67歳))  
2002年に(旧)遠野市長就任後、2005年には宮守村との合併を実現し、(新)遠野市長就任。2013年10月無投票(3期連続)で再任され、新市で3期、通算4期目の遠野市政を担っている。

### 「遠野スタイル」のまちづくりの推進組織「遠野市庁舎」



全国の市の中で、最も質素な市庁舎のひとつだが、全国に誇るまちづくりの推進組織。2011.3.11東日本大震災で旧庁舎大損壊。駅前商業施設「とびあ」の空きスペースに市長室、経営企画部等が仮庁舎として移転。入りきれない組織は市内各所に分散。今後現庁舎の隣接地に増築し、集約する予定。現施設は手狭で機能も十分ではないが、駅前地区で市民の利便性が高く、今後中心市街地活性化の先導役として期待される。

## 第2章 被災地後方支援「遠野モデル」の誕生

### 地域資源(地理的地形的条件、歴史の教訓)を活かす

#### ○2002年に市長に就任して以後の本田市長の気づき

- 本田には、市長就任時に温めていた政策があった。「遠野広域経済圏構想」である。
- 遠野を中心に地図にコンパスで50kmの円を描くと、内陸部や沿岸部の主要都市が円の中心に乗った。車で1時間から1時間半の距離だった。今から150年以上前の江戸時代には、内陸部と沿岸部を結ぶ中間点に位置し、交易が盛んだったことも、歴史をひも解いて再評価した。\*次ページの図参照
- 重要課題は市の内外をつなぐ道路ネットワーク。沿岸宮古市に最短で行ける市北部の立丸峠のトンネル化等は懸案だが、公共事業は逆風。国に予算要望しても厳しい。
- 本田はあることに気づく。3万人の人口規模に比べ市内の建設業者が多いがなぜか。⇒自宅や事務所を遠野市に置いて、朝出て夕方帰ってこれる内陸部、沿岸部の都市が多く、市外の工事現場への移動が容易なことが判明。
- ⇒この特色を遠野市の懸案解決に生かせないか。
- 2004年には市内から産婦人科医がいなくなる。ICTを活用し、市営助産院と市外医療機関をつなぐ「ねっと・ゆりかご」を構築(2007年)。市内を見るだけでなく、市外との連携協力のネットワークこそ重要。そこから、万一の時に「命をつなぐ道路づくり」につながる。

○2004年～05年当時、宮城県沖地震は30年以内に99%の確立で発生すると言われ、遠野市ではこの地震に備えた総合防災訓練を毎年実施していた。

○昔を記録した遠野の町史を調べると、1896年の明治三陸地震・津波の際に、先人が養蚕金や医薬品、救援物資を馬の背中に乗せて800～1,000mの峠を越えて8時間も10時間もかかって沿岸の集落に助けに向かった歴史があった。遠野は江戸期・南部藩政の時代から沿岸地域と活発な人的交流を行っていた。



### 被災地後方支援「遠野モデル」誕生への行動(1)

#### ○本田市長の発想と行動

- 三陸沿岸部に地震・津波が発生した場合に、遠野市、沿岸部と内陸部の中間点に位置する立地条件から救援活動の拠点として大きな役割を果たすことを確信。地盤も極めて安定的なことを確認。
- 遠野市のことだけの要望でなく、広域的視点から、遠野市ができること、国や県にお願いすべきことを考え、被災地後方支援体制の整備に関係者に訴えていく提案書をつくる必要があると考えた。

例えば「ヘリコプターの離発着も可能な市総合運動公園は道路アクセスも良く拠点として活用できる。」「このグラウンドなら自衛隊の野営地や全国からの消防、警察の集結場所としても十分な広さがある。」「将来整備の必要がある市の総合防災センターもここに移転すれば機能連携できる。」等々

○本田市長は、かつて岩手県消防防災課長を経験し、県の地域防災計画の全面見直しや防災ヘリコプター導入・県防災航空隊の発足に関わっていた。また、1995年1月17日に発生した阪神・淡路大震災の現場を訪問し、実情をつぶさに見ていた。

○2007年9月に県の総合防災訓練が遠野市で予定されていたため、例年の訓練内容(開催自治体が被災の想定)に加えて、沿岸部への医療救護や救援物資輸送訓練を遠野市から要望。

○県内87機関、8,746人参加。⇒訓練を通じ、後方支援の有効性と遠野市の優位性が実証。



2007年度岩手県総合防災訓練

被災地後方支援「遠野モデル」誕生への行動(2)

○岩手県総合防災訓練の検証データを提案書に盛り込む。⇒2007年11月、沿岸部を含む関係9市町村で構成する被災地後方支援拠点整備のための推進協議会を立ち上げ。⇒国等の関係機関約80力所に要望・提案活動を実施したが、必要性は理解しても具体的な行動につながる反応は芳しくなかった。  
○こんな中、自衛隊東北方面隊トップの宗像総監と面談。話し合いを重ねるうち、本田市長の本気度を理解し、意気投合。宗像総監が遠野市で自衛隊東北方面隊の大規模な震災対処訓練の実施を約束。

全国に類を見ない自衛隊の大規模震災対処訓練「みちのくALERT2008」



2008年10月31日・11月1日、陸上自衛隊東北方面隊震災対処訓練が岩手・宮城両県において実施された。宮城県沖を震源とする地震が発生し、三陸沿岸に津波が襲来したことを想定。東北6県所在の自衛隊全部隊、岩手・宮城両県の自治体、警察、消防、医療隊などの関係機関、地域住民など人員約18,000人、車両2,300台、航空機43機が参加。  
⇒この訓練で、遠野市の位置付けや遠野市総合運動公園の広さは必要と実証され、後方支援拠点構想は、防災に関わる関係者の心の中に「実現すべき確かな計画」として浸透されていった。

2011年3月11日14時46分東日本大震災(M9)発生

災害当日遠野市災害対策本部会議での本田市長指示



本田市長は直ちに「津波！」と直観被災地後方支援「遠野モデル」始動  
・直ちに遠野市の被害状況をチェック。市内には、大きな被害がないことを確認。市役所庁舎は大きく損壊のため屋外に災害対策本部設置。  
・自衛隊・警察・消防を受け入れる準備に着手。総合運動公園を全国からの集結拠点として開放。  
・深夜午前1時40分に沿岸大槌町から助けを求めて峠を越えてきた被災地住民に現地の凄惨な状況を開き、何をあいても遠野市ができる支援活動を行うことを決意。職員に指示し、翌早朝救援物資を持った先遣隊を被災地に派遣。

市民・職員延べ2,050人で3月11日から29日間で14万2,400個のおにぎりを作り被災地へ届ける




自衛隊・消防・警察等の集結

第3章

東日本大震災への対応


～災害時の広域応援の仕組みと震災当日の国(政府)の行動～

2011.3.11 東日本大震災発生当日の政府の行動

- 14:46 **東日本大震災(M9)**
- 14:50 緊急参集チーム官邸召集、被災状況の確認  
発災後20数分後に津波第一波沿岸到達 
- 15:14 政府・緊急災害対策本部設置  
(災害対策基本法に基づき臨時閣議で決定)
- 15:37 政府・第1回緊急災害対策本部  
(災害応急対策に関する基本方針決定)  
} 随時情報収集・被害状況の把握、現地への要員派遣の準備
- 21:05 政府調査団が被災地の宮城県庁到着(自衛隊ヘリコプター利用)


総務省消防庁資料より編集(一部加工)

災害発生直後の政府の緊急参集等行動の流れ



総務省消防庁資料より編集

災害時の広域応援体制の仕組み



総務省消防庁資料より編集(一部加工)

### 自衛隊・警察・消防が総力を挙げて救援活動



東日本大震災では、最も被害の大きかった岩手県、宮城県、福島県の3県以外の地域から、可能な限りの人員等が災害発生後直ちに被災地に派遣され、救助救援活動を行った。

**自衛隊:** 延べ1058万人(1日最大10万人以上)


**警察庁:** 延べ11万以上の警察職員

**消防庁:** 延べ3万人以上の消防職員

これらによる救出等総数は2.7万人以上






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## 第4章 「遠野モデル」のその後の展開 とまちづくりの継承・発展

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### 総合防災施設の整備・命をつなぐ道路ネットワークの整備

**○遠野市総合防災センター**  
 (施設概要)・2012年3月26日完成  
 ・免震構造2階建て  
 ・通常時は市の消防、救急業務の拠点  
 ・災害時は市災害対策本部の本拠地として機能  
 ・災害時は防災ネットワークの拠点として自衛隊等の基地として隣接運動公園敷地を提供  
 ・東日本大震災活動記録を展示し、多数の視察を受入(開設2年間で1.3万人)。

**○遠野IC設置(2015年度完成予定)**  
 ・高速アクセスの実現  
 2012年11月25日宮守IC完成  
 ・沿岸と内陸を結ぶ緊急道路  
 ・新直轄方式により**料金無料**

**○丸丸峠トンネル整備**  
 ・事業の加速化(2018年度完成予定)  
 ・峠につながるアクセスの改善(遠野っぽろード)




### 自助・共助による災害に強い地域社会づくり

2014年4月1日  
**「遠野市防災基本条例」を施行**

**「防災マップ」を作成し、全世帯に配布**

東日本大震災が発生してから3年が経過。大震災で経験したことを改めて見つめ直し、教訓を風化させることなく後世に伝え、将来にわたり災害に強い地域社会を築くため「遠野市防災基本条例」を制定。

防災基本条例施行に合わせ、自助・共助による地域防災力の取り組みを推進するため、土砂災害危険箇所、浸水区域、避難所、防災学習を記載した防災マップを全世帯に配布。



### 災害復興と新たな交流の架け橋「遠野みらい創りカレッジ」

企業等の被災地派遣研修や復興支援活動と遠野市の関わりの中から発展し、2014年4月、首都圏の大手企業と市で協定を結び、廃校になった旧土淵中学校を活用し、地域・産業の発展、人材育成をめざし「遠野みらい創りカレッジ」が開校。土淵地区は民俗学者佐々木喜善のふるさとである。

- 民俗学研究・発信拠点  
 ・遠野物語研究データ ・遠野物語資源MAP
- 大学(教育・研究)との連携  
 ・福祉文化・社会福祉 ・留学生研修 ・沿岸防災
- 企業研究ラボ・社員研修  
 ・みらいづくりカレッジ ・みらい創りキャンプ
- 6次産業化・製品加工販売  
 ・6次産業化 ・特産品開発 ・食品加工・販売
- グリーンツーリズムセンター  
 ・まち寄り農業 ・農業民宿 ・現地産観光
- レストラン・簡易滞在機能  
 ・簡易滞在施設 ・都会的なカフェレストラン

“遠野みらい創りカレッジ”  
 土淵地区 持続的な地域活性



### 遠野市のまちづくりの継承・発展と被災地後方支援「遠野モデル」

遠野市総合計画で掲げる将来像は「永遠の日本のふるさと遠野」があり、計画の基本理念は「遠野スタイルの創造」である。東日本大震災における「被災地後方支援「遠野モデル」」の取組の底流にも、総合計画の将来像や基本理念が色濃く流れている。

そして、このまちづくりの源流を辿ると、第3代工藤千蔵市長による1968年策定の総合計画「トオノピアプラン」の策定とその中核的な構想に至る。そして、これらの理念や取り組みは歴代の市長(第4代小原正巳市長、第5代菊池正(しよう)市長)に引き継がれてきた。第6代本田市長は、過去の先人の政策をけって否定することなく、継承・発展させている。

本田市長は、継承・発展させるまちづくりへの取り組みを「古くて新しいものは光り輝く」と表現し、機会あるごとに市民や職員に語りかける。本田は、行政・民間が枠組みを超えて地域が一丸となって、地域資源を古いままにせず、新たに磨きをかけていくような地域経営の姿勢こそが「遠野スタイル」のまちづくりであると説いている。被災地後方支援「遠野モデル」も過去に学び新しい役割に光をあてた。

**【現在の遠野市総合計画(2006年～2015年)における基本理念の説明】**

- 本市は、先人が守り育ててきた自然、歴史、文化、伝統を大切にした地域づくりに取り組んでいます。特に、**昭和46年(1971年)からスタートした市民センター構想**によって、生涯学習や地域づくりに一体的に取り組む活動拠点として**市民センターや地区センター(注)**を整備し、他自治体に先駆けたまちづくりを行ってきました。これを契機に**市民が主役となり、自らづくりや地域づくりを行政と一体となって進める基本的な協働スタイルが創造されました。**(以下略)
- (注)市民センター構想-カントリパーク構想の中核施設をいう。
- このような地域資源を活かした市民活動と行政の協働スタイルは、古くて新しい、本市の誇るべき不変的財産と言えるものです。

### スパイラルに継承・発展する遠野のまちづくり政策


調和・シナジー 市民協働

新たな展開

新たな展開

新たな展開

・まちづくりビジョン(過去「トオノピアプラン」～現在「遠野スタイル」)を行政・市民が共有しながら継承・発展。  
 ・様々な政策や取組が調和シナジー効果を発揮しながら、市民協働で展開。



ご静聴ありがとうございました。

～交流から生まれる新たな価値の創造～



## 政策事例の活用方法

2015.3.13  
Kiyotaka YOKOMICHI  
Professor,GRIPS

### 1. 現実を知る

- ・抽象論・一般論＋具体的事例
- ・様々な事例の存在
  - ・国内外
  - ・国・地方
  - ・各政策分野
- ・政策事例の限界
  - ・特にヒヤリングの限界

### 2. 政策を評価する

- ・内容、意思決定、プロセス(形成・実施)
- ・第三者的視点
  - ・合理的視点からの批判
  - ・規範的視点からの批判
- ・当事者的視点
  - ・自分をその場に置く
  - ・何ができたか、どうすべきだったか

### 3. ダイナミズムを理解する

- ・政策形成は非定型的な仕事
  - ・創造的、挑戦的
  - ・基本的な作法はあるか？
- ・何が必要か
  - ・問題意識
  - ・熱意(エネルギー)
  - ・調査能力、構想力、実現能力

### 4. MPPにおける活用

- ・講義
  - ・教員が事例を引用・紹介する
  - ・担当者を招いて事例について話を聞く
- ・演習
  - ・学生に事例を評価させる
    - ・第三者的評価＋当事者的評価
    - ・改善案を考えさせる
  - ・学生に事例を作成させる
    - ・優れた人物との接触による効果

**Asia Pacific Institute of Management**

**National Economics University**

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## **Research on the Status of Policy Process in Vietnam**

### **SUMMARY REPORT**

*The Summary Report was written by Dr. Nguyen Van Thang based on the three case studies conducted by researchers of the Asia Pacific Institute of Management. The research team thanks JICA-HCMA Project Management Team, professors from GRIPS, professors from National Academy of Public Administration and National Economics University for their valuable comments and suggestions on the research plans and reports.*

August 2015

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## Abbreviation

JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
MoF	Ministry of Finance
MPP	Master of Public Policy
NAPA	National Academy of Public Administration
NGOs	Non-government Organizations
NRD	New Rural Development Program
NW	Northwest
PSPs	Public Service Providers
US	The United State
VND	Vietnam Dong
WB	The World Bank

## 1 Introduction

As social and economic conditions have evolved significantly after more than two decades of reform, Vietnam is facing a serious challenge as how to promote inclusive growth and overcome the so-called “middle income country” trap (WB, 2010; Nguyen, Le, and Tran, 2015). Having well formulated policies that address the country’s development needs becomes increasingly pertinent. Given that public policies are tool of the state to steer wealth development and distribution, policy process becomes particularly prominent and contested. As a case in point, in the first half of 2013, the central government could only issue 28 policies out of 140 policies they had planned for (Nguoi lao dong, 2013). Similarly, a statistics from Ministry of Justice showed that 9017 sectorial and local policies were discovered in 2014 as contained some violations of current laws (Hai Quan Online, 2015).

Scholars have shown that a policy’s results depend on its substance and procedure (Simon, 1976). Having an appropriate policy process is critical for various reasons. Firstly, the appropriateness of the process makes the policy better in terms of its relevance, feasibility, and impact (Andrews, 2007). Secondly, a process that contain good level of participation from various stakeholders makes the policy more legitimate (Simon, 1976). Finally, a proper process also fosters understandings and commitment from various stakeholders to facilitate the enforcement of the policy (Gianpaolo, 2003; Yang and Caliahan, 2007; Mahjabeen et al., 2009). Overlooking policy process would be a serious mistake for policy makers as well as scholars.

Public policies is a new field of study in Vietnam (Nguyen Dang Loi, 2012; Nguyen Dang Thanh, 2012). Current studies and writings of public policies in Vietnam focus on the substance of the policies, and largely ignore policy process. In a very few articles that have mentioned policy process (Nguyen Dang Loi, 2012; Nguyen Dang Thanh, 2012; Trinh Thi Kieu Anh, 2013), experts have observed a number of issues in policy making in Vietnam, including a lack of genuine participation and coordination, an ignorance of research evidence, and a wide exposure to influence of elite group interests. However, most of the ideas were expert opinions and personal observations without solid empirical foundations.

This study of policy making in Vietnam is an important component of the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) project that supports the National Academy of Public

Administration (NAPA) to design a Master Program on Public Policy (MPP). The overall objective of the study are twofold:

- Provide practical basis on the status of public policy process at the central agencies in Vietnam, to serve the design of the MPP program at NAPA in the framework of the JICA project.
- Study some of actual policy cases, to describe public policy process in Vietnam as well as to identify difficulties in it, which could be useful and appropriate for future use as teaching material in MPP. We offer several ways to utilize the research results for MPP in NAPA in Appendix 3.

While understanding the regulations is important (Appendix 2), this study focuses on the practical process of the policy, i.e., how a policy is made in reality. We also focus on government-level policies for two reasons. Firstly, these policies regulate and direct the country's development more closely and specifically than the laws. Secondly, the processes of making these policies are more diverse, offering interesting insights into the topic. Through a series of three case studies, the research focuses on the varying nature and intensity of the different actors' participation in policy making, and how the interactions among these stakeholders result the policies. By doing that, the research also explores the procedural success factors of a policy and competencies needed for policy makers.

We considered a qualitative study of policy process to be most appropriate for this study. Policy making involve various stakeholders with different perspectives and interests. Qualitative interviews allowed us to approach respondents from different positions, to compare, to contrast and understand their viewpoints with specific reference to local contexts. We conduct three case studies by systematically collecting and analyzing data from related groups (e.g, policy makers, including leading team and contributors from different agencies, implementation agencies, and beneficiaries) in the policy making. While the relative narrow empirical base of our study limits the extent to which we can generalize our findings, the data are sufficiently rich to allow us to provide some insights into how the literature on policy process can be adapted to explain policy process in emerging economies (See Appendix 1 for details of research methodology).

This study contributes to our understandings of policy process in several ways. Firstly, to our knowledge, this is the first study that systematically and empirically examine the practical process of policy making in Vietnam. The study highlights how stakeholders' knowledge and

interests/power influence the policies. Secondly, the study recognizes the importance of the “middle managers” as the key agents of policy making. Finally, the study identifies a number of unique competencies needed for these agents to be capable of making good policies in Vietnam.

We start with our analytical framework that was applied to guide the three case studies. We then provide background information on the cases and compare the cases along different dimensions. We then present key findings and conclude with key lessons from the cases.

## 2 Analytical Framework

We define policy as programs and/or chain of actions that were specified from government priorities and rules to achieve objectives. This study integrates several theories to develop a research framework, including stakeholder participation and policy cycle. The integration allows us to examine key factors of policy process (stakeholders’ learning and power/interest) in a dynamic manner (stages of policy making).

### 2.1 Stakeholder participation

Scholars and practitioners have recognized the important role stakeholder participation plays in the decision-making process of governments (Baiocchi, 2003; Yang and Callahan, 2007; Mahjabeen et al., 2009; Weible & Sabatier, 2007). Participation contributes to policy results in at least three ways. Firstly, participation improves quality of the policies in terms of relevance, feasibility and impact (Andrew, 2007). In this regards, stakeholders contribute ideas, knowledge, and perspective to policy making. Secondly, participation creates a sense of ownership, and thus foster understanding and commitment from various stakeholders. These elements are important for the policy to be enforced and/or implemented. Finally, participation enhances the legitimacy of the policy. At the very least, participation often is required by law, and thus inviting stakeholders to involve shows the legitimacy of the policy itself.

However, genuine participation is hard to get. Two obstacles include influences of stakeholders’ power and interest, and their differences in knowledge of the issues.

#### **Power and interest**

Stakeholders participate in policy making is often with their self-interests. Policy participants usually influence the policies in a way to best achieve their objectives (Weible & Sabatier, 2007). Policy makers face competing demands from stakeholders, and they respond to

these demands with different priorities (Mitchell et al., 1997; Saltzstein, 1992). This implies that policy making is a negotiation process among the stakeholders. In that negotiation, more salient stakeholders would be more likely to have strong influence on the policies.

According to Mitchell et al.'s (1997) model, a stakeholder's salience depends on the stakeholder's possession of one or more relationship attributes: power, legitimacy, and urgency. *Power* refers to one's ability to bring about desired outcomes despite resistance. *Legitimacy* refers to the extent that an actor's structures and behaviors are socially accepted and expected (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Scott, 1995). *Urgency* refers to the extent that the stakeholder's claim is critical (criticality) and that government delay in attending to the claim or relationship is unacceptable to the stakeholder (time-sensitivity). To push a policy forward, the drafting teams will need to gain salience from all three attributes. They would need to gain legitimacy and power by showing how the policies are embedded in wider government agenda and by getting endorsement of powerful forces. They also need to demonstrate that the policy issues are urgent and failure to act would seriously harm the country's development.

## **Learning**

Another aspect of participation is that stakeholders possess different levels of understandings of the policy issues. Policy process can be seen as stakeholders' collective learning process. In this way, policy process could be seen as collective discovery of solutions for societal problems (Grin & Loeber, 2007).

On the one hand, learning happens as we constantly convert tacit to explicit knowledge, and vice versa (Nonaka & Takeichi, 1995; Nonaka et al., 2008). This learning progresses through interactions and empathy with the context (socialization), clear presentation of the ideas (externalization), combination of different knowledge and information (combination), and practice, deep thinking and critiques of the ideas (internalization). The learning spreads from individual to group and organizational levels.

On the other hand, learning could happen in two different patterns: single-loop and double-loop learning (Argyris & Schon, 1978). In single-loop learning, people study the environment, compare environmental changes with their existing operating norms, and initiate actions to respond to the changes. In other words, people learn to respond to environment while keeping their operating norms unquestioned. In double-loop learning, people add one more loop: asking whether

their existing operating norms are appropriate in new situations. Double-loop learning is much harder to master since it questions the implicit assumptions.

In both Nonaka's knowledge creation and Argyris and Schon's double-loop learning theories, a number of conditions for learning to happen. These include diversity of actors, free flow of information, democratic and open atmosphere that invite different perspectives, and direct interactions between the actors. Their theories are applicable to public policy making since policy process involves many and diverse stakeholders with different levels of knowledge. Many policies also need to be challenged on their underlying philosophies.

## 2.2 Policy cycle

The idea of modeling the policy process in terms of stages was first put forward by Lasswell (1956). In his model, a policy process comprises of seven stages: intelligence, promotion, prescription, invocation, application, termination, and appraisal. The model has been widely used as a framework for policy process analysis. A number of variations of the stages typology have been proposed with more differentiation of stages. Today, the process of *agenda-setting, policy formulation and decision-making, implementation, and evaluation* became popular in studying policy process (Andrew, 2007).

*Agenda setting* is often viewed as the starting point of a policy. In this stage, policy problems need to be recognized and defined in a way that expresses clearly the necessity of state intervention. Next, the recognized problems need to be put on the agenda for serious considerations of public action.

In the *policy formulation and decision-making* stage, expressed problems, proposals, and demand are transformed into government programs. This includes definitions of policy objectives and the consideration of different action alternatives.

*Implementation* refers to stage of execution or enforcement of a policy by the responsible institutions and organizations. This stage is critical as policies and their intentions will easily be changed or even distorted in the chain of communication. Normally, policy implementation contains of specification of program details and allocation of resource.


In the *evaluation* stage of policy cycle, these intended outcomes of policies move into the center of attention. However, evaluation is not only associated with the final stage in the policy cycle. Evaluation could be done in any other stages of the policy cycle.

Policy cycle theory, while is widely used, faced a number of critiques. Firstly, the theory is based on an implicit top-down perspective. Policy-making is framed as a hierarchical steering by superior institutions. Secondly, stakeholders' interests, power, and negotiation in the policy-making are under-studied. Thirdly, the policy cycle ignores the role of knowledge, ideas and learning in the policy process.

### 2.3 Research framework

We integrate stakeholder participation and policy cycle to develop an analytical framework for this study. We focus on *agenda-setting*, *policy formulation and decision making*, and *implementation* (including some *evaluation* of the studied policies). In each stage, we collect data and examine how stakeholders' power/interests and learning were present and interact, and how these factors influenced the progress of the policy. The framework serves as a general guideline for our qualitative research. Figure 1 illustrates the framework.

Figure 1: Analytical Framework



### 3 Description of the cases

#### 3.1 Selection of policies

To ensure the cases could shed lights on general practical policy process, we set four criteria for case selection:

- **There are evidences of results:** The policies should be issued for at least 3 years and it should be clear whether the policies have been implemented or not. The results of policy implementation has been evaluated or discussed by different parties. We will not evaluate the results and impacts of the policies, but refer to other sources of evaluation.
- **The policies are typical for Vietnamese policy process:** Selected policies should be typical for Vietnamese policy process. This ensures that lessons from the cases could be inferred to general situation of policy process in Vietnam. Policies that are closely linked with the transition from centrally planning to market economies, that reflect the Communist Party's goals, are given high priority.
- **It is feasible to study:** It should be feasible for the team to access to documents and informants for the studies. We chose policies where members of policy drafting teams could be interviewed.
- **The policies are potentially interesting:** The policies making involved different parties with different viewpoints and interests. We gave priority to policies that could help us explore the complexity and dynamics of stakeholder interactions and learning.

Three policies were chosen for this study, including Autonomy to Public Service Providers (PSPs), New Rural Development Program (NRD), and Northwest Tourism Plan (2008). The next section provides some background information of the policies.

#### 3.2 Basic facts of the cases

##### **Autonomy for Public Service Providers**

This “policy” is actually a combination of three key documents: Decree 10/2002/ND-CP (16/10/2002); Decree 43/2006/ND-CP (25/4/2006); and the newly issued Decree 16/2015/ND-CP (16/2/2015) on Autonomy of Public Service Providers (PSPs). The regulations aims to shift PSPs away from state budget reliance towards more self-financing status. The direct targets of the policies are public service providers in all sectors of the nation. However, since public services



can directly influence the lives of citizens, the policies got high interests from the social public. General public opinions, or at least the politicians' interpretation of public opinions, strongly influence the substance of the policies.

The three regulations reflect the dynamics of stakeholders' collective learning and power balances over time. Decree 10/2002/ND-CP abandoned the “ask & give” mechanism and introduce a “block grant” mechanism for concurrent expenditure. This provided PSPs some level of autonomy in finance, but not in organization and personnel. Decree 43/2006/ND-CP moved a step further in granting PSPs some autonomy in task implementation, personnel, and organization. However, in Decree 43, PSPs have not been treated as a “fully autonomous organizations”, e.g., do not have the right to decide “price” of the services (the concept of “price” has not been mentioned in the Decree). The recent Decree 16 (2015) opens to this higher level of autonomy. Stakeholders' learning and negotiation in this policy development promise an interesting lesson on policy process in Vietnam.

### **New Rural Development Program**

The National Target Program on New Rural Development (NRD) has been approved and implemented since 2010. The general goal of the program as stated under the Decision 800-QĐ/Ttg (4/6/2010) is to improve the lives of people in the countryside through applying modern economic development model, ensuring democratic and stable community, and protecting the eco-environment. These goals have been specified into different objectives including: (1) By 2015, 20% of communes will reach new countryside standards (under the national set of new countryside criteria); and (2) By 2020, 50% of communes will reach new countryside standards (under the national set of new countryside criteria).

NRD is complex. Firstly, the program cuts across many sectors and involves various policies and actions. Although the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD) has the state management responsibility, close coordination with other ministries and state agencies is critical in formulating and implementing the Program. Secondly, the program involves a great number of stakeholders with high diversity. Millions of farmers, non-farming households, mass organizations, cooperatives, private sector, central and local government agencies, public sector authorities and service providers - all have participated in the program.

NRD also changes over time. It started out more as a centrally managed program where 11 components and 19 new countryside criteria were applied uniformly across regions. The implementation then has pointed out the needs for participation and adjustment to local contexts. This complexity and dynamics of NRD make it very interesting to be included in this study.

### **Northwest (NW) Tourism Plan**

The Northwest Tourism Plan started in 2006 by the Institute for Tourism Development Research, following the order from Ministry of Culture, Sport, and Tourism. The objective of the Plan was to guide the tourism development of the region, and also to serve as legal reference for tourism organizations to plan their activities. The Plan was developed during 2006 – 2008, and got approval in 2008 by the Minister of the Ministry of Culture, Sport, and Tourism. However, the plan was never put in practice, and provinces were not even aware of the plan.

Different from the other two cases, this is a sector- and region-specific policy. Studying this policy is potentially interesting for several reasons. Firstly, planning used to be the core of the old socialist economy. Studying this policy would reveal how much planning has been changed with the reform of the country. Secondly, planning currently is a popular activity for all government sectors and localities. Studying planning process would be pertinent to offer timely suggestions to government agencies. Finally, this policy is a good contrast to the other two cases in a number of dimensions, such as coverage, results, and impact (See section below). Thus, it enhances the study's reliability.

### **3.3 Mapping the cases**

The cases are compared on various dimensions, as illustrated in Figure 2 - 4. The three cases provide a reasonable diversity in geographical and sectorial coverage, targets and actors involved in policy making, as well as in possible impacts and practical implementation of the policies. This diversity enhances our confidence that the cases cover key elements of (government-level) policy process in Vietnam.

- *Geographical coverage:* Northwest Tourism Plan only covered the northwest region of Vietnam. NRD and Autonomy policies, on the other hand, were nation-wide (Figure 2).
- *Sectorial coverage:* The Northwest Tourism Plan only applicable to tourism sector, while the other policies were applied to many sectors (Figure 2).




Figure 2

- *Number of actors in making policies:* The making of NW Tourism Plan involved mostly experts of Tourism sector. The making of other policies involved many ministries and organizations (Figure 3).
- *Direct beneficiaries:* The direct beneficiaries (and targets) of NRD are citizens (rural areas), while those of other policies are mostly organizations (Figure 3).




Figure 3

- *Implementation*: NW Tourism Plan was not implemented, while the other two policies were put in practices (Figure 4).
- *Impact to people's lives*: NW Tourism Plan, if implemented, would have indirect impact on people lives. The other two policies have had much more direct impacts on people's lives (Figure 4).




Figure 4

## 4 Findings

### 4.1 Emerging issues in policy process in Vietnam

Three cases differed in a number of dimensions, such as targets, beneficiaries, coverage, and results. However, a number of common issues emerged from the cases and addressing these issues would have a profound implication on policy making in Vietnam. We present these issues following the stage of policy cycle and with reference to legal requirements (Appendix 2).

#### Agenda setting

*Who initiated the policy issues?* The policy issues in all three cases were initiated by government officials at different levels. While the Autonomy Policy issue was first initiated by official at Department General level, the issues of other two policies were initiated by higher ranked officials. Non-government entities, such as citizens, staff of NGOs, private sectors may contribute to the recognition of the issues, but not the initiators of policies. This fits well with general notion that in Vietnam, policies are made by government officials.

*What issues to be recognized?* The three cases had several characteristics in common. Firstly, the issues had a strong root at current political agenda. In the Autonomy policy, the issue was first initiated in mid 1990s when economic reform made certain progress in the business sector. A reform in the public sector was sensible and fitted well with this agenda. In the NRD, development of rural areas were well recognized in the Central Party's agenda in 2000s. The NW

Tourism Plan was rooted at strong Party's and government's consideration of ethnicity and the region development.

*“In 1990s, our country had been renewed for nearly a decade. Autonomy had been given to state-own enterprises, but not for PSPs. I stressed to the Minister that we need to start reforming the public sector”.*

(Member of Autonomy core team)

*“In 2000s, rural areas faced great difficulties. Prices of agricultural products dropped, natural disasters were frequent. The Party had viewed modernization of rural areas as a priority.”*

(Member of NRD core team)

*“The government has always paid a great consideration to ethnic groups. Tourism was viewed as one way to improve economic conditions of these people. But the tourism activities were not well coordinated.”*

(Member of NW Tourism Plan core team)

Secondly, the policies got endorsement from high-ranked officials to be recognized. The Autonomy policies got strong support from the Minister (in 1990s) and then Vice Prime Minister (in mid 2000s). NRD also got endorsement of then Vice Prime Minister, and at the same time have supports from Party's committees. These supports were critical for these two policies to pass very initial objections from other agencies. The endorsement was even more important in the deficiency of strong evidences and resources. The NW Tourism Plan was directed top-down from the Minister, and this was enough to be formulated since this was a sector-specific policy.

Thirdly, the issues were presented as well rooted at the practical demand and international best practices. The Autonomy policies were presented as a solution to address the overwhelming inefficiency in the public sector. International best practices were abundant to show that autonomy would improve efficiency of public service deliveries. The proposal of NRD linked well with the problems facing rural areas in the 2000s. International experiences from Korea, Japan, and other countries were brought in to illustrate that the issue has solutions and these solutions were feasible. The NW Tourism Plan was argued to induce sustainable development and social stability for a

region. In other words, the presentation of the issues (urgent, well fitted with current Central Party's agenda, and feasible) was also critical for these policies to be recognized.

*“In Singapore or US, PSPs could spend even hundreds of billion without having to ask for item per item permission. Why do PSPs in Vietnam have to ask for permission to spend even one VND?”*

(Member of Autonomy core team)

*“Korea and Japan both had some special programs to improve lives of rural areas. We presented their experiences to persuade high-ranked officials that there were solutions for the problems we were facing.”*

(Member of NRD core team)

### **Policy formulation**

All three policies' issues were recognized and then formulated. The formulation followed legal requirements, but genuine compliance could not be assumed.

*Who were in the drafting teams?* The drafting teams comprised of officials in related ministries, of which a core team was from the ministries in charge of the policies. Retired experts were invited to the drafting in NW Tourism Plan, but not for other two policies. In all three cases, private sector, NGOs, and other non-government staff were not in the drafting teams.

*How were basic research done for the formulation process?* According to current policy (Law of Policy Formulation, 3/6/2008; Decision 135/2009/QĐ-TTg, dated 04/11/2009, from the Prime Minister), three research projects need to be conducted for the formulation of the policies. These are 1) Evaluation of existing related policies; 2) Evaluation of the current socio-political and economic status relating to the policies; and 3) Evaluation of possible impacts of the proposed policies. In all three policies, these documents were provided as required.

Our research suggested a number of issues to be discussed in this regard. Firstly, these research documents were compiled by the core team members. On the one hand, this contains a high risk of being biased toward supporting new policies. On the other hand, the officials may not have (and should not be expected to have) the skills needed to conduct these research, especially the impact evaluation.

*“Impact evaluation was done by ourselves. Of course we wrote in a way that support the need of new policy. It would be silly otherwise.”*

(Member of Autonomy core team)

Secondly, the reports were written based mostly on administrative reports and available statistics. Research that systematically collected data/perspective from different stakeholders were not conducted in any of the three policies. This lack of rigorous approach increased the risk that these documents were biased toward the core teams’ wishes.

*“Basic research was done, but mostly to fulfill the requirements. Ideas were already decided. I wish we could have rigorous studies – that would save a lot of money.”*

(Member of NRD core team)

*“Data were not reliable. With conflicting data, we decided which to use.”*

(Member of NW Tourism Plan core team)

Thirdly, the members of drafting teams, even of the core teams, did not do extensive fieldwork to really understand and empathize with the reality. Most members gained their knowledge of practical issues from “documents”, not from their first hand experiences or observations. This lack of “socialization” somehow limited their ability to formulate the policies.

*“We did not have resources to conduct careful research. I wish we could spend 10 BVND for a good research. That could save hundreds of BVND later in the implementation.”*

(Member of NRD core team)

*“No resource for further survey or field study. We just based on available data and our experience to develop the Plan.”*

(Member of NW Tourism Plan core team)

*How were comments from stakeholders solicited?* Once the policies were drafted, they should sent to related stakeholders for comments. The NW Tourism Plan was not sent to local officials and people for comments. Only experts from central government contributed to the Plan. NRD and Autonomy policies, on the other hand, went through many rounds of comments. Two important ways of getting comments were sending official letters to related agencies and organizing conferences for representatives of stakeholders to give opinions.

Official letters, as recognized by the informants, were too formal to get rich and specific comments. In Autonomy policy, official letters were sent to line ministries asking for comments. Line ministries then sent their official letters to collect comments from PSPs under their supervision. The line ministries would then compile comments from PSPs and sent back to drafting team. This arrangement contained a great risk of comments being filtered.

*“Universities and hospitals, for example, wanted more autonomy. Their line ministries did not. So when these ministries compiled the comments, there was a risk that they already chose comments that fit with their preconceptions to send to us.”*

(Member of Autonomy core team)

*“Ministries may not like NRD, but they had to follow since this was in the Party’s resolution. So when they sent us comments, the comments were very general.”*

(Member of Autonomy core team)

*“When we saw an inappropriate idea, we responded strongly. But our emotions were no way to be reflected in the official comment documents. Normally, the documents were polite and general.”*

(A staff of PSPs)

Qualities of conferences, on the other hand, depended much on the participants. Our informants acknowledged that participants were different vastly in their knowledge and interests. In addition, line ministries did not often send the most suited officials to the conferences. In a short period of time (often half day or one day), very few people could have a chance to speak. Thus, collecting feedback was more for legitimacy than for learning purposes.

*How were comments compiled and analyzed to inform policy revisions?* Numerous comments were sent to the drafting team. The core teams were responsible for analyzing these comments, making decisions on how to use these comments to revise the policies, and then write explanations to submit to the approval bodies (i.e., Government Office). This could happen many rounds. Two issues emerged in this step. Firstly, there was no standard way to guide the compilation of comments. It depended much on the “feeling” and “absorptive capacity” of the core team members. Personal biases of the members were hard to control for. Secondly, the member did not hold accountable to commentators in their responses to comments. In other words, the



selection and use of comments in policy revisions depended greatly on personal preferences and integrity of the core team members.

*“People’s comments were all over places. Some were even off-base. We needed to listen carefully and chose relevant comments.”*

(Member of Autonomy core team)

*“We gave comments on many things. But I did not see any of these comments being used in revised version. I had no idea whether our comments were even read.”*

(A staff from PSPs)

## **Implementation**

Once the policies were approved, they could be put in the implementation. NW Tourism Plan was not implemented due to the lack of institutional and resource foundations. Autonomy and NRD were implemented. Three issues emerged in these two cases.

*How were the policies communicated to implementation agencies and impacted parties?* An extensive propaganda activities were used to communicate the policies. Conferences, training, TV programs, written instructions, etc. were popular methods. Three typical channels were used:

- Administrative channel: ministries and local government organize workshops to explain the policies.
- Academic channel: some universities and training institutes were mobilized to communicate the policies to targeted groups of audiences.
- Media: mass media were used extensively to “raise awareness” of the public.

The communication, regardless of methods and channels, was mostly one-way and very top-down. Some of the policies were used “legally tight languages” that were hard to understand.

*“The language of Decree 43 sometimes were too ‘beautiful’ for PSPs to understand. When policies are written ‘beautifully’ and ‘tightly’, the chance to be implemented would be low.”*

(Member of Autonomy core team)

*How useful were lessons from pilots?* NRD and recent Autonomy policies were piloted in sample of communes (NRD) and PSPs (Autonomy). Our research showed that the pilot places

often had much better conditions than the “average”. For example, four universities piloting the full autonomy (Decree 16/QD-CP/2015) were among those that have strongest reputation and student enrollment. Similarly, pilot communes in the NRD (2010 – 2020) were often more developed than the average. Thus, piloting was only good to experience the whole process of policy implementation. The lessons from pilot models, however, were limited since these places were often too good compared to the others.

*“We could not learn from Thi Son commune [pilot commune in the district] about NRD. They are much richer than other communes in the district, and much easier to sell land.”*

(Kim Bang District official, Ha Nam province)

*How much empowerment was given to the implementation agencies?* NRD and Autonomy have been implemented for more than 5 years. Both policies started out with a low level of empowerment to the implementation agencies. Autonomy policy, by definition, coincided with a high level of empowerment. However, in the last 15 years, the autonomy granted to PSPs started very low (only for concurrent expenditure) and only increased incrementally. Similarly, NRD started out with a more centrally controlled fashion. Only when more non-government resources were needed and more context sensitive measures were called for, did the localities get higher level of empowerment.

*“The drafting team comprised of officials in Hanoi. We made policies that fit well with Red River Delta region. Implementing the NRD in Mekong Delta region appeared to have problems.”*

(Member of NRD team)

*“The NRD requires all communes to have a market. In rural areas, market places were not founded in that administrative manners. They emerged naturally and historically with people’s habits to sell and buy. We proposed many times [we do not need another market], and now the superiors allowed us to decide.”*

(Official from Le Ho Commune, Kim Bang District, Ha Nam province)

## 4.2 Success factors of policy process in Vietnam

In this study, a policy is successful if it was approved and implemented, and produced positive impact to general development and to related stakeholders. In this regard, NW Tourism

Plan was not successful, while Autonomy and NRD got better results. We compared NW Tourism Plan with other two policies to suggest some success factors in the policy process.

### **Solid political and institutional foundation and endorsement of high-ranked officials**

For a policy issue to be recognized, it needs to be well positioned in the country's political agenda, notably in the Central Party's resolutions. NRD and Autonomy policies got strong support from high-ranked officials (i.e., Vice Prime Minister and Party's leaders). The endorsement from these officials helped the policies overcome objections. By contrast, NW Tourism Plan, did not have that support. The drafting team of NW Tourism Plan could only get a signature from the Minister, not from Prime Minister. As a result, the Plan could not be implemented due to a lack of institutional foundation and resources.

*“I could see at that time that without the Prime Minister's signature in the Plan, the Plan would go nowhere.”*

(Member of NW Tourism core team)

### **Empathy of the core teams to the context and reality**

Three core teams were all knowledgeable of the policy areas. However, the leaders of the core teams differed in their empathy to the context and reality. Empathy differs from knowledge in that it contains an emotional element – the policy makers felt what the people felt. This requires firsthand experience, direct interactions with people and/or implementation agencies, and a deep internalization of the problems that people faced. Empathy facilitated the definition of problems in a way that close to reality, and identified solutions that would make positive impact on people's lives and emotions. Empathy induces intrinsic motivation to solve problems, and then commitment to successful policies.

The making of a sector or region plan was often viewed as a technical task, and NW Tourism Plan was not an exception. As a member of this core team acknowledged, the team did not have resources to do field visits, nor did they have reliable data. Even though they were experts of the field, their product lacked social and political foundations.

*“This task was directed from above quite swiftly, and we had a very short time to do. There was no resource for fieldwork, we just used our available data and expertise.”*

(Member of NW Tourism core team)

The core teams of early Autonomy policy (Decree 10) and NRD were in different positions. They had regular interactions with people in public service delivery units (Autonomy policy) or in rural areas (NRD) before being in the teams. The core teams' members shared the hard feelings with these people and had sufficient time to think about the problems. Inefficient public sector or slow development in the rural areas became these officials' problems. Empathy with the contexts and impacted parties, the officials had tried very hard to push the policies forward. Their tacit knowledge and intrinsic motivation was critical, yet had not been well recognized.

*“In my position [Director General], I could see how hard it was for the public service delivery units to regularly coming and asking for expenditure, item by item. ... After long debates, we finally submitted the policy to Government Office. On the day the policy got approved, I stayed very late at the reception of Government Office to wait for the copy of signed Decree [Decree 10]. I brought it back and gave it to the Minister as a gift to his birthday [the same day].”*

(Member of Autonomy core team)

### **Genuine participation from stakeholders**

Genuine participation was hard to get. In all three cases, participation from stakeholders started out as a legitimacy condition for the policy. The NW Tourism Plan did not go further in soliciting feedback from localities. Autonomy and NRD policies did ask stakeholders to give comments for many rounds. Comments started out as “general”, but then became more and more specific and on-target. Autonomy policies made progress, but quite slowly. Stakeholders' comments were mobilized in formal manners, mostly via official letters and conferences. NRD used more diverse ways to get comments: field visits, regional conferences, and small research projects. Feedback from various stakeholders helped these later two policies to improve, albeit slowly.

### **Core team members' ability to make wise judgment**

Besides “standard” competencies of policy makers, such as system thinking, knowledge of international common practices and policies to similar problems, and negotiation/ persuasion

skills, we found that the core teams' ability to make wise judgment is another critical competency in policymaking in Vietnam.

Wise judgment refers to the ability of making decisions that targeted at development, got through complex socio-political constraints, and yet were ethically sound. This is a combination of a strong knowledge, a good sensitivity to the practical contexts, and a determination for common goods. Practicing wise judgment starts with desirable development goals (common goods), it then bases on strong knowledge of international best practices and local contexts to generate innovative solutions, and finds creative ways to overcome various objections and constraints.

In Autonomy policies, wise judgment was present from the beginning. The determination for change was quite clear in the former Director General of the Administration and Public Service Department (MoF). She insisted that Administration needed to be separated from Public Service, and then PSPs needed to have autonomy. That idea was alien to most officials, especially her direct supervisors (Vice Ministers), at time (mid 1990s). She started conversations and explanation with the Minister, and then got his endorsement. Facing strong but implicit objections from stakeholders, the core team then started one step at a time. They did not introduce the concept of “price” for public services, and only focus on concurrent expenditure. This gave people time to understand and experience the change, and then pressed for more change later.

Wise judgment was also apparent in NRD. The idea of having an integrated program for rural development faced strong institutional inertia of specialized ministries. Without solid evidences from basic research and reliable data to support, the proposal could not be approved. The core team made a wise move to work with the Central Party to and get rural development objective into the Party's resolution. In the current institutional setting, Party's objectives could be seen as a “precious sword” that helped redirect other ministries from raising objections to finding solutions.

### **Empowerment to implementation agencies**

Empowerment was not popular in policy implementation in Vietnam, partly because empowerment means the central government agencies giving up some power to the implementation agencies. Our study suggested that appropriate empowerment facilitates the implementation in several ways. Firstly, empowerment promotes creativities of implementation agencies. The implementation of policies would then fit better to the local contexts. Secondly,

empowerment encourage non-stage actors to contribute resources to the policy implementation. Of three studied policies, empowerment was not present in NW Tourism Plan. In both Autonomy and NRD, empowerment was low at the beginning. Over time, as more non-state resources were needed for development, higher empowerment was given to the implementation agencies.

The cases also suggested that level of empowerment needs to fit with capacities of the empowered agencies. It may not be realistic to have a very high empowerment at the beginning of the policy implementation. However, it is critical to build capacity of implementation agencies, and then empower them.

### 4.3 Policy process as a collective learning and negotiation

#### **Policy process as a negotiation**

The negotiation did not occur as much in NW Tourism Plan as in NRD and Autonomy policies. In the Autonomy policies, there was a long debate on how much autonomy should be given to public service delivery units. While the core team had a vision of giving extensive autonomy to PSPs, line ministries were not very supportive. An implicit understanding was that granting autonomy meant giving up power of the central agencies. Similarly, the Treasury and Accounting agencies “support autonomy in principle, but retain current treasury and accounting practices”. Therefore, Decree 10 (2002) was only a partial change, and more were introduced in subsequent Decree 43 (2006) and Decree 16 (2015).

*“At that time [early 2000s], line ministries argued that this is financial policy, so they would only support financial autonomy. Treasury and Accounting agencies supported in principle, but they proposed to retain current treasury and accounting practices. This actually tied up our hands in promoting autonomy.”*

(Member of Autonomy core team)

The negotiation occurred even more direct in NRD. As drafting team comprised of members from related ministries, ministerial interests were put on the table in policy formulation. Without a strong scientific evidence to support one way or another, the policy ended up as a compromise.

*“Policy making in NRD is a collective bargaining. Every ministry put what they want on the table. We then take some from each, and that was why we got 19 criteria of developed communes. The criteria covered every field.”*

(Member of NRD core team)

### **Policy process as a collective learning**

The three case studies showed that policy process is a learning process, whether it is planned or emergent. The learning happened at three levels: technical, structural, and cognitive model of the policies.

At the technical level, stakeholders focused on instruments and/or levels of indicators in the policies. Technical learning occurred in all three policies:

- In NW Tourism Plan, technical learning meant a clear definition of the region, zoning of tourist activities, and identification of resources needed to realize the Plan.
- In Autonomy policy, learning at this level happened when stakeholders changed the financial procedure as well as specified financial items for autonomy.
- In NRD, the learning was about criteria of developed communes and process of making commune plans.

In the higher level of learning (structure level), stakeholders recognized the settings for technical criteria to work. In other words, the policy would not only target at changing technical instruments but also necessary conditions. In NRD, recognition of needed resources, cooperation of related stakeholders, adjustment of current policies in planning, investment, as well as public financial regulation was example of learning on the settings. In Autonomy policy, learning on the settings was reflected as the change from Decree 10 (2002) to Decree 43 (2006). For financial autonomy (Decree 10) to work, operational, organizational and personnel autonomy were also needed. NW Tourism Plan did not reach this level of learning.

The third level of learning occurred when stakeholders changed their cognitive models or philosophies underlying the policies. Decree 10 (2002) and Decree 43 (2006) of Autonomy policy treated PSPs as “state organizations” that relied on state budget. The most recent change in the policy – Decree 16 (2015) – put these organizations in a competitive environment. Thus, the

philosophy underlying the policy has changed from a system of “state subsidiary” to market competition. NRD also witnessed a change in policy philosophy at local levels. In the beginning, NRD was interpreted by most local authorities and citizens as just another administrative, state-funded program. After five years of implementation, the philosophy seemed to change: more and more people viewed this as a social, people-contributed program with guidance from the state. This change has a profound implication on policy implementation as well as resource mobilization.

### **Interactions between learning and power/interests**

Learning and power/interests intermingled, and sometimes it was very hard to determine whether a stakeholder’s opinion was based on his/her knowledge or vested interests. An ideal context for learning was where stakeholders focus on overall development goals and temporarily suppress their agencies’ benefit. This was not present at the beginning of any policy we studied. The case studies suggested that learning only happened when development policies was backed up by powerful forces. Firstly, learning could happen when the development goals were endorsed by high-ranked officials. In that situations, policy opponents realized that they could not stop policies; they started contributing to the making of the policies. Autonomy policies were initiated by powerful ministry (MoF) and endorsed by a high-ranked official. NRD was backed up by Party’s resolutions and also high-ranked officials. These powerful supports were critical for the policy issues to be realized.

Secondly, learning could also happen if there was a wide and genuine participation from implement agencies, beneficiaries and/or impacted parties. Group interests – including interests of line ministries and state agencies – persisted during policy process. Their arguments were from different viewpoints, and these different foundations could inhibit learning. Perspectives from implement agencies, beneficiaries and/or impacted parties could reconcile the differences among central state agencies. Moreover, their perspectives were close to realities and facilitated the implementation. In the cases, line ministries tried to limit the autonomy granted to PSPs (Autonomy policy) or to introduce their interests to NRD. Feedback from implementation agencies, i.e., PSPs and local governments, has pushed for more changes in the policies.

## **5 Conclusion and recommendations**

Economic reform has been implemented for almost three decades. However, policy making remained state-controlled and authoritative. Making policies has been viewed as solely the



government jobs. Participation from stakeholders is required clearly in regulations (e.g., Decision 135/2009/QĐ-TTg dated 04/11/2009, from Prime Minister), but followed artificially in practice. Vested interests slow down the learning, yet objective evidences and rigorous research have not been effectively utilized in policy process.

The essence of policy making in Vietnam, at least at the government level, has been neither top-down nor bottom-up. It has been “middle-up-down”. Middle level officials, i.e., Department Head to Director General of ministries, played a critical role in the policy process. Timeliness and quality of the policies have been largely dependent on competencies of these officials.

Based on the results of this study, we offer several recommendations. Firstly, moving toward evidence-based in policy making is critical. Rigorous studies need to be required for policy making. In this regard, we recommend to use independent research teams for impact evaluations to ensure objectivity of the studies.

Secondly, field visits should be required for the drafting teams. While rigorous research provides explicit knowledge and data, officials’ tacit knowledge requires direct interactions with impacted parties and implementation agencies. Some level of emotional attachment of empathy with the contexts and impacted people would strengthen the quality of the policies.

Thirdly, genuine participation from all related parties should be strived for. Feedbacks and comments from various stakeholders should be collected, not only to fulfill legal requirements but also to improve quality of and commitment to the policy. Open forums, democratic interactions should be created in addition to formal letters and conferences. Getting perspectives from impacted and implementation agencies should be given high priority.

Finally, accountability mechanisms in responding to comments and feedback should be in place. The drafting teams should be hold accountable to all stakeholders’ feedback, especially those of the impacted and implementation parties. Explanations of how the comments are utilized should be shared with all parties, in addition to the approval committees.

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## 7 Appendices

### 7.1 Appendix 1: Research methodology and key informants of the study

#### Desk research

The Desk research focused on three main tasks:

- *Literature review on international best practices of policy process*: We reviewed selected research articles and books on policy process models and best practices. The review is to help develop a framework for our study, i.e., identify key success factors of policy process.
- *Document review on Vietnamese regulations*: Vietnamese related regulations will then reviewed to identify required process of policy making as well as stakeholders involved in the process. As stated in previous section, this study does not focus on, but only reference to, the regulations on policy process.
- *Literature review on studies of Vietnamese policy process*: Research reports, articles, and books on Vietnamese policy process will be searched and reviewed. Systemic and empirical research on public policies in Vietnam was rare, and that for policy process was almost non-existent.

#### Interviews and fieldworks

We interviewed some key groups of informants as follows:

- Officials and units who were in charge of (or played leadership roles) in drafting the policies
- Officials who participated in the formulation of policies
- Stakeholders who are directly related to the policies: beneficiaries, affected parties, implementation parties, etc.

The identification of the interviewees will follow “snow-ball” technique. After each interview, we will ask the interviewee to suggest relevant informant for subsequent interviews. We interviewed 5 - 10 persons/case. A field visit to talk to local officials and people were also conducted for NRD and Northwest Tourism Plan.

#### Data analysis

We regularly discussed the emerging theory during the data collection. A thorough analysis was done at the end of the fieldwork in two stages. The first stage involved writing up three cases, highlighting the actual process of policy making. The second stage compared and contrasted the three cases to identify key success factors and distinctive features of policy process in Vietnam.

### **Limitations of the study**


Several limitations of the study need to be noted. Firstly, access to information on policy process was not easy. We tried all channels to access to necessary documents, but historical reports of stakeholders' comments on policies were not available. Similarly, access to right informants were difficult since many of the members of policies' drafting teams had been retired or moved to different locations. Secondly, the research relied on people's recalls of what happened in the past, from 5 to 13 years ago. People's misremembering was possible. Finally, policy process contains sensitive issues, such as group power and interests. To address these limitations, we have tried to triangulate different sources of information to ensure reliability. We are confident that the limitations, while possible, do not interfere with key findings of the study.

Table: Key informants of the study

Policy	Key informants	Content
General policy process in Vietnam	Dr. Dang Hung Vo (Formal Deputy Minister of MONRE)	Experience in regulations and practice of policy making process in Vietnam
Granting Autonomy	Dr. Tran Thi Ha (Formal General Director of Administration and Public Service Dept., MOF)	Her experience as the leader of drafting team for Decree 10/2002/QD-CP.
	<i>Mr. Vo Thanh Hung – Director General of Administration and Public Service Dept., MOF)</i>	His experience as the leader of drafting team for Decree 16/2015/QD-CP.
	<i>Dr. Nguyen Viet Hong – Deputy Director of the Treasury - MOF (Formal GD of of Administration and Public Service Dept., MOF - Successor of Dr. Ha)</i>	His experience as the member of drafting team for Decree 43/2006/QD-CP, and the head of agency that supervised the implementation of Decree 43.
	<i>Mr. Hong – Vice Director of the Financial Dept. – MoH</i>	His experience as the line Ministry of the Decree 43
	Mr. Nguyen Ba Nham Staff member of the Financial Dept., National Economics University	His experience as the implementation agency of the Decree 43
	Dr. Pham Chi Thanh, Vice Director of the Dept. for Performance Award, MOF	His knowledge of Autonomy policies as his doctoral thesis and practical experience
	Mr. Vu, Director General of the Financial Dept.- MOET	His experience as the line Ministry of the Decree 43
	New Rural Development (NRDP)	<i>Mr. Nguyen Manh Tien – Vice Director of the NRDP – MARD 02 staff in MARD</i>
A member of MPI who participate in NRDP		His experience as the member of drafting team for NRDP

Policy	Key informants	Content
	Nguyen Thi Hoa – Researcher, Institute for Agriculture Strategy and Policy, MARD	Her experience as a research of the topic
	Visit a province (Ha Nam) and worked with Provincial People Committee, Kim Bang District (People Committee), 2 communes	March 9 <sup>th</sup> , 2015
Tourism Plan for North mountainous provinces	<i>Mr. Duong Dinh Hien</i> – Director of the Planning Dept., Tourism Research Institute 02 members of the Institute	Their experience as the leader (and members) of drafting team for the Plan
	<i>Mr. Tran Huu Son</i> – Director of the Culture, Sport, and Tourism Dept., Son La Province	His experience as the member of the Northwest Region Development Committee and as a local agency
	Mr. Nguyen Quoc Hung - Tourism Research Institute	Member of Drafting team and a researcher on tourism planning
	Visit a province (Hoa Binh): Worked with Dept. of Culture, Sport, and Tourism, and visit several tourism places	Feb. 5 <sup>th</sup> , 2015

## 7.2 Appendix 2: Regulated process for government-level policies (Law of policies formulation, 3/6/2008)





### 7.3 Appendix 3: Utilization of the research reports in MPP of NAPA

The outputs of this project are in the form of research reports (summary and case reports), not teaching cases or lectures. However, these reports could be utilized for the MPP of NAPA in a number of ways. We suggest NAPA professors and JICA-HCMA to consider the following methods:

#### 1) Develop teaching cases for class discussion

NAPA professors could develop teaching cases from the case reports. This includes teaching cases and teaching notes.

##### *Writing teaching cases based on the case research reports*

Teaching cases need not and should not include analysis. The teaching cases provide description of policy process, events, and some quotes of the informants. The information in the cases should be sufficient for analysis. In special occasions, learners could be encouraged to add in information/facts based on their own experience to enrich the case.

For three studied policies, teaching cases should be developed to be more like stories. Information on the Context and The Policy Stages is the key for developing teaching cases. Descriptive information should be retained and may be rearranged in a narrative form. The analysis should be removed and used in teaching notes. Depending on the specific styles of the writers, cases could be structured differently. The cases could be comprehensive (on the whole process, cover all aspects) or focused (on a particular stage, or cover one issue like learning). However, basic storyline for three cases could be:

- **Opening:** what the case is about
- **The context:** Political, social, and economic factors that induce policy issues to emerge
- **The story:** How policy evolved from agenda setting to formulation, implementation & evaluation, and revision (if any). Information on stakeholders' learning and power/interests need to be provided in the forms of facts/ events/ quotes.
- **Appendix:** Summary of the policy and any other supplement social-economic statistics that support to the case analyses.

##### *Writing teaching notes for teachers*

Normally, a (long) teaching case is accompanied with a teaching notes for teachers to use in classes. Teaching notes include at least the following sections:

- **Synopsis of the case:** Objectives and summary of the case
- **Appropriate subjects/ topics for the cases:** The cases fit well with such topics as policy cycle, learning in policy process, stakeholder participation, power and interest in policy process, and/or policy maker competencies, among others.
- **Case questions:** Questions would depend on the teaching topics. The content of the cases suggest that following questions could be used for class discussion:
  - Compared to current regulation (Law of policy formulation, 3/6/2008), which requirements were well/ not well followed in the process of making this policy? (*This question would require the learners to read both regulation and the case, and then compare*).
  - Compare to some relevant theories of public policy which conditions/assumptions/processes/methods were well/ not well followed in the process of making this policy?
  - Describe the stages of this policy process? What are key issues in each stage? How were the issues resolved?
  - How did stakeholders learn in the policy process? What facilitate/inhibit the learning?
  - How did stakeholders negotiate in the policy process? What facilitate/inhibit the negotiation?
  - Identify the success/failure aspects of the policy? What factors (in policy process) help explain this success/failure?
- **Case discussion arrangement:**
  - Short cases (less than 5 pages) could be handed-out in class. Learners would need 20 – 30 minutes for individual reading and analysis. Small group (4-5 people) could follow, and a class discussion could conclude.
  - Long cases (more than 5 pages) should be handed-out before class. In class, learners start in their small group discussions. Each group should make a brief presentation (on assigned questions), and get feedback from other groups. A final summary from teacher(s) concludes.

### *Case development process*

To develop teaching cases and notes, we suggest a process that NAPA professors could follow:

Step 1: Identify objectives and key messages of the cases

Step 2: Prepare teaching notes

Step 3: Develop storyline of the cases

Step 4: Write up: Putting facts/ events/ stories into the cases

#### **2) Integrate to the lectures**

NAPA teachers could integrate the results to their lectures on appropriate subjects/lessons in the MPP. Some of the integration are:

- The case results could be used to illustrate how regulations were followed in policy process – and identify the “gaps” in the implementation of regulation on policy making in Vietnam.
- Vietnamese policies could be used as examples to illustrate the lectures on policy process and/or policy making.
- The cases could be used as examples on how learning (e.g., 3 levels of learning: technical, structural, and cognitive) or negotiation happened in policy process.

#### **3) Example for research projects/ final thesis research**

The case report could be used as examples for MPP thesis or research projects. Learners could choose a policy they would like to study and conduct a similar research for their theses.

NAPA professors could organize some fieldwork on related topics, such as new Rural Development and/or Autonomy. The case reports (as provided) could be used as background reading for learners before they have a fieldwork on the topics. Alternatively, the cases could serve as background reading before a policy maker is invited to speak to the class on related topics.

**Asia Pacific Institute of Management**

**National Economics University**

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## **Research on the Status of Policy Process in Vietnam**

Case

### **GRANTING AUTONOMY TO THE PUBLICLY OWNED SERVICE PROVIDERS: MOVING TOWARDS MARKET BASED OPERATION**

*This case study was conducted by researchers from Asia Pacific Institute of Management. Dr. Vu Cuong was the lead author of this case study.*

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## ABBREVIATIONS

DoF	Department of Finance
DPEM	Department of Public Expenditure Management
ICFC	Internal Code of Financial Control
MoET	Ministry of Education and Training
MoF	Ministry of Finance
MoH	Ministry of Health
MoHA	Ministry of Home Affairs
OOG	Office of Government
PAR	Public Administration Reform
POSP	Publicly Owned Service Provider

## POLICY SUMMARY

Granting autonomy to Publicly Owned Service Providers (POSPs) is a long-term reform, being phased in by different policy decisions (Government's Decrees). The process is still evolving. This study attempts to describe the reform by evolving steps of the reform, including: (i) Phase 1 focuses on reforming financial management regime for POSPs (Decree 10); (ii) Phase 2 provides fuller autonomy to POSPs, including autonomy in staffing and professional operation (Decree 43); and (iii) Phase 3 gradually moves toward applying market prices in provision of public services (Decree 16).

Item	Description		
	Phase 1: Granting autonomy in financial management to revenue-generating POSPs	Phase 2: Granting fuller autonomy to POSPs	Phase 3: Developing new autonomous mechanism to POSPs
<b>a. Policy issue</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- POSPs were strictly controlled by line item budget management mechanism, which killed their autonomy</li> <li>- Full reliance on funding from state budget</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Limited impact nationwide due to it reached only to revenue-generating POSPs.</li> <li>- Even revenue-generating POSPs did not have strong autonomy since be tightened by other regulations on technical, organizational and staffing dimensions.</li> <li>- Lack of participation of other stakeholders outside financial management agencies.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Still be constrained by conflicted regulations imposed by line ministries, typically with potential fully autonomous entities.</li> <li>- Not differentiate between service fee (subsidized prices for tasks assigned by the Government) and service price (fully market-determined price) leading to overlapping in accounting practice</li> </ul>
<b>b. Purpose</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- POSPs had discretion in allocating block grant from state budget to fulfill assigned tasks and mandates.</li> <li>- POSPs were encouraged to exploit non-budget source of revenues</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Granting autonomy on all financial, technical and organizational, staffing dimensions to all POSPs</li> <li>- The extent of autonomy varied by the level of self-financing</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Set roadmap for fully costed pricing scheme for provided services.</li> <li>- Moving towards the setting where the Government buys services from POSPs</li> <li>● - POSPs act as businesses</li> </ul>
<b>c. Contents</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Generating revenue POSPs were classified into: (i) fully self-financed for recurrent expenditure; and (ii) partially self-financed for recurrent expenditure.</li> <li>- More discretion in financial management: budgeting, asset management, spending</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- POSPs were classified into: (i) fully self-financed; partially self-financed; and (iii) full reliance on state budget (only regarding recurrent expenditure).</li> <li>- State budget funding for recurrent spending was provided as a block grant.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- POSPs were classified into: (i) fully self-financed for both capital and recurrent expenditure; (ii) fully self-financed for recurrent expenditure; (iii) partially self-financed for recurrent expenditure; and (iv) full reliance on state budget.</li> </ul>



	<p>management, carrying over of unused budget.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- More discretions in internal organization of works, constrained by assigned staff quota.</li> <li>- More discretions in setting wage and salary schedule and establishment of relevant internal funds</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- POSPs developed their own Internal Code of Financial Control (ICFC) to be used by financial management agencies and Treasury as the controlling tool.</li> <li>- Discretions in fulfilling tasks and mandates, and organization.</li> <li>- Group 1 had full discretion in staffing. Remaining had to submit staffing plan for approval.</li> <li>- More discretions in setting salary and wage schedule and establishing relevant internal funds (typically Group I)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Group I can decide by their own service prices (with a road map of fully costed pricing).</li> <li>- Group II and III use a mixture of fully costed price and subsidized service fees.</li> <li>- The Government buys services from POSPs.</li> <li>- POSPs are encourage to move up in the ladder of self-financing: More self-financing more autonomy</li> </ul>
<b>d. Protagonists</b>	Department of Recurrent Expenditure Management (DPEM) (Ministry of Finance - MOF)		
<b>e. Stakeholders</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Financial management agencies in line ministries and provinces</li> <li>- Revenue-generating POSPs nationwide.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA).</li> <li>- Line ministries and provinces</li> <li>- POSPs nationwide</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA).</li> <li>- Line ministries and provinces</li> <li>- POSPs nationwide</li> </ul>
<b>f. Institutions</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Decree 10/2002/ND-CP</li> <li>- Relevant guiding circulars</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Decree 43/2006/ND-CP</li> <li>- Relevant guiding circulars</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Decree 16/2015/ND-CP</li> <li>- Relevant guiding circulars (forthcoming)</li> <li>- Relevant Decrees regulating specific sectors (forthcoming)</li> </ul>
<b>g. Outcomes</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Progress in POSPs with large revenue base: more discretions, higher revenue, higher incomes for employees</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- More welcomed by all POSPs.</li> <li>- Significant progress in exercising autonomy.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Outcomes are not shown since just starting implementation</li> </ul>
<b>h. Impacts</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Limited impact nationwide due to it reached only to revenue-generating POSPs.</li> <li>- Even revenue-generating POSPs did not have strong autonomy since be tightened by other regulations on technical, organizational and staffing dimensions.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Still be constrained by conflicted regulations imposed by line ministries, typically with potential fully autonomous entities.</li> <li>- Not differentiate between service fee (subsidized prices for tasks assigned by the Government) and service price (fully market-determined price)</li> </ul>	

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| - Lack of participation of other stakeholders outside financial management agencies. | leading to overlapping in accounting practice |
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## PHASE 1: INTRODUCTION OF NEW FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT MECHANISM TO REVENUE-GENERATING PUBLICLY OWNED SERVICE PROVIDERS

### The context and key stakeholders

POSP in Vietnam is perceived as *an entity established by the government to exercise tasks assigned by the government in providing public services in different sectors such as health care, education, culture, information, conservation and museums, science and technology, sports, natural resource and environment management, and hydrometeorology...* Based on this definition, POSP has the following characteristics:

- POSP is established, managed and owned by the government.
- Its tasks relate to public services in such sectors as health care, education and training, culture and information, conservation and museums, science and technology, sports, natural resources and environment management, hydrometeorology, and economic services...
- Its funding is mostly provided by state budget in addition to revenues from eligible fees and charges collected as a type of state budget revenue and allowed to supplement to the entity's funding source.
- It is expected to serve socially targeted clients via contributions to state budget and other financial funds (such as social protection fund, health insurance, or poverty reduction fund...).
- POSP does not perform administration function, which distinguishes it from state administrative agencies), and does not involve agencies and organization in the sector of national defence and social security.

It is evident that in the centrally subsidized economy (prior to 1990), POSPs' operation was fully funded by state budget. Patients were benefited from free health care, pupils could access free education; entertainment tickets (movies, music, art performance...) are freely distributed to state employees... Some entities may be able to charge provided services by fees, but the value of fees and number of services provided were centrally managed and distributed by the government.

Every year, based on the assigned targets (which were only input-based indicators such as number of enrollments, number of patients or hospital beds, number of research projects, purchase and/or reparation of fixed assets and equipments...) and cost norms defined by the government, POSPs were responsible for developing budget plans. The plans then were submitted to line management agencies for approval and allocation of the approved budgets. Both POSPs and administrative agencies were subject to the same budget allocation mechanism, which is so-called budget appropriation or in fact, is “begging and giving” mechanism.

*Nature of the centrally subsidized regime is that financial management agency act as a giver while budget user acts as a begger. What are given and begged? Begging for staff quota, and giving cost norm per staff member, which then is multiplied by a number of staff to get budget estimation. Since Ministry of Finance (MoF) does not have any justifiably base for estimating cost norms, there is a lot of arbitrariness in budget appropriation leading to frustrations from POSPs.*

(Member of the Drafting team of Decree 10)

When Vietnam moves away from the centrally planned economy towards market mechanism, the budget appropriation mechanism has prevailed a lot of impediments. Firstly, from the POSPs’ perspectives, line-item budgeting practice disallows moving unused amount from this budget line to the item which is under funding shortage. This reality forced POSPs to ask financial management agencies (MoF/DoF) to approve their amendments of budget plans, which in fact was a movement among budget lines, several times in a year. Consequently, the financial management agencies paid more of their time in screening and approving revised budget plans of POSPs than in spending supervising and monitoring.

Secondly, financial management agencies were also aware of the irrationality of applying the same budget appropriation mechanism to both administrative agencies and POSPs, since those agencies are different in nature. On one hand, services provided by administrative agencies are mostly public goods in nature, which are not transacted in the market, so these agencies have to depend totally on funding from state budget. On the other hand, public services provided by POSPs are clearly subject to the interaction between market supply and demand. Therefore, the main source of revenue enjoyed by those POSPs should come from collection of user fees paid by service users rather than from budget appropriation.

Thirdly, the budget appropriation mechanism made POSPs passive and demotivated in improving service quality. On one hand, at beginning of a year, most of POSPs just received pieces of funding, and only toward the end of the year, when state budget revenue is relatively credible, POSPs’ requests for revision of budget plans were accepted. This practice implied that POSPs had to spend hastily most of their received budgets in a very short time (“rush for spending”) if they did not want to see their unused budgets to be returned back to state budget and their budgets in the next year were correspondingly deducted. On the other hand, the fact that POSPs’ spending was constrained by a set of given cost norms made them unable and unwilling to improve their

service quality. For example, operation of a typical university was constrained by enrollment quota and the preset level of tuition fee. Thus, the university did not have additional budget for purchasing morder learning aids and equipments or investing in improving quality of textbooks and training materials. Furthermore, the university laso lacked incentive to improve its service quality since such effort could lead neither to higher revenue from tuition fee collection nor better teachers' incomes.

Finally, embodied by perception that provision of public services was responsibility of the government, POSPs were actually able to avoid market competition from the private sector. Therefore, their incentives to improve service quality were further deteriorated.

Being aware of shortcomings of the budget appropriation mechanism, MoF leadership – typically DPEM's managers – was very active to find a reasonable answer for this puzzle. A large opportunity arrived when MoF benefited from supports of many donors' Technical Assistance projects. Thank for such supports, DPEM's managers were able to participate in a series of study tours to France, the US., New Zealand and South Korea. Such questions as “*Why in Siganpre or the US., POSPs could spend hundreds of billion dongs without a need for MoF's permission, while in Vietnam, a penny of state budget spending is strictly controlled by financial management agencies but POSPs' operational efficiency was still low?*” (member of the Drafting team) had come back and forth in the mindset of DPEM's managers. This DPEM's aspiration to reform received strong supports of MoF's top leadership headed by the Minister Nguyen Sinh Hung.

As recalled by the Head of Drafting Team for Decree 10 regarding the conversation with the Minister of Finance, which was considered a provision of ‘green light’ for the team to propose new financial management mechanism for POSPs.

- *Whatever you do, I need from you a new financial mechanism for those entities. No matter how much time you need for studying documents and materials, how many places you need to go visit, you have to submit me a proposal – required by the Minister.*
- *To celebrate your birthday, others may offer you gifts or wines, but I will offer you a Decree for those entities. – replied by the Head of the Drafting Team.*

## Identification of policy issues

In the first step of the policy formulation process – identification of policy issues – the idea of a new financial management mechanism for POSPs had been initiated by MoF's leadership as a vehicle to remove shortcomings of the old financial management model, which was impeding practical development of POSPs. This effort had led to the introduction of Decree 10/2002/ND-

CP dated 16 January 2002 – a so-call “headless Decree”<sup>1</sup>. Key content of the Decree is summarized in Table 1.

**Table 1. Key contents of Decree 10/2002/ND-CP**

Category	Specific content
Targeted subject	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Revenue-generating POSPs, who are able to self-finance entirely its current expenditures (or fully self-financing POSPs) and</li> <li>- Revenue-generating POSPs, who are able to self-finance only a part of its recurrent expenditures (or partially self-financing POSPs).</li> </ul>
Utilization of its funding sources	<p>The annual recurrent expenditure budget is given as a block grant, which is kept stable in a three year period.</p> <p>Annually, the block grant is subject to a proportional adjustment which is decided by Prime Minister.</p> <p>The entity has discretion in allocating and using the block grant to accomplish its assigned tasks and functions.</p>
Asset management and use	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The entity is expected to apply the same depreciation rule as state owned enterprises for fixed assets being put into service production..</li> <li>- Revenue from depreciation accounting and salvage value of sold state assets is allowed to be retained for reinvestment in the entity.</li> </ul>
Expenditure management	The entity is required to develop its ICFC to regulate its spending practice. It can discretionarily set its cost norms depending on its productivity
Staffing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The entity is given autonomy in utilizing staff quota assigned by authorized agencies; and positioning staff in different posts in alignment with its mandates and duties.</li> <li>- Contract-based recruitment system can be applied given its workload and affordability.</li> </ul>
Wages and salaries	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Fully self-financing revenue-generating POSPs can set up its own additional payroll, which cannot excess 2.5 times of the payroll base;</li> <li>- Partially self-financing revenue-generating POSPs can set up its own additional payroll, which cannot excess 2 times of the payroll base;</li> <li>- Remuneration is made based on working performance.</li> </ul>
Unused budget	Unused budget can be carried over to the next year for operation of the entity.

*Source:* Cited from Decree 10/2002/ND-CP

In short, Decree 10 had created strong incentives for revenue-generating POSPs to expand its client base towards groups of highly affordable clients and relieve subsidy burden for state budget. However, issuance of the Decree was not an easy process. Rather, it reflected a course of insistent

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<sup>1</sup> Normally, a Decree is a sub-law document, which serves as a governmental-level implementation guideline for a law. However, Decree is an exceptional case, where its promulgation is to introduction of a new financial management mechanism for a specific type of state budget users. It did not aim at specifically interpreting any given law in operation. Thus, it is called a headless Decree, which illustrated the fact that its birth stemmed from a need for solving an urgent problem in reality.

and determining advocacy and persuasion led by DPEM's managers.

### Learning/knowledge perspective:

As analyzed earlier, in early 2000s, the concept of public service provision was still broadly unacceptable in the public sector. Leaders in various level, including in MoF, were not fully understood the difference between the role of administrative agencies and of POSPs. At that time, DPEM's managers had to argue and justify, sometimes in a quite aggressive manner, with others just in order to “get a dash or a comma between the term ‘administration’ and ‘service provision’ in its mandates.

*In the meetings, I had to raise my hand, take a pen and ask “let me speak!” Then, I approached the whiteboard while six ministers and vice ministers were sitting in the room. I drew a line dividing the whiteboard into two parts: administrative agency on the left-hand side and POSP on the right-hand side. Then, I demonstrated differences between two kinds of entities. Based on that, I proposed to give administrative agency a block grant mechanism, while POSP financial autonomy. I also emphasized: “In the mandate of my Department, I request to put a dash or a comma between the term ‘administration’ and ‘public service provision’ as an indication of the clear delineation.*

(Head of the Drafting team of Decree 10)

*My Department had to swim with my own. Just joking, we often said that “the Minister is accountable for revenue raising, Vice Ministers for expenditure controlling, nobody pays attention to policy development”.*

(Member of the Drafting team of Decree 10)

Since budget appropriation norms applied to POSPs firstly depended on assigned staff quota, implementation of Decree 10 could not be a success without participation of Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA). Nevertheless, in MoHA's perception at that time, Decree 10 was about financial management mechanism, so that it was not relevant to MoHA's legitimate mandates of administrating staffing and organizational settings of public agencies. This divergence in perceptions was not surprising since financial management agencies were too familiar with input-based management. Granting financial autonomy to POSPs was actually a shift away from traditional input and process based towards more result based management, so the threat to lose control over entity's spending once money went out from MoF's budget was common worry. With the traditional convention of “just doing my job”, managers of line agencies (i.e. MoHA or other line ministries) were not aware of the necessity of interagency coordination in such big and largely impacting issue as POSP reform.

DPEM's managers had met and dialogued intensively with MoHA, both in formal and informal settings to get MoHA's support to the initiative.

### Power/interest perspective:

It was commonly perceived that application of the financial autonomy to POSPs is in fact a brave decision from MoF, since the Ministry had to remove voluntarily its power of “giving budget to POSPs”. This was the main reason why financial management agencies in line ministries and provinces (Departments of Finance [DoF]) initially opposed the initiative. The opposition relied on the fear that application of the new financial management mechanism may loosen the government control over budget of spending agencies and cause loss of public money. Several other reasons (such as the absence of specific guidance on accounting regime for autonomous entities or poor financial management capacity of POSPs’ managers – the account owners of POSPs among others) were also used by those agencies to excuse their postponement of applying the new mechanism.

Apart from those challenges, the policy initiators were also able to enjoy strong supports from top management of Office of Government (OOG) and MoF, because the initiative was aligned with requirements of public finance management – one of the key pillars of the Comprehensive Public Administration Reform (PAR) in 2001-2010 period launched by the Government.

Given newness of the initiative, DPEM was insisted in approaching relevant departments in OOG. Typically, DPEM’s managers had taken advantages of any opportunity in meetings, workshops and even personal exposures to explain with members of OOG (i) the necessity of the new mechanism for POSPs, which was better aligned with operation of market economy; (ii) that the new mechanism was just a change in supervising approach of the supervisors without a threat of losing government money; (iii) that the new mechanism would provide more freedom for POSPs, just as previous effort to liberalize productive forces for peasants or provide more level playing field for business enterprises. Recognition of soundness of the new initiative and its consistence with the course of public sector reform, together with the neutrality and for-common-interest nature of the Drafting team, OOG members turned ultimately to support the Team.

*Drafting Decree 10 was really hard work. Waking up early in the morning and staying late in the evening. Every few days I had to go to OOG to justify or persuade its staff members. When the Decree is going to be signed, I had to ‘stay’ in OOG in order to get Prime Minister’s signature. My staff had to be on standby in our office. When I needed further information, I had made a phone call and my staff would prepare it for me. OOG staff also supported me to speed up administrative procedures for approving the drafted Decree. Without the participation of the entire Department and the support of OOG, I could not imagine how we can accomplish the Decree.*

(Head of the Drafting team of Decree 10)

Secondly, since no one wanted to initiate such policies that threatened his or her self-interests, MoF's insistence to introduce Decree 10 gave the Ministry high legitimacy, which gained strong public supports. Thirdly, since Decree 10 could remove major impediments for development of POSPs, its introduction were also supported by POSPs. Finally, since the initiator of the policy was MoF, the top authority in the field of financial management, despite strong oppositions and debates from subordinate financial management agencies in line ministries and provinces, the Decree was ultimately passed and become a legally bounded decision that all financial management agencies in the system had to comply.

## Formulation of policy

Formulation of Decree 10 was a combination of policy lobbying efforts via formal and informal channels, in the center of which was the policy initiating agency – DPEM (MoF).

Via the formal channel, a Drafting Team was set up led by DPEM's Director. The draft then was circulated to get comments, initially within the Ministry. After several revisions, once the draft was relatively matured, the Team requested to hold workshops to gather comments in a broader base, including financial management agencies in line ministries and provinces. In addition, feedbacks from POSPs were also collected via various vehicles including regional workshops and submission of written feedbacks to their corresponding supervising agencies.

*I could not remember how many revisions were made. The better imagination of this was through weighting or measuring the height of all revised versions. There were so many criticizing comments, some of which come from vested interests of commenting agencies. We had to be very patient and calm to review and remove unjustifiable comments.*

(Member of the Drafting team of Decree 10)

After several rounds of getting comments and revising the draft, MoF asked for appointments to work with OOG. In such meetings, DPEM's managers again had to justify each article and issue in the Decree until reaching the consensus of all relevant OOG departments. The Decree, then, was submitted to Prime Minister for approval.

Apart from the formal process of policy formulation, DPEM's managers were fully aware of the hardship to get consensus on such new financial management mechanism as Decree 10. Therefore, the Department was active to take any chance to meet, discuss, dialogue and explain to relevant stakeholders through formal workshops, roundtable discussions or free talks outside the formal conferences. As mentioned earlier, the objectivity of the initiating agencies and the promptness of the initiative to address an urgent problem unreality, Decree 10 was ultimately passed by Prime Minister.



## Implementation of policy

The implementation of Decree 10 was conducted in similar fashion to that of other policies. After promulgated, the Decree was disseminated and introduced broadly. MoF asked line ministries to organize various training courses in which DPEM staff members acted as trainers and facilitators of question-and-answer sections. In addition, DPEM in coordination with the National Academy on Public Administration conducted mixed training courses, in which local top leadership was equipped with needed information on the Decree.

After Decree 10 was promulgated by the government, MoF had issued several guiding circulars for handling different technical aspects of Decree 10. Among others are Circular 25/2002/TT-BTC dated 21/3/2002 on guiding implementation of Decree 10, Circular 81/2002/TT-BTC dated 16/9/2002 to provide instruction on expenditure management for revenue generating agencies implementing new financial management mechanism, Circular 121/2002/TT-BTC dated 31/12/2002 to provide instruction on accounting regime applied to POSPs, Circular 50/2003/TT-BTC to provide instruction on development of CIFIC in alignment with Decree 10, and Inter-ministerial Circular 20/2003/TTLT/BTC-BVHTT-BNV dated 24/3/2003...

Decree 10 has actually been a long step towards ‘untightening’ financial management for POSPs. POSPs were granted autonomy to generate revenue in order to (i) manage collection and spending activities by themselves; (ii) mobilize new sources of revenue; (iii) rearrange their staff; and (iv) adjust salaries and wages to provide better working incentives to employees. MoF’s monitoring of the implementation process mainly relied on its request to line ministries and provinces for submission of their administrative reports. No specific monitoring and evaluation system was designed to oversee the implementation. Consequently, there was almost nonexistence of any scientific research or study to provide objective evidence on results of the implementation of Decree 10.

Despite lack of a comprehensive and objective assessment on the impacts of Decree 10, anecdotal evidences from some in-depth studies in typical public services including health care and education showed that the Decree had made initial progress in POSPs.

*...For example, Saint Paul Municipal Hospital in Hanoi (460 beds) has been implementing Decree 10 since late 2002. Although the level of its state budget funding has bene practically unchanged since 2001, its revenues have increased by VND 27 billion (86%) in only two years. Although some of the increase (about VND 4 billion) is accounted for by increases in revenue from normal user fees and health insurance reimbursements, the rest is due to a 350% increase in revenue from “special services”, which accounted for more than one half of total hospital revenue during 2003.*

*These special services, which are available on request, are of much higher quality than the hospital’s normal services... the investment necessary to prepare the hospital to provide such special services have reportedly bene mobilized from a variety of sources, including: hospital staff and other individuals, the hospital’s own revenue, ODA, and the investment funds provided by the*

*state budget.*

*... The Polyclinic of Binh Duong province (600 beds) has also seen its revenues increase dramatically during its initial year of Decree 10 implementation... Impatient admissions increased by 15% compared to 2002, while average length of stay decreased by 6% and the referral rate increased from 5.35% to 6.23%. During 2003, the average hospital salary increased by about VND 485,000 per month (about USD 31). The report from the hospital's Directorate indicates that the hospital is operating more efficiently as the result of Decree 10...*

*Source: Cited from Box 12.1 in Vietnam: Public Expenditure Review and Integrated Fiduciary Assessment 2004, Volume 2, page 69.*

In the education sector, while there is little data available on educational and financial indicators of the educational facilities that implemented Decree 10 to assess the implications of Decree 10 for enrolments, revenues from fees, and contributions as well as from the state budgets, the extent to which public schools can raise revenues by implementing Decree 10, such these additional revenues will help public schools not only to improve the structural quality of services in terms of badly needed equipment and teaching aids, but also allow them to increase staff's morale by providing higher salaries. Allowing public schools to manage their own human resources may also give these facilities the opportunity to improve the quality of their own personnel by selecting members themselves rather than having them appointed from above.

Apart from positive effects, Decree 10 also placed higher risks on provision of public services. Firstly, the potential for revenue-raising and improvement in quality and efficiency depend very much on the location, the type, and the level of services provided by these facilities. For example, public hospitals that are located in poor regions of the country are less likely to be able to collect as much revenue as those located in the affluent regions. Unless there is a reallocation of state health budgets, a greater reliance on user financing can then lead to the deepening of regional inequality in quality of health services. Moreover, the services with public good nature such as preventive care or general education will tend to be out-weighted by revenue generating services. Without adjustments in state budget allocation mechanism among regions, there will be a threat of creating a two-tiered public service system: one for affluent clients with higher quality and higher charges, and the other with lower quality for the poor.

Secondly, Decree 10 may lead to so-called client-skimming – a serious problem in health care. Revenue-generating hospitals often admit patients who are relatively easy and profitable to treat and refer those patients with chronic and serious conditions to other hospitals, normally higher level public hospitals. Consequently, the very sick and the poor are often denied access.

Thirdly, over provision of services as an incentive to generate more revenue may continue to deteriorate efficiency and equity in service provision. Finally, commercialization of public services can escalate service costs, shifting POSPs to serve more affordable clients while still enjoy preferential treatments from the government. Consequently, subsidies from state budget are

practically benefited by this group of clients.

Potentially adverse impacts of the implementation of Decree 10 on citizens' accessibility to public services together with the shortcomings of Decree 10 (discussed below) has led to replacement of Decree 10 by a new policy – Decree 43/2006/ND-CP defining POSPs' autonomy on and accountability for operations, organizational structure, staffing and financial management of the entities.

## **PHASE 2: GRANTING FULLER AUTONOMY TO PUBLICLY OWNED SERVICE PROVIDERS**

### **The context and key stakeholders**

The results of three-year implementation of Decree 10 (2002-2004) as reported by line ministries and provinces revealed that there were 37/42 ministries and central entities and 52/64 provinces and cities had granted the financial autonomy to more than 5,900 out of 13,862 revenue-generating POSPs, counting for 42,4% of the total. Particularly, according to Decree 10, 530 ministerial POSPs (78%) and 4,430 local POSPs (40%) were granted with autonomy. Sectors with the highest number of autonomy-granted POSPs included education (212 entities), science (97 entities) and culture-information (75 entities). The implementation of Decree 10 in the health sector was at slower speed, then, at the reporting time, only 28 health entities were granted autonomy. There were 6 ministries that had not granted autonomy to their entities. Also, 12 provinces and cities have not reported implementation results of Decree 10<sup>2</sup>.

Based on MoF's report, implementation of Decree 10 had brought about the following positive results:

Firstly, provision of public services was diversified. In the education sector, educational institutions had developed various training modes including full-time, part-time courses; distance learning; international cooperation in developing training curriculum, etc. Furthermore, hospitals and health care centers had developed different types of curative services including inpatient and outpatient treatment, on-demand examination or even family-doctor service, etc. In the scientific and technology sector, contract-based researches were conducted with international and domestic clients. In addition, various consulting and technological transferring services were initiated to accelerate commercialization of research results.

Secondly, the financial autonomy has been enhanced. Revenue-generating POSPs have

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<sup>2</sup> According to the submission for Government's approval on Decree 43 by MoF (Submission for approval No. 25/TTr-BTC dated on 09/03/2005).

actively explored income from public services and utilized block funding from state budget in an effective and economic manner. Consequently, there has been a dramatic improvement in financial status of those entities. Specifically,

- Regarding revenue generation: In the group of revenue-generating POSPs managed by line ministries, revenue collected from provision of public service in 2002 was VND 2,654 billion or 73% higher than that number in 2001 (when the autonomy had not been granted). Particularly, revenue from collection of service fee increased by 37.7%; from service payments increased by 53.3%. In 2003, revenue from provision of public services was VND 3,270 billion or 23.2% higher than that number in 2002. Of which, revenue from service fee increased by 24.5% and from service payments increased by 21.5%. In the group of revenue-generating POSPs managed by local authorities, total revenue collected by 1,226 units was VND 372 billion, which was 20.4% higher than the equivalent figure in 2001. Respectively, total revenue collected in 2003 was VND 482 billion or 28.6% higher than that of 2002. Noticeably, the increase in service revenue came from diversification of services provision rather than an increase in levels of fees and charges.

- Regarding utilization of allocated block grant: the allocated budget is constantly maintained within 3 years, which enabled POSPs to predict this source of funding and incorporate it into development of their business plan. This condition helped to remove the common practice of ‘rush for spending at the year-end’ as in the past. Furthermore, unplanned tasks assigned by the government were always attached with additional funding. In 2002, 2003 and 2004, investment of state capital budget in public services grew up by 15.5%, 18% and 18.8% compared to the amount of the previous year respectively.

- Regarding increase in salary and wage payment: POSPs succeeded in generating additional income for working staff in different extent via providing more fee-based services and cost saving. As a result, those entities could raise the average staff income by 10-15%, or typically in some entities by 2-2.5 times of its original payroll.

- Regarding saving creation for salary reform: in 2003, the Government made a decision on salary reform. Just concerning the group of centrally managed POSPs, when there the minimum salary level was compulsorily increased from VND 210,000 VND per month to VND 290,000 VND per month, required budget to accommodate the new salary scheme was estimated as much as VND 361 billion. However, POSPs were able to afford VND 336.4 billion (or 93.2% of required funding) from their own revenue source resulting a financial burden for salary increase from state budget for this sector was only VND 24.6 billion.

Thirdly, Decision 10 helped to differentiate mandates and tasks performed by administrative agencies and POSPs and to change managerial practice in POSPs. Administrative agencies gradually withdraw their deep intervention into internal operation of POSPs.

Apart from above-mentioned achievements, there were still drawbacks in implementation of Decree 10, which result in the fact that the Decree was strongly supported only by advantageous POSPs in revenue raising while a large number of POSPs, especially, locally managed entities, was not welcome or even looked for excuses to delay implementation.

Furthermore, even ‘gainers of Decree 10 complained about the formality of granted financial autonomy. In fact, due to inconsistency in timely revising relevant regulations governing different types of POSPs, various contradictions and obstacles emerged in implementation leading to high arbitrariness and discretions of supervising agencies in implementation of Decree 10.

The shortcomings in implementing Decree 10 forced MoF to replace the Decree by a more appropriate and fuller autonomous mechanism in order to actually improve POSPs’ operational efficiency. That was also the background for the birth of Decree 43/2006/ND-CP.

## Identification of policy issues

Obviously, at the first phase of policy making process (relating to the formation of Decree 43) – policy issue identification – the initiation of a new mechanism granting more comprehensive autonomy and accountability to POSPs was based on the fact that although Decree 10 was regarded as a better mechanism relative to the current one, the number of POSPs in favor of this Decree was modest, and even those gainers perceived autonomy guaranteed by Decree 10 as limited. Different reasons regarding stakeholders’ perception, powers and interest could justify for this.

### Perception:

Based on feedbacks from POSPs implementing Decree 10, it was recognized by MoF that Decree 10 just provided financial autonomy. Autonomy in technical operation, organizational arrangement and staffing had not been guaranteed. Various theories on public sector management clearly show that an entity has real autonomy only if it is granted with comprehensive autonomy in all three dimensions: (i) finance; (ii) operation and (iii) organizational arrangement and staffing. In fact, those dimensions are interacted. Therefore, granting only financial autonomy and strictly controlling the others will definitely make the former purely formalistic.

*Decree 10 was implemented in the Health sector at lower rate relative to the others. This is because Ministry of Health (MoH) took it with great caution given its strong impact on the society as a whole. At the end of the life of Decree 10, MoH has just implemented Decree 10 in a handful of hospitals. Frankly speaking, Decree 10 helped to remove line item budgeting practice. However, the Decree has not grant significant autonomy for hospitals because provision of new income-generating health care services at that time had been strictly controlled.*

(An official from Department of Planning and Finance, MOH)

### Power/interest perspective:

Implementation of Decree 10 had impacted differently on different stakeholders,

particularly POSPs themselves – the target of policies and state management agencies.

On one hand, Decree 10 only provided financial autonomy to revenue-generating POSPs. However, as warned in some researches and studies on public finance management in Vietnam, the revenue generating capacity was not equal among POSPs, which mainly concentrated on those with high demand for services including prestigious universities, colleges and vocational schools, big scientific institutes and central hospitals. Consequently, those with great revenue-generating capacity would warmly support new financial management mechanism.

Meanwhile, POSPs with low or limited revenue generation capacity were reluctant in shifting to new mechanism because of a risk that their assigned state budget would be cut and their own financial sources to comply regulatory requirement for salary reform would be in shortage. Especially, a large number of non-revenue-generating POSPs (more than 80% of POSPs) still applied the old mechanism.

Moreover, according to Decree 10, when compulsory increase in staff salary and wage was made by the government, POSPs were responsible for filling up the financial gap. Therefore, they hesitated to implement the new mechanism due to the risk of having insufficient funding for salary increase. In addition, it was hard for these POSPs to downsize their staffing due to a lack of autonomy in organizational arrangement and staffing. Actually, in the salary reform in 2003, state budget had still provided to fill up the gap in POSPs, who were not able to manage the salary increase as required.

On the other hand, the perception that “tight control means strong power” was still stickily built in the mindset of state management authorities. Thus, line ministries were inactive in revising their regulations and policies in alignment with Decree 10. For instance, while Decree 10 allowed managers of POSPs to decide how to spend; Decree 60/2003/ND-CP providing detailed instruction on implementation of State Budget Law stated that spending decisions of POSPs’ managers should be approved by supervising agencies. Although the latter aimed to ensure oversight function of supervising agencies, it tightened up POSPs’ autonomy.

Similarly, there were a pile of inappropriate legal documents issued by line Ministries providing technical specifications and professional standards (such as number of doctors per bed, number of teachers per class, etc.) or staffing norms. Some guideline documents instructing compositions and level of eligible fees and charges were out of date and rigid. Therefore, POSPs could not either adjust their budget plans and/or generate significant new sources of revenue for upgrading their facilities and service quality. For example, the fee schedule for health care services was unchanged since 1995, the tuition fee schedule for higher education services was kept unchanged from 1998 to 2005, despite of annual inflations.

*Decree 03/ND-CP/2003 on salary adjustment allowed each hospital to use 35% of retaining revenue (apart from collection of hospital fee and health insurance) to fill up financial gap due to salary increase. Meanwhile, Decree 95/1995/ND-CP governing hospital fee policy*

*stated that each hospital is allowed to retain 30% of revenue from collection of hospital fees to pay for bonuses and incentives for health workers. Ironically, the latter was actually still in effect when the former arrived. So which one should we apply?*

(In a conversation with a financial manager in a Central General Hospital)

Hence, the need for replacing Decree 10 by another policy that granted fuller autonomy to POSPs arose from shortcomings of this Decree in practical implementation. Those mismatches were recorded from POSPs' feedbacks as reflected in progress reports in implementation of Decree 10 made by local and ministerial authorities. It also reflected evolution of learning by doing process in policy makers themselves in MoF.

### Formulation of policy

In 2006, the policy formulation process in Vietnam was defined in a more professional fashion. The formation of a new decree – Decree 43/NĐ-CP on POSPs' autonomy and accountability in fulfilling task and mandates, making organizational arrangement and setting financial management and staff quota had basically followed the formal processes as defined in Law on Promulgation of Legal Normative Legislations in 1996, and its amendment in 2002. In particular:

The Government issued a decision on establishment of a Drafting Committee (led by a MoF's Vice Minister and membered by vice ministers of relevant ministries). MoF established a Drafting team for the Decree with the core membership of DPEM's staff. Acting as the standing authority, MoF conducted several evaluations of implementation of Decree 10. Moreover, it also proposed solutions to overcome shortcomings in implementation based on strategic orientation in public sector reform set out by the Party and the government. The evaluations were mainly conducted in the form of sending various MoF's delegations to implementing ministries and provinces and requesting implementing agencies to submit their progress reports within their authorized jurisdictions.

After information and feedbacks were collected and classified, the Drafting team prepared the first draft of the Decree. This draft was firstly circulated internally within the Drafting team and the Committee for comments then, sent out to other line ministries for comments. In the revision process, the Drafting may need to consult with the Drafting Committee if big changes occurred. The report to justify revision would be sent to MoF.

*DPEM's staff members were mainly responsible for drafting the Decree. The relevant parties did not directly involve in drafting the Decree but giving comment on it.*

(Member of the Drafting team)

After different rounds for commenting and revising, the drafted Decree 43 would be reviewed and checked its legality by MoF's Legal Department. Then, the draft would be sent by Minister of Finance to Ministry of Justice for review at ministerial level. The document profile for review included Letter to the Cabinet to propose the Decree, detailed contents of the Decree, compilation of comments and feedbacks from relevant stakeholders and MoF's responses to the comments. Ministry of Justice should prepare its assessment report to submit to the Cabinet before the Cabinet meeting for making decision on the Decree.

The last step of the formulation process was the presentations on Decree contents, assessment reports, and comments of relevant stakeholders by MoF, Ministry of Justice and relevant ministries at the Cabinet meeting. Cabinet members would discuss and vote for passing the Decree. After all, Prime Minister officially signed to issue Decree 43/NĐ-CP on 25/4/2006.

In general, the issuance of Decree 43 strictly followed the formal legal process<sup>3</sup>. Other advocacy activities including persuading and lobbying to get supports of different stakeholders via informal channels were not evident and sophisticated like those conducted for Decree 10. The main difference was due to the fact that Decree 43 was actually an effort to widen POSPs' autonomy rather than introduction of a completely new management mechanism as Decree 10. Moreover, after 5 year implementation of Decree 10 (2002-2006), the disadvantages of Decree 10 were apparently shown so that controversies on the need for replacement were not emerged. This status was exactly reflected in the statement of former DPEM Director in this period:

*Decree 43 was just the expansion of Decree 10. Therefore, it was not sensitive issue. We basically just followed the legal process to conduct it.*

(In the conversation with the Director of DPEM in the period of drafting Decree 43)

Major new points in Decree 43 relative to Decree 10 are summarized in Table 2 below.

**Table 2. Key contents of Decree 43/ND-CP dated on 25/4/2006**

No	Issue	Key adjustments
1	Policy target	Applied to all POSPs (not only revenue-generating POSPs), who are classified into 3 groups: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Group I: Fully self financing their recurrent expenditure (fully self-financed revenue-generating POSPs)</li> <li>- Group II: Partially self financing their recurrent expenditure (partially self-financed POSPs)</li> <li>- Group III: non- and low- revenue generating capacity, so that totally reliance on state budget appropriation for recurrent expenditure.</li> </ul>
2	POSPs' funding sources	Funding sources are classified in two categories: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Block grant assigned from state budget: This source is to ensure POSPs'</li> </ul>

<sup>3</sup> The legal process for issuing a decree as defined in Law on Promulgation of Normative Legislations 1996, amended in 2002 is presented in the Appendix.



		<p>fulfillment of tasks and duties assigned by authorized agencies. The block grant comes from (i) state budget (excluding Group I) and (ii) retained revenue from collection of service fees and charges.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Non-granted budget: appropriated state budget to carry out ad hoc tasks and duties assigned by the government.</li> </ul>
3	Assigned autonomous powers	<p>POSP is granted with the following autonomous powers, depending on the classification of the entity:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Autonomy in arrangement of its technical operation: Discretion in setting its mandates and tasks, developing business plans and arranging internal operations.</li> <li>- Autonomy in organizational setting: Discretion in setting up, merging and closing its affiliates.</li> <li>- Autonomy in setting staff quota:           <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>o Group I: Full discretion in staffing</li> <li>o Group II and Group III: POSP sends its annual staffing plan to authorized agencies for approval. Contract-based arrangements are allowed.</li> </ul> </li> <li>- Autonomy in utilization of funding sources:           <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>o Group I and II are allowed to decide some cost norms for operational spending <i>higher</i> or <i>lower</i> than those set out by the government; Group III cannot set out higher cost norms.</li> <li>o POSP is allowed to decide levels of fees and charges without going beyond the government set charging framework.</li> <li>o Development of ICFC is required to be used as a basis for supervision of financial management agencies and State Treasury.</li> <li>o POSP can mobilize non-budget revenue to diversify services and improve service quality. For newly diversified services, POSP can decide level of fees and charges.</li> <li>o POSP managers can allocate block grants to belonging units and make their own decision on new investments, asset procurements and large scale repairation of POSP's facilities.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
4	Decision on payroll and salary levels	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Group I: is allowed to decide total annual payroll for its staff without being constrained by the ceiling level.</li> <li>- Group II: is allowed to decide total annual payroll for its staff, but not exceed 3 times of the original payroll.</li> <li>- Group III: is allowed to decide total annual payroll for its staff, but not exceed 2 times of the original payroll.</li> </ul> <p>Salary level paid for each employee is decided by managers in alignment with conditions stated in ICFC (<i>not subject to be limited by the ceiling level</i>).</p>
5	Establishment of internal funds	<p>POSP is allowed to establish the following internal funds:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Group I and group II: R&amp;D fund (not less than 25% of the margin); Rewarding fund; Welfare fund (not more than additional payroll for 3 months); Contingency for Income Stabilization.</li> <li>- Group III: is allowed to finance facility upgrading, incentives, welfare and establishment of budget on facility improvement, rewarding, welfare, contingency for income stabilization.</li> </ul>

6	Criteria for performance evaluation	Minister, Chairperson of local People's Committee have to set out criteria for performance evaluation and performance monitoring system.
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Source: Extract from Decree 43/2006/ND-CP

In short, Decree 43 had granted greater and fuller autonomy to POSPs, taking into account different level of granted autonomy in alignment with specific categories of POSPs. This was also a preparatory step for gradually shifting POSPs, especially those in Group I to operate as enterprises. Noticeably, this is the first time that criteria for performance evaluation were mentioned. This is an evidence of a paradigm shift in policy making agencies away from input based towards more output and result based management.

### Implementation of policy

Decree 43 had been put into effect since 2006, 15 days after promulgation. To implement this Decree, MoF had to issue instructional circular number 71/2006/TT-BTC on 9/8/2006, and then was amended and supplemented in Circular 113/2007/TT-BTC dated 24/9/2007. In particular:

- POSP had to develop its own action scheme to exercise its assigned financial autonomy and accountabilities to submit to supervising authorities for monitoring. The plan should include ICFC, which is designed in a participatory and transparent manner with the involvement of all staff members.
- Central and local supervising authority had to review and check budget plan and the block grant allocated from state budget (for POSP in Group II and III) before compiling and submitting to relevant financial management agency.
- The financial management agency had to screen and send back their comments in written document on POSP's classification and the amount of block grant allocated from state budget for its recurrent expenditure (for POSP belonging to Group II and III).
- After the no objection decision is made by MoF, line ministry could grant financial autonomy and accountabilities to POSP.

In the end year of the budgetary stability period, POSP had to report on its exercising of financial autonomy and accountabilities during last 3 years. Based on that report, POSP develop its action scheme to exercise financial autonomy and accountabilities in the next budgetary stability period. The new scheme should be sent to supervising agencies together with budget plan formulate for the coming fiscal year.

For monitoring purpose, every year, POSP had to submit to its supervising agencies the report on exercising of financial autonomy and accountabilities. The report should be submitted before January 31<sup>st</sup> of the upcoming year. Annually, periodical assessment on implementation of Decree 43 should be reported by line ministries and provinces to MoF. The reports should be submitted before February 25<sup>th</sup> of the upcoming year.

In addition, MoF had issued a series of instructional guidelines including Circular 81/2006/TT-BTC dated 06/09/2006, Circular 153/2007/TT-BTC dated 17/12/2007 and Circular 172/2009/TT-BTC dated 26/8/2009 to provide further instructions on expenditure management regime for Decree bearers.

In practice, the process of implementation of Decree 43 was more warmly welcome by POSPs than that of Decree 10.

*Decree 10 just opened the window (removing the budget line management) not the door (increasing revenue for the hospitals). Later, Decree 43 actually had greater impact. Although there was technical abuse in examination and testing or overuse of medical prescriptions, it is undeniable that Decree 43 helped to relieve the big fiscal burden for state budget. Hospitals could make big investment in modern facilities and equipment by different joint-venture or cooperation arrangements with investors. At the end, citizens are actual beneficiaries of high tech application in treatment.*

(A staff member from Department of Planning and Finance, MoH)

Annual reports on implementation of Decree 43 made by local and ministerial authorities revealed that POSPs with granted autonomy were active in using the allocated state budget more effectively to complete assigned tasks. They were also creative in using their assets and human resource to develop and improve service quality, which in turn helped to raise more income.

All POSPs developed their own ICFCs to strengthen internal management, efficiently used their resources, diversified public services, explored more sources of income and took different initiatives to cut cost. Consequently, various units could be able to save recurrent spending; improve service quality, fill up the financial gap for salary increase, make savings for new investment in facilities, modern equipment and expansion of public services in their units. According to a report made by MoF's Inspectorate (2010) using incomplete set of information, in average, POSPs could finance 70-80% of their recurrent expenditures by their own sources of revenue.

Decree 43 was highly flexible in granting POSPs with autonomy in arranging technical operations, deciding staff quota, setting organizational arrangements and managing financial sources. This fuller autonomy helped to ensure POSPs' fulfillment of assigned tasks and duties in a high quality and most effective manner. However, the report also showed that POSPs had not been granted with full autonomy as expected, which in fact discouraged highly potential entities to be more autonomous. Apart from that, in its operation, many POSPs initiated various forms of joint venture and/or cooperation, which had not been specified in relevant regulations and legal documents. Given the shift from a setting of direct state provision of public services towards the one where state purchases services from POSPs, POSPs needed to estimate full cost of their services as basis for pricing in contracts with the state. However, Decree 43 did not provide specific guidance for setting public service prices, so some services were still subject to be below-cost

pricing. Various cost items including subsidy portion in management cost, depreciation, mixture of market-pricing services and subsidized service fees had not been fully accounted in service pricing. This made these POSPs impossible to transfer to the full autonomous operation like a real business. This in fact is emerging requirement from the reality, which goes along with comprehensive roadmap for public sector reform as stated in PAR for 2011-2020 period in accordance with Government Resolution 30c/NQ-CP dated 8/11/2011.

Decree 43 was applicable to all POSPs while there was variety of particularities in each specific sector such as education, health care, art performance or sport. Consequently, implementation of Decree 43 had to deal with diverse obstacles and impediments faced by different POSPs. To handle this problem, the government had to issue various regulations to govern specific sectors. For example, there were Decree 112/2005/ND-CP dated 05/09/2005 and Decree 96/2010/ND-CP dated 20/09/2010 on granting autonomous mechanism to research and technological development institutions, Decree 85/2012/ND-CP dated 15/10/2012 specifying operational and financial management mechanism for public hospitals as well as setting treatment service price framework for public health care units... This practice also requires issuance of a framework policy in replacement of Decree 43 to define new autonomous mechanism for POSPs, based on which specific decrees will be passed to introduce sector-based autonomy for POSPs operating in different sectors including education and training, health care, culture and information, sport, and science and technology.

## **PHASE 3: DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW AUTONOMOUS MECHANISM FOR PUBLICLY OWNED SERVICE PROVIDERS**

### **The context and key stakeholders**

According to incomplete reports of MoF's Inspectorate<sup>4</sup>, by the end of 2010, financial autonomy and accountability mechanism was granted to 756 POSPs nationwide by line ministries. Of which, 173 POSPs were fully self-financing, 484 were partially self-financing and 99 were state budget dependents. At the local level, 23,399 POSPs were granted with autonomy, of which 219 were self-financing, 9,868 partially self-financing and 13,312 state budget dependents.

Decree 43 had made positive effects on the operation of POSPs. This can be recognized firstly in terms of exercising operational autonomy. POSPs were active in initiating different solutions to implement tasks and functions assigned in an effective way. Typically in health sector, where Decree 43 enabled hospitals to develop and apply new and advanced treatment techniques, reduce overloading and bed sharing for inpatients, and increase productivity and service quality. Moreover, hospitals have been rearranged to increase spaces for treatment and healthcare, to

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<sup>4</sup> MoF (2010), *Summary Report on Evaluation of Implementation of Financial Autonomy in Administrative Agencies and POSPs in 2006-2010 period*, reported by MoF's Inspectorate.

increase number of beds as well as to reduce spaces for administrative works. Before-and-after comparison in results of medical treatments at provincial level hospitals in Table 3 can illustrate this argument.

**Table 3. Performance of provincial hospitals under Decree 43 by years**

Targets/year	2009	2010	2011	% 2011 over 2009
<b>1.Number of medical examinations</b>	43,364,622	45,051,235	47,223,630	<b>118.97</b>
<b>2. Number of days of inpatients</b>	34,611,965	35,785,614	37,513,260	<b>115.73</b>
<b>3. Number of surgeries</b>	1,157,682	1,190,019	1,314,291	<b>122.15</b>
<b>4. Number of minor interventions</b>	4,196,719	4,790,686	5,395,477	<b>152.09</b>
<b>5. Number of CT Scanned and X-Ray tests</b>	9,596,808	10,521,351	11,603,550	<b>134.21</b>
<b>6.Number of tests</b>	157,264,203	160,987,457	182,134,472	<b>140.62</b>
<b>7.Number of medical ultrasound tests</b>	6,659,945	6,880,515	8,029,986	<b>140.28</b>
<b>8.Number of endoscopic tests</b>	<b>693,797</b>	<b>854,012</b>	<b>1,031,151</b>	<b>182.71</b>

Source: Nguyen Nam Lien, Director of Department of Planning and Finance, MoH (2014), *Evaluation on implementation of Decree 43/2006/ND-CP in public hospitals from 2006 to 2013 and solutions*. <http://vhea.org.vn/NewsDetails.aspx?NewsID=271>.

Secondly, POSPs, especially hospitals, schools, scientific agencies have redesigned their organizational charters; restructured, merged, separated or closed functional departments and subordinate units to fit with new demand. Some POSPs also established the financially independent units to provide market-based services. Those units had to commit to be self-financed. More autonomy in recruitment also helped POSPs to be able to absorb more qualified human resources. The internal organization was rearranged in a sounder manner. Consulting and advising services were promoted to raise additional revenue and strengthen POSPs' prestige.

Thirdly, Decree 43 also helped potential revenue generating POSPs to diversify capital mobilization modalities for their investment budget. Taking only health sector into account, 9 POSPs had borrowed from Vietnam Development Bank and Demand Stimulus Fund with the amount of VND 1,332 billion and were able to pay back more than VND 526 billion including both principles and interests. As a result, many new hospitals such as Central Institute of

Hematology and Blood Transfusion, Central Dental Hospital, Hue Central Hospital, Central Hospital of Otolaryngology... had been constructed and others including Endocrinology Hospital; Medical Hospital of Ho Chi Minh City, Health and Medical University have completed the first phase of investment.

**Table 4. Aggregation of funding sources for recurrent expenditures of publicly-owned health care providers in Vietnam in 2010-2013 period**

Contents	Nationwide				Hospitals under Ministry of Health			
	2010	2011	2012	Total 2010-12	2011	2012	2013	Total 2011-13
<b>Total</b>	44,481.9	53,615.8	71,797.1	169,894.8	10,078.0	12,955.9	15,075.3	38,109.2
<b>State budget</b>	17,537.6	20,417.8	26,027.1	63,982.4	1,162.3	1,751.9	2,123.7	5,037.9
<b>Percentage of total</b>	39%	38%	36%	38%	12%	14%	14%	13%
<b>Foreign capital</b>	1,029.4	1,118.0	1,372.0	3,519.4	288.0	301.3	519.1	1,108.4
<b>Percentage of total</b>	2%	2%	2%	2%	3%	2%	3%	3%
<b>Revenue</b>	25,915.0	32,080.0	44,398.0	102,393.0	8,627.7	10,902.8	12,432.4	31,962.9
<b>Percentage of total</b>	58%	60%	62%	60%	86%	84%	82%	84%

*Source:* Nguyen Nam Lien, Director of Department of Planning and Finance, MoH (2014), *Evaluation on implementation of Decree 43/2006/ND-CP in public hospitals from 2006 to 2013 and solutions.* <http://vhea.org.vn/NewsDetails.aspx?NewsID=271>.

Thanks to the ‘socialization policy’ for mobilizing investment capital in health sector under Decree 43, a lot of modern equipment and facilities which state budget cannot afford including high-tech and costly machines for diagnosis and treatment has been purchased or leased via joint-venture projects. As a result, improvement in diagnosis and treatment was made, and POSPs’ perception relating to mobilizing capital for better equipment without heavy reliance on the state budget was set.

Finally, Decree 43 had encouraged POSPs to effectively use of their budget in order to make savings for improving staff income and establishing internal funds for facility renovation and equipment upgrading. Many hospitals and schools had created professional development fund to retrain their staff.

In addition, a lot of specificities in Decree 43 still lacked sufficient implementing guideline documents. The ambiguity in decentralization and delineation arrangements in delegating

autonomy and accountability mechanism in technical operation, organizational setting and staffing has made POSPs difficult in exercising their rights and powers as given in Decree 43. Concrete guidelines regarding performance assessment criteria were still absent, leading to impossible to rank POSPs' performance as well as to link performance to their assigned budget. Therefore, performance and quality of task implementation of each POSP could not be assessed accurately. These will be further analyzed in the following section.

### Identification of policy issues

As mentioned above, after 9 years of implementation, Decree 43 has shown some drawbacks and therefore is no longer able to catch up requirements of public sector reform.

#### Perception:

Decree 43 only granted financial autonomy in managing recurrent, but not capital expenditures. In fact, many POSPs are able to finance its capital expenditures by its own resources. Therefore, when categorizing POSPs, it is essential to take into consideration entities which can be financially autonomous in both types of expenditures. (In later stage, Decree 85/2012/ND-CP dated 15/10/2012 specifying operational and financial autonomy for publicly-owned health care units and setting up pricing framework for health services has re-classified publicly-owned health care units in 4 groups, which is similar to that of Decree 16 as analyzed in the next section).

During its implementation, some POSPs both implements tasks given by the state and does it own business. Consequently, it is very hard for them to manage separately payroll, management cost, or other expenses for these two kinds of activities. On one hand, it might be the fact that state budget is implicitly used to subsidize POSPs' profit-oriented activities. On the other hand, since POSPs do not need to set full-cost-recovery prices for their services as private service providers, unfair competition between them, or even among POSPs enjoying different level of state subsidy will exist. So far, the common perception is that the government must be responsible for providing public services. Given their objectives of serving social interests, service fees are set by the state following non-profit principle. (The level of service fees are usually very low to ensure accessibility of the poor and vulnerable). The fact that POSPs provide both 'social' and 'market' services leads to ambiguity in differentiate when subsidized fees and/or market-based service prices should be applied.

*Tuition policy is causing a problem. The current tuition framework has made educational institutions, in order to increase income, set up additional fee levels which are not defined in any guideline of education management authorities. The tuition framework for part-time training does not cover all forms of training...*

*The set registration fee level for taking enrollment exams in the full-time education is also causing trouble for universities and colleges. Universities that strictly follow the set fee level cannot cover all expenses relating to organizing the exams, so they have to make up the gap by using revenue from other educational services or appropriated state budget. This situation happens again in post-graduate education. Many*

*universities charge higher-than-required registration fee level for enrolment exams but still make lost due to a low number of applicants...*

*In other POSPs, like in natural resources and environment sector, according to the current regulations, in making budget plans for a project, depreciation expenses of fixed assets are not counted in cost estimation, because they are provided for free from state budget. However, in the current trend of public finance reform, grants from state budget for investment expenditures in POSPs is squeezing and will be stopped. Therefore, without including depreciation of machines and other properties in cost estimates will, in the long term, leave POSPs in funding shortage for reinvestment in their service development.*

*Source: An extract from a report by MoF's Inspectorate (2010).*

Dealing with the above-mentioned problems, MoF is fully aware of the need for designing a new management mechanism for fully self-financing POSPs so that they can gradually shifted to full-cost-recovery pricing model similar to an enterprise. State budget will be no longer to fund purchase of machineries, equipment for POSPs. Contract prices for delivering services ordered by the government will be fully costed.

*Unless they stop spending public money, they won't be able to be autonomous and things would be still mixed up. The real autonomy only occurs when they use their own money.*

(DPEM's Director, MoF)

### **Power/interest perspective:**

The implementation of Decree 43 also showed that there were big difference in defining autonomy and accountability mechanism between POSPs and line agencies. From POSPs' perspective, they felt that they had not fully given autonomy because their line agencies still tried to maintain their control and were hesitate to grant POSPs more autonomy as required by Decree 43.

*In higher education sector, I think that Decree 43 has not given yet remarkable autonomy to universities. Although the Decree encourages POSPs to diversify their services, proposals to open new majors or specializations from universities are more likely to be rejected by Ministry of Education and Training (MoET) with the excuse from MoET that it has to balance supply of and demand for such majors!!! By the same token, MoET does not allow universities to decide number of applicants that they wish to get enrolled the universities annually. Other proposals from many universities to have discretion in deciding staff quota and organizational setting, again, are rejected by MoHA. If universities are actively exploiting their idle facilities through leasing or putting them into non-educational joint venture contracts, this initiative is also undoable because it contradicts with provisions in Law on Public Assets... In shorts, idea of the Decree is good, but when the line agencies do not want to give up their control, how can universities become autonomous?*



(A staff member in Department of Accounting and Finance of a university)

This is also agreed by other key informants from different policy making agencies.

*The 'centralized' way of thinking still prevails in the mindset of our line ministries. Every ministry wants to keep control everything. For example, even when Decree 43 was already promulgated, MoHA still advised the government to issue a decree on management of staff quota and identification of job positions. This, obviously, is contradictory to Decree 43.*

(DPEM's former Director, MoF)

As result of investigating in selected ministries and agencies, MOF's Inspectorate pointed out that several shortcomings in implementing Decree 43 were due to the following reasons: (i) many line agencies intentionally delayed issuance of instructional circulars to guide exercise of autonomy and accountability mechanism in such dimensions as technical operation, organizational setting and staffing. Therefore, management in such dimensions were not in conformity with granted financial autonomy; (ii) many technical specifications, professional standards and norms were outdated, incomplete or unsound but yet revised and/or supplemented; and (iii) little had been done on studying and developing set of criteria for performance assessment and evaluation of service quality delivered by autonomy grantees. This limitation had hindered introduction of a performance based payment system in some POSPs and sustained the egalitarian system in others.

In short, while Decree 43 aimed to shift POSPs to operate following market signals, various existing regulations regarding pricing framework, hospital fee, cost accounting approaches, and technical specifications and professional standards... had not been timely adjusted. Consequently, it was blurry if services provided by POSPs would continue to enjoy subsidy from state budget in different forms. This makes the government to be decisive in shifting these POSPs to operate like business enterprises. The government will buy the outputs delivered by POSPs via fair market based agreements to serve the government's political and social objectives.

## Formulation of policy

Similar to the issuance of Decree 43, formulating a new Decree (Decree 16 ND-CP on 14/2/2015) to replace Decree 43 also followed formal procedures as stated in Law on Promulgation of Normative Legislations, which was passed in 2008 instead of Law of 2002 when Decree 43 was issued. Relative to Law 2002, Law 2008 defines more clearly different channels to gather comments on drafted Decree. It also requires conduct of regulatory impact assessment if a policy is implemented. For Decree 16, MoF had strictly followed all the steps in the formal policy formulation process<sup>5</sup>. However, quality of collecting and synthesizing comments as well as assessing regulatory impact of the policy was still limited.

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<sup>5</sup> Detailed decree formulation process in accordance to Law on Promulgation of Normative Legislations 2008, see Appendix.

According to Article 62 of the Law, MOF had to collect comments from other ministries and sectors, which bear direct impacts from the policy. MoF also specified issues for further comments and concrete addresses to receive comments. Comments from individuals and organizations could be sent directly to the Drafting team, added to the draft received, discussed in consultation workshops or posted in MoF's website in at least 60 days.

*After Law 2008 is in effect, we have followed to post the full text of the Decree on MOF's and Government websites within 60 days for public comments. In fact, we do not receive any comments on this channel.*

(Former Head of DPEM)

To collect comments from mass organizations, which have mandates to provide critical assessment to policy makers, MoF had organized a number of consultation workshops. Via those workshops, it was expected that comments from scientists, experts and managers would be gathered. However, there is a common feeling among policy makers that these comments lacked specificity. A possible reason is that participants providing comments were not persons who had to deal with daily problems when implementing Decree 43.

Opportunities were also opened to POSPs to send their written feedbacks on the draft of the Decree. Feedbacks then would be consolidated by their line ministries and sent to the Drafting Committee in MOF. According to a Committee member, they had to read all comments, and classify them. This is necessary step to prepare responses. However, with the number of comments mounting up to dozens of thousand, it is not clear which methods were used by the Committee to ensure no comment being missed or ignored, either intentionally or unintentionally.

*I was a letter from MoET requiring us to give comments to the draft of the Decree in written form. However, universities seem to be ignorant. It is quite popular that when they see that the topic was financial management, they would refer the draft to the department of accounting and finance. In fact, as the key message in the Decree was about autonomy, it should be jointly commented by different departments, such as department of personnel and organization, or department of training services.*

(Head of Department of Planning and Finance in a university)

*I saw this way of giving comments is just a kind of 'one-way' democracy. We sent our comments to MoET without getting any response from it. Neither information on number of universities providing comments nor details of their comments was informed. Workshops to gather comments were rarely held, or they might be held for higher level staff, if any. I felt that they did not make substantial changes upon what we proposed.*

(A staff member of Planning and Finance in a university)

Following the requirements of Law 2009, MoF also carried out regulatory impact assessment

of the issuance of the new Decree. In a foreign country, regulatory impact assessment of a policy could be conducted independently by consulting firms or NGOs specializing in policy assessment to guarantee objectivity and scientific nature of conclusions and recommendations. In Vietnam, such assessment is made by the same policy drafting agencies. Data used for policy analysis come mainly from internal sources of administrative reports, which in certain extent have to compromise with reliability and consistency. This practice hinders quality of the approved policy documents.

*In our country the authorities assess policy documents by themselves based on data supplied by different agencies. Data collection often failed to meet expectation of the drafting committee or simply because they were not available. Given the nature of this assessment is to predict potential impacts of a not-yet-issued policy, where shall we get data? Thus, the assessment is just generic, mainly to serve the policy makers' ideology.*

(Shared by the former Director of DPEM)

In case of Decree 16, after completing all reviewing works, MoF prepared a Draft profile for submission to the Government. The profile consists of (i) a proposal letter to the Cabinet regarding issuance of the Decree; (ii) revised version of the draft after absorbing comments from reviewers, organizations and individuals; (iii) a report responding to received comments; (iv) a detailed report presenting regulatory impacts of the Decree; and (v) a compilation of comments from organizations and individuals.

At the Cabinet level, OOG had called a meeting attended by representatives of MoF, Ministry of Justice, managers of relevant line ministries for final policy review. Ultimately, in a Cabinet meeting session, the Decree was passed by a majority of Cabinet members. On 14 February 2015, Decree 16 on autonomous mechanism for POSPs was passed. It contained some new points, such as setting prices and a roadmap for full-cost-recovery pricing for public services, reforming budgeting approach, which grants fully self-financing POSPs with much higher level of autonomy... In brief, if Decree 10 is considered an effort for “opening a window” and Decree 43 “opening a door”, then Decree 16 a moment for POSPs “to get out to expose to the world”.

**Table 5. The major changes in Decree 16/ND-CP/2015 relative to Decree 43/ND-CP/2006**

No.	Issue	New points
1	Policy targets	POSPs are classified in 4 groups: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Group I: self finance both their recurrent and capital expenditure.</li> <li>- Group II: self finance their recurrent and capital expenditure.</li> <li>- Group II: partially self finance their recurrent expenditure</li> <li>- Group III: fully rely on state budget allocation</li> </ul>

2	Pricing mechanism for public services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Group I has discretion in setting prices in line with market principles.</li> <li>- Prices of public services funded by state budget are set based on technical specification, professional standards and cost norms.</li> <li>- Pricing for state funded public services will follow a roadmap in which all service cost items are gradually included in price setting.</li> </ul>
3	Granted autonomy	The level of autonomy granted depends on the type of POSPs following a common principle that the more they can finance their operation by their own source of revenue, the higher level of autonomy they will receive. This is to encourage POSPs to turn quickly to the status of full autonomy.
4	Funding arrangements	<p>Shifting away from state budget appropriation modality towards a market based funding modality, which is a mixture of state buying services delivered by POSPs and state ordering service delivery assignments to POSPs based on technical specifications and quality standards applied to specific type of public services.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Group I and II: Applying market-based funding modality.</li> <li>- Group III: Combination of state ordering and state budget appropriation</li> <li>- Group IV: State budget appropriation.</li> </ul>
5	Establishment of eligible internal funds	<p>POSPs are eligible to establish the following internal funds:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Public Service Development Fund: the extraction rate is defined in the Decree.</li> <li>- Contingency Fund for Income Stabilization: the extraction rate varies in accordance with the specific grouping of POSPs. POSPs in Group I can decide the rates by themselves, while Group II, III and IV are constrained by ceilings, which do not exceed consecutively 3 times, 2 times and 1 time of the original payroll.</li> </ul>
6	Application of financial management practice of enterprises	POSPs in Group 1 can apply financial management practice of business enterprises if conditions met. In this case, POSPs will change their legal status to be Single Member Ltd. Company fully owned by the government.

Source: Extracted from Decree 16/2015/ND-CP

Obviously, Decree 16 has created freer atmosphere for POSPs, which have high self-financing potential, to move completely to operate in a market competition environment. However, to implement output-based budgeting approach, line ministries and local agencies are required to set up and perfect their set of technical specification, professional standards and performance monitoring indicators with specific measures to assess the level of task completion. At the same time, performance monitoring and evaluation, typically being conducted by external entities should be emphasized to ensure objectivity and transparency, which helps to improve service quality and efficiency of budget use. In this context, Decree 16 has not addressed the principle to connect remuneration system to workload, work quality and operational efficiency. Therefore, the eligarian nature of the current payment system as in Decree 43 remains.

Precise inclusion of full cost in setting service prices is a sensitive issue with significant impacts on society. Therefore, the government is well aware of the fact that adjustment of prices of public services should be made step by step following a carefully designed roadmap, in which impacts of market-based pricing roadmap on service diversity, inflation risks threatening macroeconomic stability, and access of vulnerable groups to public services with improving quality should be projected. Thus, Decree 16 has cautiously considered the roadmap to apply market-based pricing to public services.

*We understand very well that the full cost inclusion in service pricing must take into account such items as depreciation, taxes, salary payment, etc. However, this must be done in steps because there are abundance of hurdles. For example, precise estimate of depreciation asks for a reliable valuation approach for public assets. Estimation of tax payment requires a clear solution to deal with tax obligations of non-for-profit organizations. I propose that by 2018 cost item of salary payment will be fully counted, by 2020- management costs, and by 2025 all cost items. It is set in a faster pace in this Decree, i.e. by 2020 all costs items will be included.*

(Discussion with DPEM's former Director, MoF)

The government has also learnt some lessons from the situation when the Framework Decree (Decree 16) was passed but the ministries delay in advising the government to issue sector-specific decrees for autonomy of POSPs in typical sectors. If occurs, it will result in incompatibility among legislative documents. Thus, Decree 16 has made it clear that, in the transitional time when new sector-specific guiding documents are not available, POSPs keep exercising autonomy as regulated in Decree 43 and other existing regulations regarding autonomy in their sector.

## ANALYSIS OF POLICY PROCESS

Granting autonomy to POSPs is a long reform process, which should be made incrementally to avoid substantial chaos in the society. In this study, the process of providing POSPs with autonomy is seen as an evolution process throughout different stages, rather than focusing on any single policy attached into a single Decree. With this approach, we can point out most typical features of the policy making process in Vietnam in a more systematic and completed manner. From our perspective, major remarks and lessons can be summarized as follows:

**Firstly**, in general the legal process of policy formulation is strictly followed by the policy making agencies. Nonetheless, the nature of each step in that process is still arguable. At the stage of identification of policy context and issue, the policy of granting autonomy to POSPs has revealed the influence of two factors: (i) requirement of the reality; and (ii) sensitivity of policy making agencies with that demand. An example is Decree 10, in which DPEM was fully aware of drawbacks of the centrally managing mechanism in POSPs when they were operating in market

economy. Thus, DPEM had studied and learnt from international experiences to find way to get out. Noticeably at that time, DPEM was well aware of losing benefits if the “begging-giving” mechanism is ceased.

At the stage of policy formulation, the drafting agency is fairly flexible in generating supports from different channels. With a completely new mechanism as in Decree 10, when other state administrative agencies had not well understood the differences between public administrative agencies and POSPs, had no ex-post experiences to confirm that expanding autonomy for POSPs did not mean losing control, etc. it is important to provide persistently explanation and persuasion through informal channels. However, once a new mechanism is shaped, even incomplete, impediments will reveal during its implementation. At this point, perfecting the mechanism is very natural. It had faced little perceptual resistance and objections. Therefore, using formal legislative procedures (as defined by Law on Promulgation of Normative Legislations) by policy making agencies was dominant.

With the financial autonomy, POSPs are obviously the implementing entities. Therefore, to timely be updated with drawbacks during the implementation process, policy making agency maintained a periodically reporting regime from other line ministries. Besides, making direct on-site observations, conducting consultation workshops together with real management experiences gained by administrative agencies had become the main sources of information for stock taking of the drafting agency.

**Secondly**, the process of granting autonomy to POSPs in Vietnam is a learning-by-doing process. Once the strategic orientation of the reform is clearly defined, reform roadmap is well designed to avoid shocks.

The process of granting autonomy to POSPs reflects the process of changing perception in the policy making agency itself. At the beginning, the policy aimed only at changing managerial procedures and instruments in a typical area (public finance management, as in Decree 10), then it switched into changing other necessary conditions for fuller autonomy (autonomy in technical operation, organizational setting and staffing, as in Decree 43). Finally, the reform moves up to changing mode of operation (operating like a market-based business enterprise, as in Decree 16). Hence, it is not surprising if one says that formulation of reforming policies in Vietnam follows gradualist approach.

*When working on the [Decree] 10 we just thought of releasing some financial bottlenecks. Later we realized that finance alone was not enough, and that we also needed autonomy in operation, organization setting and staffing as well. Hence the [Decree] 43.*

(Discussion with DPEM’s Director at the time of Decree 10)

*At the time of [Decree] 43, you would surely fail if pricing public services was mentioned as you will be defeated by the criticism of the whole society. Now we have had Laws on Prices,*

*Law on Public Assets, strategies for socialization of public services, for shifting POSPs towards operating in business model. After [Decree] 43, POSPs have also been familiar with private-public partnership modalities, and it is easier to accept service prices.*

(Discussion with DPEM's Director at the time of Decree 43)

**Thirdly**, over the process of policy formulation, the puzzle regarding conflicts of interests among stakeholders needs to be solved. In this case, the relationship between MoF, line ministries and POSPs is rather complicated: MoF wished to accelerate reform process to catch up with the government's Strategy on Public Finance Management Reform. Highly potential POSPs urged for greater autonomy whilst POSPs in a weaker position in generating revenue was willing to live with the old mechanism. Line ministries, on their turns, struggled to maintain their control over POSPs. Vest interests of each party sometimes outweighed progress in perception changes, making the policy making agency be tactful in balancing them.

*MoF wished a breakthrough. Universities and hospitals called for increasing service fees. However, line ministers were under public pressure, so they did not want to cause too many troubles. Line agencies always looked for the most convenient and safest position. It is so hard to balance interests of all parties.*

(Discussion with DPEM's Director)

In fact, MoF has very "wise" approach when bridging new policy initiatives with requirements of PAR, Strategy on Public Finance Management Reform, the Government's and Party's direction on socialization of public services, as well as the birth of a series of common laws to govern all sectors and areas such as State Budget Law, Public Investment Law, Pricing Law, Law on Public Assets, etc. Therefore, MoF has gained political supports from the top leadership of the Party and the government. The classification of POSPs and having relevant "releasing" mechanism for each category of POSPs are also a tactful way to minimize resistance from these organizations.

**Fourthly**, the policy formulation process in Vietnam in fact relies more on managerial experiences than on findings of basic research and scientific studies. This is evident by blurry roles of local and international research organizations throughout the reform process. Inputs for policy adjustment mainly come from internal sources of administrative agencies. The process of collecting, compiling and processing critical comments and feedbacks is mostly kept in a close circle, which is subject to be arbitrary and highly influenced by political will of policy making agency itself.

**Finally**, the closeness is the factor that makes quality of a policy depends largely on the competency and accountability of policy making agency. Competency includes ability to understand policies, experiences in dealing with similar situation in the world, systematic analytical skills (including the ability to predict policy impacts, to do stakeholder analysis, to create

an interactive environment, and to listen to critical opinions), and policy advocacy. Accountability of policy making agency is exhibited in fairness, neutrality, and willingness to compromise vest interests with the sake of common goals. This is truly important for sensitive policies which potentially touch upon vest interests of many line ministries and agencies.

To conclude, it is worth quoting the final remark of DPEM's former Director, regarding the role of policy makers: "*The key point is to be unbiased, impartial, devoted and determined. Once you do not work for your own interests, you will always get supported*".



## APPENDIX:

### Procedures for issuing a decree as defined in Law on Promulgation of Normative Legislations

Law on Promulgation of Normative Legislations 2002	Law on Promulgation of Normative Legislations 2008
<p><b>Article 60.- Setting up of committees for drafting resolutions and decrees</b></p> <p>1. The Government shall decide on the agencies in charge of drafting resolutions or decrees.</p> <p>The agencies in charge of the drafting shall set up drafting committees.</p> <p>For decrees mentioned at Point b, Clause 2, Article 65 of this Law, the Government shall decide to set up drafting committees.</p> <p>2. A drafting committee shall be composed of a representative of the agency in charge of the drafting as its head and representatives of the evaluating agency and other concerned agencies and organizations, specialists and scientists as its members.</p> <p>3. The agencies in charge of the drafting shall have to ensure conditions for the operation of the drafting committees, be accountable to the Government for the contents and quality of draft documents and the drafting tempo.</p> <p>4. The ministries, the ministerial-level agencies and the agencies attached to the Government, which participate in the drafting committees shall have to give written opinions on the contents related to their working domains and be answerable for their opinions."</p>	<p><b>Article 60. The Decree Drafting Board</b></p> <p>1. The lead drafting agency shall create a Decree Drafting Board. A Decree Drafting Board shall consist of a Chairperson who represents the lead drafting agency, and other members who are representatives of the lead assessing agency, agencies and organizations concerned, experts and scientists.</p> <p>The Decree Drafting Board shall be responsible to the lead drafting agency for the quality and the progress of the development of draft decrees.</p> <p>The Chairperson of the decree drafting board shall create an Editorial Team to support the Decree Drafting Board and to perform tasks assigned by the Decree Drafting Board.</p> <p>2. The Decree Drafting Board has the following responsibilities:</p> <p>a) Considering and finalizing the outlines of draft decrees;</p> <p>b) Discussing main issues and contents of draft decrees, issues that are subject to different opinions of Ministries, Ministry-equivalent agencies, Government-affiliated agencies;</p> <p>c) Discussing those contents that need to be adopted, revised and improved according to the points of view of the lead assessing agency, and comments and ideas of agencies, organizations and individuals;</p> <p>d) Making sure that the rulings of draft documents are consistent with the guidelines and policies of the Party, the Constitution, laws and resolutions of the National Assembly, ordinances and resolutions of the Standing Committee of the National Assembly; ensuring unity and conformity of the draft documents with the system of laws; and ensuring feasibility of the documents.</p> <p>3. Based on the outputs of discussions of the Decree Drafting Board, the Chairperson shall direct the Editorial Team to prepare, to revise and to improve draft decrees.</p>
<p><b>Article 61.- Tasks of the committees for drafting resolutions and decrees</b></p>	<p><b>Article 61. Responsibilities of the lead drafting agency for drafting a decree</b></p>

<p>When drafting resolutions or decrees, the drafting committees shall have the following tasks:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Reviewing the situation of law enforcement, evaluating current legal documents related to the draft documents; surveying and assessing the actual situation of social relations related to the principal contents of the draft documents;</li> <li>2. Organizing the study of information and materials related to the draft documents;</li> <li>3. Outlining, compiling and revising the draft documents;</li> <li>4. Gathering comments of the concerned agencies, organizations and individuals as well as subjects to be directly affected by the documents within a scope and in a form appropriate to the nature and contents of each draft document;</li> <li>5. Preparing the reports on and other documents related to the draft documents. Such a report must clearly state the necessity to promulgate the legal documents, the purposes, requirements, scope, subjects and principal contents of the draft documents, the matters that require guiding opinions and the matters on which opinions remain divergent;</li> <li>6. Coordinating with the concerned agencies and organizations in preparing the drafts of the detailing and guiding documents</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The lead drafting agency for drafting a decree shall be accountable to the Government for the content and quality of the draft decree and the progress of drafting the decree.</li> <li>2. The lead drafting agency for drafting a decree has the following responsibilities:       <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Undertaking synthesis reviews of the enforcement of laws, assessments of current legal regulatory documents related to the draft decree in question; conducting surveys and evaluations of the current status of the social relationships related to the main contents of the draft decree.</li> <li>b) Organizing studies and researches of information, documentations and those international treaties of which Vietnam is one of the signatories that are related to the draft decree.</li> <li>c) Organizing consultations, studies, adoptions, revisions and improvements for the draft decree; preparing submissions and reports on explanations for adoption of comments on the draft decree, reports on assessment of impacts of the draft decree, and posting those documents on the website of the Government or that of the lead drafting agency.</li> <li>d) Ensuring necessary conditions for the operation of the Decree Drafting Board and the Editorial Team.</li> </ol> </li> </ol>
<p><b>Article 62.- Contribution of comments to the elaboration of draft resolutions and decrees</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Depending on the nature and contents of draft resolutions or decrees, the drafting agencies shall send the draft documents to the Nationality Council, the Central Committee of Vietnam Fatherland Front, Vietnam General Confederation of Labor, the Supreme People’s Court, the Supreme People’s Procuracy, the concerned agencies and organizations, the People’s Councils and the People’s Committees of the provinces and centrally-run cities (hereinafter collectively referred to as the provincial level) for comments.</li> <li>2. Depending on the nature and contents of draft resolutions or decrees, the Prime Minister shall assign the Government Office to publish draft resolutions or decrees on the mass media and the Internet so that agencies, organizations and individuals can give their comments.</li> </ol> <p>Individuals can give their comments on draft resolutions and decrees through their agencies or organizations, directly to or by mail to the</p>	<p><b>Article 62. Collection of comments and ideas as inputs for the preparation of the draft decree</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. In the course of developing draft decrees, the lead drafting agency shall have to organize for the collection of comments and ideas from ministries, Ministry-equivalent agencies, Government-affiliated agencies, and target groups that are directly affected by the document in question. Issues and problems that are open for comments and suggestions, and the addresses to which comments are sent should be highlighted. The full text of the draft decree should be posted on the website of the Government or that of the lead drafting agency at least for 60 days for agencies, organizations and individuals to submit their comments and ideas.</li> <li>2. Collection of comments and ideas as inputs for the development of the draft decree can be undertaken in the form of direct comments and suggestions, circulation of the draft decree for comments and suggestions, organizing consultation workshops, making use of websites of the Government and the lead drafting agency or mass media.</li> </ol>

<p>Government Office, the drafting agencies or organizations, or through the mass media.</p> <p>3. The agencies drafting resolutions or decrees shall have to study the comments so as to revise the draft resolutions or decrees, then make reports on the acceptance of comments.</p>	<p>3. The lead drafting agency shall be responsible for synthesis, studies and researches, and adoption of comments and suggestions.</p>
<p><b>Article 63.- Evaluation of draft resolutions and draft decrees</b></p> <p>1. The Ministry of Justice shall have to evaluate draft resolutions and draft decrees before submitting them to the Government.</p> <p>Evaluating councils shall be set up by the Minister of Justice to evaluate resolutions and decrees drafted by the Ministry of Justice.</p> <p>2. The scope of evaluation of draft resolutions and decrees shall comply with the provisions in Clause 2, Article 29a of this Law.</p> <p>3. In case of necessity, the evaluating agencies shall request the drafting agencies to report on matters related to the contents of the draft resolutions or decrees, conduct by themselves or jointly with the drafting agencies field surveys of the matters related to the contents of the draft resolutions or decrees. The agencies in charge of the drafting shall have to supply information and documents in service of the evaluation of the draft resolutions or decrees.</p> <p>4. The agencies in charge of the drafting shall have to study the evaluation opinions and revise the draft resolutions or decrees accordingly before submitting them to the Government. In cases where their opinions are divergent from those of the evaluating agencies, the agencies in charge of the drafting shall report them to the Government for consideration and decision.</p> <p>5. The Government Office shall send draft resolutions or decrees and evaluation documents to the cabinet members before the Government's meetings. The Government shall only consider and discuss draft resolutions or decrees when the evaluation documents are available.</p>	<p><b>Article 63. Assessment and verification of draft decrees</b></p> <p>1. The Ministry of Justice shall be responsible for assessing and verifying draft decrees before they are submitted to the prime Minister.</p> <p>Regarding those draft decrees that have complicated contents, related to many sectors and fields, or being prepared by the Ministry of Justice as the lead drafting agency, the Minister of Justice shall create an Assessors Council which consists of representatives of stakeholders, experts and scientists.</p> <p>2. The complete set of documents to be submitted for assessment and verification include the following:      The submission to the Government on the draft decree;      The draft decree;      c) An account of detailed explanations and a report on assessment of impacts exerted by the draft decree;      d) A synthesis report on comments and suggestions from agencies, organizations, individuals and target groups directly affected by the draft decree; a photocopy of the account of comments and suggestions of Ministries, Ministry-equivalent agencies and Government-affiliated agencies; a report on adoption of comments and suggestions.      Other documents (if any).</p> <p>3. The contents for the assessment and verification of the draft decree are stipulated at Clause 3 Article 36 of this Law.</p> <p>4. In cases of need, assessing agencies may request the lead drafting agency to report on issues and problems covered by the draft decree, and assessing agencies themselves or together with the lead drafting agency may organize field surveys into issues and problems covered by the draft decree. The lead drafting agency shall be responsible for providing necessary information and documents to serve the assessment and verification of the draft decree.</p> <p>5. Reports on assessment and verification of the draft decree shall be sent to the lead drafting agency no later than 15 days since the date on which the</p>

	<p>assessing agency received the complete sets of documents for assessment and verification.</p> <p>6. The lead drafting agency shall be responsible for taking into consideration comments and suggestions of the assessing agency for the improvement of the draft decree to be submitted to the Prime Minister.</p>
<p><b>Article 64.- Order of consideration and adoption of draft resolutions and draft decrees</b></p> <p>1. Depending on the nature and contents of draft resolutions and/or decrees, the Government may consider and adopt them at one or two meetings of the Government.</p> <p>2. At the Government’s meetings, the representatives of the drafting agencies make presentation on the draft documents; the evaluating agencies present their evaluation opinions on the draft documents; then the representatives of the agencies and organizations invited to the meetings present their opinions.</p> <p>3. The cabinet members discuss the matters on which opinions remain divergent.</p> <p>4. Draft resolutions and decrees of the Government shall be adopted when they are voted for by over half of the total number of cabinet members.</p> <p>5. The Prime Minister signs resolutions and decrees.</p> <p>6. In cases where draft resolutions or decrees have not yet been adopted, the Government shall give opinions on matters which need to be revised and determine the deadline for re-submission of the draft documents.</p>	<p><b>Article 64. The complete set of the draft decree and supporting documents to be submitted to the Prime Minister</b></p> <p>This includes the following:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The submission to the Government on the draft decree.</li> <li>2. The draft decree after being revised and improved with adoption of comments and suggestions of the assessing agency, other agencies, organizations and individuals.</li> <li>3. An account of adoption of comments and suggestions of the assessing agency and of other agencies, organizations and individuals.</li> <li>4. An account of detailed explanations and a report on assessment of impacts exerted by the draft decree.</li> <li>5. A synthesis report on comments and suggestions from agencies, organizations, individuals.</li> </ol> <p>Other documents (if any).</p>
	<p><b>Article 65. Improvement and finalization of draft decrees before submitting them to the Government</b></p> <p>In cases where different opinions and ideas remain amongst Ministries, Ministry-equivalent agencies and Government-affiliated agencies regarding major issues and problems covered by the draft decree, the Minister Chairman of the Office of the Government shall convene a meeting of representatives of the leadership of the lead drafting agency, the Ministry of Justice, the leadership of Ministries, Ministry-equivalent agencies and Government-affiliated agencies concerned to settle those differences before submitting them to the Government for consideration and decision. Based on the outputs of this meeting, the lead drafting agency in conjunction with agencies concerned shall continue to improve and finalize the draft decree to be submitted to the Government.</p>

**Article 66. Sequential procedures for consideration and approval of draft decrees**

Depending on the nature and the content of the draft decree in question, the Government may consider and approve it at one or two of its meetings in the following sequential procedures:

1. Representatives of the lead drafting agency shall make presentations of the draft decree;
2. Representatives of the Office of the Government shall bring forward those issues and problems that need discussions;
3. Representatives of agencies and organizations attending the meeting to express their opinions and viewpoints;
4. The Government shall discuss.

The lead drafting agency shall coordinate with the Ministry of Justice, the Office of the Government and other agencies concerned to revise and improve the draft decree taking into consideration comments and ideas of the Government.

5. The Government shall approve the draft decree by majority voting.

In the case where the draft decree is not approved, the Prime Minister shall direct and guide those issues and problems that need revision and improvement and set the deadlines for re-submitting the draft decree, and at the same time assign the lead drafting agency to the job of perfecting the draft decree to be submitted to the Government for consideration and approval.

6. The Prime Minister shall sign decrees.

**Asia Pacific Institute of Management**  
**National Economics University**

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**Research on the Status of Policy Process in Vietnam**

Case

**THE NATIONAL TARGET PROGRAM ON BUILDING A  
NEW COUNTRYSIDE DURING 2010-2020: FROM IDEAS  
TO IMPLEMENTATION**



*This case study was conducted by researchers from Asia Pacific Institute of Management.  
Dr. Nguyen Vu Hung was the lead author of this case study.*

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## List of Abreviation

DARD: Department of Agriculture and Rural Development

DPI: Department of Planning and Investment

GDP: Gross Domestic Product

MARD: Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development

MPI: Ministry of Planning and Investment

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## Summary of the policy

Items	Description
<b>a. Policy Issue</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Management requirement: one uniting authority.</li> <li>- Socio-economic status: agriculture economy to bottom.</li> </ul>
<b>b. Purpose</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Build a realistic model for rural development.</li> <li>- Experience from pilot models for overall country.</li> </ul>
<b>c. Contents</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- New rural development to achieve 19 criterion standards for new rural communes.</li> <li>- Plans will be implemented in all provinces.</li> <li>- Financial resources from state budget: credit: enterprise: citizen with the corresponding ratios of 4:3:2:1.</li> <li>- For the periods from 2010 to 2015 and to 2020.</li> </ul>
<b>d. Protagonists</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD) is the proposing and standing body.</li> </ul>
<b>e. Stakeholders</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Other ministries, especially MPIs (MPI).</li> <li>- All 63 provinces nationwide.</li> </ul>
<b>f. Institutions directly related</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Vietnam's State Budget Law (2002; 2015).</li> <li>- Vietnam's Law on Bidding (2005; 2013).</li> <li>- Other regulations on investment and finance.</li> </ul>
<b>g. Outcome</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- As the program hasn't been finished, no final evaluation yet.</li> <li>- Some initial evaluations show positive results.</li> <li>- There are many problems in the implementation phase which are required to be fixed.</li> </ul>
<b>h. Impact</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- No official impact evaluation yet.</li> </ul>

## The context and key stakeholders

The National Target Program on Building New Countryside has been approved and implemented since 2010. Its multiple initial outcomes have been achieved, contributing to significant and positive changes to the rural economy. In fact, the general goal of the program as stated under the Decision 800-QĐ/TTg signed on June 4th, 2010 is *“to build a new countryside with gradually modern socio-economic infrastructure, rational economic structure and forms of production organization; to associate agriculture with quick development of industries and services, and rural with urban development under planning; to assure a democratic and stable rural community deeply imbued with national cultural identity; to protect the eco-environment and maintain security and order; and to raise people's material and spiritual lives along the socialist orientation.”* These goals have been specified into different objectives including: (1) By 2015, 20% of communes will reach new countryside standards (under the national set of new countryside criteria); and (2) By 2020, 50% of communes will reach new countryside standards

(under the national set of new countryside criteria). These objectives then were further specified into sub objectives for different areas including economic, infrastructure, culture, security, and so on.

In fact, according to a recent report by the Government, by the end of 2014, there are 785 communes met the criterion standards (accounting for 8.8%); 1,285 communes met 10-14/19 criteria (14.5%); 2,836 communes met 10-14/19 criteria (32.1%); 2,964 communes met 5-9/19 criteria (33.6%); 945 communes met 5/19 criteria (11%), and all communes met at least one criterion. Especially, there are two districts (Xuan Loc and Long Khanh) in Dong Nai province recognized by the Prime Minister as meeting standards for new rural districts. Thus, even though there has not been any final evaluation, the objectives set for 2015 by the Program are very likely to be achieved, according to the reports. In the coming time, the Program objectives and plans would be further pushed into discussions and plans by the Party meeting at all levels, an action that is promised to be realistic and help accelerate the implementation of the Program effectively.

In fact, the ideas of such a program have appeared since 2002 but not become as necessary as “a must” since 2007-2008. The context for idea development may have been very complicated but, in essence, can be summarized by two main requirements: (1) management requirement; and (2) demand from the socio-economic situation, and especially in agriculture and rural area in 2007 and 2008.

First, in term of **management requirement**, two issues can be specified. On the one hand, in fact, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD) was established by grouping different authorities to cover two important socio-economic areas including *agriculture* and *rural development*. In its operation, while the technical area of agriculture has been managed closely with different agencies and authorities from central to local levels, the one of rural development has not been sufficiently cared until 2000. The only authority covering this area in the Ministry (to the time and even now) is the Department of Cooperatives and Rural Development (DCRD) which was formed since 2022 by combining the Departments of Policy and of Sedentarization. Even now, DCRC is still focusing on (1) developing cooperative entities, an ever less popular area in Vietnam, and (2) planning for rural citizen allocation. An expert from MARD commented that:

*“Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development was established by combining different authorities... However, while the area of agriculture which is more technical has been clearly managed, the one of rural development has been always confused.”*

On the other hand, the area of rural development in essence is cross-cutting different sectors and involved management by different ministries including culture, commerce, infrastructure construction, and so on. Management of rural development thus can collide with different ministries and cannot be implemented efficiently without applying the management mode of single integrative supervisor.

**Comments from an expert in MARD on agriculture management:**

In fact, all existing policies in Vietnam can be assigned in either form: vertical or horizontal. Horizontally (by provinces), the policies have been usually implemented from top-down. Such approach raises the problems of understanding the root's need. Vertically, programs can be implemented in an overlapping manner in one location. Thus, within the area of rural development, there have been different programs in different fields including culture, tourism, poverty reduction, infrastructure building, and so on. Recognizing the need to push forward the area of rural development, MARD has proposed this integrative program. However, as the program is cross-cutting different sectors, the MPI (MPI) would be the approving authority. Other ministries are all involved as there are areas in the program they have been supervising the allocated resources for since then.


Thus there has been a natural requirement for a single standing authority to act as the single coordinator to integrate, synthesize, master plan, clearly specify all the issues related to rural development to ensure its harmony and concerted implementation. As the authority to oversee the area of “rural development”, MARD then spontaneously became the most appropriate authority to raise the integrative program idea based on root's demand. In fact, the idea started within the MARD since 2000 and totally matches with the function of MARD.

However, the requirement for one single coordinating authority could have been understood differently by different supervising parties. The idea of a single supervising authority for an area which had been supervised by different ministries thus was not paid attention and supported by the other for a long period of time of more than five years. As an expert in the agriculture industry recalled:

*“Since 2002 MARD has piloted some programs which are root-based for rural development. After that, however, we realized that we cannot do anything without endorsing resources. Pilot projects were not supported by any ministries. Any parties want to keep for themselves the playing ground. In 2004 and 2005, the pilots thus all met with difficulties without possible solution. In 2006, Mr. Phat [who now the minister of MARD] also wanted to go back with village-based programs because the required resources for commune-based ones were too much, about VND 500-700 billion/commune. All other ministries, especially MPI, however, did not really support as it would change the current vertical management system – a sensitive issue of benefit for them.”*


The second requirement for this Program has only been really matured in 2007 and 2008: the demand from socio-economic situation in agriculture and rural development. This can be considered the sufficient requirement for the realization of the new rural area program. In this period of time, the economy of agriculture in Vietnam decreased seriously. From the macro perspective, this can be considered the economic crisis (in terms of gross domestic products - GDP growth rate) in Vietnam. More importantly, such crisis effects were realized mainly on the rural areas, causing large gaps in GDP growth rate between rural and urban areas (see Figure 1).

**Figure 1. Comparing national GDP growth rate and agriculture's over years (1987-2011)**



Such crisis can also be examined from looking at the gap in average incomes of urban and rural areas in the period (see Figure 2). Moreover, as the rural area had not been invested concertedly by the Government, the degradation in infrastructure for different fields, including transportation roads, education, health area, and so on, further extended the gaps in living standards between rural and urban areas.

**Figure 2. Average incomes of urban versus rural areas over years**



From the micro perspective, the period of 2007 and 2008 can also be considered a crisis in agricultural economy with the deep decreases in prices for different key agro-products including coffee, rice, and so on. As observed by an expert in the industry:

*“The period of 2007-2008 is a crisis time with a dramatically decrease in agro-product prices. The price for coffee, for example, has been down to the bottom level ever, only several thousand dong a kilogram... I guess only in this time that others [ministries] would sympathize.”*

In short, even though the idea for the Program was raised since the beginning of 2000s, not until 2007 and 2008 that the crisis situation of agricultural economy has provided a sufficient condition for such a program which should be managed seriously and comprehensively to integrate multiple areas in rural development. Naturally, MARD would be the main standing authority and responsible for implementing some activities. MARD also acts as the standing body to monitor and guide other ministries to implement the activities within their supervision. Moreover, probably, due to such reasons, over the course of idea realizing and implementation, the Program of new rural areas have always been mixed with debates involving both issues of perception and benefits, the issues that we would continue to discuss in the following sections.

### **Identification of policy issues**

Thus, in the initial phase of policy making – identification of policy issues – the idea of a new program for rural development came from MARD with two main requirements as mentioned above: requirement for management and demand from socio-economic situation. From both knowledge and power/interest perspectives, the requirements can be understood very differently probably because the area of “rural development” involves different ministries and industries. Knowledge and understanding can also be “distorted” by the calculation of power and interest by different parties. In fact, the then regulations on central-budge allocating power before the Program were very centralized which is in the form of “beg-and-give” and vertically so that central authorities could directly interfere in budget allocating to each commune, or even to each small work or project. Thus, as the current programs would be combined under one Program for new rural areas, other ministries would be worry of losing the “direct budget-allocating power”.

**Learning/knowledge perspective:**

From MARD's perspective, the main reason that MARD argued seems to highlight the knowledge from MARD that rooted from a requirement for a comprehensive management of the rural development issues for one rural area. Such issues had been managed dispersedly by different ministries up to the time, depending on their field of management for different periods of time. For example, rural modernization may involve building road and infrastructure, an area that is supervised by the Ministry of Construction and Ministry of Transport. In the meantime, rural development may also be related to facilitating local businesses and commerce in markets and shopping areas, an issue which is supervised by the Ministry of Industry and Trade. Other issues related to communal cultural house are supervised by the Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism (which is preceded by the divided Ministry of Culture and Information). Thus, if programs from different ministries were not coordinated in a concerted way, implementing one program may cause problems for carrying out another in the same location, resulting in economic and social waste. For example, there have been different problems in coordination for different programs at one commune. A market was under a program by Ministry of Commerce but there were no roads into the market as road building was under Ministry of Transport. Similarly, a clinic was invested heavily under the Ministry of Health but the local citizens did not visit because it was very difficult to get to the location and there were also no paved roads to the clinic. Officially, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) is controlling for financial sources and MPI functions as the single one authorizing all the investment programs, In fact, however, under the centralized system of management, the authorizing and allocating staff at the ministries can by no means understand the coordination problems in each commune. A single authority to coordinate all activities of rural development had not existed before 2000.

With the same issue, however, other ministries had different knowledge. For example, the representatives from MPI thought that all the programs for rural areas had been implemented without significant problems. The question that a representative of MPI raised was: why we need to change? Besides, representatives from other ministries reasoned that many programs had been implemented by different ministries with their own expertise. Thus, the question is if a single authority like MARD can be appropriate for the coordinating role when its only expertise is about agriculture. Knowledge and argument for MARD as a single authority for such Program

thus had been criticized and voted down in Government meetings in the beginning of 2000s because firstly the proposal for it would have to be commented and approved by MPI.

*“Under the procedure, ideas and proposals have to be examined by MPI. However, we were voted down both times we proposed the idea.”*

[An expert from MARD, who was in the formulation committee]

Besides, knowledge about making policies was also different among the involved parties. While other programs had usually been made with a top-down style and centralized, MARD wanted a root-based program which was formed from root's demand. However, it should also be noted that knowledge of MARD on this was very basic which can be stylized as: *by witnessing some problems from current programs and policies plus initial evidence from pilots with 17 communes, we think it's enough to implement a similar program nationwide.* In fact, while there had been lessons to learn and research evidence up to the time, none of these were used or reviewed or paid attention to by MARD. This time and later on, no evidence or national wide research results were referred to nor any base-line studies on actual demand for the Program. An expert in the formulation committee of the Program stated that:

*“In fact, there are no official studies. We saw they did similar things in Korea and China and there were problems we could see from the pilot programs. In fact, what we had done so far was top-down style of policy making. Since 2002, however, MARD implemented some pilot programs which were root-based.”*

In the mean time, the approach that all other programs up to the time (around 2000) and most of the programs till now were formulated and implemented is centralized and top-down. Under this approach, MPI would be the overall planning authority for many programs. Other ministries are responsible for implementing the programs under their control. For example, poverty reduction programs such as 135 and 30A (directed by the Committee for Ethnic Minority Affairs - CEMA and Ministry of Labor, Invalid and Social Affairs, respectively) have been formulated and implemented in the same way. In general, the implementation procedure would be as follows:



- One round started with local governments (usually at the district level) proposed their needs.
- The upper level authority (the provincial level) synthesizes needs for different areas which are supervised by different departments.
- The upper level authority (usually the Department of Investment and Planning) composes a master plan and submit it to MPI.
- MPI together with MOF would examine the master plans from different provinces and hear “their defenses”.
- MPI adjusts and approves master plans for provinces.
- Provincial government can wait for financial budget to implement programs via their departments.

Problems with this approach have been pointed out and emphasized in different evaluation and study reports<sup>1</sup>. As an expert in MARD commented:

*“Our program management can be either horizontal or vertical....The vertical approach is basically top-down and problematic. Thus we witnessed stories like one commune has two supplying electric lines along one road, one installed by the 135 program, and the other by the electric corporation. Both [programs] invested and they run parallel. Both wanted to invest. Here we don’t have a single coordinator. More importantly, the commune government as the representatives for local citizens as beneficiaries has no say in this.”*

Another mixed understanding for this Program is knowledge about resources and issues to be solved in programs. Based on experience from pilot programs with 17 communes, MARD realized the needs for controlled resources to be used in a program. As it acts only as the summarizing authority in the previous programs for 17 communes, MARD faced with challenges in the program implementation. This is especially true for a program that needs huge resources like the new rural one. In the mean time, MOF is still the budget balancing and allocating

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<sup>1</sup> For example, see reports by SDC, MARD, and HELVETAS (2010) with title: “Satisfaction with Public Service Delivery in the Agriculture and Rural Development Sector, local planning and financial management at commune level 2007 & 2009” and by SIDA (2010) with title: “Working beyond the grassroots: An Evaluation of the Chia Se Poverty Alleviation Programme 2003 to 2008”.

authority. Other ministries can only monitor and implement individual programs within their power and thus cannot understand the coordinating role. As a result, coordinating without resource control is usually limited within “summarizing and reporting” current situation. As an expert in MARD confirmed:

*“After pilot programs in 2002, we realized that anything has to link to resource controlled. Otherwise you can sketch out anything without supports from any ministries. Anyone just wanted to keep their own playing field, rather than get in a common playing ground.”*

### **Power/interest perspective**

Even though the terms such as power or interest have not been mentioned affirmatively in any interviews, we believe that such issues (or thinking about power/interest) may have been mixed and hidden behind the knowledge about the program (expressed in comments or approval). Here, ones can see that MARD would certainly gain some centralized control over different areas/industries related to rural development if the new program is approved. It should also be noted that in the initial phase of policy making, the policy issue identification, changing the managing power which used to be distributed diversely into one ministry’s hand is to go reverse with what have usually been done.

Until we had the ideas for the new rural program, functions and responsibilities (and the corresponding power) of different ministries could have been understood as below:

- MPI: This ministry was authorized by the Government to manage all kinds of investment programs. MPI thus has power to approve programs every year, to manage the master plan for development, and to propose to add or eliminate different issues in any current programs which is related to increase or decrease the allocated budget.
- Other ministries: Depending on their own areas and on behalf of the Government the ministries can approve and monitor the implementation of programs nationwide. These ministries certainly would have to coordinate with MPI to monitor current programs and be “given” allocated resources for new programs.

The idea of new rural program thus can be understood as a radical shift in power for managing different programs. It is not to mention the possible changes in all the-then programs because agriculture and rural issues were more likely to be emphasized in the new hands of MARD.

As a result, the idea for the new rural program was turned down in all the Government meetings. For example, MPI argued that there had been many programs for rural areas implemented “effectively” by different ministries around the nation. Thus it was not necessary to have “just another” one. In another word, under MPI’s argument, the new program would be basically a sum-up of all the then programs, which was the function of MPI, rather than a value-added one.

On the other hand, the need identification was not based on rigorous and reliable research. Basically, the reason behind MARD’s proposal lies in some evidence from pilot programs and the then situations of down-turn rural and agricultural economy and decreasing living standards of rural citizens. Such proposal was not supported by collected evidence or studies for the program needs and its nationwide impact evaluation. Similarly, MPI did not base on any evidence or studies but just argued that the idea is “not persuasive in terms of evidence and bases”. In the beginning, the idea for a new rural program thus came to a dead end.

An interesting point in the policy making case of the Program for New Rural Area is that differences between ministries could not be resolved by processes of discussion and persuasion between involving parties. Finally, with consultation from some key staff in the Party, the proposing group in MARD was working with a central party’s resolution committee and successful in “placing” some key issues in Resolution 26-NQ/TW, issued on August 5<sup>th</sup>, 2008 at the 7<sup>th</sup> Congress of the Central Party Session X, on agriculture, farmers, and rural areas. It should be noted that in the resolution approval process, the role of MPI is not as direct and significant as in Government meetings. At this level, MPI acts as only one representative, together with many others from different authorities and organizations<sup>2</sup>. As a result, MARD successfully defended

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<sup>2</sup> It should be noted that under the policy process in Vietnam, an integrative report submitted to the Government would be directed and approved by MPI. A report submitted to the Central Party, however, would be directed by a Ministry of the related field. The role of MPI and the other Ministry then would be exchanged in this case.

two key issues in Resolution 26. They are (1) the objective of 50% of communes to meet standards for new rural communes by 2020 and (2) to 2020; an urgent task is to formulate the program for new rural area.

Besides, because there were different opinions among ministries and no precedence for such an integrative and diversified program, for the first time, the Central Party's Secretary Committee directly supervised the Pilot Program for 11 communes. The then standing chairman of the Committee is Mr. Truong Tan Sang, who later became the President of Vietnam. The pilot program (2009-2010) was expected to contribute experience to amending current related policies and mechanism before the Government can implement such as program nationwide.

The resolution 26 then became "the King's sword" for MARD to propose to the Government to set up a Directing Committing for the national target program for new rural area. As an expert from MARD who participated in the policy making process from the beginning recalled:

*"It should be noted that the then first Deputy Prime Minister Nguyen Sinh Hung supported the idea for new rural area. However, as he advised, the Government could not directly support the idea if other ministries (especially the MPI) did not. Thus not until the key idea was placed in the Party Resolution that the Government and other ministries have no reasons to argue against the idea for formulating and implementing the program. Then other ministries (including MPI) can only be allowed to comment for revising the Program."*

It should also be noted that in this period of time, in general, policies and programs were basically objectives by number. Thus key content in Resolution 26-NQ/TW on agriculture, farmers, and rural areas and the Program for new rural area itself later on are planned objectives by number (see Resolution 26-NQ/TW and Decision 800-QĐ/TTg to approve the Program for new rural area). Up to this time, however, the numbers about demand and resource supply for the Program have not been specified, nor are they attended.

## **Formulation of policy**

After the Resolution 26 in 2008, the Steering Committee and Formulation Committee for the Program were established. The-then Deputy Prime Minister Nguyen Sinh Hung was the head of the former committee. The latter (working) committee consists of experts from MARD. The formulation process for the Program on New Rural Areas can be divided into different steps:

- (1) Establishment of the Steering Committee which is headed by the-then the first Deputy Prime Minister Nguyen Sinh Hung;
- (2) Establishment of the Formulation Committee at the MARD to formulate general outline for the Program;
- (3) Consultation with related ministries on the general outline (in fact, step 2 and 3 have been implemented iteratively because the first drafts of the general outline were not supported by other ministries. The outline was approved after there was a direction from the Central Party's Secretary Committee with evidence from a pilot program of 11 communes lead by the Committee);
- (4) The Formulation Committee composed a detailed outline for the Program;
- (5) Consultation with other ministries for the detailed outline with the contents under their management authority;
- (6) Final proposal for the Program was composed to submit to the Government.

In fact, the formulation process for the Program took two years to complete, from 2008 to 2010. This is considered a challenging period for the following reasons:

- Firsts, it was then period when “potential” conflicts of interest and approaches to deal with different issues between parties as discussed above were “specified” in forms of documents and comments from different ministries. As many contents in the Program for new rural areas would inflict with different ministries, it is easy to understand that no ministries really wanted to support the Program. As a member in the Formulation committee recalled:

*“After the ideas for the Program were approved, the formulation process from 2008 to 2010 was very challenging. This is because no ones wanted to be limited by a new control [the programs are not controlled but implemented by different ministries].”*

- Second, the policy formulation in Vietnam is still in a “collective style”. In this sense, a policy or program would be led by an authority (as MARD for the Program of New Rural Areas). However, other related parties would comment on the formulation process and content. The problem is knowledge of different involved parties for this Program was not in common from the previous phase in the policy making process. Decision for this Program was *pushed directly by a higher-level authority* (the Central Party) rather than by a common understanding between parties. Such formulation process then would result in the Formulation Committee had to face with and deal directly with the conflicts of interest between parties that should not be in presence till this phase. As a matter of fact, in this formulation phase, parties only agreed with what contents that they think can be beneficial to them. In reverse, the involved parties voted down and commented such as: “this activity is similar to another program that is being implemented”. The formulation committee then would have to explain and defend for what activities they want to keep. It should be noted that the similarity is for sure because, as we discussed, there had been different programs by different ministries implemented on rural areas before the Program. On the other hand, the core idea and uniqueness of the Program (as MARD wanted) is the integration of controlling power and the orientation to base on root to develop and implement program activities. An expert in the Formulation Committee complained:

*“Our policy formulation process is in a collective style. That means one would develop while others would comment. If they think something is beneficial they would agree. Otherwise they vote down and said it’s a replication. We also had representative from Central Party in the formulation committee and they are more neutral. Thanks to their participation, other ministries have been more positive about the Program.”*

Besides, the formulation process for this Program as discussed above demonstrates some weaknesses compared to a standard formulation process. Several typical weaknesses can be discussed as below:

- As the ideas for this Program did not root from any official rigorous studies, numbers for available and needed resources in this Program were just made up without basing on any rigorous studies or evaluations. Not until June 2010 when there were some evidence from the pilot program led by the Central Party's Secretary Committee that such numbers can be guesstimated by basing totally on the pilot program result. It should be noted that, under a standard formulation process (under the Decision 135/2009/QĐ-TTg on November 4rd, 2009 by the Government), there must be reports on current available resources and evaluation on socioeconomic impacts. However, thanks to a mantra of "this is a totally new program" and it is needed to be implemented fast under the Resolution 26-NQ/TW, such requirements did not need to be fulfilled.

*"There are no base-line surveys, no cost-benefit evaluations, and no data on the status quo. The formulation committee mainly discussed the current policies and mechanisms rather than any particular information and data. Then we were allowed to postpone the socio-economic evaluation too. In fact, we were allowed to do that because we have the Resolution from the Central Party. Technically, then, we did not meet any standards for developing a policy. Without the Resolution by the Central Party Meeting 7<sup>th</sup>, the program must have been voted down from the beginning."*

*"In the beginning, there are no data to calculate the needed resource for a new rural commune. Then after the pilot program with 11 communes, our team used the average data, multiplying with 9000 communes for a general needed number of resources to submit to the National Assembly."*

*[A then staff in the Formulation Committee]*

In fact, the accurate number for needed financial resources for the area has not been adequately estimated till now. Leaders and managers at the central level now can only know that the program requires a lot of financial resources. In a recent interview (February 2015) with the Central Economic Committee, a leader in the committee acknowledged:

*“...the new rural program has come into a deeper level. Thus the needed resources are huge but our mobilization for the area has not met the needs, even with the central state budget. In fact, we tried to allocate VND 5,300 billion in 2014 from the state budget and the National Assembly decided to use the government bond package of VND 15,000 billion for the Program in the period from 2014 to 2016. However, the total needs for the area may require much more than that”.*

- In the formulation process, there were multiple workshops to get expert comments but all are said to just for the formality purpose. Such workshops are considered by the-then formulation committee members as “do as it requires” and in fact no comments “were used” or “right as we thought”. An expert in the-then formulation committee commented:

*“The process requires workshops to collect expert comments but all were implemented just for formality purpose. Experts participated just to compliment rather than to criticize. Everything was already in the formulator’s mind and there was very little participation from local governments or citizens”.*

- In this formulation process, basically it is limited in taking lessons from similar projects or programs domestically or internationally. The Program activities were based mostly on one or two local programs implemented in Vietnam such as the Program 135 for the poorest and mountainous communes (with lessons of indirect investment on infrastructure rather than direct supports for the poor households). Some numbers and criteria for this Program to defend with the National Assembly were actually estimated from results of the pilot program for 11 communes which was led by the Central Party’s Secretary Committee by June 2010. Thus numbers and criteria in the final proposal (which was then approved in the Decision 800–QĐ/TTg) were lacked a rigorous base. For example, the objective of 20% of communes to meet standards of new rural area to 2015 or 50% of communes to 2020 was based on no rigorous estimation. Similarly, the ratio for different financial sources for this Program was based on experience with previous programs that it should be 1:2:3:4 for different sources from citizen: enterprises: credit: state budget. An expert from MARD commented:



*“During the formulation process there should have been studies. However, most research institutes now are less developed and cannot catch with the reality. Their works are of low quality. Many research projects have been implemented just to making financial documents. Thus we only listened and took what comments that matched with what we thought”.*

Although one of the core ideas for this Program is basing on root’s demand, the formulation members were limited with people *“who were born, grown up, and work only in the Red river delta”*. As a result, many criteria and contents in the Program proposal were said to be suitable only for the Red river delta communes, and not yet for other areas in Vietnam. As a commune leader who implemented the New Rural program acknowledged:

*“There are no studies for the actual needs in our commune. At that time, the district level said that our commune was selected to implement the program. Thus we needed to make reports to the district level who then would combine all the reports to submit to the provincial level.”*

Despite all the weaknesses and challenges, the formulation process ended successfully in 2010 with the Decision 800-QĐ/TTg approved by the Prime Minister on June 4th, 2010. Different from many other programs, the formulation process for this Program was supported with some favorable conditions as below:

- Supports for the ideas of the Program from some leaders in the Government, the Central Party, and with the Resolution 26. In fact, the head of the Steering Committee is one of the-then Deputy Prime Ministers who was said to fully support the Program. Moreover, in the Formulation Committee, there is staff from the Central Party who issued the Resolution 26. Thus the formulation became a must despite all the difficulties. An expert in the Formulation Committee commented:

*“Without the Resolution of the 7<sup>th</sup> Central Party Meeting [Resolution 26 after the 7<sup>th</sup> Congress of Central Party], this Program would have been rejected right from the beginning”.*

- In this period of time, people in the Formulation Committee (who are also from MARD) participated and consulted with the Central Party's Secretary Committees for a pilot program of 11 communes. This was considered a determination of the party leaders and thus all ministries need to develop and expand the program. By the end of the pilot program, evaluation results were used as a base for calculating different numbers in the final proposal for the Program.
- Normally, in the policy making process, the Ministry of Justice would, on behalf of the Prime Minister, evaluate a policy draft to see any replications with previous policies/programs. However, "a good opportunity" for this Program was that the Prime Minister agreed to approve the Program draft under a special mechanism. Thus as we can see, there are no "/" for year of decision in Decision 800-QĐ/TTg approved by the Prime Minister on June 4th, 2010 as usual as in other decisions by the Government.
- Besides, in the formulation process, a draft would be commented from different ministries. To the very final step, however, the draft was just evaluated by two parties: the standing body (the Formulation Committee from MARD) and the Office of Government.

From the power perspective, this is a phase of actual transferring power. However, from the knowledge perspective, ones can see that there are basically no changes in knowledge of involved parties. Participating ministries (other than MARD) still believed that this Program is not necessary as there were already other programs of the same activities. The only change is a knowledge that "we need to participate" to ensure our benefits in the new Program. Thus each participating ministry proposed its own criteria and standards for the industry under its control. At the same time, as a standing body, MARD was willing to accept all proposals from other participating parties as long as "they did not affect the process and they all satisfied". As an expert in the Formulation Committee commented:

*"The formulation process took two year long, from 2008 to 2010. In 2010, the Government felt pressure to prepare for allocating resources for development under its usual five year economic plan 2011-2015. But till the very end, other ministries still objected to the program. Luckily with supports from the Resolution and the-then Deputy Prime Minister*

*Nguyen Sinh Hung as a head of an inter-ministry committee, the Program was approved by June 4th, 2010.”*

Moreover, weaknesses in a “collective-style” policy making process can be revealed in the content of the Program draft with “more than needed” standards and criteria. As an expert in the Formulation Committee from MARD commented:

*“Such collective-style policy making process can only result in excess rather than deficiency in content. This is because when they knew they could not reject they wanted to participate to have a share. Anyone then add their own standards. We did not want to dissatisfy anyone. So we add them all in.”*

Other weaknesses in the Program as discussed above have revealed themselves later on and been fixed gradually in the implementation process.

### **Implementation of policy**

The way that the Program for New Rural Areas was implemented is not much different as with other programs in Vietnam. After the approval of Decision 800 (on June 4th, 2010), the Program has been implemented nationwide. However, as the scope of the Program is very large, the needed financial resource is huge to cover around the nation, while the content of the Program was still not clear, training and knowledge-disseminating activities have been limited, mostly in the forms of directing documents from the central level to provincial level. In their turns, at the provincial level, basically all staff were emphasized that they need to implement the Program on time and successfully to meet the needed goals. As a result, normally at a province, the best capable communes, who could meet the standards soon, would be selected for implementing the program. District authorities would synthesize the list of the communes and submit it to the provincial authority. Staff for implementing the Program would be appointed at all levels from provincial to communal ones. The general perception toward the Program from staff at all levels then is similar to other programs: *this is a program by the state, financed by the state and thus needed to be implemented smoothly to get the state budget.* The initial approach in implementation by different provinces then was to select the most potential communes that can

soon meet the set criteria rather than fully basing on the actual needs of all communes. A commune leader where the program has been implemented shared a fact:

*“In fact, the communes selected in this district met many criteria already and would need to do something more to meet all the criteria. That’s why the district requires us to make reports to submit the list to the provincial level”.*

The state budget allocated to this big Program “turned out” to be never enough. In fact, the financing structure has been specified in the program proposal with state budget accounting for only a part of total investment (though a pretty big part of 40%). However, the total investment for each province is much higher than initial estimation. The reason probably is the initial estimation was based on a pilot program where only the most favorable communes were selected compared to less capable ones around the nation. As result, the state budget was not enough even for the part of 40% of total investment. An expert in the Steering Committee admitted:

*“First we planned for VND 175 billion for each commune. At the local level, however, they pictured a needed investment of VND 700 billion probably because they think they should get more state budget. Thus for the deficient estimate, we adjusted the program on this issue to confirm that state would finance 100% only for small works and partly for big construction.”*

Due to different subjective and objective reasons from the idea and formulation phases, there were multiple thorny problems in the implementation phase of the Program for New Rural Areas under the Decision 800.

- First, many activities in the Program to be implemented would be illegal. For example, under the regulations on investment, all products and services provided need to come with legal financial invoices. However, in reality, there were even no enterprises in some communes to provide such documents. Similarly, it is required in the investment regulations under the then Bidding Law that open bid be carried out for works of total investment more than a certain level (for example more than million VND 500). However, in many communes, there are even not enough

organizations to participate the bids. Besides, the Program allowed for giving works directly to community or individual workers. However, such content goes against the current laws on auction. A staff in the Steering Committee recalled:

*“At that time any works required legal financial invoices. However, in a commune at Dien Bien province, for example, there were no enterprises to get the invoices.”*

*“When we proposed a mechanism that works should be allowed to give directly to individual workers and communities there’s a problem. They said that it would trespass the current bidding law<sup>3</sup>”.*

- Second, under the current financial regulations, fees for management, monitoring and supervising works under the program are small (less than 1% of total investment).

With such small fees, usually it is barely enough for provincial staff to do the monitoring and supervision. Then, deficient monitoring at all levels resulted in many problems in implementation at different provinces. A staff in the new rural provincial committee said that:

*“We almost have no money for monitoring. Thus we have had to use our working fees for these activities. Without the activities, there should have been more problems in implementing the program.”*

- Third, the dependence on state budget is different among provinces. Some big provinces can be more independent as they have larger sources of local revenues. On the other hand, the regulations on investment are fixed for all provinces. Thus as the state budget was not enough, some more dependent provinces could not mobilize enough resources. Implementation process then has been very slow in such provinces.

An expert in the Steering Committee concluded:

*“There are many provinces that are heavily dependent on central state budget and then very inactive. Some provinces built roads not as long and good as one commune in another province”.*

- Fourth, standards and criteria for new rural areas were applied for all the provinces nationwide. In the meantime, provinces and local places are different in terms of topographic, population density, commuting and transportation needs, culture activity

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<sup>3</sup> In fact, basing on the experience with the Program for New Rural Areas, MARD then proposed to amend the Bidding Law. Under the Bidding Law 2013, Clause 27 is the regulation to provide mechanism for directly giving works to communities and other local worker groups.

demand, and so on. Thus fixed criteria for all provinces in the beginning of the implementation process resulted in problems and discrepancies in many provinces which in turn even stopped the implementation there. For example, related to transportation issues, an expert in the Steering Committee recalled:

*“Some activities under the Program could not be implemented for two years. For any criterion, usually there were two opposing comments so that we did not know what to do. For example, related to transportation issues, areas in Red River delta with the needs for high load of good transportation require a road of 3.5-4 meters wide. In Bac Kan province [a mountainous area] the road should not be that wide. They argued that it costs VND 15 billion for 10 kilometers road of 2.5 meters wide but just for three households. No ones should invest the road like this. Then we don’t know how to solve the discrepancies”.*

There are different subjective and objective reasons for the above problems in program implementation. From the perspective of policy making process, the problems may have been rooted from the following issues:

- First, time and resources reserved for the formulation phase are limited. While time for the formulation process was 2 years, the actual time was shorter because there was discordance between participating ministries. Toward the end of the phase, pressure to finalize the Program proposal from the Government and from the-then socio economy situation in agriculture and rural area were very heavy. In the meantime, resources reserved for planning in terms of finance, expertise, and organizing manners were also limited. Such limitation resulted in inappropriate formulated activities in terms of both total investment and regulation suitability. Examples for such inappropriateness have been discussed above.
- Second, right from the beginning, formulation process did not base on rigorous studies and on actual needs. As a result, numbers and criteria in the Programs were based on personal experience and for “trial and error” approach. For example, adding the total needed investment for each communes results in a number that is much larger than state budget capability. Moreover, the criteria set in the Program were formulated top-down basing on Central Party’s Resolution and equal allocation to different provinces rather

than on the actual needs, resource utilization capabilities, current situation, and other resources (including human and natural resources).

- Third, in essence, rural development is a multi-disciplinary and multi-dimensional issue that should be locally specific. However, the policy formulation and proposing process were implemented under the approach of top-down and dependence on subjective thinking of some formulation staff. Moreover, the formulation staff only had limited experience in working with the Red River delta. As a result, the criteria and standards set out in the Program were not appropriate, for example, for the mountainous areas or Cuu Long river delta. Almost all the standards were related to the problem and one typical example is the width of commuting roads as we discussed above. Definitely, as one can imagine, the delta areas where are more populous and with larger commuting needs would require a different width of road compared to a mountainous one where population is scattering.

In fact, the Program implementation from 2010 then has become a process of “trial and error”, learning for participating parties, and luckily with positive changes over time.

- First, the Decision 695/QĐ-TTg signed on June 8<sup>th</sup>, 2012 adjusted investment mechanism toward giving more power to local level (Province) to be active in implementing the Program. The Decision stated that central budget would only be provided for small works with 100% of investment for what they cannot utilize social sources (for example, communal head office building). Other construction works would be financed partially by the central budget (for example, roads, and so on). Provincial authority would have to find ways to invest the balance from social sources including the provincial, district, communal, and citizen’s ones.
- Second, Decision 342/QĐ-TTg signed on February 20<sup>th</sup>, 2013 amended some standards for new rural areas toward providing more flexibility. Basically, big standards were turned into smaller ones (which are appropriate for small investment) and “fixed” standards (with fix numbers) into “soft” ones (just to be evaluated as meeting standards).
- Next, Decision 498/QĐ-TTg signed on March 21<sup>st</sup>, 2013 allowed for carrying out small works with basic technique under special investment mechanism rather than the normal complicated ones.

- Over the implementation course to now, typical cases of success in mobilizing resources and implementation could be found in different provinces. These cases can help provide lessons to other provinces later on. At the same time, the successful cases help confirm the righteousness of the Program ideas.

Two main reasons must be referred to for the above positive changes. First, it is the Resolution 26-NQ/TU from the Central Party's Standing Committee and the support from the key Party leaders. The Resolution brought about the requirement to have the Program while the mantra of "new policies needs new mechanism" of the-then standing head of the Secretary Committee facilitates the positive changes in the implementation phase. Second, ability and ethical standards of implementing individuals for the Program also impacted the implementation process. In fact, the positive changes meant the reduction of benefits from the so-called "beg-and-give" mechanism in other programs in Vietnam. However, the individuals were willing to renounce such benefits to facilitate the Program implementation. Comments from different staff in the Steering Committee demonstrated those points:

*"That time Uncle Tu Sang [now the President Truong Tan Sang] said new policies requires new mechanism. This mantra then became a lucky incantation to overcome different hurdles".*

*"With direction from the Secretary Committee, the implementation has been carried out successfully. Over the past four years of implementation, no other programs have more changes like this one."*

*"Investment works resulted in different problems in invoices and payment. The treasury office paid very slowly. The Central Steering Committee then had to call different meeting to decide that all the investments should be legalized or many local officials would be in deep troubles. Then the special mechanism was set out for this Program."*

It should be noted that, however, in the implementation phase, while the power has been transferred, knowledge about the Program of the leading ministry (MARD) has changed significantly which can be specified as below:



- First, root-base demand as the core of the Program has been confirmed by the leading ministry as the legitimate direction. In fact, individuals from the ministry may have known such an idea in previous programs in Vietnam and in the world. However, probably after the actual implementation of the Program that evidence and real problems helped reconfirm the idea.
- Second, the implementation process requires maximum decentralization (at least to the communal level). Without such decentralization, investment authorities would not understand the real local needs. Decentralization then became a must although it also means more reduction of power and individual interests for central and upper level authorities (provincial and district).
- Third, the standing ministry has better recognized the importance of rigorous studies right from the beginning. Unnecessary wastes and losses over the implementation process due to lack of rigorous studies have been pointed out by the standing ministry. However, it should be noted that, the implementation authority (and other policy making organizations) lacks its trust on the quality of studies run by different institutes and centers for studying and consulting policies. The trust perception is a problem that may be difficult to be solved in the short run as there is “a disconnection” in the policy process between the control authority (policy making ones) and the consulting organization (consulting and recommending policies). As a staff in the Program commented:

*“In fact, after 3-4 years of Program implementation, when we held conferences to receive comments from different experts to revise mechanisms and policies, many key leaders and leading experts in different research institutes inside and outside MART had very limited knowledge about the Program”.*

In reverse, knowledge from other related ministries seem need more time to change<sup>4</sup>. Probably, such changes would depend on the issue of what benefits would be for the ones who formulate and implement the Program.

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<sup>4</sup> During our field work, we found limited participation from departments (other than the department of agriculture and rural development), especially the one of planning and investment. However, due to the limitation of field work location, we cannot be very affirmative on this issue.

## **Analysis of policy process**

Thus the Program for New Rural Areas has been approved and implemented since 2010. Until the beginning of 2015, however, there are no official and rigorous evaluations on the Program (the end of 2015 would be the deadline for phase I of the Program). The formulation and implementation of the Programs brought about some notable issues:

First, in general, the standard policy making process has been tried to follow. However, as discussed in the previous sections, many steps and activities during the process were just for the formality purpose. In reality, if all the steps were followed rigorously, the Program may not be approved yet. Thus the establishment of the Program seemed to depend on two key factors: needs from the urgent economic situation and “wise leadership” of leaders of MARD, who supervises the Program. On the one hand, the down turn in economy at that time became an important “lever” for change in management knowledge as they could not continue the traditional approach. On the other hand, “wise leadership” facilitated the formulation and implementation processes to overcome traditional hurdles of the “collective style” mechanism.

Second, content of the Program has been changed continuously to adapt to reality for success. With this Program, thanks to “wise leadership”, content and activities in the Program has been adjusted, pretty fast, over the implementation course. The core idea of basing on root’s demand has been recognized more and more clearly though it has not been fully incorporated in the Program. It seems to be the policy making process has been going on a spiral trajectory to come back to the starting point but at a higher level (i.e. basing on root’s demand). The spiral course, however, may be necessary even costly because only real evidence may help change “deeply imprinted” knowledge of other related ministries.

Third, resolving “conflict of interest” (horizontally among ministries and vertically among different government levels) is always a difficult question in any policy making process. In many cases (as with this Program) interests and benefits may influence knowledge, resulting in knowledge discordance which cannot be resolved by discussion and persuasion. As a result, without “wise leadership” and a bit of luck in time, many policies may not be built and approved.

With this Program for New Rural Areas, there are still many problems in the next round of policy making process. Some of them should be noted as below:

First, in the new round, the clash between local specificity in rural development and formulation process should be resolved. Apparently, policies for rural development should cover local specific characteristics while the current policy making is still mostly under top-down approach. How to change to resolve such clash is still a big question.

Second and similarly, local specificity also means the specificity in investment and finance mechanism. Evidence from the implementation course seemed to show that the decentralization to the root level is the most efficient and effective approach. However, this also means a significant change in the current regulations investment including law on state budget and other related regulations. However, the recent amendments on the budget law do not seem to resolve this issue. For example, under the newly revised Budget Law, state budget can only be allocated to the official administration authorities, not to the village level. Thus commune authorities have to sign contract with villages for works.

Third, with a program with strong decentralization orientation like the Program for New Rural Areas, there would be conflicts of interest between formulator and implementer (all levels from commune to central authorities) and the beneficiary (the citizen). If benefits for the formulators and implementers cannot be institutionalized, the implementation would be difficult under the full decentralization approach. In fact, some provinces were flexible in this area by setting up an appropriate financial benefit structure for the implementing bodies and thus effectively facilitated the implementation of the Program. The issue, however, has not been solved at the central level even though it is well recognized. As a staff in the Steering Committee commented:

*“Staff in many provinces said that they carried out the Program just because they are enthusiastic enough. They did not have any specific benefits. That may be the reason why some provinces are still lagged behind... They said the Program for New Rural Areas decentralized all to the citizens then we have nothing to get”.*

Fourth, the question about an independent organization to provide research services of high quality has not been answered adequately. Evidence from the Program seems to show that such organizations are needed to save resources and avoid wastes and losses in implementation course, especially in the initial stage of Program when they had to be “walking and finding the right way”. However, the answers may also lie in the current bureaucracy for this research activity. A staff in the Steering Committee argued:

*“I think if we can spend VND 10 billion for research from the beginning, it can help save VND 1,000 billion waste later on. Now we can only spend VND 500 million for a research. No ones can do a research of high quality with that. It is even worse and more wastes. For example, in the case of Quang Ninh province, it was lucky that they changed their approach on time or I cannot imagine the wastes if they had implemented under the first approach. In 2011, Quang Ninh had a lot of money in hand and was willing to invest VND 1,700 billion for infrastructure including markets and communal cultural houses. In fact, no citizens used any works where they invested because they don’t have demand for these works. Moreover, the built roads were for the citizens and when they ruined the local government called for money from the citizens to fix these. But the citizens said: it’s your damn money so you fix it. Why we have to pay.”*

Fifth, programs and policies should not be designed to heavily depend on state budget but to find ways to utilize other resources. Evidence from the New Rural Program demonstrated that full dependence on the state budget would result in local passiveness in terms of both time and mechanism. In the meantime, for the programs which are root-based, utilizing and encouraging sources from the society is not a formidable job. Initial evidence from the Program implementation seems to prove this argument.

Sixth, though there are not any full evaluations yet, factors to success of a program, especially for the nationwide ones, should include the creativity in local implementation but focused leadership from the central authority. In another word, the key role for central authorities is leadership rather than implementation. Certainly, appropriate and effective leadership depends on the information and monitoring systems, a matter that we already mentioned above.

Seventh, ones should take into account the conflicting problem of the demand for specializing management area to be effective and the ability to coordinate among ministries and industries. For many programs and policies, the management system now in Vietnam is already divided among areas. Thus for the New Rural Program, MARD is the appropriate authority to lead as it specializes in agriculture. Other areas related to rural development would be managed by other ministries. The problem here is how to coordinate among the ministry that was not taken into account right from the beginning. As a result, there have been different coordinating problems along the processes from formulation to implementation.

In summary, there is some initial evidence of success for the Program for New Rural Areas. There are still problems for the next round of policy making process to be solved to ensure the effectiveness and efficiency of the Program. The question then is if it is time for policy makers in Vietnam to avoid the approach of “trial and error” so that a Program or policy success is not dependent heavily on smart leadership of some individuals or on the luck of time. Such an approach may be necessary for some starting programs when evidence is not available or not convincing enough. Up to now, there have been quite a few programs under this approach./.

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**Asia Pacific Institute of Management**

**National Economics University**

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## **Research on the Status of Policy Process in Vietnam**

Case

# **THE MASTER PLAN ON TOURISM DEVELOPMENT IN THE NORTHERN MIDLANDS AND MOUNTAINOUS AREAS IN 2008**

This case study was conducted by researchers from Asia Pacific Institute of Management. Dr. Pham Truong Hoang was the lead author of this case study.



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## Abbreviation

GDP	Gross Domestic Product
NGOs	Non-government organizations
NMM	Northern midlands and mountainous areas

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## Summary of the policy

<b>Content</b>	<b>The process of development and implementation of the policy</b>
<b>a. The issue</b>	The master plan for tourism development in the Northern midlands and mountainous areas toward 2020 was developed on the basis of Decision 79/2005 / QD-TTg dated 15/04/2005 to issue the Action Programme of the Government on the resolution 37-NQ /TW dated 01/07/2004 by the Politburo congress IX “orientation and tasks on the socio-economic development and national security for the Northern mountainous region toward 2010”
<b>b. Objectives</b>	Building the orientation of regional tourism development, setting as a basis for managing investment activities in tourism sector as an important sector, contributing to socio - economic development in areas. The master plan is an institutional document to set the guideline for investment and tourism development locally.
<b>c. Contents</b>	<p>Contents of the masterplan are in line with the provisions of Decree 92/2006/ ND-CP dated 7/9/2006 issued by the Government on Developing, approving, and managing master plans for socio-economic development and Decree 92/2007 dated 1/6/2007 issued by the government detailed guidance on implementing the Tourism Law.</p> <p>The contents include assessing the current state and potentials of tourism, defining the goals and direction of tourism, determining the basic resources to develop tourism and offering solutions for development in the period 2008-2015. Within the scope of planning, the action plans are not specifically - designed. Resources to implement the plan are also not well - defined</p>
<b>d. Proposers</b>	<p>The Institute for Tourism Development is assigned by Vietnam National Administration of Tourism (ministerial agency at that time and then become a part of the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism) to design the plan. A team of experienced experts in the Institute was formed to research and conduct the planning.</p> <p>Due to the limited resources in the organization of research and planning, research activities are mainly internal group discussions, processing secondary data and internal information sources from the team. The review process is conducted in the managing agencies internally with the expert assessment method.</p>

<p><b>e. the involved parties</b></p>	<p>Planning was drafted primarily from the research activities, internal assessment by the proposers. There is little involvement of external stakeholders.</p> <p>The master plan works as the guideline for the government management units rather than a specific tool to implement and affect other stakeholders in the tourism sector. It is used as a basis to develop the tourism master plan in some localities. The scope of the plan is large, covers many provinces. Thus, the implementation of the plan is not the the responsibility of any particular province.</p>
<p><b>f. Issues on institutional implementation</b></p>	<p>Socio-economic planning in general and economic sectors planning in particular is a legal tool to guide the development. The specific provisions on planning was enacted since 2006 (Decree 92/2006). However, the process of building and implementing of master plans is still "learning process" for both policy makers and policy excuters to refine the method, planning content, approval process and implementation. In 2006-2008, guidelines and requirements for building master plans were not specifically defined. There was certain limitation of experience of the master plan building and approving agencies. Moreover, due to the shortage of time and budget the planning has limited efficiency.</p>
<p><b>g. Outcomes</b></p>	<p>The master plan for tourism development in the Northern midlands and mountainous areas toward 2020 approved by the Minister of Culture - Sports and Tourism in 2008 to realize the tasks of the Prime Minister in the comprehensive socio - economic development planning for the Northern midlands and mountainous areas. Despite the insurance of the documents, the feasibility is not highly effective, working mainly as the guidelines for planning the tourism development and managing tourism resouces in some localities.</p> <p>The primary cause is the roles of the policy requirer (Prime Minister), the conductor and planner of the policy (Ministry of Culture - Sports and Tourism), the implementator and monitor the planning (Northwest Region Steering Committee as an agency of Central Party with the participation of the government and the ministries, departments, provinces and the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, the northwestern provinces) have not been clearly defined. The limited participation of stakeholders in the planning process, the restrictions on processes, methods, experience and especially the</p>

	implementation resources has affected the feasibility of the plan.
<b>h. Planning impacts</b>	The feasibility of the master plan is not high. The plan mainly works as basis for some localities to set up their tourism development strategies and the reference for technical agencies. In some localities (provinces), this plan was even nearly unknown. Several reasons explaining for the limited impacts of this planning are: (1) The task assigner (Prime Minister) is not the approver and the implementor, (2) the limitations in the participation of stakeholders, (3) the limited resources in the compilation process, (4) the limitations in the processes, methods and planning procedures, (5) lack of implementation monitoring agency.

## 1 Planning context

The origin of the Master plan for tourism development planning in the Northern Midlands and mountainous areas (hereinafter referred to as the Plan) is orientation of the Central Communist Party of Vietnam in the Resolution 37-NQ / TW dated 01/7 / 2004 by the Politburo on the direction of socio - economic development and ensuring national defense and security for the Northern Midlands and mountainous areas (NMM) towards 2010. The resolution brought forwards the objectives of promoting socio - economic development and assigned the Party and government agencies to develop and implement the solutions.

On this basis, the Decision 79/2005/QD-TTg dated 04/15/2005 by the prime minister issued the action program of the government to implement the resolution 37-NQ / TW of the Politburo. The purpose of this Decision is to direct and manage the management and investment operations, serving as a basis for all levels and departments, enterprises, economic sectors to orient their activities, targeting the social-economic development, national security goals of the NMM areas. Tasks of the Vietnam General Department of Tourism is "to plan the comprehensive tourism development in the NMM to 2020, proposing for the government approval by the second quarter of 2005". This is 1 of 23 tasks related to the review, adjustment and supplement the comprehensive planning of social-economic development, planning and development, in accordance with the planning in 2005-2010.

In 2007, the General Department of Tourism was merged with the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, so the task was assigned to the Ministry of Culture - Sports and Tourism. Minister of Culture, Sports and Tourism had appointed the Institute of Research and Tourism Department to be continue, in which the Planning department was in charge to implement the task.

By the end of 2008, in Decision No. 91/2008 / QD-BVHTTDL 31/12/2008 The Minister of Culture, Sports and Tourism , the "Master plan for tourism development in the Northern Midlands and mountainous areas areas to 2020 " was approved.

### 1.1 Socio – economic context

The NMM area is one of the most difficult areas of the country. At the time of implementation of Resolution 37/2004 / NQ-TW, Decision 79/2005 / QD-TTg, socio-economic conditions of the region was in its trough. The per capita income of this region in 2004 and 2006, was the lowest, at just 327,000 and 442,000d / 1 month

(Table 1). Until 2010, this fact has not improved much. This region remains the poorest area with the widening income gap with other provinces.

**Table 1: Actual average income per capita**

*Unit: thousand dong*

	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010
<b>The whole country</b>	356.1	484.4	636.5	995.2	1387,2
<b>Red river Delta</b>	358.0	498.0	666.0	1064.8	1580.8
<b>Northern Midlands and mountainous areas</b>	237.0	327.0	442.0	656.7	904.7
<b>Nothern Central and the central coastal areas</b>	268.0	361.0	476.0	728.2	1018.1
<b>Central Highland</b>	244.0	390.0	522.0	794.6	1088.1
<b>Southeast areas</b>	667.0	893.0	1146.0	1773.2	2304.3
<b>Mekong river delta</b>	371.0	471.0	628.0	939.9	1247.2

Source: The general statistics 2011

NMM region also has the highest poverty rate in the country in 2002 and 2008, even until the present time. The poverty rate in 2002 even reached 50%. This proportion decreased afterwards but still above 30% in 2008 and was the highest rate in the country (Table 2)

**Table 2: The porverty rate by region (\*)**

*Unit: %*

	2002	2004	2006	2008
<b>The whole country</b>	28,9	19,5	16,0	14,5
<b>By region</b>				
<b>Red river Delta</b>	21,5	11,8	8,9	8,0
<b>Northern Midlands and mountainous areas</b>	47,9	38,3	32,3	31,6
<b>Nothern Central and the central coastal areas</b>	35,7	25,9	22,3	18,4
<b>Central Highland</b>	51,8	33,1	28,6	24,1
<b>Southeast areas</b>	8,2	3,6	3,8	2,3

<b>Mekong river delta</b>	23,4	15,9	10,3	12,3
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(\*) the poverty rate is estimated by the average expenditure per capita in one month, comparing with the poverty standard line defined by the GSO and the WB as follows:

- 2002: 160 thousand dong - 2004: 173 thousand dong
- 2006: 213 thousand dong - 2008: 280 thousand dong

Source: The general statistics 2011

One remarkable data is the economic transition rate of the region. The data on the labor restructure rate of 3 occupations (agriculture, forestry and fisheries, industry and construction, services) also shows that until 2011, the percentage of employees working in the field of agriculture, forestry and fisheries in the NMM region was still nearly 80%. This rate was above 85% in 2006 and even 90% in 2001 (Table 3). Labor structure reveals that the low level of economic development of the region, especially the service sector, accounting for only a small proportion of labour (above 11%).

**Table 3: Labour transition in 3 sectors by socio – economic region in 2001, 2006 và 2010.**

Unit: %	agriculture, forestry and fisheries			industry and construction			Services		
	2001	2006	2011	2001	2006	2011	2001	2006	2011
<b>The whole country</b>	79,61	70,41	59,59	7,36	12,46	18,40	11,51	15,95	20,52
<b>Red river Delta</b>	77,26	60,48	42,63	10,50	20,36	31,26	11,67	18,31	25,18
<b>NMM</b>	91,15	86,50	79,74	2,27	4,33	8,48	6,33	8,81	11,47
<b>North Central and the central coastal areas</b>	80,28	71,95	62,64	6,93	11,16	15,52	11,36	15,73	20,47
<b>Central Highland</b>	91,94	88,38	85,28	1,55	2,52	3,04	6,22	8,84	11,42
<b>Southeast areas</b>	58,46	49,06	36,07	16,06	23,37	31,45	20,02	24,43	28,5
<b>Mekong river Delta</b>	79,23	71,81	62,17	7,83	9,74	14,33	12,64	16,89	21,33

Source: The general statistics 2012

With the difficult socio-economic conditions of the region, the introduction of the government policies to promote the socio - economic development, national security and defense is considered as necessary and timely (Conclusion of 26/2012 / TW-KL).



## **1.2 The context of tourism development in the NMM area**

Vietnam tourism industry has a long history but really has made rapid development to become an important economic sector since the 1990s. Until the late 2000s, tourism accounted for over 5% of GDP, along with the widespread impacts in addressing employment, regional development and poverty reduction.

NMM region is the area with tourism potentials to attract international and domestic tourists. As assessed by Vietnamese tourism management agencies, the region has the potentials to develop 12 out of 46 national destinations. However, to turn the potential resources into products and develop tourism industry, there are many different elements, ranging from the conditions of infrastructure (roads, utilities, communications ...) to conditions for tourism development (hotels, restaurants, business development. In the difficult socio-economic conditions, tourism in the area was only at low level in the period 2001-2005 (see annex 1 of the indicators of tourism development of Vietnam and the NMM in 2001-2010).

The impacts of tourism to the socio-economic development have two sides. Given good orientation and management, tourism not only brings tremendous economic efficiency but also have much impact on the alleviation of poverty, culture promotion and contributions in environmental protection and sustainable development. Conversely, tourism also contains many hidden risks for sustainable development, environmental destruction, cultural degradation if it not well - managed. Tourism planning is an important tool of the State agencies to promote tourism activities as well as performing the management of tourism development in an effective way.

## **1.3 The parties involved in the tourism development and planning**

Tourism is considered as an integrated economic sector, involving various industries, domains, inter-regional nature and involving business largely. Tourism development links to many sectors, branches and sectors, localities, organizations and businesses.

The stakeholders in tourism development include:

1. The tourism businesses (hotel, transportation, catering and other tourist services);
2. Investors ( interested in tourism investment);
3. Professional associations (in the field of tourism);
4. The administrative bodies (on all levels from international organizations to district and commune levels)

5. The management body of tourism professionals (according to the administrative levels)
6. Professional agency on tourism
7. Locals
8. The management agencies, specializing in tourism such as (culture, natural resources, urban, environmental ...)
9. Other parties (such as international organizations, NGOs ...)

The diversity of stakeholders in tourism development creates difficulties in engaging stakeholders in the planning process. Contextual factors, especially the capacity and organization of the parties are also a determination of the ability to engage in the process of developing the plan.

## 2 Identification of the policy issues

To reach the goal of "Directing and managing operations and investment activities; to set a basis for all levels of industries, businesses and economic sectors in order to orient their activities... accelerating the economic development, ensuring national defense and security by exploiting the region, preserving and promoting the cultural identity ... firmly defending national sovereignty "(Decision 79/2005 / QD-TTg), the Government has assigned the Vietnam General Department of Tourism to set the master plan for tourism development in the NMM region. After the merger between the General Department of Tourism and the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, the task was assigned for the Tourism Development Institute to build the plan.

The plans, including tourism plans are important tools to determine the direction, goals, tasks and the overall solutions for the development of the sectors. The Tourism Act 2005 also identified the need of setting tourism development master plan "in scale of the whole country, tourist areas, key sightseeings, key provinces and cities under the Central».

However, the determination of the master plan for tourism development policy in NMM is not involved in the travel planning requirements from national, regional, provincial city as stated in the Tourism Act 2005. The purpose is to implement Decision 79/2005 / QD-TTg with the guidelines of Resolution 37/2004 / NQ-TW. Decision 79/2005 of the Prime Minister in which assigned General Department of Tourism to draft the plan issued in 4/2005 while Tourism Act was passed by the Resolution of the National Assembly in 5/2005.

*«In 2006, Vietnam National Administration of Tourism assigned to the Institute to be in charge of planning. This was a quite hush assignment. There was not budget for the planning at that moment»*

[Interview with a member of the plan's drafting team]

It is possible to say that the Plan is built in a task given by the superior agency to solve a social-economic development problem; and serves as a tool to execute a specific task. The identification of policy needs done the way from top to bottom (top-down) rather than derived from practical needs (bottom-up). Yet to a certain extent, the policy needs of the superior management agencies also derived from experience gained from practical management with tourism is one of the important contents to be quickly developed.

### 3 Formulation process

#### 3.1 Plan formulation process

The plan formulation process is divided into three phases including content development, plan assessment and plan approval.

##### *a. Contents development.*

The basic contents of tourism planning are defined in the Tourism Act 2005. Seven sections can be summarized into three sections include: analyzing and assessing the current situation and potentials; developing orientations, strategies and objectives; and designing implementation activities. The process of developing the master plan on tourism development in NMM area is:

- Analyzing and assessing the current situation and potential. This is the process of gathering information and research organization evaluation. To accomplish this, the team used secondary information. In 2000-2001 period, the Institute of Tourism Research and Development (under Vietnam General Department of Tourism) developed the strategy and the overall planning of tourism development Vietnam during 2001-2010. During the compilation, many research activities and field trips were carried out in local area. The process also gathered many leading experts in tourism and related fields. This is a relatively rich source of data that can be exploited for the composition of the master plan for tourism development in NMM area. Moreover, this is also a secondary data source that mainly used.

However, until 2007 – the beginning of the implementation of master plans for tourism development in NMM area, the data collected in 2000-2001 were outdated, especially those related to assess the current status. Meanwhile, the research activities,

the survey or the evaluation of stakeholders had not been done except for some thematic content assigned to a team of other experts to perform.

*"Now [in 2014], the first task of master plans complying teams is field trip and collect survey data in local areas, listen to recommendations from the contemporary local authorities and adjust ... which is different from the past (at the planning of 2008) we could not do it ... The data is stored. We use previously available data and reports of provinces instead of field survey to localities due to the limitation of budget and time".*

[Interview with a member of the plan's drafting team].

*«The statistic data were outdated. Sstatistical methodology was inconsistency between agancies. But that was the only basis for the drafting team »*

[Interview with a member of the plan's drafting team]

Lack of research, study, survey and data collection activities is a limitation in the compilation of planning 2008.

- Developing strategic directions, objectives and implementation solutions is primarily based on the experience of the compliers. Although the complying team is experienced experts in planning tourism development, the lack of organizational surveys, consultation of stakeholders had limited the pioneering and practical contents in planning.

#### b. Plan assessment

After compilation, complying team had submitted to management agencies - the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism for their assesments. Some tourism experts were assigned to study and comment on the draft. The comment and adjustment were done several times before the approval.

"I remember once the complying team leader went to a business trip in other provinces, when he just arrived, he had to return to Hanoi immediately to explain the contents of the manuscript" ... "the comments, editing took long time as well

[Interview with a member of the plan's drafting team]

Besides the opinions of the experts of the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, the master plan on tourism development did not involve the participation of the local parties.

"Nowaday [2014] ... after having a draft of master plans, it is necessary to sent them (the local) for commenting,...but at that time (when building the master plan for

tourism development in highland and mountainous areas) we could not follow this comprehensive process "

[Interview with a member of the plan's drafting team]

### c. Plan Approval

The approval process was carried out within the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism. The complying team reported that "there was no appraisal and approval board" until 2008. This research was the task of the functional units in the Ministry. After receiving feedbacks, the compiling team finished the contents and reported to their head, the Minister of Culture, Sports and Tourism for approval. Decision No 91/2008 / QD-BVHTTDL 31/12/2008 of the Minister of Culture, Sports and Tourism passed "The master plan for tourism development of NMM to 2020",

«Unfortunately, this plan was not signed by the Prime Minister or the Deputy Prime Minister but the Minister only. When the Minister sign, there was little effect on other agencies to implement the master plan»

[Interview with a member of the plan's drafting team]

## **3.2 Participiation of related parties in the process of composing policies**

The Master plan of tourism development in NMM in 2008 is assigned to a team of composers of the Institute of Tourism Research and Development, which is responsible for building plans on tourism development of the whole country. Besides this team of composers, some other specialists in tourism of the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism are consulted. They did not consult related participants. The context of these policies as well as limited resources for the composition of these policies are reasons for these shortcomings.

“In 2006, the composition of the Plan was quite urgent in response to the demand of the Office of the Government. This was a “political task” without drafting budget at begining. Long after that, some fundings were added.” ...“We just consulted some specialists and asked for help in some topics”

[Interview with a member of the plan's drafting team]

Master plans on tourism development in general and plans on tourism development in NMM in particular are related to many participants, including local authorities, tourism management authorities of provinces, enterprises and local people. However, the process of making the 2008 Plan did not involve these participants. Here below are some reasons for this:

- Limited resources: there was no funding for organizing surveys, conferences, evaluation, analysis or fundings were allocated too late.... Instructions about expenditures on organizing these activities are issued in the Decision No. 281/2007/QĐ-BKH on 26/3/2007 and Circular No. 03/2008/TT-BKH on 1/7/2008 of the Ministry of Planning and Investment while the Plan was assigned in 2006.
- The time for building the master plan is urgent: from the master plan drafting assignment to submission the draft was only 6 month.
- Instructions and legal requirements are not complete: when the plan was composed, instructive documents of government authorities about composing new plans were being completed. Decree No. 92/2006/NĐ-CP on 7/9/2006 of the Government replaced the Circular No. 05/2003/TT-BKH on 22/7/2003 of the Ministry of Planning and Investment regarding planning activities. However, only after the issuance of Decree No. 04/2008/NĐ-CP on 11/1/2008 of the Government, and especially the issuance of Circular No. 03/2013/TT-BKHĐT on 31/10/2013 of the Ministry of Planning and Investment (instructions regarding composing, verifying, approving, amending and publishing the master plan on socio-economic development; plans of the development of major industries and products) were procedures and requirements of building new plans clearly instructed<sup>1</sup>. The roles of related parties in the process of composing, verifying and approving are only discussed in later documents.
- At that time, plans were considered to be technical rather than social issues. In other words, specialists' knowledge and judgements are fundamental while less attention was paid to opinions of related parties

### **3.3 Learning in the process of plan formulation**

While in policy making the process of developing contents, learning and perfecting is rather crucial, this process is not clearly reflected in the development of the Master plan of tourism development in NMM in 2008. Data for the research and the composition of the plan were existing ones and were reused. 1-2 specialists in some related aspects (such as geography and culture) are asked to join the team in a limited level (consulting ideas and writing 1 or 2 reports). Ideas for the plans were mainly based on experiences of the team of 3 planners.

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<sup>1</sup> The decree define clearly contents and procedure for developing master plans including: (1) Organizing the process for developing master plans (developing outline, planning task and budgeting), (2) Drafting master plans (including complying and consulting stakeholders), (3) Commenting and approving master plans, (4) Reviewing master plans, (5) Announcing master plans.

In the process of assessment, some specialists (officers) of the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism made some certain contribution to the contents besides the team of composers. Although these contributions are considered to “*have positive impacts on the research*” (interview with the composers), these impacts are mostly professional instead of practical. For plans on industry development, especially tourism, a multi-disciplinary industry, the participation and ideas of many different parties in the society are essential. However, the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism was the only participant, composer and issuers of the 2008 Plan.

*“At that time, there was no clear regulation about consulting other ministries, agencies ... In case of disputes, only suggestions were made within the plan. There was no communication with other groups. Nowadays, in order to report to the General Department, we have to consult ministries twice, foreign specialists once and organize a conference with industries and local authorities. Only after that is the plan reviewed and verified.”<sup>2</sup>*

[Interview with a member of the plan’s drafting team]

Limited participation of related parties also led to limitations in developing new ideas, learning, and completing ideas of the team of composers.

“I think the quality of the Plan was not as good as now, from organizing ideas to wording ... Nowadays, there are clear procedures from the most basic research steps.”

[Interview with a member of the plan’s drafting team]

### **3.4 Benefits and relationships of stakeholders**

One common problem in the process of making policies, including plans on industry development, is the dispute in benefits and concerns of each party, resulting in discussions and compromises of related parties. However, in composing the Master plan on tourism development in NMM, the limited participation of related parties resulted in the fact that there were no disputes in benefits because they were not aware of information.

## **4. Implementing policies**

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<sup>2</sup> This process for commenting is combined of the requirement for master plan development (Decree 05/2013/TT-BKHDT) about asking for comments from related ministries and the practice of the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism about asking for comments twice and from international experts.

At the end of 2008, the Master plan on tourism development in NMM was approved by the Minister of the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism according to the Decision No. 91/2008/QĐ - BVHTTDL on 30/12/2008. This was the first regional master plan which played a significant role in building the awareness of the importance of future regional plans on tourism. However, there are still some shortcomings in the execution of the Plan.

As a regional plan, the Master Plan on tourism development in NMM has been considered to be a basis for provinces to do research to build their own master plans on tourism development. This is also a compulsory requirement when other plans in lower levels are composed in order to guarantee the system and unity of legal documents.

“Our plan has become the legal basis for other plans, rather than professional basis”

[Interview with a member of the plan’s drafting team]

However, the Plan is mostly known, researched and consulted by professionals who are responsible for building plans in provinces in response to legal requirements. Some tourism management offices in many provinces in the region are not aware of contents of this plan because the master plan has not been largely announced.

Besides the role of orientation and legal basis, the feasibility of this plan is not clearly seen. This is firstly because besides orientation contents, development objectives and solutions discussed in the plan are also orientating. The execution of the plan also does not have evaluation tools. Meanwhile, provinces in the region continue to build their own master plans on tourism development to make a basis for orientating and managing tourism in their provinces. The overlap in scope and contents has resulted in the fact that executers will focus on their Provincial plans (composed suitably for regional) rather than the regional plans.

Another issue affecting the feasibility of the Plan is the role of regional plan organization and management authorities. Theoretically, the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism is to approve and the organization authorities are to and executive the plan. However, in terms of functions, provinces are to directly manage tourism development in their own regions. Plans are assigned by the Government (doing guidelines of the General Party). The West Northern Management Board is instructed by the Party and the Government to develop the socio economy, defence and security of NMM, including developing tourism. However, the Management Board provides local authorities and industries with consultation, orientation and instruction for execution. It is not the body of direct management and execution. Although many



bodies are related to the instruction for execution of the master plan on tourism development, no one manages the execution directly.

“The biggest challenge is the management of the plans. There is a Board of Management in West Northern region, but it only manages general issues instead direct management of the plans. Although the regional plan is finished, local areas manage the execution in their own way.”

[Interview with a member of the plan’s drafting team]

Who is to approve of the plan is also another issue when it comes to the feasibility of the Plan. In terms of interprovincial tourism plans and inter-disciplinary characteristics of tourism, it is essential that the Prime Minister approves of and publishes the plan to increase the feasibility of the plan.

*“If the plan is issued by ministerial level, the efficiency of its execution is reduced. The plan for tourism development in Ban Gioc waterfall approved by the Prime Minister is different. If the 2008 plan had been issued by the Prime Minister, it the implementation would surely better instead of being currently considered as a legal basis.”*

[Interview with a member of the plan’s drafting team]

Besides direct impacts of the plans which are not fully acknowledged, some other impacts of these policies are:

- Enhancing the awareness of leaders of all levels of the necessity of planning a master plan on tourism development. The process of researching and building plans confirms this necessity.

- Composing the plan is a process of “learning and perfecting” from knowledge, contents, process and methods of executing the plans. In fact, the process of making plans in general has been improved from methods, contents to the execution, from instructions of management bodies to experiences of plan makers.

## **4 Summary and discussion from the case study**

### **4.1 Review of the case study**

The Master plan on tourism development in the northern highland and mountainous area toward 2020 was composed to meet certain requirements of making policies, implementing an important guideline of the Party and the Government in developing socio economy, defence and security of NMM. When being issued, this

Plan was the first regional plan of tourism development, reflecting the initiative of orientating policies for developing tourism in the region. Although the contents and effectiveness of the plan still have some shortcomings, the importance of the Master plan of tourism development in NMM in the system of tourism development policies in general and in tourism plans in general can not be denied.

The Master plan on tourism development in NMM in 2008 is a typical example of perfecting methods and contents of the policy in the process of “doing and learning from experiences” of policy makers. The process of building the Plan in 2008 included basic steps of composing, verifying, approving but did not complete all those steps. The step of composing did not survey, evaluate and analyze updated information, which is a crucial component. The analysis based on experiences does not help policy makers to be aware of the reality of dynamic and diversified development as well as realistic requirements of policy contents. Therefore, there are not many pioneering orientation and innovation in these policies while this is a crucial component of policies. The process of verifying and approving is restricted to the internal process, limiting the reality of policies as well as the ability of publishing and integrating into people’s life.

The second problem of the Master plan is that the roles and participation of related parties have not been taken into consideration. Due to the lack of the participation of related parties, from providing information, forming ideas, verifying and publishing plans, ideas and contents of the plan are not relevant to the reality, and the process of making policies is not known to the public. The lack of participation of related parties has also made policies unrealistic.

The third problem is the scope of policies and authorities of policy issuers. The master plan of tourism development of NMM is approved by the Minister. However, due to the wide scope of policy impacts related to many socio-economic industries and ministries, the execution of policies has encountered many difficulties. The plan is executed in an area without a complete administrative management system, the regional level. This has created many challenges for combining objectives of regional tourism plans and objectives of independent socio-economic development of each region.

Two main reasons for shortcomings in the 2008 plan are limitations in the process of organizing and resources for policy making. For policies such as planning (including master plan on socio-economic development and industry plan), policy making has to be done regularly by different authorities. In fact, plans have been more and more effective in Vietnamese socio-economic development. However, the lack of definite instructions in making, verifying and approving of plans has led to different awareness

and execution of these plans. Many plans are not suitable for realistic conditions. This problem has been basically solved thanks to the **issuance** of Circular No. 05/2013/TT-BKHĐT on 31/10/2013 the Ministry of Planning and Investment instructing the process of making, verifying, approving of, amending and publishing the master plan on socio-economic development; and plan on the development of major industry and products.

Policies are executed slowly and ineffectively in response to requirements of the society due to the lack of resources for making policies. Policy making has to be based on an updated data base and scientific analysis so that policy makers are fully aware of the exact reality and future tendencies. However, insufficient attention has been paid to research activities. For example, in the Master plan on tourism development of NMM in 2008, there was a lack of investment expenditure as well as other resources. After the Circular No. 03/2008/TT-BKH on 1/7/2008 of the Ministry of Planning and Investment guiding the execution of some articles of Decree No. 04/2008/NĐ-CP on 11/01/2008 of the Government was issued, the investment on making plans was clearly identified and gradually met research requirements of plan making.

#### **4.2 Discussions from the case study**

The case study of the master plan on tourism development in the Midlands and the Northern mountainous areas in 2008 has come up with some interesting findings.

*Firstly*, the process of making policies is a process of learning, “learning by doing” to improve methods, contents and competence of policy makers. The process of developing policies is parallel to the process of improving awareness and competence of the society as well as policy makers. In this process, methods and procedures play a crucial role. A clear and definite procedure will be able to overcome limitations of awareness and competence of policy makers and related participants.

Composing documents regarding methods of designing policies is the process of learning from experiences and improving policies from practical requirements. To make this process effective, it is essential to establish channels of feedback information and policy performance evaluation.

With pioneering requirements of policies, specialists and researchers are essential. Researching the process of designing policies to identify necessary information and data should always be a compulsory requirement for the policy making. Designing policies should also be parallel evaluating requirements of supply (management levels) and demand (managers) as well as evaluating policy performance results so that these policies are constantly improved.

*Secondly*, the case study confirms inevitable roles of related parties in designing policies. These roles are reflected in steps of designing policies. From the first step of basic research, related parties are valuable, reliable and updated source of information, allowing researchers and policy makers to clearly identify the reality and problems of policies. The process of building orientation and content of policies has to be discussed by related parties to get pioneering and practical ideas. The participation of related parties is essential in the process of verifying the feasibility of these policies. Meanwhile, the process of approving of appropriate related parties allow policies to be rapidly published and executed.

Designing policies of Vietnam has seen more intensive participations of parties, which has resulted from social awareness of roles and impacts of policies on life. Policies have more direct impacts on people and related parties have to pay more attention to policies from the designing process. Moreover, competence and power of participants have been improved a lot. They are aware of the necessity of participating in the process of designing policies, competence and methods of participating effectively in the process. Therefore, in tourism, the participation of parties in planning ideas has been more specific and clearer.

(In the process of designing the plan) “nowadays, some local areas demand to be added to the list of National Tourist Sites because they will be branded and will get access to lots of infrastructure support. The designers have to investigate, verify and clarify orientations, potentials, investment requirements, and necessities of being enlisted to the National Tourist Sites to manage resources.”

[Interview with a member of the plan’s drafting team]

These are positive improvements in designing policies. However, it is necessary to take into consideration its negative aspects if they are not well managed. The participation in the process of designing policies requires competence, information and even power of each party. If the process of designing policies is not effective, less powerful participants will be restricted in giving opinions while in many cases they are the most sensitive to policy impacts. It is essential to make idea forming mechanisms and channels transparent and “friendly”, which will allow effective participation of parties, and get rid of the mechanism of “application - approval” in the process of designing policies.

*Thirdly*, decision makers play an important role in implementing policies. Normally, the implementation of policies depends on power of major issuers. However, in

Vietnam nowadays, this implementation which is done by many authorities, industries and local areas is sometimes ineffective, resulting in the fact that “those issuing policies will have to implement them”. Therefore, policy issuers have become more and more important.

Before improving the efficiency of each party, in order for policies to be implemented effectively, these policies must be issued and instructed by appropriate authorities. In the long term, it is necessary to reinforce conversational and cooperational mechanism among government bodies of equal levels, so that not all policies must be issued and instructed by the highest level authority. For the sectors related to other sectors, like tourism, the approval agencies of the the sectors’ development master plans must have capacity to monitor and dominate all implementing agencies and authorities.

*Last but not least*, planning policies need to be time efficient. The process of designing policies are more specific and has set more requirements. Due to multiple steps, designing, verifying and approving policies have taken so much time, reducing the efficiency and topicality of these policies. It is essential to accommodate a reasonable process to resources and time in designing policies.

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## Appendix 1: Some targets of Vietnam and NMM tourism development in 2001-2010


No.	Target	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
I	The whole country										
1	International tourists (1000 turns)	2.330	2.628	2.428	2.927,9	3.477,5	3.583,5	4.229,4	4.235,8	3.772,3 6	5.049,8 55
2	Domestic tourists (1000 turns)	11.700	13.000	13.500	14.500	16.000	17.500	19.200	20.500	25.000	28.000
3	Total tourism revenues (thousands of billions)	20,5	23,0	22,0	26,0	30,0	51,0	56,0	60,0	85,6	98,1
4	Industry labourers (people)	150.66 2	196.87 3	208.77 7	241.68 5	275.12 8	310.67 5	391.17 7	424.74 0	440.27 7	478.065
5	Accommodation providers (providers)	4.366	4.773	5.620	6.567	7.603	8.516	9.633	10.638	11.314	12.089
	- Rooms	86.809	95.003	110.63 9	129.13 7	150.10 5	150.10 5	189.43 6	205.97 9	219.60 5	236.747
II	NMM										

1	International tourists (1000 turns)	263,94 9	330,84 7	285,59 2	367,70 8	396,64 5	423,79 2	506,46 7	917,66 4	999, 572	1.200,3 27
2	Domestic tourists (1000 turns)	1.070,9 61	1.548,4 51	1.911,1 83	2.523,2 59	3.199,0 65	3.971,3 50	5.158,1 08	5.508,4 00	6.048,6 12	6.201,0 93
3	Total tourism revenues (thousands of billions)	428,57	531	756	1.016	1.288	1.702	2.118	2.556	3.530	3.578
3	Industry labourers (people)	6.969	7.988	9.912	12.061	11.660	15.395	17.489	19.929	22.044	25.183
4	Accommodation providers (providers)	349	475	614	915	926	1.161	1.324	1.539	1.684	1.848
	- Rooms	5.147	6.328	8.268	12.166	12.801	11.671	18.217	23.110	22.072	24.273

Source: Institute of Tourism Development Research, 2012, *Plan on Vietnam Tourism Development in 2010-2020*




**Figure 1: Number of international tourist to Vietnam and the northern highland and mountainous area in 2001-2010**



Source: Institute of Tourism Research and Development, 2012

**Figure 1: Number of domestic tourist to Vietnam and the northern highland and mountainous area in 2001-2010**



Nguồn: Viện Nghiên cứu và Phát triển Du lịch, 2012

**Table 2: Number of local touristic turns to Vietnam and NMM in 2001-2010**

Source: Institute of Tourism Research and Development, 2012